Henry Alfred Kissinger (born Heinz Alfred Kissinger) was a German-born American bureaucrat, diplomat, and 1973 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He served as National Security Advisor and later concurrently as Secretary of State in the Richard Nixon administration. Kissinger emerged unscathed from the Watergate scandal, and maintained his powerful position when Gerald Ford became President.
A proponent of Realpolitik, Kissinger played a dominant role in United States foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. During this period, he pioneered the policy of d茅tente.
During his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations he cut a flamboyant figure, appearing at social occasions with many celebrities. His foreign policy record made him a nemesis to the anti-war left and the anti-communist right alike.
A lengthy memoir book by Henry Kissinger, a well-known and, to many, controversial Secretary of State of the USA. It mostly covers his tenure in the last days of Nixon's presidency and focuses on work with the president Gerald Ford in the 1970s.
Kissinger's style struck me as highly articulate and intelligent. His knowledge and understanding of history as well as interconnections between various events are very revealing. Above all, I enjoyed reading about Kissinger's clear goals and strategy in the foreign affairs - while all the rest were simply tactics to achieve that. To maximise national security and to win the Cold War over the Communist block - these were two main objectives - and all Kissinger's actions methodically followed these (and eventually, those have been achieved). It reminded me that if one has clear objectives and strategy which shows the seeds of success, good team around and reliable allies, it is worthwhile to stick to this strategy, however difficult it might be at times.
Kissinger impressed me with his understanding of human psychology as well - which he displayed in describing the process of diplomatic negotiations with the leaders of China, the Soviet Union, Western European allies, African states, Egypt, Israel, and so on. One can learn a lot about the recent history and internal dynamics of many states all across the world (since Kissinger as a Minister of Foreign Affairs of the influential state had to deal with all of them). In particular, it was interesting to read about the impressive wisdom of the Chinese leaders in the 1970s - who started the turn-around of the Chinese economy and society.
The only parts which did not interest me that much were lengthy descriptions of internal dynamics in the American national politics. At times, these seemed somewhat apologetic too ("I was good, but not the others!").
All in all, it is not an easy piece of cake to chew (above 1100 pages), but one can learn quite a lot about strategy-based leadership and the recent world history.
The final (and, at 1,079 pages, the shortest) volume of Kissinger's memoirs as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. This volume covers the Ford years, from Nixon's resignation in August 1974 to the transition after Jimmy Carter's election as President in 1976. Due in large to Nixon's growing weakness thanks to Watergate, and then Ford becoming the first non-elected President in history, Kissinger became a much more powerful Secretary of State than he would have otherwise.
One of the things that Kissinger does extremely well here is that he compartmentalizes different areas of foreign policy: giving each region its own part in the book while also being able to juxtapose the region under discussion against the other crises and issues occurring at the same time. This gives the reader a better sense of the rapid-fire nature of the problems that Kissinger and Ford were facing. Different problems occurred at overlapping times and there was seldom enough time to devote the amount of time to each one that he thought necessary. Foreign policy issues do not happen in a vacuum, and are also not unaffected by American domestic concerns. This is one of the main themes of all three volumes, but it really comes into play here in the wake of Watergate and the declining power of the presidency.
Kissinger spends approximately the first 10% of the book talking about the end of the Nixon presidency, what it was like working for Nixon vs working for Ford, and how he really had to act as a sort of co-president while Nixon's presidency disintegrated and Ford got up to speed. Much of this was covered in the prior volume, Years of Upheaval. While Kissinger does provide some penetrating analysis on Nixon's character and what he was like as a boss, most of this could have been left out and the quality of the book would not been have been affected.
