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賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿
A caustic criticism of nearly every philosophic predecessor and a challenge of traditionally held views on right and wrong, Friedrich Nietzsche鈥檚 Beyond Good and Evil paved the way for modern philosophical thought. Through nearly three hundred transformative aphorisms, Nietzsche presents a worldview in which neither truth nor morality are absolutes, and where good and evil are not opposites but counterparts that stem from the same desires. This work dramatically rejects the tradition of Western thought with its notions of truth and God, good and evil. Nietzsche demonstrates that the Christian world is steeped in a false piety and infected with a "slave morality." With wit and energy, he turns from this critique to a philosophy that celebrates the present and demands that the individual impose their own "will to power" upon the world. Beyond Good and Evil was a foundational text for early twentieth-century thinkers, including philosophers, psychologists, novelists, and playwrights. Today鈥檚 readers will delight in Nietzsche鈥檚 pithy wit and irony while gaining a deeper understanding of his core ideology.
296 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1886
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About the author
Friedrich Nietzsche
3,863听books24.1k听followersFriedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was a German classical scholar, philosopher, and critic of culture, who became one of the most influential of all modern thinkers. He began his career as a classical philologist before turning to philosophy. He became the youngest person to hold the Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel in 1869 at the age of 24, but resigned in 1879 due to health problems that plagued him most of his life; he completed much of his core writing in the following decade. In 1889, at age 44, he suffered a collapse and afterward a complete loss of his mental faculties, with paralysis and probably vascular dementia. He lived his remaining years in the care of his mother until her death in 1897 and then with his sister Elisabeth F枚rster-Nietzsche. Nietzsche died in 1900, after experiencing pneumonia and multiple strokes.
Nietzsche's work spans philosophical polemics, poetry, cultural criticism, and fiction while displaying a fondness for aphorism and irony. Prominent elements of his philosophy include his radical critique of truth in favour of perspectivism; a genealogical critique of religion and Christian morality and a related theory of master鈥搒lave morality; the aesthetic affirmation of life in response to both the "death of God" and the profound crisis of nihilism; the notion of Apollonian and Dionysian forces; and a characterisation of the human subject as the expression of competing wills, collectively understood as the will to power. He also developed influential concepts such as the 脺bermensch and his doctrine of eternal return. In his later work, he became increasingly preoccupied with the creative powers of the individual to overcome cultural and moral mores in pursuit of new values and aesthetic health. His body of work touched a wide range of topics, including art, philology, history, music, religion, tragedy, culture, and science, and drew inspiration from Greek tragedy as well as figures such as Zoroaster, Arthur Schopenhauer, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Richard Wagner, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.
After his death, Nietzsche's sister Elisabeth became the curator and editor of his manuscripts. She edited his unpublished writings to fit her German ultranationalist ideology, often contradicting or obfuscating Nietzsche's stated opinions, which were explicitly opposed to antisemitism and nationalism. Through her published editions, Nietzsche's work became associated with fascism and Nazism. 20th-century scholars such as Walter Kaufmann, R.J. Hollingdale, and Georges Bataille defended Nietzsche against this interpretation, and corrected editions of his writings were soon made available. Nietzsche's thought enjoyed renewed popularity in the 1960s and his ideas have since had a profound impact on 20th- and early 21st-century thinkers across philosophy鈥攅specially in schools of continental philosophy such as existentialism, postmodernism, and post-structuralism鈥攁s well as art, literature, music, poetry, politics, and popular culture.
Nietzsche's work spans philosophical polemics, poetry, cultural criticism, and fiction while displaying a fondness for aphorism and irony. Prominent elements of his philosophy include his radical critique of truth in favour of perspectivism; a genealogical critique of religion and Christian morality and a related theory of master鈥搒lave morality; the aesthetic affirmation of life in response to both the "death of God" and the profound crisis of nihilism; the notion of Apollonian and Dionysian forces; and a characterisation of the human subject as the expression of competing wills, collectively understood as the will to power. He also developed influential concepts such as the 脺bermensch and his doctrine of eternal return. In his later work, he became increasingly preoccupied with the creative powers of the individual to overcome cultural and moral mores in pursuit of new values and aesthetic health. His body of work touched a wide range of topics, including art, philology, history, music, religion, tragedy, culture, and science, and drew inspiration from Greek tragedy as well as figures such as Zoroaster, Arthur Schopenhauer, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Richard Wagner, Fyodor Dostoevsky, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe.
After his death, Nietzsche's sister Elisabeth became the curator and editor of his manuscripts. She edited his unpublished writings to fit her German ultranationalist ideology, often contradicting or obfuscating Nietzsche's stated opinions, which were explicitly opposed to antisemitism and nationalism. Through her published editions, Nietzsche's work became associated with fascism and Nazism. 20th-century scholars such as Walter Kaufmann, R.J. Hollingdale, and Georges Bataille defended Nietzsche against this interpretation, and corrected editions of his writings were soon made available. Nietzsche's thought enjoyed renewed popularity in the 1960s and his ideas have since had a profound impact on 20th- and early 21st-century thinkers across philosophy鈥攅specially in schools of continental philosophy such as existentialism, postmodernism, and post-structuralism鈥攁s well as art, literature, music, poetry, politics, and popular culture.
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March 31, 2016
I can think of few instances where an author's reputation is more different from the reality of who he was, what he believed, and what he wrote--perhaps only Machiavelli has been as profoundly misunderstood by history. Today, Nietzsche tends to be thought of as a depressive nihilist, a man who believed in nothing, and an apologist for the atrocities of fascism--but no description could be further from the truth.
There probably are not many men who had more reason than Nietzsche to feel resentful and miserable: he grew up a sickly child, prone to severe headaches which often left him literally blind with pain. Then, during his brief career in the cavalry, he tore several muscles in his side, and while serving as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian war, contracted a number of diseases. These incidents would affect his health for the rest of his life, leaving him bedridden and in pain for hours or days at a time.
It would not have been unreasonable to give in to misery and bitterness under such conditions, but on those days when Nietzsche felt well enough to write, he would emerge from his room with renewed passion and vigor, taking long walks in the beauty of the countryside before returning home to labor in producing a philosophy not of misery, but of joy. Contrary to his reputation, Nietzsche rejected nihilism outright--he thought that if the world does not provide your life with a clear meaning, it is up to you to go out and find one (or create one), not to wallow and whinge.
Likewise, he spent much of his life railing against the foolishness of nationalism and bigotry--indeed, his famed falling out with the composer Wagner was over the increasingly nationalistic style of music the latter was producing. So, that being the case, how did he gain such an unfortunate reputation at all?
The first reason is that, after his death, his sister took over his estate, and as she herself was a German nationalist and anti-semite (as was her prominent husband), she had a number of her brother's papers rewritten to support these execrable positions and then published them posthumously in his name. Of course, this couldn't have fooled anyone actually familiar with Nietzsche's works and ideas, as the rewrites were in direct contradiction to his previous writings, but it still fooled many.
The second problem with the interpretation of his work is one that mirrors Machiavelli precisely: the author's observations on the nature of the world are mistaken for suggestions for how the world should be. It's like reading a book about crime scene investigation and, because it admits that murder exists and describes the methods by which is is done, assuming that it is an instruction book for murderers, when in fact it is the opposite: an instruction of how to combat them and stop them.
Both Nietzsche and Machiavelli had a similar approach: so the world can be a brutal place, a place where people gain power not by being wise and respected, but by dominating and taking advantage of others--what are we going to do about it? For Nietzsche, one of the necessary things we must do to free ourselves from this dominance over body and mind is to recognize that 'good' and 'evil' are just words, words that have been used by the powerful to justify anything they might choose to do--their 'just wars' against the 'evil foe', while that foe invariably preaches the same story in reverse, painting themselves as the hero, while in actuality both sides are motivated by greed and the desire for power.
To say that someone is 'evil' is to say that they have no rational motivation for what they do, that we should not attempt to understand them, but should oppose them without thinking about why. It's a powerful tool to deny reality, and so, as individuals, if we refuse to accept definitions of what is good or evil as they are handed down by those in power, we will have taken the first step to freeing ourselves from mental tyranny.
This was what Nietzsche meant by 'The Superman': that the man of the future, if he is to be free, cannot allow anyone else to define his life for him, cannot take authority for granted, but must question the world without as well as the world within, to discover for himself what is important and what is true. His famous 'Will to Power' is the personal decision to wrest control of your life from those who would seek to dominate you. To be free means being a philosopher.
And this is something I have tried to achieve for myself; but to unwind prejudice and ignorance is a lifelong battle, and I'm certainly grateful to have, in my search, an ally like Nietzsche (and the late Nietzsche scholar ). Many have been the days when I felt run down and exhausted, put upon and disrespected by an impersonal world bent on breaking to its will, and at those times, Nietzsche's joyful and witty deconstruction of that ridiculous, artificial world has proven an invaluable comfort to me. There is no authority who can tell you who you are, no church, no government, no university, no job, and no individual. In the end, it is up to you to create yourself.
There probably are not many men who had more reason than Nietzsche to feel resentful and miserable: he grew up a sickly child, prone to severe headaches which often left him literally blind with pain. Then, during his brief career in the cavalry, he tore several muscles in his side, and while serving as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian war, contracted a number of diseases. These incidents would affect his health for the rest of his life, leaving him bedridden and in pain for hours or days at a time.
It would not have been unreasonable to give in to misery and bitterness under such conditions, but on those days when Nietzsche felt well enough to write, he would emerge from his room with renewed passion and vigor, taking long walks in the beauty of the countryside before returning home to labor in producing a philosophy not of misery, but of joy. Contrary to his reputation, Nietzsche rejected nihilism outright--he thought that if the world does not provide your life with a clear meaning, it is up to you to go out and find one (or create one), not to wallow and whinge.
Likewise, he spent much of his life railing against the foolishness of nationalism and bigotry--indeed, his famed falling out with the composer Wagner was over the increasingly nationalistic style of music the latter was producing. So, that being the case, how did he gain such an unfortunate reputation at all?
The first reason is that, after his death, his sister took over his estate, and as she herself was a German nationalist and anti-semite (as was her prominent husband), she had a number of her brother's papers rewritten to support these execrable positions and then published them posthumously in his name. Of course, this couldn't have fooled anyone actually familiar with Nietzsche's works and ideas, as the rewrites were in direct contradiction to his previous writings, but it still fooled many.
The second problem with the interpretation of his work is one that mirrors Machiavelli precisely: the author's observations on the nature of the world are mistaken for suggestions for how the world should be. It's like reading a book about crime scene investigation and, because it admits that murder exists and describes the methods by which is is done, assuming that it is an instruction book for murderers, when in fact it is the opposite: an instruction of how to combat them and stop them.
Both Nietzsche and Machiavelli had a similar approach: so the world can be a brutal place, a place where people gain power not by being wise and respected, but by dominating and taking advantage of others--what are we going to do about it? For Nietzsche, one of the necessary things we must do to free ourselves from this dominance over body and mind is to recognize that 'good' and 'evil' are just words, words that have been used by the powerful to justify anything they might choose to do--their 'just wars' against the 'evil foe', while that foe invariably preaches the same story in reverse, painting themselves as the hero, while in actuality both sides are motivated by greed and the desire for power.
To say that someone is 'evil' is to say that they have no rational motivation for what they do, that we should not attempt to understand them, but should oppose them without thinking about why. It's a powerful tool to deny reality, and so, as individuals, if we refuse to accept definitions of what is good or evil as they are handed down by those in power, we will have taken the first step to freeing ourselves from mental tyranny.
This was what Nietzsche meant by 'The Superman': that the man of the future, if he is to be free, cannot allow anyone else to define his life for him, cannot take authority for granted, but must question the world without as well as the world within, to discover for himself what is important and what is true. His famous 'Will to Power' is the personal decision to wrest control of your life from those who would seek to dominate you. To be free means being a philosopher.
And this is something I have tried to achieve for myself; but to unwind prejudice and ignorance is a lifelong battle, and I'm certainly grateful to have, in my search, an ally like Nietzsche (and the late Nietzsche scholar ). Many have been the days when I felt run down and exhausted, put upon and disrespected by an impersonal world bent on breaking to its will, and at those times, Nietzsche's joyful and witty deconstruction of that ridiculous, artificial world has proven an invaluable comfort to me. There is no authority who can tell you who you are, no church, no government, no university, no job, and no individual. In the end, it is up to you to create yourself.
April 24, 2012
I recommend, but with a warning. The vast majority of people will not get much out of this book. Filtering through these reviews, I see a lot of people who are clearly not meant for Nietzsche's writing. They tend to fall under a couple of categories
1) Easily Offended: when Nietzsche says something they find offensive, they are turned off reading the book. Nietzsche will offend you. However...
2) People who make a superficial reading and criticize accordingly. This follows from 1. Those who are initially offended always seek more ways to find themselves offended, and read Nietzsche like he was an idiot. Seek and ye shall find. If you want to read Nietzsche as such, he will give you plenty of material.
3) Those who want a clear list of premises and a linear argument. Nietzsche's thought is ordered. Much of this book develops thematically though, and not through premises. Some won't like that style, but there is a reason Nietzsche is renowned for his writing. This leads into...
4) People who don't think like Nietzsche. Because Nietzsche doesn't write straight treatises, you need to understand the lines of thought he proposes. Those who don't see those lines commonly write negative reviews complaining about how Nietzsche doesn't "prove his assertions". This leads to the final....
5) People who don't understand Nietzsche's project. This also has a lot to do with Nietzsche's style. This book is not supposed to give formally structured arguments. If you read Nietzsche according to some rubric you deem appropriate, you miss his point entirely.
Suggestions:
1. Just because something is wrong, it doesn't mean it lacks value. Stop reading Nietzsche like a science textbook filled with facts. Also, stop reading him like he is attempting to make a logically impenetrable argument in defense of a single thesis.
2. Look for the nuances, and appreciate them. Was Nietzsche a misogynist? Yes. He was also a very thoughtful misogynist whose writings on women actually do hold some value. He contextualizes these passage in the introduction to that section, where he explicitly recognizes his own prejudices as a personal stupidity. Read in that light, his comments are actually quite interesting. Secondly, he writes of the condition of "woman" in many passages, not "woman" as a fixed essence. The two are quite distinct. Much of what is offensive at first glance is actually passing judgment upon the character of humanity at large. When he argues, for example, that men had good reason for not allowing women to speak in church, he isn't making an argument that women are inferior to men. Rather, it is an argument based upon the equality of sexes. He doesn't want to give women the chance to prove themselves just as foolish as men. Behind their silence, Nietzsche notes, they are untainted by their "real" nature. Whether or not you take Nietzsche to be making a serious suggestion here, he is obviously not making a offhand misogynistic comment. In the same way we don't dismiss the Greeks on the grounds of their caste based society, it is silly to dismiss Nietzsche for a misogyny he acknowledges as his own weakness.
3. Nietzsche writes to spark a line of thoughts and questions, not to answer all of them. Tons of the complaints start from the presupposition that Nietzsche should write according to a goal they have established for him. If you don't understand Nietzsche's goals, don't fashion your own for him.
4. It is entirely possible that you are not the type of person who can identify with Nietzsche on any sort of personal level. His work isn't meant to be read in a removed way. If you don't understand his criticisms on a personal and emotional level (not just logically), this book may not be for you. Just don't make the leap and call him unintelligent or a loose cannon. Most of the times, it is his readers that are bringing excessive emotion to the book, and their emotional reading that renders it obtuse.
1) Easily Offended: when Nietzsche says something they find offensive, they are turned off reading the book. Nietzsche will offend you. However...
2) People who make a superficial reading and criticize accordingly. This follows from 1. Those who are initially offended always seek more ways to find themselves offended, and read Nietzsche like he was an idiot. Seek and ye shall find. If you want to read Nietzsche as such, he will give you plenty of material.
3) Those who want a clear list of premises and a linear argument. Nietzsche's thought is ordered. Much of this book develops thematically though, and not through premises. Some won't like that style, but there is a reason Nietzsche is renowned for his writing. This leads into...
4) People who don't think like Nietzsche. Because Nietzsche doesn't write straight treatises, you need to understand the lines of thought he proposes. Those who don't see those lines commonly write negative reviews complaining about how Nietzsche doesn't "prove his assertions". This leads to the final....
5) People who don't understand Nietzsche's project. This also has a lot to do with Nietzsche's style. This book is not supposed to give formally structured arguments. If you read Nietzsche according to some rubric you deem appropriate, you miss his point entirely.
Suggestions:
1. Just because something is wrong, it doesn't mean it lacks value. Stop reading Nietzsche like a science textbook filled with facts. Also, stop reading him like he is attempting to make a logically impenetrable argument in defense of a single thesis.
2. Look for the nuances, and appreciate them. Was Nietzsche a misogynist? Yes. He was also a very thoughtful misogynist whose writings on women actually do hold some value. He contextualizes these passage in the introduction to that section, where he explicitly recognizes his own prejudices as a personal stupidity. Read in that light, his comments are actually quite interesting. Secondly, he writes of the condition of "woman" in many passages, not "woman" as a fixed essence. The two are quite distinct. Much of what is offensive at first glance is actually passing judgment upon the character of humanity at large. When he argues, for example, that men had good reason for not allowing women to speak in church, he isn't making an argument that women are inferior to men. Rather, it is an argument based upon the equality of sexes. He doesn't want to give women the chance to prove themselves just as foolish as men. Behind their silence, Nietzsche notes, they are untainted by their "real" nature. Whether or not you take Nietzsche to be making a serious suggestion here, he is obviously not making a offhand misogynistic comment. In the same way we don't dismiss the Greeks on the grounds of their caste based society, it is silly to dismiss Nietzsche for a misogyny he acknowledges as his own weakness.
3. Nietzsche writes to spark a line of thoughts and questions, not to answer all of them. Tons of the complaints start from the presupposition that Nietzsche should write according to a goal they have established for him. If you don't understand Nietzsche's goals, don't fashion your own for him.
4. It is entirely possible that you are not the type of person who can identify with Nietzsche on any sort of personal level. His work isn't meant to be read in a removed way. If you don't understand his criticisms on a personal and emotional level (not just logically), this book may not be for you. Just don't make the leap and call him unintelligent or a loose cannon. Most of the times, it is his readers that are bringing excessive emotion to the book, and their emotional reading that renders it obtuse.
January 23, 2014
Beyond Good and Evil simplified
- by Nietzsche's Ghost (with the borrowed use of an uncouth female GR reviewer's desktop)
i)I hate Germans and their silly jingoistic sense of self-worth.
ii)Women are fucking stupid and have no depth. 'They're not even shallow.'
iii)No bloody German university or professor spares a thought for my writings. Miserable old fools. I approve of the lone, goodly Danish professor who sees the value of my work though.
iv)Screw notions of traditional morality.
v)Screw the Church. Screw religion.
vi)Screw Martin Luther for restoring Christianity at the very moment it was on the verge of annihilation.
vii)Jews are cool. So was Zarathustra.
viii)Europe and the world are headed along the path of war and destruction the likes of which have never been witnessed before.
Disclaimer:- Before I am labeled a philistine and the philosophy majors, Nietzsche enthusiasts, Doctoral students and venerated college professors descend on me with their (metaphorical) pitchforks, the format of this review is not to be considered a veiled mockery of the great philosopher or an affront to his ideas. Just a flippant response to a first reading. To be taken in good humor.
- by Nietzsche's Ghost (with the borrowed use of an uncouth female GR reviewer's desktop)
i)I hate Germans and their silly jingoistic sense of self-worth.
ii)Women are fucking stupid and have no depth. 'They're not even shallow.'
"It is with Germans almost as it is with women: one never fathoms their depths; they don't have any, that is all."
iii)No bloody German university or professor spares a thought for my writings. Miserable old fools. I approve of the lone, goodly Danish professor who sees the value of my work though.
