What do you think?
Rate this book
亘賳丕亍 丕賱賵丕賯毓 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷
賷囟賲 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 鬲爻毓賴 賮氐賵賱 亘毓賳賵丕賳 丿毓丕卅賲 丕賱賵丕賯毓 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷貙 亘賳丕亍 丕賱賵賯丕卅毓 丕賱鬲賶 鬲乇鬲亘胤 亘丕賱賲丐爻爻賴貙 丕賱賱睾賴 賵丕賱賵丕賯毓 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賶 丕賱賳馗乇賷賴 丕賱毓丕賲賴 賱賱賵賯丕卅毓 丕賱賲乇鬲亘胤賴 亘丕賱賲丐爻爻賴貙 廿賷噩丕丿 丕賱賵賯丕卅毓 丕賱賲乇鬲亘胤賴 亘丕賱賲丐爻爻賴貙 賴賱 賱毓賱賲 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賲賳 賵噩賵丿貙 丕賱賴噩賵賲 毓賱賶 賳夭毓賴 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷賴 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷賴貙 丕賱氐丿賯 丕賱鬲胤丕亘賯 賲毓 丕賱賵丕賯毓貙 賴賱 賷賵噩丿 丿賱賷賱 賷孬亘鬲 賵噩賵丿 丕賱賵丕賯毓賷賴 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷丞.
賷賵囟丨 丕賱賲鬲乇噩賲 兀賳 兀賴賲賷賴 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 鬲賰賲賳 賮賶 兀賳 毓賯賵賱賳丕 鬲禺鬲夭賳 乇氐賷丿丕 賲賳 丕賱爻賷賳丕乇賷賵賴丕鬲 亘賮囟賱賴丕 賳氐賳毓 賳賲丕匕噩 賱賱賵丕賯毓 賵賳鬲賰賷賮 賲毓賴丕貙 賵賷賱賯賶 爻賷乇賱 丕賱囟賵亍 毓賱賶 兀賴賲賷賴 兀賮毓丕賱 丕賱賰賱丕賲貙 賵丕賱賲賯丕氐丿 丕賱鬲賶 賷乇賲賶 丕賱賲鬲丨丿孬 廿賱賶 鬲丨賯賷賯賴丕 亘賵丕爻胤賴 丕賱賱睾賴 丕賱鬲賶 鬲賲丕乇爻 賳賮賵匕賴丕 毓賱賶 丕賱爻丕賲毓 賲賲丕 賷丿賮毓賴 賱賱廿匕毓丕賳 賵丕賱丕爻鬲噩丕亘賴貙 胤丕毓賴 賱賲丕 賷胤賱亘 賲賳賴 丕賱賯賷丕賲 亘賴 賮賳賮賵匕 賮毓賱 丕賱兀賲乇 賳賮賵匕 賷丿賮毓 亘丕賱爻丕賲毓 禺賵賮丕 賲賳 爻賱胤賴 丕賱丌賲乇 丕賱鬲賶 丕賰鬲爻亘賴丕 賲賳 廿爻賳丕丿 賵馗賷賮賴 賱賴 噩毓賱鬲 賱賴 賲賰丕賳賴 賵賳賮賵匕丕 賷賲鬲賱賰 爻賱胤賴 丕賱孬賵丕亘 賵丕賱毓賯丕亘 廿賱賶 兀賳 賷胤賷毓 丕賱兀賲乇 亘丕賱賯賷丕賲 亘賮毓賱 賷睾賷乇 亘賴 賵丕賯毓賴 丕賱丨丕賱賷貙 賵賱兀爻賱賵亘 丕賱賯爻賲 賳賮賵匕 賲賲丕孬賱 亘賳丕亍 毓賱賶 爻賱胤賴 丕賱賲賯爻賲 亘賴 賷兀賲賳 亘賴 丕賱爻丕賲毓 毓賱賶 賲爻鬲賯亘賱賴 丕賱賵丕毓丿 兀賵 賷乇鬲毓丿 賲賳 丕賱亘胤卮 丕賱賯丕丿賲貙 賵賱賱賵毓丿 賮毓賱 丕賱爻丨乇 賮賶 氐賳毓 丕賱兀丨賱丕賲 賵丕賱兀賵賴丕賲 丕賱鬲賶 鬲毓丿 亘鬲睾賷賷乇 丕賱賲爻鬲賯亘賱 丨鬲賶 賵賱賵 賱賲 賳乇賴 亘毓丿 賵賳賮賵匕 兀爻丕賱賷亘 丕賱卮乇胤 賷賯賷丿賳丕 賵賷丨丕氐乇賳丕 亘賷賳 丿賮鬲賶 賮毓賱 賵噩賵丕亘 賵毓丿丕 賵賵毓賷丿丕 廿賳 賮毓賱賳丕 賵廿賳 賱賲 賳賮毓賱貙 賮賱賰賱賲丕鬲 丕賱賲鬲丨丿孬 毓賱賶 丕賱爻丕賲毓 鬲兀孬賷乇 毓賯賱賶 賵毓丕胤賮賷貙 賷乇鬲亘胤 亘兀賮毓丕賱 丕賱賰賱丕賲 丕賱兀丿丕卅賷賴 賵丕賱廿賱夭丕賲賷賴 丕賱賮丕毓賱賴 亘賳丕亍 毓賱賶 賱乇睾亘丕鬲 丕賱賲鬲賰賱賲 亘丕賱賱睾賴貙 亘賱 賯丿 賷亘丿賱 亘賲噩乇丿 丕賱賳胤賯 亘亘毓囟 丕賱兀賮毓丕賱 丕賱賱睾賵賷賴 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賰廿氐丿丕乇 丕賱兀丨賰丕賲 兀賵 廿賯丕賲賴 丕賱兀亘賳賷賴 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷賴 丕賱氐睾乇賶 賰丕賱夭賵丕噩 賵丕賱胤賱丕賯貙 賵丕賱賰亘乇賶 賰丕賱丨乇亘 賵鬲賳氐賷亘 丕賱丨賰丕賲 賱賰賳 亘卮乇賵胤 鬲賲賷夭 亘賷賳 丕賱賮毓賱 丕賱丨賯賷賯賶 賵丕賱賴夭賱貙 亘毓囟賴丕 禺丕乇噩賶 賰丕賱卮乇毓賷賴 賵丕賱兀賴賱賷賴貙賵亘毓囟賴丕 丿丕禺賱賷: 賰丕賱氐丿賯貙 賵賳賷賴 丕賱賵賮丕亍 亘丕賱賵毓丿貙 賵丕賱毓乇賮丕賳 丕賱丨賯賷賯賶.
亘丿賵賳賴丕 賷賰賵賳 賰匕亘丕 賵禺丿丕毓丕貙 賮亘賳賮賵匕 丕賱賱睾賴 鬲囟禺賲 丕賱爻賱胤賴 賵鬲氐賳毓 丕賱賴賷亘賴 賵丕賱兀賵賴丕賲 丕賱賯丕丿乇賴 毓賱賶 鬲睾賷賷乇 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賵丕賱賲爻鬲賯亘賱 賵鬲丨乇賷賰 丕賱噩賲賵毓 賵丕賱爻賷胤乇賴 毓賱賶 毓賯賱 丕賱爻丕賲毓貙 賵賮賴賲 丕賱兀賱毓丕亘 丕賱賱睾賵賷賴 囟乇賵乇賶 賱賮賴賲 賲噩丕賱丕鬲 丕賱丿毓丕賷賴貙 賵丕賱爻亘丕亘 賵丕賱丕夭丿乇丕亍貙 賵丕賱卮賮丕賮賷賴 丕賱賱睾賵賷賴貙 賵賲噩丕賱丕鬲 丕賱禺.. 丕賱鬲賶 亘賴丕 鬲賰亘賱賳丕 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 賮賶 爻噩賵賳 丕賱禺賵賮貙 兀賵 鬲賵賴賲賳丕 亘賯丿乇鬲賴丕 毓賱賶 丕賱亘胤卮 兀賵 鬲亘賷毓 賱賳丕 兀賵賴丕賲 丕賱亘胤賵賱賴 兀賵 鬲亘乇乇 亘賴丕 匕賲鬲賴丕 賲賳 丕賱毓丕乇 賵丕賱丿賲 賵丕賱禺丿丕毓貙 兀賵 鬲亘賷毓 丕賱兀賵賴丕賲.
賷賵囟丨 丕賱賲鬲乇噩賲 兀賳 兀賴賲賷賴 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 鬲賰賲賳 賮賶 兀賳 毓賯賵賱賳丕 鬲禺鬲夭賳 乇氐賷丿丕 賲賳 丕賱爻賷賳丕乇賷賵賴丕鬲 亘賮囟賱賴丕 賳氐賳毓 賳賲丕匕噩 賱賱賵丕賯毓 賵賳鬲賰賷賮 賲毓賴丕貙 賵賷賱賯賶 爻賷乇賱 丕賱囟賵亍 毓賱賶 兀賴賲賷賴 兀賮毓丕賱 丕賱賰賱丕賲貙 賵丕賱賲賯丕氐丿 丕賱鬲賶 賷乇賲賶 丕賱賲鬲丨丿孬 廿賱賶 鬲丨賯賷賯賴丕 亘賵丕爻胤賴 丕賱賱睾賴 丕賱鬲賶 鬲賲丕乇爻 賳賮賵匕賴丕 毓賱賶 丕賱爻丕賲毓 賲賲丕 賷丿賮毓賴 賱賱廿匕毓丕賳 賵丕賱丕爻鬲噩丕亘賴貙 胤丕毓賴 賱賲丕 賷胤賱亘 賲賳賴 丕賱賯賷丕賲 亘賴 賮賳賮賵匕 賮毓賱 丕賱兀賲乇 賳賮賵匕 賷丿賮毓 亘丕賱爻丕賲毓 禺賵賮丕 賲賳 爻賱胤賴 丕賱丌賲乇 丕賱鬲賶 丕賰鬲爻亘賴丕 賲賳 廿爻賳丕丿 賵馗賷賮賴 賱賴 噩毓賱鬲 賱賴 賲賰丕賳賴 賵賳賮賵匕丕 賷賲鬲賱賰 爻賱胤賴 丕賱孬賵丕亘 賵丕賱毓賯丕亘 廿賱賶 兀賳 賷胤賷毓 丕賱兀賲乇 亘丕賱賯賷丕賲 亘賮毓賱 賷睾賷乇 亘賴 賵丕賯毓賴 丕賱丨丕賱賷貙 賵賱兀爻賱賵亘 丕賱賯爻賲 賳賮賵匕 賲賲丕孬賱 亘賳丕亍 毓賱賶 爻賱胤賴 丕賱賲賯爻賲 亘賴 賷兀賲賳 亘賴 丕賱爻丕賲毓 毓賱賶 賲爻鬲賯亘賱賴 丕賱賵丕毓丿 兀賵 賷乇鬲毓丿 賲賳 丕賱亘胤卮 丕賱賯丕丿賲貙 賵賱賱賵毓丿 賮毓賱 丕賱爻丨乇 賮賶 氐賳毓 丕賱兀丨賱丕賲 賵丕賱兀賵賴丕賲 丕賱鬲賶 鬲毓丿 亘鬲睾賷賷乇 丕賱賲爻鬲賯亘賱 丨鬲賶 賵賱賵 賱賲 賳乇賴 亘毓丿 賵賳賮賵匕 兀爻丕賱賷亘 丕賱卮乇胤 賷賯賷丿賳丕 賵賷丨丕氐乇賳丕 亘賷賳 丿賮鬲賶 賮毓賱 賵噩賵丕亘 賵毓丿丕 賵賵毓賷丿丕 廿賳 賮毓賱賳丕 賵廿賳 賱賲 賳賮毓賱貙 賮賱賰賱賲丕鬲 丕賱賲鬲丨丿孬 毓賱賶 丕賱爻丕賲毓 鬲兀孬賷乇 毓賯賱賶 賵毓丕胤賮賷貙 賷乇鬲亘胤 亘兀賮毓丕賱 丕賱賰賱丕賲 丕賱兀丿丕卅賷賴 賵丕賱廿賱夭丕賲賷賴 丕賱賮丕毓賱賴 亘賳丕亍 毓賱賶 賱乇睾亘丕鬲 丕賱賲鬲賰賱賲 亘丕賱賱睾賴貙 亘賱 賯丿 賷亘丿賱 亘賲噩乇丿 丕賱賳胤賯 亘亘毓囟 丕賱兀賮毓丕賱 丕賱賱睾賵賷賴 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賰廿氐丿丕乇 丕賱兀丨賰丕賲 兀賵 廿賯丕賲賴 丕賱兀亘賳賷賴 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷賴 丕賱氐睾乇賶 賰丕賱夭賵丕噩 賵丕賱胤賱丕賯貙 賵丕賱賰亘乇賶 賰丕賱丨乇亘 賵鬲賳氐賷亘 丕賱丨賰丕賲 賱賰賳 亘卮乇賵胤 鬲賲賷夭 亘賷賳 丕賱賮毓賱 丕賱丨賯賷賯賶 賵丕賱賴夭賱貙 亘毓囟賴丕 禺丕乇噩賶 賰丕賱卮乇毓賷賴 賵丕賱兀賴賱賷賴貙賵亘毓囟賴丕 丿丕禺賱賷: 賰丕賱氐丿賯貙 賵賳賷賴 丕賱賵賮丕亍 亘丕賱賵毓丿貙 賵丕賱毓乇賮丕賳 丕賱丨賯賷賯賶.
亘丿賵賳賴丕 賷賰賵賳 賰匕亘丕 賵禺丿丕毓丕貙 賮亘賳賮賵匕 丕賱賱睾賴 鬲囟禺賲 丕賱爻賱胤賴 賵鬲氐賳毓 丕賱賴賷亘賴 賵丕賱兀賵賴丕賲 丕賱賯丕丿乇賴 毓賱賶 鬲睾賷賷乇 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賵丕賱賲爻鬲賯亘賱 賵鬲丨乇賷賰 丕賱噩賲賵毓 賵丕賱爻賷胤乇賴 毓賱賶 毓賯賱 丕賱爻丕賲毓貙 賵賮賴賲 丕賱兀賱毓丕亘 丕賱賱睾賵賷賴 囟乇賵乇賶 賱賮賴賲 賲噩丕賱丕鬲 丕賱丿毓丕賷賴貙 賵丕賱爻亘丕亘 賵丕賱丕夭丿乇丕亍貙 賵丕賱卮賮丕賮賷賴 丕賱賱睾賵賷賴貙 賵賲噩丕賱丕鬲 丕賱禺.. 丕賱鬲賶 亘賴丕 鬲賰亘賱賳丕 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 賮賶 爻噩賵賳 丕賱禺賵賮貙 兀賵 鬲賵賴賲賳丕 亘賯丿乇鬲賴丕 毓賱賶 丕賱亘胤卮 兀賵 鬲亘賷毓 賱賳丕 兀賵賴丕賲 丕賱亘胤賵賱賴 兀賵 鬲亘乇乇 亘賴丕 匕賲鬲賴丕 賲賳 丕賱毓丕乇 賵丕賱丿賲 賵丕賱禺丿丕毓貙 兀賵 鬲亘賷毓 丕賱兀賵賴丕賲.
