欧宝娱乐

Jump to ratings and reviews
Rate this book

胤睾蹖丕賳 鬲賵丿賴鈥屬囏�

Rate this book
胤睾蹖丕賳 鬲賵丿賴鈥屬囏� 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘鈥屬囏й� 禺賵夭賴 丕乇鬲诏丕蹖蹖 诏丕爻鬲貙 賮蹖賱爻賵賮 賵 賳馗乇蹖賴鈥屬矩必ж� 丕爻倬丕賳蹖丕蹖蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賲賴賲鈥屫臂屬� 丕孬乇 爻蹖丕爻蹖 丕賵 賲丨爻賵亘 賲蹖鈥屫促堌�. 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 讴賴 丿乇亘丕乇賴 馗賴賵乇 鬲賵丿賴鈥屬囏� 丿乇 毓賲賱 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 丕爻鬲貙 噩賳亘賴鈥屬囏й� 賲孬亘鬲 賵 賲賳賮蹖 丨囟賵乇 鬲賵丿賴 乇丕 丿乇 毓賲賱 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 亘乇乇爻蹖 讴乇丿賴鈥屫ж池�. 讴鬲丕亘 胤睾蹖丕賳 鬲賵丿賴鈥屬囏� 卮丕賲賱 郾鄢 賮氐賱 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘乇禺蹖 丕夭 毓賳丕賵蹖賳 丌賳 卮丕賲賱 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 丕夭丿丨丕賲貙 丕乇鬲賯丕蹖 爻胤丨 鬲丕乇蹖禺蹖貙 丕賵噩 夭賲丕賳貙 賳賲賵 夭賳丿诏蹖 賵鈥� 賲蹖鈥屫促堌�. 诏丕爻鬲 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖鈥屭堐屫�: 芦賲賴賲鈥屫臂屬� 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 夭賲丕賳賴 賲丕 馗賴賵乇 丕賳爻丕賳 鬲賵丿賴鈥屫й� 賵 鬲賵丿賴鈥屬囏� 丿乇 毓乇氐賴鈥屬囏й� 诏賵賳丕诏賵賳 噩丕賲毓賴 丕爻鬲.禄 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賳賵卮鬲丕乇 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 丕賳鬲賯丕丿蹖 賵蹖 賳爻亘鬲 亘賴 丕蹖賳 倬丿蹖丿賴 毓氐乇 賲丿乇賳 賲賵乇丿 鬲賵噩賴 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賴鈥屫ж池�. 亘賴鈥屫藏官� 诏丕爻鬲貙 丕賳爻丕賳 鬲賵丿賴鈥屫й屫� 讴爻蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 夭賳丿诏蹖鈥屫ж� 賴丿賮 賳丿丕乇丿貙 亘賱讴賴 氐乇賮丕 噩乇蹖丕賳 丿丕乇丿. 丕賳爻丕賳 鬲賵丿賴鈥屫й� 丕夭 亘毓丿 賮讴乇蹖 爻丕丿賴 賵 丕亘鬲丿丕蹖蹖 丕爻鬲 賵 丕蹖賳 丕賳爻丕賳 賲丨氐賵賱 丿賵乇賴 夭賲丕賳 禺丕氐蹖 丕夭 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賵 卮乇丕蹖胤 賮乇賴賳诏蹖貙 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 賵 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘乇丕蹖 卮賳丕禺鬲 亘賴鬲乇 丕賵 亘丕蹖丿 丕蹖賳 卮乇丕蹖胤 乇丕 亘賴鬲乇 卮賳丕禺鬲.

144 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1923

711 people are currently reading
12.9k people want to read

About the author

Jos茅 Ortega y Gasset

438books725followers
Jos茅 Ortega y Gasset was a Spanish liberal philosopher and essayist working during the first half of the 20th century while Spain oscillated between monarchy, republicanism and dictatorship. He was, along with Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, a proponent of the idea of perspectivism.

Ratings & Reviews

What do you think?
Rate this book

Friends & Following

Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!

Community Reviews

5 stars
2,254 (36%)
4 stars
2,315 (37%)
3 stars
1,169 (19%)
2 stars
298 (4%)
1 star
100 (1%)
Displaying 1 - 30 of 494 reviews
Profile Image for Jim.
248 reviews100 followers
March 27, 2008
I first read this for a political theory class as an undergrad; at the time I pestered everyone around me with recitations of Ortegan thought. The more I re-read it, the more I'm convinced that Ortega's ideas are still applicable, even though the book came out in 1930. (If only my roommates had listened, they'd be so much smarter now.)

Basically, Ortega says that the central feature of modernity is an unwillingness by the mass (which included people from all social classes) to pay deference to people, culture, institutions he termed 'select'. In a democratic society, we'd say a healthy sense of skepticism for authority is a good thing, but that's not what he was writing about.

Instead, Ortega's mass-man was supremely self-centered, threatened by greater intellect or knowledge, refinement, superior skill, etc. Rather than respecting people with such attributes, the mass feels compelled to ridicule them and tear them down. One can hear echoes of this attitude in the phrase, 'Sure he's smart, but it's all from books. He has no common sense.'

The mass-man isn't content to wallow in pop culture and kitsch (and who doesn't love a good wallow?), but he feels compelled to ridicule anyone who might enjoy high culture. (As someone who has taught high school students, I can tell you that the adolescent who loves literature, likes classical music, or appreciates art probably needs to develop a thick skin. Or keep those enthusiasms a secret. This is especially true for boys.)

Ortega was a liberal republican who was opposed to the political tendency to cater to people's base emotions.
His special target was the se帽orito satisfecho (satisfied little gentleman), educated, bourgeois (or petit bourgeois), smug, mistaking specialized knowledge for expertise in all things. Ortega saw this social type as marked by a self-satisfied ignorance that they fought hard to maintain. As a group, they turned out to be some of the most ardent supporters of the fascist movements that dominated Europe in the 1930s and into the 40s.

One of the great things for the casual reader of philosophy is that Ortega was committed to widely disseminating ideas and wrote in an accessible style. The downside of this book is that one goes away from it with the sense that the situatuion Ortega describes isn't going to get better.
Profile Image for Roy Lotz.
Author听2 books8,907 followers
December 19, 2016
[Like in my other Spanish reviews, the English translation is below. This review should be more or less free of errors, since I asked someone to help me with it, but if anyone finds a mistake feel free to let me know!]
芦El espacio y el tiempo f铆sicos son lo absolutamente est煤pido del universo.禄

La rebeli贸n de las masas es probablemente la obra de 蹿颈濒辞蝉辞蹿铆补 m谩s conocida de Espa帽a. Pero no lo he le铆do solo por eso. Lo he le铆do porque鈥攃omo dejar茅 claro鈥攅ste libro vuelve a ser ahora quiz谩s tan relevante como lo fue en el momento de su publicaci贸n.

El mensaje de Ortega es dif铆cil de creer ahora, en nuestra 茅poca de igualitarismo. Como Ortega es elitista, no estamos de acuerdo con 茅l, y el lector tiene que resistir su impulso de condenarlo con asco sin entender lo que Ortega est谩 diciendo. Palabras como 芦mejor禄 y 芦peor禄, 芦superior禄 e 芦inferior禄, 芦elite禄 y 芦masa禄 son casi tab煤 actualmente. Por lo menos, no vamos a hacer amigos con este vocabulario.

驴Cu谩les son sus argumentos? Es dif铆cil explicarlos, por dos razones: la m谩s obvia es que no hablo bien 别蝉辫补帽辞濒; la m谩s importante es que Ortega no est谩 muy preocupado con ser coherente ni sistem谩tico. Una explicaci贸n parcial de la 煤ltima es el origen de este libro. Antes de ser libro, fue una serie de art铆culos publicados en el diario El Sol. Por eso sus cap铆tulos son cortos y su lenguaje es, adem谩s de ser elegante y erudito, directo y sencillo. (Si un guiri como yo puede entenderlo, no es muy dif铆cil.) Para 茅l es muy importante conocer su audiencia; y su audiencia es el p煤blico culto, no especialista en 蹿颈濒辞蝉辞蹿铆补.

Seg煤n 茅l, en sociedad hay siempre dos tipos de hombre: el hombre-masa, y la minor铆a excelente. Avisa de que no habla sobre clases econ贸micas ni sociales. Tampoco la divisi贸n es una cuesti贸n de inteligencia en s铆. La divisi贸n se basa, m谩s bien, en la personalidad y la voluntad. La minor铆a excelente no est谩 satisfecha consigo misma; no est谩 segura de que tiene raz贸n, y no puede aceptar las opiniones convencionales, ni el sentido com煤n. Tiene que pensar por s铆 misma y cambiar su car谩cter y su mundo.

El hombre-masa est谩, por el contrario, muy satisfecho con su mundo y con s铆 mismo. Con un poco de humor, Ortega le llama 芦se帽orito satisfecho禄. Para un 芦se帽orito satisfecho禄, lo importante no es tener sus conclusiones propias, sino estar de acuerdo con todo el mundo. (Y en 芦todo el mundo禄 no est谩 incluido la minor铆a excelente, porque son raros.) No quiere cambiar y mejorar el mundo porque el mundo ya tiene todo lo que necesita. La masa exige el derecho de no tener raz贸n, el derecho de no pensar ni aprender; en sus palabras, 芦el derecho de la vulgaridad, o la vulgaridad como derecho.禄

La diferencia principal entre el mundo pret茅rito y el mundo actual no es la existencia de las masas, sino su potencia. Esto es una consecuencia de la mayor riqueza de la sociedad y de la democracia liberal. Los dos son productos de la Ilustraci贸n, su ciencia, industria, ingenier铆a, liberalismo, capitalismo, y sus principios de igualdad. El mundo es ahora tan rico que las masas pueden olvidar la lucha que ha sido necesaria, los hombres que han dedicado sus vidas para mejorar el mundo, y han olvidado cu谩n dif铆cil, fr谩gil, y reciente es la civilizaci贸n contempor谩nea.

En opini贸n de Ortega, los movimientos m谩s caracter铆sticos de las masas son el fascismo y el comunismo. Lo dice porque ninguno de los dos entiende la Historia; sus partidarios no pueden dudar de sus principios, sino que todo el mundo tiene que creer en la misma cosa. Ortega est谩 en contra de estos movimientos; es un liberal. Para 茅l, la libertad es fundamental, y los individuos excelentes valen m谩s que ideolog铆as o movimientos.

Su concepci贸n de 芦raz贸n hist贸rica禄 significa que cada situaci贸n en la historia es 煤nica, y cada individuo tiene una porci煤ncula de la verdad. No hay ninguna soluci贸n definitiva, ni un gobierno perfecto. Por eso, ning煤n sistema puede explicar todo. Y un gobierno que quiere controlar todo y gobernar de manera est谩tica no puede tener 茅xito. La vida cambia, o no es la vida.
Reducir a formula tan simple la infinitud de cosas que integran la realidad hist贸rica actual, es sin duda e en el mejor caso, una exageraci贸n, y yo necesitaba por eso recordar que pensar es, qui茅rase o no, exagerar. Quien prefiera no exagerar tiene que callarse; m谩s a煤n tiene que paralizar su intelecto y ver la manera de idiotizarse.

El estilo de Ortega me recuerda al de Montesquieu o de Rousseau. Sobre todo, es epigram谩tico. Tiene los vicios y las virtudes de ese estilo. La virtud principal es su fuerza; cada frase se queda en tu mente; y el efecto acumulativo es como una serie de golpes. Ortega es el boxeador de los escritores. Pero el defecto de este estilo tambi茅n es grave. Un epigrama puede resumir un argumento y hacer una conclusi贸n. Sin embargo, si cada frase es un epigrama, no puedes hacer un razonamiento muy sensato. Se pierde la l贸gica de sus conclusiones. El resultado es como un castillo de naipes dorados: cada parte es precioso, pero la estructura es fr谩gil.

Como no hay mucha evidencia ni l贸gica en sus conclusiones, parece que son productos de prejuicios y no de razonamientos. Y probablemente sea as铆. Ortega perteneci贸 a una familia rica, culta, y refinada. Por eso, la subida de la cultura popular le da asco. En este aspecto, Ortega es similar a Nietzsche, un consumado elitista. Es obvio ahora que su disgusto nubla su juicio. Pens贸, por ejemplo, que la man铆a del deporte f铆sico y los ba帽os de sol desaparecer铆an. Actualmente el gusto de Ortega nos parece anacr贸nico.