"Ten years-and nobody in Germany has felt bound in conscience to defend my name against the absurd silence under which it lies buried: it was a foreigner, a Dane, who first possessed sufficient refinement of instinct and courage for this, who felt outraged by my alleged friends."
iv)Screw notions of traditional morality.
v)Screw the Church. Screw religion.
"The concept of "God" invented as a counterconcept of life - everything harmful, poisonous, slanderous, the whole hostility unto death against life synthesized in this concept in a gruesome unity! The concept of "beyond", the "true world" invented in order to devaluate the only world there is - in order to retain no goal, no reason, no task for our earthly reality!"
vi)Screw Martin Luther for restoring Christianity at the very moment it was on the verge of annihilation.
vii)Jews are cool. So was Zarathustra.
viii)Europe and the world are headed along the path of war and destruction the likes of which have never been witnessed before.
"For when truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics will have merged entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been exploded-all of them are based on lies: there will be wars the like of which have never yet been seen on earth."
Disclaimer:- Before I am labeled a philistine and the philosophy majors, Nietzsche enthusiasts, Doctoral students and venerated college professors descend on me with their (metaphorical) pitchforks, the format of this review is not to be considered a veiled mockery of the great philosopher or an affront to his ideas. Just a flippant response to a first reading. To be taken in good humor.
March 16, 2008
For those of you who are unfamiliar with him, Friedrich Nietzsche was an angry little man who protected himself from the Mean Old World by swaddling himself in an exaggerated ego (and an even more exaggerated moustache).
Rather than suggest that you read any or all of his works, I've taken the liberty of creating a "Nietzsche Book Generator" that you can use to construct your very own philosophical tomes, in the comfort of your own home!
Just follow these simple steps:
1) Make one or more completely ridiculous claims
2) Cover your ass by asserting that anyone who disagrees with you is simply too stupid to understand what you're saying (aka "The Emperor's New Clothes" method of argument)
3) When you run out of things to say, just write the most misogynistic thing that comes to mind
4) Be sure to dazzle the reader with your endless supply of Latin clich茅s
5) Repeat steps 1-4 two hundred times or so, and you've got yourself a "book"
Then all that's left is to sit back and prepare to be taken seriously by a large number of otherwise intelligent people!
Rather than suggest that you read any or all of his works, I've taken the liberty of creating a "Nietzsche Book Generator" that you can use to construct your very own philosophical tomes, in the comfort of your own home!
Just follow these simple steps:
1) Make one or more completely ridiculous claims
2) Cover your ass by asserting that anyone who disagrees with you is simply too stupid to understand what you're saying (aka "The Emperor's New Clothes" method of argument)
3) When you run out of things to say, just write the most misogynistic thing that comes to mind
4) Be sure to dazzle the reader with your endless supply of Latin clich茅s
5) Repeat steps 1-4 two hundred times or so, and you've got yourself a "book"
Then all that's left is to sit back and prepare to be taken seriously by a large number of otherwise intelligent people!
August 1, 2008
290. Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood.
If Nietzsche had started here 鈥� rather than nearly ending with this thought 鈥� he might have been more comprehensible. His readers might have said 鈥� 鈥榦h, right, so that is how it is going to be, is it? We鈥檙e dealing with some smart-arse that is going to play games with us 鈥� well, play away鈥︹€�
But, he doesn鈥檛 start here 鈥� he starts here:
鈥淪UPPOSING that Truth is a woman--what then?鈥�
Now, my lecturer at university got very excited over this idea. In fact, he was writing his doctorate on precisely this idea 鈥� called it something like 鈥楴ietzsche鈥檚 Women鈥�. So, I pretty much read this book as if it was written as an exploration of truth being defined as whatever a sort of German version of Victorian sexual relationships would have had the stereotype of 鈥榳oman鈥� be. And really, Nietzsche, to me, simply doesn鈥檛 sustain this metaphor at all. Later in the work, when he talks of women (a highly sexist version of women, admittedly) but he talks of women, not of truth.
I ought to say something about how the book is structured. Firstly, there is a Preface, nine parts and a final sort of ramble that I guess is supposed to be quite 鈥榓rtistic鈥�. The whole is divided into 296 numbered paragraphs. Some of these paragraphs can go for a couple of pages (which gets to be a pain in the bum to read, as they are thick text and quite dense). Others are aphorisms and can be quite direct: 鈥�141 The belly is the reason man does not easily take himself for a god鈥� 鈥� or obscure to the point of incomprehensibility: 鈥�184 There is a wild spirit of good-naturedness that looks like malice鈥�. Some of these end up on desk calendars, most don鈥檛.
The paragraphs which I think my lecturer must have struggled over most were those from 233 to 239 鈥� where Nietzsche discusses the 鈥榳eaker sex鈥�. This seems to me to be standard sexist nonsense and says nothing interesting about either women or truth.
Right then 鈥� my division of the spoils!
The Good:
From 247: 鈥淭he preacher was the only one in Germany who knew the weight of a syllable or a word, in what manner a sentence strikes, springs, rushes, flows, and comes to a close; he alone had a conscience in his ears, often enough a bad conscience: for reasons are not lacking why proficiency in oratory should be especially seldom attained by a German, or almost always too late. The masterpiece of German prose is therefore with good reason the masterpiece of its greatest preacher: the BIBLE has hitherto been the best German book. Compared with Luther's Bible, almost everything else is merely "literature"--something which
has not grown in Germany, and therefore has not taken and does not take root in German hearts, as the Bible has done.鈥�
I like this because I think it is based on a profound truth, that texts written that are not written to be voiced often do sound hollow and lack something very important.
I also liked some of the aphorisms, not least, 鈥�132. One is punished most for one鈥檚 virtues鈥� (yeah, tell me about it) and the final one which since I first read it about 20 years ago has stayed in my memory and been something I have sought to avoid, 鈥�185. 鈥業 do not like it鈥� 鈥� Why? 鈥� 鈥業 am not up to it.鈥� 鈥� has anyone ever answered like that?鈥� I would like to think that I have tried to be someone who has answered like that 鈥� that is, to admit (to myself, if no one else) when I have not understood something because it is beyond me. But this aphorism is even deeper than this 鈥� nevertheless, one should seek to avoid talking of disliking something because it hurts one鈥檚 vanity in its being too far beyond where one is currently up to.
The Bad
I find his rants against democracy and socialism 鈥� against what he calls the 鈥榟erd mentality鈥� 鈥� quite obnoxious. From 202: after discussing Anarchists who are鈥� 鈥淎pparently in opposition to the peacefully industrious democrats and Revolution-ideologues, and still more so to the awkward philosophasters and fraternity-visionaries who call themselves Socialists and want a "free society," those are really at one with them all in their thorough and instinctive hostility to every form of society other than that of the AUTONOMOUS herd (to the extent even of repudiating the notions "master" and "servant"--ni dieu ni maitre, says a socialist formula); at one in their tenacious opposition to every special claim, every special right and privilege (this means ultimately opposition to EVERY right, for when all are equal, no one needs "rights" any longer);鈥� the rant continues on and on in yet another example of Nietzsche鈥檚 endless sentences 鈥� and one (I can only assume) that doesn鈥檛 read terribly well even in German despite his own advice quoted earlier. As one who is proud to call out 鈥� even in French, if necessary 鈥� Neither God nor Master! his rants did nothing to convince me otherwise. Having seen some of the morons who float to the top and call themselves 鈥榗ream鈥� 鈥� I will happily struggle against every special right and special claim.
His criticism of the English in 252 鈥淚t is characteristic of such an unphilosophical race to hold on firmly to Christianity--they NEED its discipline for "moralizing" and humanizing鈥� is the sort of trite and pointless nonsense, meant only as an insult, that undermines his arguments generally.
The Evil
I have a rather visceral reaction to some topics 鈥� eugenics is one that poisons the very depths of my heart鈥檚 blood. I find it hard to think clearly about something that I have such a potent reaction against 鈥� and naturally, Nietzsche is quite in favour of such hideous excesses. When he doesn鈥檛 talk about Darwin in contempt, he reiterates the least interesting conclusion - the need for a 鈥榮truggle for existence鈥� to strengthen the 鈥榬ace鈥� (oh how the rightwing love such notions as 鈥榮urvival of the fittest鈥� 鈥� as if human culture wasn鈥檛 premised on mutual protection to make us strong despite all of our frailties 鈥� see for example: 262 鈥淎 species arises, a type becomes fixed and strong, through protracted struggle against essentially constant unfavourable conditions鈥� 鈥� oh yeah, says who?).
And so he begins his most obnoxious part of the work, 鈥淲hat is Noble?鈥� with the line: 鈥淓very elevation of the type 鈥榤an鈥� has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society鈥�. Or in 258, 鈥淚ts (an aristocratic society鈥檚) fundamental faith must be that society should not exist for the sake of society but only as foundation and scaffolding upon which a select species of being is able to raise itself to its higher task and in general to a higher existence:鈥� Blah, blah, blah. At university, when I would point to passages like these and complain about their obnoxious implications 鈥� that the majority of humanity is cast in the role of the play thing of the 鈥榩owerful鈥� 鈥� I would be told not to see such statements as being about 鈥榮ociety鈥� as such, but rather about the individual. And this has become the standard, the received reading of Nietzsche 鈥� that he was really about taking control of one鈥檚 own life and making life an artistic project and such blather 鈥� but I鈥檝e never been able to read him in this way. His pronouncements on society are clear and unambiguous. He may not be the forerunner of Hitler, as he was made out by his sister, but the fact remains he is not hard to twist into a rightwing ideologue 鈥� his views are poisonous to society. And they are meant to be read as a social formula 鈥� I have yet to be convinced otherwise.
Beyond
I鈥檝e gone back to reading Nietzsche again because twenty years ago I read him and hated him. Since then I鈥檝e read many commentaries and listened to some lectures from the Teaching Company in which he is greatly praised by people I found quite sensible and worthwhile. I thought that perhaps I really had disliked him because I was not up to him. But if that was true then, it is still true now.
I find Modern Philosophy鈥檚 obsession with the individual and the 鈥榤eaninglessness鈥� of the world to be a dead end. I find it as dull as dishwater and part of the reason I stopped reading philosophy and went on to reading about the advances in neural science instead, for example. I quickly become bored with obscurantism, and if there is one thing that the children of Nietzsche do exceptionally well it is obscurantism 鈥� Oh Heidegger, Oh Sartre, Oh Derrida鈥� - As wrong as that might make me 鈥� I鈥檓 just not interested enough in the rants of someone who simply does not want to be clear. Life is too short.
Now, an aside.
Throughout this book there are odd punctuation marks 鈥� perhaps the cause of the sentences never seeming to come to an end. Anyway, one of these marks is : - and it seemed a bit out of place, but also made me think of smileys or emotes or whatever these hideous things are called 鈥�:-)鈥� Except in this case they looked like little penises scattered throughout the text. After a while I couldn鈥檛 help feel this was quite appropriate.
If Nietzsche had started here 鈥� rather than nearly ending with this thought 鈥� he might have been more comprehensible. His readers might have said 鈥� 鈥榦h, right, so that is how it is going to be, is it? We鈥檙e dealing with some smart-arse that is going to play games with us 鈥� well, play away鈥︹€�
But, he doesn鈥檛 start here 鈥� he starts here:
鈥淪UPPOSING that Truth is a woman--what then?鈥�
Now, my lecturer at university got very excited over this idea. In fact, he was writing his doctorate on precisely this idea 鈥� called it something like 鈥楴ietzsche鈥檚 Women鈥�. So, I pretty much read this book as if it was written as an exploration of truth being defined as whatever a sort of German version of Victorian sexual relationships would have had the stereotype of 鈥榳oman鈥� be. And really, Nietzsche, to me, simply doesn鈥檛 sustain this metaphor at all. Later in the work, when he talks of women (a highly sexist version of women, admittedly) but he talks of women, not of truth.
I ought to say something about how the book is structured. Firstly, there is a Preface, nine parts and a final sort of ramble that I guess is supposed to be quite 鈥榓rtistic鈥�. The whole is divided into 296 numbered paragraphs. Some of these paragraphs can go for a couple of pages (which gets to be a pain in the bum to read, as they are thick text and quite dense). Others are aphorisms and can be quite direct: 鈥�141 The belly is the reason man does not easily take himself for a god鈥� 鈥� or obscure to the point of incomprehensibility: 鈥�184 There is a wild spirit of good-naturedness that looks like malice鈥�. Some of these end up on desk calendars, most don鈥檛.
The paragraphs which I think my lecturer must have struggled over most were those from 233 to 239 鈥� where Nietzsche discusses the 鈥榳eaker sex鈥�. This seems to me to be standard sexist nonsense and says nothing interesting about either women or truth.
Right then 鈥� my division of the spoils!
The Good:
From 247: 鈥淭he preacher was the only one in Germany who knew the weight of a syllable or a word, in what manner a sentence strikes, springs, rushes, flows, and comes to a close; he alone had a conscience in his ears, often enough a bad conscience: for reasons are not lacking why proficiency in oratory should be especially seldom attained by a German, or almost always too late. The masterpiece of German prose is therefore with good reason the masterpiece of its greatest preacher: the BIBLE has hitherto been the best German book. Compared with Luther's Bible, almost everything else is merely "literature"--something which
has not grown in Germany, and therefore has not taken and does not take root in German hearts, as the Bible has done.鈥�
I like this because I think it is based on a profound truth, that texts written that are not written to be voiced often do sound hollow and lack something very important.
I also liked some of the aphorisms, not least, 鈥�132. One is punished most for one鈥檚 virtues鈥� (yeah, tell me about it) and the final one which since I first read it about 20 years ago has stayed in my memory and been something I have sought to avoid, 鈥�185. 鈥業 do not like it鈥� 鈥� Why? 鈥� 鈥業 am not up to it.鈥� 鈥� has anyone ever answered like that?鈥� I would like to think that I have tried to be someone who has answered like that 鈥� that is, to admit (to myself, if no one else) when I have not understood something because it is beyond me. But this aphorism is even deeper than this 鈥� nevertheless, one should seek to avoid talking of disliking something because it hurts one鈥檚 vanity in its being too far beyond where one is currently up to.
The Bad
I find his rants against democracy and socialism 鈥� against what he calls the 鈥榟erd mentality鈥� 鈥� quite obnoxious. From 202: after discussing Anarchists who are鈥� 鈥淎pparently in opposition to the peacefully industrious democrats and Revolution-ideologues, and still more so to the awkward philosophasters and fraternity-visionaries who call themselves Socialists and want a "free society," those are really at one with them all in their thorough and instinctive hostility to every form of society other than that of the AUTONOMOUS herd (to the extent even of repudiating the notions "master" and "servant"--ni dieu ni maitre, says a socialist formula); at one in their tenacious opposition to every special claim, every special right and privilege (this means ultimately opposition to EVERY right, for when all are equal, no one needs "rights" any longer);鈥� the rant continues on and on in yet another example of Nietzsche鈥檚 endless sentences 鈥� and one (I can only assume) that doesn鈥檛 read terribly well even in German despite his own advice quoted earlier. As one who is proud to call out 鈥� even in French, if necessary 鈥� Neither God nor Master! his rants did nothing to convince me otherwise. Having seen some of the morons who float to the top and call themselves 鈥榗ream鈥� 鈥� I will happily struggle against every special right and special claim.
His criticism of the English in 252 鈥淚t is characteristic of such an unphilosophical race to hold on firmly to Christianity--they NEED its discipline for "moralizing" and humanizing鈥� is the sort of trite and pointless nonsense, meant only as an insult, that undermines his arguments generally.
The Evil
I have a rather visceral reaction to some topics 鈥� eugenics is one that poisons the very depths of my heart鈥檚 blood. I find it hard to think clearly about something that I have such a potent reaction against 鈥� and naturally, Nietzsche is quite in favour of such hideous excesses. When he doesn鈥檛 talk about Darwin in contempt, he reiterates the least interesting conclusion - the need for a 鈥榮truggle for existence鈥� to strengthen the 鈥榬ace鈥� (oh how the rightwing love such notions as 鈥榮urvival of the fittest鈥� 鈥� as if human culture wasn鈥檛 premised on mutual protection to make us strong despite all of our frailties 鈥� see for example: 262 鈥淎 species arises, a type becomes fixed and strong, through protracted struggle against essentially constant unfavourable conditions鈥� 鈥� oh yeah, says who?).
And so he begins his most obnoxious part of the work, 鈥淲hat is Noble?鈥� with the line: 鈥淓very elevation of the type 鈥榤an鈥� has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic society鈥�. Or in 258, 鈥淚ts (an aristocratic society鈥檚) fundamental faith must be that society should not exist for the sake of society but only as foundation and scaffolding upon which a select species of being is able to raise itself to its higher task and in general to a higher existence:鈥� Blah, blah, blah. At university, when I would point to passages like these and complain about their obnoxious implications 鈥� that the majority of humanity is cast in the role of the play thing of the 鈥榩owerful鈥� 鈥� I would be told not to see such statements as being about 鈥榮ociety鈥� as such, but rather about the individual. And this has become the standard, the received reading of Nietzsche 鈥� that he was really about taking control of one鈥檚 own life and making life an artistic project and such blather 鈥� but I鈥檝e never been able to read him in this way. His pronouncements on society are clear and unambiguous. He may not be the forerunner of Hitler, as he was made out by his sister, but the fact remains he is not hard to twist into a rightwing ideologue 鈥� his views are poisonous to society. And they are meant to be read as a social formula 鈥� I have yet to be convinced otherwise.
Beyond
I鈥檝e gone back to reading Nietzsche again because twenty years ago I read him and hated him. Since then I鈥檝e read many commentaries and listened to some lectures from the Teaching Company in which he is greatly praised by people I found quite sensible and worthwhile. I thought that perhaps I really had disliked him because I was not up to him. But if that was true then, it is still true now.
I find Modern Philosophy鈥檚 obsession with the individual and the 鈥榤eaninglessness鈥� of the world to be a dead end. I find it as dull as dishwater and part of the reason I stopped reading philosophy and went on to reading about the advances in neural science instead, for example. I quickly become bored with obscurantism, and if there is one thing that the children of Nietzsche do exceptionally well it is obscurantism 鈥� Oh Heidegger, Oh Sartre, Oh Derrida鈥� - As wrong as that might make me 鈥� I鈥檓 just not interested enough in the rants of someone who simply does not want to be clear. Life is too short.
Now, an aside.
Throughout this book there are odd punctuation marks 鈥� perhaps the cause of the sentences never seeming to come to an end. Anyway, one of these marks is : - and it seemed a bit out of place, but also made me think of smileys or emotes or whatever these hideous things are called 鈥�:-)鈥� Except in this case they looked like little penises scattered throughout the text. After a while I couldn鈥檛 help feel this was quite appropriate.
April 11, 2022
Jenseits von Gut und B枚se: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft = Beyond good and evil, Friedrich Nietzsche
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche accuses past philosophers of lacking critical sense and blindly accepting dogmatic premises in their consideration of morality. Specifically, he accuses them of founding grand metaphysical systems upon the faith that the good man is the opposite of the evil man, rather than just a different expression of the same basic impulses that find more direct expression in the evil man.
The work moves into the realm "beyond good and evil" in the sense of leaving behind the traditional morality which Nietzsche subjects to a destructive critique in favor of what he regards as an affirmative approach that fearlessly confronts the perspectival nature of knowledge and the perilous condition of the modern individual.
