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(賲鬲丕賮蹖夭蹖讴 (賲丕亘毓丿丕賱胤亘蹖毓賴
"All men by nature are actuated with the desire of knowledge," declared Aristotle. The philosopher's works are foundational to the history of science, and his treatise on metaphysics, or "first philosophy," is divided into sections on previous philosophical thought and theories; a refutation of skepticism; a demonstration of God's existence; an examination of the relation of metaphysics to the other sciences; an elucidation of the nature of the infinite; and other major philosophical issues.
The central theme consists of an inquiry into how substance may be defined as a category of being. Aristotle defines substance as ultimate reality, since substance belongs to no other category of being, and because substance serves as the basis for every other category of being. The philosopher also defines substance as an underlying reality, or as the substratum of all existing things. He describes substance as both formal and material reality, and he discusses the relation between potentiality and actuality. An excellent example of Aristotle's dialectical method, which reasons from reliable opinions rather than known truths, this work offers a fine introduction to classical metaphysics.
The central theme consists of an inquiry into how substance may be defined as a category of being. Aristotle defines substance as ultimate reality, since substance belongs to no other category of being, and because substance serves as the basis for every other category of being. The philosopher also defines substance as an underlying reality, or as the substratum of all existing things. He describes substance as both formal and material reality, and he discusses the relation between potentiality and actuality. An excellent example of Aristotle's dialectical method, which reasons from reliable opinions rather than known truths, this work offers a fine introduction to classical metaphysics.
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First published January 1, 331
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About the author
Aristotle
3,407听books5,330听followersAristotle (Greek: 螒蚁喂蟽蟿慰蟿苇位畏蟼; 384鈥�322 BC) was an Ancient Greek philosopher and polymath. His writings cover a broad range of subjects spanning the natural sciences, philosophy, linguistics, economics, politics, psychology, and the arts. As the founder of the Peripatetic school of philosophy in the Lyceum in Athens, he began the wider Aristotelian tradition that followed, which set the groundwork for the development of modern science.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c.鈥�347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Ab茅lard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c.鈥�347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Ab茅lard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
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February 12, 2012 "When he to whom one speaks does not understand, and he who speaks himself does not understand, that is metaphysics."
-Voltaire
-Voltaire
June 2, 2016
I have very mixed feelings about Aristotle.
On the one hand, he's so tedious and uninspiring. This is only partially his fault: everything we have of his are lecture notes, and so it is no surprise that they are stylistically wanting. Many scholars think that Metaphysics contains many sections written at different times and for different purposes, which Aristotle never intended to be read together. There is even one section which may not have been written by him at all. This makes his work (particularly this book) often difficult and confusing.
That being said, his ideas are not poetic either. His Ethics contains ingredients to live a well-balanced life, but a life curiously devoid of great passion or excitement. His Rhetoric reads like a handbook for lawyers. His interest in biology pervades his thinking: he loves to catalog, to systematize masses of details. He was the original stamp collector.
On top of this, Aristotle's ideas often take the form of common sense pedantically expressed (to paraphrase Bertrand Russell). His temper was the opposite of Plato's, who seemed to deliberately try to draw counter-intuitive conclusions. One often gets the feeling that Aristotle found Plato a bit excitable, and longed to make philosophy into a more respectable, hard-headed enterprise. When engaging with his mentor's ideas, Aristotle is either (1) opposing them, or (2) trying to reconcile them with common sense. The result of the latter is a strange admixture of the mundane and the mystic.
But his positive qualities are equally compelling. Compare Aristotle's careful claims, his scrupulous definitions, and systematic procedure to Plato's more artistic style. Plato was the master of the straw man. Compelling as the dialogue form is, it allowed Plato to caricature his opponents' positions and get away with some pretty sloppy thinking. Aristotle will have none of this. Plato sought to banish all poets from his Republic, and maybe he himself would have been barred entry. Aristotle would have waltzed right in.
It is hard to evaluate the argument of this book, if only because it is so disorganized and wordy. Aristotle does do a good job in pointing out the logical absurdities of Plato's theory of Ideas. However, his own theory of Form and Substance is curiously similar, and is liable to some of the same criticisms. To me, this shows just how much Aristotle was under the influence of his old teacher鈥攅ven though he tried to wrest himself free, he gets sucked back in.
[An Afterthought: Plato and Aristotle are perfect antidotes for different places and times. When emotion, superstition, fanaticism, and sophism reign, Aristotle is where it's at. But, for me, our world is sometimes too systematic, too commonsensical, and too averse to abstract argument. Plato is like a glass of cool water.]
On the one hand, he's so tedious and uninspiring. This is only partially his fault: everything we have of his are lecture notes, and so it is no surprise that they are stylistically wanting. Many scholars think that Metaphysics contains many sections written at different times and for different purposes, which Aristotle never intended to be read together. There is even one section which may not have been written by him at all. This makes his work (particularly this book) often difficult and confusing.
That being said, his ideas are not poetic either. His Ethics contains ingredients to live a well-balanced life, but a life curiously devoid of great passion or excitement. His Rhetoric reads like a handbook for lawyers. His interest in biology pervades his thinking: he loves to catalog, to systematize masses of details. He was the original stamp collector.
On top of this, Aristotle's ideas often take the form of common sense pedantically expressed (to paraphrase Bertrand Russell). His temper was the opposite of Plato's, who seemed to deliberately try to draw counter-intuitive conclusions. One often gets the feeling that Aristotle found Plato a bit excitable, and longed to make philosophy into a more respectable, hard-headed enterprise. When engaging with his mentor's ideas, Aristotle is either (1) opposing them, or (2) trying to reconcile them with common sense. The result of the latter is a strange admixture of the mundane and the mystic.
But his positive qualities are equally compelling. Compare Aristotle's careful claims, his scrupulous definitions, and systematic procedure to Plato's more artistic style. Plato was the master of the straw man. Compelling as the dialogue form is, it allowed Plato to caricature his opponents' positions and get away with some pretty sloppy thinking. Aristotle will have none of this. Plato sought to banish all poets from his Republic, and maybe he himself would have been barred entry. Aristotle would have waltzed right in.
It is hard to evaluate the argument of this book, if only because it is so disorganized and wordy. Aristotle does do a good job in pointing out the logical absurdities of Plato's theory of Ideas. However, his own theory of Form and Substance is curiously similar, and is liable to some of the same criticisms. To me, this shows just how much Aristotle was under the influence of his old teacher鈥攅ven though he tried to wrest himself free, he gets sucked back in.
[An Afterthought: Plato and Aristotle are perfect antidotes for different places and times. When emotion, superstition, fanaticism, and sophism reign, Aristotle is where it's at. But, for me, our world is sometimes too systematic, too commonsensical, and too averse to abstract argument. Plato is like a glass of cool water.]
February 19, 2021
Aristotle's Physics that I have recently read discussed things that change within space and time. Whereas, Aristotle's Metaphysics discusses things that do not change relative to space and time.
Metaphysics is Aristotle's principles and causes of being. Aristotle believed that everything around us consists of a substance, or the essence of a thing, where this substance is a mixture of actual form and potential matter. In these discussions of being, Aristotle, states that matter is only found in that what is being created, changing, and is perishable such as the things of the observable world and the celestial bodies and eternal sky. Whereas, that, what has no matter and just actual form is the embodiment of perfection which is stationary, indivisible and unobservable; the immovable mover of all (God).
Aristotle does not use the term metaphysics in book. There is this notion that the book was given the title Metaphysics by the ancient compilers of Aristotle's writings simply because these works came after his Physics book; where 'meta' means 'after' in Greek.
Aristotle presents his philosophical ideas and conclusions superior to those of the Pythagoreans, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, and even his teacher Plato. He does give them partial recognition, but more often is critical (at times unjustifiably) of their philosophy. For instance, Aristotle is not content with Plato's mathematization of philosophy. So instead of using numbers and shapes to express a thing for what it precisely is, Aristotle, uses the semantic power of words to express a thing or being by giving it a precise name that would distinguish it from other things. Therefore, Aristotle, wants to detach and create a clear distinction between philosophy, on the one hand, and mathematics and physics, on the other. Consequently, Aristotle names the philosophy of this book, which he often refers to as theology and the study of being (ontology), as a first philosophy and physics and mathematics as a second philosophy.
Perhaps with all the scientific discoveries of the last couple of centuries metaphysics 鈥榚lbow room鈥� has considerably narrowed, although, it was Aristotle and his emphasis on employing observation using our senses, not just reasoning, the backbone for gathering data in all of the sciences today. On the whole, the book is very readable, even though, the term being is used in many ways and the interpretation at times can be tricky or ambiguous. But some chapters (books) were truly amazing, and the content of the book withstood the test of time better than that of his Physics book.
(4.5/5.0)
Metaphysics is Aristotle's principles and causes of being. Aristotle believed that everything around us consists of a substance, or the essence of a thing, where this substance is a mixture of actual form and potential matter. In these discussions of being, Aristotle, states that matter is only found in that what is being created, changing, and is perishable such as the things of the observable world and the celestial bodies and eternal sky. Whereas, that, what has no matter and just actual form is the embodiment of perfection which is stationary, indivisible and unobservable; the immovable mover of all (God).
Aristotle does not use the term metaphysics in book. There is this notion that the book was given the title Metaphysics by the ancient compilers of Aristotle's writings simply because these works came after his Physics book; where 'meta' means 'after' in Greek.
Aristotle presents his philosophical ideas and conclusions superior to those of the Pythagoreans, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, and even his teacher Plato. He does give them partial recognition, but more often is critical (at times unjustifiably) of their philosophy. For instance, Aristotle is not content with Plato's mathematization of philosophy. So instead of using numbers and shapes to express a thing for what it precisely is, Aristotle, uses the semantic power of words to express a thing or being by giving it a precise name that would distinguish it from other things. Therefore, Aristotle, wants to detach and create a clear distinction between philosophy, on the one hand, and mathematics and physics, on the other. Consequently, Aristotle names the philosophy of this book, which he often refers to as theology and the study of being (ontology), as a first philosophy and physics and mathematics as a second philosophy.
Perhaps with all the scientific discoveries of the last couple of centuries metaphysics 鈥榚lbow room鈥� has considerably narrowed, although, it was Aristotle and his emphasis on employing observation using our senses, not just reasoning, the backbone for gathering data in all of the sciences today. On the whole, the book is very readable, even though, the term being is used in many ways and the interpretation at times can be tricky or ambiguous. But some chapters (books) were truly amazing, and the content of the book withstood the test of time better than that of his Physics book.
(4.5/5.0)
January 2, 2019
賳賯卮 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丿乇 賮賱爻賮赖 賲孬賱 賳賯卮 乇蹖丕囟蹖丕鬲 丿乇 賲賴賳丿爻蹖賴.
September 29, 2014
The Plan
I had been able to bring together my notes/thoughts for the earlier parts of this reading. Those can be found here:
Book 1: A Preliminary Outline of Philosophy
Book 2: An Introduction to Philosophical Problems
Book 3: The Basic Instruments Of Philosophy
From Book 4 onwards, it becomes slightly harder to talk about the books in isolation. Also, A became easier to follow - so I stopped using so many supplementary resources. I will try to put up a review here incorporating my reading notes, additional thoughts, criticisms, doubts, ideas and a few unwarranted digs at Aristotle as soon as I can. Meanwhile, I am planning to now move into The Organon and Physics next.
The original plan was to progress in an orderly fashion through the great philosophical works before reading the modern ones (all first-hand) but Sartre has thrown a spanner into that plan by being so irresistible. So now the new plan is to read in parallel the moderns and the ancients - and to meet somewhere in the middle, some day...
January 24, 2021
鈥淢eta-,鈥� or 渭蔚蟿峤�-, is a Greek prefix meaning "beyond"; 鈥渕etaphysics,鈥� therefore, literally means that one is going 鈥渂eyond physics.鈥� Really? Really? When I start reading Aristotle鈥檚 Metaphysics, I鈥檓 committing to go beyond physics? And I thought that reading Aristotle鈥檚 Physics was difficult. But for all that is difficult or even self-contradictory about the Metaphysics, it turns out to be one of the richest and most rewarding reading experiences in all of classical philosophy.
As Hugh Lawson-Tancred of the University of London points out in a helpful foreword to this Penguin Books edition of Aristotle鈥檚 Metaphysics, the text of The Metaphysics is itself problematic. While Aristotle speaks of the ideas gathered here as a follow-up to ideas previously discussed in The Physics and Categories, Lawson-Tancred suggests that The Metaphysics may actually be something of a scattershot gathering of texts that cannot always be reconciled with one another.