O quiz谩s no. Cuando art铆culos falsos pueden cambiar una elecci贸n, y cuando una estrella de telerrealidad es elegido presidente, y cuando los nacionalismos est谩n creciendo en el mundo occidental, su an谩lisis parece prof茅tico. Nuestra incapacidad de tener un debate, el escepticismo de la ciencia (contra el cambio clim谩tico y la evoluci贸n) y anti-intelectualismo en general, no son buenos presagios. Y la opini贸n, cada a帽o m谩s popular, de que estamos en una 茅poca de decadencia, evidencia que hay un gran problema en el sistema mundial. Pero 驴qu茅 debemos hacer? Ortega no lo ha dicho, y seguro que yo no lo s茅.

English:
Profile Image for Szplug.
466 reviews1,458 followers
June 20, 2010
This is a remarkable extended essay by Ortega, who cast his discerning eye upon Europe in 1930 in an effort to assess a continent that, it was claimed, was transitioning into a decline from its prior global preeminence. Probing this malaise, Ortega proffers in explanation the startling rise of the mass-man, a foreseeable product of the nineteenth century's unprecedented population increase due to its enthusiastic embrace of technicist liberal democracy. This promotion of democracy, capitalism, and science had risen the historic level of Western European society to a domineering height; yet the resultant modernized civilization it created was a state of affairs taken for granted by the mass-man, the coarse majority who passed their days oblivious of their obligation to society even as they demanded of it every right, who reveled in low-culture and the selfish pursuit of pleasure whilst scorning any who attempted to stand out from the crowd through excellence in thought, duty, or deed. Ortega took pains to make clear that mass-man was not a construct of class or money, but crossed all spectrums of society; he existed wherever the base was favored over the noble, the easy over the difficult, sufficient unto himself in his cultural barbarity and lacking any desire (since perceiving no need) for betterment. Without respect for the minorities who formerly guided the great European nations to their advanced achievements, the masses were languishing in countries rudderless and without purpose, while communism and fascism threatened to destroy all that democracy had achieved, if for no other reason than the two systems offered a purpose to capture the apathetic attention of the beleaguered Western countries. In addition to his rumination on the ascendency of the ignoble mass-man Ortega included an extended examination of the creation, and sustaining memes, of the nation state; the rise and fall of the historic level throughout the ages; the perils of compartmentalizing occupations and straitening minds under the rigorous, isolating guise of specialism, a necessary precursor for the ignorance of the masses; and offered an earlier version of the European Union as a project worthy of the cramped genius of the Western European nations and a means to energize the selfish majorities and provoke them into a concerted effort to ensure the continuance of the vitally important modern European culture.

This book has been continuously in print in English since 1932, and it doesn't take long to see why: Ortega writes in graceful-but-clear prose, and his brilliant and thoughtful analysis is engaging and persuasive. Although the mass-man he outlined was a European entity, his existence has continued on through today, as can be determined by a short examination of any community, or fifteen minutes of television. It is curious how, in examining the reasons for mass society's loss of faith in its governing and higher institutions, he spares little attention to the First World War, an extended slaughter that was enacted for such inane and purposeless reasons that they would test the faith of the most ardent believer in European destiny; and his pronouncement of a 1930 US, having never suffered, as being unready and unable to take up the mantle of global leadership was clearly wrong. Other than these points, however, he has proved remarkably prescient in his predictions and cautions, especially of the futility of attempts to reverse-engineer time by voiding liberal democracy, and the necessity of the pursuit of European union as the next logical process in the evolution of civilization on the still-eminent continent - and the mass-man will seemingly always exist wherever modern societies lack a cohesive purpose or direction, and instead allow their citizens to bask in the fruits of society's abundance while demanding naught but calendar-delimited votes and a steady expenditure of their (ofttimes meagre) savings. To paraphrase the great Spaniard, the historic level may be at an all-time high, but life is lived in the valleys where what is sown is reaped.
Profile Image for P.E..
879 reviews718 followers
October 31, 2021
La vara de medir - lo actual en lo anticuado

Este ensayo del intelectual 别蝉辫补帽辞濒 Jos茅 Ortega y Gasset se centra en la emergencia de un nuevo tipo social, que 茅l llama 'hombre-masa'. El prop贸sito del ensayo principal es definir este tipo sociol贸gico, su genealog铆a y las posibles condiciones para su superaci贸n.

Este texto est谩 precedido por un un pr贸logo para franceses (1937) tratando del caracter din谩mico del equilibrio europeo, del origen de los derechos colectivos e individuales, del 'derecho a la continuidad', del peligro de las revoluciones, del estatismo, de la uniformizacion general de los modos de vivir entre otros,
y un ep铆logo para ingleses (1938), sobre el genio brit谩nico, su pragmatismo, la superioridad de su organizaci贸n social y los defectos de los Brit谩nicos como individuos.

Siguen un ensayo sobre el pacifismo en Europa escrito en 1937, y textos sobre el papel desempe帽ado por las generaciones y los sexos en el perfil psicol贸gico y conductual de una 茅poca.


Entre los puntos fuertes del ensayo, yo pondr铆a:

1. El an谩lisis de los factores sociol贸gicos que causan los cambios sociales.

2. La definici贸n rigurosa de los conceptos de convivencia, sociedad, opini贸n p煤blica, costumbres y derecho, estado, aristocracia, hombre-masa, aglomeraciones y sus or铆genes.

3. En cuanto al hombre de masas: 驴por qu茅 y c贸mo apareci贸 est茅 tipo de ciudadanos tan ensimismados e incapaz de poner simplemente sus propios puntos de vista en tela de juicio?

4. Reflexiones sobre lo que la Sociedad de las Naciones y Europa eran en su d铆a, por qu茅 fracasaron, y lo que deber铆an ser. Mejor dicho, cu谩l habr铆a sido el futuro de la ONU y la UE seg煤n Jos茅 Ortega y Gasset. Y por qu茅 estas siguen siendo preguntas cruciales hoy en d铆a.

5. Una apreciaci贸n din谩mica y dial茅ctica de las tendencias pol铆ticas, de la moda en la ropa y las ideas, de los tipos de personalidad dominantes dependiendo de la 茅poca y de qu茅 principios estaban en su apogeo entonces.


Entre las deficiencias o debilidades:

1. Algunas teor铆as caducadas sobre el origen de la singularidad politica, tecnica y economica europea en el siglo XIX. Me gustar铆a recomendarles:





2. Falta de an谩lisis econ贸mico en mi opini贸n, especialmente en lo que se refiere al exodo rural, la divisi贸n del trabajo (exceptuando la del intelectual o cient铆fico), de los efectos mec谩nicos de tales fen贸menos sobre la repartici贸n de la poblaci贸n y sus nuevos patrones de comportamiento.

3. Mientras Jos茅 Ortega y Gasset se encarga de separar lo que define como 'hombre-masa' de las clases bajas en la aceptaci贸n econ贸mica, o la aristocracia social de la de nacimiento, afirmando que el individuo excelente es quienquiera reconoce sus limitaciones y no pretende ense帽ar al maestro鈥攍o que definitivamente parece anunciar una concepci贸n din谩mica y de lo que son las 茅lites y las masas respectivamente鈥�, sin embargo, 茅l tiende a moralizar el 茅xito social y su materializaci贸n en posiciones de poder: la de pol铆tico, la de una buena parte de la antigua aristocracia de nacimiento. Aunque tenga cuidado de dar contraejemplos (el arist贸crata hastiado, cuya vida est谩 desprovista de sentido o el demagogo), eso no invalida la proposici贸n anterior de que los que se elevan a tales posiciones son en su mayor parte merecedores, especialmente el pol铆tico. Esto me parece particularmente cuestionable, especialmente hoy en d铆a...

Sin embargo, por otra parte, la reflexi贸n sobre el papel relativo de las generaciones y los g茅neros en funci贸n de la sociedad en cuesti贸n, o la falsa cuesti贸n del pacifismo absoluto, me pareci贸 de la actualidad m谩s v铆vida.

Yo disfrut茅 mucho leyendo este ensayo, que me pareczo tan bien inscrito en su tiempo como capaz de estimular una reflexi贸n met贸dica sobre los acontecimientos pol铆ticos, econ贸micos y sociales del siglo XXI.

----

CITAS
'Cuando se habla de 芦minor铆as selectas禄, la habitual bellaquer铆a suele tergiversar el sentido de esta expresi贸n, fingiendo ignorar que el hombre selecto no es el petulante que se cree superior a los dem谩s, sino el que se exige m谩s que los dem谩s, aunque no logre cumplir en su persona esas exigencias superiores.'

'La fatalidad en que caemos al caer en este mundo鈥攅l mundo es siempre 茅ste, 茅ste de ahora鈥攃onsiste en todo lo contrario. En vez de imponernos una trayectoria, nos impone varias, y, consecuentemente, nos fuerza... a elegir. 隆Sorprendente condici贸n la de nuestra vida! Vivir es sentirse fatalmente forzado a ejercitar la libertad, a decidir lo que vamos a ser en este mundo.'

'En el sufragio universal no deciden las masas, sino que su papel consisti贸 en adherirse a la decisi贸n de una u otra minor铆a. 脡stas presentaban sus 芦programas禄 [...], programas de vida colectiva. En ellos se invitaba a la masa a aceptar un proyecto de decisi贸n.
Hoy acontece una cosa muy diferente. Si se observa la vida p煤blica de los pa铆ses donde el triunfo de las masas ha avanzado m谩s [...], sorprende notar que en ellos se vive pol铆ticamente al d铆a. [...] El poder p煤blico se halla en manos de un representante de masas. Estas son tan poderosas, que han aniquilado toda posible oposici贸n. [...] Y, sin embargo, el poder p煤blico, el gobierno, vive al d铆a; no se presenta como un porvenir franco, ni significa un anuncio claro de futuro, no aparece como comienzo de algo cuyo desarrollo o evoluci贸n resulte imaginable. En suma, vive sin programa de vida, sin proyecto. [...] Cuando ese poder p煤blico intenta justificarse, no alude para nada al futuro, sino, al contrario, se recluye en el presente y dice con perfecta sinceridad: 芦soy un modo anormal de gobierno que es impuesto por las circunstancias禄. Es decir, por la urgencia del presente, no por c谩lculos del futuro. De aqu铆 que su actuaci贸n se reduzca a esquivar el conflicto de cada hora; no a resolverlo, sino a escapar de 茅l por de pronto, empleando los medios que sean, aun a costa de acumular, con su empleo, mayores conflictos sobre la hora pr贸xima. As铆 ha sido siempre el poder p煤blico cuando lo ejercieron directamente las masas: omnipotente y ef铆mero. El hombre-masa es el hombre cuya vida carece de proyectos y va a la deriva. Por eso no construye nada, aunque sus posibilidades, sus poderes, sean enormes.'

'el hombre que analizamos se habit煤a a no apelar de si mismo a ninguna instancia fuera de 茅l. Est谩 satisfecho tal y como es. Igualmente, sin necesidad de ser vano, como lo m谩s natural del mundo, tender谩 a afirmar y dar por bueno cuanto en s铆 halla: opiniones, apetitos, preferencias o gustos.'

'al creerse con derecho a tener una opini贸n sobre el asunto sin previo esfuerzo para forj谩rsela, manifiestan su ejemplar pertenencia al modo absurdo de ser hombre que he llamado 芦masa rebelde禄.'

'No se trata de que el hombre-masa sea tonto. Por el contrario, el actual es m谩s listo, tiene m谩s capacidad intelectiva que el de ninguna otra 茅poca. Pero esa capacidad no le sirve de nada; en rigor, la vaga sensaci贸n de poseerla le sirve s贸lo para cerrarse m谩s en si y no usarla. [...] el vulgar crea que es sobresaliente y no vulgar, sino que el vulgar proclame e imponga el derecho de la vulgaridad o la vulgaridad como un derecho.'

'Bajo las especies de sindicalismo y fascismo aparece por primera vez en Europa un tipo de hombre que no quiere dar razones ni quiere tener raz贸n, sino que, sencillamente, se muestra resuelto a imponer sus opiniones. He aqu铆 lo nuevo: el derecho a no tener raz贸n, la raz贸n de la sinraz贸n.'

'el hombre-masa se sentir铆a perdido si aceptase la discusi贸n, e instintivamente repudia la obligaci贸n de acatar esa instancia suprema que se halla fuera de 茅l. Por eso, lo 芦nuevo禄 es en Europa 芦acabar con las discusiones禄, y se detesta toda forma de convivencia que por si misma implique acatamiento de normas objetivas, desde la conversaci贸n hasta el Parlamento, pasando por la ciencia.'

'no se hallar谩 entre todos los que representan la 茅poca actual uno solo cuya actitud ante la vida no se reduzca a creer que tiene todos los derechos y ninguna obligaci贸n. Es indiferente que se enmascare de reaccionario o de revolucionario [...] su estado de 谩nimo consistir谩 decisivamente en ignorar toda obligaci贸n y sentirse, sin que 茅l mismo sospeche por qu茅, sujeto de ilimitados derechos.'


