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丕賱毓賯賱 : 賲丿禺賱 賲賵噩夭
丕賱毓丿丿 343 賲賳 爻賱爻賱丞 毓丕賱賲 丕賱賲毓乇賮丞
262 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2004
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2,314 people want to read
About the author
John Rogers Searle
72听books355听followersJohn Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado) is an American philosopher and was the Slusser Professor of Philosophy and Mills Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley). Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy, he was the first tenured professor to join the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley. He received the Jean Nicod Prize in 2000, and the National Humanities Medal in 2004.
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June 13, 2024
讴鬲丕亘 丿乇丌賲丿蹖 讴賵鬲丕賴 亘賴 匕賴賳貙 丕孬乇 噩丕賳 爻乇賱 賵 亘賴 鬲乇噩賲賴 賲丨賲丿 蹖賵爻賮蹖貙 鬲賵爻胤 賳卮乇 賳蹖 亘賴 趩丕倬 乇爻蹖丿賴 讴賴 賲丿鬲鈥屬囏ж池� 鬲噩丿蹖丿 趩丕倬 賳卮丿賴 賵 賲賳 賳鬲賵賳爻鬲賲 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 倬蹖丿丕 讴賳賲 賲诏乇 鬲賵蹖 讴鬲丕亘禺賵賳賴鈥屬囏й� 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴.
丕诏乇 亘賴 賲賵囟賵毓 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 毓賱丕賯賲賳丿 賴爻鬲蹖丿貙 亘賴 賳馗乇賲 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 卮乇賵毓 禺賵亘蹖 賳蹖爻鬲. 蹖毓賳蹖 丕诏乇 蹖讴 爻乇蹖 丕夭 賲賵囟賵毓丕鬲 乇賵 賯亘賱丕賸 卮賳蹖丿蹖丿貙 丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 亘蹖卮鬲乇蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖鈥屫堎嗃屫� 亘亘乇蹖丿.
讴鬲丕亘貙 卮丕賲賱 蹖丕夭丿賴 賮氐賱 賴爻鬲.
爻乇賱 鬲賵蹖 賮氐賱 丕賵賱 亘賴 爻賳鬲 亘蹖卮鬲乇 讴鬲亘 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳貙 亘丨孬 禺賵丿卮 乇賵 丕夭 鬲卮乇蹖丨 賳馗乇丕鬲 丿讴丕乇鬲 卮乇賵毓 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 賵 丿賵诏丕賳賴鈥屫з嗂ж臂� 噩賵賴乇蹖 賵 蹖丕 丿賵诏丕賳賴鈥屫з嗂ж臂� 丿讴丕乇鬲蹖 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴. 丕夭 丿賱 丕蹖賳 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 丿賵诏丕賳賴鈥屫з嗂ж必з嗁囏� 蹖丕夭丿賴 賲爻卅賱賴 丕爻丕爻蹖 丕蹖噩丕丿 賲蹖卮賴. 爻乇賱 鬲賱丕卮 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 丕蹖賳 蹖丕夭丿賴 鬲丕 丕蹖乇丕丿 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 亘丿賴. 丕蹖賳 賳賯胤賴 亘爻蹖丕乇 賲賴賲蹖 鬲賵蹖 讴鬲丕亘賴. 丕诏乇 丕蹖賳 蹖丕夭丿賴 賳讴鬲賴 賵 賳賯丿 賮賴賲蹖丿賴 亘卮賴貙 卮賲丕 亘丕 丕氐賱 噩丕賳 丌賳趩賴 讴賴 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 丿乇 鬲賱丕卮賴 乇丕噩毓 亘賴卮 亘丨孬 讴賳賴貙 賲賵丕噩賴 賲蹖鈥屫篡屫�.
鬲賵蹖 賮氐賱 丿賵賲 爻乇賱 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴 讴賴 趩賴鈥屫焚堌� 賵 亘賴 趩賴 賳丨賵蹖 噩丕賲毓賴 毓賱賲蹖 丕夭 丿賵诏丕賳賴鈥屫з嗂ж臂� 亘賴 爻賲鬲 賲丕丿蹖鈥屭必й屰� 趩乇禺蹖丿. 丕蹖賳噩丕 爻乇賱 丕賳賵丕毓 乇賮鬲丕乇诏乇丕蹖蹖 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴 賵 丕蹖賳 讴賴 趩賴 胤賵乇 丕夭 乇賮鬲丕乇诏乇丕蹖蹖 乇丕丿蹖讴丕賱 亘賴 讴丕乇讴乇丿诏乇丕蹖蹖 賵 賳馗乇蹖丕鬲 賴賵卮 賲氐賳賵毓蹖 乇爻蹖丿蹖賲.
鬲賵蹖 賮氐賱 爻賵賲 丿乇 丨丕賱蹖 讴賴 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 丕丨爻丕爻 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 賴賲賴 趩蹖夭 賲賳胤賯蹖 丨賱 卮丿賴貙 爻乇賱 賳賯丿鈥屬囏й屰� 讴賴 亘賴 賲丕丿蹖鈥屭必й屰� 賵 賳馗乇蹖丕鬲 賲胤乇丨 卮丿賴 讴賴 卮丕賲賱 賳賯丿鈥屬囏й� 禺賵丿卮 賵 讴爻丕賳蹖 賲孬賱 讴乇蹖倬讴蹖 賴爻鬲 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж操�.
丕夭 賮氐賱 趩賴丕乇賲 鬲丕 賮氐賱 丌禺乇 讴鬲丕亘貙 噩丕蹖蹖賴 讴賴 爻乇賱 卮乇賵毓 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 亘賴 亘乇乇爻蹖 倬丕爻禺鈥屬囏й� 禺丕氐 亘賴 賴乇 爻賵丕賱 蹖毓賳蹖 丿乇 賴乇 賮氐賱 亘賴 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 蹖丕夭丿賴 賲卮讴賱 丕爻丕爻蹖 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж操�. 丿乇 丕蹖賳 亘蹖賳 噩賵丕亘 賴丕蹖 禺賵丿卮 賵 氐賵乇鬲鈥屫ㄙ嗀� 禺賵丿卮 丕夭 賲爻卅賱賴 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴. 賴乇 趩賴鈥屬傌� 讴賴 爻乇賱 賲賵賮賯 卮丿賴 丕蹖丿賴鈥屬囏й� 丿蹖诏乇 丕賮乇丕丿 乇賵 丿賯蹖賯 賵 爻丕丿賴 鬲賵囟蹖丨 亘丿賴貙 丕賳诏丕乇 趩賳蹖賳 鬲賱丕卮蹖 乇賵 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖丿賴鈥屬囏й� 禺賵丿卮 賳讴乇丿賴 賵 讴鬲丕亘 丕夭 賮氐賱 趩賴丕乇賲 亘賴 亘毓丿 賮賳蹖鈥屫� 賵 亘賴 胤亘毓 丿賯蹖賯鈥屫� 賲蹖卮賴 讴賴 賮賴賲卮 乇賵 丿卮賵丕乇鬲乇 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁�.
賳賯丿蹖 讴賴 亘賴 丌乇丕蹖 爻乇賱 賵丕乇丿賴 丕蹖賳賴 讴賴 亘賴 賳馗乇 賲蹖鈥屫必迟� 丿乇 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 賳賯丕胤 賲乇鬲讴亘 賴賲丕賳 趩蹖夭蹖 卮丿賴 讴賴 賳賯丿卮 讴乇丿賴. 賵 氐乇賮丕賸 亘丕 丕丿亘蹖丕鬲蹖 丿蹖诏乇 賴賲賵賳 诏賮鬲丕乇 乇賵 亘丕夭鬲賵賱蹖丿 讴乇丿賴.
丿乇 丌禺乇 丕诏乇 丿賵爻鬲 丿丕乇蹖丿 丿乇 丨賵夭賴 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 亘禺賵丕賳蹖丿 亘賴鬲乇賴 丕夭 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 卮乇賵毓 賳讴賳蹖丿. 趩賵賳 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 氐丕丨亘 賳馗乇 丕爻鬲 賵 亘賴 胤亘毓 亘禺卮 丕毓馗賲蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 亘賴 鬲賵囟蹖丨 丕蹖丿賴鈥屬囏й� 卮禺氐蹖 禺賵丿卮 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴 讴賴 趩蹖夭 睾蹖乇 胤亘蹖毓蹖 賴賲 賳蹖爻鬲. 丿乇 賲賯丕亘賱 亘賴鬲乇賴 丕夭 讴鬲亘蹖 卮乇賵毓 讴賳蹖丿 讴賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 鬲賱丕卮 讴乇丿賴 亘蹖卮鬲乇 丕蹖丿賴鈥屬囏й� 丿蹖诏乇 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 亘丿賴. 丕鬲賮丕賯蹖 讴賴 鬲賵蹖 爻賴 賮氐賱 丕亘鬲丿丕蹖蹖 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇禺 賲蹖丿賴. 賲孬賱 讴鬲丕亘 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 丨爻蹖賳 卮蹖禺 乇囟丕蹖蹖 賵 丕賲蹖乇 丕丨爻丕賳 讴乇亘丕爻蹖 夭丕丿賴.
丕诏乇 亘賴 賲賵囟賵毓 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 毓賱丕賯賲賳丿 賴爻鬲蹖丿貙 亘賴 賳馗乇賲 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 卮乇賵毓 禺賵亘蹖 賳蹖爻鬲. 蹖毓賳蹖 丕诏乇 蹖讴 爻乇蹖 丕夭 賲賵囟賵毓丕鬲 乇賵 賯亘賱丕賸 卮賳蹖丿蹖丿貙 丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 亘蹖卮鬲乇蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖鈥屫堎嗃屫� 亘亘乇蹖丿.
讴鬲丕亘貙 卮丕賲賱 蹖丕夭丿賴 賮氐賱 賴爻鬲.
爻乇賱 鬲賵蹖 賮氐賱 丕賵賱 亘賴 爻賳鬲 亘蹖卮鬲乇 讴鬲亘 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳貙 亘丨孬 禺賵丿卮 乇賵 丕夭 鬲卮乇蹖丨 賳馗乇丕鬲 丿讴丕乇鬲 卮乇賵毓 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 賵 丿賵诏丕賳賴鈥屫з嗂ж臂� 噩賵賴乇蹖 賵 蹖丕 丿賵诏丕賳賴鈥屫з嗂ж臂� 丿讴丕乇鬲蹖 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴. 丕夭 丿賱 丕蹖賳 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 丿賵诏丕賳賴鈥屫з嗂ж必з嗁囏� 蹖丕夭丿賴 賲爻卅賱賴 丕爻丕爻蹖 丕蹖噩丕丿 賲蹖卮賴. 爻乇賱 鬲賱丕卮 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 丕蹖賳 蹖丕夭丿賴 鬲丕 丕蹖乇丕丿 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 亘丿賴. 丕蹖賳 賳賯胤賴 亘爻蹖丕乇 賲賴賲蹖 鬲賵蹖 讴鬲丕亘賴. 丕诏乇 丕蹖賳 蹖丕夭丿賴 賳讴鬲賴 賵 賳賯丿 賮賴賲蹖丿賴 亘卮賴貙 卮賲丕 亘丕 丕氐賱 噩丕賳 丌賳趩賴 讴賴 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 丿乇 鬲賱丕卮賴 乇丕噩毓 亘賴卮 亘丨孬 讴賳賴貙 賲賵丕噩賴 賲蹖鈥屫篡屫�.
鬲賵蹖 賮氐賱 丿賵賲 爻乇賱 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴 讴賴 趩賴鈥屫焚堌� 賵 亘賴 趩賴 賳丨賵蹖 噩丕賲毓賴 毓賱賲蹖 丕夭 丿賵诏丕賳賴鈥屫з嗂ж臂� 亘賴 爻賲鬲 賲丕丿蹖鈥屭必й屰� 趩乇禺蹖丿. 丕蹖賳噩丕 爻乇賱 丕賳賵丕毓 乇賮鬲丕乇诏乇丕蹖蹖 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴 賵 丕蹖賳 讴賴 趩賴 胤賵乇 丕夭 乇賮鬲丕乇诏乇丕蹖蹖 乇丕丿蹖讴丕賱 亘賴 讴丕乇讴乇丿诏乇丕蹖蹖 賵 賳馗乇蹖丕鬲 賴賵卮 賲氐賳賵毓蹖 乇爻蹖丿蹖賲.
鬲賵蹖 賮氐賱 爻賵賲 丿乇 丨丕賱蹖 讴賴 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 丕丨爻丕爻 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 賴賲賴 趩蹖夭 賲賳胤賯蹖 丨賱 卮丿賴貙 爻乇賱 賳賯丿鈥屬囏й屰� 讴賴 亘賴 賲丕丿蹖鈥屭必й屰� 賵 賳馗乇蹖丕鬲 賲胤乇丨 卮丿賴 讴賴 卮丕賲賱 賳賯丿鈥屬囏й� 禺賵丿卮 賵 讴爻丕賳蹖 賲孬賱 讴乇蹖倬讴蹖 賴爻鬲 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж操�.
丕夭 賮氐賱 趩賴丕乇賲 鬲丕 賮氐賱 丌禺乇 讴鬲丕亘貙 噩丕蹖蹖賴 讴賴 爻乇賱 卮乇賵毓 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 亘賴 亘乇乇爻蹖 倬丕爻禺鈥屬囏й� 禺丕氐 亘賴 賴乇 爻賵丕賱 蹖毓賳蹖 丿乇 賴乇 賮氐賱 亘賴 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 蹖丕夭丿賴 賲卮讴賱 丕爻丕爻蹖 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж操�. 丿乇 丕蹖賳 亘蹖賳 噩賵丕亘 賴丕蹖 禺賵丿卮 賵 氐賵乇鬲鈥屫ㄙ嗀� 禺賵丿卮 丕夭 賲爻卅賱賴 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴. 賴乇 趩賴鈥屬傌� 讴賴 爻乇賱 賲賵賮賯 卮丿賴 丕蹖丿賴鈥屬囏й� 丿蹖诏乇 丕賮乇丕丿 乇賵 丿賯蹖賯 賵 爻丕丿賴 鬲賵囟蹖丨 亘丿賴貙 丕賳诏丕乇 趩賳蹖賳 鬲賱丕卮蹖 乇賵 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖丿賴鈥屬囏й� 禺賵丿卮 賳讴乇丿賴 賵 讴鬲丕亘 丕夭 賮氐賱 趩賴丕乇賲 亘賴 亘毓丿 賮賳蹖鈥屫� 賵 亘賴 胤亘毓 丿賯蹖賯鈥屫� 賲蹖卮賴 讴賴 賮賴賲卮 乇賵 丿卮賵丕乇鬲乇 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁�.
賳賯丿蹖 讴賴 亘賴 丌乇丕蹖 爻乇賱 賵丕乇丿賴 丕蹖賳賴 讴賴 亘賴 賳馗乇 賲蹖鈥屫必迟� 丿乇 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 賳賯丕胤 賲乇鬲讴亘 賴賲丕賳 趩蹖夭蹖 卮丿賴 讴賴 賳賯丿卮 讴乇丿賴. 賵 氐乇賮丕賸 亘丕 丕丿亘蹖丕鬲蹖 丿蹖诏乇 賴賲賵賳 诏賮鬲丕乇 乇賵 亘丕夭鬲賵賱蹖丿 讴乇丿賴.