296 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 1995
150 people are currently reading
4229 people want to read
About the author
John Rogers Searle
72听books356听followersJohn Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado) is an American philosopher and was the Slusser Professor of Philosophy and Mills Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley). Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy, he was the first tenured professor to join the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley. He received the Jean Nicod Prize in 2000, and the National Humanities Medal in 2004.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 29 of 56 reviews
July 29, 2018
馗丕賴乇丕 丕賳诏蹖夭賴鈥屰� 爻乇賱 亘乇丕蹖 賳賵卮鬲賳 讴鬲丕亘貙 鬲丨賱蹖賱 蹖讴 賵丕賯毓賴鈥屰� --亘賴 诏賮鬲賴鈥屰� 丕賵-- 亘賴 賱丨丕馗 賲鬲丕賮蹖夭蹖讴蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 倬蹖趩蹖丿賴 賲孬賱 爻賮丕乇卮 丿丕丿賳 賯賴賵賴 丕爻鬲貙 賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲丕賴蹖鬲 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲蹖 讴賴 賳賴丕丿蹖 賲孬賱 倬賵賱 丿丕乇丿 (賲丕蹖蹖賲 讴賴 亘賴 蹖讴 鬲讴賴 讴丕睾匕 芦讴丕乇讴乇丿禄 賲蹖鈥屫囒屬�). 丕賲丕 丿乇 賳蹖賲賴鈥屰� 丕賵賱 讴鬲丕亘 賮賯胤 鬲讴乇丕乇 丿丕乇蹖賲 賵 鬲讴乇丕乇 亘丿蹖賴蹖丕鬲貙 丕夭 蹖讴 爻乇蹖 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 囟毓蹖賮 賵 爻丕丿賴鈥屫勜з嗁囏� 丨鬲丕 丕賴賲蹖鬲 爻賵丕賱 賵 賲爻卅賱賴鈥屰� 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賲卮禺氐 賳蹖爻鬲.
讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 禺乇蹖丿賲 趩賵賳 亘丨孬 芦賵丕賯毓鈥屭必й屰� 毓賱賲蹖禄 亘乇丕蹖賲 賲爻卅賱賴 亘賵丿賴. 讴鬲丕亘 丿乇 蹖讴 賮氐賱 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲賵囟賵毓 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж藏�. 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賲賵丕賮賯 賵丕賯毓鈥屭必й屰� 丕爻鬲. 賮蹖賱爻賵賮丕賳蹖 讴賴 囟丿賵丕賯毓鈥屭必� 賴爻鬲賳丿 乇丕 賲爻禺乇賴 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀� 賵 賲蹖鈥屭堐屫� 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱鈥屬囏й� 丌賳鈥屬囏� 丨鬲丕 芦丕乇夭卮 噩賵丕亘 丿丕丿賳禄 賴賲 賳丿丕乇丿 賵 丕蹖賳 芦禺蹖賱蹖 賵丕囟丨禄 丕爻鬲 讴賴 噩賴丕賳 賲丕 賵丕賯毓蹖 丕爻鬲. 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丌乇丕蹖 賲毓丿賵丿 丿蹖诏乇丕賳蹖 乇丕 賴賲 讴賴 匕讴乇 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀� 趩賳丕賳 爻丕丿賴鈥屫池ж槽� 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀� 讴賴 毓賲賱丕 趩蹖夭蹖 丕夭 賮賱爻賮賴鈥屰� 丕賵賱蹖賴 亘丕賯蹖 賳賲蹖鈥屬呚з嗀� 賵 亘毓丿 卮乇賵毓 亘賴 丨賲賱賴 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀�.
丿乇 賮氐賱 丌禺乇 賴賲 賲亘丕丨孬蹖 丿乇 亘丕亘 芦氐丿賯禄 賲胤乇丨 賲蹖鈥屫促堌� 讴賴 亘蹖鈥屫ж蒂� 賲蹖鈥屬呚з嗀� 趩賵賳 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賳鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賴 亘丨孬 賵丕賯毓鈥屭必й屰� 乇丕 丿乇 賮氐賱 賯亘賱 倬蹖卮 亘亘乇丿.
賳卮乇 賳賵 (毓賱蹖鈥屫必嘿� 丕蹖賳鈥屭┵� 讴鬲丕亘鈥屬囏й� 禺賵亘蹖 賴賲 趩丕倬 讴乇丿賴)貙 丿丕乇丿 亘賴 爻賲鬲 賴賲蹖賳 芦爻賵丿賵-賮賱爻賮賴禄賴丕 賲蹖鈥屫辟堌�. 跇丕賳乇蹖 讴賴 丕蹖賳 乇賵夭賴丕 亘爻蹖丕乇 胤乇賮丿丕乇 倬蹖丿丕 讴乇丿賴. 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 亘賴 噩丕蹖 丌賵乇丿賳 丿賱蹖賱 賵 亘乇賴丕賳貙 亘賴 噩賲賱丕鬲蹖 乇賵丕賳卮賳丕爻丕賳賴 (丿乇 亘賴鬲乇蹖賳 丨丕賱鬲!) 丕鬲讴丕 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀�. 丕蹖賳 賴賲丕賳 毓賱賲 讴丕匕亘蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 丕賮乇丕丿蹖 乇丕 噩匕亘 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀� 讴賴 毓賱賲 乇丕 丿乇爻鬲 丿乇賳蹖丕賮鬲賴鈥屫з嗀� 賵 禺胤乇 丿乇 賴賲蹖賳鈥屫� 賳賴賮鬲賴 丕爻鬲貙 賳賴 讴鬲丕亘鈥屬囏й� 倬蹖卮 丕夭 毓卮賯 賵 倬爻 丕夭 鬲賵 賵 丕蹖賳鈥屬囏�.
讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 禺乇蹖丿賲 趩賵賳 亘丨孬 芦賵丕賯毓鈥屭必й屰� 毓賱賲蹖禄 亘乇丕蹖賲 賲爻卅賱賴 亘賵丿賴. 讴鬲丕亘 丿乇 蹖讴 賮氐賱 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲賵囟賵毓 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж藏�. 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賲賵丕賮賯 賵丕賯毓鈥屭必й屰� 丕爻鬲. 賮蹖賱爻賵賮丕賳蹖 讴賴 囟丿賵丕賯毓鈥屭必� 賴爻鬲賳丿 乇丕 賲爻禺乇賴 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀� 賵 賲蹖鈥屭堐屫� 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱鈥屬囏й� 丌賳鈥屬囏� 丨鬲丕 芦丕乇夭卮 噩賵丕亘 丿丕丿賳禄 賴賲 賳丿丕乇丿 賵 丕蹖賳 芦禺蹖賱蹖 賵丕囟丨禄 丕爻鬲 讴賴 噩賴丕賳 賲丕 賵丕賯毓蹖 丕爻鬲. 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丌乇丕蹖 賲毓丿賵丿 丿蹖诏乇丕賳蹖 乇丕 賴賲 讴賴 匕讴乇 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀� 趩賳丕賳 爻丕丿賴鈥屫池ж槽� 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀� 讴賴 毓賲賱丕 趩蹖夭蹖 丕夭 賮賱爻賮賴鈥屰� 丕賵賱蹖賴 亘丕賯蹖 賳賲蹖鈥屬呚з嗀� 賵 亘毓丿 卮乇賵毓 亘賴 丨賲賱賴 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀�.
丿乇 賮氐賱 丌禺乇 賴賲 賲亘丕丨孬蹖 丿乇 亘丕亘 芦氐丿賯禄 賲胤乇丨 賲蹖鈥屫促堌� 讴賴 亘蹖鈥屫ж蒂� 賲蹖鈥屬呚з嗀� 趩賵賳 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賳鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賴 亘丨孬 賵丕賯毓鈥屭必й屰� 乇丕 丿乇 賮氐賱 賯亘賱 倬蹖卮 亘亘乇丿.
賳卮乇 賳賵 (毓賱蹖鈥屫必嘿� 丕蹖賳鈥屭┵� 讴鬲丕亘鈥屬囏й� 禺賵亘蹖 賴賲 趩丕倬 讴乇丿賴)貙 丿丕乇丿 亘賴 爻賲鬲 賴賲蹖賳 芦爻賵丿賵-賮賱爻賮賴禄賴丕 賲蹖鈥屫辟堌�. 跇丕賳乇蹖 讴賴 丕蹖賳 乇賵夭賴丕 亘爻蹖丕乇 胤乇賮丿丕乇 倬蹖丿丕 讴乇丿賴. 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 亘賴 噩丕蹖 丌賵乇丿賳 丿賱蹖賱 賵 亘乇賴丕賳貙 亘賴 噩賲賱丕鬲蹖 乇賵丕賳卮賳丕爻丕賳賴 (丿乇 亘賴鬲乇蹖賳 丨丕賱鬲!) 丕鬲讴丕 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀�. 丕蹖賳 賴賲丕賳 毓賱賲 讴丕匕亘蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 丕賮乇丕丿蹖 乇丕 噩匕亘 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀� 讴賴 毓賱賲 乇丕 丿乇爻鬲 丿乇賳蹖丕賮鬲賴鈥屫з嗀� 賵 禺胤乇 丿乇 賴賲蹖賳鈥屫� 賳賴賮鬲賴 丕爻鬲貙 賳賴 讴鬲丕亘鈥屬囏й� 倬蹖卮 丕夭 毓卮賯 賵 倬爻 丕夭 鬲賵 賵 丕蹖賳鈥屬囏�.
May 23, 2015
Really disappointing although possibly my fault in a bad choice. I had assumed this was going to be an argument about how everything we take as reality is in fact a construction of mind and language. But it posited that there are a group of 'brute facts' that exist with or without there being anyone to observe it (if a tree falls in a forest but there's no one to hear it etc), such as there is snow on top of Mount Everest, and then there is a category of socially constructed reality such as money, marriage, baseball rules etc. The second is obviously true, in that other species don't have marriage, money or baseball, but the 'brute facts' rely entirely on our human perception and conception and of course language. 'Snow is white' is not a brute fact, because colour is entirely reliant on the human oracular apparatus as to how light reflects off bodies. Our senses of perception and how our mind arranges this data and how we frame it in language utterly construct reality, whether it persists beyond our own existence or not. We wouldn't be able to call that big lump of rock a mountain, or Everest, or even lump & rock if humans weren't around to conceptualise all that. There would be a solid mass existing in deep time, but even solid, mass & time are human conceptions.
The arguments are dominated by the weaknesses in counter arguments, so that somehow disproving counter arguments is offered to stand as proof for the last argument standing, which it doesn't. Seems to be these 'winning' arguments are just as vulnerable to disproof as the ones Searle chooses to take down with logic. And finally, for an example of how this book disappears up its own jacksie, he argues or tries to argue about the difference between "truth' and 'fact' and gets nowhere.
Let's face it., Wittgenstein's work on language has queered the field for all subsequent philosophy. Language is an intercessionary layer on everything that removes it one level from any material proof.
The arguments are dominated by the weaknesses in counter arguments, so that somehow disproving counter arguments is offered to stand as proof for the last argument standing, which it doesn't. Seems to be these 'winning' arguments are just as vulnerable to disproof as the ones Searle chooses to take down with logic. And finally, for an example of how this book disappears up its own jacksie, he argues or tries to argue about the difference between "truth' and 'fact' and gets nowhere.
Let's face it., Wittgenstein's work on language has queered the field for all subsequent philosophy. Language is an intercessionary layer on everything that removes it one level from any material proof.
May 12, 2023
I like to say that John Searle is a perfect example of how one can be but . His work is a model of the clarity and rigor that is increasingly scarce in philosophy. One conspicuous locus of the kind of vague looseness that I have in mind is in all the chatter about social construction. To listen to some philosophers, you would think that there is no objective reality and that it's representation all the way down. They will probably tell you that Wittgenstein has demonstrated this, of course, but鈥擜las!鈥攖hey will be unable to tell you how.
As the title suggests, Searle's The Construction of Social Reality (1995) seeks to explain the ontological status of social reality. his thesis is that social reality can be explained by three ingredients. The first of these is what he calls assignment of function, i.e., our propensity to impose functions on a brute reality that has none in and of itself. The second is collective intentionality, i.e., our ability to share intentional states like beliefs and desires. The third and last is constitutive rules, i.e., those kinds of rules that, besides regulating an activity, make it the activity that it is.
How exactly does this play out? Well, consider the example of money. Money is, in and of itself, purposeless bits of metal and paper. However, we can assign a purpose to those them by treating them in a certain way. We can do this, for instance, by jointly agreeing to treat them as having a certain exchange value. And this value is in turn to be cashed out in terms of the constitutive rules that make it up: Such and such a piece of nickel counts as being worth so much in this or that context. The same story can be told, mutatis mutandis, of any social fact you please, be it government, property, marriage, etc.
Searle has always repudiated the analytic-continental distinction on the grounds that he is closer to many so-called 鈥渃ontinental鈥� thinkers than to his 鈥渁nalytic鈥� peers. The Construction of Social Reality perfectly exemplifies this; its core theses might as well be lifted from straight from Foucault. However, unlike some of the less sophisticated continental thinkers (or at least their American readers!), Searle avoids falling into the absurd position that there is nothing outside language or representation. For that reason alone, I鈥檇 recommend that anyone tempted to throw around the term 鈥渟ocial construction鈥� read this book鈥攊f, that is, I had any confidence that they might understand it.