'Es fr铆volo interpretar los reg铆menes autoritarios del d铆a como engendrados por el capricho o la intriga. Bien claro est谩 que son manifestaciones ineludibles del estado de guerra civil en que casi todos los pa铆ses se hallan hoy.'

'el caso es que el hombre-masa cree, en efecto, que 茅l es el Estado, y tender谩 cada vez m谩s a hacerlo funcionar con cualquier pretexto, a aplastar con 茅l toda minor铆a creadora que lo perturbe; que lo perturbe en cualquier orden: en pol铆tica, en ideas, en industria.'

'Todo por el Estado; nada fuera del Estado; nada contra el Estado. Bastar铆a esto para descubrir en el fascismo un t铆pico movimiento de hombre-masa. Mussolini se encontr贸 con un Estado admirablemente construido鈥攏o por 茅l, sino precisamente por las fuerzas e ideas que 茅l combate: por la democracia liberal鈥�.'


'Sin mandamientos que nos obliguen a vivir de un cierto modo, queda nuestra vida en pura disponibilidad. [...] De puro sentirse libres, exentas de trabas, se sienten vac铆as. Una vida en disponibilidad es mayor negaci贸n de s铆 misma que la muerte. Porque vivir es tener que hacer algo determinado -es cumplir un encargo-, y en la medida en que eludamos poner a algo nuestra existencia, evacuamos nuestra vida.'


'resulta muy extra帽a la obstinaci贸n con que [...] se persiste en dar a la nacionalidad como fundamentos la sangre y el idioma. [...] Porque el franc茅s debe su Francia actual, y el 别蝉辫补帽辞濒 su actual Espa帽a, a un principio X, cuyo impulso consisti贸 precisamente en superar la estrecha comunidad de sangre y de idioma. De suerte que Francia y Espa帽a consistir铆an hoy en lo contrario de lo que las hizo posibles.'

'Es el terminus ad quem, es el verdadero Estado, cuya unidad consiste precisamente en superar toda unidad dada. Cuando ese impulso hacia el m谩s all谩 cesa, el Estado autom谩ticamente sucumbe, y la unidad que ya exist铆a y parec铆a f铆sicamente cimentada -raza, idioma, frontera natural- no sirve de nada: el Estado se desagrega, se dispersa, se atomiza.'


'[...] el entresijo esencial de una naci贸n, [...] se compone de estos dos ingredientes: primero, un proyecto de convivencia total en una empresa com煤n; segundo, la adhesi贸n de los hombres a ese proyecto incitativo.'

'La convivencia, sin m谩s, no significa sociedad [...]. Convivencia implica s贸lo relaciones entre individuos. Pero no puede haber convivencia duradera y estable sin que se produzca autom谩ticamente el fen贸meno social por excelencia, que son los usos鈥攗sos intelectuales u 芦opini贸n p煤blica禄, usos de t茅cnica vital o 芦costumbres禄, usos que dirigen la conducta o 芦moral禄, usos que la imperan o 芦derecho禄.'

'una sociedad es un conjunto de individuos que mutuamente se saben sometidos a la vigencia de ciertas opiniones y valoraciones. Seg煤n esto, no hay sociedad sin la vigencia efectiva de cierta concepci贸n del mundo, la cual act煤a como una 煤ltima instancia a la que se puede recurrir en caso de conflicto.'


'las cosas humanas no son res stantes, sino todo lo contrario, cosas hist贸ricas, es decir, puro movimiento, mutaci贸n perpetua. El derecho tradicional es s贸lo reglamento para una realidad paral铆tica. Y como la realidad hist贸rica cambia peri贸dicamente de modo radical, choca sin remedio con la estabilidad del derecho, que se convierte en una camisa de fuerza.'

'[...]la guerra s贸lo puede evitarse si se entiende por paz un esfuerzo todav铆a mayor, un sistema de esfuerzos complicad铆simos y que, en parte, requieren la venturosa intervenci贸n del genio. Lo otro es un puro error. Lo otro es interpretar la paz como el simple hueco que la guerra dejar铆a si desapareciese por lo tanto, ignorar que si la guerra es una cosa que se hace, tambi茅n la paz es una cosa que hay que hacer'

'Si Europa es s贸lo una pluralidad de naciones, pueden los pac铆ficos despedirse radicalmente de sus esperanzas. Entre sociedades independientes no puede existir verdadera paz. Lo que solemos llamar as铆 no es m谩s que un estado de guerra m铆nima o latente.'

'propugno y anuncio el advenimiento de una forma m谩s avanzada de convivencia europea, un paso adelante en la organizaci贸n jur铆dica y pol铆tica de su unidad. Esta idea europea es de signo inverso a aquel abstruso internacionalismo. Europa no es, no ser谩 la internaci贸n, porque eso significa, en claras nociones de historia, un hueco, un vac铆o y nada. Europa ser谩 la ultranaci贸n.'


'si ceden los verdaderos y normales poderes hist贸ricos鈥攔aza, religi贸n, pol铆tica, ideas鈥�, toda la energ铆a social vacante es absorbida por 茅l. Dir铆amos, pues, que cuando se volatilizan los dem谩s prestigios queda siempre el dinero, que, a fuer de elemento material, no puede volatilizarse. O, de otro modo : el dinero no manda m谩s que cuando no hay otro principio que mande.'

'El dinero no es m谩s que un medio para comprar cosas. Si hay pocas cosas que comprar, por mucho dinero que haya y muy libre que se encuentre Su acci贸n de conflictos con otras potencias, su influjo ser谩 escaso. [...]
el poder social del dinero鈥攃eteris paribus鈥攕er谩 tanto mayor cuantas m谩s cosas haya que comprar, no cuanto mayor sea la cantidad del dinero mismo.'

'As铆 explica esa nota com煤n a todas las 茅pocas sometidas al imperio cremat铆stico que consiste en ser tiempos de transici贸n. Muerta una constituci贸n pol铆tica y moral, se queda la sociedad sin motive que jerarquice a los hombres. Ahora bien: esto es imposible. Contra la ingenuidad igualitaria es preciso hacer notar que la jerarquizaci贸n es el impulso esencial de la socializaci贸n.'
Ensayos/ficciones con temas similares :

Fe, opini贸n, epistemolog铆a :



Moral :



Democracia, Estado y naciones :









Historia internacional, uniformizaci贸n de las culturas:








Medios :




Nacionalismo :



Desigualdad y jerarqu铆as :




V铆nculo hacia el texto:
Profile Image for 尝耻铆蝉.
2,271 reviews1,177 followers
March 29, 2024
History is at this point where Europe has two problems to solve: that of the mass man and that of his too much success. The 19th century, by significantly increasing the diffusion of knowledge and industrial production throughout the world, certainly allowed the world to move up a level, but it also produced mass man. Its main characteristic, steeped in civilization as it is, is to believe that egalitarianism is the equivalence of ideas between individuals without suspecting that intellectual investment modulates the value of these ideas. The mass man takes what he is and what he intuitively thinks very precisely as equivalent to the thought and action of anyone and, in return, everything that is on his path for production (intellectual or manufacturing) with no more value than the efforts he puts into producing his thought - that is to say none. Hence, his "clumsiness" means that he imposes his simplistic vulgarity on the world and takes the civilization where he lives for something due to him. The problem of the mass man is that he is incapable of governing the world and that his mode of action is brutality. We must, therefore, prevent him from taking power and, as quickly as possible, "take back command." The other problem is that Europe has Europeanized the world. Ortega y Gasset notes that what we consider to be an essential characteristic of America, its pragmatism and its technique, were precisely born in Europe in the 18th century, that is to say, at the time of the birth of the United States. So, the problem does not come from there. This problem is because, having internationalized, the bridgeheads of Europe, Germany, England, and France feel cramped within their respective borders, and this causes their demoralization. In short, the only solution is to open the windows, give some air, and create Europe, that is, the ultra-nation.
More than the thesis, I found the colorful, dynamic, and stimulating writing exciting. It should also note that it wrote the text in 1930 and that it mainly intended to evoke Francoism, fascism, and perhaps Ortega already sees it, Nazism. However, since the thesis is sober and rises above its contemporary horrors, it applies well to our current world. It encourages us to reflect on our future as a whole population and the relationship that we can maintain with all these objects that surround us and other innumerable media, the use and frenzied consultation of which certainly assimilate us, at least at times, to this "mass-man"...
Profile Image for Kamakana.
Author听2 books411 followers
March 16, 2019
291115: this is a later addition: after the election of the orange-skinned hair-challenged man in the United States it is perhaps time to reflect on the current of anti-intellectualism which informs this event and Ortega addresses. there is an aspect neglected in my 'pedagogical theory' of politics. that is, irrespective of quality, sincerity, expertise, of the teacher: not everyone wants to learn and may in fact be hostile to any suggestion that they need learn, or that knowledge, thought, perception may be helpful, useful, practical in any way. that informed thought rather than ignorant emotion is perhaps the best way to deal with complexity...

first review: an interesting series of essays of political philosophy. weighted with history, of its time, of eurocentric heritage, rather elitist conception of values, character, action, that possibly i can sometimes agree with, particularly his concept of 'mass-man'. however, this agreement does not extend to ortega's warnings, laments, solutions. aside from writing of his times, primarily of 'noble' qualities of the 'minority' of 'men', this helps me clarify my own 'polis' attitude...

in pedagogical theory there is the idea that all learners will fit in three classes: those who will learn easily, competent, quick, deep and well- those who will not learn, who are ignorant, uninterested, or likely to learn only superficially- and the great majority who will learn with some help, gradually, sometimes deeply, sometimes not. it is the third students for whom a teacher will be of most use, for the quick will learn themselves well, the ignorant and unmotivated are a waste of any help, but the majority will be in the middle, who can use some help...

now replace the concept 'learn' with 'live' and recognize that any teacher or thinker might also turn some effort to the unmotivated, not charity, not cultish, only generous- also recognize that living as learning is of multiple values, that proficiency in any one 'field' does not guarantee such in all fields, and if that field is 'how to live' even so that determination is individual, not something to choose, to impose on the other... as generals learn after succeeding in coups then struggling to govern, as a parent may tell you what Not to do but not What to do, and at any rate will not live your life... a sense of history is helpful yes, but so is invention, novelty, the new...

i am not myself convinced that any elite is necessarily more moral than the so-called 'mass-man'... i too do not think of the 'mass-man' as of this or that class in society, workers, decadent aristos, directionless bourgeois 'self-satisfied man'- but do not agree with ortega that the answer is for the many to honour the few past who have established your world, for they also may have mistreated you or your world... they came first, they had their own motivations, not only some 'moral code'- but also lust for power, wealth, recognition... this book is history- spain, europe, of 85 years past- and it is interesting to read how a thoughtful man weaned in the 19th century, was seeing the 20th... i keep reading title as 'the revolting masses'...
Profile Image for Matthew W.
199 reviews
February 25, 2010
A good analysis of the mass-man mind of intellectual barbarism. You know, the kind of people you see everyday, that feel confident in their ignorance and seek to stomp out any viewpoint that diverges from their safe fantasy world. You know, the majority of the American population that can only see the pseudo-dichotomies of "democrat" and "republican" or "liberal" and "conservative." A great example everyday of the typical mass-minded individual are those people that refuse to watch a film with subtitles and/or that is in black/white. That would be way too big of inconvenience.

Spanish author Jose Ortega y Gasset gave tons of reasons in "The Revolt of the Masses" as to why the mindless masses are taking over. One I found the most obvious and universal (especially on a global scale) is how people take all technology for granted. They have no idea how aspirin or a computer works, but they feel entitled to it and cannot see the world otherwise. They have no idea how civilization and technology have created a completely contrived world of luxury for them. One can only guess what would happen to all the people in the world if electricity and cellphones were to disappear.

If Jose Ortega y Gasset were to see the world now, he would unfortunately realize the world has gotten a lot worse than he could have ever imagined. If he were to see the public school systems, he would be disgusted by how the "schools" indoctrinate the student into being a mass-man. Who doesn't remember the propaganda posters in elementary school that cutely stated "There is no "I" in team."

The mass-man lot of the lowest common denominator, just like the blob, is only growing bigger and bigger....One can only wonder if the mass-man will fully engulf the world until it leads to its total destruction.
Profile Image for Charles Haywood.
538 reviews1,050 followers
March 24, 2018
Oh, but this is a fascinating book. Written in 1930 by the Spanish philosopher Jos茅 Ortega y Gasset, it is one of those books that is occasionally mentioned, especially recently, but rarely actually read. 1930, in Spain, was the hinge of fate, and it has been nearly a hundred years since Ortega wrote. That means we can see where he was wrong, and where he was right, and what he wrote says to us today.