Whatever the case may actually be regarding The Metaphysics and the process by which these Aristotelian texts came to be brought together as they are today, we can all agree that Aristotle is interested here in the most fundamental philosophical questions of what it means to be 鈥� 鈥渂eing qua being,鈥� as one key term is repeatedly translated here, even though qua is a Latin preposition rather than a Greek one.
Aristotle begins The Metaphysics by writing that 鈥淏y nature, all men long to know鈥� (p. 4). Update it to say, 鈥渁ll people,鈥� and I am fully in agreement. Throughout The Metaphysics, as with The Physics and Categories, Aristotle follows that longing-to-know, proceeding in accordance with a rigorous logic of predication: can one thing follow upon another, with complete logical consistency, as a predicate follows its subject in a sentence that expresses an agreed-upon truth? Characteristic in this regard are the passages in which Aristotle states, as a principle, that 鈥淚t is impossible for the same thing at the same time both to be-in and not to be-in the same thing in the same respect鈥� (p. 88), and when he subsequently writes that 鈥渢here can be nothing intermediate to an assertion and a denial. We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject鈥� (p. 106).
With his interest in the idea of 鈥渆ssence as substance鈥� as a core element of 鈥渂eing qua being,鈥� Aristotle suggests to the reader, 鈥淸L]et us make the further suppositions that we have three things on our hands 鈥� matter, form, and the composite 鈥� and that matter, form, and the composite are each a substance. Then, (i) in a way even the matter will be said to be a part of something, but (ii) in another way the matter will not be taken as a part, the parts of the thing being only those comprised by the account of the form鈥� (p. 201; emphasis in original).
Readers of Aristotle鈥檚 work will recall his setting forth, in The Nicomachean Ethics, the idea that every virtue is a desirable mean between two opposite and equally undesirable extremes. That interest in setting up an all-encompassing and all-inclusive system of categorization similarly in forms Aristotle鈥檚 claim, in The Metaphysics, that contraries always come in pairs:
鈥淥n the assumption that a single thing has a single contrary, a possible question might be in what way unity and plurality are opposites, and in what way equality is opposite to greatness and smallness. A clue is the use of the interrogative 鈥榳hether.鈥� It is, after all, only in cases of opposition that we use this term. We ask 鈥榳hether鈥� something is white or black and 鈥榳hether鈥� it is white or not white, but not 鈥榳hether鈥� something is a man or white鈥� (p. 300).
Scholars of religion and theology may take particular interest in Aristotle鈥檚 positing the existence of a 鈥渇irst mover鈥� that comes before everything else and is not moved by anything else, as when Aristotle suggests that 鈥渢here must be a kind of eternal unmoved substance鈥� (p. 368). Aristotle subsequently explores this idea in greater detail, writing that 鈥渢here exists a kind of eternal, unmoved substance that is separate from sensible things鈥�.[I]t is without parts, and indivisible. The reason is that it is a source of movement for infinite time鈥�.[I]t is without affection or alteration, since all the other motions are posterior to those in space鈥� (p. 375).
One immediately senses how this line of reasoning might have influenced theologians and church leaders at the time of Christianity鈥檚 beginnings, centuries after Aristotle鈥檚 death. To have the support of Aristotelian logic, in any contest of ideas, is always a thing to be desired. Or, to paraphrase one of the songs from Lin-Manuel Miranda's musical Hamilton (2015): It must be nice, it must be nice, to have Aristotle on your side鈥�
Subsequent parts of The Metaphysics, I must admit, were not as interesting to me. Here, one sees the problems inherent in a book that basically contains a great mass of lecture notes, assembled by students and put together as they saw fit. It can get a bit tiring hearing yet more of Aristotle鈥檚 speculations (and attacks) on Platonist assertions of a link between mathematical concepts and Platonic Forms, as when Aristotle writes that 鈥淚n any case, all methods employed by [Platonists] to demonstrate the Forms fail. There are some which can be given no logical form. Others produce Forms even for those things for which they do not suppose there to be Forms. Take the Argument from the Sciences. It will yield a Form for every possible object of a science!鈥� (p. 402) And the extensive numerological reflections toward the end are likely to be of interest only to students of numerology.
And yet I am very glad to have read The Metaphysics. Aristotle, after all, stands at the beginning of so many scholarly conversations 鈥� about ethics, logic, physics, politics, rhetoric, natural science. So it is with metaphysics. That whole grand conversation that goes beyond physics, to the most fundamental questions of being and reality 鈥� that conversation that now includes the work of Leibniz, Descartes, Spinoza, Mill, Locke, Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Russell 鈥� started with Aristotle. The Metaphysics takes us back to where that conversation began.
As Hugh Lawson-Tancred of the University of London points out in a helpful foreword to this Penguin Books edition of Aristotle鈥檚 Metaphysics, the text of The Metaphysics is itself problematic. While Aristotle speaks of the ideas gathered here as a follow-up to ideas previously discussed in The Physics and Categories, Lawson-Tancred suggests that The Metaphysics may actually be something of a scattershot gathering of texts that cannot always be reconciled with one another.
Whatever the case may actually be regarding The Metaphysics and the process by which these Aristotelian texts came to be brought together as they are today, we can all agree that Aristotle is interested here in the most fundamental philosophical questions of what it means to be 鈥� 鈥渂eing qua being,鈥� as one key term is repeatedly translated here, even though qua is a Latin preposition rather than a Greek one.
Aristotle begins The Metaphysics by writing that 鈥淏y nature, all men long to know鈥� (p. 4). Update it to say, 鈥渁ll people,鈥� and I am fully in agreement. Throughout The Metaphysics, as with The Physics and Categories, Aristotle follows that longing-to-know, proceeding in accordance with a rigorous logic of predication: can one thing follow upon another, with complete logical consistency, as a predicate follows its subject in a sentence that expresses an agreed-upon truth? Characteristic in this regard are the passages in which Aristotle states, as a principle, that 鈥淚t is impossible for the same thing at the same time both to be-in and not to be-in the same thing in the same respect鈥� (p. 88), and when he subsequently writes that 鈥渢here can be nothing intermediate to an assertion and a denial. We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject鈥� (p. 106).
With his interest in the idea of 鈥渆ssence as substance鈥� as a core element of 鈥渂eing qua being,鈥� Aristotle suggests to the reader, 鈥淸L]et us make the further suppositions that we have three things on our hands 鈥� matter, form, and the composite 鈥� and that matter, form, and the composite are each a substance. Then, (i) in a way even the matter will be said to be a part of something, but (ii) in another way the matter will not be taken as a part, the parts of the thing being only those comprised by the account of the form鈥� (p. 201; emphasis in original).
Readers of Aristotle鈥檚 work will recall his setting forth, in The Nicomachean Ethics, the idea that every virtue is a desirable mean between two opposite and equally undesirable extremes. That interest in setting up an all-encompassing and all-inclusive system of categorization similarly in forms Aristotle鈥檚 claim, in The Metaphysics, that contraries always come in pairs:
鈥淥n the assumption that a single thing has a single contrary, a possible question might be in what way unity and plurality are opposites, and in what way equality is opposite to greatness and smallness. A clue is the use of the interrogative 鈥榳hether.鈥� It is, after all, only in cases of opposition that we use this term. We ask 鈥榳hether鈥� something is white or black and 鈥榳hether鈥� it is white or not white, but not 鈥榳hether鈥� something is a man or white鈥� (p. 300).
Scholars of religion and theology may take particular interest in Aristotle鈥檚 positing the existence of a 鈥渇irst mover鈥� that comes before everything else and is not moved by anything else, as when Aristotle suggests that 鈥渢here must be a kind of eternal unmoved substance鈥� (p. 368). Aristotle subsequently explores this idea in greater detail, writing that 鈥渢here exists a kind of eternal, unmoved substance that is separate from sensible things鈥�.[I]t is without parts, and indivisible. The reason is that it is a source of movement for infinite time鈥�.[I]t is without affection or alteration, since all the other motions are posterior to those in space鈥� (p. 375).
One immediately senses how this line of reasoning might have influenced theologians and church leaders at the time of Christianity鈥檚 beginnings, centuries after Aristotle鈥檚 death. To have the support of Aristotelian logic, in any contest of ideas, is always a thing to be desired. Or, to paraphrase one of the songs from Lin-Manuel Miranda's musical Hamilton (2015): It must be nice, it must be nice, to have Aristotle on your side鈥�
Subsequent parts of The Metaphysics, I must admit, were not as interesting to me. Here, one sees the problems inherent in a book that basically contains a great mass of lecture notes, assembled by students and put together as they saw fit. It can get a bit tiring hearing yet more of Aristotle鈥檚 speculations (and attacks) on Platonist assertions of a link between mathematical concepts and Platonic Forms, as when Aristotle writes that 鈥淚n any case, all methods employed by [Platonists] to demonstrate the Forms fail. There are some which can be given no logical form. Others produce Forms even for those things for which they do not suppose there to be Forms. Take the Argument from the Sciences. It will yield a Form for every possible object of a science!鈥� (p. 402) And the extensive numerological reflections toward the end are likely to be of interest only to students of numerology.
And yet I am very glad to have read The Metaphysics. Aristotle, after all, stands at the beginning of so many scholarly conversations 鈥� about ethics, logic, physics, politics, rhetoric, natural science. So it is with metaphysics. That whole grand conversation that goes beyond physics, to the most fundamental questions of being and reality 鈥� that conversation that now includes the work of Leibniz, Descartes, Spinoza, Mill, Locke, Kant, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Russell 鈥� started with Aristotle. The Metaphysics takes us back to where that conversation began.
August 28, 2019
Les M茅taphysiques d鈥橝ristote sont un ensemble de livres qui traitent plus ou moins du m锚me sujet, assembl茅s et 茅dit茅 par ses 茅l猫ves bien apr猫s la mort du maitre. On y parle de sagesse, de science, de m茅thodes, des causes et des d茅finitions, et de l鈥櫭猼re tel qu鈥檌l est.
Malgr茅 sa nature fragmentaire, le travail d鈥櫭ヾition a rendu cette 艙uvre remarquablement coh茅rente. Aristote se pose des questions sur la nature de la sagesse, de la science, y a-t-il une seule ou plusieurs, comment aborder l鈥櫭猼re et comment adapter les diff茅rentes sagesses 脿 ces objets de recherche. Entre l鈥檜niversel et le particulier, l鈥櫭﹖ernel et le changeant, le sensible et l鈥檌d茅al.
Ainsi, les questions que se pose Aristote sont de l鈥檕rdre fondamental, et se situent au c艙ur de toute tentative de savoir ou de contemplation et r茅flexion sur la nature de ce qui existe. C鈥檈st ce qui est la difficult茅 majeure du texte, la nature du sujet impose un langage assez complexe et abstrait qui peut 锚tre insaisissable pour le lecteur amateur. N茅anmoins, Aristote en grand penseur qu鈥檌l est, att茅nue la gravit茅 de son texte en exposant au d茅but de l鈥櫯搖vre les diff茅rentes tentatives des anciens pour expliquer l鈥櫭猼re, le changement et la g茅n茅ration. Il analyse et critique leurs r茅ponses aux probl茅matiques pos茅es en signalant les absurdit茅s et les contraintes impos茅es par chaque solution propos茅e. Ainsi, on rencontre les philosophes de la nature, qui avancent un ou des 茅l茅ments naturels comme principe de tout ce qui existe, les phytagoriciens qui avancent la primaut茅 du nombre, H茅raclite et Parm茅nide et leur r茅flexion sur la nature de l鈥櫭猼re et du changement, et enfin Platon et sa th茅orie des Id茅es.
Suite aux incapacit茅s de ces syst猫mes de rendre compte de ce qui existe, Aristote avance les deux 茅l茅ments principaux de sa pens茅e dans Les M茅taphysiques, certainement plus d茅velopp茅s ailleurs dans d鈥檃utres 艙uvres. Il s鈥檃git de sa th茅orie des causes, et le principe de non contradiction. Il d茅fend longuement sa solution tout en montrant que ce qu鈥檌l avance est inspir茅 et bas茅 sur les efforts de ces pr茅d茅cesseurs en esseyant de d茅passer leurs difficult茅s. Avec sa m茅thode de pr茅senter sa pens茅, on commence 脿 avoir l鈥檌mpression que Aristote est vraiment la synth猫se et l鈥檃boutissement le plus glorieux de toute la tradition philosophique grecque la plus glorieuse.
En lisant Aristote, on commence 脿 se rendre compte de son statut colossal dans la tradition philosophique et scientifique occidental. Il a d茅fini les paradigmes de la recherche du savoir, l鈥檌mportance et l鈥櫭﹖endue de sa contribution 脿 toute forme et genre de savoir sont vraiment in茅gal茅es.