毓賳賵丕賳賴丕蹖 趩丕倬 卮丿賴 丿乇 丕蹖乇丕賳: 芦賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴禄貨 芦賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 丿乇丌賲丿蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴禄貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴貨 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 乇賵夭 亘蹖爻鬲 賵 倬賳噩賲 賲丕賴 爻倬鬲丕賲亘乇 爻丕賱1983賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳: 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴貨 賲鬲乇噩賲 (丕夭 賲鬲賳 丌賱賲丕賳蹖): 丿丕乇蹖賵卮 丌卮賵乇蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 賵夭丕乇鬲 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 丌賲賵夭卮 毓丕賱蹖貙 賲乇讴夭 賲胤丕賱毓賴 賮乇賴賳诏賴丕貙 爻丕賱1358貨 丿乇296氐貨 卮丕亘讴9644870441貨 賲賵囟賵毓: 丕禺賱丕賯 賵 賮賱爻賮賴 賮蹖賱爻賵賮丕賳 丌賱賲丕賳 - 爻丿賴19賲
毓賳賵丕賳: 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴貨 賲鬲乇噩賲 丿丕乇蹖賵卮 丌卮賵乇蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 禺賵丕乇夭賲蹖貙 爻丕賱1361貨 丿乇296氐貨 卮丕亘讴9644870441貨
毓賳賵丕賳: 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 丿乇丌賲丿蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 爻毓蹖丿 賮蹖乇賵夭丌亘丕丿蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 噩丕賲蹖貙 爻丕賱1387貨 丿乇247氐貨 卮丕亘讴9789642575244貨
賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿貙 丿乇 賵丕倬爻蹖賳 爻丕賱鈥屬囏й� 夭賳丿诏蹖 芦賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴禄貙 丿乇 爻丕賱1886賲蹖賱丕丿蹖 丕賳鬲卮丕乇 蹖丕賮鬲貨 毓賳賵丕賳 丕氐賱蹖 讴鬲丕亘: 芦賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮賴 丌蹖賳丿賴禄 丕爻鬲貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丿乇 賵丕倬爻蹖賳 爻丕賱鈥屬囏й� 毓賲乇 禺賵蹖卮 丿賵乇賴鈥� 丕蹖 爻禺鬲 乇丕 诏匕乇丕賳丿賴鈥� 賵 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丨丕氐賱 夭賲爻鬲丕賳 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 爻丕賱鈥屬囏й� 毓賲乇 丕蹖卮丕賳爻鬲貙 讴賴 亘賴 诏賮鬲賴 蹖 禺賵蹖卮 亘爻蹖丕乇 賲賴賲 亘賵丿賴鈥� 丕爻鬲貨
丕蹖卮丕賳 丿乇 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 賳丕賲賴鈥� 賴丕蹖 禺賵蹖卮 亘賴 丿賵爻鬲 禺賵丿 賲蹖鈥屬嗁堐屫迟嗀�: (丕夭 丕蹖賳 夭賲爻鬲丕賳 亘賴乇賴鈥� 丕蹖 賮乇丕賵丕賳 亘乇丿賲 賵 丕孬乇蹖 賳诏丕卮鬲賲 讴賴 丿卮賵丕乇蹖鈥屬囏й� 賮乇丕賵丕賳蹖 丿丕乇丿 賵 丨鬲蹖 丕夭 丕賳鬲卮丕乇 丌賳 诏丕賴蹖 賲蹖鈥屬囏必ж迟� 賵 賱乇夭賴 亘乇 丕賳丿丕賲賲 賲蹖鈥屫з佖� 賳丕賲 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 趩賳蹖賳 丕爻鬲: 芦賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮賴 丌蹖賳丿賴禄)貨 亘乇诏乇丿丕賳 賮丕乇爻蹖 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 亘丕乇 噩賳丕亘 芦丿丕乇蹖賵卮 丌卮賵乇蹖禄 丕夭 賳爻禺賴 蹖 賲鬲賳 丌賱賲丕賳蹖 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇诏乇丿丕賳丿賴鈥� 丕爻鬲
鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴賳诏丕賲 乇爻丕賳蹖: 16/03/1399貨 21/01/1401賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche accuses past philosophers of lacking critical sense and blindly accepting dogmatic premises in their consideration of morality. Specifically, he accuses them of founding grand metaphysical systems upon the faith that the good man is the opposite of the evil man, rather than just a different expression of the same basic impulses that find more direct expression in the evil man.
The work moves into the realm "beyond good and evil" in the sense of leaving behind the traditional morality which Nietzsche subjects to a destructive critique in favor of what he regards as an affirmative approach that fearlessly confronts the perspectival nature of knowledge and the perilous condition of the modern individual.
毓賳賵丕賳賴丕蹖 趩丕倬 卮丿賴 丿乇 丕蹖乇丕賳: 芦賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴禄貨 芦賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 丿乇丌賲丿蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴禄貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴貨 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 乇賵夭 亘蹖爻鬲 賵 倬賳噩賲 賲丕賴 爻倬鬲丕賲亘乇 爻丕賱1983賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳: 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴貨 賲鬲乇噩賲 (丕夭 賲鬲賳 丌賱賲丕賳蹖): 丿丕乇蹖賵卮 丌卮賵乇蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 賵夭丕乇鬲 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 丌賲賵夭卮 毓丕賱蹖貙 賲乇讴夭 賲胤丕賱毓賴 賮乇賴賳诏賴丕貙 爻丕賱1358貨 丿乇296氐貨 卮丕亘讴9644870441貨 賲賵囟賵毓: 丕禺賱丕賯 賵 賮賱爻賮賴 賮蹖賱爻賵賮丕賳 丌賱賲丕賳 - 爻丿賴19賲
毓賳賵丕賳: 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴貨 賲鬲乇噩賲 丿丕乇蹖賵卮 丌卮賵乇蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 禺賵丕乇夭賲蹖貙 爻丕賱1361貨 丿乇296氐貨 卮丕亘讴9644870441貨
毓賳賵丕賳: 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 丿乇丌賲丿蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 爻毓蹖丿 賮蹖乇賵夭丌亘丕丿蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 噩丕賲蹖貙 爻丕賱1387貨 丿乇247氐貨 卮丕亘讴9789642575244貨
賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿貙 丿乇 賵丕倬爻蹖賳 爻丕賱鈥屬囏й� 夭賳丿诏蹖 芦賮乇蹖丿乇蹖卮 賵蹖賱賴賱賲 賳蹖趩賴禄貙 丿乇 爻丕賱1886賲蹖賱丕丿蹖 丕賳鬲卮丕乇 蹖丕賮鬲貨 毓賳賵丕賳 丕氐賱蹖 讴鬲丕亘: 芦賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮賴 丌蹖賳丿賴禄 丕爻鬲貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丿乇 賵丕倬爻蹖賳 爻丕賱鈥屬囏й� 毓賲乇 禺賵蹖卮 丿賵乇賴鈥� 丕蹖 爻禺鬲 乇丕 诏匕乇丕賳丿賴鈥� 賵 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丨丕氐賱 夭賲爻鬲丕賳 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 爻丕賱鈥屬囏й� 毓賲乇 丕蹖卮丕賳爻鬲貙 讴賴 亘賴 诏賮鬲賴 蹖 禺賵蹖卮 亘爻蹖丕乇 賲賴賲 亘賵丿賴鈥� 丕爻鬲貨
丕蹖卮丕賳 丿乇 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 賳丕賲賴鈥� 賴丕蹖 禺賵蹖卮 亘賴 丿賵爻鬲 禺賵丿 賲蹖鈥屬嗁堐屫迟嗀�: (丕夭 丕蹖賳 夭賲爻鬲丕賳 亘賴乇賴鈥� 丕蹖 賮乇丕賵丕賳 亘乇丿賲 賵 丕孬乇蹖 賳诏丕卮鬲賲 讴賴 丿卮賵丕乇蹖鈥屬囏й� 賮乇丕賵丕賳蹖 丿丕乇丿 賵 丨鬲蹖 丕夭 丕賳鬲卮丕乇 丌賳 诏丕賴蹖 賲蹖鈥屬囏必ж迟� 賵 賱乇夭賴 亘乇 丕賳丿丕賲賲 賲蹖鈥屫з佖� 賳丕賲 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 趩賳蹖賳 丕爻鬲: 芦賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 - 倬蹖卮 丿乇丌賲丿蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮賴 丌蹖賳丿賴禄)貨 亘乇诏乇丿丕賳 賮丕乇爻蹖 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 亘丕乇 噩賳丕亘 芦丿丕乇蹖賵卮 丌卮賵乇蹖禄 丕夭 賳爻禺賴 蹖 賲鬲賳 丌賱賲丕賳蹖 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇诏乇丿丕賳丿賴鈥� 丕爻鬲
鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴賳诏丕賲 乇爻丕賳蹖: 16/03/1399貨 21/01/1401賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
April 17, 2024
Beyond Good and Evil is a thought-provoking philosophical masterpiece that challenges conventional notions of morality and ethics. This book is a must-read or must-listen () for anyone seeking to delve into the depths of human existence and consciousness.
Nietzsche's exploration of the dichotomy between good and evil, and his critique of traditional moral values, is as relevant today as it was when the book was first published. His razor-sharp wit and piercing insights force readers to confront uncomfortable truths about society, religion, and the human condition.
As an audiobook listener, I was captivated by the narrator's delivery, which brought Nietzsche's dense prose to life in a way that was both engaging and accessible. Listening to the audiobook allowed me to fully immerse myself in Nietzsche's ideas, pondering each thought-provoking passage and reflecting on its implications.
One of the highlights of this book is Nietzsche's relentless pursuit of truth and his willingness to challenge long-held beliefs. Whether you agree with his conclusions or not, there's no denying the impact of his ideas on modern philosophy and culture.
Nietzsche's exploration of the dichotomy between good and evil, and his critique of traditional moral values, is as relevant today as it was when the book was first published. His razor-sharp wit and piercing insights force readers to confront uncomfortable truths about society, religion, and the human condition.
As an audiobook listener, I was captivated by the narrator's delivery, which brought Nietzsche's dense prose to life in a way that was both engaging and accessible. Listening to the audiobook allowed me to fully immerse myself in Nietzsche's ideas, pondering each thought-provoking passage and reflecting on its implications.
One of the highlights of this book is Nietzsche's relentless pursuit of truth and his willingness to challenge long-held beliefs. Whether you agree with his conclusions or not, there's no denying the impact of his ideas on modern philosophy and culture.
July 20, 2018
A bit of well-meaning advice right at the start: don't read Nietzsche for moral insight or you'll drive yourself insane with rage, or else inhale some of the poison gas here. Read him instead for his insights into the nature of value, truth and knowledge. Nietzsche angers us most when he most successfully shows us how naked we humans are without our most cherished faiths - whether it be in human nature, natural law, the power of reason, or in a transcendent being to ground our incomplete, finite, utterly contingent existence into a cosmic meaning. He shows us that value lies at the center of reasoning, and that morality, as well as every ideal of excellence, falls because every purely rational, metaphysical grounding for value has failed. He also reminds us how much of what we take to be knowledge is normative through and through, and also in danger of crumbling in a naturalistic worldview. Therein lies his true contribution.
Much that is said about Nietzsche is ridiculously point-missing and amounts to no more than a nitpicking over details that are peripheral to his system. Peripherals such as his virulent misogyny don't, I think, suffice to diminish the value of his key contributions to philosophy. He is a challenging thinker to come to terms with in part because he doesn't deign to present an airbrushed counterfeit of himself, but instead presents his thinking about the conflicting sides of his nature - including those areas filled with festering resentment and, at times, hatred. We expect philosophy to proceed from a much more edited, manicured persona, and it is right here, at the start, that he defies our expectation and instead chooses to put his whole personality on the table for our dissection. All of it. He is unique in that he tries to philosophize with his whole self. We cannot read him unless we strive to do the same and attain a bit more honesty about the complexity of what drives us.
As Vaihinger pointed out in his "The Philosophy of As-If," Nietzsche's work can best be read as
taking the Kantian critical project to its radical conclusion. This is because he asks the questions that even Kant didn't feel the need to ask, namely, questions about the foundations that make critique possible - any critique! I have to admit with Vaihinger that Kant and Nietzsche are best understood in terms of each other. Nietzsche's work furthers the Kantian exploration of the structure of experience by taking into account the ways that our embodiment shapes meaning in ways that Kant's transcendental starting point prevented him from taking into account. Nietzsche takes his stance with the embodied, experiencing, meaning-creating subject. It is this starting point that motivates the epistemological perspectivism and constructivism which leads to his notoriously radical critiques of foundational metaphysical concepts.
Nietzsche shows here how the materialist paradigm, by pushing value and meaning out of its reigning world-picture, leaves us with the existential problem of overcoming nihilism. I understand nihilism as the severing of a vital, sustaining link between mind and world; it is the loss of our capacity to register the external world as a source of value and meaning. This work brings the problem of value center-stage. Somehow we must find a source of meaning within subjective activity entirely unmoored from sustaining connection with the external world. Whether the alienated self, conceived as creator, suffices to provide itself with such a source of meaning - which I think it doesn't - is the big question his philosophy leaves us with.
His self-description as an inverse Socrates turns out to be literally true here, though perhaps his real enemy is Plato for his attempt to co-opt Socrates. Much that Nietzsche does is to undo the Platonification of Socrates, which misleads us into replacing the fundamental question of self-knowledge with the question of metaphysics. Plato has perverted the purpose of philosophy 鈥� Know Thyself - by seeking to reduce the process of self-knowledge to the process of a metaphysical speculation that seeks to situate the self in an objective order. Scientific cosmology is no answer, either, for him.
The only thing that'll fix the damage, he says here, will be to go back to the pre-Platonic, Socratic roots of critique, and to dig deeper, to ask the truly foundational questions anew, and without loaded dice. And the big, unasked question, for him, is: What is the value of truth, if we understand that its only grounding is the embodied striving of individuals to realize their characteristic mode of existence?
Most important is his claim that accepting the starting point of the embodied subject logically leads us to see ontology as a species of axiology 鈥� i.e., of aesthetics and morals. His analysis shows how metaphysics after Plato has been structured in terms of a tacitly presupposed normative, and ultimately aesthetic definition of truth. One can recall Plato鈥檚 normative definition of the forms as the only objects that really count as knowledge. This is especially evident in Plato鈥檚 metaphorical identification of the True with the Beautiful and the Good in Diotima鈥檚 speech in the Symposium, where he normatively defines the highest act of knowing as one that is simultaneously cognitive-theoretical, morally transformative and aesthetically satisfying. Instead, Nietzsche busts the construct time and again to show how ontological principles and epistemological rules are rightly seen as mere coordinates set by 鈥渢he perspective optics of (human) life,鈥� which define the shape the real can take for us.
Ontologies are constructs that are defined in relation to embodied perspective-taking. The golden thread that runs through his scattered, rambling critiques of 鈥渢he prejudices鈥� that grounded the philosophies of the Stoics, the Kantians, the Cartesians, the Christians, and even the materialist atomists, is his exposition of the way that each has committed the fallacy of ignoring embodiment, while presupposing creative, embodied processes of meaning-making in order to get its thinking in motion. Ignoring embodiment has led to reifying its products into ontologies which he characterizes as 鈥渁esthetic anthropomorphisms.鈥�
The key to his argument (especially in his essay, "On Truth and Lies") is giving cognitive priority to image-based, rather than linguistic thinking, and showing that the latter is based on the former. In his analysis, metaphysics emerges as the product of an aestheticizing simplification of the real, which abstracts from real, experienced particulars in order to construct general patterns that are then 鈥渂aptized鈥� with the honorific status of 鈥渇irst principles.鈥� This imagistic process generates all the 鈥渁esthetic anthropomorphisms鈥� and 鈥渞egulative fictions鈥漷hat grounds all our reasoning. Among those foundational constructs listed by Nietzsche are: substance, individual thing, object, ego, causal agent, causal relation, law of nature, forms, ontological principles, etc. All such epistemic and metaphysical principles are grounded entirely in a subjective, ultimately aesthetic necessity. They define, in other words, the parameters within which we can maintain a coherent, life-enhancing perspective on the real. Ultimately, for Nietzsche, these beliefs in a permanent order did not win out because they were 鈥渢he most true, but the most useful.鈥�
Even logic, with its (to Nietzsche, infamous) claim to purity and disembodied independence from the human condition, isn鈥檛 immune, as he notes in his discussion of 鈥渢he fictions of logic.鈥� He points out the ways that logic is based on presuppositions that correspond to nothing in reality, as, for instance, the ideas of equality, identity, and perfect isolability of individual things which can correspond to the logical variables.
Mathematics, too, according to him, is grounded on 鈥渁esthetic anthropomorphisms鈥� that are reified into ontologies. Mathematical reasoning, according to Nietzsche, cannot get off the ground without the foundational 鈥渋llusion of identity,鈥� of individual things, and of substances, since mathematical concepts such as lines would not be possible without the substance-mode ontology that these myths support.
And what about the physicist鈥檚 pride and joy, the atoms and the laws of nature? Both are, in Nietzsche鈥檚 eyes, abstract residues of our 鈥渕ythological dreaming.鈥� 鈥淟et us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities: there is nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses.鈥� 鈥淭he total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos--in the sense not of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms.鈥� Nothing, absolutely nothing, escapes his stringent reorientation of philosophy in terms of the constructive processes of the embodied subject.
Even Kant's critique of reason, the instrument of all knowing, assumed too much right at the start, and thereby fell short of asking the truly foundational questions. 鈥淗ow are synthetic judgments a priori possible?鈥� Kant asked himself 鈥� and what really is his answer? 鈥楤y virtue of a faculty. (鈥�) But is that 鈥� an answer? An explanation? Or is it not merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? 鈥楤y virtue of a faculty.鈥欌€� Nietzsche suggests here that Kant is begging the question that such principles are accessible to us embodied existents. 鈥淏ut such replies belong in comedy, and it is high time to replace the Kantian question 鈥� by another question, 鈥榃hy is belief in such judgments necessary?' 鈥� and to comprehend that such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though, they might, of course, be false judgments for all that!鈥�
He goes on to note that 鈥渟ynthetic judgments a priori should not 鈥榖e possible鈥� at all; we have no right to them.鈥� Kant thus assumed too much when he assumed their possibility. He assumed we had a 鈥渞ight鈥� to such principles. Instead, a genuine critique of reason must consider the chilling possibility that human nature may just not be the kind of thing that is made for the kind of truth that we have thus far thought we sought. From Nietzsche鈥檚 perspective, then, it looks like Kant didn鈥檛 altogether 鈥渃ritique鈥� the ontological principles of past metaphysics; rather, he projected them inward, as 鈥渇aculties鈥� in the subject that support 鈥渟ynthetic a priori principles.鈥�
To all of the pseudo-discovery projects of past metaphysics, Nietzsche retorts 鈥測ou would like all existence to exist only after your own image.鈥� It wasn鈥檛 knowledge of the real that was sought, after all, despite our explicit (and self-flattering) claims to the contrary. The traditional metaphysical approach to self-knowledge involved us in an effort to 鈥渕easure reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical.鈥� 鈥淧hilosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the 鈥榗reation of the world, 鈥檛o the causa prima.鈥�
Nietzsche points out that we cannot assume what most needs proving, namely, that there is an ontological correlate to our truth and value concepts. He asks us instead to start by 鈥�(s)upposing, that is, that not just man is the measure of all things.鈥� From this reversed starting point, we ca no longer assume that knowing the truth will be knowing the good and the beautiful, as Plato did. Knowing the truth may not bring us the fulfillment we seek. Truth may be ugly, and it may be evil. It may not be about the furtherance of life, but may instead reveal its insignificance. If we can鈥檛 assume objective normative standards as the grounds of truth, then the question of the status of truth hinges on identifying the true nature of our drives, since it is our drives that remain as its only possible foundation. 鈥淚 do not believe that a 鈥榙rive to knowledge鈥� is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has 鈥� employed understanding 鈥� as a mere instrument.鈥� So which drive powers the pursuit of knowledge?