First, though, we have to hack our way through two misconceptions that both seem to attend any modern mention of "The Revolt of the Masses." The first misconception is that this is a book about class, about how Ortega favors the bourgeois, or the rich, over the working class, or at least that it is an analysis of their conflicts. Given that class was a hot topic in 1930, this is a reasonable guess from the title, but it is totally wrong. This misconception cropped up repeatedly after Trump鈥檚 election, and, for example, the review by David Brooks in the New York Times of J. D. Vance鈥檚 "Hillbilly Elegy" was titled 鈥淭he Revolt of the Masses.鈥� But Ortega was a political moderate, and seems to not have been exercised by questions of class at all. Rather, this is a book about human excellence, what it can accomplish, and how it can be destroyed.

The second misconception is that Ortega鈥檚 call for excellence is a call for masses to defer to experts鈥攕upposedly, according to various chatterers, Ortega鈥檚 main point is that experts are ignored. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, Ortega thinks all, or almost all, modern experts are the definition of mediocrity, and the masses deferring to them is like deferring to a mirror. Instead, people should defer to a natural aristocracy, not of blood, but of focus and accomplishment. Those people are not experts, who are narrow, but are instead broad people of taste, judgment, and discipline. We will return to this misconception later, with specific recent examples, but now that we are past the reef, we can sail into the open ocean of Ortega鈥檚 thought.

So, if this is not a book about class, who are the 鈥渕asses鈥�? Ortega divides every society into 鈥渕inorities,鈥� a small set of people who are 鈥渟pecially qualified,鈥� and the 鈥渕asses,鈥� everyone not specially qualified. The key question is who is average and who is not. A mass person feels as if he is 鈥渏ust like everybody,鈥� that he is not particularly special, and not only does this not concern him, he celebrates the fact. (Thus, someone who examines his talents and concludes he is mediocre, and feels that is a problem, is not a mass man.) But this, of course, begs the question鈥攚hat makes a person above average or, in Ortega鈥檚 term, 鈥渟pecially qualified鈥�? They are those who make personal demands for excellence upon themselves, and live in that way. This makes them the minority, by definition. They may not fulfil those demands; it is the demand being made, that alone, which makes the person a minority. In contrast, mass men 鈥渄emand nothing special of themselves, but [ ] to live is to be every moment what they already are, without imposing on themselves any effort toward perfection.鈥�

The minority, the elite, are thus not coterminous with traditional aristocracy or a ruling class. Ortega acknowledges that in traditional social elites excellence is more likely to be found, but mere heredity does not make a person place demands on himself, so an aristocrat by blood can be a mass man just like a peasant or a steelworker鈥攁nd a peasant or a steelworker can be a member of the minority. The class of intellectuals, in particular, fancy themselves to be above the masses, but are often vulgar pseudo-intellectuals, swept along by lazy, commonplace thinking, and therefore mass men. Children of the excellent frequently ride on their parents鈥� accomplishments; they thereby become mass men themselves. Ortega wants 鈥渘obility鈥� to mean not nobility of blood, but to restore the meaning of 鈥渘oble鈥� as 鈥渨ell-known, that is, known by everyone, famous, he who has made himself known by excelling the anonymous mass.鈥� Anyone can do this, from any walk of life, but few do, human nature being what it is.

Having gotten definitions out of the way, Ortega鈥檚 first substantive point is that in the past, the mass was content to exist in the background, ceding to the minority such higher-level societal functions as art, government and political judgment. No more. Now, the mass assert their right to dictate in all such areas, without having to demand from themselves, much less achieve, excellence. In politics, this is 鈥渉yperdemocracy,鈥� and Ortega thinks it a degradation. In other areas, such as philosophy (Ortega鈥檚 specialty), it means that readers (and, today, listeners and YouTube watchers), do so 鈥渨ith the view, not of learning from the writer, but rather, of pronouncing judgment on him when he is not in agreement with the commonplaces that the said reader carries in his head.鈥� It鈥檚 not that the mass man thinks he鈥檚 an expert. 鈥淭he characteristic of the hour is that the commonplace mind, knowing itself to be commonplace, has the assurance to proclaim the rights of the commonplace and to impose them wherever it will. . . . . The mass crushes beneath it everything that is different, everything that is excellent, individual, qualified and select.鈥� Mediocrity rules, and does not care that it is mediocre.

All this is a new thing in our history, but not in world history. It can be found in the declining years of Rome, among other places. Ortega ascribes its modern growth, though, not to decline, but to liberal democracy, to the discovery of the abstract sovereignty of the individual. He doesn鈥檛 dislike liberal democracy鈥攓uite the contrary, he thinks both that it鈥檚 great, and that it鈥檚 inevitable and broadly irreversible, as I discuss further below. But if the individual is sovereign, we should not be surprised if each man treats himself as if he is indeed sovereign.

None of this implies decadence鈥攃ontra Spengler, Ortega thinks that relative to the nineteenth century, which viewed itself as a time of 鈥減lenitude鈥� when the destination of society had been reached, the twentieth century, viewing the future as open-ended and in flux, is in many ways superior. (At this point, you have to remember it鈥檚 1930, look around you at the world of 2018, as well as the past hundred years, then chuckle grimly and draw your own conclusions.) But the twentieth century takes it too far, because the mass men dominate, and they have 鈥渓ost all respect, all consideration for the past.鈥� Thus, the mass men both see the future as open, but assured, and themselves as perfect and satisfied. That鈥檚 a dangerous combination, for it leads to a world 鈥渆mpty of purposes, anticipations, ideals.鈥� It was those things the minority supplied, and it was those things that drove the world forward. Now, with the triumph of the masses, nobody supplies those things. So the twentieth century is an apogee鈥攂ut the nature of apogees is there is nowhere to go but down.

Thus, the nineteenth century, for all its accomplishments, also gave us the rise of the mass man, and the mass man will, unless his rise is constrained, within thirty years, 鈥渟end our continent back to barbarism.鈥� (This is a book quite explicitly about Europe. America is treated as close to a non-entity, with thinly veiled contempt. And Europe is defined as France, Germany, and England鈥攊t does not, for these purposes, really even include Spain.) The mass man, for example, feels that he himself is qualified to decide, and should decide, political matters, rather than his vote 鈥渟upporting the decision of one minority or another.鈥� That will lead to the disappearance of liberal democracy, which Ortega regards as man鈥檚 highest political achievement (鈥渓egislative technique鈥�), but it will also lead to the end of 鈥渋ndustrial technique,鈥� since the pursuit of technical excellence by minorities drives industry forward, just like other pursuit of excellence drives political organization forward.

It is this latter 鈥渋ndustrial technique,鈥� this combination of 鈥渟cientific experiment and industrialism,鈥� that Ortega names 鈥渢echnism.鈥� Technism has allowed the mass man to escape the feeling that dominated all prior societies, that of material scarcity and restrictions. At the same time, liberal democracy makes the mass man believe that he is master of his psychic and political destiny. Thus, the mass man feels in his bones that life is now 鈥渆xempt from restrictions鈥� on every level. That is to say, in modern parlance, he is emancipated. 鈥淭he world which surrounds the new man from his birth does not compel him to limit himself in any fashion, it sets up no veto in opposition to him; on the contrary, it incites his appetite, which in principle can increase indefinitely.鈥� Ortega鈥檚 objection is not that appetites increasing is bad; he did not foresee the logical endpoint of total emancipation, which is total autonomy combined with total tyranny and a denial of basic reality. Instead, his objection is that the mass man fails to appreciate that all this, that benefits him, was created with great toil by the excellence of minorities; he thinks it manna from heaven. What characterizes the mass man is inertia鈥攖he opposite of the ceaseless, self-generated search for excellence that characterizes the truly noble. And this failure to understand the sources of the bounty that blesses him, his 鈥渞adical ingratitude,鈥� combined with the new dominance of the mass man over society, means it will all disappear, and barbarism will return, as excellence flees.

For Ortega, such barbarism isn鈥檛 of the type that, looking backward, the twentieth century actually delivered. Rather, 鈥渂arbarism is the absence of standards to which appeal can be made.鈥� That seems like not a fatal problem, but it is. No standards, no progress, only regress. Certainly, mass men are the creators of such tripe as Syndicalism, Fascism (explicitly in the Mussolini sense) and, Communism (鈥渁 monotonous repetition of the eternal revolution,鈥� oblivious to history, like all these movements). They are created by 鈥渢he type of man who does not want to give reasons or to be right, but simply shows himself resolved to impose his opinions. This is the new thing: the right not to be reasonable, the 鈥榬eason of unreason.鈥� . . . Hence his ideas are in effect nothing more than appetites in words. . . .鈥� (Ortega would not have enjoyed spending time on Facebook, much less Twitter.) When mass men of politics say they are 鈥渄one with discussions,鈥� this is what they mean. It implies also that 鈥渄irect action,鈥� that is, violence, becomes not the ultima ratio, the final argument when all others are through, but the prima ratio, the first argument. This is always true, 鈥渁t every epoch when the mass, for one purpose or another, has taken a part in public life.鈥� In all areas, what is recognized by the excellent, the minorities, in all times as 鈥渃ivilized,鈥� from literature, to sexual relations, to art, to manners, to justice, decays. It is those standards for those things that make 鈥渢he community, common life鈥� possible. Result of their end: barbarism, if we don鈥檛 change course.

We can certainly see this degradation of all standards today, to a degree that makes Ortega鈥檚 prescience startling (although he was far off the mark on one matter, which I talk about last). Not only is the mass man as Ortega defines him far more dominant, over the whole Western world, than in Ortega鈥檚 time, but we see the barbarism Ortega identifies has long since arrived. Certainly almost nobody demands excellence in any field; instead, the mass men who rule demand such rubbish as 鈥渄iversity and inclusion,鈥� the wholesale granting of unearned benefits on the basis of (preferred) immutable characteristics. The very idea that there is such a thing as excellence is denied as a matter of course. Similarly with the political processes Ortega identifies. We hear all the time, mostly from the Left but also from the Right, that the time for discussion is over, and the time for action is here, by which the speaker means 鈥渃onform to my unreasoned and emotion-driven demands or be crushed.鈥� (Such language is all over the latest push to confiscate firearms, for example, along with other forms of knuckle-dragging political behavior that would have horrified Ortega, with his focus on high rationality and political liberty.) And, more broadly, what characterizes everything in the West is a call for total autonomy implemented, if necessary, by government tyranny, and a rejection of any standards as an offense against emancipation.

Ortega believed that as long as the minority of the excellent dominates, progress is inevitable. And the reverse is also true. Therefore, Ortega would, perhaps, not be surprised by the situation today. Moreover, since barbarism has arrived in the form of the domination of mass men, it is natural that a portion of those mass men hold themselves out as the minority, as the elites. But, of course, they are merely the rulers鈥攖hey do not actually demand of themselves any pursuit of excellence at all. The names of categories are maintained, in art, politics, and culture, but they are hollow, for the standards are set by mass men clothed in false skins. So, it is entirely possible, if standards have decayed and barbarism returned, for there to be nobody at all to whom the masses can turn for guidance. The polestar may simply have winked out, to, perhaps, be restored at a time to be announced, when the world is remade.

Thus, "The Revolt of the Masses" feels surprisingly fresh, given not only its age but all the water that has passed under the bridge since it was written. Yes, Ortega does display a simplistic, if touching, faith, in liberal democracy, which has since his time shown its deficiency. The Europe of 1930 is the triumph of 鈥渓iberal democracy and technical knowledge,鈥� shown by, among other things, a tripling of the population of Europe. (Ortega is wrong here, of course鈥攖here is no necessary, or actual historical, linkage of liberal democracy with the rise of technical knowledge or its impacts in the Industrial Revolution.) He concludes that 鈥渓iberal democracy based on technical knowledge is the highest type of public life hitherto known,鈥� and though it might be possible to imagine a better, anything better must continue to embody both liberal democracy and technical knowledge, and that it would be 鈥渟uicidal鈥� to return to any pre-nineteenth-century form. It is the 鈥渢ruth of destiny.鈥�

That was a supportable argument, maybe, in 1930, but not now. True, the term no longer means what it meant for Ortega. For him, it meant political liberty, 鈥渃onsideration for one鈥檚 neighbor,鈥� 鈥渋ndirect action鈥� (i.e., a rejection of violence), and, explicitly, universal suffrage where the mass of voters chose among programs offered by their betters. Today, it means, as Ryszard Legutko says, 鈥渃oercion to freedom,鈥� where no political liberty is offered to those opposed to unbridled autonomy, and democracy means only being allowed to vote for what today鈥檚 elites, who are not Ortega鈥檚 minority, allow. Ortega thought liberal democracy 鈥渁nnounces the determination to share existence with the enemy.鈥� Those who today howl 鈥淚 can tolerate anything but intolerance鈥� can have nothing in common with this sentiment. So perhaps we can say that Ortega may have been right, but liberal democracy as he used the term is dead, a casualty of the barbarism he feared, replaced by its zombie equivalent (although probably such zombification was inevitable, in the nature of liberal democracy, as several recent writers have claimed).