丿乇 丌禺乇 丕诏乇 丿賵爻鬲 丿丕乇蹖丿 丿乇 丨賵夭賴 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 亘禺賵丕賳蹖丿 亘賴鬲乇賴 丕夭 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 卮乇賵毓 賳讴賳蹖丿. 趩賵賳 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 氐丕丨亘 賳馗乇 丕爻鬲 賵 亘賴 胤亘毓 亘禺卮 丕毓馗賲蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 亘賴 鬲賵囟蹖丨 丕蹖丿賴鈥屬囏й� 卮禺氐蹖 禺賵丿卮 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴 讴賴 趩蹖夭 睾蹖乇 胤亘蹖毓蹖 賴賲 賳蹖爻鬲. 丿乇 賲賯丕亘賱 亘賴鬲乇賴 丕夭 讴鬲亘蹖 卮乇賵毓 讴賳蹖丿 讴賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 鬲賱丕卮 讴乇丿賴 亘蹖卮鬲乇 丕蹖丿賴鈥屬囏й� 丿蹖诏乇 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 亘丿賴. 丕鬲賮丕賯蹖 讴賴 鬲賵蹖 爻賴 賮氐賱 丕亘鬲丿丕蹖蹖 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇禺 賲蹖丿賴. 賲孬賱 讴鬲丕亘 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 丨爻蹖賳 卮蹖禺 乇囟丕蹖蹖 賵 丕賲蹖乇 丕丨爻丕賳 讴乇亘丕爻蹖 夭丕丿賴.
November 6, 2009
The question of the mind is a convoluted mess. Until recently I'd not given too much thought to the whole mind/body question, it's one of those questions that continental philosophy just doesn't give too much attention to. There are intersubjective questions like The Other, and that gets played out quite a bit, but to get into the real logical / science of it all is just something left to those unsexy analytical eggheads.
The ridiculousness of the question is that it's based on a bunch of assumptions that have been fought over to logical death for the past few hundred years, and no one outside of philosophers really give a shit about the question. Just take the perception part of the mind problem, there are a great many philosophers, really smart men (I don't know of any women who said these things), who believe we don't see the world, but only some sense of the world, that may or may not be an accurate representation of the world, that may or may not even be there, but could be, or could just be an idea in our minds, based on the fact that when we look at a coin at different angles the shape can change from being a circle to being elliptical, and that a table can look differently depending on if you are on one side, or crouch down at eye-level with it, or standing above it. Because these things look different it means that we don't see the thing it-self, but only some kind of impression of it, that is only our perception and not the thing-it-self (roughly). A five year old has the cognitive ability to realize that changing ones point of view makes something look different but doesn't change the thing, and that it is impossible to see anything from all sides and perspectives at once.
When you read grown men arguing about this stuff, and proving that this means something, one wonders why half of the philosophical world just threw their hands up, called an end to philosophy and went literary with no regard for the logic that can make otherwise intelligent people seriously believe things like this.
One can blame Descartes for all of this, and then Hume who brought a certain logical paradox between a person and their relationship to the world that got taken as being a true psychological or mental state instead of being a problem (even though Hume probably thought he was right and was describing the mind as it was, or maybe not, I don't know).
Searle's book is an attempt to clear out all of the bullshit that the questions of the mind have resulted in to, and give his own interpretation of the problem and it's solution. He does a nice job of clearing away the rubble of centuries of misguided formulations of the problems, and shoots lots of holes in contemporary attempts to solve the nature of the mind problem, but I have no idea if his solution is any better. This isn't the kind of book where he goes into enough detail for me to know that.
Instead of the title the book has, it should be called, Mind: A Brief Introduction to John Searle's Take on the Mind, not that this is a problem, it's just not shall I say an unbiased look at the mind problem.
From my own opinions and knowledge, I think that Searle might be partly right about the mind problem, but I think that there is something missing in his view, and maybe in his other works he gives a clearer explanation, or a more detailed description of what he actually thinks.
I, of course, have my own unfounded opinion about the solution to problems brought up in this book, but I have no proof, and I'm sure other people have thought of my ideas first, and I'm just going to keep it to myself for now, because it's much more fun playing with the logic in my head and trying to figure out how to put it into words at this point.
One thing that I think is missing in this book is any real focus on memory. It's brought up from time to time, but a few of the topics could have been expanded further by going into what Searle thinks memory is. The only time he really uses memory is in the chapter about the self, where I found it problematic. Is memory really a necessary condition to our knowledge of our self? Don't other people have a say in our conception of believing ourselves to be a self? I'm thinking of an extreme example, but recently I saw a documentary about a guy who just suddenly lost all memory of who he was, and he filmed himself on his quest to find out who he was. Is this man a new person? A different self? What about the people who knew him before, do they see him as the same person? There are problems that arise in this documentary that don't seem adequately covered in criteria of 'self-hood' that Searle plays with.
A second problem was in his distinction of conscious and unconscious states. He dismisses the unconscious, which could be ok, but puts certain things that one would say are unconscious in a non-conscious part of the mind, such as breathing and natural functions that happen regardless of what we are thinking about. This is fine, but the line he draws is too cut and dry since ones consciousness can move into the non-conscious part of the mind with the right focus, or training or whatever you want to call it. Think Buddhist monks that can cause radical shifts in their body through meditation, bringing their pulse and breathing down to really low levels, or if you don't like the Eastern kind of example, then how about military trained snipers, who learn to control their body to get a better shot in between heartbeats and breathing? The point of these two examples is that the functions of the mind that Searle designates as non-conscious can in fact be consciously controlled in the right situations, which in the scope of the chapter in this book, means that the realm of consciousness is possibly farther reaching, or at least more dynamic than he is acknowledging. Which means (I think) that there is a more complex system at work than the simplified duality he posits (which one could draw an analogy to being similar to the mind/body duality he is (I think) successfully arguing against in the first half of the book. It's almost as if when we enter into the realm where science hasn't quite gotten the whole story on what is happening that Searle is reverting to the phantoms of either/or thinking that limit problem in such a way that the entire premise, or assumptions could be faulty.
I'm kind of rambling, I started this review feeling awake, and now I'm feeling like sleeping. I apologize if some of the last two paragraphs make no sense. I'll probably try to clarify some of what I'm thinking in my blog in the near future.
The ridiculousness of the question is that it's based on a bunch of assumptions that have been fought over to logical death for the past few hundred years, and no one outside of philosophers really give a shit about the question. Just take the perception part of the mind problem, there are a great many philosophers, really smart men (I don't know of any women who said these things), who believe we don't see the world, but only some sense of the world, that may or may not be an accurate representation of the world, that may or may not even be there, but could be, or could just be an idea in our minds, based on the fact that when we look at a coin at different angles the shape can change from being a circle to being elliptical, and that a table can look differently depending on if you are on one side, or crouch down at eye-level with it, or standing above it. Because these things look different it means that we don't see the thing it-self, but only some kind of impression of it, that is only our perception and not the thing-it-self (roughly). A five year old has the cognitive ability to realize that changing ones point of view makes something look different but doesn't change the thing, and that it is impossible to see anything from all sides and perspectives at once.
When you read grown men arguing about this stuff, and proving that this means something, one wonders why half of the philosophical world just threw their hands up, called an end to philosophy and went literary with no regard for the logic that can make otherwise intelligent people seriously believe things like this.
One can blame Descartes for all of this, and then Hume who brought a certain logical paradox between a person and their relationship to the world that got taken as being a true psychological or mental state instead of being a problem (even though Hume probably thought he was right and was describing the mind as it was, or maybe not, I don't know).
Searle's book is an attempt to clear out all of the bullshit that the questions of the mind have resulted in to, and give his own interpretation of the problem and it's solution. He does a nice job of clearing away the rubble of centuries of misguided formulations of the problems, and shoots lots of holes in contemporary attempts to solve the nature of the mind problem, but I have no idea if his solution is any better. This isn't the kind of book where he goes into enough detail for me to know that.
Instead of the title the book has, it should be called, Mind: A Brief Introduction to John Searle's Take on the Mind, not that this is a problem, it's just not shall I say an unbiased look at the mind problem.
From my own opinions and knowledge, I think that Searle might be partly right about the mind problem, but I think that there is something missing in his view, and maybe in his other works he gives a clearer explanation, or a more detailed description of what he actually thinks.
I, of course, have my own unfounded opinion about the solution to problems brought up in this book, but I have no proof, and I'm sure other people have thought of my ideas first, and I'm just going to keep it to myself for now, because it's much more fun playing with the logic in my head and trying to figure out how to put it into words at this point.
One thing that I think is missing in this book is any real focus on memory. It's brought up from time to time, but a few of the topics could have been expanded further by going into what Searle thinks memory is. The only time he really uses memory is in the chapter about the self, where I found it problematic. Is memory really a necessary condition to our knowledge of our self? Don't other people have a say in our conception of believing ourselves to be a self? I'm thinking of an extreme example, but recently I saw a documentary about a guy who just suddenly lost all memory of who he was, and he filmed himself on his quest to find out who he was. Is this man a new person? A different self? What about the people who knew him before, do they see him as the same person? There are problems that arise in this documentary that don't seem adequately covered in criteria of 'self-hood' that Searle plays with.
A second problem was in his distinction of conscious and unconscious states. He dismisses the unconscious, which could be ok, but puts certain things that one would say are unconscious in a non-conscious part of the mind, such as breathing and natural functions that happen regardless of what we are thinking about. This is fine, but the line he draws is too cut and dry since ones consciousness can move into the non-conscious part of the mind with the right focus, or training or whatever you want to call it. Think Buddhist monks that can cause radical shifts in their body through meditation, bringing their pulse and breathing down to really low levels, or if you don't like the Eastern kind of example, then how about military trained snipers, who learn to control their body to get a better shot in between heartbeats and breathing? The point of these two examples is that the functions of the mind that Searle designates as non-conscious can in fact be consciously controlled in the right situations, which in the scope of the chapter in this book, means that the realm of consciousness is possibly farther reaching, or at least more dynamic than he is acknowledging. Which means (I think) that there is a more complex system at work than the simplified duality he posits (which one could draw an analogy to being similar to the mind/body duality he is (I think) successfully arguing against in the first half of the book. It's almost as if when we enter into the realm where science hasn't quite gotten the whole story on what is happening that Searle is reverting to the phantoms of either/or thinking that limit problem in such a way that the entire premise, or assumptions could be faulty.
I'm kind of rambling, I started this review feeling awake, and now I'm feeling like sleeping. I apologize if some of the last two paragraphs make no sense. I'll probably try to clarify some of what I'm thinking in my blog in the near future.
December 7, 2023
This is a fascinating exposition of some of the primary issues pertaining to the philosophy of mind鈥攁nd these issues are head-spinning, to put it mildly. This book prompts endless questions and opens a series of rabbit-holes that lead off in all directions. Man, I feel dizzy pondering questions such as: How does consciousness arise from the material brain? Do we have free will, and what exactly is it? How can we even possibly have free will given the random aspect of quantum mechanics at the subatomic level of matter? These topics are challenging (and quite often frustrating) brain food for anyone.
December 17, 2016
兀賳丕 賲毓噩亘 亘爻賷乇賱 賮賷 丕賱毓賲賵賲貙 鬲毓噩亘賳賷 鬲丨賱賷賱丕鬲賴貙
賵賲賳賴噩賴 丕賱賯丕卅賲 毓賱賶 賲丨丕賰賲丞 丕賱賲爻賱賲丕鬲貙 賵廿毓丕丿丞 氐賷丕睾丞 丕賱賲卮丕賰賱 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷丞
丕爻鬲禺丿丕賲賴 賱賱賲賳胤賯 賵賵囟賵丨賴 . . 卮賷亍 賲賲鬲毓 丕賱丨賯賷賯丞
賲賱丕丨馗丕鬲 毓丕亘乇丞 毓賱賶 賴丕賲卮 丕賱賰鬲丕亘:
賮賷 乇丿 爻賷乇賱 毓賱賶 丕賱丨噩丞 丕賱賲爻鬲賲丿丞 賲賳 丕賱毓賱賲 囟丿 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞 賷賯賵賱:
"賮賷 胤賮賵賱鬲賷 賰丕賳鬲 丕賱賮乇賵丿賷丞 賵丕賱賲丕乇賰爻賷丞 兀賰孬乇 兀賳賵丕毓 丕賱賲睾丕賱胤丕鬲 丕賱兀氐賱賷丞
genetic fallacy
卮賷賵毓丕賸.
賴賱 鬲卮賰 賮賷 丨賯賷賯丞 丕賱賲丕乇賰爻賷丞責 = 賴匕丕 賷毓賳賷 兀賳 禺賱賮賷鬲賰 丕賱胤亘賯賷丞 丕賱亘乇噩賵丕夭賷丞 囟賱賱鬲賰.
賴賱 鬲卮賰 賮賷 丨賯賷賯丞 鬲毓丕賱賷賲 賮乇賵賷丿責 賴匕丕 賷亘乇賴賳 毓賱賶 兀賳賰 囟丨賷丞 賰亘鬲賰 丕賱卮禺氐賷."
丕賱丨噩丞 丕賱賲爻鬲賲丿丞 賲賳 丕賱毓賱賲 賱賳賯囟 賮賰乇丞 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞 (兀賵 廿丿乇丕賰賳丕 丕賱賲亘丕卮乇 賱賱毓丕賱賲) 鬲賯賵賱 亘亘爻丕胤丞: 廿賳 丕賱毓賲賱賷丕鬲 丕賱賳賷乇賵亘賷賵賱賵噩賷丞 賱賱丿賲丕睾 鬲爻亘亘 鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰貙 賵賱賰賳 丕賱卮賷亍 丕賱毓賯賱賷 丕賱賵丨賷丿 丕賱賲賵噩賵丿 賮賷 賵毓賷賳丕 賴賵 鬲賱賰 丕賱毓賲賱賷丕鬲貙 賵賱丕 賷賲賰賳 丕賱丕鬲氐丕賱 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰賷 丕賱賲亘丕卮乇 賲毓 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷.
乇丕爻賱 亘賷賯賵賱:
"丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞 鬲丐丿賷 廿賱賶 丕賱賮賷夭賷丕亍貙 賵丕賱賮賷夭賷丕亍 廿匕丕 氐丿賯鬲 鬲亘乇賴賳 毓賱賶 兀賳 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞 賰丕匕亘丞" 賷毓賳賷 賮賰乇丞 廿丿乇丕賰賳丕 丕賱賲亘丕卮乇 賱賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷 = 賲鬲賳丕賯囟丞 匕丕鬲賷丕貙 鬲賰匕亘 賳賮爻賴丕.
賷購毓賱賯 爻賷乇賱 亘廿賳 丕賱丨噩丞 丕賱賲爻鬲賲丿丞 賲賳 丕賱毓賱賲 賱丕 鬲賰匕亘 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞貙 賱兀賳 丕賱丨噩丞 鬲賯賵賱 廿賳賳丕 賱賵 賰賳丕 賯丕丿乇賷賳 賳賯丿賲 鬲賮爻賷乇 爻亘亘賷 賱廿丿乇丕賰 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱丨賯賷賯賷貙 廿匕賳 賮賱丕 賳爻鬲胤賷毓 廿丿乇丕賰 丕賱毓丕賱賲 . . 賮丕賱丨噩丞 亘鬲賯毓 賮賷 丕賱賲睾丕賱胤丞 丕賱兀氐賱賷丞 genetic fallacy貙 賵鬲賮鬲乇囟 兀賳 丕賱鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻亘亘賷 賱賲氐丿乇 丕賱賲毓鬲賯丿貙 賷賮爻乇 賰賷賮賷丞 丕賱丨氐賵賱 毓賱賶 丕賱賲毓鬲賯丿貙 廿匕賳 賮丕賱賲毓鬲賯丿 賰丕匕亘.