鈥淏ehind all logic鈥� there stand valuations, or, more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life.鈥� It is the drive to the realization of our characteristic mode of life that powers all we do, including our pursuit of knowledge. Perhaps the best motto of Nietzsche's thought can be expressed in one of his followers', Ernst Becker's, words: 鈥淲e create the world that we need in order to discover ourselves.鈥� If we were honest, Nietzsche says, we would recognize that the true value of a judgment, for us, is not its truth value, but rather its 鈥渓ife-promoting鈥� value. As he puts it in The Gay Science:
鈥淲e have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live - by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life. But that does not prove them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might include error.鈥�
Even though such basic ideas have a subjective necessity by virtue of their being part of 鈥渢he perspective optics of life,鈥� and because, as such, they have 鈥渢heir regulative importance for us,鈥� we must recognize that they may have limited accuracy as 鈥渕ere foreground estimates.鈥�
I think that such observations make Nietzsche's analysis of the epistemological consequences of Darwinism much more accurate than is that of most other more optimistic evolutionists. He realizes that if reason is but the late adaptation of an organism, it loses even that last (albeit relavitized, perspectivized) transcendental foundation that Kant sought to give it. What kind of a truth can an organism claim, whose reason is but an organ adapted to seeking out the conditions in which the organism can secure its wellbeing? Knowledge, as part of this larger organismic self-furthering project, is but an instrument to wrest control over the environment, to impose our shape over it, and to ultimately reduce the world to our own terms.
So, the take-home points, for me:
-ontologies are formalized "lifeworlds" (in Husserl's terms): i.e., they reflect our attempts to bridge the divide and conceive the world as our home; they also specify what the world must be like if it is to support and fulfill our drive to realization,
-the psychological function of the pursuit of knowledge has more to do with our quest for self-realization than with the attainment of impersonal, objective truth, and
- we cannot make the oh-so convenient, yet fundamental assumption of post-Platonic metaphysics, the assumption that objective truth is life-affirming. Perhaps such truth, once purged of our life-affirming constructs, spells out a world that is radically Other and opposed to life's strivings (an entropic universe, anyone?).
Now take a breath for a minute and really think about how deep this criticism really cuts. As a friend of mine put it, it is difficult to abide with Nietzsche on this point, to really follow him and take our questioning this far. It is difficult to sustain this level of critical elucidation of these tacit life-practices which alone ground our thinking, even though, each time, we erase our steps and delude ourselves into thinking that we're setting up our edifices on the firm foundation of the structure of being itself.
The big question is, of course, whether Nietzsche's is the -inevitable- conclusion of the critical tradition that Kant initiated. Is this the inevitable last word? Does this tradition, if pursued intransigently, really leave us in this abysmal pit of doubt? Does the fact of the knower's embodiment really mean the dissolution of all foundations? We must come to grips with Nietzsche much more carefully if we are to answer these still-vital questions.
Much that is said about Nietzsche is ridiculously point-missing and amounts to no more than a nitpicking over details that are peripheral to his system. Peripherals such as his virulent misogyny don't, I think, suffice to diminish the value of his key contributions to philosophy. He is a challenging thinker to come to terms with in part because he doesn't deign to present an airbrushed counterfeit of himself, but instead presents his thinking about the conflicting sides of his nature - including those areas filled with festering resentment and, at times, hatred. We expect philosophy to proceed from a much more edited, manicured persona, and it is right here, at the start, that he defies our expectation and instead chooses to put his whole personality on the table for our dissection. All of it. He is unique in that he tries to philosophize with his whole self. We cannot read him unless we strive to do the same and attain a bit more honesty about the complexity of what drives us.
As Vaihinger pointed out in his "The Philosophy of As-If," Nietzsche's work can best be read as
taking the Kantian critical project to its radical conclusion. This is because he asks the questions that even Kant didn't feel the need to ask, namely, questions about the foundations that make critique possible - any critique! I have to admit with Vaihinger that Kant and Nietzsche are best understood in terms of each other. Nietzsche's work furthers the Kantian exploration of the structure of experience by taking into account the ways that our embodiment shapes meaning in ways that Kant's transcendental starting point prevented him from taking into account. Nietzsche takes his stance with the embodied, experiencing, meaning-creating subject. It is this starting point that motivates the epistemological perspectivism and constructivism which leads to his notoriously radical critiques of foundational metaphysical concepts.
Nietzsche shows here how the materialist paradigm, by pushing value and meaning out of its reigning world-picture, leaves us with the existential problem of overcoming nihilism. I understand nihilism as the severing of a vital, sustaining link between mind and world; it is the loss of our capacity to register the external world as a source of value and meaning. This work brings the problem of value center-stage. Somehow we must find a source of meaning within subjective activity entirely unmoored from sustaining connection with the external world. Whether the alienated self, conceived as creator, suffices to provide itself with such a source of meaning - which I think it doesn't - is the big question his philosophy leaves us with.
His self-description as an inverse Socrates turns out to be literally true here, though perhaps his real enemy is Plato for his attempt to co-opt Socrates. Much that Nietzsche does is to undo the Platonification of Socrates, which misleads us into replacing the fundamental question of self-knowledge with the question of metaphysics. Plato has perverted the purpose of philosophy 鈥� Know Thyself - by seeking to reduce the process of self-knowledge to the process of a metaphysical speculation that seeks to situate the self in an objective order. Scientific cosmology is no answer, either, for him.
The only thing that'll fix the damage, he says here, will be to go back to the pre-Platonic, Socratic roots of critique, and to dig deeper, to ask the truly foundational questions anew, and without loaded dice. And the big, unasked question, for him, is: What is the value of truth, if we understand that its only grounding is the embodied striving of individuals to realize their characteristic mode of existence?
Most important is his claim that accepting the starting point of the embodied subject logically leads us to see ontology as a species of axiology 鈥� i.e., of aesthetics and morals. His analysis shows how metaphysics after Plato has been structured in terms of a tacitly presupposed normative, and ultimately aesthetic definition of truth. One can recall Plato鈥檚 normative definition of the forms as the only objects that really count as knowledge. This is especially evident in Plato鈥檚 metaphorical identification of the True with the Beautiful and the Good in Diotima鈥檚 speech in the Symposium, where he normatively defines the highest act of knowing as one that is simultaneously cognitive-theoretical, morally transformative and aesthetically satisfying. Instead, Nietzsche busts the construct time and again to show how ontological principles and epistemological rules are rightly seen as mere coordinates set by 鈥渢he perspective optics of (human) life,鈥� which define the shape the real can take for us.
Ontologies are constructs that are defined in relation to embodied perspective-taking. The golden thread that runs through his scattered, rambling critiques of 鈥渢he prejudices鈥� that grounded the philosophies of the Stoics, the Kantians, the Cartesians, the Christians, and even the materialist atomists, is his exposition of the way that each has committed the fallacy of ignoring embodiment, while presupposing creative, embodied processes of meaning-making in order to get its thinking in motion. Ignoring embodiment has led to reifying its products into ontologies which he characterizes as 鈥渁esthetic anthropomorphisms.鈥�
The key to his argument (especially in his essay, "On Truth and Lies") is giving cognitive priority to image-based, rather than linguistic thinking, and showing that the latter is based on the former. In his analysis, metaphysics emerges as the product of an aestheticizing simplification of the real, which abstracts from real, experienced particulars in order to construct general patterns that are then 鈥渂aptized鈥� with the honorific status of 鈥渇irst principles.鈥� This imagistic process generates all the 鈥渁esthetic anthropomorphisms鈥� and 鈥渞egulative fictions鈥漷hat grounds all our reasoning. Among those foundational constructs listed by Nietzsche are: substance, individual thing, object, ego, causal agent, causal relation, law of nature, forms, ontological principles, etc. All such epistemic and metaphysical principles are grounded entirely in a subjective, ultimately aesthetic necessity. They define, in other words, the parameters within which we can maintain a coherent, life-enhancing perspective on the real. Ultimately, for Nietzsche, these beliefs in a permanent order did not win out because they were 鈥渢he most true, but the most useful.鈥�
Even logic, with its (to Nietzsche, infamous) claim to purity and disembodied independence from the human condition, isn鈥檛 immune, as he notes in his discussion of 鈥渢he fictions of logic.鈥� He points out the ways that logic is based on presuppositions that correspond to nothing in reality, as, for instance, the ideas of equality, identity, and perfect isolability of individual things which can correspond to the logical variables.
Mathematics, too, according to him, is grounded on 鈥渁esthetic anthropomorphisms鈥� that are reified into ontologies. Mathematical reasoning, according to Nietzsche, cannot get off the ground without the foundational 鈥渋llusion of identity,鈥� of individual things, and of substances, since mathematical concepts such as lines would not be possible without the substance-mode ontology that these myths support.
And what about the physicist鈥檚 pride and joy, the atoms and the laws of nature? Both are, in Nietzsche鈥檚 eyes, abstract residues of our 鈥渕ythological dreaming.鈥� 鈥淟et us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities: there is nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses.鈥� 鈥淭he total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos--in the sense not of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms.鈥� Nothing, absolutely nothing, escapes his stringent reorientation of philosophy in terms of the constructive processes of the embodied subject.
Even Kant's critique of reason, the instrument of all knowing, assumed too much right at the start, and thereby fell short of asking the truly foundational questions. 鈥淗ow are synthetic judgments a priori possible?鈥� Kant asked himself 鈥� and what really is his answer? 鈥楤y virtue of a faculty. (鈥�) But is that 鈥� an answer? An explanation? Or is it not merely a repetition of the question? How does opium induce sleep? 鈥楤y virtue of a faculty.鈥欌€� Nietzsche suggests here that Kant is begging the question that such principles are accessible to us embodied existents. 鈥淏ut such replies belong in comedy, and it is high time to replace the Kantian question 鈥� by another question, 鈥榃hy is belief in such judgments necessary?' 鈥� and to comprehend that such judgments must be believed to be true, for the sake of the preservation of creatures like ourselves; though, they might, of course, be false judgments for all that!鈥�
He goes on to note that 鈥渟ynthetic judgments a priori should not 鈥榖e possible鈥� at all; we have no right to them.鈥� Kant thus assumed too much when he assumed their possibility. He assumed we had a 鈥渞ight鈥� to such principles. Instead, a genuine critique of reason must consider the chilling possibility that human nature may just not be the kind of thing that is made for the kind of truth that we have thus far thought we sought. From Nietzsche鈥檚 perspective, then, it looks like Kant didn鈥檛 altogether 鈥渃ritique鈥� the ontological principles of past metaphysics; rather, he projected them inward, as 鈥渇aculties鈥� in the subject that support 鈥渟ynthetic a priori principles.鈥�
To all of the pseudo-discovery projects of past metaphysics, Nietzsche retorts 鈥測ou would like all existence to exist only after your own image.鈥� It wasn鈥檛 knowledge of the real that was sought, after all, despite our explicit (and self-flattering) claims to the contrary. The traditional metaphysical approach to self-knowledge involved us in an effort to 鈥渕easure reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical.鈥� 鈥淧hilosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power, to the 鈥榗reation of the world, 鈥檛o the causa prima.鈥�
Nietzsche points out that we cannot assume what most needs proving, namely, that there is an ontological correlate to our truth and value concepts. He asks us instead to start by 鈥�(s)upposing, that is, that not just man is the measure of all things.鈥� From this reversed starting point, we ca no longer assume that knowing the truth will be knowing the good and the beautiful, as Plato did. Knowing the truth may not bring us the fulfillment we seek. Truth may be ugly, and it may be evil. It may not be about the furtherance of life, but may instead reveal its insignificance. If we can鈥檛 assume objective normative standards as the grounds of truth, then the question of the status of truth hinges on identifying the true nature of our drives, since it is our drives that remain as its only possible foundation. 鈥淚 do not believe that a 鈥榙rive to knowledge鈥� is the father of philosophy; but rather that another drive has 鈥� employed understanding 鈥� as a mere instrument.鈥� So which drive powers the pursuit of knowledge?
鈥淏ehind all logic鈥� there stand valuations, or, more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life.鈥� It is the drive to the realization of our characteristic mode of life that powers all we do, including our pursuit of knowledge. Perhaps the best motto of Nietzsche's thought can be expressed in one of his followers', Ernst Becker's, words: 鈥淲e create the world that we need in order to discover ourselves.鈥� If we were honest, Nietzsche says, we would recognize that the true value of a judgment, for us, is not its truth value, but rather its 鈥渓ife-promoting鈥� value. As he puts it in The Gay Science:
鈥淲e have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live - by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life. But that does not prove them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might include error.鈥�
Even though such basic ideas have a subjective necessity by virtue of their being part of 鈥渢he perspective optics of life,鈥� and because, as such, they have 鈥渢heir regulative importance for us,鈥� we must recognize that they may have limited accuracy as 鈥渕ere foreground estimates.鈥�
I think that such observations make Nietzsche's analysis of the epistemological consequences of Darwinism much more accurate than is that of most other more optimistic evolutionists. He realizes that if reason is but the late adaptation of an organism, it loses even that last (albeit relavitized, perspectivized) transcendental foundation that Kant sought to give it. What kind of a truth can an organism claim, whose reason is but an organ adapted to seeking out the conditions in which the organism can secure its wellbeing? Knowledge, as part of this larger organismic self-furthering project, is but an instrument to wrest control over the environment, to impose our shape over it, and to ultimately reduce the world to our own terms.
So, the take-home points, for me:
-ontologies are formalized "lifeworlds" (in Husserl's terms): i.e., they reflect our attempts to bridge the divide and conceive the world as our home; they also specify what the world must be like if it is to support and fulfill our drive to realization,
-the psychological function of the pursuit of knowledge has more to do with our quest for self-realization than with the attainment of impersonal, objective truth, and
- we cannot make the oh-so convenient, yet fundamental assumption of post-Platonic metaphysics, the assumption that objective truth is life-affirming. Perhaps such truth, once purged of our life-affirming constructs, spells out a world that is radically Other and opposed to life's strivings (an entropic universe, anyone?).
Now take a breath for a minute and really think about how deep this criticism really cuts. As a friend of mine put it, it is difficult to abide with Nietzsche on this point, to really follow him and take our questioning this far. It is difficult to sustain this level of critical elucidation of these tacit life-practices which alone ground our thinking, even though, each time, we erase our steps and delude ourselves into thinking that we're setting up our edifices on the firm foundation of the structure of being itself.
The big question is, of course, whether Nietzsche's is the -inevitable- conclusion of the critical tradition that Kant initiated. Is this the inevitable last word? Does this tradition, if pursued intransigently, really leave us in this abysmal pit of doubt? Does the fact of the knower's embodiment really mean the dissolution of all foundations? We must come to grips with Nietzsche much more carefully if we are to answer these still-vital questions.
April 22, 2015
Nietzsche, the original Meninist. #NotAllPhilosophers
February 20, 2023
In "Beyond Good and Evil," Nietzsche does not go with a grain of salt. His criticism of the democratic principle of equality leads him to take radical positions that could offend individual humanist minds. This criticism would be (this is my interpretation) a logical continuation of the Christian principles of pity and charity. Indeed, to preserve themselves from the disgust of life and not sink into incurable pessimism, men hide from the truth through these principles defined as functional. We thus understand why men are false and inconstant. Equality is only an illusion, the hide-and-seek of a world that advances by what Nietzsche calls the will of power. There are beings he calls "aristocratic," seeking to flourish through the oppression of other beings, by far the most numerous, desiring them to submit to great leaders through all-powerful masters. Isn't it a lovely picture?
But its most stimulating aphorisms are those dealing with relativism: any theory being only interpretation, even scientific laws, then there is no lasting and immutable truth. Moreover, our senses are deceptive. They cannot give us the keys to a sovereign reality. And he also does not hesitate to warn us about the truths he teaches us: these are his current truths. They will no longer once write down on paper.
But its most stimulating aphorisms are those dealing with relativism: any theory being only interpretation, even scientific laws, then there is no lasting and immutable truth. Moreover, our senses are deceptive. They cannot give us the keys to a sovereign reality. And he also does not hesitate to warn us about the truths he teaches us: these are his current truths. They will no longer once write down on paper.
June 22, 2012
Why exactly, should I strive to be kind, and not cruel? Why am I being taught to be fair and not selfish all my life? Why should I subscribe to equal rights, non discrimination, egalitarianism and freedom of speech?
Nietzsche posits that the above mentioned virtues and aesthetic and or moral imperatives (or indeed any imperatives) are merely legacy, the result of Darwinian (although he does not use this word) qualities which have ensured the survival and prosperity of the 鈥榠ssuing鈥� authority. Good and evil, salvation of the soul and growth has nothing to do with it. As social structures change, so does the concept of morality. This of course, is the point, where his ingenious treatise of master and slave morality comes in.
Under 鈥榝eudal鈥� conditions, it is the rulers who determine the conception of 鈥榞ood鈥� and morality. 鈥榃e truthful one鈥檚 鈥� the nobility in ancient Greece called themselves, as it is a fundamental belief of all aristocrats that the common people are liars, insignificant, and cowards. It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were applied first to men, and were only derivatively applied at a later period to actions. The noble man regards himself, then as a determiner of values, he does not require to be approved of, he alone passes the judgment.鈥� On slave morality: 鈥榮upposing the abused and oppressed were allowed to moralise? What will be the common element in their moral estimates? Probably a pessimistic suspicion with regard to the entire situation of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man together with his situation. The slave has an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful, a scepticism of anything 鈥榞ood鈥� there honoured- he would fain persuade himself that an happiness found there was not genuine. Those qualities which serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers are brought into prominence: it is here that sympathy, the kind, helping hand, the warm heart, patience, diligence and humility attain to honour, for here they are the most useful qualities, and almost the only means of supporting the burden of existence. Here is the seat then of the famous antithesis of good and evil.鈥�
In essence, it is this 鈥榮lave morality鈥�, which arose incumbent on certain socio-economic conditions which no longer exist today, which has prevailed, and which tells me to be kind and fair, and not cruel. Why has it prevailed? Because it has been propped up by the Church for its own reasons(according to Nietzsche) which are not the subject of my review.
Under this argument, there can be no intrinsic value attached to say my being 鈥榢ind鈥� or 鈥樷€檈quitable鈥� or any such : it is an essence an arbitrary signifier, devoid of inherent 鈥榞ood or evil鈥�, simply a(n evolving) measure of utility imposed by the establishment in order to normalise expected intragroup behaviour, based on social and cultural conditions at the prevailing time.
The idea that morality is a tool for managing expectations is intriguing. In essence, in any subject-object interaction, the qualitative determination of the action in terms of 鈥榞ood and evil鈥� is not objective phenomena: it is simply an arbitrarily shared agreement between the two entities. The bible, for example, condones slavery. In the Unforgiving Slave (Mathew 18:21-35) there are a lot of people throwing themselves at each other鈥檚 feet (depending on rank) and debate on forgiveness: should you do it 7 or 77 times 7 times. But, interestingly, neither slave nor master seem in the least bit preoccupied about the institution of slavery. There is an expectation, an agreement, on both sides of the equation, at that particular time, that slavery is a non negotiable condition, and certainly not contra-morality.
The ethical quandary arises when their is a mismatch between subject object expectations. So, how many times should you forgive? 7? 77? Not at all? What determines this decision?
The negation, in the first instance, of a universal morality 鈥� The demand for one morality for all is detrimental (to the higher man)鈥� which can be applied as a 鈥榮ympathetic action鈥� and the determination of person specific morality is informed particularly by 鈥榯he power to will鈥�, namely that intra-group, we are not all equal. A hierarchy of power, circular in nature, is established whereby everyone surrenders their will to someone else, everyone has power over someone else.