Les M茅taphysiques n鈥檈st pas un texte tr猫s confortable 脿 lire, il est tr猫s difficile avec un langage tr猫s sec et abstrait, des argumentations denses et condens茅es, mais il se situe 脿 une des sources de notre savoir actuel. Puisque Aristote lui-m锚me d茅finit la sagesse comme recherche des causes premi猫res, il est important pour toute personne cherchant la sagesse et le savoir de le lire.
Malgr茅 sa nature fragmentaire, le travail d鈥櫭ヾition a rendu cette 艙uvre remarquablement coh茅rente. Aristote se pose des questions sur la nature de la sagesse, de la science, y a-t-il une seule ou plusieurs, comment aborder l鈥櫭猼re et comment adapter les diff茅rentes sagesses 脿 ces objets de recherche. Entre l鈥檜niversel et le particulier, l鈥櫭﹖ernel et le changeant, le sensible et l鈥檌d茅al.
Ainsi, les questions que se pose Aristote sont de l鈥檕rdre fondamental, et se situent au c艙ur de toute tentative de savoir ou de contemplation et r茅flexion sur la nature de ce qui existe. C鈥檈st ce qui est la difficult茅 majeure du texte, la nature du sujet impose un langage assez complexe et abstrait qui peut 锚tre insaisissable pour le lecteur amateur. N茅anmoins, Aristote en grand penseur qu鈥檌l est, att茅nue la gravit茅 de son texte en exposant au d茅but de l鈥櫯搖vre les diff茅rentes tentatives des anciens pour expliquer l鈥櫭猼re, le changement et la g茅n茅ration. Il analyse et critique leurs r茅ponses aux probl茅matiques pos茅es en signalant les absurdit茅s et les contraintes impos茅es par chaque solution propos茅e. Ainsi, on rencontre les philosophes de la nature, qui avancent un ou des 茅l茅ments naturels comme principe de tout ce qui existe, les phytagoriciens qui avancent la primaut茅 du nombre, H茅raclite et Parm茅nide et leur r茅flexion sur la nature de l鈥櫭猼re et du changement, et enfin Platon et sa th茅orie des Id茅es.
Suite aux incapacit茅s de ces syst猫mes de rendre compte de ce qui existe, Aristote avance les deux 茅l茅ments principaux de sa pens茅e dans Les M茅taphysiques, certainement plus d茅velopp茅s ailleurs dans d鈥檃utres 艙uvres. Il s鈥檃git de sa th茅orie des causes, et le principe de non contradiction. Il d茅fend longuement sa solution tout en montrant que ce qu鈥檌l avance est inspir茅 et bas茅 sur les efforts de ces pr茅d茅cesseurs en esseyant de d茅passer leurs difficult茅s. Avec sa m茅thode de pr茅senter sa pens茅, on commence 脿 avoir l鈥檌mpression que Aristote est vraiment la synth猫se et l鈥檃boutissement le plus glorieux de toute la tradition philosophique grecque la plus glorieuse.
En lisant Aristote, on commence 脿 se rendre compte de son statut colossal dans la tradition philosophique et scientifique occidental. Il a d茅fini les paradigmes de la recherche du savoir, l鈥檌mportance et l鈥櫭﹖endue de sa contribution 脿 toute forme et genre de savoir sont vraiment in茅gal茅es.
Les M茅taphysiques n鈥檈st pas un texte tr猫s confortable 脿 lire, il est tr猫s difficile avec un langage tr猫s sec et abstrait, des argumentations denses et condens茅es, mais il se situe 脿 une des sources de notre savoir actuel. Puisque Aristote lui-m锚me d茅finit la sagesse comme recherche des causes premi猫res, il est important pour toute personne cherchant la sagesse et le savoir de le lire.
September 6, 2019
Wow. I finished my study of Aristotle. Admittedly, I watched a lot of lectures in conjunction with reading his original works, which is - I must emphasize this - necessary to understand what he's talking about. Aristotle's works are not readable (at all) and most works are characterized by their unfinished, unorganized structure.
Metaphysics is the illustration par excellence of this problem. The work consists of 13 books, which sometimes are coherent wholes, but more usually parts of longer lines of thoughts - spanning multiple books. This makes the book impossible to summarize properly, so I won't even attempt it.
Suffice to say that in Metaphysics Aristotle is occupied with First Philosophy (his term) - the study of the first principles and causes of Being. All sciences spring from this one foundational science, which looks for the ways in which things in this universe 'are'. There are some central doctrines within Aristotle's conception of First Philosophy that outline his approach:
1. The doctrine of four causes (cause meaning explanation). All things are explained in terms of four causes - matter, form, efficiency (our modern notion of 'cause') and end/purpose.
2. The doctrine of hylemorphism. All things are a composition of form and matter. Form does not exist independently from matter - contra Plato!
3. The doctrine of actuality and potentitality. Matter has multiple potentialities, form actualizes one characteristic potentiality, giving the matter its unique essence.
4. All things in the universe have effective causes, meaning that everything is created/destroyed, altered in number, changed quantitatively or displaced due to some other thing effecting this change.
5. All things in the universe have final causes, i.e. a specific purpose or end. This means that the whole world is purposeful, and that all things are ensouled by a form which gives the thing its essence so that it can fulfil its purpose.
6. How can a composite thing be a unity? This is due to the identification of efficient and final cause. The efficient cause imposes the essential form on the particular matter, in order to give it its unique purpose.
These are the core ideas that make up the essence of Aristotle's metaphysical framework. There are two major implications of this way of viewing the world.
1. There is a threefold distinction within science, which is based on three types of substance. Substance can be either perceptible or purely intelligible (ideal). Perceptible substance can either be changing or eternal. Perceptible changing things are placed in the sublunar world: everything that happens on Earth. Everything in the sublunar world is made of earth, water, air and fire; this is the study of the earth and life sciences (to use an anachronistic term). Perceptible eternal things are placed in the heavenly spheres: the Sun, Moon, planets and the starry heaven. These bodies move in eternal paths and are made of a perfect type of matter (ether); this is the study of astronomy. Intelligible substance occurs outside of the universe and is unchanging and eternal, it cannot be perceived by us and is only intellectually knowable. This is the study of theology (and - maybe - of logic and mathematics?)
2. Why is the study of the unchanging and eternal called theology? Because Aristotle claims the unchanging and eternal is the final purpose of the universe as a whole. It is the unmoved mover, which inspires wonder, desire and love in the stars to become as perfect as the unmoved mover, and this sets in motion the heavenly sphere. This sphere subsequently sets in motion the planetary spheres, which in turn cause all the change on Earth.
It is important to notice that the unmoved mover is not an efficient cause, this would mean that this entity acts and hence is not perfect - Aristotle calls this universal principle of the cosmos 'pure actuality' - a thing which is fully realized - and with an anthropomorphic touch he claims that it is leading the best possible life. Since all practice is imperfection (i.e. actualizing potentiality), it is only contemplating. About what? About itself contemplating - the best possible life is thus a God which does not create or destroy, does not crave affection or wonder in any sense, does not occupy itself with anything at all, besides thinking about his thinking about himself. Talk about a narcissist...
Later on, Aristotle claims on the basis of astronomical and logical evidence, that there are, in effect, 47 or even 55 of such unmoved movers, after which he immediately claims that multiplicity is impossible so there is one Unmoved Mover after all...
The last two books deal with an important corollary of all the above: What is the status of mathematical objects and Forms?
Since Aristotle claims that the metaphysical foundation of the world is substance and substance only (making metaphysics the study of substance), it is logically impossible that mathematical objects exist as entities. This would make them substances - which would imply that mathematical objects (like numbers or ratios) are principles and causes of the things in this world. Aristotle then proceeds to show how numbers are not formal, material or efficient causes. He goes to greater length to dispel the claim that numbers might be formal causes, since this would imply Plato's theory of Forms to be true - in one way or another.
Plato claimed that perfect Forms exist as ideal entitites in a realm beyond this world - all perceptible things in the world participate in their respective perfect Forms and hence acquire a status of imperfect derivatives. Occupying oneself with the study of worldly things thus gets relegated in favour of the contemplation of the perfect Forms. But Aristotle claims throughout the work that it is entirely unclear how Platonic Forms cause things to exist, just like the harmonies and ratios of the Pythagoreans don't explain how things are caused by numbers. Both participation and imitation are literally senseless concepts and don't explain anything.
According to Aristotle, mathematics treats normal objects in a special way: the mathematician treats physical objects as being not physical objects. He seems to mean that we induce certain concepts from sense-perception, placing both mathematics and logic in the realm of human psychology. We first experience things through our senses, we store these experiences in our memory, we organize these experience into unified classes, and subsequently intuit the essences of species of things. This would mean that numbers are nothing but psychological constructs - a debate which continues until this day: Do numbers exist as entities? Are they psychological constructs? Or are they something else entirely, and if so, what?
In my opinion, the Metaphysics cannot be appropriately understood if one doesn't grasp both Aristotle's natural philosophy (Physics and De Anima) as well as his logic (Categories, On Interpretation, Posterior Analytics) - once you understand these fields, the Metaphysics will tie all of these different domains together in a very beautiful way. Also, his ethics (Ethica Nicomachea) and theology spring logically from his metaphysical framework - both cannot be understood in the right way if one is unfamiliar with the Aristotelean metaphysical doctrines.
After finishing Aristotle, I feel baffled. I have read much about his philosophical doctrines - mostly from a physical perspective - but the conception I formed based on these second-hand sources was wholly a misrepresentation. Having read his original works and followed a lecture course on his philosophy, I feel enlightened and (very) satisfied. Truly an amazing philosopher and perhaps one of the most original and complete thinkers that ever lived... (Don't mind my ratings of his works - they have more to do with style and difficulty rating ancient works than with the quality of Aristotle's philosophy.)
Metaphysics is the illustration par excellence of this problem. The work consists of 13 books, which sometimes are coherent wholes, but more usually parts of longer lines of thoughts - spanning multiple books. This makes the book impossible to summarize properly, so I won't even attempt it.
Suffice to say that in Metaphysics Aristotle is occupied with First Philosophy (his term) - the study of the first principles and causes of Being. All sciences spring from this one foundational science, which looks for the ways in which things in this universe 'are'. There are some central doctrines within Aristotle's conception of First Philosophy that outline his approach:
1. The doctrine of four causes (cause meaning explanation). All things are explained in terms of four causes - matter, form, efficiency (our modern notion of 'cause') and end/purpose.
2. The doctrine of hylemorphism. All things are a composition of form and matter. Form does not exist independently from matter - contra Plato!
3. The doctrine of actuality and potentitality. Matter has multiple potentialities, form actualizes one characteristic potentiality, giving the matter its unique essence.
4. All things in the universe have effective causes, meaning that everything is created/destroyed, altered in number, changed quantitatively or displaced due to some other thing effecting this change.
5. All things in the universe have final causes, i.e. a specific purpose or end. This means that the whole world is purposeful, and that all things are ensouled by a form which gives the thing its essence so that it can fulfil its purpose.
6. How can a composite thing be a unity? This is due to the identification of efficient and final cause. The efficient cause imposes the essential form on the particular matter, in order to give it its unique purpose.
These are the core ideas that make up the essence of Aristotle's metaphysical framework. There are two major implications of this way of viewing the world.
1. There is a threefold distinction within science, which is based on three types of substance. Substance can be either perceptible or purely intelligible (ideal). Perceptible substance can either be changing or eternal. Perceptible changing things are placed in the sublunar world: everything that happens on Earth. Everything in the sublunar world is made of earth, water, air and fire; this is the study of the earth and life sciences (to use an anachronistic term). Perceptible eternal things are placed in the heavenly spheres: the Sun, Moon, planets and the starry heaven. These bodies move in eternal paths and are made of a perfect type of matter (ether); this is the study of astronomy. Intelligible substance occurs outside of the universe and is unchanging and eternal, it cannot be perceived by us and is only intellectually knowable. This is the study of theology (and - maybe - of logic and mathematics?)
2. Why is the study of the unchanging and eternal called theology? Because Aristotle claims the unchanging and eternal is the final purpose of the universe as a whole. It is the unmoved mover, which inspires wonder, desire and love in the stars to become as perfect as the unmoved mover, and this sets in motion the heavenly sphere. This sphere subsequently sets in motion the planetary spheres, which in turn cause all the change on Earth.
It is important to notice that the unmoved mover is not an efficient cause, this would mean that this entity acts and hence is not perfect - Aristotle calls this universal principle of the cosmos 'pure actuality' - a thing which is fully realized - and with an anthropomorphic touch he claims that it is leading the best possible life. Since all practice is imperfection (i.e. actualizing potentiality), it is only contemplating. About what? About itself contemplating - the best possible life is thus a God which does not create or destroy, does not crave affection or wonder in any sense, does not occupy itself with anything at all, besides thinking about his thinking about himself. Talk about a narcissist...