賷毓賳賷 賱賵 亘賳賯賵賱 廿賳 乇丐賷鬲賳丕 賱卮賷亍 兀賲丕賲 兀毓賷賳賳丕貙 賷丨丿孬 亘爻亘亘 廿賳毓賰丕爻 丕賱囟賵亍 丕賱賲爻亘亘 賱賱鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱亘氐乇賷丞貙 賮賰賱 賲丕 乇兀賷賳丕賴 賱賷爻 丕賱卮賷亍 廿賳賲丕 賴賵 鬲噩乇亘鬲賳丕 丕賱亘氐乇賷丞 丕賱賳丕鬲噩丞 毓賳 毓賲賱賷丕鬲 賳賷乇賵亘賷賵賱賵噩賷丞 . . 賱賰賳 丕賱鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻亘亘賷 賱乇丐賷丞 丕賱卮賷亍 兀賲丕賲 毓賳賷賳丕 賱丕 賷亘乇賴賳 廿賳賳丕 賱丕 賳乇賶 丕賱卮賷亍 賮毓賱丕 兀賲丕賲 毓賳賷賳丕貙 賮賷 賯賮夭丞 賮賷 丕賱亘乇賴丕賳 賵賴賷 賳賮爻賴丕 丕賱鬲賷 鬲購爻鬲禺丿賲 賱丿丨囟 丕賱賲毓鬲賯丿丕鬲 丕賱丿賷賳賷丞 兀賵 賮賰乇丞 丨乇賷丞 丕賱廿乇丕丿丞貙 賮賱賵 賯丕丿乇 兀賯丿賲 鬲賮爻賷乇 爻亘亘賷 (毓氐亘賷) 賱賲毓鬲賯丿賰 丕賱丿賷賳賷 兀賵 賱卮毓賵乇賰 亘丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱丨乇丞貙 廿匕賳 賲毓鬲賯丿賰 禺丕胤卅 兀賵 廿乇丕丿鬲賰 丕賱丨乇丞 睾賷乇 賲賵噩賵丿丞.
賱賲 賷賳爻 爻賷乇賱 毓賱賶 兀賳 賷賳亘賴 兀賳 賴匕賴 丕賱賲睾丕賱胤丞貙 賱丕 賷購爻賲毓 毓賳賴丕 丕賱丌賳 廿賱丕 賲賳 亘毓丿 丕賱丨丿丕孬賷賷賳!
==========
賲賳 丕賱賯賱卮 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷 丕賱賱胤賷賮 毓賱賶 丕賱賲丿乇爻丞 丕賱爻賱賵賰賷丞貙 賳賰鬲丞 亘鬲賯賵賱 廿賳 夭賵噩賷賳 亘毓丿 丕賳鬲賴丕亍賴賲 賲賳 賲賲丕乇爻丞 丕賱噩賳爻貙 丕賱夭賵噩 賯丕賱 賱夭賵噩鬲賴 賱賯丿 賰丕賳鬲 鬲噩乇亘丞 乇丕卅毓丞 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 (廿賱賷賰賽) 賰賷賮 賰丕賳鬲 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 (廿賱賷賾).
丕賱賲丿乇爻丞 丕賱爻賵賰賷丞 亘鬲賯锟斤拷乇丨 廿賳 丕賱卮賷亍 丕賱賵丨賷丿 丕賱賲賲賰賳 丿乇丕爻鬲賴 亘賲賵囟賵毓賷丞 賴賵 爻賱賵賰 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳貙 賲毓 廿賴賲丕賱 丕賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞貙 賮賮賷 乇賮囟賴丕 賱賱孬賳丕卅賷丞貨 鬲乇賮囟 丕賱爻賱賵賰賷丞 兀賷 卮賷亍 禺丕氐 亘丨丕賱丕鬲 亘丕胤賳賷丞貙 乇賵丨賷丞貙 毓賯賱賷丞 . . 賮兀賷 丕毓鬲賯丕丿 丿丕禺賱賷 毓賯賱賷 賷賲賰賳 丕禺鬲夭丕賱賴 賱爻賱锟斤拷賰 禺丕乇噩賷 兀賵 丕爻鬲毓丿丕丿 賱賱爻賱賵賰 賷賲賰賳 丿乇丕爻鬲賴 鬲噩乇賷亘賷賸丕貙 賮丕賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 賱賷爻 賱賴丕 賲毓賳賶 廿賳 賲賰賳卮 賱賴丕 賵噩賵丿 兀氐賱丕.
賮丕賱夭賵噩賷賳 丕賱爻賱賵賰賷賷賳 賲賲賰賳 賰賱 賵丕丨丿 賮賷賴賲 賷賱丕丨馗 爻賱賵賰 丕賱鬲丕賳賷 賵賷賯賵賱 賱賴 賴賵 賰丕賳 丨丕爻爻 亘廿賷賴!
賵賲賳賴噩賴 丕賱賯丕卅賲 毓賱賶 賲丨丕賰賲丞 丕賱賲爻賱賲丕鬲貙 賵廿毓丕丿丞 氐賷丕睾丞 丕賱賲卮丕賰賱 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷丞
丕爻鬲禺丿丕賲賴 賱賱賲賳胤賯 賵賵囟賵丨賴 . . 卮賷亍 賲賲鬲毓 丕賱丨賯賷賯丞
賲賱丕丨馗丕鬲 毓丕亘乇丞 毓賱賶 賴丕賲卮 丕賱賰鬲丕亘:
賮賷 乇丿 爻賷乇賱 毓賱賶 丕賱丨噩丞 丕賱賲爻鬲賲丿丞 賲賳 丕賱毓賱賲 囟丿 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞 賷賯賵賱:
"賮賷 胤賮賵賱鬲賷 賰丕賳鬲 丕賱賮乇賵丿賷丞 賵丕賱賲丕乇賰爻賷丞 兀賰孬乇 兀賳賵丕毓 丕賱賲睾丕賱胤丕鬲 丕賱兀氐賱賷丞
genetic fallacy
卮賷賵毓丕賸.
賴賱 鬲卮賰 賮賷 丨賯賷賯丞 丕賱賲丕乇賰爻賷丞責 = 賴匕丕 賷毓賳賷 兀賳 禺賱賮賷鬲賰 丕賱胤亘賯賷丞 丕賱亘乇噩賵丕夭賷丞 囟賱賱鬲賰.
賴賱 鬲卮賰 賮賷 丨賯賷賯丞 鬲毓丕賱賷賲 賮乇賵賷丿責 賴匕丕 賷亘乇賴賳 毓賱賶 兀賳賰 囟丨賷丞 賰亘鬲賰 丕賱卮禺氐賷."
丕賱丨噩丞 丕賱賲爻鬲賲丿丞 賲賳 丕賱毓賱賲 賱賳賯囟 賮賰乇丞 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞 (兀賵 廿丿乇丕賰賳丕 丕賱賲亘丕卮乇 賱賱毓丕賱賲) 鬲賯賵賱 亘亘爻丕胤丞: 廿賳 丕賱毓賲賱賷丕鬲 丕賱賳賷乇賵亘賷賵賱賵噩賷丞 賱賱丿賲丕睾 鬲爻亘亘 鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰貙 賵賱賰賳 丕賱卮賷亍 丕賱毓賯賱賷 丕賱賵丨賷丿 丕賱賲賵噩賵丿 賮賷 賵毓賷賳丕 賴賵 鬲賱賰 丕賱毓賲賱賷丕鬲貙 賵賱丕 賷賲賰賳 丕賱丕鬲氐丕賱 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰賷 丕賱賲亘丕卮乇 賲毓 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷.
乇丕爻賱 亘賷賯賵賱:
"丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞 鬲丐丿賷 廿賱賶 丕賱賮賷夭賷丕亍貙 賵丕賱賮賷夭賷丕亍 廿匕丕 氐丿賯鬲 鬲亘乇賴賳 毓賱賶 兀賳 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞 賰丕匕亘丞" 賷毓賳賷 賮賰乇丞 廿丿乇丕賰賳丕 丕賱賲亘丕卮乇 賱賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷 = 賲鬲賳丕賯囟丞 匕丕鬲賷丕貙 鬲賰匕亘 賳賮爻賴丕.
賷購毓賱賯 爻賷乇賱 亘廿賳 丕賱丨噩丞 丕賱賲爻鬲賲丿丞 賲賳 丕賱毓賱賲 賱丕 鬲賰匕亘 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱爻丕匕噩丞貙 賱兀賳 丕賱丨噩丞 鬲賯賵賱 廿賳賳丕 賱賵 賰賳丕 賯丕丿乇賷賳 賳賯丿賲 鬲賮爻賷乇 爻亘亘賷 賱廿丿乇丕賰 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱丨賯賷賯賷貙 廿匕賳 賮賱丕 賳爻鬲胤賷毓 廿丿乇丕賰 丕賱毓丕賱賲 . . 賮丕賱丨噩丞 亘鬲賯毓 賮賷 丕賱賲睾丕賱胤丞 丕賱兀氐賱賷丞 genetic fallacy貙 賵鬲賮鬲乇囟 兀賳 丕賱鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻亘亘賷 賱賲氐丿乇 丕賱賲毓鬲賯丿貙 賷賮爻乇 賰賷賮賷丞 丕賱丨氐賵賱 毓賱賶 丕賱賲毓鬲賯丿貙 廿匕賳 賮丕賱賲毓鬲賯丿 賰丕匕亘.
賷毓賳賷 賱賵 亘賳賯賵賱 廿賳 乇丐賷鬲賳丕 賱卮賷亍 兀賲丕賲 兀毓賷賳賳丕貙 賷丨丿孬 亘爻亘亘 廿賳毓賰丕爻 丕賱囟賵亍 丕賱賲爻亘亘 賱賱鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱亘氐乇賷丞貙 賮賰賱 賲丕 乇兀賷賳丕賴 賱賷爻 丕賱卮賷亍 廿賳賲丕 賴賵 鬲噩乇亘鬲賳丕 丕賱亘氐乇賷丞 丕賱賳丕鬲噩丞 毓賳 毓賲賱賷丕鬲 賳賷乇賵亘賷賵賱賵噩賷丞 . . 賱賰賳 丕賱鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻亘亘賷 賱乇丐賷丞 丕賱卮賷亍 兀賲丕賲 毓賳賷賳丕 賱丕 賷亘乇賴賳 廿賳賳丕 賱丕 賳乇賶 丕賱卮賷亍 賮毓賱丕 兀賲丕賲 毓賳賷賳丕貙 賮賷 賯賮夭丞 賮賷 丕賱亘乇賴丕賳 賵賴賷 賳賮爻賴丕 丕賱鬲賷 鬲購爻鬲禺丿賲 賱丿丨囟 丕賱賲毓鬲賯丿丕鬲 丕賱丿賷賳賷丞 兀賵 賮賰乇丞 丨乇賷丞 丕賱廿乇丕丿丞貙 賮賱賵 賯丕丿乇 兀賯丿賲 鬲賮爻賷乇 爻亘亘賷 (毓氐亘賷) 賱賲毓鬲賯丿賰 丕賱丿賷賳賷 兀賵 賱卮毓賵乇賰 亘丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱丨乇丞貙 廿匕賳 賲毓鬲賯丿賰 禺丕胤卅 兀賵 廿乇丕丿鬲賰 丕賱丨乇丞 睾賷乇 賲賵噩賵丿丞.
賱賲 賷賳爻 爻賷乇賱 毓賱賶 兀賳 賷賳亘賴 兀賳 賴匕賴 丕賱賲睾丕賱胤丞貙 賱丕 賷購爻賲毓 毓賳賴丕 丕賱丌賳 廿賱丕 賲賳 亘毓丿 丕賱丨丿丕孬賷賷賳!
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賲賳 丕賱賯賱卮 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷 丕賱賱胤賷賮 毓賱賶 丕賱賲丿乇爻丞 丕賱爻賱賵賰賷丞貙 賳賰鬲丞 亘鬲賯賵賱 廿賳 夭賵噩賷賳 亘毓丿 丕賳鬲賴丕亍賴賲 賲賳 賲賲丕乇爻丞 丕賱噩賳爻貙 丕賱夭賵噩 賯丕賱 賱夭賵噩鬲賴 賱賯丿 賰丕賳鬲 鬲噩乇亘丞 乇丕卅毓丞 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 (廿賱賷賰賽) 賰賷賮 賰丕賳鬲 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 (廿賱賷賾).
丕賱賲丿乇爻丞 丕賱爻賵賰賷丞 亘鬲賯锟斤拷乇丨 廿賳 丕賱卮賷亍 丕賱賵丨賷丿 丕賱賲賲賰賳 丿乇丕爻鬲賴 亘賲賵囟賵毓賷丞 賴賵 爻賱賵賰 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳貙 賲毓 廿賴賲丕賱 丕賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞貙 賮賮賷 乇賮囟賴丕 賱賱孬賳丕卅賷丞貨 鬲乇賮囟 丕賱爻賱賵賰賷丞 兀賷 卮賷亍 禺丕氐 亘丨丕賱丕鬲 亘丕胤賳賷丞貙 乇賵丨賷丞貙 毓賯賱賷丞 . . 賮兀賷 丕毓鬲賯丕丿 丿丕禺賱賷 毓賯賱賷 賷賲賰賳 丕禺鬲夭丕賱賴 賱爻賱锟斤拷賰 禺丕乇噩賷 兀賵 丕爻鬲毓丿丕丿 賱賱爻賱賵賰 賷賲賰賳 丿乇丕爻鬲賴 鬲噩乇賷亘賷賸丕貙 賮丕賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 賱賷爻 賱賴丕 賲毓賳賶 廿賳 賲賰賳卮 賱賴丕 賵噩賵丿 兀氐賱丕.
賮丕賱夭賵噩賷賳 丕賱爻賱賵賰賷賷賳 賲賲賰賳 賰賱 賵丕丨丿 賮賷賴賲 賷賱丕丨馗 爻賱賵賰 丕賱鬲丕賳賷 賵賷賯賵賱 賱賴 賴賵 賰丕賳 丨丕爻爻 亘廿賷賴!
February 22, 2016
"Philosophy begins with a mystery and wonder at what any sane person regards as too obvious to worry about." - John R. Searle.
An extremely compelling introduction to consciousness, perception, causation and personal identity. Full to the brim with whimsical thought experiments - the zombie, 'what is it like to be a bat?', the brain in a vat - one really begins to understand the problems that plague the Philosophy of Mind.
An extremely compelling introduction to consciousness, perception, causation and personal identity. Full to the brim with whimsical thought experiments - the zombie, 'what is it like to be a bat?', the brain in a vat - one really begins to understand the problems that plague the Philosophy of Mind.
April 13, 2020
丿賵 賳馗乇賷賴 賷 丕爻丕爻賷 丕賷 賰賴 丿乇 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賳丿 丿賵卅丕賱賷爻賲 賵 賲丕鬲乇賷丕賱賷爻賲 賴爻鬲賳丿. 丿賵卅丕賱賷爻鬲 賴丕 賲毓鬲賯丿賳丿 丿賵 噩賵賴乇 丿乇 噩賴丕賳 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿貙 噩賵賴乇 賲丕丿賷 賵 噩賵賴乇 匕賴賳賷貙 丕賷賳 丿賷丿诏丕賴 亘丕 丿賰丕乇鬲 丕睾丕夭 卮丿. 丕賱亘鬲賴 賰賴 丕賲乇賵夭賴 賰爻丕賳賷 賰賴 亘賴 丿賵诏丕賳賴 丕賳诏丕乇賷 賲毓鬲賯丿賳丿 賲孬賱 丿賰丕乇鬲 丿賵 噩賵賴乇 噩丿丕 丕夭 賴賲 乇丕 賯亘賵賱 賳丿丕乇賳丿 趩賵賳 賳賯丿賴丕賷 夭賷丕丿賷 亘賴 丕賷賳 丿賷丿诏丕賴 賵丕乇丿 丕爻鬲 賲孬賱 丕賷賳賰賴 趩胤賵乇 丿乇 夭賳噩賷乇賴 賷 毓賱賷 丕賲乇賷 匕賴賳賷 賲賷鬲賵丕賳丿 亘乇 丕賲乇賷 賲丕丿賷 丕孬乇 诏匕丕乇 亘丕卮丿 丕賲丕 賴賲趩賳丕賳 丕诏丕賴賷 乇丕 丕賲乇賷 噩丿丕 丕夭 賲丕丿賴 賲賷 丿丕賳賳丿. 賲亘賳丕賷 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 丕賳賴丕 丿乇 乇丿 賲丕鬲乇賷丕賱爻賷賲 賰賴 賴賲賴 趩賷夭 乇丕 丿乇 噩賴丕賳 賲丕丿賷 賲賷丿丕賳丿 賵 丕诏丕賴賷 乇丕 賯亘賵 賱 賳丿丕乇丿 賰賵丕賱賷丕 丕爻鬲貙 賷毓賳賷 賵賷跇诏賷 賰賷賮賷 鬲噩丕乇亘 賲丕.