As the title suggests, Searle's The Construction of Social Reality (1995) seeks to explain the ontological status of social reality. his thesis is that social reality can be explained by three ingredients. The first of these is what he calls assignment of function, i.e., our propensity to impose functions on a brute reality that has none in and of itself. The second is collective intentionality, i.e., our ability to share intentional states like beliefs and desires. The third and last is constitutive rules, i.e., those kinds of rules that, besides regulating an activity, make it the activity that it is.
How exactly does this play out? Well, consider the example of money. Money is, in and of itself, purposeless bits of metal and paper. However, we can assign a purpose to those them by treating them in a certain way. We can do this, for instance, by jointly agreeing to treat them as having a certain exchange value. And this value is in turn to be cashed out in terms of the constitutive rules that make it up: Such and such a piece of nickel counts as being worth so much in this or that context. The same story can be told, mutatis mutandis, of any social fact you please, be it government, property, marriage, etc.
Searle has always repudiated the analytic-continental distinction on the grounds that he is closer to many so-called 鈥渃ontinental鈥� thinkers than to his 鈥渁nalytic鈥� peers. The Construction of Social Reality perfectly exemplifies this; its core theses might as well be lifted from straight from Foucault. However, unlike some of the less sophisticated continental thinkers (or at least their American readers!), Searle avoids falling into the absurd position that there is nothing outside language or representation. For that reason alone, I鈥檇 recommend that anyone tempted to throw around the term 鈥渟ocial construction鈥� read this book鈥攊f, that is, I had any confidence that they might understand it.
January 22, 2011
I found this to be an intriguing counterpoint to the social constructionism of the 80s and early 90s. Read in juxtaposition to Latour and in conjunction with Hacking, I think that Searle makes an interesting argument. This might be a bit "dated" by now, but if you're going to read Latour and Woolgar, I see no reason not to indulge in work that was a reaction to the Social Construction of Facts.
Interesting side note: Political scientists were assigning this book at Cal last fall, which is why I picked it up in the first place. I'd be curious to know why Searle has gone out of favor recently.
Interesting side note: Political scientists were assigning this book at Cal last fall, which is why I picked it up in the first place. I'd be curious to know why Searle has gone out of favor recently.
January 17, 2014
The Social Construction of Reality, a sociology of knowledge by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann which explained the existence of social facts, social objects, and social institutions from a phenomenological and broadly symbolic interactionist perspective, with a focus on the importance of languge, was published in 1966. It was a seminal work in the constructivist movement within the social sciences and probably originated, or at least popularized the concept of 鈥渟ocial construction鈥�. It is a well-known, marginally famous book within sociology, the content of which is presented in reduced form in a great many introductory sociology textbooks and its popularity is not limited to sociology.
In the context of familiarity with and appreciation of Berger & Luckmann鈥檚 book and sharing a phenomenological perspective, a couple months ago I came across some supportive references to John R. Searle鈥檚 book on the same general topic with the very similar title, The Construction of Social Reality (1995), and decided to read it. I have now read through the end of Chapter 2, and have decided to abandon the book. I find it flawed and more than a little absurd. I do not recommend it.
The first problem I have with this book is that it seems very much to be written as a philosophical reply or answer to, yet has no mention of, Berger and Luckmann鈥檚 much earlier work. Not only does it cover the same general content as Berger & Luckmann and have a title that plays directly on theirs, but Searle explicitly frames his book as a rejection of phenomenological philosophy. One on p.2 and the other on p.5: 鈥淲e cannot just describe how it seems to us from an internal phenomenological point of view鈥︹€� (Of course the phenomenologists would say we have no choice but to describe it that way.) Moreover in the introduction he writes 鈥溾€ne might suppose that they would have been addressed and solved already in the various social sciences鈥� [but] as far as I can tell the questions I am addressing in this book have not been satisfactorily answered in the social sciences.鈥� What can I make of this? It may be that this is intended as a slam of Berger & Luckmann predicated on the word 鈥渟atisfactorily鈥�. It doesn鈥檛 seem possible that a competent scholar doing a literature review on this topic, or with this title in mind, could possibly fail to turn up references to Berger & Luckmann鈥檚 work. Nor does it seem possible that a scholar sharing these ideas with other scholars would not at some point have someone mention the obvious similarities to their work. That seems to leave us with two possibilities: that Searle either is incompetent as a scholar, or else is being disingenuous in failing to explicitly reference Berger & Luckmann.
A second major problem I find with this book is that he begins with the presumption of an objective reality. The core question of the work, framed either as 鈥淗ow are institutional facts possible?鈥� or 鈥淗ow is a socially constructed reality possible?鈥� 鈥� referencing a concept that probably originated with Berger & Luckmann鈥檚 work 鈥� only make sense if one has assumed an objective reality. To a phenomenologist these aren鈥檛 questions at all, and an objective reality can only be known or dealt with through necessarily subjective knowledge. An interesting illustration arises from Searle鈥檚 comments on p.6-7 in which he presents atomic theory and evolutionary theory not as theory or knowledge but as objective reality. Unfortunately we can never know with absolute certainty that atoms or evolution or any other knowledge of what we presume to be an objective world is the reality itself as opposed to merely being our current model of it. Past models of what was thought to be objective reality have at times been replaced by newer models, and these two may be superseded in the future.
Searle offers a discussion of function which seems to offer nothing new, not already well known to social science. He discusses the special category of symbolic functions, e.g. language, in a way that very much parallels the central importance of language in Berger & Luckmann鈥檚 theory.
Searle suggests that there is collective intentionality, which presumes collective conscience. He offers absolutely no evidence that such a thing exists, arguing for it instead on the grounds that it is a more parsimonious, elegant explanation for social action than the negotiated, symbolic social interaction model that underlies nearly all microsociology. I think, unfortunately for Searle, this is one instance in which Occam鈥檚 razor fails. All it would take for his argument is to show even one example of collective intentionality in which there was an absence of symbolic social interaction, but apparently he can think of none. Neither can I. I am inclined to think such examples do not exist. If that is true it would seem to be strong evidence that Searle鈥檚 model is simply wrong.
Searle defines the term 鈥渟ocial fact鈥� in terms of collective intentionality, and 鈥渋nstitutional fact鈥� as a subclass of 鈥渟ocial fact鈥�, the latter being facts that 鈥渞equire special human institutions for their very existence鈥� (p.27). Institutional facts are contrasted with 鈥渂rute鈥� or 鈥渘atural鈥� facts that, in Searle鈥檚 view, exist independently of human, i.e. social, institutions.
Consideration of how institutional facts are created is the main theme of Chapter 2. He suggests that many institutional facts are self-referential, by which he means they can only exist as such because people accept that they exist. Money is a prime example of self-referential fact. Its value and use as money is predicated on people recognizing and accepting it as such. This is a large part of what Berger & Luckmann meant to say that something was socially constructed, but Searle thinks the self-referential quality is limited to institutional facts, whereas Berger & Luckmann suggest that all social knowledge, all 鈥渙bjective鈥� facts, are social constructions. Who鈥檚 right? On p.33 Searle writes 鈥淪omething can be a mountain even if no one believe it is a mountain鈥�. Other than the hypothetical case that Searle has implied in the question, is this statement true? I don鈥檛 think so. No person can present any concrete example of a mountain that no one believes is a mountain. That鈥檚 precisely because even the concept of a mountain, which seems to be a very 鈥渘atural鈥� and 鈥渙bjective鈥� object, is a social construction. Facts are not objective reality. They are knowledge of a (presumably) objective reality, and thus they themselves are subjective. The physical object presumably would remain no matter what we call it, but the concept of a mountain is self-referential, i.e. socially constructed, just like money is. It exists because people recognize it as such.
There are other, similar examples in this chapter. Searle wants to tell us that a printed dollar bill that falls between the cracks of the floor of the mint and is never circulated is nevertheless money, but that a perfect counterfeit bill that no one recognizes as counterfeit and which is circulated and accepted is not money. Both of those assertions are false, I think. Whatever is accepted as money is money, and what is not circulated can, at best, only have the potential to be money. 鈥淢oney鈥�, he writes, 鈥渉as to exist in some physical form.鈥� That seems unlikely. We have replaced precious resources with fiat paper money and to some extent have replaced paper money with electronic tick marks in the magnetization of credit cards or computer records of a bank account balance. Even those, I suppose, have at least the symbol as a physical form, but there seems to be nothing other than the inconvenience of keeping track mentally, to stop people from having a currency that consists entirely in peoples鈥� cognitions without any physical marker or form whatsoever. By the end of Chapter 2 I鈥檇 found enough that I found simply incongruent with the way that the world actually operates, as I understand it, that I quit this book.
Searle is no doubt correct when he writes that 鈥渕uch of our world view depends on our concept of objectivity and the contrast between the objective and subjective鈥�.鈥� (p.7) Throw out the concept of objectivity and recognize that the objective can only be known subjectively and Searle鈥檚 whole line of thought tumbles into the garbage can.
In the context of familiarity with and appreciation of Berger & Luckmann鈥檚 book and sharing a phenomenological perspective, a couple months ago I came across some supportive references to John R. Searle鈥檚 book on the same general topic with the very similar title, The Construction of Social Reality (1995), and decided to read it. I have now read through the end of Chapter 2, and have decided to abandon the book. I find it flawed and more than a little absurd. I do not recommend it.
The first problem I have with this book is that it seems very much to be written as a philosophical reply or answer to, yet has no mention of, Berger and Luckmann鈥檚 much earlier work. Not only does it cover the same general content as Berger & Luckmann and have a title that plays directly on theirs, but Searle explicitly frames his book as a rejection of phenomenological philosophy. One on p.2 and the other on p.5: 鈥淲e cannot just describe how it seems to us from an internal phenomenological point of view鈥︹€� (Of course the phenomenologists would say we have no choice but to describe it that way.) Moreover in the introduction he writes 鈥溾€ne might suppose that they would have been addressed and solved already in the various social sciences鈥� [but] as far as I can tell the questions I am addressing in this book have not been satisfactorily answered in the social sciences.鈥� What can I make of this? It may be that this is intended as a slam of Berger & Luckmann predicated on the word 鈥渟atisfactorily鈥�. It doesn鈥檛 seem possible that a competent scholar doing a literature review on this topic, or with this title in mind, could possibly fail to turn up references to Berger & Luckmann鈥檚 work. Nor does it seem possible that a scholar sharing these ideas with other scholars would not at some point have someone mention the obvious similarities to their work. That seems to leave us with two possibilities: that Searle either is incompetent as a scholar, or else is being disingenuous in failing to explicitly reference Berger & Luckmann.
A second major problem I find with this book is that he begins with the presumption of an objective reality. The core question of the work, framed either as 鈥淗ow are institutional facts possible?鈥� or 鈥淗ow is a socially constructed reality possible?鈥� 鈥� referencing a concept that probably originated with Berger & Luckmann鈥檚 work 鈥� only make sense if one has assumed an objective reality. To a phenomenologist these aren鈥檛 questions at all, and an objective reality can only be known or dealt with through necessarily subjective knowledge. An interesting illustration arises from Searle鈥檚 comments on p.6-7 in which he presents atomic theory and evolutionary theory not as theory or knowledge but as objective reality. Unfortunately we can never know with absolute certainty that atoms or evolution or any other knowledge of what we presume to be an objective world is the reality itself as opposed to merely being our current model of it. Past models of what was thought to be objective reality have at times been replaced by newer models, and these two may be superseded in the future.
Searle offers a discussion of function which seems to offer nothing new, not already well known to social science. He discusses the special category of symbolic functions, e.g. language, in a way that very much parallels the central importance of language in Berger & Luckmann鈥檚 theory.
Searle suggests that there is collective intentionality, which presumes collective conscience. He offers absolutely no evidence that such a thing exists, arguing for it instead on the grounds that it is a more parsimonious, elegant explanation for social action than the negotiated, symbolic social interaction model that underlies nearly all microsociology. I think, unfortunately for Searle, this is one instance in which Occam鈥檚 razor fails. All it would take for his argument is to show even one example of collective intentionality in which there was an absence of symbolic social interaction, but apparently he can think of none. Neither can I. I am inclined to think such examples do not exist. If that is true it would seem to be strong evidence that Searle鈥檚 model is simply wrong.
Searle defines the term 鈥渟ocial fact鈥� in terms of collective intentionality, and 鈥渋nstitutional fact鈥� as a subclass of 鈥渟ocial fact鈥�, the latter being facts that 鈥渞equire special human institutions for their very existence鈥� (p.27). Institutional facts are contrasted with 鈥渂rute鈥� or 鈥渘atural鈥� facts that, in Searle鈥檚 view, exist independently of human, i.e. social, institutions.
Consideration of how institutional facts are created is the main theme of Chapter 2. He suggests that many institutional facts are self-referential, by which he means they can only exist as such because people accept that they exist. Money is a prime example of self-referential fact. Its value and use as money is predicated on people recognizing and accepting it as such. This is a large part of what Berger & Luckmann meant to say that something was socially constructed, but Searle thinks the self-referential quality is limited to institutional facts, whereas Berger & Luckmann suggest that all social knowledge, all 鈥渙bjective鈥� facts, are social constructions. Who鈥檚 right? On p.33 Searle writes 鈥淪omething can be a mountain even if no one believe it is a mountain鈥�. Other than the hypothetical case that Searle has implied in the question, is this statement true? I don鈥檛 think so. No person can present any concrete example of a mountain that no one believes is a mountain. That鈥檚 precisely because even the concept of a mountain, which seems to be a very 鈥渘atural鈥� and 鈥渙bjective鈥� object, is a social construction. Facts are not objective reality. They are knowledge of a (presumably) objective reality, and thus they themselves are subjective. The physical object presumably would remain no matter what we call it, but the concept of a mountain is self-referential, i.e. socially constructed, just like money is. It exists because people recognize it as such.
There are other, similar examples in this chapter. Searle wants to tell us that a printed dollar bill that falls between the cracks of the floor of the mint and is never circulated is nevertheless money, but that a perfect counterfeit bill that no one recognizes as counterfeit and which is circulated and accepted is not money. Both of those assertions are false, I think. Whatever is accepted as money is money, and what is not circulated can, at best, only have the potential to be money. 鈥淢oney鈥�, he writes, 鈥渉as to exist in some physical form.鈥� That seems unlikely. We have replaced precious resources with fiat paper money and to some extent have replaced paper money with electronic tick marks in the magnetization of credit cards or computer records of a bank account balance. Even those, I suppose, have at least the symbol as a physical form, but there seems to be nothing other than the inconvenience of keeping track mentally, to stop people from having a currency that consists entirely in peoples鈥� cognitions without any physical marker or form whatsoever. By the end of Chapter 2 I鈥檇 found enough that I found simply incongruent with the way that the world actually operates, as I understand it, that I quit this book.