As I promised, let鈥檚 turn back to the second misconception about Ortega鈥檚 thoughts, regarding 鈥渆xperts.鈥� In the past few years, there have been minor outbreaks of renewed interest in Ortega鈥檚 thoughts, always facile. For example, in the "Atlantic," a colloquy recently appeared between a staff writer and a reader, where the statement was endorsed by both, that Ortega 鈥渄escribes a movement that appeals to a cross-section of non-intellectual people across class lines that seems to parallel Donald Trump鈥檚 cross-cultural appeal. There it seemed to lead to Fascism.鈥� Ortega would have a conniption. His objection is not that the mass man fails to be intellectual; it is that the mass man does not pursue excellence. For the most part, Ortega loathes modern intellectuals as the very worst type of mass man. Nor does he make any suggestion at all that mass men lead to Fascism; rather, he says that the domination of mass men leads to regression in political organization, one possible end of which is Fascism. The "Atlantic" colloquy continues, with such gems as 鈥淸T]he digital age seems to have trouble accepting 鈥榚lite鈥� consensus regarding complex topics such as climate change (and gun control, evolution and tax policy, among many other subjects where the vast majority of scientists, economists, etc., accept certain basic facts that are rejected by large swaths of the public).鈥� Ortega did not care about what scientists and economists had to say. At all. He would call them ignoramuses, narrow men whose narrow learning did not qualify them to say anything at all to society at large, especially about topics not subject to rigid calculation. His 鈥渆lites鈥� were men of excellence and broad learning, not sophists and calculators.

To Ortega, 鈥渟pecial qualifications鈥� are not those of experts. Our experts are scientists and similar types who are narrow and ignorant outside of a tiny area, yet presume to think otherwise. His leaders, to whom the mass should defer, are men of great mind, not technicians. They are aristocrats. In fact, Ortega despises the 鈥� 鈥榤an of science,鈥� the high-point of European humanity,鈥� as being actually 鈥渢he prototype of the mass man.鈥� This is because the days of scientific discoveries by generalists, like Newton, are over, and the days of narrow specialization by each scientist are here. Science itself is not specialized, and in fact must be informed by areas outside science鈥攂ut scientific work, today, must be. The days of encyclopedic minds are gone, and what we have are specialists, each only knowledgeable in 鈥渢he small corner of which he is an active investigator.鈥� Given this hyper-specialization, men who are overall mediocre, rather than excellent, can actually keep science advancing (this is today called the 鈥淥rtega Hypothesis鈥�), because 鈥渁 fair amount of the things that have to be done in physics or biology is mechanical work of the mind which can be done by anyone, or almost anyone.鈥� But such men think they are excellent, even though each 鈥渒nows very well his own tiny corner of the universe; [but] he is radically ignorant of all the rest.鈥� He is a 鈥渓earned ignoramus,鈥� which is bad enough, but worse is in store, for 鈥淏y specializing him, civilization has made him hermetic and self-satisfied within his limitations; but this very inner feeling of dominance and worth will induce him to wish to predominate outside his specialty. The result is . . . that he will behave in almost all spheres of life as does the unqualified, the mass-man.鈥�

This is what we see, most of the time, when people demand that the public listen to 鈥渆xperts鈥濃€攖hat we listen to specialists in one area who are thereby presumed to be competent to lecture us in areas either only loosely related, or, more often, wholly unrelated. The names are endless, but include everyone from Bill Nye to Stephen Hawking. It is these specialists, Ortega says, who exist in a state of 鈥� 鈥榥ot-listening,鈥� of not submitting to higher courts of appeal,鈥� a characteristic of the mass man. That is, the experts we are told today we must listen to are, for Ortega, the archetypical mass men, whom we should ignore, and to whom we listen to at our peril.

[Review finishes as first comment.]
Profile Image for Ankit.
56 reviews13 followers
December 23, 2013
Started this book with high expectation considering that it is repeatedly called one of the best works of non-fiction in 19th century but was totally disappointed with the book.

The book is nothing but the expression of anxiety of the Europeans (which the elitist author himself defines as Britain, France and Germany) in the post world war I period. The author it seems is heartbroken to see European countries fighting each other when they should be united in their natural and noble quest of civilizing people (or basically expanding frontiers of their colonies). It is just a senseless apologetic defense of European imperialism, their natural right to rule because they are "naturally" superior. He is upset with his generation of the Europeans that they are too busy indulging and enjoying the progress of science and hence civilization and are not demanding enough from themselves. According to author this was going to cost dearly to Europe (and hence humankind, as is implied).

A small excerpt from the book -

"It is serious enough that this doubt as to the rule over the world, hitherto held by Europe, should have demoralised the other nations, except those who by reason of their youth are still in their
pre-history. But it is still more serious that this marking- time should reach the point of entirely demoralising the European himself. I do not say this because I am a European or something of
the sort. I am not saying 鈥淚f the European is not to rule in the immediate future, I am not interested in the life of the world.鈥�

Europe鈥檚 loss of command would not worry me if there were in existence another group of countries capable of taking its place in power and in the direction of the planet. I should not even ask so
much. I should be content that no one rule, were it not that this would bring in its train the volatilisation of all the virtues and qualities of European man. Well, this is what would inevitably happen. If the European grows accustomed not to rule, a generation and a half will be sufficient to bring the old continent, and the whole world along with it, into moral inertia, intellectual sterility, universal barbarism. It is only the illusion of rule, and the discipline of responsibility which it entails, that can keep Western minds in tension. Science, art, technique, and all the rest live on the tonic atmosphere created by the consciousness of authority. If this is lacking, the European will gradually become degraded."


It would have been interesting to know if Ortega would have recognized the irony that the "mass-men" (should add "European" before it) he so condemns (and preaches) in this book are the ones who hold him as one of the most important thinkers of 20th century. No doubt, if such are the important thinkers we witnessed such barbaric century.

And not only in terms of content but in form also, even though it is small, the book drags and bores. Such a waste of time on Saturday morning.
Profile Image for Shaikha Alkhaldi.
451 reviews189 followers
January 29, 2021
賲賵囟賵毓 夭賲丕賳賳丕.. 丿乇丕爻丞 賳賯丿賷丞 賳卮乇鬲 毓丕賲 佟侃佗伲賲貙 賲囟賲賵賳賴丕 賷賰賲賳 賮賷 禺囟賵毓 丕賱毓賯賱 賱賱丨賷賵賷丞貙 賵賵囟毓賴 丿丕禺賱 賲丕 賴賵 亘賷賵賱賵噩賷 賵鬲賯賷丿賴 亘丕賱匕丕鬲賷丞貙 賵賱爻賵賮 賷馗賴乇 禺賱丕賱 爻賳賵丕鬲 賯賱賷賱丞 毓亘孬 丕賱胤賱亘 廿賱賶 丕賱丨賷丕丞 亘兀賳 賷賵囟毓 丕賱毓賯賱 賳賮爻賴 賮賷 禺丿賲丞 丕賱孬賯丕賮丞.
賵兀賳 賲賴賲丞 "夭賲丕賳賳丕 丕賱噩丿賷丿" 賴賷 鬲丨丿賷丿丕賸 兀賳 鬲丨賵賱 丕賱毓賱丕賯丞貙 賵鬲亘賷賳 兀賳 丕賱孬賯丕賮丞 賵丕賱毓賯賱 賵丕賱賮賳 賵丕賱兀禺賱丕賯 賴賷 賲賳 賷噩亘 毓賱賷賴 禺丿賲丞 丕賱丨賷丕丞.
.
丿乇丕爻丞 賲賰乇乇丞 亘毓賳賵丕賳 賲禺鬲賱賮
Profile Image for Feliks.
495 reviews
May 8, 2018
For the most part this book does not live up to it's reputation. I had much higher hopes for it. The first 70% of the book is rather pallid; unfocused; rambling. Gasset covers a too-diffuse m茅lange of miscellaneous European historical and social topics.

The edges and handles of Gasset's discussion are all very slippery and rubbery, it's really an old-school set of rather vague aesthetic essays the kind bohemians used to enjoy on the Left Bank of the Seine during the age of the Fin de si猫cle.

Gasset is more of an artist, observer, and philosopher more than he is social scientist; but here he is expounding wildly on social theory.

There are occasional flashes of brilliance and some very 'quotable quotes' sprinkled through the text; but the book doesn't truly assume any power or shape until the final three chapters.

Gasset poses a kind of 'metaphysical' problem which has no ready solution. Of course, knowledge in itself is empowering but there's still nothing to do about the issues Gasset has raised here.

At the end of it all, his analysis of modern European Man is interesting and insightful; it has some beautiful language; but ultimately it is unfruitful; and a slog to read.

This dampness is not at all indicated by the glowing blurbs and ebullient raves on the book's cover. In no way at all, does this tidy little set of ruminations compare to Jean Jacques Rousseau or Karl Marx. It's more akin to something by Henry David Thoreau, Paul Valery, Camus' (nonfiction), Guy DeBord, or Gaston Bachelard.
Profile Image for Mojtaba Asghari.
80 reviews17 followers
September 21, 2021
丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丿乇 爻丕賱 1929 賳賵卮鬲賴 卮丿賴 亘毓丿 丕夭 诏匕卮鬲 趩賳丿 爻丕賱 丕夭 丕賳賯賱丕亘 1917 乇賵爻蹖賴
賵 亘賴 賲爻丕賱賴 丕蹖賳讴賴 趩乇丕 鬲賵丿賴 賴丕 賴乇噩丕 胤睾蹖丕賳 賲蹖讴賳賳丿 賳鬲丕蹖噩 诏賳丿蹖 亘賴 亘丕乇 賲蹖 丌賵乇賳丿 賲蹖倬乇丿丕夭丿
丿乇 讴賱 亘丕 丨乇賮 賴丕卮 賲賵丕賮賯賲 貙 讴賱丕 賴乇噩丕 丌丿賲 丿賳亘丕賱 鬲賵丿賴 賴丕 乇丕賴 亘蹖賮鬲賴 賳鬲蹖噩賴 丕蹖 噩夭 賲毓賲賵賱蹖 卮丿賳 賵 鬲丨鬲 賮乇賲丕賳 丕蹖丿卅賵賱賵跇蹖 乇賮鬲賳 亘賴 亘丕乇 賳禺賵丕賴丿 丿丕卮鬲
丨丕賱丕 趩賴 丕蹖賳 丕蹖丿卅賵賱賵跇蹖 亘禺賵丕丿 亘賱卮賵蹖蹖爻賲 亘丕卮賴 趩賴 丕蹖丿卅賵賱賵跇蹖 爻乇賲丕蹖賴 丿丕乇蹖 丨丕讴賲 丕賲乇賵夭 亘乇 丿賳蹖丕
賲賳賵 蹖丕丿 賳馗乇 賲乇丿賲 丿乇 夭賲丕賳 丕讴乇丕賳 賮蹖賱賲 胤毓賲 诏蹖賱丕爻 讴蹖丕乇爻鬲賲蹖 丕賳丿丕禺鬲
讴賴 鬲賵丿賴 賲乇丿賲 賲蹖诏賮鬲賳丿 丕蹖賳 趩賴 賮蹖賱賲 趩乇鬲蹖 亘賵丿 讴賴 爻丕禺鬲賴!
丿乇 讴賱 賲蹖鬲賵賳賲 亘诏賲 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丕夭 趩賳丿 氐賮丨賴 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 賵 鬲亘丕乇卮賳丕爻蹖 丕禺賱丕賯 賳蹖趩賴 讴賴 丿乇 丌賳 亘賴 賴賲蹖賳 賲爻丕賱賴 丕蹖乇丕丿丕鬲 鬲賵丿賴 丕蹖 賮讴乇 讴乇丿賳 賲乇丿賲
丕卮丕乇賴 讴乇丿賴 貙 丕賯鬲亘丕爻 讴乇丿賴 賵 賲賱丕讴 爻丕夭賳丿诏蹖 乇丕 賳賴 鬲賵丿賴 丕蹖 亘賵丿賳 亘賱讴賴 丕賱蹖鬲 亘賵丿賳 鬲賵氐蹖賴 賲蹖讴賳丿
賲賳賲 賲賵丕賮賯賲 賲賱丕讴 丕乇夭卮 丕夭 丿蹖丿 賲賳 亘乇禺賱丕賮 乇丕蹖 丕讴孬乇蹖鬲 賲乇丿賲 賲毓賲賵賱蹖 亘賵丿賳賴 賵 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 賴賲 亘丕 丕蹖賳讴賴 賲禺鬲氐乇 賵 讴賵鬲丕賴 丕爻鬲 丿乇 丕蹖賳 夭賲蹖賳賴 丕鬲賮丕賯丕 倬蹖卮 亘蹖賳蹖 賴丕蹖 禺賵亘蹖 丿乇 丕乇鬲亘丕胤 亘丕 丌蹖賳丿賴 丕乇賵倬丕 丕乇丕卅賴 讴乇丿賴 讴賴 丿乇 丨賯蹖賯鬲 丿乇 賮丕氐賱賴 亘蹖賳 丿賵 噩賳诏 噩賴丕賳蹖 丕賵賱 賵 丿賵賲 卮乇丨 丨丕賱蹖 丕夭 賵囟毓蹖鬲 丕乇賵倬丕蹖 诏蹖乇 讴乇丿賴 丿乇 賲蹖丕賳 賳蹖賴蹖賱蹖爻賲 賵 禺賵丕爻鬲 丕讴孬乇蹖鬲 鬲賵丿賴 賴丕蹖 毓氐蹖丕丕賳诏乇 賵 亘賴 賯賵賱 讴鬲丕亘 禺賵丕爻鬲 賴丕蹖 亘毓囟丕 賳丕賲毓賯賵賱 丕讴孬乇蹖鬲 亘趩賴 賱賵爻 賴丕蹖 鬲賵丿賴 賲乇丿賲 丕乇丕卅賴 賲蹖丿賴 讴賴 賱夭賵賲丕 賴賲丕賳 禺賵丕爻鬲 丕賯賱蹖鬲 丕賱蹖鬲 噩丕賲毓賴 賳蹖爻鬲
Profile Image for Richard Newton.
Author听27 books592 followers
February 21, 2018
A classic piece of thinking from 1930. An often prescient portrayal of mass society, it is often surprising to reflect this was written 90 years ago. If you like intelligent writing, well worth reading.