爻乇賱 賲丕鬲乇賷丕賱賷爻鬲賷 丕爻鬲 賰賴 丕诏丕賴賷 乇丕 賯亘賵賱 丿丕乇丿 賵 丕賳 乇丕 噩夭賷賷 丕夭 賮乇丕賷賳丿 毓氐亘 夭賷爻鬲 卮賳丕禺鬲賷 賲丕 賲賷丿丕賳丿. 丕賵 賲毓鬲賯丿 丕爻鬲 丿賵 噩賴丕賳 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕乇丿貙 賮賯胤 賷賰 噩賴丕賳 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿 賰賴 丿乇 丿賵 爻胤丨 鬲賵氐賷賮 賲賷 卮賵丿.
丿乇 丕賷賳 賰鬲丕亘 爻乇賱 賲賵囟賵毓丕鬲 丕爻丕爻賷 賮賱爻賮賴 匕賴賳 乇丕 亘賷丕賳 賰乇丿賴貙 賳賯丿賴丕賷賷 賰賴 亘賴 丕賳賴丕 賵丕乇丿 丕爻鬲 乇丕 亘乇乇爻賷 賰乇丿賴 賵 爻倬爻 賳馗乇丕鬲 禺賵丿卮 乇丕 亘賷丕賳 賰乇丿賴 丕爻鬲. 賲孬丕賱 賴丕賷 禺賷賱賷 禺賵亘賷 賴賲 夭丿賴 丕爻鬲. 锟�
賲賳 賴賳賵夭 丿乇亘丕乇賴 賷 丕賷賳賰賴 禺賵丿賲 趩賴 毓賯賷丿賴 丕賷 丿丕乇賲 鬲氐賲賷賲 賳诏乇賮鬲賲 賵賱賷 丿賷丿诏丕賴 爻乇賱 噩丕賱亘 丕爻鬲.
September 25, 2009
Full disclosure before beginning this review of John Searle's Mind. Outside of speculative fiction and impressive displays of raw logic, I'm not a big fan of philosophy, far preferring empirically-based observation. I like to tell myself that I'm comfortable with the unknown. Got a way to discover something? Great! You do it (or at least describe it so others can do it). Just don't come yammering your certainties at me based exclusively on your own navel gazing. For me, faith is a pasttime, not a means of ordering my world.
So why, then, bother to read a book on the philosophy of mind? Well, I do enjoy books which promise to reveal the answers at the back so-to-speak, and this one promised to deliver by recapping the evolution of thought on thought鈥� and the last chapter was supposed to synopsize the state of the art of cognitive neuroscience, so hey, not too shabby. Searle is an extremely elegant writer, who takes extreme care to avoid obfuscating academic mumbo-jumbo and jargon. For example, at page 84, he debunks attempts to dismiss subjectivity as a superficial by-product of organic brain activity with, "There are lots of concepts where the surface features of the phenomena are more interesting than the microstructure. Consider mud or Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Mud behavior is molecular behavior but that is not the interesting thing about mud, so few people are anxious to insist: 'Mud can be reduced to molecular behavior,' though they could if they really wanted to. Similarly with Beethoven鈥�. The music critic who writes, 'All I could hear were wave motions,' has missed the point of the performance." (On that note, what makes going to a performance of Beethoven's Ninth like listening to the ocean? All you can hear are鈥� oh, never mind.) Seriously, Searle can really be a delight to read, and he in fact does deliver on the book's promise to trace (and then debunk) theories of consciousness from Rene Descartes' mind/body dualism to David Chalmers' avowed belief in the existence of a conscious thermostat (cited on p. 104). Personally, I prefer Philip K. Dick's proposition of a pair of happy brown oxford shoes, but hey, to each his own.
As Searle defines it, intangibility is the problem of consciousness that has so troubled philosophers through the ages. Pain is intangible. Our perception of color is intangible. My desire to enjoy an oreo-chip hot fudge sundae while nattering on about the way the brain works is intangible (but, I hope, widely-shared nonetheless). While Searle does walk the reader through the various attempts to solve this problem (in the process almost making me care about it), I was immensely disappointed when it came time for him to offer his own solution. I mean here's a self-described philosopher who professes, "It is a logical possibility, though I think extremely unlikely, that when our bodies are destroyed, our souls will go marching on. I have not tried to show that this is an impossibility (indeed, I wish it were true), but rather that it is inconsistent with just about everything else we know about how the universe works and therefore it is irrational to believe in it." (p. 92) That pretty much sums up my world view right there.
The problem I have is that Searle moves from this rigorous statement of rationality to one which throws the whole argument out the window. Recall my Searle quote about Beethoven and mud two paragraphs up. Well, it turns out that's the crux of the matter. Searle asserts that consciousness is a nonsuperficial neurobiological by-product. It's just what happens when the nervous system works properly. Sure we don't know why that is, but so what? Just accept it. Don't get me wrong. I agree with this position. It's essentially what I came to this book believing anyway. However, it completely takes the wind out of a book's sails to take great lengths to analyze a concept only to dismiss it out of hand as superfluous and be done with it. I mean, why bother at all?
Searle goes on to tackle free will (sort of, he concludes "We really do not know how free will exists in the brain, if it exists at all," at p. 164); how it is that our sense of self can survive unconsciousness (uh, Searle? It's called 'memory,' you can look it up); and the problem of perception (a bubble he bursts on p. 181 with "I think the argument most likely to convince most people in the history of [the subject of how it is that we can see our hand waving in front of our face:] is the argument from science. But in the history of philosophy the argument that has been more influential among philosophers is called the argument from illusion.") Searle goes on of course from here at length with the argument from illusion, but at this point, I'm wholly in the camp of the "most people." I simply couldn't care less.
Why does Searle?
So why, then, bother to read a book on the philosophy of mind? Well, I do enjoy books which promise to reveal the answers at the back so-to-speak, and this one promised to deliver by recapping the evolution of thought on thought鈥� and the last chapter was supposed to synopsize the state of the art of cognitive neuroscience, so hey, not too shabby. Searle is an extremely elegant writer, who takes extreme care to avoid obfuscating academic mumbo-jumbo and jargon. For example, at page 84, he debunks attempts to dismiss subjectivity as a superficial by-product of organic brain activity with, "There are lots of concepts where the surface features of the phenomena are more interesting than the microstructure. Consider mud or Beethoven's Ninth Symphony. Mud behavior is molecular behavior but that is not the interesting thing about mud, so few people are anxious to insist: 'Mud can be reduced to molecular behavior,' though they could if they really wanted to. Similarly with Beethoven鈥�. The music critic who writes, 'All I could hear were wave motions,' has missed the point of the performance." (On that note, what makes going to a performance of Beethoven's Ninth like listening to the ocean? All you can hear are鈥� oh, never mind.) Seriously, Searle can really be a delight to read, and he in fact does deliver on the book's promise to trace (and then debunk) theories of consciousness from Rene Descartes' mind/body dualism to David Chalmers' avowed belief in the existence of a conscious thermostat (cited on p. 104). Personally, I prefer Philip K. Dick's proposition of a pair of happy brown oxford shoes, but hey, to each his own.
As Searle defines it, intangibility is the problem of consciousness that has so troubled philosophers through the ages. Pain is intangible. Our perception of color is intangible. My desire to enjoy an oreo-chip hot fudge sundae while nattering on about the way the brain works is intangible (but, I hope, widely-shared nonetheless). While Searle does walk the reader through the various attempts to solve this problem (in the process almost making me care about it), I was immensely disappointed when it came time for him to offer his own solution. I mean here's a self-described philosopher who professes, "It is a logical possibility, though I think extremely unlikely, that when our bodies are destroyed, our souls will go marching on. I have not tried to show that this is an impossibility (indeed, I wish it were true), but rather that it is inconsistent with just about everything else we know about how the universe works and therefore it is irrational to believe in it." (p. 92) That pretty much sums up my world view right there.
The problem I have is that Searle moves from this rigorous statement of rationality to one which throws the whole argument out the window. Recall my Searle quote about Beethoven and mud two paragraphs up. Well, it turns out that's the crux of the matter. Searle asserts that consciousness is a nonsuperficial neurobiological by-product. It's just what happens when the nervous system works properly. Sure we don't know why that is, but so what? Just accept it. Don't get me wrong. I agree with this position. It's essentially what I came to this book believing anyway. However, it completely takes the wind out of a book's sails to take great lengths to analyze a concept only to dismiss it out of hand as superfluous and be done with it. I mean, why bother at all?
Searle goes on to tackle free will (sort of, he concludes "We really do not know how free will exists in the brain, if it exists at all," at p. 164); how it is that our sense of self can survive unconsciousness (uh, Searle? It's called 'memory,' you can look it up); and the problem of perception (a bubble he bursts on p. 181 with "I think the argument most likely to convince most people in the history of [the subject of how it is that we can see our hand waving in front of our face:] is the argument from science. But in the history of philosophy the argument that has been more influential among philosophers is called the argument from illusion.") Searle goes on of course from here at length with the argument from illusion, but at this point, I'm wholly in the camp of the "most people." I simply couldn't care less.
Why does Searle?
Read
June 7, 2012When I read John Searle-- unlike many of the other analytic philosophers-- I get the feeling I'm dealing not with a specialist, but with a broad-ranging and fierce intellect. That being said, he faces what I feel to be the number one problem facing modern analytic philosophy-- a lot of it seems to be a very pointless language game, relying more on misapprehension of definition than anything else.
That being said, it is a very good primer on philosophy of mind, and I really do feel that Searle's Chinese room concept is a very valuable concept. It's just not ideal. I'm still curious to hear more of the man's ideas.
That being said, it is a very good primer on philosophy of mind, and I really do feel that Searle's Chinese room concept is a very valuable concept. It's just not ideal. I'm still curious to hear more of the man's ideas.
Read
January 28, 2016Searle, the hobgoblin of philosophy of mind, lets his overly defensive, grating personality shine through in this breezy introduction.
March 30, 2017
丕賱毓賯賱.. 賲丿禺賱 賲賵噩夭
毓丕賱賲 丕賱賲毓乇賮丞/343
鬲兀賱賷賮/ 噩賵賳 乇. 爻賷乇賱
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丨賷賳賲丕 賯乇乇鬲 丕賱亘丿亍 賮賷 賯乇丕亍丞 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 鬲賵賯毓鬲 兀賳賷 爻兀噩丿賴 毓賳 丕賱毓賯賱 賲賳 賲賳馗賵乇 毓賱賲 丕賱賳賮爻. 賱賰賳 賲丕 丕賰鬲卮賮鬲賴 兀賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 毓賳 丕賱毓賯賱 賱賰賳 賲賳 賲賳馗賵乇 賮賱爻賮賷. 賮丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賮賷 兀賯賱 賯賱賷賱丕 賲賳 丕賱賲丕卅鬲賷賳 賵禺賲爻賷賳 氐賮丨丞 賷賳賯爻賲 廿賱賷 兀丨丿 毓卮乇 賮氐賱丕 亘丿兀 賲丐賱賮賴 亘丕賱丨丿賷孬 毓賳 丕賱兀爻亘丕亘 丕賱鬲賷 丿賮毓鬲賴 賱鬲兀賱賷賮 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘貙 賮鬲丨丿孬 兀賵賱丕 毓賳 孬賱丕孬丞 賲賳 兀爻賵兀 丕賱賲卮賰賱丕鬲 丕賱鬲賷 鬲賯丕亘賱 賲賳 賷鬲丨丿孬賵賳 毓賳 丕賱毓賯賱. 賴匕賴 丕賱賲卮賰賱丕鬲 賴賷: 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱賱鬲噩丕乇亘 丕賱賵丕毓賷丞貙 賰鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱噩乇丨 賲孬賱丕貙 兀賳 鬲鬲爻亘亘 賮賷 丨丿賵孬 鬲噩乇亘丞 毓賯賱賷丞 賵賴賷 丕賱兀賱賲責 賵賴匕賴 丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 賷胤賱賯 毓賱賷賴丕 賲卮賰賱丞 "丕賱毓賯賱 賵丕賱噩爻丿". 丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱孬丕賳賷丞 賴賷 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱賱賯氐丿貙 賲孬賱 賯氐丿 丕賱丨乇賰丞貙 賵賴賵 禺亘乇丞 毓賯賱賷丞貙 兀賳 賷賳鬲噩 毓賳賴丕 兀孬乇 賲丕丿賷貙 賵賴賵 丕賱丨乇賰丞 丕賱賮毓賱賷丞責 賵賴匕賴 鬲爻賲賷 "賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱爻亘亘賷丞 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞". 丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱孬丕賱孬丞 賴賷 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱兀賮賰丕乇賰貙 賵賴賷 丿丕禺賱 乇兀爻賰貙 兀賳 鬲卮賷乇 廿賱賷 兀賲丕賰賳 亘毓賷丿丞 鬲賲丕賲丕 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷責 賵賴匕賴 鬲爻賲賷 "賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱賯氐丿賷丞".
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱兀賵賱 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 毓賳 丕孬賳鬲丕 毓卮乇丞 賲卮賰賱丞 賮賷 賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱毓賯賱. 賮亘丿兀 亘丕賱鬲兀賰賷丿 毓賱賷 兀賳 賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱毓賯賱 亘丿兀鬲 賮毓賱賷丕 亘兀毓賲丕賱 丕賱賮賷賱爻賵賮 丿賷賰丕乇鬲貙 賵兀卮賴乇 賲亘丿兀 賱丿賷賰丕乇鬲 賴賵 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷丞貙 丕賱匕賷 賷賯爻賲 賮賷賴 丕賱賲賵噩賵丿丕鬲 廿賱賷 噩賵丕賴乇 賲丕丿賷丞 賵噩賵丕賴乇 毓賯賱賷丞. 賵丨丿丿 賲丕賴賷丞 丕賱毓賯賱 亘兀賳賴丕 丕賱賵毓賷 賵賲丕賴賷丞 丕賱噩爻丿 亘丕賱丕賲鬲丿丕丿 賮賷 孬賱丕孬丞 兀亘毓丕丿. 賵賰丕賳 賱賴匕賴 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷丞 兀賴賲賷鬲賴丕 丕賱卮丿賷丿丞 賱兀賳賴丕 賮氐賱鬲 毓丕賱賲 丕賱毓賱賵賲 毓賳 毓丕賱賲 丕賱丿賷賳.
賳丕賯卮 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱兀賵賱 丕孬賳鬲丕 毓卮乇丞 賲卮賰賱丞 賴賷:
1_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱毓賯賱 賵丕賱噩爻丿.
賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱兀賷 卮賷亍 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 兀賳 賷爻亘亘 卮賷亍 賮賷 丕賱噩爻丿貙 賵賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱兀賷 卮賷亍 賮賷 丕賱噩爻丿 兀賳 賷爻亘亘 卮賷亍 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱責
2_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱毓賯賵賱 丕賱兀禺乇賶.
賵鬲亘丨孬 賮賷 賰賷賮賷丞 丕賱鬲兀賰丿 賲賳 兀賳 賱丿賷 丕賱丌禺乇賷賳 毓賯賵賱丕.
3_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱卮賰賷丞 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷.
4_ 鬲丨賱賷賱 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰.
賵賮賯 乇兀賷 丿賷賰丕乇鬲 賮廿賳 丕賱賲毓乇賮丞 丕賱賵丨賷丿丞 賴賷 賯丿乇鬲賷 毓賱賷 丕賱鬲毓乇賮 毓賱賷 賲丨鬲賵賷丕鬲 毓賯賱賷貙 賱賰賳賷 賴賱 鬲賵噩丿 胤乇賷賯丞 兀鬲毓乇賮 亘賴丕 毓賱賷 賲丨鬲賵賷丕鬲 丕賱毓丕賱賲 賲賳 丨賵賱賷 賵丕賱鬲兀賰丿 賲賳 丨賯賷賯丞 賲丕 兀乇丕賴責
5_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丨乇賷丞 丕賱廿乇丕丿丞.