Later on, Aristotle claims on the basis of astronomical and logical evidence, that there are, in effect, 47 or even 55 of such unmoved movers, after which he immediately claims that multiplicity is impossible so there is one Unmoved Mover after all...
The last two books deal with an important corollary of all the above: What is the status of mathematical objects and Forms?
Since Aristotle claims that the metaphysical foundation of the world is substance and substance only (making metaphysics the study of substance), it is logically impossible that mathematical objects exist as entities. This would make them substances - which would imply that mathematical objects (like numbers or ratios) are principles and causes of the things in this world. Aristotle then proceeds to show how numbers are not formal, material or efficient causes. He goes to greater length to dispel the claim that numbers might be formal causes, since this would imply Plato's theory of Forms to be true - in one way or another.
Plato claimed that perfect Forms exist as ideal entitites in a realm beyond this world - all perceptible things in the world participate in their respective perfect Forms and hence acquire a status of imperfect derivatives. Occupying oneself with the study of worldly things thus gets relegated in favour of the contemplation of the perfect Forms. But Aristotle claims throughout the work that it is entirely unclear how Platonic Forms cause things to exist, just like the harmonies and ratios of the Pythagoreans don't explain how things are caused by numbers. Both participation and imitation are literally senseless concepts and don't explain anything.
According to Aristotle, mathematics treats normal objects in a special way: the mathematician treats physical objects as being not physical objects. He seems to mean that we induce certain concepts from sense-perception, placing both mathematics and logic in the realm of human psychology. We first experience things through our senses, we store these experiences in our memory, we organize these experience into unified classes, and subsequently intuit the essences of species of things. This would mean that numbers are nothing but psychological constructs - a debate which continues until this day: Do numbers exist as entities? Are they psychological constructs? Or are they something else entirely, and if so, what?
In my opinion, the Metaphysics cannot be appropriately understood if one doesn't grasp both Aristotle's natural philosophy (Physics and De Anima) as well as his logic (Categories, On Interpretation, Posterior Analytics) - once you understand these fields, the Metaphysics will tie all of these different domains together in a very beautiful way. Also, his ethics (Ethica Nicomachea) and theology spring logically from his metaphysical framework - both cannot be understood in the right way if one is unfamiliar with the Aristotelean metaphysical doctrines.
After finishing Aristotle, I feel baffled. I have read much about his philosophical doctrines - mostly from a physical perspective - but the conception I formed based on these second-hand sources was wholly a misrepresentation. Having read his original works and followed a lecture course on his philosophy, I feel enlightened and (very) satisfied. Truly an amazing philosopher and perhaps one of the most original and complete thinkers that ever lived... (Don't mind my ratings of his works - they have more to do with style and difficulty rating ancient works than with the quality of Aristotle's philosophy.)
January 11, 2019
Jednog dana na samrtnoj postelji kaja膰u se 拧to jednu Jelenu iz srednje Grafi膷ke nisam pozvao na kola膷e i 拧to sam desetak godina kasnije 膷itao "Metafiziku"... 艩alim se, mo啪da i pre啪alim Jelenu.
May 7, 2014
An awful text -- use Ross' Greek text.
The story goes thus: Jaeger was working on a text of the Metaphysics, when W.D. Ross published (with Oxford) his magnificent two-volume text with commentary in 1924. Of course, Jaeger, who had already done a lot of work, had to scrap his project. He did, however, then publish two long articles (in German) on the text and manuscripts of the Metaphysics, discussing various textual crux' in a series of lemmata. These are reprinted in his Scripta Minora. They are an utter embarrassment. Illogical, confused, they show that Jaeger had no grasp at all of technical philosophy, and (what is worse!) no grasp of Aristotle. And even less sense of what textual criticism is all about.
By the time the OCT decided to put out a Metaphysics in the 1950's, someone there decided to give old Jaeger (who was now living in the U.S. -- having conveniently 'forgotten' his Dritte Humanismus of the 1930's...) a chance to salvage some of his old work. So Jaeger -- and I have this on good authority -- took out Ross text, pulled out his old notes, and a red pen, and started making changes. Of course, this is not how a scientific text is put together -- one doesn't just add or subtract words based on mood or on 'how it strikes you' -- it has to be done in a thoroughly scientific manner based on the rules of textual criticism (which is based on stemmatics, etc.) -- conjecture being only the move of last resort.
Well..., Jaeger was not daunted by scruples of this sort, and produced a text that is an absolute mess -- unrecognizable in nearly every sentence. He turns Ross' elegant Aristotle into gibberish -- adding clauses, deleting clauses, rearranging not just words, but clauses and sections -- all based on... his (Jaeger's) own surmises..., surmises that are themselves based on a very poor understanding of what Aristotle was all about.
Anyway -- avoid.
(BTW -- even Jaeger's "developmental" interpretation of Aristotle was not original, but was based on the obscure work of a man named Case from an article in the famous 11th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica.)
The story goes thus: Jaeger was working on a text of the Metaphysics, when W.D. Ross published (with Oxford) his magnificent two-volume text with commentary in 1924. Of course, Jaeger, who had already done a lot of work, had to scrap his project. He did, however, then publish two long articles (in German) on the text and manuscripts of the Metaphysics, discussing various textual crux' in a series of lemmata. These are reprinted in his Scripta Minora. They are an utter embarrassment. Illogical, confused, they show that Jaeger had no grasp at all of technical philosophy, and (what is worse!) no grasp of Aristotle. And even less sense of what textual criticism is all about.
By the time the OCT decided to put out a Metaphysics in the 1950's, someone there decided to give old Jaeger (who was now living in the U.S. -- having conveniently 'forgotten' his Dritte Humanismus of the 1930's...) a chance to salvage some of his old work. So Jaeger -- and I have this on good authority -- took out Ross text, pulled out his old notes, and a red pen, and started making changes. Of course, this is not how a scientific text is put together -- one doesn't just add or subtract words based on mood or on 'how it strikes you' -- it has to be done in a thoroughly scientific manner based on the rules of textual criticism (which is based on stemmatics, etc.) -- conjecture being only the move of last resort.
Well..., Jaeger was not daunted by scruples of this sort, and produced a text that is an absolute mess -- unrecognizable in nearly every sentence. He turns Ross' elegant Aristotle into gibberish -- adding clauses, deleting clauses, rearranging not just words, but clauses and sections -- all based on... his (Jaeger's) own surmises..., surmises that are themselves based on a very poor understanding of what Aristotle was all about.
Anyway -- avoid.
(BTW -- even Jaeger's "developmental" interpretation of Aristotle was not original, but was based on the obscure work of a man named Case from an article in the famous 11th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica.)
February 6, 2013
Considered by many academics to be the most challenging work throughout all of literature, Aristotle's "Metaphysics" is more than just fancy words and non-sensical theorems. It deals with the most important theme possible: being/existence - both generally and specifically. For the Greek philosopher, nothing takes precedence over being because without being, there would be nothing. In other words, Aristotle deals with First Principles of knowledge by determining what composes the fabrics of our very existence. Ultimately, he concludes that substance, essence, form and matter and the unity established between them is - out of necessity - the so-called fabrics of not just being but nearly everything, with a few exceptions. The most difficult challenge in reading a work of this intellectual magnitude is understanding the difference between substance, essence, form and matter and how they apply differently to becoming (a potentiality, therefore a non-actualized state of being) and being (the state after becoming is actualized - like ourselves). Moreover, Aristotle's treatise on being is not devoid of faith for he will demonstrate in the final books that the so-called "Unmoved Mover" (i.e. God) is responsible for setting all actions into motion which allows everything that is in a potential state to be actualized (being). Without sparking controversy, many scholars claim that Aristotle's interpretation of God as the Unmoved Mover - being the first philosophy to conceive of a single, omnipotent God - greatly influenced "The Holy Bible" and the way God is portrayed throughout its holy pages. On a final note, I fear that this read would be too difficult for most readers which is why I highly recommend taking a course (like I did) or read additional guides to aid you in your endeavour in conquering this intimidating book. Read it for its genius, read it for its impact on Western culture but most of all, read it for a personal challenge and feel proud that Aristotle was indeed mortal and human like ourselves, even though his timeless wisdom suggests otherwise.
March 1, 2023
I didn't get too much out of this one.
I really enjoyed his Ethics, but I feel like I could engage with that book. This one I just felt like I should be reading a more modern take on the subjects.
It's one I may revisit again in the future. But for now I've been preferring secondary sources to learn this subject.
I really enjoyed his Ethics, but I feel like I could engage with that book. This one I just felt like I should be reading a more modern take on the subjects.
It's one I may revisit again in the future. But for now I've been preferring secondary sources to learn this subject.
May 20, 2018
This was fascinating. I summarized the whole thing after I finished, as I am wont to do with books of this nature. I just don't feel like reproducing the summary. There is so much to go over, it is ridiculously intense. Getting a glimpse inside Aristotle's mind is fascinating. Everything is a cycle. And everything is explained/touched upon. I look forward to reading Ptolemy's additions to his cosmology and Proclus' comments on this book in his Commentary on Euclid. Five stars, because although there were some contradictions here and there, overall I thought it was a solid piece of literature that expanded my view of the universe and mathematics.
February 18, 2021
亘乇丕蹖 讴爻丕賳蹖 讴賴 賲蹖 禺賵丕賴賳丿 賮賱爻賮赖 乇賵 卮乇賵毓 讴賳賳 讴鬲丕亘 噩賲賴賵乇蹖 丕賮賱丕胤賵賳 賵 賲丕亘毓丿丕賱胤亘蹖毓賴 丕乇爻胤賵 禺蹖賱蹖 賲賳丕爻亘 賴爻鬲賳丿.
賳讴鬲賴 丕蹖 讴賴 賴爻鬲 丕乇爻胤賵 丿乇 亘毓囟蹖 噩丕賴丕 丕賵賱 賲胤賱亘 乇賵 賱蹖爻鬲 讴乇丿賴 賵 亘毓丿 丿乇 賮氐賱 賴丕 賵 讴鬲丕亘 賴丕蹖 亘毓丿蹖 鬲賵囟蹖丨 丿丕丿賴 賵 亘毓囟蹖 賵賯鬲賴丕 丕賵賱 賲胤賱亘 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 丿丕丿賴 賵 亘毓丿 賱蹖爻鬲 讴乇丿賴.
亘賴 賳馗乇賲 亘乇丕蹖 卮乇賵毓 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘貙 亘賴鬲乇 賴爻鬲 讴賴 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 倬賳噩賲 讴賴 讴賱賲丕鬲 賵 毓賳丕賵蹖賳 丕氐賱蹖 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖 丿賴 卮乇賵毓 讴乇丿 賵 亘毓丿 亘賴 爻乇丕睾 丕賵賱 讴鬲丕亘 乇賮鬲 賵 亘毓丿 讴鬲丕亘 賴丕蹖 亘毓丿 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 賴賮鬲賲 乇賵 賲胤丕賱毓賴 讴乇丿.
賳讴鬲賴 丕蹖 讴賴 賴爻鬲 丕乇爻胤賵 丿乇 亘毓囟蹖 噩丕賴丕 丕賵賱 賲胤賱亘 乇賵 賱蹖爻鬲 讴乇丿賴 賵 亘毓丿 丿乇 賮氐賱 賴丕 賵 讴鬲丕亘 賴丕蹖 亘毓丿蹖 鬲賵囟蹖丨 丿丕丿賴 賵 亘毓囟蹖 賵賯鬲賴丕 丕賵賱 賲胤賱亘 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 丿丕丿賴 賵 亘毓丿 賱蹖爻鬲 讴乇丿賴.
亘賴 賳馗乇賲 亘乇丕蹖 卮乇賵毓 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘貙 亘賴鬲乇 賴爻鬲 讴賴 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 倬賳噩賲 讴賴 讴賱賲丕鬲 賵 毓賳丕賵蹖賳 丕氐賱蹖 乇賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖 丿賴 卮乇賵毓 讴乇丿 賵 亘毓丿 亘賴 爻乇丕睾 丕賵賱 讴鬲丕亘 乇賮鬲 賵 亘毓丿 讴鬲丕亘 賴丕蹖 亘毓丿 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 賴賮鬲賲 乇賵 賲胤丕賱毓賴 讴乇丿.
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September 17, 2018This translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics by Hippocrates G. Apostle is apparently now out of print. When I read it in 1969, I was impressed with the accuracy of the translation as well as with Hippocrates Apostle's Glossary and editorial commentary. Equally serviceable translations are doubtlessly available today, though I have not consulted them.