It is not always the easiest of reads - perhaps 1930s Spanish is just hard to translate into modern English. But I found most insightful and enlightening, even if I did not agree with absolutely everything. I have highlighted lots of parts - as there are many wonderful turns of phrase.

The first 13 chapters are mostly excellent. The long penultimate chapter - chapter 14 I found the least rewarding, although it made me reflect on the recent decision of the UK to leave the EU, which again is an achievement for a book written a decade before WW2.
Profile Image for A.
439 reviews41 followers
May 7, 2022
8/10.

What does it mean to be noble? Do any of we moderns even know? We have been so saturated with the sweet rhetoric of "equality" that we have forgotten all concepts of distinction. Yet, forgotten though they may be, they still remain true. Nobility is characterized by a distinct mindset 鈥� a mindset that is the great dividing line of mankind. Nobles embrace obligations, in fact require them to live. Without obligations, without an external duty to live up to, those noble in spirit languish in eternal torment. Their consciences do not let them fritter their lives away. Noblesse oblige: the obligations of nobility.

But the higher obligation of nobility 鈥� of ordering one's life towards a transcendent goal 鈥� is not taken as a burden. It is simply a necessity. Without it, the noble lives in his shadow 鈥� a shadow that perenially taunts him about his unfulfilled potential. It is a condition worse than death. It is to be dead 鈥� but still continue living.

In opposition to the noble man is the mass-man. Modernity has created a profusion of this type. The great increase of human numbers wrought by the industrial revolution has by necessity created a mass influx of mediocrity. What is mediocrity? It is the carefree lifestyle. "To live as one likes is plebian; the noble man aspires to order and law" (Goethe). The mass-man has desires and immediately acts on them. He osmotically receives ideas from his media masters and enforces them on others through force. Most of all, he recognizes no hierarchy of values and thus is free to do as he wishes. "Freedom" 鈥� the opportunity to account to nothing of value.

The mass-man has grown up in a time of mass plenty. He has been fed well his entire life; has been relieved of the cold, ugly privations of nature; and has been given all he wants by his parents. Civilization? "That's always there, and always will be!" (so thinks the mass-man). Not realizing the tremendous intellectual, physical, and technological struggles of his forefathers, the mass-man is fundamentally a spoiled child. Born into an age of mass luxury, he degenerates by accepting civilization as an irrevocable, magic premise.

The state of man before the industrial revolution was one of struggle, of having one's desires stopped by Nature. Food was not always available, storms could come at any moment, and foreign tribes could murder one's family without the slightest warning. But through this struggle man realized that Nature was not one's servant. One could not cry and pout to Mommy Nature for more cookies. No. One needed to accept hunger, thirst, cold, and heat as the premises of life to act upon and overcome.

These conditions steeled the minds and hearts of men. Through sturm und drang arose the noble soul 鈥� the soul that accepts struggle as its natural existence. Only through strength, only through courage, only through practical ingenuity could man survive. But through natural superiority, some did not just survive. Some rose out of the homogenous primitivity of man and created something new. Thus came the men who discovered fire, who created the wheel, who founded empires. They were not given these things; no, they conquered nature and their fellow man.

Thus the nobility rise. Through natural excellence and leadership, they bubble atop their societies. Their children are trained to fulfill their noble blood. Born from a line of leaders, of Herculean movers of man and earth, nobles are taught to live up to their ancestors. Grecian and Latin nobility traced their lineages to mystical men who founded their city-states. Preserving their blood was key. But noble blood brought noble obligations such as an obligation to become cultured. Thus the nobility was replenished with nobles in spirit.

Yet with the industrial revolution, this was all changed. The increase in technological ability brought about by entrepreneurs allowed for greater specialization in Europe. The ability for specialization opened up more economic niches, thus allowing for a growing middle class. This was composed of professions like doctors, lawyers, teachers, and industrial managers. Having gained status with their hammer (technical, specialized knowledge), the rising middle class saw everything as a nail. No culture was needed; all that was needed was technik.

From here sprouted forth an ever-growing amount of "experts". These experts, knowing much in their ever-shrinking domain but nothing in any other sphere, did not think their knowledge stopped in their specialty. No. They could apply their smarts everywhere. The greatest of follies was let loose. Feeling strong and dominant in his own domain, the specialist was confident in his abilities in all other domains. The problem? He was an ignoramus. "Men of science" could now determine politics, ethics, art, culture, and religion. Greedy of fame and fortune, the "experts" flooded into public life, ready to apply their pinprick of knowledge to all human problems.

The flood came, and it drowned our culture. Scientists forgot that their discipline was only kept alive through something other than science. It was founded on a noble spirit, the spirit that feels an obligation to find the truth. But as the wide-scoping minds of the Royal Society turned into your average busy-body professor, that noble spirit dissipated. The mass-man rose in science, accepted "the scientific method" as All-Holy and Infallible, and proceeded to devour Science from the inside. Taking the word "science" and throwing it out like magic, he falsified data and applied his conclusions in absurd manners for fame and fortune. What more could he do when his society puts no obligations on his back? With no obligations, man naturally flows downwards like water, pursuing nothing but his self-interest.

But what purpose is self-interest, the fulfilling of one's base desires? Is living like a worm desirable? Squirming around, this way and that, the mass-man has no form and no goal to head to. He wastes his existence in an eternal labyrinth. Where to go, what to do, who to follow? Squirm, squirm goes the mass-man worm. The worm feels desire. It masturbates. The worm gets hungry. It eats an oily burger. The worm eternally squirms towards its nearest desires. It turns round and round in the labyrinth of pleasure and begins to feel alienated from itself. "What am I?" it thinks. No form, no purpose, no goal to progress toward, the worm commits spiritual suicide. Such is the life of the mass-man.

But what are those noble in spirit to do in our age? We hate formlessness and need duty. We despise the low standards and lack of duty of our society after the revolution of mediocre mass-men. Our first step shall be to accept our task, accept our duty. Our duty is to become bodily strong and mentally sharp. We are challenged to live up to our spiritual responsibility. We must accept the burdens of learning, for only through those burdens will we feel satisfied with ourselves. Most complain about their obligations, but we look at each day as a challenge to actualize our potential. Worm or noble? You decide.
Profile Image for 惭颈濒辞拧.
144 reviews
July 18, 2020
"Izopa膷enost i poni啪enje su samo oblici 啪ivota koji preostaju 膷oveku 拧to se odrekao da bude ono 拧to bi trebalo biti. Njegovo izvorno bi膰e time ne zamire, ve膰 se pretvara u optu啪uju膰u senku, u utvaru, koja ga stalno podse膰a na ni啪u vrednost njegovog 啪ivota spram 啪ivota koji je trebalo da vodi. Poni啪eni 膷ovek je pre啪iveli samoubica".
Profile Image for Isaac Clemente r铆os.
262 reviews25 followers
June 30, 2020
Sorprende leer la contundencia con la que Ortega anticip贸:

1. La preponderancia del hombre masa en el contexto sociopol铆tico
2. El fracaso del fascismo y el comunismo
3. La necesidad para el ethos continental de transicionar del colonialismo-imperialismo a la Uni贸n pol铆tica europea
4. El fracaso de la pol铆tica pacifista de contenci贸n brit谩nica.
5. La dimensi贸n elefanti谩sica y escler贸tica que iban adquirir los Estados
6. El cambio que el miedo a los totalitarismos iba provocar en las democracias liberales (para depurarlas y refinarlas)

Todo esto antes de la segunda guerra mundial.

Por descontado hay errores de apreciaci贸n y sesgos con los que discrepo, pero la clarividencia del pensador es realmente notable.

mi valoraci贸n: 9/10
Author听2 books17 followers
January 25, 2020
Ortega egy m疟velt, morcos elitista.
Legutolj谩ra akkor olvastam ilyen nagy m疟velts茅g疟, morcos elitist谩t (TGM), amikor az 茅pp Ort茅g谩t t谩madta morcos elitizmusa miatt. #elitistaception

Ha politikai szempontb贸l k茅ne 茅rt茅kelni az itt le铆rt gondolatokat, a besorol谩s viszonylag egyszer疟 lenne. Ortega konzervat铆v-liber谩lis; a 19. sz谩zadi klasszikus liberalizmus 茅rt茅keit v茅delmezni a huszadik sz谩zadi t枚megmozgalmakkal szemben 茅pp煤gy lehet konzervat铆v, mint egy - valamivel arisztokratikusabb - liber谩lis 谩ll谩spont is. A t枚megek vs. kev茅s kiv谩lasztott elit szembe谩ll铆t谩s a sok ism茅tl茅s k枚vetkezt茅ben egy id艖 ut谩n ellaposodik a k枚nyvben, r谩ad谩sul a t枚meg olyan sok 茅rtelmet nyer Orteg谩n谩l (sokas谩g, s煤lyoss谩g/mozdulatlans谩g), hogy felmer眉lt bennem a k茅rd茅s, 艖 hogyan vonja ki mag谩t a t枚megkult煤ra hat谩sa al贸l?

De ebben a k枚nyvben az茅rt enn茅l t枚bb van, 煤gyhogy nagyon hasznos olvasm谩nynak bizonyult. A szerz艖 izgalmasan 茅s 枚sszetetten 铆rja le a modernit谩s id艖- 茅s t茅rtapasztalat谩t, a t枚rt茅nelmi mozg谩s ellent茅t茅t a statikuss谩ggal. R谩ad谩sul kifejezetten id艖t谩ll贸 gondolatok vannak benne a nemzetek keletkez茅s茅r艖l is (mert Ortega szerint nincs k茅sz nemzet, minden folyamatos alakul谩st枚rt茅net - ez茅rt veti el pl. a "term茅szetes hat谩rok" koncepci贸j谩t).

M茅g ha nem is teljesen az 茅n vil谩gom, egy nagyon l贸l meg铆rt 茅s szellemes munk谩r贸l van sz贸.
Profile Image for Andrew.
2,196 reviews882 followers
Read
May 28, 2015
If Ortega y Gasset was the principled elitist he saw himself as, we would have less of a problem. After all, I'm the sort of bastard who appreciates a certain kind of tirade against the world of mass culture and the stupidity that accompanies a supposedly enlightened era. But, despite his protestations to the contrary, he winds up edifying the pre-democratic past, delivered through a set of proclamations without any accompanying qualifications. For a more vigorous opposition to mass culture written by a more sensitive observer, I have to recommend Adorno instead.
Profile Image for J L.
10 reviews10 followers
September 4, 2014
Plenty to think on here. The central thesis -- the rise and rebellion of the self-satisfied mass-man -- is compelling. Humbling, too, for the dark glimpses of self you see in this angry Spaniard's mirror.

There's a sharp mind behind this essay, and a wise one:

"To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. This is the sport, the luxury, special to the intellectual man. The gesture characteristic of his tribe consists in looking at the world with eyes wide open in wonder. Everything in the world is strange and marvelous to well-open eyes."