6_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱匕丕鬲 賵丕賱賴賵賷丞 丕賱卮禺氐賷丞.
賵賴匕賴 丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 賷乇丕賴丕 丕賱卮禺氐 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷 爻賴賱丞 賱兀賳 丕賱賴賵賷丞 鬲鬲毓賱賯 亘丕賱噩賵賴乇 丕賱毓賯賱賷 賵丕賱賳賮爻 丕賱禺丕賱丿丞 賵賱丕 鬲鬲毓賱賯 亘丕賱噩爻丿.
7_ 賴賱 毓賳丿 丕賱丨賷賵丕賳丕鬲 毓賯賵賱責
賵丕賱廿噩賲丕毓 賮賷賴丕 兀賳 丕賱丨賷賵丕賳丕鬲 賱丕 鬲賲賱賰 毓賯賵賱丕. 賵兀賳 丕賱毓賯賵賱 賴賷 丕賱賮丕乇賯 丕賱丨丕爻賲 亘賷賳 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳 賵丕賱丨賷賵丕賳丕鬲.
8_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱賳賵賲.
賷乇賷 丿賷賰丕乇鬲 兀賳 賲賳 賷鬲賵賯賮 毓賳 丕賱賵毓賷 賷鬲賵賯賮 毓賳 丕賱賵噩賵丿. 賱賰賳賴 賷乇賷 兀賳 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳 毓賳丿 丕賱賳賵賲 賱丕 賷鬲賵賯賮 毓賳 丕賱賵毓賷 鬲賲丕賲丕貙 亘賱 亘賳爻亘丞 兀賯賱 賲賳 100%.
9_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱賯氐丿賷丞.
賵丕賱賯氐丿賷丞 賱賮馗丞 鬲毓賳賷 丕賱賯丿乇丞 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 丕賱鬲賷 鬲賲賰賳 丕賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 賲賳 丕賱廿卮丕乇丞 丕賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱賲睾丕賷乇丞 毓賳賴丕 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲. 賵丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 賴賳丕貙 賱賳賮乇囟 兀賳賳賷 兀毓鬲賯丿 兀賳 噩賵乇噩 亘賵卮 賮賷 賵丕卮賳胤賳貙 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱兀賮賰丕乇賷 兀賳 鬲爻丕賮乇 賰賱 賴匕丕 丕賱胤乇賷賯責
10_ 丕賱爻亘亘賷丞 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 賵丕賱馗丕賴乇丕鬲賷丞 丕賱賲氐丕丨亘賷丞.
11_ 丕賱賱丕賵毓賷.
賵鬲鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱毓賲賱賷丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 賱賰賳 賵賳 賲馗丕賴乇 賵丕毓賷丞.
12_ 丕賱鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻賷賰賵賱賵噩賷 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷.
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱孬丕賳賷 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 毓賳 丕賱賱噩賵亍 賱賱賲丕丿賷丞貙 賷乇賷 賮賷賴 丕賱賲丐賱賮 兀賳 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷丞 賳丕爻亘鬲 丕賱賲丐賲賳賷賳 亘丕賱兀丿賷丕賳貨 賱兀賳賴丕 鬲賲丕卮鬲 賲毓 廿賷賲丕賳賴賲 亘賵噩賵丿 丨賯賷賯丞 噩賵賴乇賷丞 亘丕賯賷丞 亘毓丿 賮賳丕亍 丕賱噩爻丿. 賱賰賳 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 丕賱兀賰孬乇 鬲兀孬賷乇丕 丕賱丌賳 賴賷 丕賱賲丕丿賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 兀氐亘丨鬲 賰丕賱丿賷賳 賴匕賴 丕賱兀賷丕賲. 賵兀賯丿賲 兀賳賵丕毓 丕賱賲丕丿賷丞 賴賷 賲丕 賷毓乇賮 亘丕賱爻賱賵賰賷丞貙 賵賴賷 賮賷 氐賷睾鬲賴丕 丕賱兀賵賱賷丞 鬲卮賷乇 廿賱賷 兀賳 丕賱毓賯賱 賱賷爻 爻賵賶 爻賱賵賰 丕賱噩爻丿.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱孬丕賱锟斤拷 賳丕賯卮 丨噩噩丕 囟丿 丕賱賲丕丿賷丞.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱乇丕亘毓 賵丕賱禺丕賲爻 鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱賵毓賷 賵賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱毓賯賱 賵丕賱噩爻丿 賵亘賳賷丞 丕賱賵毓賷 賵丕賱賳賷乇賵亘賵賱賵噩賷丕. 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 毓賳 丕賱鬲賲賷賷夭 亘賷賳 丕賱毓賯賱賷 賵丕賱賲丕丿賷貙 賵鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 氐賮丕鬲 丕賱賵毓賷.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱爻丕丿爻 鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱賯氐丿賷丞貙 賵禺氐氐賴 賱賱丨丿賷孬 毓 賲卮賰賱丞 賰賷賮 賱賮賰乇丞 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 兀賳 鬲卮賷乇 廿賱賷 兀賵 鬲爻丕賮乇 賲爻丕賮丕鬲 賱賲賰丕賳 丌禺乇 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲責
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱爻丕亘毓 丨丕賵賱 丕賱廿噩丕亘丞 毓賳 爻丐丕賱貙 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱毓賲賱賷丕鬲 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 兀賳 鬲賰賵賳 爻亘亘丕 賱兀丨丿丕孬 賵丕賯毓賷丞 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷. 丨丕賵賱 賮賷賴 丕賱丕爻鬲賮丕丿丞 賲賳 鬲賮爻賷乇 賴賷賵賲 賱賱爻亘亘賷丞.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱孬丕賲賳 禺氐氐賴 賱賱丨丿賷孬 毓賳 丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱丨乇丞. 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 毓賳 爻亘亘 卮毓賵乇賳丕 亘賵噩賵丿 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳賷丞 賵賴賱 賴賷 丨乇丞 兀賵 睾賷乇 丨乇丞.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱鬲丕爻毓 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 毓賳 丕賱賱丕賵毓賷 賵鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻賱賵賰貙 兀卮丕乇 賮賷賴 廿賱賷 丕賱噩丿賷丿 賮賷 毓賱賲 丕賱賳賮爻 賵丿賵乇 賮乇賵賷丿 賮賷 賰卮賮 丿賵乇 丕賱賱丕賵毓賷 賮賷 鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻賱賵賰 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳賷.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱毓丕卮乇 鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱丨丕丿賷 毓卮乇 鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱匕丕鬲.
賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲丕丿鬲賴 氐毓亘丞 噩丿丕貙 賵賲賲賱丞 噩丿丕貙 賵賱賷爻 賲賳 丕賱爻賴賱 賴囟賲賴丕貙 賵賱匕賱賰 賱賲 兀鬲賲賰賳 賲賳 賲鬲丕亘毓丞 丕賱賯乇丕亍丞 賮賷 氐賮丨丕鬲 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 亘丿賯丞 賰丕賱賲毓鬲丕丿貙 賮鬲丨乇賰鬲 丨乇賰丞 爻乇賷毓丞 亘賷賳 氐賮丨丕鬲賴 賵丕賰鬲賮賷鬲 亘兀禺匕 賮賰乇丞 爻乇賷毓丞 毓賳賴.
毓丕賱賲 丕賱賲毓乇賮丞/343
鬲兀賱賷賮/ 噩賵賳 乇. 爻賷乇賱
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丨賷賳賲丕 賯乇乇鬲 丕賱亘丿亍 賮賷 賯乇丕亍丞 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 鬲賵賯毓鬲 兀賳賷 爻兀噩丿賴 毓賳 丕賱毓賯賱 賲賳 賲賳馗賵乇 毓賱賲 丕賱賳賮爻. 賱賰賳 賲丕 丕賰鬲卮賮鬲賴 兀賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 毓賳 丕賱毓賯賱 賱賰賳 賲賳 賲賳馗賵乇 賮賱爻賮賷. 賮丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賮賷 兀賯賱 賯賱賷賱丕 賲賳 丕賱賲丕卅鬲賷賳 賵禺賲爻賷賳 氐賮丨丞 賷賳賯爻賲 廿賱賷 兀丨丿 毓卮乇 賮氐賱丕 亘丿兀 賲丐賱賮賴 亘丕賱丨丿賷孬 毓賳 丕賱兀爻亘丕亘 丕賱鬲賷 丿賮毓鬲賴 賱鬲兀賱賷賮 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘貙 賮鬲丨丿孬 兀賵賱丕 毓賳 孬賱丕孬丞 賲賳 兀爻賵兀 丕賱賲卮賰賱丕鬲 丕賱鬲賷 鬲賯丕亘賱 賲賳 賷鬲丨丿孬賵賳 毓賳 丕賱毓賯賱. 賴匕賴 丕賱賲卮賰賱丕鬲 賴賷: 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱賱鬲噩丕乇亘 丕賱賵丕毓賷丞貙 賰鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱噩乇丨 賲孬賱丕貙 兀賳 鬲鬲爻亘亘 賮賷 丨丿賵孬 鬲噩乇亘丞 毓賯賱賷丞 賵賴賷 丕賱兀賱賲責 賵賴匕賴 丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 賷胤賱賯 毓賱賷賴丕 賲卮賰賱丞 "丕賱毓賯賱 賵丕賱噩爻丿". 丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱孬丕賳賷丞 賴賷 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱賱賯氐丿貙 賲孬賱 賯氐丿 丕賱丨乇賰丞貙 賵賴賵 禺亘乇丞 毓賯賱賷丞貙 兀賳 賷賳鬲噩 毓賳賴丕 兀孬乇 賲丕丿賷貙 賵賴賵 丕賱丨乇賰丞 丕賱賮毓賱賷丞責 賵賴匕賴 鬲爻賲賷 "賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱爻亘亘賷丞 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞". 丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱孬丕賱孬丞 賴賷 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱兀賮賰丕乇賰貙 賵賴賷 丿丕禺賱 乇兀爻賰貙 兀賳 鬲卮賷乇 廿賱賷 兀賲丕賰賳 亘毓賷丿丞 鬲賲丕賲丕 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷責 賵賴匕賴 鬲爻賲賷 "賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱賯氐丿賷丞".
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱兀賵賱 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 毓賳 丕孬賳鬲丕 毓卮乇丞 賲卮賰賱丞 賮賷 賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱毓賯賱. 賮亘丿兀 亘丕賱鬲兀賰賷丿 毓賱賷 兀賳 賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱毓賯賱 亘丿兀鬲 賮毓賱賷丕 亘兀毓賲丕賱 丕賱賮賷賱爻賵賮 丿賷賰丕乇鬲貙 賵兀卮賴乇 賲亘丿兀 賱丿賷賰丕乇鬲 賴賵 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷丞貙 丕賱匕賷 賷賯爻賲 賮賷賴 丕賱賲賵噩賵丿丕鬲 廿賱賷 噩賵丕賴乇 賲丕丿賷丞 賵噩賵丕賴乇 毓賯賱賷丞. 賵丨丿丿 賲丕賴賷丞 丕賱毓賯賱 亘兀賳賴丕 丕賱賵毓賷 賵賲丕賴賷丞 丕賱噩爻丿 亘丕賱丕賲鬲丿丕丿 賮賷 孬賱丕孬丞 兀亘毓丕丿. 賵賰丕賳 賱賴匕賴 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷丞 兀賴賲賷鬲賴丕 丕賱卮丿賷丿丞 賱兀賳賴丕 賮氐賱鬲 毓丕賱賲 丕賱毓賱賵賲 毓賳 毓丕賱賲 丕賱丿賷賳.
賳丕賯卮 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱兀賵賱 丕孬賳鬲丕 毓卮乇丞 賲卮賰賱丞 賴賷:
1_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱毓賯賱 賵丕賱噩爻丿.
賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱兀賷 卮賷亍 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 兀賳 賷爻亘亘 卮賷亍 賮賷 丕賱噩爻丿貙 賵賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱兀賷 卮賷亍 賮賷 丕賱噩爻丿 兀賳 賷爻亘亘 卮賷亍 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱責
2_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱毓賯賵賱 丕賱兀禺乇賶.
賵鬲亘丨孬 賮賷 賰賷賮賷丞 丕賱鬲兀賰丿 賲賳 兀賳 賱丿賷 丕賱丌禺乇賷賳 毓賯賵賱丕.
3_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱卮賰賷丞 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷.
4_ 鬲丨賱賷賱 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰.
賵賮賯 乇兀賷 丿賷賰丕乇鬲 賮廿賳 丕賱賲毓乇賮丞 丕賱賵丨賷丿丞 賴賷 賯丿乇鬲賷 毓賱賷 丕賱鬲毓乇賮 毓賱賷 賲丨鬲賵賷丕鬲 毓賯賱賷貙 賱賰賳賷 賴賱 鬲賵噩丿 胤乇賷賯丞 兀鬲毓乇賮 亘賴丕 毓賱賷 賲丨鬲賵賷丕鬲 丕賱毓丕賱賲 賲賳 丨賵賱賷 賵丕賱鬲兀賰丿 賲賳 丨賯賷賯丞 賲丕 兀乇丕賴責
5_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丨乇賷丞 丕賱廿乇丕丿丞.
6_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱匕丕鬲 賵丕賱賴賵賷丞 丕賱卮禺氐賷丞.
賵賴匕賴 丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 賷乇丕賴丕 丕賱卮禺氐 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷 爻賴賱丞 賱兀賳 丕賱賴賵賷丞 鬲鬲毓賱賯 亘丕賱噩賵賴乇 丕賱毓賯賱賷 賵丕賱賳賮爻 丕賱禺丕賱丿丞 賵賱丕 鬲鬲毓賱賯 亘丕賱噩爻丿.
7_ 賴賱 毓賳丿 丕賱丨賷賵丕賳丕鬲 毓賯賵賱責
賵丕賱廿噩賲丕毓 賮賷賴丕 兀賳 丕賱丨賷賵丕賳丕鬲 賱丕 鬲賲賱賰 毓賯賵賱丕. 賵兀賳 丕賱毓賯賵賱 賴賷 丕賱賮丕乇賯 丕賱丨丕爻賲 亘賷賳 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳 賵丕賱丨賷賵丕賳丕鬲.
8_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱賳賵賲.
賷乇賷 丿賷賰丕乇鬲 兀賳 賲賳 賷鬲賵賯賮 毓賳 丕賱賵毓賷 賷鬲賵賯賮 毓賳 丕賱賵噩賵丿. 賱賰賳賴 賷乇賷 兀賳 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳 毓賳丿 丕賱賳賵賲 賱丕 賷鬲賵賯賮 毓賳 丕賱賵毓賷 鬲賲丕賲丕貙 亘賱 亘賳爻亘丞 兀賯賱 賲賳 100%.
9_ 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱賯氐丿賷丞.
賵丕賱賯氐丿賷丞 賱賮馗丞 鬲毓賳賷 丕賱賯丿乇丞 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 丕賱鬲賷 鬲賲賰賳 丕賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 賲賳 丕賱廿卮丕乇丞 丕賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷丞 丕賱賲睾丕賷乇丞 毓賳賴丕 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲. 賵丕賱賲卮賰賱丞 賴賳丕貙 賱賳賮乇囟 兀賳賳賷 兀毓鬲賯丿 兀賳 噩賵乇噩 亘賵卮 賮賷 賵丕卮賳胤賳貙 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱兀賮賰丕乇賷 兀賳 鬲爻丕賮乇 賰賱 賴匕丕 丕賱胤乇賷賯責
10_ 丕賱爻亘亘賷丞 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 賵丕賱馗丕賴乇丕鬲賷丞 丕賱賲氐丕丨亘賷丞.
11_ 丕賱賱丕賵毓賷.