Therefore, a 鈥榮ympathetic action鈥� (i.e. moral action) is not an independent, objective and universal phenomenon but must be, by default, be derived from the dynamics of the specific subject-object agreement from which it emanates. In essence, a 鈥榟igher excellence鈥� individual鈥� is the originators of his own 鈥榩ersonalised鈥� morality, which will constantly adapt and evolve according to the specificity of the recipient.
The above process is relevant only to higher excellence individuals (e.g. superman), e.g. those who do not follow the slave mentality outlined above. And it is by no means a pain free process:
the man who is a product of contrary instincts finds himself the hotbed of values which struggle with one another, and are seldom at peace. It is a weak man whose desire is that the war within him should come to an end; happiness appears to him in the character of a soothing medicine : the happiness of repose, undisturbedness, of repletion鈥�: which effectively portains the shutdown of mental faculties and free will, the strive for perfection and completion, a 鈥榙umbing down鈥� and surrender to the status quo, the non crystallisation of endless possibility. Instead, Nietzsche argues, 鈥榠f men, in addition to their powerful and irreconcilable instincts, have also indoctrinated in themselves a subtlety for carrying on the conflict in themselves, there then arisesthose marvellously incomprehensible and inexplicable beings, predestined for鈥�...conquest, achievement, fulfilment.
In essence, suffering is an essential prerequisite and necessary for the cultivation of human excellence. If an individual were to internalise the norm that suffering must be alleviated, then instead of suffering to 鈥榗reate鈥�, all energy is wasted, squandered in self pity and lament.
A possible explanation for Nietzsche鈥檚 insistence on suffering is his conception of a human being is one constituted by non conscious-type facts that determine his actions: 鈥極ne will become only what one is鈥� and 鈥榟e can only follow to the end what is fixed about him鈥�. His argument here is informed by a reversal of the Cartesian 鈥業 am therefore I think鈥� to 鈥業 think, therefore, I am鈥�, caveated with an epihenomenological explanation of the occurrence of thoughts; a thought arrives 鈥榳hen it wishes, not when 鈥業 鈥榳ish. Consequently it follows that actions are not caused by conscious but rather than unconscious will. If so, then it is not possible to resolve a conflict against one own self.
So far, so much waffle. (Not that Nietzsche doesn鈥檛 waffle: because he does). Epi consciousness, will of power, normative and descriptive components of morality, so the fuck what? Where exactly is the 鈥榮how me the money鈥� shot here?
I come away with:
I suffer. Its been a life-long project; with an end goal to alleviation. Now, I am free, because I I accept that suffering is OK: its a non balancing equation. I do not need to 鈥榞as鈥� it, I need to accept it. Its not something I will ever neutralise. If you can鈥檛 beat them join them. I will NOT waste anymore energy in suppression tactics. I will, instead, harness it and make it work for me. God, the relief....
I will no longer measure my worth in accordance with accepted dogma, and penalise myself if I feel I fall short. Morality is arbitrary: there is no objective good and evil. I will make my own morality. It is OK then, to take the path less travelled, and not subscribe to 鈥榮lave morality鈥�. If there is subject 鈥搊bject disagreement, is it possible, perhaps, that you are wrong and I am right? Does your disagreement and sense of entitlement obviate my sense of reason?
My life is determined by 鈥榳ill of power鈥�. You can go on and disagree, be a Jesuit. But. I accept that I will hurt people, and that people will hurt me, despite my best efforts. Even when I think I鈥檓 labouring for the 鈥榞reater good鈥�, someone will be coming unstuck for it. This is OK. It is a fallacy to strive for perfection in the non hurting business. One man鈥檚 poison is another man鈥檚 meat.
But finally. The money shot. I don鈥檛 need to hate myself. Instead of wasting energy on penitence and self flagellation, I need to be finding my own 鈥榣ittle community.鈥� I would much rather sin with a group of five than suffer in isolation amongst millions. If I failed you: you weren鈥檛 for me. We just don鈥檛 have 鈥� subject object鈥� agreement.
I don鈥檛 want to give up my morality for you.
I don鈥檛 want you to give up your morality for me.
I want us to share a morality.
Is this a drunken review?
Nietzsche posits that the above mentioned virtues and aesthetic and or moral imperatives (or indeed any imperatives) are merely legacy, the result of Darwinian (although he does not use this word) qualities which have ensured the survival and prosperity of the 鈥榠ssuing鈥� authority. Good and evil, salvation of the soul and growth has nothing to do with it. As social structures change, so does the concept of morality. This of course, is the point, where his ingenious treatise of master and slave morality comes in.
Under 鈥榝eudal鈥� conditions, it is the rulers who determine the conception of 鈥榞ood鈥� and morality. 鈥榃e truthful one鈥檚 鈥� the nobility in ancient Greece called themselves, as it is a fundamental belief of all aristocrats that the common people are liars, insignificant, and cowards. It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were applied first to men, and were only derivatively applied at a later period to actions. The noble man regards himself, then as a determiner of values, he does not require to be approved of, he alone passes the judgment.鈥� On slave morality: 鈥榮upposing the abused and oppressed were allowed to moralise? What will be the common element in their moral estimates? Probably a pessimistic suspicion with regard to the entire situation of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man together with his situation. The slave has an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful, a scepticism of anything 鈥榞ood鈥� there honoured- he would fain persuade himself that an happiness found there was not genuine. Those qualities which serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers are brought into prominence: it is here that sympathy, the kind, helping hand, the warm heart, patience, diligence and humility attain to honour, for here they are the most useful qualities, and almost the only means of supporting the burden of existence. Here is the seat then of the famous antithesis of good and evil.鈥�
In essence, it is this 鈥榮lave morality鈥�, which arose incumbent on certain socio-economic conditions which no longer exist today, which has prevailed, and which tells me to be kind and fair, and not cruel. Why has it prevailed? Because it has been propped up by the Church for its own reasons(according to Nietzsche) which are not the subject of my review.
Under this argument, there can be no intrinsic value attached to say my being 鈥榢ind鈥� or 鈥樷€檈quitable鈥� or any such : it is an essence an arbitrary signifier, devoid of inherent 鈥榞ood or evil鈥�, simply a(n evolving) measure of utility imposed by the establishment in order to normalise expected intragroup behaviour, based on social and cultural conditions at the prevailing time.
The idea that morality is a tool for managing expectations is intriguing. In essence, in any subject-object interaction, the qualitative determination of the action in terms of 鈥榞ood and evil鈥� is not objective phenomena: it is simply an arbitrarily shared agreement between the two entities. The bible, for example, condones slavery. In the Unforgiving Slave (Mathew 18:21-35) there are a lot of people throwing themselves at each other鈥檚 feet (depending on rank) and debate on forgiveness: should you do it 7 or 77 times 7 times. But, interestingly, neither slave nor master seem in the least bit preoccupied about the institution of slavery. There is an expectation, an agreement, on both sides of the equation, at that particular time, that slavery is a non negotiable condition, and certainly not contra-morality.
The ethical quandary arises when their is a mismatch between subject object expectations. So, how many times should you forgive? 7? 77? Not at all? What determines this decision?
The negation, in the first instance, of a universal morality 鈥� The demand for one morality for all is detrimental (to the higher man)鈥� which can be applied as a 鈥榮ympathetic action鈥� and the determination of person specific morality is informed particularly by 鈥榯he power to will鈥�, namely that intra-group, we are not all equal. A hierarchy of power, circular in nature, is established whereby everyone surrenders their will to someone else, everyone has power over someone else.
Therefore, a 鈥榮ympathetic action鈥� (i.e. moral action) is not an independent, objective and universal phenomenon but must be, by default, be derived from the dynamics of the specific subject-object agreement from which it emanates. In essence, a 鈥榟igher excellence鈥� individual鈥� is the originators of his own 鈥榩ersonalised鈥� morality, which will constantly adapt and evolve according to the specificity of the recipient.
The above process is relevant only to higher excellence individuals (e.g. superman), e.g. those who do not follow the slave mentality outlined above. And it is by no means a pain free process:
the man who is a product of contrary instincts finds himself the hotbed of values which struggle with one another, and are seldom at peace. It is a weak man whose desire is that the war within him should come to an end; happiness appears to him in the character of a soothing medicine : the happiness of repose, undisturbedness, of repletion鈥�: which effectively portains the shutdown of mental faculties and free will, the strive for perfection and completion, a 鈥榙umbing down鈥� and surrender to the status quo, the non crystallisation of endless possibility. Instead, Nietzsche argues, 鈥榠f men, in addition to their powerful and irreconcilable instincts, have also indoctrinated in themselves a subtlety for carrying on the conflict in themselves, there then arisesthose marvellously incomprehensible and inexplicable beings, predestined for鈥�...conquest, achievement, fulfilment.
In essence, suffering is an essential prerequisite and necessary for the cultivation of human excellence. If an individual were to internalise the norm that suffering must be alleviated, then instead of suffering to 鈥榗reate鈥�, all energy is wasted, squandered in self pity and lament.
A possible explanation for Nietzsche鈥檚 insistence on suffering is his conception of a human being is one constituted by non conscious-type facts that determine his actions: 鈥極ne will become only what one is鈥� and 鈥榟e can only follow to the end what is fixed about him鈥�. His argument here is informed by a reversal of the Cartesian 鈥業 am therefore I think鈥� to 鈥業 think, therefore, I am鈥�, caveated with an epihenomenological explanation of the occurrence of thoughts; a thought arrives 鈥榳hen it wishes, not when 鈥業 鈥榳ish. Consequently it follows that actions are not caused by conscious but rather than unconscious will. If so, then it is not possible to resolve a conflict against one own self.
So far, so much waffle. (Not that Nietzsche doesn鈥檛 waffle: because he does). Epi consciousness, will of power, normative and descriptive components of morality, so the fuck what? Where exactly is the 鈥榮how me the money鈥� shot here?
I come away with:
I suffer. Its been a life-long project; with an end goal to alleviation. Now, I am free, because I I accept that suffering is OK: its a non balancing equation. I do not need to 鈥榞as鈥� it, I need to accept it. Its not something I will ever neutralise. If you can鈥檛 beat them join them. I will NOT waste anymore energy in suppression tactics. I will, instead, harness it and make it work for me. God, the relief....
I will no longer measure my worth in accordance with accepted dogma, and penalise myself if I feel I fall short. Morality is arbitrary: there is no objective good and evil. I will make my own morality. It is OK then, to take the path less travelled, and not subscribe to 鈥榮lave morality鈥�. If there is subject 鈥搊bject disagreement, is it possible, perhaps, that you are wrong and I am right? Does your disagreement and sense of entitlement obviate my sense of reason?
My life is determined by 鈥榳ill of power鈥�. You can go on and disagree, be a Jesuit. But. I accept that I will hurt people, and that people will hurt me, despite my best efforts. Even when I think I鈥檓 labouring for the 鈥榞reater good鈥�, someone will be coming unstuck for it. This is OK. It is a fallacy to strive for perfection in the non hurting business. One man鈥檚 poison is another man鈥檚 meat.
But finally. The money shot. I don鈥檛 need to hate myself. Instead of wasting energy on penitence and self flagellation, I need to be finding my own 鈥榣ittle community.鈥� I would much rather sin with a group of five than suffer in isolation amongst millions. If I failed you: you weren鈥檛 for me. We just don鈥檛 have 鈥� subject object鈥� agreement.
I don鈥檛 want to give up my morality for you.
I don鈥檛 want you to give up your morality for me.
I want us to share a morality.
Is this a drunken review?
August 15, 2015
賳蹖趩賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 丿乇 倬蹖 乇賵卮賳诏乇蹖 丕爻鬲. 丕爻倬蹖賳賵夭丕 乇丕 亘丕 卮賲卮蹖乇 賲賳胤賯 爻乇 賲蹖亘乇丿 賵 亘乇 丿蹖賳丿丕乇蹖 賵賱鬲乇 賲蹖鬲丕夭丿. 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 丕賮賱丕胤賵賳 乇丕 亘賴 賵乇胤賴 鬲賳丕賯囟 賲蹖讴卮丕賳丿 賵 亘丕 賮賱賵亘乇 丕賳丿賵賴賳丕讴 賴賲丿乇丿蹖 賲蹖讴賳丿. 賳蹖趩賴 丿乇 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿貙 禺賵丕爻鬲 夭賳丕賳 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丕爻鬲賳 乇丕 鬲賯亘蹖丨 賲蹖讴賳丿 賵 賲乇丿丕賳 賲丿丕賮毓 丕蹖賳 賳馗乇蹖賴 乇丕 丕亘賱賴丕賳 賲蹖賳丕賲丿. 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿 亘蹖丕賳诏乇 賳馗乇蹖丕鬲 丕賳鬲賯丕丿蹖 賳蹖趩賴 丿乇 乇丕爻鬲丕蹖 鬲亘蹖蹖賳 賮賱爻賮賴 丌蹖賳丿賴 賵 鬲毓乇蹖賮 賮蹖賱爻賵賮 噩丿蹖丿 丕爻鬲. 丿乇 賮氐賱 倬丕蹖丕賳蹖 讴鬲丕亘貙 賳蹖趩賴 賲賮賴賵賲 "賵丕賱丕 " 乇丕 卮乇丨 賲蹖丿賴丿 賵 讴丕乇 乇丕 亘丿爻鬲 噩丕賳 賴丕蹖 丌夭丕丿賴 賲蹖诏匕丕乇丿. 丿乇 鬲毓亘蹖乇蹖 亘蹖 賳賴丕蹖鬲 丕賮爻賵賳诏乇 噩丕賳 賴丕蹖 丌夭丕丿賴 乇丕 亘丕 爻鬲丕乇诏丕賳 亘丕 卮讴賵賴 丿賵乇 丿爻鬲 賲賯丕蹖爻賴 賲蹖讴賳丿 賵 賲蹖诏賵蹖丿 鬲丕 夭賲丕賳蹖 讴賴 賳賵乇 丕蹖賳 爻鬲丕乇诏丕賳 亘賴 丕賳爻丕賳 賳乇爻丿 賳賵毓 亘卮乇 賵噩賵丿 丌賳丕賳 乇丕 丕賳讴丕乇 賲蹖讴賳丿. 爻倬爻 亘丕 胤乇丨 倬乇爻卮蹖 賴賵卮賲賳丿丕賳賴 丕蹖賳 賳讴鬲賴 乇丕 蹖丕丿丌賵乇 賲蹖鈥屫促堌� 讴賴 噩丕賳 賴丕蹖 丌夭丕丿賴 亘乇丕蹖 卮賳丕禺鬲 賵 倬匕蹖乇卮 丕夭 爻賵蹖 賲乇丿賲 亘賴 趩賳丿 賯乇賳 夭賲丕賳 丕丨鬲蹖丕噩 丿丕乇賳丿責 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 丕賳鬲賯丕丿蹖 賳蹖趩賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 爻鬲賵丿賳蹖 丕爻鬲. 氐乇丕丨鬲 亘蹖丕賳 丕賵 賳賵毓 亘卮乇 乇丕 賳卮丕賳賴 诏乇賮鬲賴 賵 囟毓賮 禺乇丿 賮蹖賱爻賵賮丕賳 乇丕 亘賴 毓賳賵丕賳 乇賵卮賳賮讴乇丕賳 亘卮乇 诏賲乇丕賴 讴賳賳丿賴 賲蹖鈥屫促呚ж必�. 賳蹖趩賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 鬲賳賴丕爻鬲. 賮乇蹖丕丿 亘乇丌賲丿賴 丕夭 鬲賳賴丕蹖蹖 丕賵 賳賯卮 诏賱蹖 乇丕 丕蹖賮丕 賲蹖讴賳丿 讴賴 丿乇 倬蹖 倬跇賲乇丿賳 賵 丕夭 丿爻鬲 丿丕丿賳 亘賵蹖 禺賵蹖卮 丕爻鬲. 賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿貙 氐賵乇鬲 讴丕睾匕蹖 賴夭丕乇鬲賵蹖 夭乇蹖賳 賳蹖趩賴 丕爻鬲.
June 2, 2016
What a strange book this is. I鈥檓 not sure that I am comfortable labeling it 鈥減hilosophy.鈥� Thoughtful, yes. Interesting, definitely. Philosophical, sure. But philosophy?
Nietzsche is a powerful and brilliant writer. His prose, swift; his sentences, roving; his tone, pugnacious. But I frequently wished he would decelerate from his brisk allegro to a moderato, to a tempo where he can better express his ideas systematically. But perhaps that鈥檚 not the point. After all, Nietzsche was aiming for destruction, not construction. And this book contains plenty of it.
After reading Notes from the Underground, I can really appreciate what he was getting at with 鈥渂eyond good and evil.鈥� Previous moral thinkers (Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Mill) all start off assuming that good and evil are opposites. But what if they aren鈥檛? Nietzsche goes on to attack the notion of truth vs. appearance. He boldly proclaims that 鈥淚t is nothing more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than appearance.鈥� And it is precisely moral prejudice that Nietzsche is trying to avoid.
What a prophet this man was! In this book, he rails at anti-semitism, and boldly proclaims that 鈥淭he time for petty politics is past: the very next century will bring with it mastery of the whole earth.鈥� Add this to his discussion of the death of Christian morality and the rise of scientific materialism and democracy 鈥� the man saw all of it coming.
The modern reader (we 鈥渓ast men鈥�) will perhaps get a bitter taste in our mouth from Nietzsche鈥檚 discussion of the natural inequality of man, and the higher-man鈥檚 privilege to exploit the lower men. However, it is a point worth thinking about. Hobbes begins his philosophy by taking the natural equality of men as a given. Locke, Rousseau, and Marx continued this line of thought. Nietzsche considers this just a Pollyannish idea that we have conjured up to make ourselves feel better. Inequality exists, and the point of a society is to support its highest caste. Well somebody had to consider it.
But remember: 鈥淓very deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood.鈥� He鈥檚 a tricky man, his prose dances, and it鈥檚 tough to document a dancer in still photographs.
Nietzsche is a powerful and brilliant writer. His prose, swift; his sentences, roving; his tone, pugnacious. But I frequently wished he would decelerate from his brisk allegro to a moderato, to a tempo where he can better express his ideas systematically. But perhaps that鈥檚 not the point. After all, Nietzsche was aiming for destruction, not construction. And this book contains plenty of it.
After reading Notes from the Underground, I can really appreciate what he was getting at with 鈥渂eyond good and evil.鈥� Previous moral thinkers (Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Mill) all start off assuming that good and evil are opposites. But what if they aren鈥檛? Nietzsche goes on to attack the notion of truth vs. appearance. He boldly proclaims that 鈥淚t is nothing more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than appearance.鈥� And it is precisely moral prejudice that Nietzsche is trying to avoid.
What a prophet this man was! In this book, he rails at anti-semitism, and boldly proclaims that 鈥淭he time for petty politics is past: the very next century will bring with it mastery of the whole earth.鈥� Add this to his discussion of the death of Christian morality and the rise of scientific materialism and democracy 鈥� the man saw all of it coming.
The modern reader (we 鈥渓ast men鈥�) will perhaps get a bitter taste in our mouth from Nietzsche鈥檚 discussion of the natural inequality of man, and the higher-man鈥檚 privilege to exploit the lower men. However, it is a point worth thinking about. Hobbes begins his philosophy by taking the natural equality of men as a given. Locke, Rousseau, and Marx continued this line of thought. Nietzsche considers this just a Pollyannish idea that we have conjured up to make ourselves feel better. Inequality exists, and the point of a society is to support its highest caste. Well somebody had to consider it.
But remember: 鈥淓very deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood.鈥� He鈥檚 a tricky man, his prose dances, and it鈥檚 tough to document a dancer in still photographs.