Searle is no doubt correct when he writes that 鈥渕uch of our world view depends on our concept of objectivity and the contrast between the objective and subjective鈥�.鈥� (p.7) Throw out the concept of objectivity and recognize that the objective can only be known subjectively and Searle鈥檚 whole line of thought tumbles into the garbage can.
May 20, 2022
亘乇丕蹖 賲賳 讴賴 鬲丕夭賴 卮乇賵毓 讴乇丿賲 乇丕噩毓 亘賴 噩丕賲毓賴 卮賳丕爻蹖 禺賵賳丿賳 丕氐賱丕 丕賳鬲禺丕亘 禺賵亘蹖 賳亘賵丿 ( 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賮蹖賱爻賵賮賴 賵 亘丕 鬲讴乇丕乇賴丕蹖 夭蹖丕丿 爻毓蹖 丿乇 丕孬亘丕鬲 诏夭丕乇賴 賴丕 丿丕乇賴 貙 賵 賲賳蹖 讴賴 賳蹖丕夭 賲賳丿 蹖賴 讴鬲丕亘 亘賵丿賲 讴賴 賮毓賱丕 诏夭丕乇賴 賴丕蹖 賲禺鬲賱賮 乇賵 亘賴賲 賳卮賵賳 亘丿賴 鬲丕 亘毓丿 亘乇賲 爻乇丕睾 丨賱丕噩蹖卮賵賳) 賵賱蹖 禺亘 亘賴 賴乇 丨丕賱 賱匕鬲 亘乇丿賲 賵 讴賱蹖 亘賴賲 丕賮夭賵丿 賵 賲丿禺賱蹖 卮丿 亘賴 賲賵囟賵毓蹖 讴賴 亘乇丕賲 禺蹖賱蹖 賲賴賲賴
August 10, 2021
丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丕孬乇 噩丕賳 爻乇賱貙 賮蹖賱爻賵賮 賲毓丕氐乇 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖賴 賵 亘蹖卮鬲乇 丿乇 丨賵夭賴 匕賴賳 賵 夭亘丕賳 讴丕乇 賲蹖讴賳賴 賵 丿乇 賲賵乇丿 夭亘丕賳 賵 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖貙 丕賲賵乇 賵丕賯毓 賳賴丕丿蹖貙 鬲亘蹖蹖賳 倬丿蹖丿賴鈥屬囏й� 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖貙 氐丿賯 賵 鬲胤丕亘賯 丨乇賮 賲蹖夭賳賴...
賲爻卅賱賴 丕氐賱蹖 讴鬲丕亘 丕夭 丕蹖賳 賯乇丕乇賴 讴賴: 亘禺卮鈥屬囏й屰� 丕夭 噩賴丕賳 賵丕賯毓蹖 賲丕 賮賯胤 亘賵丕爻胤賴鈥屰� 鬲賵丕賮賯 丕賳爻丕賳鈥屬囏� 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 亘賴 丨爻丕亘 賲蹖丕丿貙 蹖毓賳蹖 亘毓囟蹖 趩蹖夭丕 賮賯胤 亘賴 丕蹖賳 毓賱鬲 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賳 讴賴 賲丕 賲毓鬲賯丿蹖賲 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賳! 賲孬賴 倬賵賱 賵 丿丕乇丕蹖蹖 賵 丿賵賱鬲 賵 丕夭丿賵丕噩 賵 ... 趩胤賵乇 賲賲讴賳賴 丿乇 噩賴丕賳蹖 讴賴 鬲賲丕賲丕 丕夭 匕乇丕鬲 賮蹖夭蹖讴蹖賽 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 丿乇賵賳 賲蹖丿丕賳鈥屬囏й� 賳蹖乇賵 鬲卮讴蹖賱 卮丿賴 賵 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖鈥屫臂屬� 丕氐賵賱卮 乇賵 毓賱賵賲 胤亘蹖毓蹖 鬲毓蹖蹖賳 賲蹖讴賳賴貙 噩賴丕賳 毓蹖賳蹖賽 倬賵賱 賵 丿丕乇丕蹖蹖 賵 丕夭丿賵丕噩 賵 丿賵賱鬲 賵 丕賳鬲禺丕亘丕鬲 賵 賮賵鬲亘丕賱 賵 賲賴賲丕賳蹖 鬲賵賱丿 賵 丿丕丿诏丕賴 賵噩賵丿 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮賴責 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 鬲丕 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 禺賵賳丿賲貙 丕夭 賵囟賵丨 賵 賯丿乇鬲 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 亘丕賱丕蹖蹖 亘乇禺賵乇丿丕乇賴 賵 鬲乇噩賲賴 禺賵亘卮 亘丕 賵噩賵丿 丿卮賵丕乇蹖 賳爻亘蹖 賲爻丕卅賱貙 賮賴賲 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 鬲丕 丨丿蹖 丌爻賵賳 賲蹖讴賳賴.
賲爻卅賱賴 丕氐賱蹖 讴鬲丕亘 丕夭 丕蹖賳 賯乇丕乇賴 讴賴: 亘禺卮鈥屬囏й屰� 丕夭 噩賴丕賳 賵丕賯毓蹖 賲丕 賮賯胤 亘賵丕爻胤賴鈥屰� 鬲賵丕賮賯 丕賳爻丕賳鈥屬囏� 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 亘賴 丨爻丕亘 賲蹖丕丿貙 蹖毓賳蹖 亘毓囟蹖 趩蹖夭丕 賮賯胤 亘賴 丕蹖賳 毓賱鬲 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賳 讴賴 賲丕 賲毓鬲賯丿蹖賲 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賳! 賲孬賴 倬賵賱 賵 丿丕乇丕蹖蹖 賵 丿賵賱鬲 賵 丕夭丿賵丕噩 賵 ... 趩胤賵乇 賲賲讴賳賴 丿乇 噩賴丕賳蹖 讴賴 鬲賲丕賲丕 丕夭 匕乇丕鬲 賮蹖夭蹖讴蹖賽 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 丿乇賵賳 賲蹖丿丕賳鈥屬囏й� 賳蹖乇賵 鬲卮讴蹖賱 卮丿賴 賵 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖鈥屫臂屬� 丕氐賵賱卮 乇賵 毓賱賵賲 胤亘蹖毓蹖 鬲毓蹖蹖賳 賲蹖讴賳賴貙 噩賴丕賳 毓蹖賳蹖賽 倬賵賱 賵 丿丕乇丕蹖蹖 賵 丕夭丿賵丕噩 賵 丿賵賱鬲 賵 丕賳鬲禺丕亘丕鬲 賵 賮賵鬲亘丕賱 賵 賲賴賲丕賳蹖 鬲賵賱丿 賵 丿丕丿诏丕賴 賵噩賵丿 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮賴責 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 鬲丕 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 禺賵賳丿賲貙 丕夭 賵囟賵丨 賵 賯丿乇鬲 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 亘丕賱丕蹖蹖 亘乇禺賵乇丿丕乇賴 賵 鬲乇噩賲賴 禺賵亘卮 亘丕 賵噩賵丿 丿卮賵丕乇蹖 賳爻亘蹖 賲爻丕卅賱貙 賮賴賲 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 鬲丕 丨丿蹖 丌爻賵賳 賲蹖讴賳賴.
December 14, 2009
How can ideas that depend upon the human mind be said to be true? Does there even exist such a thing as social facts? Many thinkers have doubted it, but only now has a philosopher taken the question up.
John Searle shows here how ontologically subjective concepts can be objective facts. Intentionality is key, but only collective intentionality makes social facts possible. Yet this collective intentionality is exactly what libertarians deny 鈥� consider Margaret Thatcher, who tells us there are no societies, only individuals. What can Searle say to this without raising the specter of a Hegelian Absolute? His precise line of reasoning I leave for the book鈥檚 readers to assess.
In any case, Searle links physical entities to social facts by describing those facts as labels of intentionality. Physical entities can 鈥渃ount as鈥� (the intending consciousness) mental facts, such as paper rectangle that counts as money. And social objects (a dollar), at bottom, are simply placeholders for some activity (commerce).
The joint buildout of social and ontological facts is the basis of institutions, and here again, fact implies function. A government is an institutional fact; more importantly, it is a function or activity. The upshot is that power grows out of organizations, not individuals.
Social and institutional facts, the author further explains, are true when a 鈥渟ufficient number鈥� of people in a community treat them as facts. Again, an institution, say a bank, is an ontologically subjective concept. But its acceptance by the people who use it makes it epistemically objective.
As to the individual, we learn nothing. Searle doesn鈥檛 tell us what a 鈥渟ufficient鈥� number is, or what the status of an institution's opponents or dropouts is. Searle finds it amusing that the individual can be thought of as possessing inherent rights. Does that invalidate the power of whatever institutions recognize or enable that concept? Here the discussion stops, perhaps awaiting another book. Meantime, is a short read I recommend to fill the gap.
Searle does address a related problem, the aforementioned Hegelian idealism, public enemy number one of the individual according to so many. And here Searle has a lot to say. The book, in fact, contains two parts. The exploration of the institution ends the first part. The second part is a defense of both realism and the correspondence theory of truth. Although seemingly superfluous 鈥� after all, Searle has already taken care to tie epistemology to a physical ontology 鈥� this part is a solid work in its own right. Readers will enjoy the careful perusal of the philosophy in the second part.
The book is not easy. Despite the touchy-feely book cover, this is neither anthropology nor sociology. It is philosophy. But the discussion is structured with an elegance that fans of the subject will appreciate after having their ears boxed by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. I鈥檓 glad to give it a good rating. For those who haven鈥檛 thought much about how philosophy relates to social matters, this book is a good way to expand one鈥檚 horizons.
John Searle shows here how ontologically subjective concepts can be objective facts. Intentionality is key, but only collective intentionality makes social facts possible. Yet this collective intentionality is exactly what libertarians deny 鈥� consider Margaret Thatcher, who tells us there are no societies, only individuals. What can Searle say to this without raising the specter of a Hegelian Absolute? His precise line of reasoning I leave for the book鈥檚 readers to assess.
In any case, Searle links physical entities to social facts by describing those facts as labels of intentionality. Physical entities can 鈥渃ount as鈥� (the intending consciousness) mental facts, such as paper rectangle that counts as money. And social objects (a dollar), at bottom, are simply placeholders for some activity (commerce).
The joint buildout of social and ontological facts is the basis of institutions, and here again, fact implies function. A government is an institutional fact; more importantly, it is a function or activity. The upshot is that power grows out of organizations, not individuals.
Social and institutional facts, the author further explains, are true when a 鈥渟ufficient number鈥� of people in a community treat them as facts. Again, an institution, say a bank, is an ontologically subjective concept. But its acceptance by the people who use it makes it epistemically objective.
As to the individual, we learn nothing. Searle doesn鈥檛 tell us what a 鈥渟ufficient鈥� number is, or what the status of an institution's opponents or dropouts is. Searle finds it amusing that the individual can be thought of as possessing inherent rights. Does that invalidate the power of whatever institutions recognize or enable that concept? Here the discussion stops, perhaps awaiting another book. Meantime, is a short read I recommend to fill the gap.
Searle does address a related problem, the aforementioned Hegelian idealism, public enemy number one of the individual according to so many. And here Searle has a lot to say. The book, in fact, contains two parts. The exploration of the institution ends the first part. The second part is a defense of both realism and the correspondence theory of truth. Although seemingly superfluous 鈥� after all, Searle has already taken care to tie epistemology to a physical ontology 鈥� this part is a solid work in its own right. Readers will enjoy the careful perusal of the philosophy in the second part.
The book is not easy. Despite the touchy-feely book cover, this is neither anthropology nor sociology. It is philosophy. But the discussion is structured with an elegance that fans of the subject will appreciate after having their ears boxed by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. I鈥檓 glad to give it a good rating. For those who haven鈥檛 thought much about how philosophy relates to social matters, this book is a good way to expand one鈥檚 horizons.
February 13, 2013
My first contact with Searle, or at least the first time I actually read a text by Searle, was roughly a year and a half ago, when I was attending a philosophy class where we were supposed to write an essay on a subject of our own choosing in the area of the philosophy of mind. I had gotten interested in Searle's argument against the possibility of strong AI because I had been in contact with his Chinese room thought experiment while studying AI during my computer science studies several years ago (a project, I can mention as an aside, with which I am still not done...) The particular text I was reading then was Searle's classic "Mind, Brains and Programs" in which he presents the above mentioned thought experiment and argues against strong AI. I found something deeply wrong with his presentation of the arguments coming from the other side and thought he completely misunderstood the issues involved. My essay was based around using Daniel Dennett's intentional stance (or strategy) and it's implications for the conclusions we can draw as to what entities are truly intentional, and turned that against Searle's statements of what needs to be fulfilled in order for us to say of some entity that it was intentional. The experience did not give me a good impression of Searle, I found his arguments to be completely erroneous and concluded that he had no basis for claiming that intentionality can only be supposed to exist "for real" in an entity if it is discovered to display "the right causal relations" (whatever that's supposed to mean). Dennett's account was much more reasonable in that it concluded that wherever we are able to use the intentional strategy to predict the behavior of some entity in such a way that we could not do without the intentional strategy, we have reason to conclude that the entity actually has intentionality (Dennett is often misunderstood as having an instrumentalist view of intentionality, which is simply not true, he says clearly that it is a real, objective phenomenon).
In any case, this first impression was, as I said, not good. At the same time I realized, of course, that one single paper was hardly grounds for dismissing Searle as a philosopher on the whole. Hence, I felt that I should probably read some more of Searle's writings sometime in the future. Roughly a year later the opportunity came when I attended a class (actually, two different classes taken after each other, filling up the fall semester) on the philosophy of science. In the second of these two classes, we read a book called "Understanding Philosophy of Science" by James Ladyman, which was a more or less traditional introduction to the subject, dealing with the scientific method, changes in scientific theories (Kuhn's "paradigms" and "scientific revolutions") as well as a part about realism (a book I have yet to finish, I'm behind in more than one place in my studies). The other book was the present one and it supplied a very different take on some of the issues concerning science and reality. Without going into the scientific method or the justification of science (something which Searle, quite rightly, takes for granted) Searle treats fact in the most general sense, giving a very convincing and easy to follow account of how he can combine his view of the world as one unified entity with the existence of social fact, which seem to differ greatly from "brute" facts of nature as he calls them. The account goes through how any social or institutional fact can be said to have the structure "X counts as Y in C" meaning that a specific object or other phenomenon X can be counted as an instance of a social phenomenon Y in a certain context C. This all need to bottom out, ultimately, in an X which is a brute natural fact, but complex structures of social and institutional facts can be established by building higher and higher levels upon the lower level, meaning that a certain social fact can consist in counting another social fact X as a new social fact Y (in a context C). This avoids an infinite regress by demanding that there is a brute fact at the bottom, this is what makes it possible to maintain the actual existence of social facts while also claiming that there is one and only one world.