賵鬲鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱毓賲賱賷丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 賱賰賳 賵賳 賲馗丕賴乇 賵丕毓賷丞.
12_ 丕賱鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻賷賰賵賱賵噩賷 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷.
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱孬丕賳賷 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 毓賳 丕賱賱噩賵亍 賱賱賲丕丿賷丞貙 賷乇賷 賮賷賴 丕賱賲丐賱賮 兀賳 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷丞 賳丕爻亘鬲 丕賱賲丐賲賳賷賳 亘丕賱兀丿賷丕賳貨 賱兀賳賴丕 鬲賲丕卮鬲 賲毓 廿賷賲丕賳賴賲 亘賵噩賵丿 丨賯賷賯丞 噩賵賴乇賷丞 亘丕賯賷丞 亘毓丿 賮賳丕亍 丕賱噩爻丿. 賱賰賳 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 丕賱兀賰孬乇 鬲兀孬賷乇丕 丕賱丌賳 賴賷 丕賱賲丕丿賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 兀氐亘丨鬲 賰丕賱丿賷賳 賴匕賴 丕賱兀賷丕賲. 賵兀賯丿賲 兀賳賵丕毓 丕賱賲丕丿賷丞 賴賷 賲丕 賷毓乇賮 亘丕賱爻賱賵賰賷丞貙 賵賴賷 賮賷 氐賷睾鬲賴丕 丕賱兀賵賱賷丞 鬲卮賷乇 廿賱賷 兀賳 丕賱毓賯賱 賱賷爻 爻賵賶 爻賱賵賰 丕賱噩爻丿.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱孬丕賱锟斤拷 賳丕賯卮 丨噩噩丕 囟丿 丕賱賲丕丿賷丞.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱乇丕亘毓 賵丕賱禺丕賲爻 鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱賵毓賷 賵賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱毓賯賱 賵丕賱噩爻丿 賵亘賳賷丞 丕賱賵毓賷 賵丕賱賳賷乇賵亘賵賱賵噩賷丕. 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 毓賳 丕賱鬲賲賷賷夭 亘賷賳 丕賱毓賯賱賷 賵丕賱賲丕丿賷貙 賵鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 氐賮丕鬲 丕賱賵毓賷.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱爻丕丿爻 鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱賯氐丿賷丞貙 賵禺氐氐賴 賱賱丨丿賷孬 毓 賲卮賰賱丞 賰賷賮 賱賮賰乇丞 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 兀賳 鬲卮賷乇 廿賱賷 兀賵 鬲爻丕賮乇 賲爻丕賮丕鬲 賱賲賰丕賳 丌禺乇 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲責
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱爻丕亘毓 丨丕賵賱 丕賱廿噩丕亘丞 毓賳 爻丐丕賱貙 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱毓賲賱賷丕鬲 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷 丕賱毓賯賱 兀賳 鬲賰賵賳 爻亘亘丕 賱兀丨丿丕孬 賵丕賯毓賷丞 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷. 丨丕賵賱 賮賷賴 丕賱丕爻鬲賮丕丿丞 賲賳 鬲賮爻賷乇 賴賷賵賲 賱賱爻亘亘賷丞.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱孬丕賲賳 禺氐氐賴 賱賱丨丿賷孬 毓賳 丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱丨乇丞. 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 毓賳 爻亘亘 卮毓賵乇賳丕 亘賵噩賵丿 賲卮賰賱丞 丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳賷丞 賵賴賱 賴賷 丨乇丞 兀賵 睾賷乇 丨乇丞.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱鬲丕爻毓 鬲丨丿孬 賮賷賴 毓賳 丕賱賱丕賵毓賷 賵鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻賱賵賰貙 兀卮丕乇 賮賷賴 廿賱賷 丕賱噩丿賷丿 賮賷 毓賱賲 丕賱賳賮爻 賵丿賵乇 賮乇賵賷丿 賮賷 賰卮賮 丿賵乇 丕賱賱丕賵毓賷 賮賷 鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱爻賱賵賰 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳賷.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱毓丕卮乇 鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰.
賮賷 丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱丨丕丿賷 毓卮乇 鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賱匕丕鬲.
賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲丕丿鬲賴 氐毓亘丞 噩丿丕貙 賵賲賲賱丞 噩丿丕貙 賵賱賷爻 賲賳 丕賱爻賴賱 賴囟賲賴丕貙 賵賱匕賱賰 賱賲 兀鬲賲賰賳 賲賳 賲鬲丕亘毓丞 丕賱賯乇丕亍丞 賮賷 氐賮丨丕鬲 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 亘丿賯丞 賰丕賱賲毓鬲丕丿貙 賮鬲丨乇賰鬲 丨乇賰丞 爻乇賷毓丞 亘賷賳 氐賮丨丕鬲賴 賵丕賰鬲賮賷鬲 亘兀禺匕 賮賰乇丞 爻乇賷毓丞 毓賳賴.
April 14, 2016
This book is John Searle's attempt at giving a brief overview of what he sees as the most pressing questions in the philosophy of mind.
The most central issue of them all is to give an account of the nature of consciousness and how it fits into what we know about the world. For Searle, the two most influential ways of answering this problem鈥攄ualism and materialism鈥攄o not hold water.
When it comes to dualism, it's simply not very coherent. It supposes that mind and body are different things altogether, consisting of different types of substance or in different realms if you will. It's hard to find any satisfying account of how these separate realms are able to intersect causally, and it does not jive very well with what we know from modern science: everything points to consciousness being quite inseparable from the physical body鈥攖he soul can be altered by surgery, chemicals, a lack of oxygen, or any other influence upon the physical brain.
Various forms of materialism, on the other hand, are more fashionable these days, especially among the scientifically minded. There are so many flavors in this group, but the basic premise underlying them is that the world consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force, and nothing over and above this. The mind, being a part of our world, must therefore also be entirely be explainable in these physical terms. So far, so good, right? The problem for Searle is the extent that these views tend to end up in reductionism. Everything is ultimately to be reduced to the lowest level of explanation, and these explanations take the form of third-person ontology. However, it seems quite vividly to us that our consciousness has certain subjective qualities, experiences that have a first-person ontology: there is a certain feel to my experience of the color red right now, for instance. The answer of many radical materialists is to in some way or another explain away this phenomena, often suggesting that it is an illusion. One famous example of this thinking taken to its extreme, and by now the butt of several jokes, is behaviorism. The behaviorists had the idea that the postulation of a mind couldn't be studied at all, and hence it must be disposed of鈥攁ll there really is, is behavior. In that vein, some philosophers have suggested that consciousness isn't something that really exists, only something we postulate out of convenience for explaining behavior. Searle, in my view correctly, caustically points out that this is as silly as suggesting that feet is only something we postulate for the convenience of explaining our walking behavior. We know very well from our experience that we have both feet and subjective conscious experiences.
Searle spends a good deal of time on the somewhat more sophisticated materialist thesis of functionalism, and first and foremost the functionalism that has come to be known as computational theory of mind. Here he also gives an outline and defense of his famous Chinese room argument. I won't go into the details of this discussion
But what, then, is Searle's own answer to the problem of the nature of consciousness? The way to proceed is to get rid of some of the old and loaded terminology inherent in the schism between the mental and physical. If you look at the facts of what we know, what we're left with is consciousness being a feature of the brain at the systemic level. As such it is causally reducible to the micro-level behavior of the neurons and neurotransmitters, and so on. However, it is not thereby ontologically reducible to these micro-level explanations鈥攚e still have a qualitative, subjective conscious experience that can not be captured in such third-person accounts. Consciousness is a biological feature of the brain at the system-level, much like digestion is a biological feature of the digestive system. Searle calls his view biological naturalism.
I think I generally agree with the view that he outlines. However, certain things appear a bit unclear to me. He proposes that the question of how our consciousness functions is to be answered by neurobiology, something I again generally agree with. But while neurobiology will undoubtedly give us plenty of answers to the technical and empirical questions about consciousness, and may do it in a way that doesn't have to deny the fact of our qualitative experiences, won't the explanations in a fundamental sense still be third-person explanations? Even if we were at the point where we could give a full neurobiological account of the functions our brain carries out, wouldn't the so-called hard problem of consciousness still persist to some extent? Perhaps not, I am not sure.
Outside of this question, Searle also gives some treatment to topics like intentionality, mental causation, free will, the unconscious, and the self. A prime virtue of the book is his admirably clear writing style. He doesn't seek to obfuscate, but lays out the arguments clearly and logically. I do get the feeling, here as in some of his other work, that he is at times somewhat uncharitable to his opponents, perhaps arguing some straw men, and he does sometimes jump rather quickly to the point of "let's just do it like this, and poof, you see I'm obviously right". Nonetheless, on the whole, I found this to be an accessible and reasoned introduction to some of the most tantalizing questions of contemporary philosophy.
The most central issue of them all is to give an account of the nature of consciousness and how it fits into what we know about the world. For Searle, the two most influential ways of answering this problem鈥攄ualism and materialism鈥攄o not hold water.
When it comes to dualism, it's simply not very coherent. It supposes that mind and body are different things altogether, consisting of different types of substance or in different realms if you will. It's hard to find any satisfying account of how these separate realms are able to intersect causally, and it does not jive very well with what we know from modern science: everything points to consciousness being quite inseparable from the physical body鈥攖he soul can be altered by surgery, chemicals, a lack of oxygen, or any other influence upon the physical brain.
Various forms of materialism, on the other hand, are more fashionable these days, especially among the scientifically minded. There are so many flavors in this group, but the basic premise underlying them is that the world consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force, and nothing over and above this. The mind, being a part of our world, must therefore also be entirely be explainable in these physical terms. So far, so good, right? The problem for Searle is the extent that these views tend to end up in reductionism. Everything is ultimately to be reduced to the lowest level of explanation, and these explanations take the form of third-person ontology. However, it seems quite vividly to us that our consciousness has certain subjective qualities, experiences that have a first-person ontology: there is a certain feel to my experience of the color red right now, for instance. The answer of many radical materialists is to in some way or another explain away this phenomena, often suggesting that it is an illusion. One famous example of this thinking taken to its extreme, and by now the butt of several jokes, is behaviorism. The behaviorists had the idea that the postulation of a mind couldn't be studied at all, and hence it must be disposed of鈥攁ll there really is, is behavior. In that vein, some philosophers have suggested that consciousness isn't something that really exists, only something we postulate out of convenience for explaining behavior. Searle, in my view correctly, caustically points out that this is as silly as suggesting that feet is only something we postulate for the convenience of explaining our walking behavior. We know very well from our experience that we have both feet and subjective conscious experiences.
Searle spends a good deal of time on the somewhat more sophisticated materialist thesis of functionalism, and first and foremost the functionalism that has come to be known as computational theory of mind. Here he also gives an outline and defense of his famous Chinese room argument. I won't go into the details of this discussion
But what, then, is Searle's own answer to the problem of the nature of consciousness? The way to proceed is to get rid of some of the old and loaded terminology inherent in the schism between the mental and physical. If you look at the facts of what we know, what we're left with is consciousness being a feature of the brain at the systemic level. As such it is causally reducible to the micro-level behavior of the neurons and neurotransmitters, and so on. However, it is not thereby ontologically reducible to these micro-level explanations鈥攚e still have a qualitative, subjective conscious experience that can not be captured in such third-person accounts. Consciousness is a biological feature of the brain at the system-level, much like digestion is a biological feature of the digestive system. Searle calls his view biological naturalism.
I think I generally agree with the view that he outlines. However, certain things appear a bit unclear to me. He proposes that the question of how our consciousness functions is to be answered by neurobiology, something I again generally agree with. But while neurobiology will undoubtedly give us plenty of answers to the technical and empirical questions about consciousness, and may do it in a way that doesn't have to deny the fact of our qualitative experiences, won't the explanations in a fundamental sense still be third-person explanations? Even if we were at the point where we could give a full neurobiological account of the functions our brain carries out, wouldn't the so-called hard problem of consciousness still persist to some extent? Perhaps not, I am not sure.
Outside of this question, Searle also gives some treatment to topics like intentionality, mental causation, free will, the unconscious, and the self. A prime virtue of the book is his admirably clear writing style. He doesn't seek to obfuscate, but lays out the arguments clearly and logically. I do get the feeling, here as in some of his other work, that he is at times somewhat uncharitable to his opponents, perhaps arguing some straw men, and he does sometimes jump rather quickly to the point of "let's just do it like this, and poof, you see I'm obviously right". Nonetheless, on the whole, I found this to be an accessible and reasoned introduction to some of the most tantalizing questions of contemporary philosophy.
September 2, 2012
While this book was not what I expected nor what the title seems to advertise, I was pleasantly surprised and immensely enjoyed reading it. Based upon the title (and no additional research), I assumed that this book would indeed by "a brief introduction" to the philosophy of mind. I expected something like a "Philosophy of Mind for Dummies" approach as is typical of such books and set out to introduce myself to the topic. Within the first chapter, however, I encountered the lament of the author that he is not able to simply inform his students and readers of the truth (as he sees it, though he wouldn't acknowledge that point) but instead must tell them about the other opinions and the history of those opinions. Any introduction that starts that way is no longer an introduction. That said, Searle does, in a sense, and certainly with a great deal of bias, introduce us to many of the most important issues in the philosophy of mind. He does so, of course, in a way that will lead us to his own opinion and, he hopes, convince us of it, but he does introduce nonetheless.
Having said all of that, I do think that Searle's approach is a very interesting one that is perhaps one of the best (that is, one with the fewest problems) approaches within philosophy of mind today. He seeks to overcome the historical categories and diametric opposites such as "dualism" and "materialism" and instead posit a sort of "third way" which he views as the common sense approach in between the two extremes. While this is clever and, as I've already said, leads us out of many of the problems of dualism and materialism, I think that it also brings his ideas into an area which suffers from many of the same problems as dualism and materialism. That is, while avoiding certain problems of each philosophy, he has taken on certain problems from both.
Overall, this book is an excellent and very readable read (which is saying a lot for a book on the philosophy of mind; "readable" is rarely an apt description for works on such a subject). I recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about the philosophy of mind and especially anyone who wasn't lost the child's ability to question things that everyone else just takes for granted.
Having said all of that, I do think that Searle's approach is a very interesting one that is perhaps one of the best (that is, one with the fewest problems) approaches within philosophy of mind today. He seeks to overcome the historical categories and diametric opposites such as "dualism" and "materialism" and instead posit a sort of "third way" which he views as the common sense approach in between the two extremes. While this is clever and, as I've already said, leads us out of many of the problems of dualism and materialism, I think that it also brings his ideas into an area which suffers from many of the same problems as dualism and materialism. That is, while avoiding certain problems of each philosophy, he has taken on certain problems from both.
Overall, this book is an excellent and very readable read (which is saying a lot for a book on the philosophy of mind; "readable" is rarely an apt description for works on such a subject). I recommend this book to anyone interested in learning more about the philosophy of mind and especially anyone who wasn't lost the child's ability to question things that everyone else just takes for granted.
August 8, 2015
" 兀爻賵兀 丕賱兀卮賷丕亍 丕賱鬲賷 賷賲賰賳 丕賱賯賷丕賲 亘賴丕 賴賷 兀賳 鬲賵丨賷 賱賱賯乇丕亍兀賳賴賲 賷賮賴賲賵賳 卮賷卅賸丕 亘賷賳賲丕 賮賷 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賱丕 賷賮賴賲賵賳賴"
January 16, 2012
I thought a lot about whether to give this book four or five stars. Ultimately, I am giving it five stars because although the book is superb, it's a strangely written little book. Purportedly, John R. Searle set out to write an "intro to" text on the philosophy of the mind, and this book is that "intro to". Yet the text is not really for a new-comer to the field of cognitive science or philosophy of the mind 鈥� although I disagree with pretty much every conclusion and method in the text, I'd suggest as a better book for a new-comer. You probably also want to pick up or to get a good handle on the cognitive science and some of the complexities of the mind's structure. Once you have those books under your belt, this is a superb read, absolutely worth five stars...but it's definitely not the "intro to" that it advertises itself to be, so I'm giving it four stars for its pedagogical fib. It's a cute rhetorical move on Searle's part, but the book is a lot easier to read if you realize it's not what it is making itself out to be.