The term "metaphysics" should not mislead the twenty-first-century reader. Unlike Plato, Aristotle exhibited no trace of mysticism in his surviving works, including this one. In this treatise Aristotle explored the fundamentals of being and of the logic of being. He approached these questions from a philosophical rather than from what we would now call a scientific perspective. Aristotle addressed scientific matters in many other treatises, including his Physics (which is properly translated as "physical nature" rather than that branch of science that is now called "physics"). Metaphysics, for Aristotle, was the study of first principles, of being qua being. Although modern science makes Aristotle's concepts unfamiliar to us, this work sets forth some of the architectonic principles of scientific thinking, including Aristotle's famous principle of contradiction (or noncontradiction): A thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect.
7/5/2018 Note: I have now concluded that the following is a more accurate translation: Aristotle's "Metaphysics", trans. and ed. Joe Sachs (Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2002).
The term "metaphysics" should not mislead the twenty-first-century reader. Unlike Plato, Aristotle exhibited no trace of mysticism in his surviving works, including this one. In this treatise Aristotle explored the fundamentals of being and of the logic of being. He approached these questions from a philosophical rather than from what we would now call a scientific perspective. Aristotle addressed scientific matters in many other treatises, including his Physics (which is properly translated as "physical nature" rather than that branch of science that is now called "physics"). Metaphysics, for Aristotle, was the study of first principles, of being qua being. Although modern science makes Aristotle's concepts unfamiliar to us, this work sets forth some of the architectonic principles of scientific thinking, including Aristotle's famous principle of contradiction (or noncontradiction): A thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect.
7/5/2018 Note: I have now concluded that the following is a more accurate translation: Aristotle's "Metaphysics", trans. and ed. Joe Sachs (Santa Fe, NM: Green Lion Press, 2002).
March 20, 2016
Aristotle is painfully pedantic. It was very hard to keep my mind focused on the endless digressions he took in order to refute other philosophers in mind numbing detail. He spent very little time actually laying out his own system in much needed detail. Specifics on his own system were lacking in this work. One element that was noticeably absent was his approach to time. If time is uncreated, then his first mover is in a dualistic relationship with time; if it is created, then he faces the consequence that time itself is an ideal form; and all of his digressions in order to point out the contradictions of idealist philosophers become moot at that point. Time must be eternal, if the contradictions of ideal forms in regards to time, be valid. If time is eternal, there are many problems Aristotle has to address that are just as contradictory as those he points out in the idealist philosophers. This work didn't cover any of that. Maybe his other works do.
I will have to read more of him later, but it won't be anytime soon. I admit I tried to read through this quickly. I will read his Physics next, whenever I get around to it. There are too many questions I have that this book didn't address. It more or less was a refutation of other Greek philosophers and little else.
I am not a fan of Aristotle. Reading this work hasn't changed that. I do think there is some good exercises in logic in this book, but I see very little value in anything else here. His system is flawed I believe. I still remain more of a Platonist.
I will have to read more of him later, but it won't be anytime soon. I admit I tried to read through this quickly. I will read his Physics next, whenever I get around to it. There are too many questions I have that this book didn't address. It more or less was a refutation of other Greek philosophers and little else.
I am not a fan of Aristotle. Reading this work hasn't changed that. I do think there is some good exercises in logic in this book, but I see very little value in anything else here. His system is flawed I believe. I still remain more of a Platonist.
December 29, 2022
Mi s-a extins creierul de dou膬 ori 葯i acum se simte mai gol ca niciodat膬 :)))
L膬s芒nd gluma la o parte, cartea e foarte abstract膬, se cite葯te lent, 卯n lini葯te 葯i cu mintea c芒t se poate de limpede. Mie mi s-a p膬rut genial膬 葯i m-am bucurat de un mod diferit de a privi lucrurile din jur, dar cu siguran葲膬 nu e o carte adresat膬 publicului larg 葯i nu m-ar mira dac膬 majoritatea ar vedea-o ca o lectur膬 鈥漣nutil膬鈥� - 卯ntr-adev膬r, nu r膬m芒i cu fragmente memorabile, expresii suculente sau citate de re葲inut, dar modul 卯n care a g芒ndit Aristotel mie mi s-a p膬rut absolut fascinant.
Edi葲ia aceasta (a 3-a 卯n traducerea lui Andrei Cornea) este excelent膬 卯n toate privin葲ele (coperta, calitatea h芒rtiei, modul de amplasare a notelor de subsol - mai ales dac膬 compar膬m cu volumele recente a lui Platon, de exemplu, unde 葯i-au cam b膬tut joc de aceste aspecte).
Introducerea 葯i, 卯n special, interpretarea la metafizica lui Aristotel (50 pagini 卯n total) sunt superbe 葯i ar putea fi o carte 卯n sine. Traducerea mi s-a p膬rut excelent膬 葯i am apreciat mult unele decizii de traducere, cum ar fi cea de a redenumi poten葲膬/act cu virtualitate/actualizare care red膬 mult mai bine sensul acestor concepte.
Cartea n-ar fi fost nici pe jum膬tate at芒t de inteligibil膬 f膬r膬 efortul depus de domnul Cornea a葯a c膬 a葯tept ziua c芒nd o s膬-i ridice statuie cei de la Humanitas :))
L膬s芒nd gluma la o parte, cartea e foarte abstract膬, se cite葯te lent, 卯n lini葯te 葯i cu mintea c芒t se poate de limpede. Mie mi s-a p膬rut genial膬 葯i m-am bucurat de un mod diferit de a privi lucrurile din jur, dar cu siguran葲膬 nu e o carte adresat膬 publicului larg 葯i nu m-ar mira dac膬 majoritatea ar vedea-o ca o lectur膬 鈥漣nutil膬鈥� - 卯ntr-adev膬r, nu r膬m芒i cu fragmente memorabile, expresii suculente sau citate de re葲inut, dar modul 卯n care a g芒ndit Aristotel mie mi s-a p膬rut absolut fascinant.
Edi葲ia aceasta (a 3-a 卯n traducerea lui Andrei Cornea) este excelent膬 卯n toate privin葲ele (coperta, calitatea h芒rtiei, modul de amplasare a notelor de subsol - mai ales dac膬 compar膬m cu volumele recente a lui Platon, de exemplu, unde 葯i-au cam b膬tut joc de aceste aspecte).
Introducerea 葯i, 卯n special, interpretarea la metafizica lui Aristotel (50 pagini 卯n total) sunt superbe 葯i ar putea fi o carte 卯n sine. Traducerea mi s-a p膬rut excelent膬 葯i am apreciat mult unele decizii de traducere, cum ar fi cea de a redenumi poten葲膬/act cu virtualitate/actualizare care red膬 mult mai bine sensul acestor concepte.
Cartea n-ar fi fost nici pe jum膬tate at芒t de inteligibil膬 f膬r膬 efortul depus de domnul Cornea a葯a c膬 a葯tept ziua c芒nd o s膬-i ridice statuie cei de la Humanitas :))
June 28, 2021
I have no doubt that Metaphysics is Aristotle鈥檚 most important work. Unfortunately, the fragmented nature of the work results in a barely coherent thesis. Nor does the disastrous prose help. My only takeaway is pity that Aristotle鈥檚 lectures on this topic were not arranged in a lucid manner.
The book started off really well. I think Books 1 and 2 were the best part of this. You find really good takes on the nature of knowledge and truth 鈥�
The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, no one fails entirely, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually they contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.
For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all.
You also find an ancient critique of postmodernism(!)鈥�
If, however, they were not limited but one were to say that the word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning reasoning with other people, and indeed with oneself has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing
Let it be assumed then, as was said at the beginning, that the name has a meaning and has one meaning; it is impossible, then, that being a man should mean precisely not being a man
For the second paragraph, I think this problem could be resolved by adopting the Hartian idea of words having settled meanings versus a penumbra of uncertainty. So while the word 鈥渕an鈥� may have a penumbra around it, it can never include 鈥渘ot-man鈥�.
However, from books 3-6, I felt like this got bogged down in semantical definitions which were not very helpful to the discussions in later books. Overall, I only liked books 1-2, 7, and 11-12: 5 out of 14 books.
I encourage any reader to help me figure out the meaning of this line (talk about prose disasters!)鈥�
Therefore that which is coming to be is ceasing to be when it has come to be coming to be; for it cannot cease to be at the very time at which it is coming to be coming to be, nor after it has come to be; for that which is ceasing to be must be.
In his (partial) takedown of the Platonic idea of Forms, Aristotle鈥檚 meticulousness is praiseworthy. However, I feel like while this empiricist method may have been revolutionary in its time as a deconstruction of the mystics, its results are painfully obvious to modern readers, making the whole pursuit of answers according to Aristotle鈥檚 process appear pedantic. Further, few people even believe the positions that he takes so much effort to refute. This being so, I can only gauge historical and pedagogical value from reading Aristotle. I fail to see how he could make a significant contribution to a reader鈥檚 philosophical position today. Note that this could very well be because I didn鈥檛 read him closely and didn鈥檛 watch lectures or read essays on this book.
That being said, as I stated while reviewing Physics, I appreciate and can understand some of the implications of his idea of potentiality vs actuality. It was nice to see him elaborate on that here. This leads to the conclusion that a thing must already contain the material for everything it can potentially become (excluding that with which it reacts to become this new thing). Interestingly, he also uses this concept of potentiality to concede to the nondualists that all things were together potentially (in the primary substance), but not actually. Most of the non dualists, being mystics, couldn鈥檛 care about this difference and probably meant it anyway, which really makes Aristotle鈥檚 effort in combatting their position look worthless.
Lastly, the unmoved prime mover, which made complete sense in Physics, sneakily becomes god (with a capital G) here, and has all the positive qualities of the Good and the Beautiful associated with it. I am still not quite sure how such a move was made, or if this is a modern translation error. My issue is that if the prime mover is a continuous being, this being must have all qualities associated with it. I fail to see how Aristotle only associates the good and the beautiful with his god. This discussion finally makes it clear to me why the medieval Christians (particularly the Thomists) associated themselves with Aristotle, who made no explicit mention of god in the books I鈥檇 read until now.
The book started off really well. I think Books 1 and 2 were the best part of this. You find really good takes on the nature of knowledge and truth 鈥�
The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, no one fails entirely, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually they contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.
For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all.
You also find an ancient critique of postmodernism(!)鈥�
If, however, they were not limited but one were to say that the word has an infinite number of meanings, obviously reasoning would be impossible; for not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning reasoning with other people, and indeed with oneself has been annihilated; for it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing
Let it be assumed then, as was said at the beginning, that the name has a meaning and has one meaning; it is impossible, then, that being a man should mean precisely not being a man
For the second paragraph, I think this problem could be resolved by adopting the Hartian idea of words having settled meanings versus a penumbra of uncertainty. So while the word 鈥渕an鈥� may have a penumbra around it, it can never include 鈥渘ot-man鈥�.
However, from books 3-6, I felt like this got bogged down in semantical definitions which were not very helpful to the discussions in later books. Overall, I only liked books 1-2, 7, and 11-12: 5 out of 14 books.
I encourage any reader to help me figure out the meaning of this line (talk about prose disasters!)鈥�
Therefore that which is coming to be is ceasing to be when it has come to be coming to be; for it cannot cease to be at the very time at which it is coming to be coming to be, nor after it has come to be; for that which is ceasing to be must be.
In his (partial) takedown of the Platonic idea of Forms, Aristotle鈥檚 meticulousness is praiseworthy. However, I feel like while this empiricist method may have been revolutionary in its time as a deconstruction of the mystics, its results are painfully obvious to modern readers, making the whole pursuit of answers according to Aristotle鈥檚 process appear pedantic. Further, few people even believe the positions that he takes so much effort to refute. This being so, I can only gauge historical and pedagogical value from reading Aristotle. I fail to see how he could make a significant contribution to a reader鈥檚 philosophical position today. Note that this could very well be because I didn鈥檛 read him closely and didn鈥檛 watch lectures or read essays on this book.
That being said, as I stated while reviewing Physics, I appreciate and can understand some of the implications of his idea of potentiality vs actuality. It was nice to see him elaborate on that here. This leads to the conclusion that a thing must already contain the material for everything it can potentially become (excluding that with which it reacts to become this new thing). Interestingly, he also uses this concept of potentiality to concede to the nondualists that all things were together potentially (in the primary substance), but not actually. Most of the non dualists, being mystics, couldn鈥檛 care about this difference and probably meant it anyway, which really makes Aristotle鈥檚 effort in combatting their position look worthless.
Lastly, the unmoved prime mover, which made complete sense in Physics, sneakily becomes god (with a capital G) here, and has all the positive qualities of the Good and the Beautiful associated with it. I am still not quite sure how such a move was made, or if this is a modern translation error. My issue is that if the prime mover is a continuous being, this being must have all qualities associated with it. I fail to see how Aristotle only associates the good and the beautiful with his god. This discussion finally makes it clear to me why the medieval Christians (particularly the Thomists) associated themselves with Aristotle, who made no explicit mention of god in the books I鈥檇 read until now.