After dealing with these issues in quite a great deal of detail, along the way dealing with and refuting social constructionism and other theories found absurd, he closes with three chapters arguing for some basic ideas about reality and truth that are not exactly part of the project undertaken in the book's main part (which is why they are placed in the end), but are nonetheless presupposed by his account of social facts. Here, Searle defends realism, shows how the common arguments against realism does not hold up to scrutiny, and shows why realism, while not directly provable, is a necessary presupposition for talking at all about the world. An interesting aspect of all this is that he does not, as hinted at just now, aim at proving a thesis directly, but instead aims to show how some positions he takes are necessary by a transcendental form of argument. The final chapter deals with truth and defends, to my satisfaction, the correspondence theory of truth so that it has been shown, once again, that it follows by necessity from some basic ideas we have about truth such that it would not be possible to talk about truth in a reasonable sense of the word without it having a meaning such that a true statement is true in virtue of a sort of correspondence to the external world.
It's a wonderful account of a set of related ideas, seemingly centered around defending the view that an external world exists, that at the bottom we find brute facts, that we can build layers of social and institutional facts on top of these, and that all these facts have in common that they describe some conditions on the world on which true statements are based. It's clear, straight forward, calm, very well written, interesting and extremely insightful. I maintain my previous assessment of Searle regarding his discussion of AI and intentionality (to a certain extent, I actually think he's probably right about the nature of intentionality in a sense, but that he is wrong in dismissing Dennett's account of how we come to know that some entity does exhibit intentionality), but my overall view of Searle as a philosopher has (to say the least) been greatly changed for the better.
In any case, this first impression was, as I said, not good. At the same time I realized, of course, that one single paper was hardly grounds for dismissing Searle as a philosopher on the whole. Hence, I felt that I should probably read some more of Searle's writings sometime in the future. Roughly a year later the opportunity came when I attended a class (actually, two different classes taken after each other, filling up the fall semester) on the philosophy of science. In the second of these two classes, we read a book called "Understanding Philosophy of Science" by James Ladyman, which was a more or less traditional introduction to the subject, dealing with the scientific method, changes in scientific theories (Kuhn's "paradigms" and "scientific revolutions") as well as a part about realism (a book I have yet to finish, I'm behind in more than one place in my studies). The other book was the present one and it supplied a very different take on some of the issues concerning science and reality. Without going into the scientific method or the justification of science (something which Searle, quite rightly, takes for granted) Searle treats fact in the most general sense, giving a very convincing and easy to follow account of how he can combine his view of the world as one unified entity with the existence of social fact, which seem to differ greatly from "brute" facts of nature as he calls them. The account goes through how any social or institutional fact can be said to have the structure "X counts as Y in C" meaning that a specific object or other phenomenon X can be counted as an instance of a social phenomenon Y in a certain context C. This all need to bottom out, ultimately, in an X which is a brute natural fact, but complex structures of social and institutional facts can be established by building higher and higher levels upon the lower level, meaning that a certain social fact can consist in counting another social fact X as a new social fact Y (in a context C). This avoids an infinite regress by demanding that there is a brute fact at the bottom, this is what makes it possible to maintain the actual existence of social facts while also claiming that there is one and only one world.
After dealing with these issues in quite a great deal of detail, along the way dealing with and refuting social constructionism and other theories found absurd, he closes with three chapters arguing for some basic ideas about reality and truth that are not exactly part of the project undertaken in the book's main part (which is why they are placed in the end), but are nonetheless presupposed by his account of social facts. Here, Searle defends realism, shows how the common arguments against realism does not hold up to scrutiny, and shows why realism, while not directly provable, is a necessary presupposition for talking at all about the world. An interesting aspect of all this is that he does not, as hinted at just now, aim at proving a thesis directly, but instead aims to show how some positions he takes are necessary by a transcendental form of argument. The final chapter deals with truth and defends, to my satisfaction, the correspondence theory of truth so that it has been shown, once again, that it follows by necessity from some basic ideas we have about truth such that it would not be possible to talk about truth in a reasonable sense of the word without it having a meaning such that a true statement is true in virtue of a sort of correspondence to the external world.
It's a wonderful account of a set of related ideas, seemingly centered around defending the view that an external world exists, that at the bottom we find brute facts, that we can build layers of social and institutional facts on top of these, and that all these facts have in common that they describe some conditions on the world on which true statements are based. It's clear, straight forward, calm, very well written, interesting and extremely insightful. I maintain my previous assessment of Searle regarding his discussion of AI and intentionality (to a certain extent, I actually think he's probably right about the nature of intentionality in a sense, but that he is wrong in dismissing Dennett's account of how we come to know that some entity does exhibit intentionality), but my overall view of Searle as a philosopher has (to say the least) been greatly changed for the better.
October 17, 2021
"賲爻卅賱踿 丕氐賱蹖 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丕夭 丕蹖賳 賯乇丕乇 丕爻鬲: 亘禺卮鈥屬囏й屰� 丕夭 噩賴丕賳賽 賵丕賯毓蹖 賴爻鬲 讴賴 賮賯胤 亘賴鈥屬堌ж池粉€ 鬲賵丕賮賯 丕賳爻丕賳鈥屬囏� 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 亘賴鈥屫促呚ж� 賲蹖鈥屫③屫�. 蹖毓賳蹖 亘毓囟蹖 趩蹖夭賴丕 賮賯胤 亘賴 丕蹖賳 毓賱鬲 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賳丿 讴賴 賲丕 賲毓鬲賯丿蹖賲 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賳丿. 賲賳馗賵乇 趩蹖夭賴丕蹖蹖 丕爻鬲 賳馗蹖乇 倬賵賱 賵 丿丕乇丕蹖蹖 賵 丿賵賱鬲 賵 丕夭丿賵丕噩.
鬲丕 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 丕讴賳賵賳 賲蹖鈥屫з嗃屬呚� 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖鈥屫臂屬� 禺氐賵氐蹖丕鬲 丕蹖賳 噩賴丕賳 賴賲丕賳鈥屭堎嗁� 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賮蹖夭蹖讴 賵 卮蹖賲蹖 賵 丿蹖诏乇 毓賱賵賲 胤亘蹖毓蹖 鬲賵氐蹖賮 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁嗀�. 丕賲丕 趩诏賵賳賴 賲賲讴賳 丕爻鬲 丿乇 噩賴丕賳蹖 讴賴 亘賴鈥屫呚з呟� 丕夭 匕乇丕鬲 賮蹖夭蹖讴蹖賽 賯乇丕乇诏乇锟斤拷鬲賴 丿乇賵賳 賲蹖丿丕賳鈥屬囏й� 賳蹖乇賵 鬲卮讴蹖賱 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 噩賴丕賳賽 毓蹖賳蹖賽 倬賵賱 賵 丿丕乇丕蹖蹖 賵 丕夭丿賵丕噩 賵 丿賵賱鬲 賵 丕賳鬲禺丕亘丕鬲 賵 賮賵鬲亘丕賱 賵 賲賴賲丕賳蹖 賵 鬲賵賱丿 賵 丿丕丿诏丕賴 賵噩賵丿 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮丿責
賮蹖賱爻賵賮 亘乇噩爻鬲踿 丕賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖貙 噩丕賳 爻乇賱貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 丕賳鬲夭丕毓 趩賳丿 毓賳氐乇 讴賱蹖丿蹖 丕夭 卮亘讴踿 倬蹖趩蹖丿踿 丨蹖丕鬲 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖貙 賵 丕乇丕卅踿 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖 賲賳胤賯蹖 丕夭 丌賳 賲蹖鈥屭┵堌簇� 丿乇讴蹖 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖賳 丕夭 丕賲乇 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 亘賴鈥屫池� 丿賴丿. 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 倬乇賴蹖夭 丕夭 賲睾賱賯鈥屭堐屰屸€屬囏й� 賮賱爻賮蹖 賵 亘賴 夭亘丕賳蹖 爻丕丿賴 賳诏丕卮鬲賴 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 丕賲丕 丿乇 毓蹖賳 丨丕賱 亘賴 亘蹖丕賳 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱鈥屬囏� 賵 鬲丨賱蹖賱鈥屬囏й� 賮賱爻賮蹖 賲賴賲 賵 丕爻丕爻蹖 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж藏�."
鬲丕 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 丕讴賳賵賳 賲蹖鈥屫з嗃屬呚� 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖鈥屫臂屬� 禺氐賵氐蹖丕鬲 丕蹖賳 噩賴丕賳 賴賲丕賳鈥屭堎嗁� 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賮蹖夭蹖讴 賵 卮蹖賲蹖 賵 丿蹖诏乇 毓賱賵賲 胤亘蹖毓蹖 鬲賵氐蹖賮 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁嗀�. 丕賲丕 趩诏賵賳賴 賲賲讴賳 丕爻鬲 丿乇 噩賴丕賳蹖 讴賴 亘賴鈥屫呚з呟� 丕夭 匕乇丕鬲 賮蹖夭蹖讴蹖賽 賯乇丕乇诏乇锟斤拷鬲賴 丿乇賵賳 賲蹖丿丕賳鈥屬囏й� 賳蹖乇賵 鬲卮讴蹖賱 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 噩賴丕賳賽 毓蹖賳蹖賽 倬賵賱 賵 丿丕乇丕蹖蹖 賵 丕夭丿賵丕噩 賵 丿賵賱鬲 賵 丕賳鬲禺丕亘丕鬲 賵 賮賵鬲亘丕賱 賵 賲賴賲丕賳蹖 賵 鬲賵賱丿 賵 丿丕丿诏丕賴 賵噩賵丿 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮丿責
賮蹖賱爻賵賮 亘乇噩爻鬲踿 丕賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖貙 噩丕賳 爻乇賱貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 丕賳鬲夭丕毓 趩賳丿 毓賳氐乇 讴賱蹖丿蹖 丕夭 卮亘讴踿 倬蹖趩蹖丿踿 丨蹖丕鬲 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖貙 賵 丕乇丕卅踿 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖 賲賳胤賯蹖 丕夭 丌賳 賲蹖鈥屭┵堌簇� 丿乇讴蹖 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖賳 丕夭 丕賲乇 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 亘賴鈥屫池� 丿賴丿. 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 倬乇賴蹖夭 丕夭 賲睾賱賯鈥屭堐屰屸€屬囏й� 賮賱爻賮蹖 賵 亘賴 夭亘丕賳蹖 爻丕丿賴 賳诏丕卮鬲賴 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 丕賲丕 丿乇 毓蹖賳 丨丕賱 亘賴 亘蹖丕賳 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱鈥屬囏� 賵 鬲丨賱蹖賱鈥屬囏й� 賮賱爻賮蹖 賲賴賲 賵 丕爻丕爻蹖 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж藏�."
December 11, 2023
This book is an extremely interesting read and a recommendation for anyone who is looking for tools to make sense of the world in which we live. Searle convincingly that there is a special kind of facts, social facts, which are products of human symbolism and not products of their physical nature. Think for example of money, marriage, or borders. He explains how this 'social' reality comes into being. Of course, this means that this book is about social constructs. However, it would be a mistake to think that any social construct is illegitimate or useless, as Searle makes very clear too. Social reality is a specific kind of reality that needs its own account, and one account is given in this book.
I also want to command specifically Searle's ability to convey complex, academic thought in a very accessible and easy-to-follow text.
I did have some problems with this book. Perhaps this was the first book that explicitly analysed the construction of social reality, but I missed a debate - or at least, a refutal of (possible) counter-arguments. Moreover, even though Searle attempts to justify his use of terminology in the last few chapters, I feel he could have backed his arguments in the chapters themselves better (it is important to note that the first few chapters are about the actual construction of social reality, and the last few about the theoretical assumptions or concepts used). For example, he continually mentions 'snow on Mount Everest' as a brute fact, but the lack of acknowledgement of the fact that Mount Everest (or, for that matter, snow) is also a human social construction was a bit painful to me. Anyway, in the last few chapters, Searle does attempt to give an account for the theory he uses, but this part takes up so much of the book one starts to wonder how relevant it is in a book that bears this title.
I could attempt to challenge some more claims made in this book, but let me instead reaffirm that John Searle is masterfully skilled at deconstructing philosophical problems and exhibiting them in accessible English. Reading this book will make the world a humble bit easier to understand, and that is no small accomplishment.
I also want to command specifically Searle's ability to convey complex, academic thought in a very accessible and easy-to-follow text.
I did have some problems with this book. Perhaps this was the first book that explicitly analysed the construction of social reality, but I missed a debate - or at least, a refutal of (possible) counter-arguments. Moreover, even though Searle attempts to justify his use of terminology in the last few chapters, I feel he could have backed his arguments in the chapters themselves better (it is important to note that the first few chapters are about the actual construction of social reality, and the last few about the theoretical assumptions or concepts used). For example, he continually mentions 'snow on Mount Everest' as a brute fact, but the lack of acknowledgement of the fact that Mount Everest (or, for that matter, snow) is also a human social construction was a bit painful to me. Anyway, in the last few chapters, Searle does attempt to give an account for the theory he uses, but this part takes up so much of the book one starts to wonder how relevant it is in a book that bears this title.
I could attempt to challenge some more claims made in this book, but let me instead reaffirm that John Searle is masterfully skilled at deconstructing philosophical problems and exhibiting them in accessible English. Reading this book will make the world a humble bit easier to understand, and that is no small accomplishment.
August 23, 2022
Sicuramente molto illuminante la descrizione, seppur umile, di Searle relativa ai fatti sociale e istituzionali. Analisi che 猫 capace di mettere in evidenza la trama soggiacente alla realt脿 sociale.