The book starts with recounting Descartes, because that is where both the philosophy of the mind started and where it was placed on the wrong track. Although the temptation for a journeyman philosopher might be to skip this part, don't 鈥斕齋earle's framing of the argument is actually setting up his response to it, so pay careful attention to what it is he is laying out. The bulk of the book lays out and defends Searle's biological naturalism, with the final few chapters turning towards frontiers in Searle's philosophy on the matter. The book was extremely convincing to me (although I was fondly disposed towards him to begin with), excepting Searle's treatment of free will (which even he admits is fragmentary).
As a comprehensive overview of the philosophy of mind and Searle's most concise portrayal of his particular take, this book is absolutely superb. Searle argues that we have been using the wrong models of the body and mind, and if we instead refocus our attention on the actual facts of the matter, a lot of the problems simply evaporate. Although that sounds arrogant, the book is actually surprisingly humble, and Searle comes out on a couple of different occasions and outright admits that he does not know the answer to certain questions. All in all, the book is very enjoyable, insightful, and entertaining. It is a kind of "real world" engagement by a philosopher with serious technical chops, which is absolutely wonderful to experience. Definitely read it if you've made it this far into my review.
The book starts with recounting Descartes, because that is where both the philosophy of the mind started and where it was placed on the wrong track. Although the temptation for a journeyman philosopher might be to skip this part, don't 鈥斕齋earle's framing of the argument is actually setting up his response to it, so pay careful attention to what it is he is laying out. The bulk of the book lays out and defends Searle's biological naturalism, with the final few chapters turning towards frontiers in Searle's philosophy on the matter. The book was extremely convincing to me (although I was fondly disposed towards him to begin with), excepting Searle's treatment of free will (which even he admits is fragmentary).
As a comprehensive overview of the philosophy of mind and Searle's most concise portrayal of his particular take, this book is absolutely superb. Searle argues that we have been using the wrong models of the body and mind, and if we instead refocus our attention on the actual facts of the matter, a lot of the problems simply evaporate. Although that sounds arrogant, the book is actually surprisingly humble, and Searle comes out on a couple of different occasions and outright admits that he does not know the answer to certain questions. All in all, the book is very enjoyable, insightful, and entertaining. It is a kind of "real world" engagement by a philosopher with serious technical chops, which is absolutely wonderful to experience. Definitely read it if you've made it this far into my review.
October 20, 2014
This concise work by an important philosopher of language provides a somewhat intriguing but ultimately wrong-headed if not outright dangerous approach to the phenomena of language and cognition. There are many category errors in MIND: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION. I will mention only two.
First of all, Searle shares with Chomsky and with most mainstream linguists a certain dogmatic belief. Roughly, this belief is that language is for thinking, and any other reflexes that are enabled by the minds of us rational animals (society, art, religion, economics, law, auto repair, intimacy, family, whatever) are secondary, maybe even wholly derivative and epiphenomenal, to the real purpose, telos, and function of the MIND, which is to stand at the professor's podium and say stuff that sounds good and rational. To suggest that a culture that is expressed by mind(s) and a society that hangs together by mind(s) are solely unintended consequences of the human brain is to admit a clear lack of understanding of humanity's essentially collective and shared existence. We speak because we think, yes, but we more significantly speak because there is someone to talk to.
Let that segue to my other point. To treat the mind as a fundamentally autonomous system that controls through our egocentric intentions our other systems ('I want to raise my arm, so I do' is the irrelevant example he continues to return to), or to see the intent of the individual as basic to the mind's functioning, is to reduce the person to a machine, an automaton, a thing. We now know the un-dividable individual is an abstraction of the Bourgeois era, a hyperbolic gesture to the man who is an island, and not anything that can provide the basis for a theory of human nature and cognitive primacy, raising arms or not.
If you are interested in the philosophy of language or in logic and pragmatics, don't read this book. If you have any knowledge of hermeneutics or phenomenology, then don't read this book. If you think the social is in many ways the telos of the cognitive, don't read this book. But if you want to learn more about how the mind works, then please, don't read this book.
First of all, Searle shares with Chomsky and with most mainstream linguists a certain dogmatic belief. Roughly, this belief is that language is for thinking, and any other reflexes that are enabled by the minds of us rational animals (society, art, religion, economics, law, auto repair, intimacy, family, whatever) are secondary, maybe even wholly derivative and epiphenomenal, to the real purpose, telos, and function of the MIND, which is to stand at the professor's podium and say stuff that sounds good and rational. To suggest that a culture that is expressed by mind(s) and a society that hangs together by mind(s) are solely unintended consequences of the human brain is to admit a clear lack of understanding of humanity's essentially collective and shared existence. We speak because we think, yes, but we more significantly speak because there is someone to talk to.
Let that segue to my other point. To treat the mind as a fundamentally autonomous system that controls through our egocentric intentions our other systems ('I want to raise my arm, so I do' is the irrelevant example he continues to return to), or to see the intent of the individual as basic to the mind's functioning, is to reduce the person to a machine, an automaton, a thing. We now know the un-dividable individual is an abstraction of the Bourgeois era, a hyperbolic gesture to the man who is an island, and not anything that can provide the basis for a theory of human nature and cognitive primacy, raising arms or not.
If you are interested in the philosophy of language or in logic and pragmatics, don't read this book. If you have any knowledge of hermeneutics or phenomenology, then don't read this book. If you think the social is in many ways the telos of the cognitive, don't read this book. But if you want to learn more about how the mind works, then please, don't read this book.
August 25, 2014
Searle's book provides an excellent overview to both the history of the philosophy of mind and the current state of understanding of this important area. His primary concern is the philosophical but he never shies away from describing how our philosophical understanding of the mind has to be aligned with and informed by neurobiological understanding and research.
What I found most refreshing about Searle's approach was his ability to ground his arguments in everyday experience and common sense. He systematically works his way through a sequence of thorny philosophical topics: the mind-body problem; consciousness; causality; free-will; perception; and provides a sound and well-argued framework to understand why these issues have caused such deep debate between philosophers over the years and the gives his own view as to the best resolution.
He is completely candid about where the limits of our current knowledge are and which problems will benefit from more scientific research and which problems need better philosophical research.
I found that in the sections dealing with specifically philosophical arguments, for example the section on Intentionality-with-a-t compared with Intensionality-with-an-s, the philosophical vocabulary made the material dense and opaque, but Searle brings back the topic to concrete examples wherever he can which found helpful.
One aspect of the book that I found a little disappointing was that Searle only touched very lightly on Artificial Intelligence and the possibility of machine-learning and consciousness. Given that he has been so involved in that debate - see The Chinese Room thought-experiment - I had hoped that he might have included more discussion of this important current topic.
Overall, I very much appreciated his style which mixed a comprehensive knowledge of the subject with humor and insight.
What I found most refreshing about Searle's approach was his ability to ground his arguments in everyday experience and common sense. He systematically works his way through a sequence of thorny philosophical topics: the mind-body problem; consciousness; causality; free-will; perception; and provides a sound and well-argued framework to understand why these issues have caused such deep debate between philosophers over the years and the gives his own view as to the best resolution.
He is completely candid about where the limits of our current knowledge are and which problems will benefit from more scientific research and which problems need better philosophical research.
I found that in the sections dealing with specifically philosophical arguments, for example the section on Intentionality-with-a-t compared with Intensionality-with-an-s, the philosophical vocabulary made the material dense and opaque, but Searle brings back the topic to concrete examples wherever he can which found helpful.
One aspect of the book that I found a little disappointing was that Searle only touched very lightly on Artificial Intelligence and the possibility of machine-learning and consciousness. Given that he has been so involved in that debate - see The Chinese Room thought-experiment - I had hoped that he might have included more discussion of this important current topic.
Overall, I very much appreciated his style which mixed a comprehensive knowledge of the subject with humor and insight.
October 12, 2024
THE FAMED ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHER GIVES AN OVERVIEW
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He has written many other books, such as 'The Mystery of Consciousness,' 'The Rediscovery of the Mind,' 'Mind,' 'Language And Society,' etc.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 2004 book, "there is an overriding reason for my wanting to write a general introduction to the philosophy of mind. Almost all of the works that I have read accept the same set of historically inherited categories for describing mental phenomena, especially consciousness... The different positions then are all taken within a set of mistaken assumptions... this [book] is my only attempt at a comprehensive introduction to the entire subject of the philosophy of mind." (Pg. 1-2) He adds, "this is my second reason for wanting to write this book. Most of the general introductions to the subject are just about the Big Questions... I do not think these are the only interesting questions in the philosophy of mind... Specifically, it seems to me we need to investigate questions about the detailed structure of consciousness... we can then go on to examine the actual structure of human intentionality." (Pg. 5)
Later, he says, "I will state biological naturalism about consciousness as a set of four theses: 1. Conscious states, with their subjective, first-person ontology, are real phenomena in the real world... 2. Conscious states are entirely caused by lower level neurobiological processes in the brain. Conscious states are thus causally reducible to neurobiological processes... 3. Conscious states are realized in the brain as features of the brain system, and thus exist at a level higher than that of neurons and synapses... 4. Because conscious states are real features of the real world, they function causally." (Pg. 113-114)
He argues, "There is no reason why a physical system such as a human or animal organism should not have states that are qualitative, subjective, and intentional... There is no metaphysical reason why you could not have measurements of the degrees of pain or conscious awareness, for example. This one of the most important messages of this book. Once you revise the traditional categories to fit the facts, there is no problem in recognizing that the mental qua mental is physical qua physical." (Pg. 118)
He observes, "One of the weird features of recent intellectual life was the idea that consciousness... was not important, that somehow it didn't matter. One reason this is so preposterous is that consciousness is itself the condition of anything having importance. Only to a conscious being can there be any such thing as importance." (Pg. 158)
He summarizes, "Psychological libertarianism as I have defined it is probably true. The thesis says that our psychological states, beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc., are not in every case causally sufficient to determine the subsequent action. As far as the psychological level is concerned, free actions do indeed exist, though of course not all actions are free at the psychological level... the gap is PSYCHOLOGICALLY real, it is not an illusion... Our conscious states are higher-level or system features of the brain, and consequently there are not two separate sets of causes---the psychological and the neurobiological. The psychological is just the neurobiological described as a higher level." (Pg. 226-227)
He concludes, "The self as I am describing it is a purely formal notion... involving the capacity to organize its intentionality under constraints of rationality in such a way as to undertake voluntary, intentional actions, where the reasons are not causally sufficient to fix the action... similarly, the notion of a self that I am postulating ...has to be an entity, such that one and the same entity has consciousness, perception, rationality, the capacity to engage in action, and the capacity to organize perceptions and reasons, so as to perform voluntary actions on the presupposition of freedom. If you have got all of that, you have a self." (Pg. 296-297)
Searle is one of the most important contemporary philosophers of mind; this book will be of keen interest to anyone studying this field.
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He has written many other books, such as 'The Mystery of Consciousness,' 'The Rediscovery of the Mind,' 'Mind,' 'Language And Society,' etc.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 2004 book, "there is an overriding reason for my wanting to write a general introduction to the philosophy of mind. Almost all of the works that I have read accept the same set of historically inherited categories for describing mental phenomena, especially consciousness... The different positions then are all taken within a set of mistaken assumptions... this [book] is my only attempt at a comprehensive introduction to the entire subject of the philosophy of mind." (Pg. 1-2) He adds, "this is my second reason for wanting to write this book. Most of the general introductions to the subject are just about the Big Questions... I do not think these are the only interesting questions in the philosophy of mind... Specifically, it seems to me we need to investigate questions about the detailed structure of consciousness... we can then go on to examine the actual structure of human intentionality." (Pg. 5)
Later, he says, "I will state biological naturalism about consciousness as a set of four theses: 1. Conscious states, with their subjective, first-person ontology, are real phenomena in the real world... 2. Conscious states are entirely caused by lower level neurobiological processes in the brain. Conscious states are thus causally reducible to neurobiological processes... 3. Conscious states are realized in the brain as features of the brain system, and thus exist at a level higher than that of neurons and synapses... 4. Because conscious states are real features of the real world, they function causally." (Pg. 113-114)
He argues, "There is no reason why a physical system such as a human or animal organism should not have states that are qualitative, subjective, and intentional... There is no metaphysical reason why you could not have measurements of the degrees of pain or conscious awareness, for example. This one of the most important messages of this book. Once you revise the traditional categories to fit the facts, there is no problem in recognizing that the mental qua mental is physical qua physical." (Pg. 118)
He observes, "One of the weird features of recent intellectual life was the idea that consciousness... was not important, that somehow it didn't matter. One reason this is so preposterous is that consciousness is itself the condition of anything having importance. Only to a conscious being can there be any such thing as importance." (Pg. 158)
He summarizes, "Psychological libertarianism as I have defined it is probably true. The thesis says that our psychological states, beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc., are not in every case causally sufficient to determine the subsequent action. As far as the psychological level is concerned, free actions do indeed exist, though of course not all actions are free at the psychological level... the gap is PSYCHOLOGICALLY real, it is not an illusion... Our conscious states are higher-level or system features of the brain, and consequently there are not two separate sets of causes---the psychological and the neurobiological. The psychological is just the neurobiological described as a higher level." (Pg. 226-227)
He concludes, "The self as I am describing it is a purely formal notion... involving the capacity to organize its intentionality under constraints of rationality in such a way as to undertake voluntary, intentional actions, where the reasons are not causally sufficient to fix the action... similarly, the notion of a self that I am postulating ...has to be an entity, such that one and the same entity has consciousness, perception, rationality, the capacity to engage in action, and the capacity to organize perceptions and reasons, so as to perform voluntary actions on the presupposition of freedom. If you have got all of that, you have a self." (Pg. 296-297)
Searle is one of the most important contemporary philosophers of mind; this book will be of keen interest to anyone studying this field.
December 20, 2019
The mark of a great thinker is being able to discuss complex issues deeply while using simple language that鈥檚 easy to understand. John Searle does that beautifully. He penetrates deeply into the questions in the philosophy of mind, and finds common sense answers to many of them.
He has a tendency, like Aristotle, to reject extremes. He rejects dualism as well as materialism. Dualism is easy to refute, but he goes further and refutes even in the more modern form of 鈥減roperty dualism鈥�. He then turns to materialism in its various types. This is the doctrine that physical particles exist and that all properties must be reducible to these physical particles. In other words, that there are no larger level properties or functions that are not reducible to the level of physical particles. He goes through the types and the problem with them. Then he offers his common sense alternative: that the mind exists with all its functions, that it is material, but not fully reducible. It is brought about by physical properties but the subject experience of it cannot be reduced to those properties.
He then goes on to address various other problems in philosophy of mind, using his simple common sense approach.
Most fascinating is that he gets at the real problems in the enlightenment and in Hume鈥檚 philosophy that have impaired further progress in this area. Their problem was that the thought that people can only perceive sensations rather than real entities. Their other problem (particularly hume鈥檚) was that we can only know about atomistic experiences, and not larger entities and processes that are implied by the experiences we have. I was pleasantly surprised to see him endorse perceptual realism - a position I came to after reading David Kelley鈥檚 The Evidence of the Senses.
He has a tendency, like Aristotle, to reject extremes. He rejects dualism as well as materialism. Dualism is easy to refute, but he goes further and refutes even in the more modern form of 鈥減roperty dualism鈥�. He then turns to materialism in its various types. This is the doctrine that physical particles exist and that all properties must be reducible to these physical particles. In other words, that there are no larger level properties or functions that are not reducible to the level of physical particles. He goes through the types and the problem with them. Then he offers his common sense alternative: that the mind exists with all its functions, that it is material, but not fully reducible. It is brought about by physical properties but the subject experience of it cannot be reduced to those properties.