January 6, 2013
The passage which really summed up this book for me was "Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood." Yep, right there. It's what annoys me about a lot of philosophy - I just want people to be able to write clearly and honestly about what they actually mean. Nietzsche's language is so dense and impenetrable (and clearly deliberately so) that it is frustrating to read. There's definitely a whiff of the emperor's new clothes about this book.
And don't get me started on his views about women: "nothing is more foreign, more repugnant, or more hostile to woman than truth - her great art is falsehood, her chief concern is appearance and beauty." Oh dear, too late, I can't stop now: "When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain virility of taste...".
"Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the instinct for the secondary role."
I thought Erasmus's views were bad, but he lived four hundred years before Nietzsche. I had hoped that by the late nineteenth century 'deep thinkers' might have become more enlightened. Apparently not.
And don't get me started on his views about women: "nothing is more foreign, more repugnant, or more hostile to woman than truth - her great art is falsehood, her chief concern is appearance and beauty." Oh dear, too late, I can't stop now: "When a woman has scholarly inclinations there is generally something wrong with her sexual nature. Barrenness itself conduces to a certain virility of taste...".
"Comparing man and woman generally, one may say that woman would not have the genius for adornment, if she had not the instinct for the secondary role."
I thought Erasmus's views were bad, but he lived four hundred years before Nietzsche. I had hoped that by the late nineteenth century 'deep thinkers' might have become more enlightened. Apparently not.
January 17, 2018
賮乇丕爻賵蹖 賳蹖讴 賵 亘丿
丕孬乇 禺賵亘蹖 亘賵丿. 亘毓丿 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 趩賳蹖賳 诏賮鬲 夭乇鬲卮鬲 賳賵卮鬲賴 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賱丕夭賲 丕爻鬲 賯亘賱 丕夭 禺賵丕賳丿賳 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇貙 禺賵丕賳丿賴 卮賵丿 夭蹖乇丕 趩賳丿蹖賳 丕乇噩丕毓 賴乇趩賳丿 讴賵趩讴 丿乇 賲鬲賳貙 亘賴 丌賳 氐賵乇鬲 賲蹖 诏蹖乇丿.
乇爻丕賱鬲 丕氐賱蹖 賳蹖趩賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 賳蹖夭 蹖丕賮鬲賳 賵 賳卮丕賳 丿丕丿賳 丨賯蹖賯鬲 丕爻鬲. 丕賵 丿乇 鬲賲丕賲 亘丕賵乇賴丕蹖 賯亘賱 丕夭 禺賵丿 卮讴 賲蹖 讴賳丿貙 丌賳賴丕 乇丕 夭蹖乇 爻賵丕賱 賲蹖 亘乇丿 賵 亘賴 趩丕賱卮 賲蹖 讴卮丿 賵 丿乇 賳賴丕蹖鬲 囟毓賮 丌賳賴丕 乇丕 賳賲丕蹖丕賳 讴乇丿賴 賵 丌賳賴丕 乇丕 卮讴爻鬲 賲蹖丿賴丿. 丕賵 丿乇 丕蹖賳 乇丕賴 丨鬲蹖 賮蹖賱爻賵賮丕賳 亘夭乇诏賽 賯亘賱 丕夭 禺賵丿 賵 丕賳丿蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 丌賳賴丕 乇丕 夭蹖乇 爻賵丕賱 賲蹖 亘乇丿 賵 賴蹖趩 讴爻 乇丕 鬲賯丿蹖爻 賳賲蹖讴賳丿. 亘賴 亘乇乇爻蹖 賲爻丕卅賱 爻蹖丕爻蹖貙 賳丨賵賴 夭賳丿诏蹖貙 丿賵賱鬲 賴丕貙 賲乇丿賲丕賳 賲賱賱 賲禺鬲賱賮貙 丕禺賱丕賯 賵 ... 賲蹖 倬乇丿丕夭丿貙 囟毓賮 賲賵噩賵丿 爻蹖爻鬲賲 賮毓賱蹖 丌賳賴丕 乇丕 賳賲丕蹖卮 賲蹖丿賴丿 賵 乇丕賴讴丕乇 賲賳丕爻亘 丿乇 亘乇禺賵乇丿 亘丕 丌賳賴丕 乇丕 丕乇丕卅賴 賲蹖丿賴丿.
賳賯丕胤 賯賵鬲:
亘乇乇爻蹖 賴賲賴 噩丕賳亘賴 賲爻丕卅賱
夭蹖乇 爻賵丕賱 亘乇丿賳 賴賲賴 趩蹖夭 賵 賴賲賴 讴爻
倬乇賴蹖夭 丕夭 鬲賯丿蹖爻 讴乇丿賳
丕丿亘蹖丕鬲 賮賵賯 丕賱毓丕丿賴 賯賵蹖
噩賲賱賴 賴丕蹖 胤賵賱丕賳賭賭賭賭賭賭賭賭賭蹖 賵 丿乇 毓蹖賳 丨丕賱 賯賵蹖
丌蹖賳丿賴 賳诏乇蹖賽 丿乇爻鬲貙 亘賴 胤賵乇蹖 讴賴 亘毓囟蹖 丕夭 倬蹖卮 亘蹖賳蹖 賴丕蹖 丕賵貙 丿乇 丿賳蹖丕蹖 丕賲乇賵夭 亘賴 丨賯蹖賯鬲 倬蹖賵爻鬲賴 丕爻鬲
丕卮毓丕乇 夭蹖亘丕
賳賯丕胤 囟毓賮:
丕蹖賳 賳賯丕胤 囟毓賮貙 賳馗乇 卮禺氐蹖 爻鬲 讴賴 鬲丕 丕蹖賳 賱丨馗賴 賳鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賲 賲卮讴賱丕鬲 禺賵丿賲 乇丕 亘丕 丌賳 丨賱 讴賳賲.
賲爻丕賱賴 丕禺賱丕賯 : 亘乇乇爻蹖 爻蹖爻鬲賲 賴丕蹖 丕禺賱丕賯蹖 讴丕乇亘乇丿蹖 丿乇 噩丕賲毓賴 賵 賳賴 鬲賲丕賲 爻蹖爻鬲賲 賴丕蹖 丕禺賱丕賯蹖 匕讴乇 卮丿賴貙 讴賲蹖 亘丕 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 賮丕氐賱賴 丿丕乇丿貙 亘賴 胤賵乇蹖 讴賴 賳賲賵丿 爻蹖爻鬲賲 丕禺賱丕賯蹖 噩丕賲毓賴貙 亘丕 鬲賲丕賲 毓蹖亘 賴丕蹖 禺賵丿貙 丿乇 丨丕賱 丨乇讴鬲 賵 倬丕爻禺诏賵蹖蹖 丕爻鬲 賵 賳賲賵丿賽 丕蹖賳 爻蹖爻鬲賲貙 丨鬲蹖 丿乇 丿蹖爻鬲賵倬蹖丕 賳蹖夭貙 亘丕 亘乇乇爻蹖 氐賵乇鬲 诏乇賮鬲賴 鬲賵爻胤 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 賮丕氐賱賴 丿丕乇丿. 賲賵囟賵毓 丿蹖诏乇貙 賳丨賵賴 毓賲賱讴乇丿 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 亘毓丿 丕夭 丕毓賱丕賲 丕蹖賲賵乇丕賱 亘賵丿賳 禺锟斤拷丿 丕爻鬲. 亘賴 胤賵乇蹖 讴賴 爻蹖爻鬲賲 乇賮鬲丕乇蹖賽 丕乇丕卅賴 卮丿賴 鬲賵爻胤 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴貙 囟毓賮 賴丕蹖 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖 丕禺賱丕賯蹖 卮丿蹖丿蹖 乇丕 卮丕賲賱 賲蹖 卮賵丿 讴賴 亘乇丕蹖 賲孬丕賱賽 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 丕蹖賳 囟毓賮 賴丕貙 賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳 亘賴 賲爻卅賵賱蹖鬲 倬匕蹖乇蹖 丕夭 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 跇丕賳-倬賱 爻丕乇鬲乇貙 丕卮丕乇賴 讴乇丿.
賲爻丕賱賴 夭賳丕賳: 爻乇鬲丕爻乇 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇貙 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 亘毓丿 丕夭 丕蹖賳讴賴 賲禺丕賱賮鬲 禺賵丿 乇丕 丕賮乇丕丿 蹖丕 爻蹖爻鬲賲 賴丕 丕毓賱丕賲 賲蹖讴賳丿貙 丿賱丕蹖賱 禺賵丿 乇丕 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 讴丕賲賱 丿乇 丕丿丕賲賴 蹖 丌賳 匕讴乇 賲蹖讴賳丿. 鬲賳賴丕 亘禺卮蹖 讴賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 亘賴 丕毓賱丕賲 賲禺丕賱賮鬲 賵 鬲禺乇蹖亘 亘丿賵賳 丕乇丕卅賴 丿賱蹖賱 賲蹖 倬乇丿丕夭丿貙 亘禺卮 賲乇亘賵胤 亘賴 夭賳丕賳 丕爻鬲. 賳讴鬲賴 胤毓賳賴 丌賲蹖夭 丕蹖賳 亘禺卮 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 讴賴 倬蹖卮 亘蹖賳蹖 賴丕蹖 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丿乇 乇丕亘胤賴 亘賴 噩賳亘卮 賮賲賳蹖爻賲貙 丿乇 丿賵乇賴 夭賲丕賳蹖 賲丕貙 亘賴 丨賯蹖賯鬲 丿乇丌賲丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 丕賲丕 賴賲趩賳丕賳 丕蹖賳 賲賵囟賵毓貙 丿賱蹖賱蹖 亘乇丕蹖 賲禺丕賱賮鬲 亘丕 夭賳丕賳貙 賳賲蹖 卮賵丿.
丿乇 乇丕亘胤賴 亘丕 鬲乇噩賲賴:
鬲乇噩賲賴 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 讴賴 鬲賵爻胤 噩賳丕亘 丌卮賵乇蹖 氐賵乇鬲 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕爻鬲貙 讴丕賲賱貙 夭蹖亘丕貙 诏蹖乇丕 賵 亘丿賵賳 讴賵趩讴鬲乇蹖賳 丕蹖乇丕丿 賵 丕卮讴丕賱蹖 丕爻鬲 賵 鬲丕 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 夭亘丕賳 賮丕乇爻蹖 丕噩丕夭賴 賲蹖丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 鬲乇噩賲賴 乇賵丕賳 賵 丕氐蹖賱蹖 氐賵乇鬲 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕爻鬲.
亘乇賵夭 乇爻丕賳蹖 : 亘丕 鬲賵噩賴 亘賴 乇賵卮賳诏乇蹖 丕蹖 讴賴 賳蹖趩賴 丿乇 讴鬲丕亘 "鬲亘丕乇卮賳丕爻蹖 丕禺賱丕賯" 丿乇 賲賵乇丿 毓賳賵丕賳 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丕賳噩丕賲 賲蹖丿賴丿貙 噩賳丕亘 丿丕乇蹖賵卮 丌卮賵乇蹖 丿乇 倬丕賳賵蹖爻 丌賳 丕孬乇 (鬲亘丕乇卮賳丕爻蹖 丕禺賱丕賯貙 鬲乇噩賲賴 丿丕乇蹖賵卮 丌卮賵乇蹖貙 賳卮乇 丌诏賴貙 氐賮丨賴 67) 匕讴乇 賲蹖讴賳丿 讴賴 丿乇爻鬲 丌賳 亘賵丿 讴賴 賳丕賲 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 乇丕 "賮乇丕爻賵蹖 禺蹖乇 賵 卮乇" 賲蹖 诏匕丕卮鬲賴 丕爻鬲.
July 2, 2021
Started the book very enthusiastically but it was way too difficult to comprehend. Requires a lot of time and concentration in order to understand the book and writer鈥檚 point of view.
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January 8, 2016
I enjoyed the writings of this philosopher. The author was a strong thinker of the eighteen hundreds. His philosophy goes strongly against the western thought of Christianity. Instead of the slave morality that Christianity imbrases, his philosophy celebrates living in the moment.
I recommend this book to all.
Enjoy and Be Blessed.
Diamond
I recommend this book to all.
Enjoy and Be Blessed.
Diamond
December 24, 2020
Beyond Good and Evil has made for an informative and thought-provoking experience. I did not appreciate this as much as The Antichrist, but still, this book holds some rather valuable points, and I'm glad to have finally read it.
To appreciate Nietzsche, it helps to not be easily offended. I am aware of people that are put off by something that he may have stated in his writings, and therefore, they just make the rather odd presumption, that Nietzsche was in fact, a moron. As a feminist, it is evident that Nietzsche was a misogynist, and there are parts in this book where he makes this known, but there are also parts, where he discusses equality of the sexes. I notice that Nietzsche admits that his misogyny is in fact a terrible weakness of his.
The style of this book is written in typical Nietzsche, so if you are expecting something that flows smoothly, you won't find that here. This is written in note form, although, the subject matter is in some sort of order that one can gain something from.
"Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you."
I enjoy how Nietzsche can write a line of thoughts, and then that can prompt a series of interesting questions and answers from his readers. I'll certainly be reading more from him in the future.
To appreciate Nietzsche, it helps to not be easily offended. I am aware of people that are put off by something that he may have stated in his writings, and therefore, they just make the rather odd presumption, that Nietzsche was in fact, a moron. As a feminist, it is evident that Nietzsche was a misogynist, and there are parts in this book where he makes this known, but there are also parts, where he discusses equality of the sexes. I notice that Nietzsche admits that his misogyny is in fact a terrible weakness of his.
The style of this book is written in typical Nietzsche, so if you are expecting something that flows smoothly, you won't find that here. This is written in note form, although, the subject matter is in some sort of order that one can gain something from.
"Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you."
I enjoy how Nietzsche can write a line of thoughts, and then that can prompt a series of interesting questions and answers from his readers. I'll certainly be reading more from him in the future.
September 10, 2017
賲丕 賵乇丕亍 丕賱禺賷乇 賵丕賱卮乇 賴賵 兀賴賲 賰鬲亘 賳賷鬲卮賴 亘毓丿 賴賰匕丕 鬲賰賱賲 夭乇丕丿卮鬲 賵兀賰孬乇賴賲 氐毓賵亘丞 賵廿乇賴丕賯賸丕 賮賷 丕賱賯乇丕亍丞貙 賮賰丕賳鬲 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賲賳 丕賱賲賯丕胤毓 亘丨丕噩丞 廿賱賶 丕賱廿毓丕丿丞 毓丿丞 賲乇賾丕鬲 賰賷 兀爻鬲胤賷毓 賮賴賲賴丕 亘卮賰賱 噩賷丿.
丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賳賯丿 賱賱丨丿丕孬丞 賰賲丕 賯丕賱 賳賷鬲卮賴 毓賳賴貙 賮賱丕 賷爻鬲孬賳賶 兀賷 賮毓賱 丨丿丕孬賷 爻賷丕爻賷賸丕 兀賵 兀禺賱丕賯賷賸丕 兀賵 丿賷賳賷賸丕 廿賱丕 賵鬲丨丿孬 毓賳賴貙 賵賰丕賳 兀賰孬乇 鬲乇賰賷夭賸丕 毓賱賶 毓乇囟 賲賮賴賵賲 丕賱賱丕 兀禺賱丕賯賷丞 兀賰孬乇 賲賳 兀賷 賳賯胤丞 兀禺乇賶 賮賷 賮賱爻賮鬲賴.
賵賷馗賱 賳賷鬲卮賴 賲賳 兀賯乇亘 丕賱賮賱丕爻賮丞 廿賱賷賻賾 賵兀賰孬乇賴賲 鬲兀孬賷乇賸丕 賮賷賻賾 亘毓丿 賰丕賳胤.
丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賳賯丿 賱賱丨丿丕孬丞 賰賲丕 賯丕賱 賳賷鬲卮賴 毓賳賴貙 賮賱丕 賷爻鬲孬賳賶 兀賷 賮毓賱 丨丿丕孬賷 爻賷丕爻賷賸丕 兀賵 兀禺賱丕賯賷賸丕 兀賵 丿賷賳賷賸丕 廿賱丕 賵鬲丨丿孬 毓賳賴貙 賵賰丕賳 兀賰孬乇 鬲乇賰賷夭賸丕 毓賱賶 毓乇囟 賲賮賴賵賲 丕賱賱丕 兀禺賱丕賯賷丞 兀賰孬乇 賲賳 兀賷 賳賯胤丞 兀禺乇賶 賮賷 賮賱爻賮鬲賴.
賵賷馗賱 賳賷鬲卮賴 賲賳 兀賯乇亘 丕賱賮賱丕爻賮丞 廿賱賷賻賾 賵兀賰孬乇賴賲 鬲兀孬賷乇賸丕 賮賷賻賾 亘毓丿 賰丕賳胤.
September 10, 2021
'What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil.'
This collection of statements and aphorisms over various subjects written in a resolutely lyrical tone - inasmuch as I can judge from the English translation - is double-edged indeed.
On the one hand, it is an eloquent, powerful case made for the individual yearning for personal freedom, the determination of their own values, the affirmation of the self.
On the other hand, the values that are set here indeed spring from the strong personal prejudices of the writer. Strangely enough, some remarks casually made about the use of women had a ring strikingly similar to those made by Arthur Schopenhauer in his . Some regarding the eternal necessity of slaves to human society to support an elite. Some others about the supposedly European invention of love.
-----
QUOTES:
On truth, and the creation, self-determination of values :
34.
'It is nothing more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than semblance; it is, in fact, the worst proved supposition in the world. So much must be conceded: there could have been no life at all except upon the basis of perspective estimates and semblances; and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm and stupidity of many philosophers, one wished to do away altogether with the "seeming world"--well, granted that YOU could do that,--at least nothing of your "truth" would thereby remain! Indeed, what is it that forces us in general to the supposition that there is an essential opposition of "true" and "false"? Is it not enough to suppose degrees of seemingness, and as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of semblance--different valeurs, as the painters say? Why might not the world WHICH CONCERNS US--be a fiction? And to any one who suggested: "But to a fiction belongs an originator?"--might it not be bluntly replied: WHY? May not this "belong" also belong to the fiction?'
260.
'The noble type of man regards HIMSELF as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: "What is injurious to me is injurious in itself;" [...]'
259.
'To refrain mutually from injury, from violence, from exploitation, and put one's will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain rough sense in good conduct among individuals when the necessary conditions are given (namely, the actual similarity of the individuals in amount of force and degree of worth, and their co-relation within one organization). As soon, however, as one wished to take this principle more generally, and if possible even as the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF SOCIETY, it would immediately disclose what it really is--namely, a Will to the DENIAL of life, a principle of dissolution and decay. Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is ESSENTIALLY appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation [...]. Even the organization within which, as was previously supposed, the individuals treat each other as equal--it takes place in every healthy aristocracy--must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organization, do all that towards other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will endeavour to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy-- not owing to any morality or immorality, but because it LIVES, and because life IS precisely Will to Power.'
208.
'The skeptic, in effect, that delicate creature, is far too easily frightened; [...] Yea! and Nay!--they seem to him opposed to morality; he loves, on the contrary, to make a festival to his virtue by a noble aloofness [...]. For skepticism is the most spiritual expression of a certain many-sided physiological temperament, which in ordinary language is called nervous debility and sickliness; it arises whenever races or classes which have been long separated, decisively and suddenly blend with one another. In the new generation, which has inherited as it were different standards and valuations in its blood, everything is disquiet, derangement, doubt, and tentativeness; the best powers operate restrictively, the very virtues prevent each other growing and becoming strong, equilibrium, ballast, and perpendicular stability are lacking in body and soul. That, however, which is most diseased and degenerated in such nondescripts is the WILL; they are no longer familiar with independence of decision, or the courageous feeling of pleasure in willing--they are doubtful of the "freedom of the will" even in their dreams Our present-day Europe, the scene of a senseless, precipitate attempt at a radical blending of classes, and CONSEQUENTLY of races, is therefore skeptical in all its heights and depths, sometimes exhibiting the mobile skepticism which springs impatiently and wantonly from branch to branch, sometimes with gloomy aspect, like a cloud over-charged with interrogative signs--and often sick unto death of its will! Paralysis of will, where do we not find this cripple sitting nowadays!'