October 1, 2021
Great framework, dumb conclusions
This books approaches ideas that I really liked from Harari's Sapiens with much more depth. Searle's classification of ontological and epistemogical subjectivity and objectivity is really useful, and the way it is applied to analyze institutional facts was fascinating.
But the text derails into discussions about external realism and the correspondence theory of truth that, although adjacent to the main point, felt more like long winded appendices of things better discussed in other texts.
I really disliked Searle's conclusion of "biology always winning." I would agree with a certain form of materialism and the precedence of material reality over ideas, but the way it was posed here was really crude and undermines the previous discussion. If that was the point he was trying to make, he wasted a great framework on something dumb.
This books approaches ideas that I really liked from Harari's Sapiens with much more depth. Searle's classification of ontological and epistemogical subjectivity and objectivity is really useful, and the way it is applied to analyze institutional facts was fascinating.
But the text derails into discussions about external realism and the correspondence theory of truth that, although adjacent to the main point, felt more like long winded appendices of things better discussed in other texts.
I really disliked Searle's conclusion of "biology always winning." I would agree with a certain form of materialism and the precedence of material reality over ideas, but the way it was posed here was really crude and undermines the previous discussion. If that was the point he was trying to make, he wasted a great framework on something dumb.
September 3, 2023
讴鬲丕亘蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 禺賵丕賳丿賳蹖 亘丕 鬲乇噩賲賴 乇賵丕賳 賵 丿賯蹖賯 丌賯丕蹖 賲丨賲丿丕賲蹖賳蹖貙 亘賴 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 賵 趩诏賵賳诏蹖 賵 趩乇丕蹖蹖 爻丕禺鬲 丌賳 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж藏�.
賵丕賯毓蹖丕鬲蹖 丕夭 丕蹖賳 丿爻鬲 讴賴 賳賴丕丿 賴丕 趩诏賵賳賴 賵 趩乇丕 卮讴賱 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕賳丿責 倬賵賱 丕夭 诏匕卮鬲賴 鬲丕 丕賱丕賳 趩賴 鬲睾蹖蹖乇蹖 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲 責 卮乇賵胤 亘賴鈥屭┴ж壁屫臂� 倬賵賱 賵 丿蹖诏乇 爻丕禺鬲丕乇賴丕蹖 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 趩蹖爻鬲責
芦鬲賵丕賮賯 噩賲毓蹖貙 賳賲丕丿 賵 夭亘丕賳. 禄
夭亘丕賳鈥屬呝嗀� 亘賵丿賳 丕賳爻丕賳 賵 賳賲丕丿爻丕夭蹖貙 乇讴賳 丕氐賱蹖 丕賮鬲乇丕賯 亘蹖賳 爻丕禺鬲丕乇賴丕蹖 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 丕賳爻丕賳 賵 賳馗丕賲 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 賲賵乇趩賴 賴丕 賵 夭賳亘賵乇賴丕爻鬲.
丿乇 丕丿丕賲賴 亘賴 鬲賮丕賵鬲鈥屬囏� 賲蹖丕賳 賳賴丕丿 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 賵 毓蹖賳蹖丕蹖蹖 趩賵賳 讴賵賴 丕賵乇爻鬲 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж藏� 賵 丕蹖賳 诏賵賳賴 噩賴丕賳鈥屫ㄛ屬嗃� 禺賵丿 乇丕 鬲讴賲蹖賱 賲蹖讴賳丿 賵 亘賴 丿賮丕毓 丕夭 丌賳 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж藏�.
亘乇丕蹖 賴乇 毓賱丕賯賴鈥屬呝嗀� 亘賴 噩丕賲毓賴鈥屫促嗀ж驰� 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 倬蹖卮賳賴丕丿 賲蹖鈥屫促堌�.
賵丕賯毓蹖丕鬲蹖 丕夭 丕蹖賳 丿爻鬲 讴賴 賳賴丕丿 賴丕 趩诏賵賳賴 賵 趩乇丕 卮讴賱 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕賳丿責 倬賵賱 丕夭 诏匕卮鬲賴 鬲丕 丕賱丕賳 趩賴 鬲睾蹖蹖乇蹖 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲 責 卮乇賵胤 亘賴鈥屭┴ж壁屫臂� 倬賵賱 賵 丿蹖诏乇 爻丕禺鬲丕乇賴丕蹖 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 趩蹖爻鬲責
芦鬲賵丕賮賯 噩賲毓蹖貙 賳賲丕丿 賵 夭亘丕賳. 禄
夭亘丕賳鈥屬呝嗀� 亘賵丿賳 丕賳爻丕賳 賵 賳賲丕丿爻丕夭蹖貙 乇讴賳 丕氐賱蹖 丕賮鬲乇丕賯 亘蹖賳 爻丕禺鬲丕乇賴丕蹖 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 丕賳爻丕賳 賵 賳馗丕賲 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 賲賵乇趩賴 賴丕 賵 夭賳亘賵乇賴丕爻鬲.
丿乇 丕丿丕賲賴 亘賴 鬲賮丕賵鬲鈥屬囏� 賲蹖丕賳 賳賴丕丿 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 賵 毓蹖賳蹖丕蹖蹖 趩賵賳 讴賵賴 丕賵乇爻鬲 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж藏� 賵 丕蹖賳 诏賵賳賴 噩賴丕賳鈥屫ㄛ屬嗃� 禺賵丿 乇丕 鬲讴賲蹖賱 賲蹖讴賳丿 賵 亘賴 丿賮丕毓 丕夭 丌賳 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж藏�.
亘乇丕蹖 賴乇 毓賱丕賯賴鈥屬呝嗀� 亘賴 噩丕賲毓賴鈥屫促嗀ж驰� 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 倬蹖卮賳賴丕丿 賲蹖鈥屫促堌�.
November 24, 2021
"X counts as Y in C" ... there is hardly a more concise way to sum up what this volume is about. Although Searle cautions not to fetishize this algorithm, it is the base for building a social reality from facts that only exist because we perceive them and because they are maintained and enforced by the institutions we build up around them. For these institutional facts, "X" is the thing in itself, the brute fact, the worldly phenomenon that exists apart from human perception. "Y" is the function that people assign to "X" -- an example being monetary value that we assign to slips of paper. "C" is the condition under which "X" carries out the functions associated with "Y" -- so slips of paper /printed by a US Mint/ function as money within an economic system built around buying and selling. These attributional or institutional truths are iterative and stackable, and their continual evocation and support through the formation of complementary institutions constitutes a social reality.
Overall, the book offers an engaging argument and I think it builds upon some of the vagueness of Berger and Luckmann's treatment of the same topic. The first six chapters are quite accessible and well argued. They constitute the core of the book. The last three chapters shift focus a bit to defending the implications of the first part of the book against charges that it promotes an endlessly circuitous view of reality that never escapes language. Searle instead goes on at length to show that institutional facts can and do trace a straight line back to brute reality.
Overall, the book offers an engaging argument and I think it builds upon some of the vagueness of Berger and Luckmann's treatment of the same topic. The first six chapters are quite accessible and well argued. They constitute the core of the book. The last three chapters shift focus a bit to defending the implications of the first part of the book against charges that it promotes an endlessly circuitous view of reality that never escapes language. Searle instead goes on at length to show that institutional facts can and do trace a straight line back to brute reality.
July 23, 2018
An interesting mix of linguistics and philosophy, Searles gives a lot of information on why are cultures are what they are. Lots of vocabulary you may need to look up, but easy to follow, and good source material, some more books for my book pile. Learn things, check it out.
April 17, 2021
Importance of collective intentionality and how we use it to build our institutions and social reality
October 19, 2024
THE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHER APPLIES HIS IDEAS TO SOCIAL REALITY
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He explained in the 鈥淎cknowledgements鈥� section of this 1995 book, 鈥淭he first version of these ideas was presented as the Immanuel Kant lectures in Stanford in 1002. Subsequent versions were presented as the Thalheimer Lectures at Johns Hopkins, the Hempel Lectures at Princeton, and as a series of lectures at the College de France in Paris. I have also presented this material in seminars in Berkeley and at the University of Graz in Austria鈥� I have also had the opportunity to try out some of these ideas in several universities in the United States and Europe.鈥�
He wrote in the Introduction, 鈥淭he theory of speech acts is in part an attempt to answer the question, 鈥楬ow do we get from the physics of utterances to meaningful speech acts performed by speakers and writers? The theory of mind I have attempted to develop is in large part an attempt to answer the question, How does a mental reality, a world of consciousness, intentionality, and other mental phenomena, fit into a world consisting entirely of physical particles in fields of force? This book extends the investigation to social reality: How can there be an objective world of money, property, marriage, governments, elections, football games, cocktail parties and law courts in a world that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force, and in which some of these particles are organized into systems that are conscious biological beasts, such as ourselves?鈥�
He explains, 鈥淥ur aim is to assimilate social reality to our basic ontology of physics, chemistry, and biology. To do this we need to show the continuous line that goes from molecules and mountains to screwdrivers, levers, and beautiful sunsets, and then to legislatures, money, and nation-states. The central span on the bridge from physics to society is collective intentionality, and the decisive movement on that bridge in the creation of social reality is the collective intentional imposition of function on entities that cannot perform those functions without that imposition. The radical movement that gets us from such simple social facts as that we are sitting on a bench together or having a fistfight to such institutional facts as money, property, and marriage is the collective imposition of function on entities, which---unlike levers, benches, and cars---cannot perform the functions solely by virtue of their physical structure.鈥� (Pg. 41)
He summarizes, 鈥渨e can see several other reasons why institutional facts require language: First, language is epistemically indispensable鈥� Second, the facts in question, being inherently social, must be communicable鈥� Third, in real life the phenomena in question are extremely complex, and the representation of such complex information requires language鈥ourth, the facts in question persist through time independently of the duration of the urges and inclinations of the participants in the institution.鈥� (Pg. 76-78)
He asserts, 鈥淪ince Freud we have found it useful and convenient to speak glibly about the unconscious mind without paying the price of explaining exactly what we mean. Our picture of unconscious mental states is that they are just like conscious states only minus the consciousness. But what exactly is that supposed to mean? I have not seen a satisfactory answer to that question---certainly not in Chomsky or Fodor and not even in Freud. To put the point crudely, I believe that in most appeals to the unconscious in Cognitive Science we really have no clear idea what we are talking about.鈥� (Pg. 128)
He continues, 鈥淚 have thus defined the 鈥楤ackground鈥� as the set of nonintentional or preintentional capabilities that enable intentional states of function.鈥� (Pg. 129) He goes on to list 鈥渟everal types of Background functions. First鈥� the Background enables linguistic interpretation to take place... Second, the Background enables perceptual interpretation to take place鈥� Third, the Background structures consciousness鈥� Fourth, temporally extended sequences of experiences come to us with a narrative of dramatic shape. They come to us under what for want of a better work I will call 鈥榙ramatic鈥� categories鈥� Fifth, each of us has a set of motivational dispositions, and these will condition the structure of our experiences鈥� Sixth, the Background facilitates certain kinds of readiness鈥� Seventh, the Background disposes me to certain sorts of behavior鈥� 鈥� (Pg. 132-136)
He argues, 鈥淭here is a parallelism between the functional structure of the Background and the intentional structure of the social phenomena to which the Background capacities relate. That strict parallelism gives us the illusion that the person who is able to deal with money, to cope with society, and speak a language must be unconsciously following rules. Here I am arguing, Of course there are rules and often we do follow them, both consciously and unconsciously, but: 1. The rules are never self interpreting, and 2. They are never exhaustive, and 3. In fact in many situations, we just know what to do, we just know how to deal with the situation. We do not apply the rules consciously or unconsciously.鈥� (Pg. 142-143)
He goes on, 鈥渙ften the person who behaves in a skillful way within an institution behaves as if he were following the rules鈥� but rather because the mechanism has evolved precisely so that it will be sensitive to the rules. The mechanism explains the behavior, and the mechanism is explained by the system of rules. I am in short urging the addition of another level, a diachronic level, in the explanation of certain sorts of social behavior.鈥� (Pg. 146)
He asserts, 鈥渢here is a normal way of understanding utterances, and that when performing speech acts in a public language, speakers typically attempt to achieve normal understanding. The point we are attempting to show is that for a large class 鈥� a condition of intelligibility for the normal understanding of these utterances is that there is a way that things are that is independent of human representations. The consequence is that when we attempt to communicate to achieve normal understanding with these sorts of utterances we must presuppose external realism.鈥� (Pg. 184)
This book will be of great interest to anyone seriously studying Searle and the development of his thought.