"That man is intellectually of the mass who, in face of any problem, is satisfied with thinking the first thing he finds in his head. On the contrary, the excellent man is he who contemns what he finds in his mind without previous effort, and only accepts as worthy of him what is still far above him and what requires a further effort in order to be reached."

Also, cutting:

"The psychological structure of this new type of mass-man...is as follows: (1) An inborn, root-impression that life is easy, plentiful, without any grave limitations; consequently, each average man finds within himself a sensation of power and triumph which, (2) invites him to stand up for himself as he is, to look upon his moral and intellectual endowment as excellent, complete. This contentment with himself leads him to shut off from any external court of appeal; not to listen, not to submit his opinions to judgement, not to consider others' existence. His intimate feeling of power urges him always to exercise predominance. He will act then as of he and his like were the only beings existing in the world; and, consequently, (3) will intervene in all matters, imposing his own vulgar views without respect or regard for others, without limit or reserve, that is to say, in accordance with a system of 'direct action.'"

The temptation when reading "The Revolt of the Masses" is to cast yourself as judge of the "mass-man," enjoying Ortega y Gasset's scorn a little too much. His targets begin to take on the faces of those you disagree with, and you find it easy to adapt his criticisms to your own. There's a whiff of the crude pleasures of disdain you find in Ayn Rand. Ortega y Gasset is much more sophisticated, though, and well-worth your time if your approach is honest and self-critical.



Profile Image for Felix.
345 reviews360 followers
July 29, 2022
Ortega posits that in recent years (this book was published in 1930, so by this I mean the 1910s and the 1920s), Europe was increasingly seeing the emergence of a certain type of social entity: the mass-man. This creature, it is suggested, eschews the advice of the experts and of knowledgeable individuals and promotes his own view, no matter ill-informed (or simply wrong) ahead of theirs. The views of this entity are not to be conceived of as an individual thing, but rather as vast collective feelings. Their views are not necessarily wrong in all cases, but whether wrong or right they seek to dominate social discourse - including by force if necessary.

Specifically the movements which are covered in this analysis are Bolshevism and Fascism (it could also apply to any number of other less successful movements though). These examples are both fundamentally anti-intellectual, positing in that they provide answers to difficult questions which have stumped nebulous 'elites'. And both of them require their subjects to abandon various degrees of critical reasoning and independent thought in order to advance the will of the state as a collective entity. And of course, if needs to be pointed out too, both are happy to liberally employ violent force on their own subjects in order to see that these ends are brought about.

I suppose the reason that this book still has enduring appeal is that many people can see parallels between what Ortega is describing and the modern 'populist' movements. I'm not keen to name specific examples, because I think these parallels don't run all that deep. I'm not, for example, a fan of Marine Le Pen, but I'm also not keen to throw her in the same basket as Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler.

But I suppose there's some sense in comparing the anti-intellectualism of some of these movements with the phenomenon that Ortega identifies. I don't know - I'm only half convinced. It's a pretty good analysis of the inter-war emergence of political radicalism though - both Bolshevism and Fascism. And I think most of us now agree that both the Bolsheviks and the Fascists were pretty bad guys.
Profile Image for 颁茅蝉补谤.
294 reviews82 followers
August 11, 2022
En un punto del ensayo presente se detiene Ortega en los hombres de especial sensibilidad capaces de percibir el trazo de la Historia antes que el resto: los profetas. Los ha habido en todas las 茅pocas, incluida la que nos toc贸 en suerte. Sin duda prof茅tico resulta el ensayo del fil贸sofo 别蝉辫补帽辞濒 contempor谩neo con m谩s proyecci贸n internacional junto, tal vez, a Unamuno. Casi cien a帽os antes del momento presente, Ortega esboza el tipo humano que 茅l denomina "hombre-masa", caracter铆stico de la 茅poca actual. Sorprende la frescura de muchos de los pensamientos vertidos en el texto, aplicables sin la menor correcci贸n al presente: el mencionado hombre-masa y su rebeli贸n inacabada, Europa y su unidad de destino, los males de la especializaci贸n cient铆fica o la supuesta decadencia de la cultura europea.

Siempre es grato encontrar una prosa rica en expresividad que sirve de acomodo a argumentos de impecable factura. Se palpa en el resultado final el proceso razonador del pensador madrile帽o, una m谩quina consciente de sus deberes y responsabilidades, forjada en la pr谩ctica cotidiana de eso que tanto escasea en la masa: el ejercicio puro del razonar.

El libro, pese a sus luminosas reflexiones, como conjunto aqueja cierto car谩cter desestructurado, como a medio cocer en lo tocante al afinamiento formal. Cosa esta que no resta validez a su tesis y trascendencia a la justa importancia ganada con los a帽os.

El "Ep铆logo para ingleses" result贸 ser la secci贸n que menos logr贸 captar mi inter茅s, a veces por pura cuesti贸n de lejan铆a temporal con alguno de los temas tratados, como es el caso del pacifismo brit谩nico en las primeras d茅cadas del siglo XX. Otros en cambio, como el de la hegemon铆a de la juventud, tema a煤n vigente, fascinan por su clarividente exposici贸n.
Profile Image for Dorotea.
400 reviews73 followers
January 28, 2018
A book that it's prone to misunderstandings (especially with Americans, which is further proof that the USA is a paradise for the masses), yet incredibly relevant to the current age - a historical period not separate from the one Ortega y Gasset originally talked about, in which the same phenomenon thrives. Worth reading not just for the main thesis, but for all of the philosophical underpinnings.

This is a summary that does not in no way do justice to the depth of the book but nevertheless: The central thesis is clearly posed in the title 鈥� the rise of the masses . By 'masses鈥� he defines multitudes of people who think in the same way. The rise of the masses has brought a crisis 鈥� it鈥檚 the triumph of pseudo-intellecutals doing activities that were the prerogative of qualified minorities before. The dominion of the masses is especially clear in the recent political innovations (a hyperdemocracy in which the mass acts directly, outside the law, imposing its aspirations and its desires by means of material pressure). Now, 鈥楢nybody who is not like everybody, who does not think like everybody, runs the risk of being eliminated鈥�. By rise, he means appropriation and expansion, sprung from a democratic inspiration but turned in arrogant presumptions, which has led to a levelling of the society. The feeling finds correspondence in the increase in the worlds鈥� possibilities 鈥� more precisely, an increase of vital potentiality in a world of comfort; yet 鈥榳e live at a time when man believes himself fabulously capable of creation, but he does not know what to create鈥�. The current society - The Self-Satisfied Age - looks back on the past with a feeling of superiority, and looks ahead expecting always progress. Yet it is disoriented and does not know how to act. And 鈥榳hen the mass acts on its own, it does so only in one way, for it has no other: it lynches. It is not altogether by chance that lynch law comes from America, for America is, in a fashion, the paradise of the masses.鈥�

An interesting parallel to be made, I think, is with Vico鈥檚 cycles 鈥� with us being the declining end before an new one, just like the end of the Roman Empire declined into the middle ages.
Profile Image for James Henderson.
2,180 reviews160 followers
November 24, 2021
As one advances in life, one realizes more and more that the majority of men - and of women - are incapable of any other effort than that strictly imposed on them as a reaction to external compulsion. And for that reason, the few individuals we have come across who are capable of a spontaneous and joyous effort stand out isolated, monumentalized, so to speak, in our experience. These are the select men, the nobles, the only ones who are active and not merely reactive, for whom life is a perpetual striving, an incessant course of training.
- [Author: Jose Ortega y Gasset], [Book: The Revolt of the Masses] (pp. 65-66)

In my reading of The Revolt of the Masses I would emphasize Ortega y Gasset's discussion of the new world (circa 1930) as one of "practically limitless possibilities".(p 61) This is a view that he contrasts with the past where the masses felt themselves limited, and rightly so. If anything, eighty years after the first publication of this book there are even larger groups of people that have the possibility of fewer limits on the progress of their lives. However he does not see any guarantee that progress will be the result and later in his book he discusses the danger of the modern state as a limiting factor. Even in western democracies we have seen the power of the state grow over the past eighty years since Ortega y Gasset's observations. I wonder if the nobility within mankind will be able to continue to move forward and not be limited by the masses of average men.
Profile Image for Sara.
138 reviews
July 31, 2021
No puedo hablar de ensayos de 蹿颈濒辞蝉辞蹿铆补 desde la posici贸n de alguien que sabe, porque solo estoy empezando, pero s铆 puedo recomendarlo una y mil veces precisamente para gente que est茅 en mi posici贸n.

Por el estilo del autor me parece muy buen libro para quien quiera leer 蹿颈濒辞蝉辞蹿铆补 y no sepa por d贸nde empezar. Es ameno, muy bonito y sabe expresar las ideas de forma clara, de manera que es muy dif铆cil perder el hilo.

Pero si algo me ha impresionado es el grado de exactitud con el que Ortega y Gasset entend铆a a Europa y a los pa铆ses europeos y sus gentes. Es alucinante c贸mo lo que escribi贸 hace 90 a帽os se puede ver hoy en d铆a en Espa帽a y Europa casi palabra por palabra. No s茅 expresar sufucientemente bien el asombro que me ha producido cap铆tulo tras cap铆tulo.

Por 煤ltimo, creo es muy interesante desde todos los puntos de vista pero, en especial, para aquellos/as que estudiamos ciencia. En ese caso lo considero incluso imprescindible.

No puedo recomendarlo m谩s y tampoco puedo esperar a leer 'La Espa帽a invertebrada'. Ha sido un 10 rotundo.
Profile Image for Benjamin.
1,373 reviews24 followers
Read
May 6, 2007
Not sure what to say about Ortega y Gasset other than that he's a conspicuous elitist, without necessarily being aristocratic or absolutely class-conscious in his elitism; the mass-man is the self-satisfied man, the man who doesn't look beyond himself for meaning or challenge (shades of Lukacs' "transcendental homelessness") -- which is a state of affairs that comes about through the brute fact of plenitude: more people enjoying more goods as their rights (rather than as fruits of their own struggle). Not sure entirely if this will be useful to think about in terms of crowd-theory, but I guess it's nice to see the seething resentment of the crowd in Le Bon become an articulated hope for the coming war with the mass in Ortega y Gasset. (And doesn't that old-style aristo naming convention already makes Jose seem multiple?)
Profile Image for Marc OAR.
45 reviews2 followers
November 2, 2022
Como mis capacidades filos贸ficas est谩n un poco colganderas, s贸lo lo puedo calificar seg煤n la tabarra que me ha dado. 4/5, m谩s tabarra y menos sexy que Camus pero es de agradecer que te suelta menos chapa que, por ejemplo, Bergson.
3 reviews
August 25, 2007
If you think we live in a world of "us and thems" and enjoy spitting in the air and letting the spit land in your own face, then this book is for you.
Profile Image for Evil Morty.
30 reviews8 followers
December 27, 2023
Brilliantly elitist; a sophisticated and calmly disdainful dissection of npc psychology and the consequences of it鈥檚 preeminence in directing society.

鈥淭he sovereignty of the unqualified individual, of the human being as such, generically, has now passed from being a juridical idea or ideal to be a psychological state inherent to the average man鈥鈥鈥� Now the average man represents the field over which the history of each period acts; he is to history what sea-level is to geography.鈥�

- - -

Other gems:

鈥淭he evil lies in the fact that this decision taken by the masses to assume the activities proper to the minorities is not, and cannot be, manifested solely in the domain of pleasure, but that it is a general feature of our time.鈥�

鈥淭he history of the Roman Empire is also the history of the uprising of the Empire of the Masses, who absorb and annul the directing minorities and put themselves in their place.鈥�

鈥淏ut the mediocre soul is incapable of transmigrations 鈥� the supreme form of sport.鈥�
Profile Image for Siarhei Krukau.
90 reviews6 followers
March 17, 2021
小锌邪褋懈斜芯 袙懈泻褌芯褉褍 袛屑懈褌褉懈械胁懈褔褍 袘邪斜邪褉懈泻芯 蟹邪 褉械泻芯屑械薪写邪褑懈褞. 袛械泄褋褌胁懈褌械谢褜薪芯 锌芯褌褉褟褋邪褞褖邪褟 泻薪懈谐邪, 泻芯褌芯褉褍褞 褋褌芯懈谢芯 斜褘 胁泻谢褞褔懈褌褜 胁 泻褍褉褋 褎懈谢芯褋芯褎懈懈 / 锌芯谢懈褌芯谢芯谐懈懈 胁 褍薪懈胁械褉邪褏.