222.
'Wherever sympathy (fellow-suffering) is preached nowadays-- and, if I gather rightly, no other religion is any longer preached--let the psychologist have his ears open through all the vanity, through all the noise which is natural to these preachers (as to all preachers), he will hear a hoarse, groaning, genuine note of SELF-CONTEMPT.'
258.
'The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the SIGNIFICANCE and highest justification thereof--that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, FOR ITS SAKE, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments.'
On the tyranny of the majority (reasonable or not) trespassing on individuality :
191.
'[...] the question whether, in respect to the valuation of things, instinct deserves more authority than rationality [...]. Unless one should make an exception in the case of Descartes, the father of rationalism (and consequently the grandfather of the Revolution), who recognized only the authority of reason: but reason is only a tool, and Descartes was superficial.'
228.
'Not one of those ponderous, conscience-stricken herding-animals (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as conducive to the general welfare) wants to have any knowledge or inkling of the facts that the "general welfare" is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all grasped, but is only a nostrum,--that what is fair to one MAY NOT at all be fair to another.'
200.
'The man of an age of dissolution which mixes the races with one another, who has the inheritance of a diversified descent in his body--that is to say, contrary, and often not only contrary, instincts and standards of value, which struggle with one another and are seldom at peace--such a man of late culture and broken lights, will, on an average, be a weak man. His fundamental desire is that the war which is IN HIM should come to an end; happiness appears to him in the character of a soothing medicine and mode of thought (for instance, Epicurean or Christian); it is above all things the happiness of repose, of undisturbedness, of repletion, of final unity--it is the "Sabbath of Sabbaths," to use the expression of the holy rhetorician, St. Augustine, who was himself such a man.--Should, however, the contrariety and conflict in such natures operate as an ADDITIONAL incentive and stimulus to life--and if, on the other hand, in addition to their powerful and irreconcilable instincts, they have also inherited and indoctrinated into them a proper mastery and subtlety for carrying on the conflict with themselves (that is to say, the faculty of self-control and self-deception), there then arise those marvelously incomprehensible and inexplicable beings, those enigmatical men, predestined for conquering and circumventing others, the finest examples of which are Alcibiades and Caesar (with whom I should like to associate the FIRST of Europeans according to my taste, the Hohenstaufen, Frederick the Second), and among artists, perhaps Leonardo da Vinci. They appear precisely in the same periods when that weaker type, with its longing for repose, comes to the front; the two types are complementary to each other, and spring from the same causes.'
242.
'The same new conditions under which on an average a levelling and mediocrising of man will take place--a useful, industrious, variously serviceable, and clever gregarious man--are in the highest degree suitable to give rise to exceptional men of the most dangerous and attractive qualities. For, while the capacity for adaptation, which is every day trying changing conditions, and begins a new work with every generation, almost with every decade, makes the POWERFULNESS of the type impossible; while the collective impression of such future Europeans will probably be that of numerous, talkative, weak-willed, and very handy workmen who REQUIRE a master, a commander, as they require their daily bread; while, therefore, the democratising of Europe will tend to the production of a type prepared for SLAVERY in the most subtle sense of the term: the STRONG man will necessarily in individual and exceptional cases, become stronger and richer than he has perhaps ever been before--owing to the unprejudicedness of his schooling, owing to the immense variety of practice, art, and disguise. I meant to say that the democratising of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the rearing of TYRANTS--taking the word in all its meanings, even in its most spiritual sense.'
44.
'Briefly and regrettably, they belong to the LEVELLERS, these wrongly named "free spirits"--as glib-tongued and scribe-fingered slaves of the democratic taste and its "modern ideas" all of them men without solitude, without personal solitude, blunt honest fellows to whom neither courage nor honourable conduct ought to be denied, only, they are not free, and are ludicrously superficial, especially in their innate partiality for seeing the cause of almost ALL human misery and failure in the old forms in which society has hitherto existed [...]! What they would fain attain with all their strength, is the universal, green-meadow happiness of the herd, together with security, safety, comfort, and alleviation of life for every one, their two most frequently chanted songs and doctrines are called "Equality of Rights" and "Sympathy with All Sufferers"--and suffering itself is looked upon by them as something which must be DONE AWAY WITH. We opposite ones, however, [...] believe that severity, violence, slavery, danger in the street and in the heart, secrecy, stoicism, tempter's art and devilry of every kind,--that everything wicked, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and serpentine in man, serves as well for the elevation of the human species as its opposite [...].'
Having been at home, or at least guests, in many realms of the spirit, having escaped again and again from the gloomy, agreeable nooks in which preferences and prejudices, youth, origin, the accident of men and books, or even the weariness of travel seemed to confine us, full of malice against the seductions of dependency which he concealed in honours, money, positions, or exaltation of the senses, grateful even for distress and the vicissitudes of illness, because they always free us from some rule, and its "prejudice," grateful to the God, devil, sheep, and worm in us, inquisitive to a fault, investigators to the point of cruelty, with unhesitating fingers for the intangible, with teeth and stomachs for the most indigestible, ready for any business that requires sagacity and acute senses, ready for every adventure, owing to an excess of "free will", with anterior and posterior souls, into the ultimate intentions of which it is difficult to pry, with foregrounds and backgrounds to the end of which no foot may run, hidden ones under the mantles of light, appropriators, although we resemble heirs and spendthrifts, arrangers and collectors from morning till night, misers of our wealth and our full-crammed drawers, economical in learning and forgetting, inventive in scheming, sometimes proud of tables of categories, sometimes pedants, sometimes night-owls of work even in full day, yea, if necessary, even scarecrows--and it is necessary nowadays, that is to say, inasmuch as we are the born, sworn, jealous friends of SOLITUDE, of our own profoundest midnight and midday solitude--such kind of men are we, we free spirits!'
225.
'Whether it be hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, or eudaemonism, all those modes of thinking which measure the worth of things according to PLEASURE and PAIN, that is, according to accompanying circumstances and secondary considerations, are plausible modes of thought and naivetes, which every one conscious of CREATIVE powers and an artist's conscience will look down upon with scorn, though not without sympathy. Sympathy for you!--to be sure, that is not sympathy as you understand it: it is not sympathy for social "distress," for "society" with its sick and misfortuned, for the hereditarily vicious and defective who lie on the ground around us; still less is it sympathy for the grumbling, vexed, revolutionary slave-classes who strive after power--they call it "freedom." OUR sympathy is a loftier and further-sighted sympathy:--we see how MAN dwarfs himself, how YOU dwarf him! and there are moments when we view YOUR sympathy with an indescribable anguish, when we resist it,--when we regard your seriousness as more dangerous than any kind of levity. You want, if possible--and there is not a more foolish "if possible" --TO DO AWAY WITH SUFFERING; and we?--it really seems that WE would rather have it increased and made worse than it has ever been! Well-being, as you understand it--is certainly not a goal; it seems to us an END; a condition which at once renders man ludicrous and contemptible--and makes his destruction DESIRABLE! The discipline of suffering, of GREAT suffering--know ye not that it is only THIS discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto?
About PC and finger-pointing, among others:
219.
'The practice of judging and condemning morally, is the favourite revenge of the intellectually shallow on those who are less so, it is also a kind of indemnity for their being badly endowed by nature, and finally, it is an opportunity for acquiring spirit and BECOMING subtle--malice spiritualises. [...]'
201.
'How much or how little dangerousness to the community or to equality is contained in an opinion, a condition, an emotion, a disposition, or an endowment-- that is now the moral perspective, here again fear is the mother of morals. It is by the loftiest and strongest instincts, when they break out passionately and carry the individual far above and beyond the average, and the low level of the gregarious conscience, that the self-reliance of the community is destroyed, its belief in itself, its backbone, as it were, breaks, consequently these very instincts will be most branded and defamed. The lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, and even the cogent reason, are felt to be dangers, everything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called EVIL, the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition, the MEDIOCRITY of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour. Finally, under very peaceful circumstances, there is always less opportunity and necessity for training the feelings to severity and rigour, and now every form of severity, even in justice, begins to disturb the conscience, a lofty and rigorous nobleness and self-responsibility almost offends, and awakens distrust, "the lamb," and still more "the sheep," wins respect. There is a point of diseased mellowness and effeminacy in the history of society, at which society itself takes the part of him who injures it, the part of the CRIMINAL, and does so, in fact, seriously and honestly. To punish, appears to it to be somehow unfair--it is certain that the idea of "punishment" and "the obligation to punish" are then painful and alarming to people. "Is it not sufficient if the criminal be rendered HARMLESS? Why should we still punish? Punishment itself is terrible!"--with these questions gregarious morality, the morality of fear, draws its ultimate conclusion. If one could at all do away with danger, the cause of fear, one would have done away with this morality at the same time, it would no longer be necessary, it WOULD NOT CONSIDER ITSELF any longer necessary!--Whoever examines the conscience of the present-day European, will always elicit the same imperative from its thousand moral folds and hidden recesses, the imperative of the timidity of the herd "we wish that some time or other there may be NOTHING MORE TO FEAR!" Some time or other--the will and the way THERETO is nowadays called "progress" all over Europe.'
---------
See also:
This collection of statements and aphorisms over various subjects written in a resolutely lyrical tone - inasmuch as I can judge from the English translation - is double-edged indeed.
On the one hand, it is an eloquent, powerful case made for the individual yearning for personal freedom, the determination of their own values, the affirmation of the self.
On the other hand, the values that are set here indeed spring from the strong personal prejudices of the writer. Strangely enough, some remarks casually made about the use of women had a ring strikingly similar to those made by Arthur Schopenhauer in his . Some regarding the eternal necessity of slaves to human society to support an elite. Some others about the supposedly European invention of love.
-----
QUOTES:
On truth, and the creation, self-determination of values :
34.
'It is nothing more than a moral prejudice that truth is worth more than semblance; it is, in fact, the worst proved supposition in the world. So much must be conceded: there could have been no life at all except upon the basis of perspective estimates and semblances; and if, with the virtuous enthusiasm and stupidity of many philosophers, one wished to do away altogether with the "seeming world"--well, granted that YOU could do that,--at least nothing of your "truth" would thereby remain! Indeed, what is it that forces us in general to the supposition that there is an essential opposition of "true" and "false"? Is it not enough to suppose degrees of seemingness, and as it were lighter and darker shades and tones of semblance--different valeurs, as the painters say? Why might not the world WHICH CONCERNS US--be a fiction? And to any one who suggested: "But to a fiction belongs an originator?"--might it not be bluntly replied: WHY? May not this "belong" also belong to the fiction?'
260.
'The noble type of man regards HIMSELF as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: "What is injurious to me is injurious in itself;" [...]'
259.
'To refrain mutually from injury, from violence, from exploitation, and put one's will on a par with that of others: this may result in a certain rough sense in good conduct among individuals when the necessary conditions are given (namely, the actual similarity of the individuals in amount of force and degree of worth, and their co-relation within one organization). As soon, however, as one wished to take this principle more generally, and if possible even as the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF SOCIETY, it would immediately disclose what it really is--namely, a Will to the DENIAL of life, a principle of dissolution and decay. Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is ESSENTIALLY appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation [...]. Even the organization within which, as was previously supposed, the individuals treat each other as equal--it takes place in every healthy aristocracy--must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organization, do all that towards other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other it will have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will endeavour to grow, to gain ground, attract to itself and acquire ascendancy-- not owing to any morality or immorality, but because it LIVES, and because life IS precisely Will to Power.'
208.
'The skeptic, in effect, that delicate creature, is far too easily frightened; [...] Yea! and Nay!--they seem to him opposed to morality; he loves, on the contrary, to make a festival to his virtue by a noble aloofness [...]. For skepticism is the most spiritual expression of a certain many-sided physiological temperament, which in ordinary language is called nervous debility and sickliness; it arises whenever races or classes which have been long separated, decisively and suddenly blend with one another. In the new generation, which has inherited as it were different standards and valuations in its blood, everything is disquiet, derangement, doubt, and tentativeness; the best powers operate restrictively, the very virtues prevent each other growing and becoming strong, equilibrium, ballast, and perpendicular stability are lacking in body and soul. That, however, which is most diseased and degenerated in such nondescripts is the WILL; they are no longer familiar with independence of decision, or the courageous feeling of pleasure in willing--they are doubtful of the "freedom of the will" even in their dreams Our present-day Europe, the scene of a senseless, precipitate attempt at a radical blending of classes, and CONSEQUENTLY of races, is therefore skeptical in all its heights and depths, sometimes exhibiting the mobile skepticism which springs impatiently and wantonly from branch to branch, sometimes with gloomy aspect, like a cloud over-charged with interrogative signs--and often sick unto death of its will! Paralysis of will, where do we not find this cripple sitting nowadays!'
222.
'Wherever sympathy (fellow-suffering) is preached nowadays-- and, if I gather rightly, no other religion is any longer preached--let the psychologist have his ears open through all the vanity, through all the noise which is natural to these preachers (as to all preachers), he will hear a hoarse, groaning, genuine note of SELF-CONTEMPT.'
258.
'The essential thing, however, in a good and healthy aristocracy is that it should not regard itself as a function either of the kingship or the commonwealth, but as the SIGNIFICANCE and highest justification thereof--that it should therefore accept with a good conscience the sacrifice of a legion of individuals, who, FOR ITS SAKE, must be suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments.'
On the tyranny of the majority (reasonable or not) trespassing on individuality :
191.
'[...] the question whether, in respect to the valuation of things, instinct deserves more authority than rationality [...]. Unless one should make an exception in the case of Descartes, the father of rationalism (and consequently the grandfather of the Revolution), who recognized only the authority of reason: but reason is only a tool, and Descartes was superficial.'
228.
'Not one of those ponderous, conscience-stricken herding-animals (who undertake to advocate the cause of egoism as conducive to the general welfare) wants to have any knowledge or inkling of the facts that the "general welfare" is no ideal, no goal, no notion that can be at all grasped, but is only a nostrum,--that what is fair to one MAY NOT at all be fair to another.'
200.
'The man of an age of dissolution which mixes the races with one another, who has the inheritance of a diversified descent in his body--that is to say, contrary, and often not only contrary, instincts and standards of value, which struggle with one another and are seldom at peace--such a man of late culture and broken lights, will, on an average, be a weak man. His fundamental desire is that the war which is IN HIM should come to an end; happiness appears to him in the character of a soothing medicine and mode of thought (for instance, Epicurean or Christian); it is above all things the happiness of repose, of undisturbedness, of repletion, of final unity--it is the "Sabbath of Sabbaths," to use the expression of the holy rhetorician, St. Augustine, who was himself such a man.--Should, however, the contrariety and conflict in such natures operate as an ADDITIONAL incentive and stimulus to life--and if, on the other hand, in addition to their powerful and irreconcilable instincts, they have also inherited and indoctrinated into them a proper mastery and subtlety for carrying on the conflict with themselves (that is to say, the faculty of self-control and self-deception), there then arise those marvelously incomprehensible and inexplicable beings, those enigmatical men, predestined for conquering and circumventing others, the finest examples of which are Alcibiades and Caesar (with whom I should like to associate the FIRST of Europeans according to my taste, the Hohenstaufen, Frederick the Second), and among artists, perhaps Leonardo da Vinci. They appear precisely in the same periods when that weaker type, with its longing for repose, comes to the front; the two types are complementary to each other, and spring from the same causes.'
242.
'The same new conditions under which on an average a levelling and mediocrising of man will take place--a useful, industrious, variously serviceable, and clever gregarious man--are in the highest degree suitable to give rise to exceptional men of the most dangerous and attractive qualities. For, while the capacity for adaptation, which is every day trying changing conditions, and begins a new work with every generation, almost with every decade, makes the POWERFULNESS of the type impossible; while the collective impression of such future Europeans will probably be that of numerous, talkative, weak-willed, and very handy workmen who REQUIRE a master, a commander, as they require their daily bread; while, therefore, the democratising of Europe will tend to the production of a type prepared for SLAVERY in the most subtle sense of the term: the STRONG man will necessarily in individual and exceptional cases, become stronger and richer than he has perhaps ever been before--owing to the unprejudicedness of his schooling, owing to the immense variety of practice, art, and disguise. I meant to say that the democratising of Europe is at the same time an involuntary arrangement for the rearing of TYRANTS--taking the word in all its meanings, even in its most spiritual sense.'
44.
'Briefly and regrettably, they belong to the LEVELLERS, these wrongly named "free spirits"--as glib-tongued and scribe-fingered slaves of the democratic taste and its "modern ideas" all of them men without solitude, without personal solitude, blunt honest fellows to whom neither courage nor honourable conduct ought to be denied, only, they are not free, and are ludicrously superficial, especially in their innate partiality for seeing the cause of almost ALL human misery and failure in the old forms in which society has hitherto existed [...]! What they would fain attain with all their strength, is the universal, green-meadow happiness of the herd, together with security, safety, comfort, and alleviation of life for every one, their two most frequently chanted songs and doctrines are called "Equality of Rights" and "Sympathy with All Sufferers"--and suffering itself is looked upon by them as something which must be DONE AWAY WITH. We opposite ones, however, [...] believe that severity, violence, slavery, danger in the street and in the heart, secrecy, stoicism, tempter's art and devilry of every kind,--that everything wicked, terrible, tyrannical, predatory, and serpentine in man, serves as well for the elevation of the human species as its opposite [...].'
Having been at home, or at least guests, in many realms of the spirit, having escaped again and again from the gloomy, agreeable nooks in which preferences and prejudices, youth, origin, the accident of men and books, or even the weariness of travel seemed to confine us, full of malice against the seductions of dependency which he concealed in honours, money, positions, or exaltation of the senses, grateful even for distress and the vicissitudes of illness, because they always free us from some rule, and its "prejudice," grateful to the God, devil, sheep, and worm in us, inquisitive to a fault, investigators to the point of cruelty, with unhesitating fingers for the intangible, with teeth and stomachs for the most indigestible, ready for any business that requires sagacity and acute senses, ready for every adventure, owing to an excess of "free will", with anterior and posterior souls, into the ultimate intentions of which it is difficult to pry, with foregrounds and backgrounds to the end of which no foot may run, hidden ones under the mantles of light, appropriators, although we resemble heirs and spendthrifts, arrangers and collectors from morning till night, misers of our wealth and our full-crammed drawers, economical in learning and forgetting, inventive in scheming, sometimes proud of tables of categories, sometimes pedants, sometimes night-owls of work even in full day, yea, if necessary, even scarecrows--and it is necessary nowadays, that is to say, inasmuch as we are the born, sworn, jealous friends of SOLITUDE, of our own profoundest midnight and midday solitude--such kind of men are we, we free spirits!'
225.