December 2, 2024
賵賯鬲蹖 賮賴賲蹖丿賲 丕亘賳鈥屫驰屬嗀� 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 鄹郯 亘丕乇 禺賵賳丿賴 賵 亘丕夭 賴賲 賳賮賴賲蹖丿賴貙 亘賴 禺賵丿賲 丕賲蹖丿賵丕乇 卮丿賲 讴賴 賴蹖趩蹖 丕夭卮 賳賮賴賲蹖丿賲 :/
June 3, 2022
Aristotelis meistri拧kai kritikuoja Platon膮, pitagorie膷ius ir kitus filosofus, bet pats savo filosofij膮 d臈sto labai painiai. Taigi skaitinys ne i拧 lengv懦j懦, nors ir vertas 寞d臈t懦 pastang懦.
Labiausiai Metafizikoje patiko dalis apie teologij膮. Visatoje viskas juda, bet kas prad臈jo jud臈jim膮? Juk jis negal臈jo prasid臈ti savaime. 膶ia 寞vedama Pirmojo judintojo - Dievo s膮voka. Dievas prad臈jo jud臈jim膮, nes buvo geid啪iamas (dar ver膷iama 鈥渕ylimas鈥�). O Dievo esm臈 yra mintis, kuri apm膮sto pati save (palygink i拧 Evangelijos: 鈥漃rad啪ioje buvo 沤odis. Tas 沤odis buvo pas Diev膮, ir 沤odis buvo Dievas鈥�). Aristotelio Dievas yra gyvas, ir jis yra geras, tad ir visas pasaulis, kuris i拧 jo kilo, taip pat yra geras.
Viduram啪iais, kai Aristotelis buvo i拧 naujo atrastas, jis tapo did啪iuliu autoritetu ir paskatino i拧 naujo perm膮styti krik拧膷ioni拧k膮j膮 teologij膮. Tiek skaitydamas Platono Faidon膮, tiek Aristotelio Metafizik膮 steb臈jausi, kaip daug krik拧膷ionyb臈 per臈m臈 min膷i懦 i拧 拧i懦 pagonyb臈s laik懦 filosof懦. Ta膷iau nereikia manyti, kad bes膮lygi拧kas kliovimasis Aristotelio autoritetu viduram啪iais vertinamas labai teigiamai. Grei膷iau prie拧ingai, filosofijoje jis nul臈m臈 sustabar臈jim膮 ir dogmati拧kum膮. Bertrandas Russellas apie Aristotelio 寞tak膮 v臈lesniais laikais ra拧臈 taip: 鈥淗e came at the end of the creative period in Greek thought, and after his death it was two thousand years before the world produced any philosopher who could be regarded as approximately his equal. Towards the end of this long period his authority had become almost as unquestioned as that of the Church, and in science, as well as in philosophy, had become a serious obstacle to progress.鈥�
Labiausiai Metafizikoje patiko dalis apie teologij膮. Visatoje viskas juda, bet kas prad臈jo jud臈jim膮? Juk jis negal臈jo prasid臈ti savaime. 膶ia 寞vedama Pirmojo judintojo - Dievo s膮voka. Dievas prad臈jo jud臈jim膮, nes buvo geid啪iamas (dar ver膷iama 鈥渕ylimas鈥�). O Dievo esm臈 yra mintis, kuri apm膮sto pati save (palygink i拧 Evangelijos: 鈥漃rad啪ioje buvo 沤odis. Tas 沤odis buvo pas Diev膮, ir 沤odis buvo Dievas鈥�). Aristotelio Dievas yra gyvas, ir jis yra geras, tad ir visas pasaulis, kuris i拧 jo kilo, taip pat yra geras.
Viduram啪iais, kai Aristotelis buvo i拧 naujo atrastas, jis tapo did啪iuliu autoritetu ir paskatino i拧 naujo perm膮styti krik拧膷ioni拧k膮j膮 teologij膮. Tiek skaitydamas Platono Faidon膮, tiek Aristotelio Metafizik膮 steb臈jausi, kaip daug krik拧膷ionyb臈 per臈m臈 min膷i懦 i拧 拧i懦 pagonyb臈s laik懦 filosof懦. Ta膷iau nereikia manyti, kad bes膮lygi拧kas kliovimasis Aristotelio autoritetu viduram啪iais vertinamas labai teigiamai. Grei膷iau prie拧ingai, filosofijoje jis nul臈m臈 sustabar臈jim膮 ir dogmati拧kum膮. Bertrandas Russellas apie Aristotelio 寞tak膮 v臈lesniais laikais ra拧臈 taip: 鈥淗e came at the end of the creative period in Greek thought, and after his death it was two thousand years before the world produced any philosopher who could be regarded as approximately his equal. Towards the end of this long period his authority had become almost as unquestioned as that of the Church, and in science, as well as in philosophy, had become a serious obstacle to progress.鈥�
June 7, 2017
Aristotle's 鈥渇irst act of divine motion鈥� in his Physics is a set of logical implications and applying his scientific method-rightfully so given he invented it. He justifies what he calls the 鈥渇irst mover鈥� or "Divinity" by continuing the Aristotelian narrative of placing the mind or intellect as the ultimate objective; surpassing the
soul.
This would be an example of Aristotelian privilege. Here Aristotle doesn't need to explain his divine inception into what God is, he asserts it, and by asserting it he had made the mistake of being corrected-ironically from himself.
Duality and as well as sub having different functions. An example of having duality in thoughts is when a person is drinking coffee with a friend, he鈥檚 simultaneously enjoying the coffee and the conversation. Moreover, he uses a multiplicity to try to escape the idea of dual thinking and initiates only a first
To elaborate, Aristotle's Divine mover or God in his physics is unchanging, yet influences change in substances. The problem here is his assertion on a beginning. Here he arrives at multiple paradoxes; if his divine is in a state of self-contemplation, how did we access it, and find it? Why should his first mover be unique and exempt from anything?
soul.
This would be an example of Aristotelian privilege. Here Aristotle doesn't need to explain his divine inception into what God is, he asserts it, and by asserting it he had made the mistake of being corrected-ironically from himself.
Duality and as well as sub having different functions. An example of having duality in thoughts is when a person is drinking coffee with a friend, he鈥檚 simultaneously enjoying the coffee and the conversation. Moreover, he uses a multiplicity to try to escape the idea of dual thinking and initiates only a first
To elaborate, Aristotle's Divine mover or God in his physics is unchanging, yet influences change in substances. The problem here is his assertion on a beginning. Here he arrives at multiple paradoxes; if his divine is in a state of self-contemplation, how did we access it, and find it? Why should his first mover be unique and exempt from anything?
February 22, 2016
Oh my god, finally.
It is extremely difficult to review this book because on the one hand, Aristotle pioneered a branch of philosophy which is still discussed today and on the other hand, he basically jumpstarted the dark ages in philosophical thought. It wasn't until the Enlightenment, more than 2000 years later that Aristotle's philosophy became a little bit less relevant.
Still, in terms of 'logical hygiene' Aristotle does quite well. In terms of writing style, it leaves much to be desired. Also, the entire book is a series of lecture notes from confused students, so he was actually a boring speaker first, a philosopher second. He comes under scrutiny, but at the time he was reconciling conflicting theories, always trying to compromise and salvage ideas from antagonistic philosophies. The essence of it all is "plato is wrong" and "substance rules", which after 450 pages I still have no idea what the hell substance is.
I like the movement he started, I just don't like how far it was taken.
It is extremely difficult to review this book because on the one hand, Aristotle pioneered a branch of philosophy which is still discussed today and on the other hand, he basically jumpstarted the dark ages in philosophical thought. It wasn't until the Enlightenment, more than 2000 years later that Aristotle's philosophy became a little bit less relevant.
Still, in terms of 'logical hygiene' Aristotle does quite well. In terms of writing style, it leaves much to be desired. Also, the entire book is a series of lecture notes from confused students, so he was actually a boring speaker first, a philosopher second. He comes under scrutiny, but at the time he was reconciling conflicting theories, always trying to compromise and salvage ideas from antagonistic philosophies. The essence of it all is "plato is wrong" and "substance rules", which after 450 pages I still have no idea what the hell substance is.
I like the movement he started, I just don't like how far it was taken.
July 19, 2009
Don't even think you can understand this by reading it on your own. Perhaps the greatest work in philosophy of all-time.
June 11, 2022
In The Metaphysics, Aristotle investigates Substance, the most fundamental category of being. He comes to the profound conclusion that Substance equals Essence, i.e. what a thing is is what it was to be that thing.
The climax is certainly Lambda 7, in which Aristotle proves the existence of God - the prime mover who moves the heavens by contemplating his own contemplation.
This is not an easy read at all, it took me almost six months and there were many instances where I understood nothing of what Aristotle meant. However, Aristotle can be rather funny, especially when he roasts Plato and other philosophers.
In the end it was worth it because this book might just be the most influential work in the history of Western philosophy. Would recommend to people interested in the Western canon.
The climax is certainly Lambda 7, in which Aristotle proves the existence of God - the prime mover who moves the heavens by contemplating his own contemplation.
This is not an easy read at all, it took me almost six months and there were many instances where I understood nothing of what Aristotle meant. However, Aristotle can be rather funny, especially when he roasts Plato and other philosophers.
In the end it was worth it because this book might just be the most influential work in the history of Western philosophy. Would recommend to people interested in the Western canon.
May 29, 2021
Aristotle鈥檚 鈥淢etaphysics鈥� was for me a very difficult book that I did not understand very well. This review is intended to serve purely as a personal record for my GR database that I can refer to at a later date. As it is not going to help any GR member understand the work, I do not encourage anyone else to read any further.
Through good luck I chose the French translation by J. Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire published in 1879. While I do not think that I understood a single thing from what Aristotle wrote, Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire鈥檚 excellent introduction provided number of interesting notions that I feel confident that I will be able to retain.
Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire begins by alerting the reader to the fact that the book is highly disorganized and full of repetitions being an unorthodox compilation of writings by Aristotle about being and God. Aristotle never himself used the term Metaphysics which seems to have been coined by whoever compiled the work. Without excluding the possibility, the compiler may in places have twisted Aristotle鈥檚 writing to support one his own theses, Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire still believes that 鈥淢etaphysics鈥� can be regarded as having been authored by Artistotle.
Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire sees three strong points in the 鈥淢etaphysics鈥�. First, it posits that a prime mover having many of the attributes of the Christian God created a good universe that moves in the direction of good. Second, it enunciates the important doctrine of contradiction by which a thing cannot both be and not be. Third, finally despite having neither a true author nor a subject, the work contains the basic framework which has guided and directed all subsequent writing on Metaphysics.
Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire, however, has two major problems with the work. A great deal of space is devoted to a critique of the theory of numbers developed by Pythagoras and other pre-Socratics. The issue here is that since the pre-Socratic writings in question have disappeared, one is simply not able to determine if Aristotle鈥檚 criticism have any validity.
The second major complaint of Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire is that Aristotle misinterprets and distorts Plato鈥檚 theory of ideas. This point further undermines Aristotle鈥檚 criticisms of the pre-Socratics, for if he is proven to be unreliable as a critic of works that we can still read, we have even more reason to distrust him on works that no longer exist.
Finally, my own criticism of the 鈥淢etaphysics鈥� is that in it, Aristotle often writes as a mere taxonomist rather than as a philosopher; that is to say, Aristotle shows a tendency simply categorize rather than to truly analyze.
I found in the 鈥淢etaphysics鈥� a work that indeed does support the Christian world view. I wish then that I could have liked more than I did.
Through good luck I chose the French translation by J. Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire published in 1879. While I do not think that I understood a single thing from what Aristotle wrote, Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire鈥檚 excellent introduction provided number of interesting notions that I feel confident that I will be able to retain.
Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire begins by alerting the reader to the fact that the book is highly disorganized and full of repetitions being an unorthodox compilation of writings by Aristotle about being and God. Aristotle never himself used the term Metaphysics which seems to have been coined by whoever compiled the work. Without excluding the possibility, the compiler may in places have twisted Aristotle鈥檚 writing to support one his own theses, Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire still believes that 鈥淢etaphysics鈥� can be regarded as having been authored by Artistotle.
Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire sees three strong points in the 鈥淢etaphysics鈥�. First, it posits that a prime mover having many of the attributes of the Christian God created a good universe that moves in the direction of good. Second, it enunciates the important doctrine of contradiction by which a thing cannot both be and not be. Third, finally despite having neither a true author nor a subject, the work contains the basic framework which has guided and directed all subsequent writing on Metaphysics.
Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire, however, has two major problems with the work. A great deal of space is devoted to a critique of the theory of numbers developed by Pythagoras and other pre-Socratics. The issue here is that since the pre-Socratic writings in question have disappeared, one is simply not able to determine if Aristotle鈥檚 criticism have any validity.
The second major complaint of Barth茅lemy-Saint-Hilaire is that Aristotle misinterprets and distorts Plato鈥檚 theory of ideas. This point further undermines Aristotle鈥檚 criticisms of the pre-Socratics, for if he is proven to be unreliable as a critic of works that we can still read, we have even more reason to distrust him on works that no longer exist.
Finally, my own criticism of the 鈥淢etaphysics鈥� is that in it, Aristotle often writes as a mere taxonomist rather than as a philosopher; that is to say, Aristotle shows a tendency simply categorize rather than to truly analyze.
I found in the 鈥淢etaphysics鈥� a work that indeed does support the Christian world view. I wish then that I could have liked more than I did.
October 19, 2019
This collection (while dense and at times seemingly semantically exhausting) is exceptional. Be prepared to contend with the rich strife in Aristotle鈥檚 fastidious discernment and terminology, his almost unabashedly effortful nature of his undertaking, but herein lies the value of his contemplation. Our individual nature is, by definition, one of seeking. This innate thirst serves not only as the genesis of our intellectual undertakings, but also as our basis for all experience, for where else does one start to know but by one鈥檚 own senses, perception, and history? This activity has empowered us to develop knowledge of the world and how to operate within it but such knowledge is not the end goal. Though we begin with the individual and the particular, it is not sufficient to cease here.
As Aristotle embarks on his first philosophy, a study of the universal principles of being and existence, he takes great care to establish his focus on that which endeavors beyond the material and the perceptible. Just as 鈥渉e who invented any art鈥� must have 鈥淸gone] beyond the common perceptions鈥� Aristotle must continue this push beyond (2). After identifying the foundational elements that comprise our experience, he delves into the self that is experiencing 鈥� the self not as a physical form, but as possibility, capacity, actuality. Contending with 鈥淲isdom鈥� that might address 鈥渢he first causes and the principles of things鈥� (3). Or, more simply: what might it mean to be a thing capable of reflecting on its own ability to reflect? Experiencing its own experience?
These questions could come off as clever linguistic play, something intellectually haughty and therefore inaccessible, but to truly savor the purity of the questioning, to appreciate the context and time in which Aristotle questioned, is to discover the delightful paradoxes at the core of being human. Surely, it is not enough to study that we exist, but why and how and in what manner we exist. It is the effort to transcend the immediacy of experience 鈥� that, as it were, the fire is hot 鈥� and to delve deeper, ask more, seek more expansively.
As Aristotle embarks on his first philosophy, a study of the universal principles of being and existence, he takes great care to establish his focus on that which endeavors beyond the material and the perceptible. Just as 鈥渉e who invented any art鈥� must have 鈥淸gone] beyond the common perceptions鈥� Aristotle must continue this push beyond (2). After identifying the foundational elements that comprise our experience, he delves into the self that is experiencing 鈥� the self not as a physical form, but as possibility, capacity, actuality. Contending with 鈥淲isdom鈥� that might address 鈥渢he first causes and the principles of things鈥� (3). Or, more simply: what might it mean to be a thing capable of reflecting on its own ability to reflect? Experiencing its own experience?
These questions could come off as clever linguistic play, something intellectually haughty and therefore inaccessible, but to truly savor the purity of the questioning, to appreciate the context and time in which Aristotle questioned, is to discover the delightful paradoxes at the core of being human. Surely, it is not enough to study that we exist, but why and how and in what manner we exist. It is the effort to transcend the immediacy of experience 鈥� that, as it were, the fire is hot 鈥� and to delve deeper, ask more, seek more expansively.
December 9, 2021
The thirteen books making up Aristotle鈥檚 Metaphysics are dry but not especially difficult to read and it is undoubtedly a valuable thing to have read Aristotle in his own words. They appear to be produced from lecture notes and often read as though Aristotle is working out on paper a set of problems that perplex him, of which some seem close to resolution, others (especially in the later books) being rather inconclusive. He is very systematic 鈥� or perhaps relentless - in the way he examines his topics from many points of view, he gives a lot of information about the opinions of other philosophers up to his own time and in Book V especially he gives an incredibly helpful collection of definitions and explanations of important terms. He repeats himself a lot, and I get the impression that he sometimes is over elaborate because he is failing to discover the solutions he wants. He does attempt to give practical examples to illustrate his arguments but he has a very restricted palette in this respect, partly because science was in its infancy, partly because he lacks Plato鈥檚 flair. I can imagine a modern lecturer, though, giving a lot more colour to the material by pointing out its many connections to modern arguments that either rest on the same ground that Aristotle prepared or, just as interesting, fail to take Aristotle into account and are thereby exposed as deficient.
Aristotle laid much of the groundwork on which Western philosophy was to be constructed. His contribution was to be a pioneer in virgin territory. His solutions have required improvement and often radical changes but philosophy has not changed out of recognition, the questions he posed and the lines of argument he mapped out have not lost their relevance. In fact, perhaps it would be better to approach Aristotle not as an introduction to Philosophy but alongside more contemporary writing, because there are many current debates that would benefit from a look back to what Aristotle has to say. What he wrote is not scripture (and for a time people tried to treat him that way) but it is foundational and it is a valuable benchmark. If it is indeed dry and ponderous, it comes to life when its continuing relevance becomes clear.
For one example, this quote: 鈥淪ince, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 鈥榳here鈥�, others its 鈥榳hen鈥�, 鈥榖eing鈥� has a meaning answering to each of these.鈥� I suggest this is very close to Roy Bhasker鈥檚 Critical Realism and specifically his view that we can appreciate that we are dealing with an external material reality, quite independent of our imaginations, rather than a mere mental construct, to the extent that we can find an infinite number of ways to examine and understand any aspect of it. So if we take a topical argument saying that sex is a social construct, we can agree that it has a social dimension, we can analyse its social context, cultural differences in thinking about sex, and its history, we can explore sex in literature and other cultural expressions, we can study sexual behaviours, we can compare this with sexual behaviour in other species, we can study the anatomy, the physiology, the hormonal chemistry of sex, we can explore sex differences 鈥� for instance in responses to medicines or symptoms of ill health such as heart attacks - and we can compare all this with the same qualities in other species, we can examine the generation of sexuality both at the level of chromosomes and in either physical, psychological or social development across the life cycle, we can study the evolution of sexual reproduction over 1.2 billion years and we can explain it at any level and utilising almost any branch of science鈥� Bhasker would say that sex permits infinite layers of analysis, Aristotle would say it has infinite predicates, but both would infer that this is only possible because there is a reality to sex 鈥� an object independent of our imaginations. Sex is not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of sex.
Aha, the sceptic will protest, but is not sex a characteristic predicated of many species? That is not a question that Aristotle failed to consider but you have to read his Metaphysics for his answers. Postmodernity is a painful procedure of unlearning everything we know and substituting it with word salad, but it鈥檚 not new and it鈥檚 not different to the arguments answered long ago by Aristotle. I really wonder how we could cope with today鈥檚 culture wars without reading the Greeks or why we would try.
Quotes
There are many sense in which a things may be said to 鈥榖e鈥� but all that 鈥榠s鈥� is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to 鈥榖e鈥� by a mere ambiguity. [Bk IV Ch 2]
For if it is not the function of the philosopher, who is it who will inquire whether Socrates and Socrates seated are the same thing鈥�? [Bk IV Ch 2]
Cause means (1) that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being, e.g. the bronze is the cause of the statue鈥� (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the definition of the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general are causes of the octave) and the parts included in the definition. (3) that from which the change or resting from change first begins; e.g. the adviser is a cause of the action and the father a cause of the child and in general the maker a cause of the thing made 鈥�. (4) The end; i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is; e.g. health is the cause of walking. For 鈥榃hy does one walk?鈥� we say: 鈥榯hat one may be healthy鈥� and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause. [Bk V Ch 2]
Things are said to 鈥榖e鈥� (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their nature. .. In an accidental sense, e.g. we say 鈥榯he righteous doer is musical鈥� and 鈥榯he man is musical鈥� 鈥� 鈥榯he musician builds鈥� because the builder happens to be musical or the musician happened to be a builder; for here, 鈥榦ne thing is another鈥� means 鈥榦ne thing is an accident of another鈥欌€� The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the sense of 鈥榖eing鈥� are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 鈥榳here鈥�, others its 鈥榳hen鈥�, 鈥榖eing鈥� has a meaning answering to each of these. [Bk V Ch 7]
We call 鈥榮ubstance鈥� (1) the simple bodies. i.e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings, and the parts of these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them. 鈥�(2) That which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is the being of an animal. 鈥�(3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed鈥�.. 鈥�(4) The essence, the formula which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing. [Bk V Ch 8}
The term 鈥榬ace鈥� or 鈥榞enus鈥� is used (1) if generation of things which have the same form is continuous, e.g. 鈥榳hile the race lasts鈥� means 鈥榳hile the generation of them goes on continuously鈥�. 鈥�(2) It is used with reference to that which first brought things into existence; for it is thus that some are called Hellenes by race and others Ionians, because the former proceed from Hellen and the latter from Ion as their first begetter鈥� in definitions the first constituent element, which is included in the 鈥榳hat鈥�, is the genus, whose differentiae qualities are said to be. Genus then is used in all these ways, (1) in reference to continuous generation of the same kind, (2) in reference to the first mover which is of the same kind as the things it moves, (3) as matter, for that to which the differentia or quality belongs is the substratum, which we call matter. [Bk V Ch 28]
There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 鈥榖e鈥�; 鈥or in one sense the 鈥榖eing鈥� meant is 鈥榳hat a things is鈥� or a 鈥榯his鈥�, and in another sense it means a quality or quantity of one of the other things that are predicated as these are. While 鈥榖eing鈥� has all these senses, obviously that which 鈥榠s鈥� primarily is the 鈥榳hat鈥�, which indicates the substance of the thing鈥� And one might even raise the question where the words 鈥榯o walk鈥�, 鈥榯o be healthy鈥�, 鈥榯o sit鈥� imply that each of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort, for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks, or sits, or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual), which is implied in such a predicate; for we never use the word 鈥榞ood鈥� or 鈥榮itting鈥� without implying this. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others also is. Therefore that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense, must be substance. [Bk VII ch 1]
By the matter I mean, the bronze; by the shape the pattern of its form, and by the compound of these the statue, the concrete whole. [Bk V ch 3]
Both separability and 鈥榯hisness鈥� are thought to belong chiefly to substance. [Bk V ch 3]
鈥hisness belongs only to substance. [Bk V ch 4]
But we must articulate our meaning before we begin to inquire: if not, the inquiry is on the border-line between a search for something and a search for nothing. [Bk VII Ch 17]
The infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever actually have separate existence; it exists potentially only for knowledge. For the fact that the process of dividing never comes to an end ensures that this activity exists potentially, but not that the infinite exists separately. [Book IX Ch 6]
For from the potentially existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually existing thing: e.g. man from man, musician by musician: there is always a first mover and the mover already exists actually. We have said in our account of substance that everything that is produced is something produced from something and that the same species as it. [Book IX Ch 8]
Aristotle laid much of the groundwork on which Western philosophy was to be constructed. His contribution was to be a pioneer in virgin territory. His solutions have required improvement and often radical changes but philosophy has not changed out of recognition, the questions he posed and the lines of argument he mapped out have not lost their relevance. In fact, perhaps it would be better to approach Aristotle not as an introduction to Philosophy but alongside more contemporary writing, because there are many current debates that would benefit from a look back to what Aristotle has to say. What he wrote is not scripture (and for a time people tried to treat him that way) but it is foundational and it is a valuable benchmark. If it is indeed dry and ponderous, it comes to life when its continuing relevance becomes clear.
For one example, this quote: 鈥淪ince, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 鈥榳here鈥�, others its 鈥榳hen鈥�, 鈥榖eing鈥� has a meaning answering to each of these.鈥� I suggest this is very close to Roy Bhasker鈥檚 Critical Realism and specifically his view that we can appreciate that we are dealing with an external material reality, quite independent of our imaginations, rather than a mere mental construct, to the extent that we can find an infinite number of ways to examine and understand any aspect of it. So if we take a topical argument saying that sex is a social construct, we can agree that it has a social dimension, we can analyse its social context, cultural differences in thinking about sex, and its history, we can explore sex in literature and other cultural expressions, we can study sexual behaviours, we can compare this with sexual behaviour in other species, we can study the anatomy, the physiology, the hormonal chemistry of sex, we can explore sex differences 鈥� for instance in responses to medicines or symptoms of ill health such as heart attacks - and we can compare all this with the same qualities in other species, we can examine the generation of sexuality both at the level of chromosomes and in either physical, psychological or social development across the life cycle, we can study the evolution of sexual reproduction over 1.2 billion years and we can explain it at any level and utilising almost any branch of science鈥� Bhasker would say that sex permits infinite layers of analysis, Aristotle would say it has infinite predicates, but both would infer that this is only possible because there is a reality to sex 鈥� an object independent of our imaginations. Sex is not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of sex.