袩芯褉邪卸邪械褌 胁 褝褌芯泄 泻薪懈谐械, 薪邪锌懈褋邪薪薪芯泄 屑械卸写褍 锌械褉胁芯泄 懈 胁褌芯褉芯泄 屑懈褉芯胁褘屑懈 胁芯泄薪邪屑懈, 泻邪泻 邪胁褌芯褉 锌褉械写胁懈写械谢 屑薪芯谐懈械 锌褉芯褑械褋褋褘, 锌褉芯懈蟹芯褕械写褕懈械 胁 袝胁褉芯锌械 写械褋褟褌懈谢械褌懈褟屑懈 锌芯蟹卸械: 泻褉芯胁邪胁褘泄 褉邪蟹谐褍谢 泻芯屑屑褍薪懈蟹屑邪 懈 褎邪褕懈蟹屑邪, 邪 蟹邪褌械屑 懈 芯斜褗械写懈薪械薪懈械 袝胁褉芯锌褘 胁 械写懈薪芯械 锌褉芯褋褌褉邪薪褋褌胁芯 斜械蟹 谐褉邪薪懈褑. 袞邪谢褜 褌芯谢褜泻芯, 褔褌芯 胁 褉械邪谢褜薪芯屑 屑懈褉械 褝褌懈 锌褉芯褑械褋褋褘 蟹邪薪褟谢懈 褋褌芯谢褜泻芯 胁褉械屑械薪懈 懈 卸懈蟹薪械泄.

袠薪褌械褉械褋薪芯, 泻邪泻 芯褌薪芯褋懈谢懈褋褜 泻 泻薪懈谐械 褋芯胁褉械屑械薪薪懈泻懈? 袙芯蟹屑芯卸薪芯, 褋褔懈褌邪谢懈 械褢 锌械褋褋懈屑懈褋褌懈褔薪芯泄 懈 邪谢邪褉屑懈褋褌褋泻芯泄, 懈谢懈 褋谢懈褕泻芯屑鈥� 褋锌械褋懈胁芯泄. 袙械写褜 锌芯 邪胁褌芯褉褍 褔械谢芯胁械泻芯屑 屑邪褋褋褘 屑芯卸械褌 斜褘褌褜 (褋褌邪褌褜, 芯泻邪蟹邪褌褜褋褟) 泻邪卸写褘泄! 袧邪胁械褉薪褟泻邪 薪械锌褉懈褟褌薪芯 褔懈褌邪褌褜 褌邪泻芯械 芯锌懈褋邪薪懈械 褋械斜褟.

袧芯 胁褉械屑褟 锌芯写褌胁械褉写懈谢芯 屑薪芯谐懈械 芯锌邪褋械薪懈褟 邪胁褌芯褉邪 懈, 褔褌芯 褋邪屑芯械 写褉褟薪薪芯械, 褝褌懈 芯锌邪褋械薪懈褟 懈 懈写械懈 写芯 褋懈褏 锌芯褉 邪泻褌褍邪谢褜薪褘. 袠 写邪卸械 斜芯谢械械 邪泻褌褍邪谢褜薪褘, 褔械屑 褌芯谐写邪.
Profile Image for Med.
103 reviews10 followers
August 11, 2021
La rebeli贸n de las masas es una obra escrita por el fil贸sofo 别蝉辫补帽辞濒 Jos茅 Ortega y Gasset en 1930, obra que acabar铆a una vez estando exiliado en plena guerra civil 别蝉辫补帽辞濒a.
Este es un libro con 100 a帽os de antig眉edad pero muy vigente a d铆a de hoy, lo que demuestra que, por mucha velocidad que tenga nuestra sociedad, si las bases no est谩n bien asentadas, todo lo que venga despu茅s se desmorona.

El t茅rmino 鈥渉ombre-masa鈥� es un concepto curioso y atemporal que se ha venido dando desde que existe la civilizaci贸n.
Es la clase de hombre que predomina en nuestra sociedad.
Existe desde tiempos inmemoriales pero, cada vez va adquiriendo m谩s fuerza.
Todos hemos sido masa alguna vez, es imposible no verse engullida por ella, ocurre de manera inconsciente, sin darte cuenta.
Viviendo en sociedad se corre el riesgo de ser anulado individualmente.
El pensamiento cr铆tico es un buen ant铆doto para salir de las garras de esta.

驴Pero qu茅 es exactamente el hombre masa?
El hombre masa es un ni帽o mimado, un se帽orito, que se cree el centro del mundo, se siente perfecto y es m谩s, cree que merece todo.
No escucha, no quiere hacerlo, al contrario, s贸lo juzga.
Juzga a todo el que est茅 en contra suya.
Exige, desde una posici贸n acomodada.
Ama su vulgaridad y se regocija en ella, la presume.
Es poco emp谩tico, no sale de su mundo para ponerse en el lugar del otro.
"Compararse ser铆a salir un rato de s铆 mismo y trasladarse al pr贸jimo. Pero el alma mediocre es incapaz de transmigraciones-deporte supremo."

Un hombre que se dedica a imitar, cre谩ndose as铆 ese gran reba帽o abandonando la individualidad.
El hombre-masa vive en una 茅poca en la que todo est谩 a su alcance, tiene todo cuanto se imagina. Piensa que es producto de la naturaleza, lo consigue sin esfuerzo y porque se lo merece. No piensa en lo que a sus antecesores les ha podido costar para que 茅l lo disfrute ahora.
No le importa lo que haya acontecido anteriormente a 茅l, no le importa la civilizaci贸n, sus cimientos. 脡l solo quiere conducir el mejor coche, no le importa c贸mo se haya construido ni qu茅 ha pasado hasta llegar a hacerlo.
"Lo civilizado es el mundo, pero su habitante no lo es"

Esta poca sensibilidad no est谩 discutida con su falta de inteligencia.
Contamos con muchos recursos y materiales para una buena educaci贸n, mayor nivel de escolaridad, acceso a cuidados m茅dicos, mejor alimentaci贸n, entornos que estimulan el pensamiento, familias m谩s peque帽as que ponen mayor atenci贸n a los hijos, mayor educaci贸n de los padres鈥� Esto nos ayuda a estar mejor preparados, a煤n as铆, nos encontramos con una paradoja; ahora somos m谩s inteligentes que antes pero de poco nos sirve que sea as铆, ya que por mucha capacidad intelectiva que tenga, se niega a usarla. (Efecto Flynn).

En una sociedad infantilizada la poblaci贸n no es capaz de hacer nada por s铆 misma, relega en un poder superior, en el Estado, su capacidad de decisi贸n y su vida.
Si tiene alg煤n problema, no se preocupe, el estado se lo solucionar谩.
"Ese es el mayor peligro que hoy amenaza a la civilizaci贸n: la estratificaci贸n de la vida, el intervencionismo del Estado, la absorci贸n de toda espontaneidad social por el Estado; es decir la anulaci贸n de la espontaneidad hist贸rica, que definitiva sostiene, nutre y empuja los destinos humanos."

El hecho de relegar en el Estado tal confianza nos lleva a otro asunto que Ortega define como "uno de los fen贸menos m谩s alarmantes de estos 煤ltimos 30 a帽os: el aumento enorme en todos los pa铆ses de las fuerzas de polic铆a."
La fuerza policial que viene dada por m谩s seguridad, implica menos libertad.
"El crecimiento social ha obligado ineludiblemente a ello. Por muy habitual que no sea no debe perder su terrible parad贸jico ante nuestro esp铆ritu el hecho de que la poblaci贸n de una gran urbe actual, para caminar pac铆ficamente y acudir a sus negocios, necesita, sin remedio, una polic铆a que regule la circulaci贸n. Pero es una inocencia de las gentes de orden pensar que estas fuerzas de orden p煤blico, creadas para el orden, se van a contentar con imponer siempre el que aquellas quieran. Lo inevitable es que acaban por definir y decidir ellas el orden que van a imponer y que ser谩, naturalmente, el que les convenga.".

El t茅rmino de "generaci贸n Orteguiana":
El tema de las generaciones, la idea de que la irrupci贸n de 茅stas en la vida social, en lucha con generaciones anteriores, constituye el motor de la evoluci贸n hist贸rica, impregna actualmente la ideolog铆a 别蝉辫补帽辞濒a, de una u otra forma.
"Una revoluci贸n no dura m谩s de 15 a帽os, periodo que coincide con la vigencia de una generaci贸n. Una generaci贸n actual de alrededor de 30 a帽os. Pero esa actuaci贸n se divide en dos etapas y toma dos formas: la de la primera mitad de este periodo la primera generaci贸n es la propaganda de sus ideas, preferencias y gustos que, a qu茅 hora en vigencia, y son lo dominante en la segunda mitad de su carrera.
M谩s la generaci贸n educada bajo su imperio tra铆a otras ideas, preferencias y gustos, que empieza a inyectar en el aire p煤blico.
Cuando las ideas, preferencias y gustos de la generaci贸n imperante son extremistas, y por ello revolucionarios, la nueva generaci贸n es anti extremista y anti revolucionaria, es decir de alma sustancialmente restauradora.
Claro que por restauraci贸n no ha de entenderse simple vuelta a lo antiguo, cosa que nunca ha sido la restauraciones."


Espa帽a vive desde hace siglos sin tener claro las cuestiones de mando y obediencia.
El hecho de que el ser humano sea un ser social hace que nos veamos empujados a seguir los pasos colectivos, seguir ciertas normas de convivencia y como resultado actuar seg煤n la masa dicte.
El problema surge cuando la sociedad sufre un encanallamiento, es decir, aceptar actos viles e irregulares como algo normal.
El individuo se encuentra indefenso ante esta situaci贸n, m谩s a煤n si carece de criterio propio.
Lo criminal y anormal es normalizado, se acepta hasta lo m谩s deshonroso.
Algo as铆 como una "ventana de Overton".
Las sociedades van perdiendo su moral y la poblaci贸n se envilece.
"Pero el 别蝉辫补帽辞濒 ha hecho lo contrario: en vez de oponerse a ser imperado por quien su 铆ntima conciencia rechazaba, ha preferido falsificar todo el resto de su ser para acomodarlo a aquel fraude inicial."
El hombre masa vive en pa铆ses donde no existe la oposici贸n.
"En casi todos, una masa homog茅nea pesa sobre el poder p煤blico y aplasta, aniquila a todo el grupo opositor. La masa 驴qui茅n lo dir铆a al ver su aspecto contacto y multitudinario? - no desea la convivencia con lo que no es ella. Odia a muerte lo que no es ella."
La masa se dedica a una cosa: a linchar.
Sin moralidad ni valores, la civilizaci贸n est谩 perdida y tan s贸lo queda la barbarie.

Ortega hace alusi贸n a la importancia de tener un proyecto, de construir la vida del individuo en base a algo, tener objetivos, creencias, motivos por los cuales vivir.
El hombre masa no tiene nada de eso, se dedica a existir y consumir sin necesidad de pensar mucho. Expuesto a tantas comodidades y ventajas, este no ha de padecer por nada, sus sentidos est谩n adormecidos y va sin un rumbo concreto limit谩ndose a imitar.
"La vida humana, por su naturaleza propia, tiene que estar puesta algo, a una empresa gloriosa o humilde, a un destino ilustre o trivial. Se trata de una condici贸n extra帽a, pero inexorable, inscrita en nuestra existencia. Por un lado, vivir es algo que cada cual hace por s铆 y para as铆. Por otro lado, si esa vida m铆a, que solo a m铆 me importa, no es entregada por m铆 algo, caminar谩 desvencijada, sin tensi贸n y sin forma. Estos a帽os asistimos al gigantesco espect谩culo de innumerables vidas humanas que marchan perdidas en el laberinto de s铆 mismas por no tener nada aqu铆 entregarse."

El arquetipo del hombre-masa es el hombre de ciencia, un especialista.
Una persona especializada en un campo, un 谩mbito en concreto, haci茅ndole pensar que el hecho de saber tanto de algo le da la potestad de opinar de todo.
Ese t茅rmino que hoy en d铆a ser铆a 鈥渆l experto鈥�.
"El especialista sabe muy bien su m铆nimo rinc贸n del universo; pero ignora el resto. El especialista no puede ser sumido bajo ninguna categor铆a. No es un sabio, porque ignora formalmente cuanto no entra en su especialidad; pero tampoco es un ignorante, porque es un hombre de ciencia y conoce muy bien su porci煤ncula de universo. Habremos de decir que es un sabio ignorante."

La clave de la decadencia europea tiene como base un distanciamiento moral del individuo que se refleja en el car谩cter colectivo.
La globalizaci贸n ha causado que los pueblos europeos se distancien m谩s moralmente.
Ante la subida de los nacionalismos, Ortega defiende la unidad de Europa.
Europa como una entidad diversa en que si se homogeneiza destruir铆a su belleza.
Como 茅l bien predijo, esta est谩 entrando en decadencia, se va haciendo vieja para dar paso a los m谩s j贸venes, 100 a帽os despu茅s, el autor ten铆a raz贸n, el declive de occidente va a pasos cada vez m谩s acelerados.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 494 reviews

Can't find what you're looking for?

Get help and learn more about the design.