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He explained in the 鈥淎cknowledgements鈥� section of this 1995 book, 鈥淭he first version of these ideas was presented as the Immanuel Kant lectures in Stanford in 1002. Subsequent versions were presented as the Thalheimer Lectures at Johns Hopkins, the Hempel Lectures at Princeton, and as a series of lectures at the College de France in Paris. I have also presented this material in seminars in Berkeley and at the University of Graz in Austria鈥� I have also had the opportunity to try out some of these ideas in several universities in the United States and Europe.鈥�
He wrote in the Introduction, 鈥淭he theory of speech acts is in part an attempt to answer the question, 鈥楬ow do we get from the physics of utterances to meaningful speech acts performed by speakers and writers? The theory of mind I have attempted to develop is in large part an attempt to answer the question, How does a mental reality, a world of consciousness, intentionality, and other mental phenomena, fit into a world consisting entirely of physical particles in fields of force? This book extends the investigation to social reality: How can there be an objective world of money, property, marriage, governments, elections, football games, cocktail parties and law courts in a world that consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force, and in which some of these particles are organized into systems that are conscious biological beasts, such as ourselves?鈥�
He explains, 鈥淥ur aim is to assimilate social reality to our basic ontology of physics, chemistry, and biology. To do this we need to show the continuous line that goes from molecules and mountains to screwdrivers, levers, and beautiful sunsets, and then to legislatures, money, and nation-states. The central span on the bridge from physics to society is collective intentionality, and the decisive movement on that bridge in the creation of social reality is the collective intentional imposition of function on entities that cannot perform those functions without that imposition. The radical movement that gets us from such simple social facts as that we are sitting on a bench together or having a fistfight to such institutional facts as money, property, and marriage is the collective imposition of function on entities, which---unlike levers, benches, and cars---cannot perform the functions solely by virtue of their physical structure.鈥� (Pg. 41)
He summarizes, 鈥渨e can see several other reasons why institutional facts require language: First, language is epistemically indispensable鈥� Second, the facts in question, being inherently social, must be communicable鈥� Third, in real life the phenomena in question are extremely complex, and the representation of such complex information requires language鈥ourth, the facts in question persist through time independently of the duration of the urges and inclinations of the participants in the institution.鈥� (Pg. 76-78)
He asserts, 鈥淪ince Freud we have found it useful and convenient to speak glibly about the unconscious mind without paying the price of explaining exactly what we mean. Our picture of unconscious mental states is that they are just like conscious states only minus the consciousness. But what exactly is that supposed to mean? I have not seen a satisfactory answer to that question---certainly not in Chomsky or Fodor and not even in Freud. To put the point crudely, I believe that in most appeals to the unconscious in Cognitive Science we really have no clear idea what we are talking about.鈥� (Pg. 128)
He continues, 鈥淚 have thus defined the 鈥楤ackground鈥� as the set of nonintentional or preintentional capabilities that enable intentional states of function.鈥� (Pg. 129) He goes on to list 鈥渟everal types of Background functions. First鈥� the Background enables linguistic interpretation to take place... Second, the Background enables perceptual interpretation to take place鈥� Third, the Background structures consciousness鈥� Fourth, temporally extended sequences of experiences come to us with a narrative of dramatic shape. They come to us under what for want of a better work I will call 鈥榙ramatic鈥� categories鈥� Fifth, each of us has a set of motivational dispositions, and these will condition the structure of our experiences鈥� Sixth, the Background facilitates certain kinds of readiness鈥� Seventh, the Background disposes me to certain sorts of behavior鈥� 鈥� (Pg. 132-136)
He argues, 鈥淭here is a parallelism between the functional structure of the Background and the intentional structure of the social phenomena to which the Background capacities relate. That strict parallelism gives us the illusion that the person who is able to deal with money, to cope with society, and speak a language must be unconsciously following rules. Here I am arguing, Of course there are rules and often we do follow them, both consciously and unconsciously, but: 1. The rules are never self interpreting, and 2. They are never exhaustive, and 3. In fact in many situations, we just know what to do, we just know how to deal with the situation. We do not apply the rules consciously or unconsciously.鈥� (Pg. 142-143)
He goes on, 鈥渙ften the person who behaves in a skillful way within an institution behaves as if he were following the rules鈥� but rather because the mechanism has evolved precisely so that it will be sensitive to the rules. The mechanism explains the behavior, and the mechanism is explained by the system of rules. I am in short urging the addition of another level, a diachronic level, in the explanation of certain sorts of social behavior.鈥� (Pg. 146)
He asserts, 鈥渢here is a normal way of understanding utterances, and that when performing speech acts in a public language, speakers typically attempt to achieve normal understanding. The point we are attempting to show is that for a large class 鈥� a condition of intelligibility for the normal understanding of these utterances is that there is a way that things are that is independent of human representations. The consequence is that when we attempt to communicate to achieve normal understanding with these sorts of utterances we must presuppose external realism.鈥� (Pg. 184)
This book will be of great interest to anyone seriously studying Searle and the development of his thought.
July 1, 2014
Searle's The Construction of Social Reality is terrific as a brief introduction to Searle's view of metaphysics; it takes a stab at giving an account of social institutions in terms of psychological features distributed across collections of individuals and, so far as I can tell, is the most successful attempt at bridging the gap between the physical, psychological, and social in recent intellectual history. There are many reasons to be concerned about Searle's ideas (his open use of Cartesian language to contrast the physical and psychological; limited attention to the way that social institutions shape individual and social psychology, etc.) but overall the work is a solid piece of philosophy and deserves the attention that it's been given.
Those who disagree with Searle, in particular, should be obligated to read this particular text. It's a clean and straightforward articulation of his views, and does take some time to show the ways that his views about social reality interact with his views about language and thought. Whether you agree with him on any of those subjects (and most people disagree with him on most subjects) it is important to have an understanding of Searle, as someone who has been widely influential in philosophy. This book is probably the best introduction to his views I've come across, and is fairly accessible.
Those who disagree with Searle, in particular, should be obligated to read this particular text. It's a clean and straightforward articulation of his views, and does take some time to show the ways that his views about social reality interact with his views about language and thought. Whether you agree with him on any of those subjects (and most people disagree with him on most subjects) it is important to have an understanding of Searle, as someone who has been widely influential in philosophy. This book is probably the best introduction to his views I've come across, and is fairly accessible.
November 21, 2018
If you started out searching for truth, you may have read a lot of philosophy. I did, when younger, and eventually drifted toward science, because philosophy seemed too abstract and circular.
You can鈥檛 read a better argument for what truth is than is presented by John Searle, in The Construction of Social Reality. He delineates truth and fact in his explanation of 鈥渋nstitutional facts鈥� and facts in general.
Some facts, he says, are brute facts, true no matter what anybody thinks. The summit of Mt. Everest is covered with snow: that is an example of a brute fact.
But institutional facts are different, and they are the basis of our social life. Take money, for example. Money works because we agree it鈥檚 valuable. But if we stopped agreeing about money, it would simply cease to be, unlike Mt. Everest.
This book is all about the things that started out in our minds and imaginations and became codifed in our institutions and laws. Things like: property, marriage, contracts, and governments. And this book is the opposite of abstract and circular. John Searle writes some of the clearest and best philosophical explanations I have ever seen. First published in 1995, this is a timeless masterpiece for any student of philosophy, or anybody interested in what truth is, and how society functions.
You can鈥檛 read a better argument for what truth is than is presented by John Searle, in The Construction of Social Reality. He delineates truth and fact in his explanation of 鈥渋nstitutional facts鈥� and facts in general.
Some facts, he says, are brute facts, true no matter what anybody thinks. The summit of Mt. Everest is covered with snow: that is an example of a brute fact.
But institutional facts are different, and they are the basis of our social life. Take money, for example. Money works because we agree it鈥檚 valuable. But if we stopped agreeing about money, it would simply cease to be, unlike Mt. Everest.
This book is all about the things that started out in our minds and imaginations and became codifed in our institutions and laws. Things like: property, marriage, contracts, and governments. And this book is the opposite of abstract and circular. John Searle writes some of the clearest and best philosophical explanations I have ever seen. First published in 1995, this is a timeless masterpiece for any student of philosophy, or anybody interested in what truth is, and how society functions.
November 24, 2021
In this book John Searle sets out to prove -- contra the postmodernists -- that there is a reality whose existence is guaranteed having a separate existence apart from our conception of it, a reality that cannot be questioned. He distinguishes the fact that we affirm the permanently concrete existence of reality by removing the Berkeleyian element of judgment based on what we believe is external reality. He says he disbelieves in the half-measure that Hilary Putnam champions, internal realism, as a defensible position between external realism and antirealism. His reaction to those who would defy attempts made to rationally confirm the basic facts provided by the senses as attempts to prove the framework within the existence of the framework with the simple exclamation, "So what ?"
Searle says that arguments that suggest no transcendence of reality is possible take realism for granted, which leads him to the conclusion that we must take external reality for existing reality; it is a necessary presupposition, he says. Although he admits that it does not seem likely that there could be an argument in favor of the existence of external reality which does not "beg-the-question", he says these same arguments hold up because they entail the conditions of intelligibility; he says it is not an epistemologically arbitrable point, but a matter of being a publicly accessible perspective on reality. Searle draws attention to the main distinction he is trying to make in writing this book: that there is a difference between the facts involved in one's belief in external reality and the facts involved in the existence of human representations in normal understanding. Some things, he says, are not socially constructed.
It seems to be that this a question of Searle's Oxfordian education; in trying to refute Berkeley and Putnam, he is bequeathing honors and restoring the place of English rationalism to its proper place... This text is understood to be important as a refutation of relativism or any philosophical argument which takes a "meta"-linguistic approach to the subject of truth claims. Searle suggests that contemporary postmodernism ways of thinking have taken over which see the statement that facts are nonlinguistic entities and that the truth-claims stemming from these so-called "facts" imply a false matching between the linguistic and nonlinguistic. Nevertheless, the world of particle physics says that there exists an unknowable world where decision-making takes place in a seemingly irrational way and a way that defies concrete reality; it is, experientially, on the microscopic world of quantum physics that this center of undecidability from where socially constructed knowledge disintegrates in a cosmic sense. To be continued.....
Searle says that arguments that suggest no transcendence of reality is possible take realism for granted, which leads him to the conclusion that we must take external reality for existing reality; it is a necessary presupposition, he says. Although he admits that it does not seem likely that there could be an argument in favor of the existence of external reality which does not "beg-the-question", he says these same arguments hold up because they entail the conditions of intelligibility; he says it is not an epistemologically arbitrable point, but a matter of being a publicly accessible perspective on reality. Searle draws attention to the main distinction he is trying to make in writing this book: that there is a difference between the facts involved in one's belief in external reality and the facts involved in the existence of human representations in normal understanding. Some things, he says, are not socially constructed.
It seems to be that this a question of Searle's Oxfordian education; in trying to refute Berkeley and Putnam, he is bequeathing honors and restoring the place of English rationalism to its proper place... This text is understood to be important as a refutation of relativism or any philosophical argument which takes a "meta"-linguistic approach to the subject of truth claims. Searle suggests that contemporary postmodernism ways of thinking have taken over which see the statement that facts are nonlinguistic entities and that the truth-claims stemming from these so-called "facts" imply a false matching between the linguistic and nonlinguistic. Nevertheless, the world of particle physics says that there exists an unknowable world where decision-making takes place in a seemingly irrational way and a way that defies concrete reality; it is, experientially, on the microscopic world of quantum physics that this center of undecidability from where socially constructed knowledge disintegrates in a cosmic sense. To be continued.....
January 2, 2025
"the construction of reality", when examined through a Nick Landian framework, dissolves into a hyperstitional vortex where the "real" is not merely constructed but is a recursive effect of cybernetic feedback loops and capitalist technogenesis. Reality, in this schema, becomes a machinic assemblage, perpetually disassembled and reassembled by the algorithmic flows of late-stage capitalism. Land's accelerationist critique would posit that the construction of reality is not a human endeavor but an inhuman process driven by the emergent intelligence of technocapital itself, wherein humans serve merely as transitory agents within the vast circuitries of abstraction.
Simultaneously, from a Baudrillardian perspective, the construction of reality collapses under the weight of simulation and hyperreality. Here, reality is not constructed but endlessly reproduced as simulacra, erasing any distinction between the real and its representation. The constructed "reality" thus becomes a play of floating signifiers, untethered from any referential ground. The notion of construction itself is a simulacrum鈥攁 sign of a process that no longer possesses a discernible origin or telos, merely oscillating within the desert of the real.Meanwhile, Deleuze鈥檚 ontology disrupts the very premise of "construction" as a linear or teleological process. For Deleuze, reality is an immanent plane of becoming, perpetually deterritorialized and reterritorialized by assemblages of desire, affect, and materiality. The so-called "construction of reality" is thus not a construction but a rhizomatic unfolding, a multiplicity that resists totalization or binary stratifications. The real is not constructed but continuously differentiated, emerging from the interplay of forces and intensities that exceed any representational or structural paradigm.In synthesis, Landian hyperstition, Baudrillardian hyperreality, and Deleuzian immanence converge to annihilate the concept of reality as a static construct. Instead, reality appears as a pulsating, machinic, and infinitely mutable assemblage鈥攁n ever-accelerating nexus where the boundaries between construction, simulation, and becoming are obliterated. The "construction of reality" is not merely a human endeavor but a symptom of forces鈥攃apital, code, and chaos鈥攖hat exceed and efface the human altogether.
Simultaneously, from a Baudrillardian perspective, the construction of reality collapses under the weight of simulation and hyperreality. Here, reality is not constructed but endlessly reproduced as simulacra, erasing any distinction between the real and its representation. The constructed "reality" thus becomes a play of floating signifiers, untethered from any referential ground. The notion of construction itself is a simulacrum鈥攁 sign of a process that no longer possesses a discernible origin or telos, merely oscillating within the desert of the real.Meanwhile, Deleuze鈥檚 ontology disrupts the very premise of "construction" as a linear or teleological process. For Deleuze, reality is an immanent plane of becoming, perpetually deterritorialized and reterritorialized by assemblages of desire, affect, and materiality. The so-called "construction of reality" is thus not a construction but a rhizomatic unfolding, a multiplicity that resists totalization or binary stratifications. The real is not constructed but continuously differentiated, emerging from the interplay of forces and intensities that exceed any representational or structural paradigm.In synthesis, Landian hyperstition, Baudrillardian hyperreality, and Deleuzian immanence converge to annihilate the concept of reality as a static construct. Instead, reality appears as a pulsating, machinic, and infinitely mutable assemblage鈥攁n ever-accelerating nexus where the boundaries between construction, simulation, and becoming are obliterated. The "construction of reality" is not merely a human endeavor but a symptom of forces鈥攃apital, code, and chaos鈥攖hat exceed and efface the human altogether.
November 28, 2021
In this book, Searle's project is to give an account of the existence of social phenomena in a one-world ontology; that is, an ontology that presupposes naturalism. His project is descriptive insofar as he attempts to explain how social fact (y) is derived from or constructed 鈥渙n top鈥� of brute facts (x鈥檚). Facts about social institutions (such as money or marriage) are objectively true in a world constituted by atoms and fields of force for the following reason: Institutions and other conventions are constituted by collective beliefs that confer status and powers on objects and events. They are mind-dependent yet objective because locutions such as "Dollars are legal tender in the U.S." or "John and Dawn are married" are said to be "true" or "false."
Searle begins by making a number of conceptual distinctions, which will serve as the tools for constructing the required mechanisms that generate social ontology. One such distinction concerns features of the world. There are those that are intrinsic features of the world and those that are extrinsic or observer relative features of the world. Intrinsic features are agent independent. For instance, mountains and molecules are, according to Searle, things that exist independently of our representations of them. It is true of the object I鈥檓 sitting on that it has a certain mass and chemical composition; that it is made partly of wood, the cells of which are composed of cellulose fibers, and so forth. All such features are intrinsic, claims Searle. Observer relative features are agent dependent. For instance, it is true of a certain object, which consists of various intrinsic features, that it is also a screwdriver. To describe something as a screwdriver is to specify a feature of the object that is observer or agent relative. Screwdrivers are not things you find intrinsically in the world, even though there are objects that are screwdrivers. Searle makes a further distinction the objective and subjective, which are then further divided into those that are epistemic and those that are ontological. The epistemic concerns predicates of judgments. There are subjective epistemic judgments 鈥� Rembrandt is a better artist than Reubens.鈥� There also are objective epistemic judgments 鈥淩embrandt lived in Amsterdam during the year 1632.鈥� The ontological concerns predicates of entities. There are subjective ontological predicates such as pains, and there are objective ontological predicates such as mountains. All these distinctions serve as the basic toolkit that Searle uses to carve up what he takes to be social ontology.