One thing that clearly stands out in this volume is the basic human decency and kindness of Gerald Ford. Time and again, Kissinger describes how Ford rarely put politics ahead of making what he thought was the right decision. This goes from the pardoning of Nixon to the beginnings of the negotiation over a treaty to transfer control of the Panama Canal to Panama (here was one of the few concessions to the electoral calendar that Ford ultimately did make, putting the brakes on talks for most of 1976). It is clear that, after the turmoil of the Nixon years, Kissinger relished Ford's simplicity in human relations and his honesty and support in dealing with him.
Kissinger does not miss any chance to fillet Congress and the media as being short-sighted and obtuse in their views of America's role and responsibilities in the world. This is especially acute when writes about the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, and how Congress, with a large boost from an extremely skeptical media, cut funding and basically cut Ford and Kissinger's legs out from under them, rendering them helpless as they watched Saigon be overtaken by the North Vietnamese communists. Kissinger's main beef is that the U.S. was basically leaving its longtime ally, South Vietnam, hung out to dry and the regime of President Thieu be destroyed. He does have a point, and one must take into consideration his experience and all of the months that he devoted to finding an acceptable settlement to the Vietnam War. His first volume, White House Years, describes the intense and maddening negotiations that he underwent with Le Duc Tho from North Vietnam, and how he had to constantly endure Tho's arrogance and condescension. So, his being angry at Congress in effect taking decisions out of his hands and letting his work go down the drain is more than understandable.
However, when would the U.S. have completely gotten out of South Vietnam? Did Kissinger really think that, after all of the upheaval of the late 1960s, and all of the protests, and all of the troops who died there, that the American public would accept a return of armed forces to South Vietnam? Did he think that Congress, in the wake of Watergate, in the wake of the lies told by Johnson and Nixon, with the economy turning sour due to inflation and the energy crisis, would recommit America to once again defending a weak regime in South Vietnam? North Vietnam had one distinct advantage over the United States (and France before it), and that was that - at some point - the U.S. would go home. Troops would not be kept there indefinitely. Kissinger does not discuss the impact that these aspects had on Congress' decision to end all funding to Vietnam.
Later in the book, Kissinger discusses Latin America. This was an area of the world where he admitted that he had little expertise in - as his primary interest and background was in Cold War diplomacy, and a focus on American relationships with Western Europe. Kissinger also admits that he knew that Latin America was important, and that he wished he had had more time to devote to the region, but other priorities and crises usually intervened and served to divert his attention elsewhere. When looking at what was going on in the world while Kissinger was in office, this is definitely an accurate description of U.S.-Latin American affairs. However, Kissinger once again goes out of his way to distance himself - and the CIA - from the bloody coup that took place in Chile in 1973. There are many sources that one can read that show that Kissinger was far more involved than he admits in removing Salvador Allende and thus paving the way for Augusto Pinochet.
Towards the end of the book, Kissinger devotes significant time to discussing issues with majority rule in southern Africa. Any discussion of African politics was completely absent from the first two volumes, and after slogging through chapter after chapter about arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union, it was a pleasure to read about a completely different area of the world for a change. Kissinger's work in this area came late in his tenure, and was once again hampered by a recalcitrant Congress determined to prevent any type of military or financial endeavors in a distant part of the globe. This causes Kissinger to somewhat contradict himself here as on page 999 he talks about warning Rhodesian "Prime Minister" Ian Smith (Smith was basically self-appointed to that position, but Kissinger recognized him as such anyways to help smooth negotiations) that he needs to follow the American and British plans for majority rule, but then two pages later he is forced to admit the considerable limits placed on the U.S. by Congress if Kissinger advocated for any economic aid, let alone military assistance.
Despite his proclivity to write in such detail, there are some things that Kissinger is somewhat tight-lipped about (including the Chile coup as previously mentioned): Ford's decision to remove him as National Security Adviser in late 1975, the removal of Nelson Rockefeller from the 1976 Republican ticket, and the machinations of a young Donald Rumsfeld first as Chief of Staff and then as Secretary of Defense. Kissinger includes almost no personal references in these volumes, other than occasional references to his emigrating to the U.S. from Germany as a boy. Indeed, on only the second to last page does he mention that he has a brother! He also plays somewhat coy about wanting to stay on in office. Early in the book, he quotes directly from Ford that Ford planned to retain as Secretary of State had he been elected in 1976. Yet, during the African portion of the memoir, he writes that he planned to resign even if Ford had been reelected.