Aha, the sceptic will protest, but is not sex a characteristic predicated of many species? That is not a question that Aristotle failed to consider but you have to read his Metaphysics for his answers. Postmodernity is a painful procedure of unlearning everything we know and substituting it with word salad, but it鈥檚 not new and it鈥檚 not different to the arguments answered long ago by Aristotle. I really wonder how we could cope with today鈥檚 culture wars without reading the Greeks or why we would try.
Quotes
There are many sense in which a things may be said to 鈥榖e鈥� but all that 鈥榠s鈥� is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to 鈥榖e鈥� by a mere ambiguity. [Bk IV Ch 2]
For if it is not the function of the philosopher, who is it who will inquire whether Socrates and Socrates seated are the same thing鈥�? [Bk IV Ch 2]
Cause means (1) that from which, as immanent material, a thing comes into being, e.g. the bronze is the cause of the statue鈥� (2) The form or pattern, i.e. the definition of the essence, and the classes which include this (e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general are causes of the octave) and the parts included in the definition. (3) that from which the change or resting from change first begins; e.g. the adviser is a cause of the action and the father a cause of the child and in general the maker a cause of the thing made 鈥�. (4) The end; i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is; e.g. health is the cause of walking. For 鈥榃hy does one walk?鈥� we say: 鈥榯hat one may be healthy鈥� and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause. [Bk V Ch 2]
Things are said to 鈥榖e鈥� (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their nature. .. In an accidental sense, e.g. we say 鈥榯he righteous doer is musical鈥� and 鈥榯he man is musical鈥� 鈥� 鈥榯he musician builds鈥� because the builder happens to be musical or the musician happened to be a builder; for here, 鈥榦ne thing is another鈥� means 鈥榦ne thing is an accident of another鈥欌€� The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the sense of 鈥榖eing鈥� are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 鈥榳here鈥�, others its 鈥榳hen鈥�, 鈥榖eing鈥� has a meaning answering to each of these. [Bk V Ch 7]
We call 鈥榮ubstance鈥� (1) the simple bodies. i.e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings, and the parts of these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them. 鈥�(2) That which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is the being of an animal. 鈥�(3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed鈥�.. 鈥�(4) The essence, the formula which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing. [Bk V Ch 8}
The term 鈥榬ace鈥� or 鈥榞enus鈥� is used (1) if generation of things which have the same form is continuous, e.g. 鈥榳hile the race lasts鈥� means 鈥榳hile the generation of them goes on continuously鈥�. 鈥�(2) It is used with reference to that which first brought things into existence; for it is thus that some are called Hellenes by race and others Ionians, because the former proceed from Hellen and the latter from Ion as their first begetter鈥� in definitions the first constituent element, which is included in the 鈥榳hat鈥�, is the genus, whose differentiae qualities are said to be. Genus then is used in all these ways, (1) in reference to continuous generation of the same kind, (2) in reference to the first mover which is of the same kind as the things it moves, (3) as matter, for that to which the differentia or quality belongs is the substratum, which we call matter. [Bk V Ch 28]
There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 鈥榖e鈥�; 鈥or in one sense the 鈥榖eing鈥� meant is 鈥榳hat a things is鈥� or a 鈥榯his鈥�, and in another sense it means a quality or quantity of one of the other things that are predicated as these are. While 鈥榖eing鈥� has all these senses, obviously that which 鈥榠s鈥� primarily is the 鈥榳hat鈥�, which indicates the substance of the thing鈥� And one might even raise the question where the words 鈥榯o walk鈥�, 鈥榯o be healthy鈥�, 鈥榯o sit鈥� imply that each of these things is existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort, for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks, or sits, or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual), which is implied in such a predicate; for we never use the word 鈥榞ood鈥� or 鈥榮itting鈥� without implying this. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others also is. Therefore that which is primarily, i.e. not in a qualified sense, must be substance. [Bk VII ch 1]
By the matter I mean, the bronze; by the shape the pattern of its form, and by the compound of these the statue, the concrete whole. [Bk V ch 3]
Both separability and 鈥榯hisness鈥� are thought to belong chiefly to substance. [Bk V ch 3]
鈥hisness belongs only to substance. [Bk V ch 4]
But we must articulate our meaning before we begin to inquire: if not, the inquiry is on the border-line between a search for something and a search for nothing. [Bk VII Ch 17]
The infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever actually have separate existence; it exists potentially only for knowledge. For the fact that the process of dividing never comes to an end ensures that this activity exists potentially, but not that the infinite exists separately. [Book IX Ch 6]
For from the potentially existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually existing thing: e.g. man from man, musician by musician: there is always a first mover and the mover already exists actually. We have said in our account of substance that everything that is produced is something produced from something and that the same species as it. [Book IX Ch 8]
August 15, 2021
It is very strange to read a 2,300 years old foundational text in a modern translation. Moreover, this is not a book as intended by Aristotle, but a slightly loose gathering of different texts done by some scholarly monk and named 鈥渕eta-Physics鈥� because it was placed in a library shelf after/next to Aristotle's 鈥淧hysics鈥�. As such, 鈥渕etaphysics鈥� started to name the quest for 鈥渇irst principles鈥�, 鈥渂eing qua being鈥�, or of philosophy/theology 鈥� as pursued here by Aristotle. As a point of inflection in Western culture, Aristotle and his work stood for an unprecedented opening. Eventually, it all collapsed into our modern, materialistic, scientific, rational, theological, correct, uniform, and logical understanding. Physics, logos, aletheia, being, unity, categories, and so on are inevitably translated here as material world, movement, logic, reason, truth, universal, representations, principles, conscience, and so on. Emergence, unconcealment, gathering, coming to presence, and so on disappeared without a trace from the translation work. Subject, object, reason, space, language, and so on appear in translation 鈥� even if to my understanding there were no such concepts in ancient Greek. We moderns completely accepted some of Aristotle's statements and took them as trivial/obvious, and similarly rejected and overcame others and find them ridiculous today. Thus the strangeness we find in ourselves while reading this book 鈥� trivial, obscure, obviously false, self-evident, unexpected, archaic, and so on.
July 21, 2011
J'茅tais tr猫s curieux de lire ce petit livre, sur lequels se pench猫rent des commentateurs c茅l猫bres, comme Ma茂monides, Averroes, ou encore Thomas d'Aquin. J'ai vite compris pourquoi des hommes pr茅tendant trouver leur chemin dans le labyrinthe de la M茅taphysique ont pu en imposer 脿 leur semblables, tant le brouillard qui enveloppe les id茅es expos茅es dans l'ouvrage est 茅pais. Cette 茅paisseur tranche d'ailleurs avec la clart茅 d'autres ouvrages d'Aristote, comme la Po茅tique ou la Rh茅torique. On pourrait peut-锚tre expliquer une partie de cette obscurit茅 par une certaine lourdeur de la traduction, due au fait qu'il est difficile de rendre en fran莽ais les tours serr茅s que permettent la richesse grammaticale du grec. Ensuite, la paternit茅 du texte est douteuse, comme l'expose la pr茅face : a-t-il 茅t茅 constitu茅 par l'assemblage de fragments 茅parts, comme le sugg猫re les r茅p茅titions, ou l'histoire du manuscrit? On trouvera une critique de la th茅orie des Id茅es de Platon, et la qu锚te d'une science des "principes", une science qui gouverne toutes les autres, et en particulier ces satan茅es math茅matiques qui jouissent d'une insupportable autorit茅. Les raisonnements et sp茅culations sur lesquelles le lecteur se casse la t锚te font disparaitre la distinction entre la finesse et les finesses, et l'on est bien heureux d'en voir la fin, pour oublier le d茅pit d'avoir 茅t茅 pay茅 de sa peine par beaucoup plus d'ennui que d'instruction.
December 18, 2021
乇丕蹖噩 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賲毓賳蹖賽 賲丕亘毓丿丕賱胤亘蹖毓賴 賵 賲丕賵乇丕丕賱胤亘蹖毓賴 禺賱胤 卮賵丿. 賲賵囟賵毓賽 賲丕亘毓丿丕賱胤亘蹖毓賴 賲亘丕丿蹖賽 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖賳 胤亘蹖毓鬲 賵 噩賴丕賳 丕爻鬲貙 賲孬賱丕賸 鬲丨賯蹖賯 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 賵噩賵丿貙 匕丕鬲貙 噩賵賴乇貙 亘乇丕亘乇蹖貙 鬲囟丕丿貙 丕蹖賳鈥屬囐呚з嗃屫� 毓賱賾蹖鬲 賵 睾蹖乇賴. 賵 賲丕賵乇丕賱胤亘蹖毓賴 亘丕 丕賲賵乇蹖 爻乇賵讴丕乇 丿丕乇丿 讴賴 賮乇丕蹖賽 鬲氐賵乇賽 賲丕 丕夭 胤亘蹖毓鬲 賵 賯丕賳賵賳鈥屬囏й� 鬲噩乇亘蹖 賵 胤亘蹖毓蹖 賴爻鬲賳丿.
賴丿賮賽 丕氐賱蹖 賲鬲丕賮蹖夭蹖讴賽 丕乇爻胤賵 賳賮賵匕 亘賴 賵噩賵丿貙 噩賵賴乇 賵 匕丕鬲賽 趩蹖夭賴丕蹖 賲禺鬲賱賮. 賲鬲丕賮蹖夭蹖讴 賯胤毓丕賸 讴鬲丕亘蹖 賳蹖爻鬲 讴賴 亘丿賵賳賽 丿丕賳卮賽 倬蹖卮蹖賳蹖賽 賮賱爻賮蹖 賮賴賲 卮賵丿貙 诏乇趩賴 亘丕 趩賳蹖賳 丿丕賳卮蹖 賴賲 讴丕賲賱丕賸 賮賴賲蹖丿賴 賳賲蹖鈥屫促堌�. 讴鬲丕亘賽 爻禺鬲鈥屫堌з嗃� 丕爻鬲. 丿乇 丨賯蹖賯鬲 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 賲噩賵毓賴鈥屫й� 丕夭 蹖丕丿丿丕卮鬲鈥屬囏ж池� 賳诏丕卮鬲賴鈥屫簇� 鬲賵爻胤賽 丕乇爻胤賵 亘乇丕蹖 讴賱丕爻鈥屬囏й屰� 讴賴 亘乇诏夭丕乇 賲蹖鈥屭┴必� 蹖丕 賳賵卮鬲賴鈥屫簇� 鬲賵爻胤賽 卮丕诏乇丿丕賳 丿乇 讴賱丕爻鈥屬囏й� 丕賵.
賴丿賮賽 丕氐賱蹖 賲鬲丕賮蹖夭蹖讴賽 丕乇爻胤賵 賳賮賵匕 亘賴 賵噩賵丿貙 噩賵賴乇 賵 匕丕鬲賽 趩蹖夭賴丕蹖 賲禺鬲賱賮. 賲鬲丕賮蹖夭蹖讴 賯胤毓丕賸 讴鬲丕亘蹖 賳蹖爻鬲 讴賴 亘丿賵賳賽 丿丕賳卮賽 倬蹖卮蹖賳蹖賽 賮賱爻賮蹖 賮賴賲 卮賵丿貙 诏乇趩賴 亘丕 趩賳蹖賳 丿丕賳卮蹖 賴賲 讴丕賲賱丕賸 賮賴賲蹖丿賴 賳賲蹖鈥屫促堌�. 讴鬲丕亘賽 爻禺鬲鈥屫堌з嗃� 丕爻鬲. 丿乇 丨賯蹖賯鬲 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 賲噩賵毓賴鈥屫й� 丕夭 蹖丕丿丿丕卮鬲鈥屬囏ж池� 賳诏丕卮鬲賴鈥屫簇� 鬲賵爻胤賽 丕乇爻胤賵 亘乇丕蹖 讴賱丕爻鈥屬囏й屰� 讴賴 亘乇诏夭丕乇 賲蹖鈥屭┴必� 蹖丕 賳賵卮鬲賴鈥屫簇� 鬲賵爻胤賽 卮丕诏乇丿丕賳 丿乇 讴賱丕爻鈥屬囏й� 丕賵.
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