One of the interesting arguments Searle employs is his function argument. Searle argues that, unlike causes, functions are intensional, not extensional; functions are observer relative and, hence, are not intrinsic features of the world. His argument against intrinsic functionality is analogous to the argument against the substitutivity of terms in referentially opaque contexts.
Consider Leibniz鈥檚 Law:
Fa
a=b
Therefore
Fb
The substitution of co-referential terms does not affect the truth-value of the sentence as a whole. Now consider the following invalid instantiation:
John believes that Hesperus is Hesperus;
Hesperus is Phosphorus;
Therefore:
John believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
The principle of substitutivity is applied illicitly here, and Searle thinks that substitutability in function contexts, likewise, yields invalidity. The following schema, therefore, is invalid:
A鈥檚 function is to X
X-ing = Y-ing
Therefore:
A鈥檚 function is to Y
Searle claims that arguments for intrinsic functionality fail to capture the ordinary notion of function. So, Searle's function argument serves as a premise for the overall argument that either one鈥檚 account fits with substitutivity and is, therefore, observer relative, or one must redefine the sense in which the term 鈥渇unction鈥� is being used.
Among the notion of a function, Searle distinguishes the following kinds: Agentive and nonagentive. Agentive functions are those that are agent dependent; e.g., chairs, screwdrivers, paperweights. Nonagentive functions are those that are agent independent; e.g., pumping hearts.
Searle鈥檚 project also includes giving an account of collective intentionality, which involves cooperative behavior and shared intentional states. Searle spells out an interesting negative account of 鈥渨e intentions鈥� but leaves much to be desired if you are looking for a full treatment of this fascinating aspect of ontology.
Another aspect of his ontological toolkit is the notion of constitutive rules and regulative rules. Regulative rules are antecedent to the phenomena of which they regulate: 鈥淒rive on the right-hand side of the road.鈥� Constitutive rules, however, determine the phenomena of which they govern: 鈥淧laying chess is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules.鈥� Constitutive rules have the form: 鈥淴 counts as Y in context C.鈥�
Searle's project is an interesting one, though not a novel one; and it is noteworthy that he does not much refer to those who have engaged in projects similar to his, such as Heidegger, Foucault, or Merleu Ponty; or for that matter his contemporaries such as Ian Hacking. Elgin, and Sally Haslanger.
There are a number of problems with Searle鈥檚 account. One of which is his vague use of 鈥榖rute fact鈥�. You get the sense that Searle knows that if he presses this concept for all it's worth, he鈥檒l end up with something like a Kantian 鈥渢hing-in-itself;鈥� but Searle trys to avoid being committed to this (it doesn鈥檛 rub well with na茂ve realism). Further difficulties arise when Searle's notion of a 鈥榖ackround鈥� is fleshed out. Again, Searle seems to be committing himself to more than his toolkit allows for. His position on the way in which our concept use plays into the construction of various social entities, and how this concept use and construction is related to collective intentionality, is presented weakly.
Regarding collective intentionality, Searle claims that cooperative intention constrains one's individual intention. I think his argument for this (which I'm not giving here) has many problems, but as is the case with most philosophical arguments that don't quite succeed, it is interesting, and yields plenty of further argumentative fruit.
All in all the book is well worth reading, and I鈥檝e hardly said anything that should dissuade anyone from reading it. It would have been nice, however, if Searle had dealt with some of the more interesting and difficult issues that arise from his project, which people like Hacking and Haslanger and Elgin have dealt with.
Searle begins by making a number of conceptual distinctions, which will serve as the tools for constructing the required mechanisms that generate social ontology. One such distinction concerns features of the world. There are those that are intrinsic features of the world and those that are extrinsic or observer relative features of the world. Intrinsic features are agent independent. For instance, mountains and molecules are, according to Searle, things that exist independently of our representations of them. It is true of the object I鈥檓 sitting on that it has a certain mass and chemical composition; that it is made partly of wood, the cells of which are composed of cellulose fibers, and so forth. All such features are intrinsic, claims Searle. Observer relative features are agent dependent. For instance, it is true of a certain object, which consists of various intrinsic features, that it is also a screwdriver. To describe something as a screwdriver is to specify a feature of the object that is observer or agent relative. Screwdrivers are not things you find intrinsically in the world, even though there are objects that are screwdrivers. Searle makes a further distinction the objective and subjective, which are then further divided into those that are epistemic and those that are ontological. The epistemic concerns predicates of judgments. There are subjective epistemic judgments 鈥� Rembrandt is a better artist than Reubens.鈥� There also are objective epistemic judgments 鈥淩embrandt lived in Amsterdam during the year 1632.鈥� The ontological concerns predicates of entities. There are subjective ontological predicates such as pains, and there are objective ontological predicates such as mountains. All these distinctions serve as the basic toolkit that Searle uses to carve up what he takes to be social ontology.
One of the interesting arguments Searle employs is his function argument. Searle argues that, unlike causes, functions are intensional, not extensional; functions are observer relative and, hence, are not intrinsic features of the world. His argument against intrinsic functionality is analogous to the argument against the substitutivity of terms in referentially opaque contexts.
Consider Leibniz鈥檚 Law:
Fa
a=b
Therefore
Fb
The substitution of co-referential terms does not affect the truth-value of the sentence as a whole. Now consider the following invalid instantiation:
John believes that Hesperus is Hesperus;
Hesperus is Phosphorus;
Therefore:
John believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
The principle of substitutivity is applied illicitly here, and Searle thinks that substitutability in function contexts, likewise, yields invalidity. The following schema, therefore, is invalid:
A鈥檚 function is to X
X-ing = Y-ing
Therefore:
A鈥檚 function is to Y
Searle claims that arguments for intrinsic functionality fail to capture the ordinary notion of function. So, Searle's function argument serves as a premise for the overall argument that either one鈥檚 account fits with substitutivity and is, therefore, observer relative, or one must redefine the sense in which the term 鈥渇unction鈥� is being used.
Among the notion of a function, Searle distinguishes the following kinds: Agentive and nonagentive. Agentive functions are those that are agent dependent; e.g., chairs, screwdrivers, paperweights. Nonagentive functions are those that are agent independent; e.g., pumping hearts.
Searle鈥檚 project also includes giving an account of collective intentionality, which involves cooperative behavior and shared intentional states. Searle spells out an interesting negative account of 鈥渨e intentions鈥� but leaves much to be desired if you are looking for a full treatment of this fascinating aspect of ontology.
Another aspect of his ontological toolkit is the notion of constitutive rules and regulative rules. Regulative rules are antecedent to the phenomena of which they regulate: 鈥淒rive on the right-hand side of the road.鈥� Constitutive rules, however, determine the phenomena of which they govern: 鈥淧laying chess is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules.鈥� Constitutive rules have the form: 鈥淴 counts as Y in context C.鈥�
Searle's project is an interesting one, though not a novel one; and it is noteworthy that he does not much refer to those who have engaged in projects similar to his, such as Heidegger, Foucault, or Merleu Ponty; or for that matter his contemporaries such as Ian Hacking. Elgin, and Sally Haslanger.
There are a number of problems with Searle鈥檚 account. One of which is his vague use of 鈥榖rute fact鈥�. You get the sense that Searle knows that if he presses this concept for all it's worth, he鈥檒l end up with something like a Kantian 鈥渢hing-in-itself;鈥� but Searle trys to avoid being committed to this (it doesn鈥檛 rub well with na茂ve realism). Further difficulties arise when Searle's notion of a 鈥榖ackround鈥� is fleshed out. Again, Searle seems to be committing himself to more than his toolkit allows for. His position on the way in which our concept use plays into the construction of various social entities, and how this concept use and construction is related to collective intentionality, is presented weakly.
Regarding collective intentionality, Searle claims that cooperative intention constrains one's individual intention. I think his argument for this (which I'm not giving here) has many problems, but as is the case with most philosophical arguments that don't quite succeed, it is interesting, and yields plenty of further argumentative fruit.
All in all the book is well worth reading, and I鈥檝e hardly said anything that should dissuade anyone from reading it. It would have been nice, however, if Searle had dealt with some of the more interesting and difficult issues that arise from his project, which people like Hacking and Haslanger and Elgin have dealt with.
September 12, 2020
An original work in which Searle eludicates the structure of social reality and institutional facts using speech act theory. Searle distinguishes an institutional fact as a subclass of a social fact. A social fact refers to any fact involving collective intentionality which can be exhibited by prelinguistic animals when they engage in more structural collective behaviours such as pack hunting or territorial marking.
Institutional facts involve the use of created conventions with constitutive rules established by language, such as money, property, marriage, sports competitions. The use of language features performative utterances to create institutional facts as seen in declarations of marriage, war, and swearing into office.
The structure of institutional facts has several features. First it has status functions of the form "x counts as y in context C" iterated in its constitutive rules, e.g., paper counts as money in society C. Second, there is an interlocking systems of constitutive rules and systems to sustain institutional facts. Paper can count as money only if money exists in an established financial exchange system, and, a financial system exists as an institution in society C.
Searle further provides the maintenance and hierarchy of institutional facts.
Also included in the book is a defence of ontological external realism given that Searle's notion of institutional facts is based on a primacy of brute facts and an assumption of background concepts in Searle's work on background semantics.
This clearly written work in typical Searlian lucid prose is useful for followup courses in speech act theory or pragmatics.
Institutional facts involve the use of created conventions with constitutive rules established by language, such as money, property, marriage, sports competitions. The use of language features performative utterances to create institutional facts as seen in declarations of marriage, war, and swearing into office.
The structure of institutional facts has several features. First it has status functions of the form "x counts as y in context C" iterated in its constitutive rules, e.g., paper counts as money in society C. Second, there is an interlocking systems of constitutive rules and systems to sustain institutional facts. Paper can count as money only if money exists in an established financial exchange system, and, a financial system exists as an institution in society C.
Searle further provides the maintenance and hierarchy of institutional facts.
Also included in the book is a defence of ontological external realism given that Searle's notion of institutional facts is based on a primacy of brute facts and an assumption of background concepts in Searle's work on background semantics.
This clearly written work in typical Searlian lucid prose is useful for followup courses in speech act theory or pragmatics.
June 18, 2017
I don't dive into many books on philosophy, but this one was recommended by a friend. Said he was assigned it in a grad-level History of Psychology class. And while this book is very relevant to that particular science, it applies to... nearly everything.
At a critical level, all I can really say is that Searle's arguments make sense to me. They're understandable. But I am afraid that I don't know the other arguments well enough to strongly say that this text is a definitive account of reality (external, internal, or otherwise). It's a short text, and because he sticks to his points, the book feels dense. I had to slow myself down and unpack some of his language at times, but that's not to say that it's written in a complicated way. On the contrary, actually.
It wasn't until I finished, felt that I enjoyed it, only to Google what John Searle was up to these days. His history of sexual misconduct and harassment with students doesn't change any of his arguments, but it sure made me sick to my stomach after the fact.
At a critical level, all I can really say is that Searle's arguments make sense to me. They're understandable. But I am afraid that I don't know the other arguments well enough to strongly say that this text is a definitive account of reality (external, internal, or otherwise). It's a short text, and because he sticks to his points, the book feels dense. I had to slow myself down and unpack some of his language at times, but that's not to say that it's written in a complicated way. On the contrary, actually.
It wasn't until I finished, felt that I enjoyed it, only to Google what John Searle was up to these days. His history of sexual misconduct and harassment with students doesn't change any of his arguments, but it sure made me sick to my stomach after the fact.
June 24, 2023
This is a sensible and very well-grounded account of the phenomenon of social facts. Using ideas he developed in his philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, Searle is able illuminatingly to extend them to explain such facts as the existence of money and marriage. These are things social scientists presuppose but are not equipped to explain. It is the only philosophically respectable (or simply respectable) theory of this extremely important aspect of reality.
The last three chapters of the book (7, 8 and 9) constitute a self-contained discussion of realism and truth. It is amazingly clear, convincing, and should be accessible to anyone with intelligence and an open mind. I would require all literary critics, social theorists, an assorted postmodernist "thinkers" to first read this before presuming to make any pronouncements of their own (should there be any left for them to make).
The last three chapters of the book (7, 8 and 9) constitute a self-contained discussion of realism and truth. It is amazingly clear, convincing, and should be accessible to anyone with intelligence and an open mind. I would require all literary critics, social theorists, an assorted postmodernist "thinkers" to first read this before presuming to make any pronouncements of their own (should there be any left for them to make).
February 22, 2020
The most lucid and thoughtful exposition of a much-abused term in social sciences, i.e., social construction. A much-needed sober take that I think is an important check on the tendency toward ontological relativism. Should be required reading for all programs dealing with the social construction of anything.
November 1, 2022
This is the book that I would write If I had the academic credentials of the author or even more.
Even though the topics he is discussing and analysing are complex, he tries to do it as simple as possible while maintaining an academic and philosophical perspective.
I totally recommend to anyone who wants to learn, think and understand more of our social constructions and our world in general.
Even though the topics he is discussing and analysing are complex, he tries to do it as simple as possible while maintaining an academic and philosophical perspective.
I totally recommend to anyone who wants to learn, think and understand more of our social constructions and our world in general.
May 12, 2023
An excellent book for understanding the mystery of capital
The idea of 鈥渟tatus function鈥� and 鈥渃ollective intentionality鈥� is indispensable for understanding the mystery of capital which are beyond the comprehension of Adam Smith and Karl Marx. John R. Searle and Hernando de Soto are two giants helping us to discover the mystery of capital. This book is highly recommended.
The idea of 鈥渟tatus function鈥� and 鈥渃ollective intentionality鈥� is indispensable for understanding the mystery of capital which are beyond the comprehension of Adam Smith and Karl Marx. John R. Searle and Hernando de Soto are two giants helping us to discover the mystery of capital. This book is highly recommended.
Displaying 1 - 29 of 56 reviews
Can't find what you're looking for?
Get help and learn more about the design.