He then goes on to address various other problems in philosophy of mind, using his simple common sense approach.
Most fascinating is that he gets at the real problems in the enlightenment and in Hume鈥檚 philosophy that have impaired further progress in this area. Their problem was that the thought that people can only perceive sensations rather than real entities. Their other problem (particularly hume鈥檚) was that we can only know about atomistic experiences, and not larger entities and processes that are implied by the experiences we have. I was pleasantly surprised to see him endorse perceptual realism - a position I came to after reading David Kelley鈥檚 The Evidence of the Senses.
May 26, 2022
A really good introductory book to the philosophy of mind. Searle's style here is very engaging and beginner friendly. No prior knowledge of philosophy is needed as all the technical jargon is explained in detail. The topics covered in this book include discussion of all the major positions in philosophy of mind (from substance dualism to functionalism), the nature of consciousness and unconsciousness, intentionality, free will, direct vs indirect realism, and personal identity.
Searle's own position, biological naturalism, is a rather unique position in philosophy of mind compared to all the other standard positions. He argues in this book that the traditional distinction between the mental and the physical is outdated and do not adequately describe the world as we know it. Hence, we should revise the distinction between the mental and the physical. From there, he argues that mental phenomena are causally reducible to physical phenomena, but they are not ontologically reducible. Mental phenomena are just higher level features of the brain caused by neurological processes, which are lower level features of the brain. Similar to how the properties of a piece of metal can be causally explained by the properties of its molecules. However, while the macro features are causally explained by the micro features, that doesn't necessarily mean the macro is nothing but the micro. So while Searle doesn't believe in souls or any other immaterial substances, he states we should still treat mental phenomena as ontologically distinct from physical phenomena due to the subjective first-person nature of the former and the objective third-person nature of the latter.
Searle's own position, biological naturalism, is a rather unique position in philosophy of mind compared to all the other standard positions. He argues in this book that the traditional distinction between the mental and the physical is outdated and do not adequately describe the world as we know it. Hence, we should revise the distinction between the mental and the physical. From there, he argues that mental phenomena are causally reducible to physical phenomena, but they are not ontologically reducible. Mental phenomena are just higher level features of the brain caused by neurological processes, which are lower level features of the brain. Similar to how the properties of a piece of metal can be causally explained by the properties of its molecules. However, while the macro features are causally explained by the micro features, that doesn't necessarily mean the macro is nothing but the micro. So while Searle doesn't believe in souls or any other immaterial substances, he states we should still treat mental phenomena as ontologically distinct from physical phenomena due to the subjective first-person nature of the former and the objective third-person nature of the latter.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
June 20, 2022
Well that read took a while, which wasn't actually my fault - determinism has just caused my neurons to go blank in the face of philosophy of mind.
I really enjoyed the book, Searle certainly seems to have a strong disagreement with most of the theories of consciousness I was familiar with before reading, and even theories on other things later on in the book. This doesn't stop him from painting a nice picture of the theories of consciousness and how many of the components of them work, however. I didn't necessarily find his own theory entirely convincing even though I appreciate his attempt at simplifying a complex issue.
Without writing a C- quality paper on how consciousness works, I'll just say that I learnt a lot, and was given the opportunity to think a lot about how our minds work, and how some of the philosophical problems could be approached and thought about through the endless amount of theories available. The notes feature on Kindle is becoming a great tool to pause and reflect on how you're actually reading things, instead of just gliding past the words on the screen with a surface level of engagement.
At this stage I feel like an epiphonemonalist, my consciousness is surplus to requirements, it lacks mental causation, and "I" am really just watching the end result of my physiological and neurobiological processes play out in real time.
On that note, I can hear my physiological processes calling, it's time to click the post button below...
I really enjoyed the book, Searle certainly seems to have a strong disagreement with most of the theories of consciousness I was familiar with before reading, and even theories on other things later on in the book. This doesn't stop him from painting a nice picture of the theories of consciousness and how many of the components of them work, however. I didn't necessarily find his own theory entirely convincing even though I appreciate his attempt at simplifying a complex issue.
Without writing a C- quality paper on how consciousness works, I'll just say that I learnt a lot, and was given the opportunity to think a lot about how our minds work, and how some of the philosophical problems could be approached and thought about through the endless amount of theories available. The notes feature on Kindle is becoming a great tool to pause and reflect on how you're actually reading things, instead of just gliding past the words on the screen with a surface level of engagement.
At this stage I feel like an epiphonemonalist, my consciousness is surplus to requirements, it lacks mental causation, and "I" am really just watching the end result of my physiological and neurobiological processes play out in real time.
On that note, I can hear my physiological processes calling, it's time to click the post button below...
May 21, 2024
There are two introductory books I recommend to anyone interested in philosophy of mind; Ravenscroft鈥檚 鈥淧hilosophy of Mind: A Beginner鈥檚 Guide鈥� and this one.
Of the two, Ravenscroft鈥檚 book is the better general learning tool. However, Searle鈥檚 book, including more of the authors personal perspective, is a decent introduction for thinking about philosophy of mind within a particular neurological framework.
As a baseline introduction to the most relevant historical and contemporary propositions and research projects in philosophy of mind, this book isn鈥檛 particularly strong. There鈥檚 a great deal of bias (and even arguably some degree of dismissal) involved, even though the author makes attempts at being fair when introducing concepts for the first time. Jargon is inconsistently presented with and without explanation, and some points and counterpoints to presented propositions and research projects are a little too quickly glossed over.
The book isn鈥檛 useless by any means, but if you鈥檙e looking for a genuinely pedagogically structured introduction to philosophy of mind, Ravenscroft鈥檚 book is probably the better way to go. If you鈥檙e primarily interested in a more neurologically rooted perspective of philosophy of mind, and don鈥檛 mind glossing over other perspectives, this book is definitely worth the read.
Of the two, Ravenscroft鈥檚 book is the better general learning tool. However, Searle鈥檚 book, including more of the authors personal perspective, is a decent introduction for thinking about philosophy of mind within a particular neurological framework.
As a baseline introduction to the most relevant historical and contemporary propositions and research projects in philosophy of mind, this book isn鈥檛 particularly strong. There鈥檚 a great deal of bias (and even arguably some degree of dismissal) involved, even though the author makes attempts at being fair when introducing concepts for the first time. Jargon is inconsistently presented with and without explanation, and some points and counterpoints to presented propositions and research projects are a little too quickly glossed over.
The book isn鈥檛 useless by any means, but if you鈥檙e looking for a genuinely pedagogically structured introduction to philosophy of mind, Ravenscroft鈥檚 book is probably the better way to go. If you鈥檙e primarily interested in a more neurologically rooted perspective of philosophy of mind, and don鈥檛 mind glossing over other perspectives, this book is definitely worth the read.
April 27, 2022
Searle鈥檚 鈥淏iological Naturalism鈥� position does not seem to be too different from what most would call 鈥減roperty dualism.鈥� Maybe Searle would prefer the term 鈥渁spect dualism鈥� since he has an affinity for that word and a distaste for the traditional vocabulary.
Highly intriguing, informative, most of all clear as can be. Searle has a few arguments which I feel don鈥檛 hold up. His argument for the inherent presupposition of direct realism in discourse doesn鈥檛 quite hold, because the causal notion of object->representation in the sense-datum theory already assumes that the 鈥渘oumenon鈥� or 鈥渢hing-in-itself鈥� causes our representation of an object and that even if these representations have a token difference, they have a type identity because our understanding creates an intelligible gestalt structure from the individual sense perceptions, and, like Searle emphasizes himself, we intuit and understand the spatio-temporal contiguity of objects in the same manner as we do for personal identity.
Overall, fire! Endlessly entertaining to read.
Highly intriguing, informative, most of all clear as can be. Searle has a few arguments which I feel don鈥檛 hold up. His argument for the inherent presupposition of direct realism in discourse doesn鈥檛 quite hold, because the causal notion of object->representation in the sense-datum theory already assumes that the 鈥渘oumenon鈥� or 鈥渢hing-in-itself鈥� causes our representation of an object and that even if these representations have a token difference, they have a type identity because our understanding creates an intelligible gestalt structure from the individual sense perceptions, and, like Searle emphasizes himself, we intuit and understand the spatio-temporal contiguity of objects in the same manner as we do for personal identity.
Overall, fire! Endlessly entertaining to read.
October 24, 2020
I think this is a rather informative overview by Searle, where he highlights mind's uniqueness and the uniqueness of any such attempt at analysis. Here he begins by looking into various existing issues in approaching the philosophy of mind which include materialism, the mind/body problem, explanations on consciousness, intentionality, free will, and mental causation. Searle also considers the place of consciousness in the broader world, where the dualism concept of mind and body being distinct comes into play, and then there being views on materialism including functionalism and his Chinese room argument, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera... Views on mind are complicated and possess great depth, I'll advise those with an interest to read the book, its a good introduction and can be downloaded...
June 2, 2022
賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賱賷爻 賲噩乇丿 賲賯丿賲丞 丕賱賶 賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱毓賯賱 賵賱賰賳賴 丕賷囟丕 丿乇丕爻丞 鬲丨賱賷賱賴 賵賳賯丿賷丞 賵賲賳馗賲丞 賱丕賴賲 丕賱賲卮賰賱丕鬲 丕賱鬲賷 鬲卮賰賱 賲賵囟賵毓 賲賵囟賵毓 賴匕丕 丕賱丨賯賱 丕賱賲乇賰夭賷 賮賷 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 毓丕賲丞. 賮賷 賴匕賴 丕賱丿乇丕爻丞 賷鬲噩丕賵夭 丕賱賲丐賱賮 丕賱賲賯賵賱丕鬲 丕賱鬲賯賱賷丿賷丞 丕賱賲賳賴噩 丕賱賲兀賱賵賮 賮賷 賲毓丕賱噩丞 賴匕賴 丕賱賲卮賰賱丕鬲 賵賲賳 丕賴賲 丕賱廿賳噩丕夭丕鬲 丕賱鬲賷 賯丿賲賴丕 噩賵賳 爻賷乇賱 賮賷 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 鬲賯丿賷賲 丨賱賵賱 賲毓賯賵賱丞 賵賲賮賷丿丞 噩丿丕 賱賱賲卮賰賱丕鬲 丕賱氐毓亘丞 丕賱鬲賷 賵乇孬賳丕賴丕 賲賳 丿賷賰丕乇鬲 賮賷 亘丿丕賷丞 丕賱賯乇賳 丕賱爻丕亘毓 毓卮乇 .
賷賰鬲亘 丕賱賲丐賱賮 賵賷亘鬲丿卅 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 亘卮乇丨 孬賱丕孬丞 兀爻卅賱丞 兀爻丕爻賷丞 賮賷 賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱毓賯賱 賷爻鬲賮爻乇 兀賵賱賴丕 毓賳 丕賱賮乇賯 亘賷賳 丕賱匕丕鬲賷 丕賵 丕賱賲賵囟賵毓賷 丕賵 亘賷賳 丕賱毓賯賱賷 賵丕賱賲丕丿 亘賷賳賲丕 賷鬲賲丨賵乇 丕賱孬丕賳賷 丨賵賱 : 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 丕賱賱丕賲丕丿賷丞 丕賳 鬲賵噩丿 賮賷 毓丕賱賲 賲丕丿賷責 丕賲丕 丕賱孬丕賱孬 賮賷鬲爻丕賿賱 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱丨丕賱鬲 毓賯賱賷丞 丕賳 鬲爻亘亘 丨賵丕丿孬 賲丕丿賷丞 賵賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱丨賵丿丕孬 賲丕丿賷丞 丕賳 鬲爻亘亘 丨丕賱丕鬲 毓賯賱賷丞 .
賷賰鬲亘 丕賱賲丐賱賮 賵賷亘鬲丿卅 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 亘卮乇丨 孬賱丕孬丞 兀爻卅賱丞 兀爻丕爻賷丞 賮賷 賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱毓賯賱 賷爻鬲賮爻乇 兀賵賱賴丕 毓賳 丕賱賮乇賯 亘賷賳 丕賱匕丕鬲賷 丕賵 丕賱賲賵囟賵毓賷 丕賵 亘賷賳 丕賱毓賯賱賷 賵丕賱賲丕丿 亘賷賳賲丕 賷鬲賲丨賵乇 丕賱孬丕賳賷 丨賵賱 : 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱賱丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱毓賯賱賷丞 丕賱賱丕賲丕丿賷丞 丕賳 鬲賵噩丿 賮賷 毓丕賱賲 賲丕丿賷責 丕賲丕 丕賱孬丕賱孬 賮賷鬲爻丕賿賱 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱丨丕賱鬲 毓賯賱賷丞 丕賳 鬲爻亘亘 丨賵丕丿孬 賲丕丿賷丞 賵賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱丨賵丿丕孬 賲丕丿賷丞 丕賳 鬲爻亘亘 丨丕賱丕鬲 毓賯賱賷丞 .
March 22, 2025
This is a good introduction to the topic but it has a major wart. That wart is that the author, John Searle, is an asshole.
And as a consequence of him being such, he takes an entirely dismissive attitude towards views he doesn鈥檛 find worth addressing and gives weak, half-arguments to refute them before moving on as if it was obvious he was correct and the subject deserved no further exploration (it appears he especially dislikes Daniel Dennett). In spite of that this is still a well written and engaging introduction and it鈥檚 probably worthwhile to read if the subject interests you and you don鈥檛 know where to start
And as a consequence of him being such, he takes an entirely dismissive attitude towards views he doesn鈥檛 find worth addressing and gives weak, half-arguments to refute them before moving on as if it was obvious he was correct and the subject deserved no further exploration (it appears he especially dislikes Daniel Dennett). In spite of that this is still a well written and engaging introduction and it鈥檚 probably worthwhile to read if the subject interests you and you don鈥檛 know where to start
December 5, 2019
隆Qu茅 tema interesante! Me parece central a la hora de discutir muchas otras cosas. Creo que Searle lo agarra m谩s para el lado del lenguaje que es su especialidad y mi aburrimiento. Me llam贸 la atenci贸n que (si no me equivoco) no cita a Damasio en ning煤n momento. Le har铆a bien una mirada menos cerebro-centrada. Dir铆a en general que se trata de una mirada desde la filosof铆a al problema neurocient铆fico. Se discute sobre posibilidades, eso puede ayudar a expandir la frontera, pero tambi茅n resulta ambiguo.
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April 23, 2020Stopping at Chapter 4 to potentially be picked up later; Searle starts dipping exclusively into his own theory of mind, which is not really what I want from an introductory PhilMind book. Still, first three chapters are a good history of thought, even if Searle occasionally butts his head in to give his opinion, which isn鈥檛 always good (he critiques inferring minds for using argument by analogy but then uses it himself in arguing for animal consciousness, c鈥檓on dude)
July 22, 2020
Excellent. I am reading a lot of philosophy recently and I found his normal language explanations refreshing. Too many philosophers seem to become bogged down in jargon. Whether the intent is to show how much they know, or to obscure what they do not, is not always clear. It seems clear to me that the author is in good command of his material and is honest enough to share with the reader when he is not. Recommended.
November 1, 2020
Very interesting Introduction in the sense that it's scope is primarily the author's accepted, and often quite underdeveloped, theories concerning the parts of discussion.
I understand the "brief" nature of the work may have limited to scope of argumentation, but still so many of the arguments were presented with a sense of assurance and common-sense necessity while being poorly developed or even primarily linguistic.
If nothing else, this work gives a brief summary of Searle's other work in philosophy of mind, and though based on certain phrasings it may seem to be orthogonal to his intention, alleviates you of the need to spend too much time exploring those works..
I understand the "brief" nature of the work may have limited to scope of argumentation, but still so many of the arguments were presented with a sense of assurance and common-sense necessity while being poorly developed or even primarily linguistic.
If nothing else, this work gives a brief summary of Searle's other work in philosophy of mind, and though based on certain phrasings it may seem to be orthogonal to his intention, alleviates you of the need to spend too much time exploring those works..
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