Overall, this volume is a satisfying conclusion to Kissinger's many travels and adventures over eight years of significant change in American history. For anyone interested in American diplomatic history, the opening to China, U.S.-Russian Cold War relations, or the Nixon and/or Ford presidencies, these books are highly valuable. But, for the general or casual reader, you might wish to look elsewhere unless you would like to devote a few months' worth of reading time to these massive tomes.
鈥淵ears of Renewal鈥� is the conclusion of Henry Kissinger鈥檚 memoirs, this volume dealing primarily with the Ford years. The chapters are organized by topics: the transition, the Nixon legacy, the Ford Team, East-West relations, the Middle East, Indochina, Europe, Latin America, Communists, Southern Africa and, at the end, another transition.
The author makes the point that he assumed duties beyond those of a routine Secretary of State because of Nixon鈥檚 increasing pre-occupation with political problems and Ford鈥檚 inexperience in foreign affairs. As the new president put it: 鈥� Henry, I need you. The country needs you. I want you to stay.鈥�
This book reminds the reader about the rapid fire crises with which Ford and his team had to deal. Without the period between election and inauguration, Ford had to pick up where Nixon left off. He had to build on Nixon鈥檚 relationships with the Soviet Union and China while managing eruptions in Cyprus, perennial turmoil in the Middle East, and an immediate election season that returned a 鈥淢cGovernite鈥� Congress, only two years after McGovern had been soundly defeated.
One of the gravest crises to face Ford was the collapse in Indochina. Kissinger gives an insider鈥檚 view of the analysis and efforts of the administration to obtain approval to restore aid to South Vietnam, as provided for in the Peace Accords, when the North made its final push to unify the country. After Ford conceded that the Vietnam War was over for the United States Cambodia provided a chance for America to send a message when it captured the Mayaguez. Kissinger makes the case that the Helsinki accords, though unpopular at the time, were an important step leading to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Toward the end Kissinger was involved in the breakthroughs leading to majority rule in Rhodesia, Southwest Africa and set in motion the process that brought it to South Africa.
On these pages Kissinger tells his story and defends the administration. It is obvious that he respects Ford and resented the interference from the McGovernite Congress. He specifically highlighted congressional cutting of funds for Vietnam and Angola which left Kissinger with nothing to threaten or offer during his diplomatic negotiations.
The tome is lengthy but the writing is superb. The reader is treated to a detailed journey through the foreign policy challenges of the Ford years. Kissinger provides his impressions of those with whom he worked with and against. Ford is shown as a calm leader under attack from both right and left who, while cognizant of political considerations never sacrificed the national welfare on the altar of political expediency. His impressions are not always flattering but always respectful and bare no secrets. 鈥淵ears of Renewal鈥� is a valuable contribution to the historical record of the Ford administration and should be read by anyone wanting to understand it or just remember the headlines of that era
I have to admit, the bastard can write. It's frankly a gift that we have such a clear-sighted and readable account of what went on in the mind of one of the most consequential (for good and for very bad) statesmen of the 20th century. While it didn't make me come out on Kissinger's side, it did bring home that he was very often the voice of reason in a truly scary White House. That the roots of Reagan/Bush-style neoconservatism were already present in the Nixon and Ford administrations is very clear in this volume, even if Kissinger doesn't quite address it.
鈥淵ears of Renewal鈥� by Henry Kissinger is the final volume of his memoir. Whereas the first two volumes had climaxes that colored their pages, this volume, though the shortest, was hardest to finish due to its rather colorless recounting of foreign policy in the two years of Ford.
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