'Whether it be hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, or eudaemonism, all those modes of thinking which measure the worth of things according to PLEASURE and PAIN, that is, according to accompanying circumstances and secondary considerations, are plausible modes of thought and naivetes, which every one conscious of CREATIVE powers and an artist's conscience will look down upon with scorn, though not without sympathy. Sympathy for you!--to be sure, that is not sympathy as you understand it: it is not sympathy for social "distress," for "society" with its sick and misfortuned, for the hereditarily vicious and defective who lie on the ground around us; still less is it sympathy for the grumbling, vexed, revolutionary slave-classes who strive after power--they call it "freedom." OUR sympathy is a loftier and further-sighted sympathy:--we see how MAN dwarfs himself, how YOU dwarf him! and there are moments when we view YOUR sympathy with an indescribable anguish, when we resist it,--when we regard your seriousness as more dangerous than any kind of levity. You want, if possible--and there is not a more foolish "if possible" --TO DO AWAY WITH SUFFERING; and we?--it really seems that WE would rather have it increased and made worse than it has ever been! Well-being, as you understand it--is certainly not a goal; it seems to us an END; a condition which at once renders man ludicrous and contemptible--and makes his destruction DESIRABLE! The discipline of suffering, of GREAT suffering--know ye not that it is only THIS discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto?
About PC and finger-pointing, among others:
219.
'The practice of judging and condemning morally, is the favourite revenge of the intellectually shallow on those who are less so, it is also a kind of indemnity for their being badly endowed by nature, and finally, it is an opportunity for acquiring spirit and BECOMING subtle--malice spiritualises. [...]'
201.
'How much or how little dangerousness to the community or to equality is contained in an opinion, a condition, an emotion, a disposition, or an endowment-- that is now the moral perspective, here again fear is the mother of morals. It is by the loftiest and strongest instincts, when they break out passionately and carry the individual far above and beyond the average, and the low level of the gregarious conscience, that the self-reliance of the community is destroyed, its belief in itself, its backbone, as it were, breaks, consequently these very instincts will be most branded and defamed. The lofty independent spirituality, the will to stand alone, and even the cogent reason, are felt to be dangers, everything that elevates the individual above the herd, and is a source of fear to the neighbour, is henceforth called EVIL, the tolerant, unassuming, self-adapting, self-equalizing disposition, the MEDIOCRITY of desires, attains to moral distinction and honour. Finally, under very peaceful circumstances, there is always less opportunity and necessity for training the feelings to severity and rigour, and now every form of severity, even in justice, begins to disturb the conscience, a lofty and rigorous nobleness and self-responsibility almost offends, and awakens distrust, "the lamb," and still more "the sheep," wins respect. There is a point of diseased mellowness and effeminacy in the history of society, at which society itself takes the part of him who injures it, the part of the CRIMINAL, and does so, in fact, seriously and honestly. To punish, appears to it to be somehow unfair--it is certain that the idea of "punishment" and "the obligation to punish" are then painful and alarming to people. "Is it not sufficient if the criminal be rendered HARMLESS? Why should we still punish? Punishment itself is terrible!"--with these questions gregarious morality, the morality of fear, draws its ultimate conclusion. If one could at all do away with danger, the cause of fear, one would have done away with this morality at the same time, it would no longer be necessary, it WOULD NOT CONSIDER ITSELF any longer necessary!--Whoever examines the conscience of the present-day European, will always elicit the same imperative from its thousand moral folds and hidden recesses, the imperative of the timidity of the herd "we wish that some time or other there may be NOTHING MORE TO FEAR!" Some time or other--the will and the way THERETO is nowadays called "progress" all over Europe.'
---------
See also:
April 15, 2025
In the tepid Ottawa Valley Spring of 1967, I finished William Barrett鈥檚 Irrational Man. I was studying for SATs, insofar as they Could be studied for. All that left me unprepared for their inexplicable logic. A sorta logic tailor made to an Aspie like me.
I aced them, totally unprepared for something that turned out to be right up my alley.
My high school guidance counsellor dubbed me one smart guy. Oh, I had the smarts alright. Smarts that were totally unconnected to my emotions. Friends called me bright but saw right through me. They wanted me to try their extroverted Pretzel Logic鈥�
The existentialists used Pretzel Logic too. Barrett tied me up in interior pretzels, totally unconnected to my friends鈥� SOCIAL PRETZELS! My friends called it a Win/Win Game. I only played games through books. Go figure.
There I was, GONE. I thought you made friends by Liking some, and refusing to Friend Others. Like on 欧宝娱乐. Remember that sixties soap, Another World? That鈥檚 where I lived, and still live. Another World Made By Books. Being Aspie, I avoided the Real World.
Irrational Man was my First Pick for reading in 1967. It led me to read ALL the philosophers Barrett name-dropped.
Including Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil.
There I was, gone. I couldn鈥檛 see that that book pointed me to a coming Reality, not a Theory.
But I know now.
It鈥檚 EVERYWHERE!
There is now no goodness nor badness.
Guess what, Friends?
Here we ALL are, now, GONE.
GONE, GONE, GONE BEYOND -
ANY REDEEMABLE KINDA WISDOM!!
I aced them, totally unprepared for something that turned out to be right up my alley.
My high school guidance counsellor dubbed me one smart guy. Oh, I had the smarts alright. Smarts that were totally unconnected to my emotions. Friends called me bright but saw right through me. They wanted me to try their extroverted Pretzel Logic鈥�
The existentialists used Pretzel Logic too. Barrett tied me up in interior pretzels, totally unconnected to my friends鈥� SOCIAL PRETZELS! My friends called it a Win/Win Game. I only played games through books. Go figure.
There I was, GONE. I thought you made friends by Liking some, and refusing to Friend Others. Like on 欧宝娱乐. Remember that sixties soap, Another World? That鈥檚 where I lived, and still live. Another World Made By Books. Being Aspie, I avoided the Real World.
Irrational Man was my First Pick for reading in 1967. It led me to read ALL the philosophers Barrett name-dropped.
Including Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil.
There I was, gone. I couldn鈥檛 see that that book pointed me to a coming Reality, not a Theory.
But I know now.
It鈥檚 EVERYWHERE!
There is now no goodness nor badness.
Guess what, Friends?
Here we ALL are, now, GONE.
GONE, GONE, GONE BEYOND -
ANY REDEEMABLE KINDA WISDOM!!
May 4, 2013
As with my review of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the below comprises the notes I jotted down鈥攄eciphered as best could be managed against the near hieroglyphic obfuscation of the chicken riot I call handwriting鈥攚hen this was read some dozen or so years ago. As I failed to consistently make clear what were Nietzsche's words, as set against my own thoughts on the latter, the non-italicized portions may represent one giant act of plagiarizing. Luckily for me, the man seldom presented himself as possessing a litigious personality.
The Free Thinker:
Nietzsche is basically detailing a plan for the new philosophers鈥攖hey will be men of solitude, men who can attain the esoteric; look down from on high where good and evil, virtue and vice cannot be so easily compartmentalized through yes and no. Above all, their search cannot be thought of as being undertaken for the good of society. Suffering cannot be eliminated, happiness cannot be guaranteed, and the new philosophers will have to face many painful untruths and be very courageous. They cannot limit themselves by such sentiments as generosity or pity, or like things that deplete their spirit.
On the Religious:
Early Christianity comprised more suffering, more of a continual suicide of reason and freedom and pride, and an enslavement at the same time. The saint has always fascinated, because of our historic swings between voluptuousness and asceticism, and the sense of a great will taking control; the sense that this will must have had or served a Powerful Purpose in doing so.
The Old Testament: Passionate and glorious language, violent鈥�big-souled. The New Testament: Loving and tender, mustily abnegative鈥�small-souled. The Greek religion was noble because it had a sense of great gratitude for life; felt that life is a boon.
Modern philosophy, as epistemological skepticism, is anti-Christian but not anti-religious, either overtly or covertly. From a surety in the soul (the "I") modern philosophy has come to wonder if the "I" is only apparent, that is, that the think may create the "I".
The three greatest of the religious rungs of cruelty are:
One: Sacrifice of something dear (eg, one's firstborn) to god鈥攖his is the Pre-Moral Stage.
Two: Sacrifice of one's nature to God鈥攖his is the Moral Stage.
Three: Sacrifice of God to the Nothing鈥攖his is our Modern Times
Humans are accustomed to lying. Our senses dislike the new and prefer the familiar; our instincts, by nature, lead us to prefer the truth of instincts鈥�Man is much more of an artist than he knows.
Nietzsche further hammers upon the authoritarian strain in man:
Modern man does not understand the devotion to things that attract the higher and choosier tastes he calls the disinterested action, thinking it selfless; but even the highest disinterested action in truth is exceedingly interested and interesting. Done for love鈥攂ut everything done for love is egotistic. Done for sacrifice鈥攂ut a sacrificer knows that he wanted and got something in return, perhaps a part of himself for a part of himself.
Nietzsche avers that the religion of modern man is Pity鈥攖hough through all the noise of its preachers can be discerned a sound of self-contempt. The man of modern ideas is immeasurably dissatisfied with himself; he suffers, and his vanity wants him鈥�needs him鈥攖o suffer along with others, to feel pity.
Sections 223 and 224 are flat-out brilliantly prophetic about the potential burgeoning of multiculturalism. The modern taste is for the infinite: we dress in the costumes of all cultures and drink the waters of all times鈥攚e cannot stand and measure things, but long for, crave the eternal, even as our instincts, in the play of chaos, run towards the past. Limitations or highest valuations seem an infernal stasis, while the boundless horizon, abandonment, the primal and unmeasured appears rife with the promise and thrill of life.
The Last Men wish to abolish suffering: the Higher Men hold that to be an end that makes man contemptible and ridiculous. The discipline of suffering is what allows Man to transcend his limits. Man is both Created and Creator, and so necessarily should and must suffer; be broken, burned, and reformed, that he might create to overcome himself.
Nietzsche explains how cruelty has always been needed for man to break through his comfortable thoughts and notions: the spirit is all too happy to assume masks to maintain illusions鈥攕ometimes the will revels in ignorance. The cruelty of intellectual conscience must be able to break or shatter these other wills in order for man to grow.
The demoralization of Europe is making races and peoples more alike鈥攊s the flattening and the mediocritization of man. This new herd society of good workers will thus be comprised of people as in need of command as of sustenance鈥攖he masses will be produced for slavery in the subtlest sense. But this will allow select individuals to become stronger and richer than ever before imaginable鈥攁n involuntary arrangement for the cultivation of tyrants, taking that word even in the spiritual sense.
Peoples and Fatherlands:
Nietzsche says Wagner wrote perfect German music for his day鈥攊t looked fondly at tomorrow whilst yearning for the past; the Germans were people of yesterday and tomorrow鈥攖hey had no today. Mozart and Beethoven wrote music for Europe, changed Europe. With the birth of the Romantics, German music became dangerous, a music not of Europe but rather of Fatherlands.
Nietzsche further finds the English to be the un-philosophical people, the vulgar nation, creator and implementer of Modern Ideas. They are non-musical鈥攁nd hence succumbed to The Spirit of Gravity from Zarathustra. The French are the creators of Noble ideas in Europe, but their soul is being corrupted by the small virtues of the English.
What is Noble:
Nietzsche holds that all enhancements of man have arisen within an aristocratic society: a noble caste of barbarians, strong in will to power and uncorrupted by anarchy among the instincts, takes advantage of the inherent exploitation that is a primordial fact of all history.
Master Morality and Slave Morality often exist, side-by-side or intermingled, in modern man. Master Morality is value-creating, one wherein good and bad are paired as noble vs contemptible. It creates value from oneself, not from outside judgements. It provides aid to the weak from an excess of power, the source of gifts, never from pity. Pity is contemptible. A hardness of heart is needed. Slave Morality bears the marked distinction of being a morality of pity, acting for others disinterestedly, ie from selflessness, compassionate feelings and a warm heart.
Master Morality possesses a reverence for age and tradition; personal honour in doing one's duties, of which said duty is only to one's peers, for friendships and enmities. The lower castes are treated beyond Good and Evil鈥攂ut duty demands that pity be given its appropriate place downwards. Slave Morality looks to progress and the future, and disrespects tradition. All the world are brothers and equals鈥攑ity is extended and extendable to everyone. It is inherently suspicious towards the values of a Master Morality, and is invariably a morality of utility: industry, happiness, friendship, compassion. It is designed specifically to ease suffering.
In Master Morality, the Good inspire, and wish to inspire, fear. The Bad is the contemptible. In Slave Morality, The Evil are those who inspire fear. However, the Good in a Slave Morality has also to inspire some degree of contempt, because the Good is not dangerous. In all Slave Morality cultures the language tends to bring closer together the words Good and Stupid.
The noble man arises from an area beset by nature and/or neighbours. Only a tradition of hard, firm, unchanging laws and severity allows the state's continued existence; only when one no longer exists within such life and death environs does that hardness thaw and people begin to prize the individual. Corruption sets in as all individuals inevitably learn to preach mediocrity.
The noble soul is egoism鈥攊t has no vanity and only treats thoughtfully with its peers. The noble soul is used to looking straight ahead, slowly, or down: rarely does it stray upwards because it already knows itself to be at a height. It is not vain because it doesn't require the good opinion of others to provide it with a self-confidence or self-esteem it does not have already have. Support from others is alien to the noble soul.
Nietzsche is saying herein that the noble soul has reverence for itself. Many aspire to be noble鈥攁nd none can say who will be a genius and great鈥攂ut this self-honour must be innate. Everywhere that men gather, there also will gather the urge to commonality. The noble soul will be drawn to what are virtues for it: solitude, courage, insight, sympathy. Raphael, born without hands, would still be a great artist!
The perception through illusion and mask that true life is a great and endless suffering causes nausea鈥攖he non-noble soul will choke on this nausea and learn to loathe himself and life; the noble soul will spit out the nausea and continue revering life.
Man invented the good conscience in order to be able to enjoy his soul as simple. In this way the entirety of his morality is an enduringly opaque veil allowing him enjoyment of the sight of the soul.
Gradually it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; also that the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy constituted the real germ of life from which the whole plant had grown.We manipulate our prejudices and desires with language to make our symbols and interpretations be reality鈥攖his is our inscribed presumption.
The free and unfree wills are mythology鈥攊n real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills.
Our highest insights must鈥攁nd should鈥攕ound like follies and sometimes like crimes when they are heard without permission by those who are not predisposed and predestined for them.Why does there have to be a truth and falsity in opposition? Why not gradations of values? Why can't the world that concerns us be a fiction and why does it need an author?
There is something about truth, about the search for truth; and when a human being is too human about it鈥攈e seeks to do only the good鈥擨 bet he finds nothing.Has the text of the past finally disappeared under the interpretation? Has noble posterity misunderstood the whole past and in that way alone made it tolerable to look at?
The Free Thinker:
Nietzsche is basically detailing a plan for the new philosophers鈥攖hey will be men of solitude, men who can attain the esoteric; look down from on high where good and evil, virtue and vice cannot be so easily compartmentalized through yes and no. Above all, their search cannot be thought of as being undertaken for the good of society. Suffering cannot be eliminated, happiness cannot be guaranteed, and the new philosophers will have to face many painful untruths and be very courageous. They cannot limit themselves by such sentiments as generosity or pity, or like things that deplete their spirit.
On the Religious:
Early Christianity comprised more suffering, more of a continual suicide of reason and freedom and pride, and an enslavement at the same time. The saint has always fascinated, because of our historic swings between voluptuousness and asceticism, and the sense of a great will taking control; the sense that this will must have had or served a Powerful Purpose in doing so.
The Old Testament: Passionate and glorious language, violent鈥�big-souled. The New Testament: Loving and tender, mustily abnegative鈥�small-souled. The Greek religion was noble because it had a sense of great gratitude for life; felt that life is a boon.
Modern philosophy, as epistemological skepticism, is anti-Christian but not anti-religious, either overtly or covertly. From a surety in the soul (the "I") modern philosophy has come to wonder if the "I" is only apparent, that is, that the think may create the "I".
The three greatest of the religious rungs of cruelty are:
One: Sacrifice of something dear (eg, one's firstborn) to god鈥攖his is the Pre-Moral Stage.
Two: Sacrifice of one's nature to God鈥攖his is the Moral Stage.
Three: Sacrifice of God to the Nothing鈥攖his is our Modern Times
It is the profound, suspicious fear of an invincible pessimism that forces whole millennia to bury their teeth in, and cling to, a religious interpretation of existence: the fear of that instinct which senses that one might get a hold of the truth too soon, before man has become strong enough, hard enough, artist enough.Aphorisms Which Gave Me An Hermeneutic Steamer:
Whoever despises himself, respects himself as one who despises.Natural History of Morals:
A soul that knows it is loved but does not love itself betrays its sediment: what is at the bottom comes up.
Heavy, heavy-spirited people become lighter precisely through what makes others heavier, through hatred and love, and for a time they surface.
The great epochs of our life come when we gain the courage to rechristen our evil as what is best in us.
The devil has the broadest perspectives for God; therefore he keeps so far away from God鈥攖he devil being the most ancient friend of wisdom.
Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster. And when you look long enough into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you.
Whatever is done from love always occurs beyond good and evil.
The thought of suicide is a powerful comfort: it helps one through many a dreadful night.
The high spirits of kindness may look like malice.
Every morality is, as opposed to laisser-aller, a bit of tyranny against "nature", also against "reason".Nietzsche declares that morality is the setting of obedience over a lengthy period and in a single direction鈥攑hilosophers and moralists knew the answers that they wanted before they asked questions. Morality crushed and tyrannized much of nature within man and made him stupid in so doing; yet it was perhaps needed for spiritual discipline to harden and shape European Man.
Humans are accustomed to lying. Our senses dislike the new and prefer the familiar; our instincts, by nature, lead us to prefer the truth of instincts鈥�Man is much more of an artist than he knows.
Nietzsche further hammers upon the authoritarian strain in man:
Nothing has been exercised and cultivated better and longer among men so far than obediance.Men have thus ingrained inside them an instinct for Thou Shalt!
It seizes upon things as a rude appetite, rather indiscriminately, and accepts whatever is shouted into its ears by someone who issues commands鈥攑arents, teachers, laws, class, prejudices, public opinions.Nietzsche mocks the Objective Man鈥攖he man who accepts everything, who has no ideas of his own but is a mere vessel for the ideas and beliefs of others. He is a mirror, reduced to acceding or refusing, to saying Yes and No. Nietzsche further mocks the Skeptic鈥攖he man who doubts everything and will never say Yes or No, but ever hesitates and has thus lost his will. Doubts exists more, and skepticism flourishes, the more civilized a country has become. However, Nietzsche admires the stronger and more dangerous skepticism introduced to Germany and Europe by Frederick the Great鈥攖his is a virile and manly skepticism that leads to great expeditions, efforts, and exertions of the will.
Love thy neighbour stems from fear thy neighbour.
Everything that elevates an individual above the herd and intimidates the neighbour is henceforth called evil.
The imperative of herd timidity鈥攚e want that some day there should be nothing anymore to be afraid of. Throughout Europe, the will and way to this day is called progress.
Moral judgements and condemnations constitute the favorite revenge of the spiritually limited against those less limited鈥攁lso a sort of compensation for having been ill-favored by nature鈥攆inally, an opportunity for acquiring spirit and becoming refined: malice spiritualized.Our Virtues:
Modern man does not understand the devotion to things that attract the higher and choosier tastes he calls the disinterested action, thinking it selfless; but even the highest disinterested action in truth is exceedingly interested and interesting. Done for love鈥攂ut everything done for love is egotistic. Done for sacrifice鈥攂ut a sacrificer knows that he wanted and got something in return, perhaps a part of himself for a part of himself.
Nietzsche avers that the religion of modern man is Pity鈥攖hough through all the noise of its preachers can be discerned a sound of self-contempt. The man of modern ideas is immeasurably dissatisfied with himself; he suffers, and his vanity wants him鈥�needs him鈥攖o suffer along with others, to feel pity.
Sections 223 and 224 are flat-out brilliantly prophetic about the potential burgeoning of multiculturalism. The modern taste is for the infinite: we dress in the costumes of all cultures and drink the waters of all times鈥攚e cannot stand and measure things, but long for, crave the eternal, even as our instincts, in the play of chaos, run towards the past. Limitations or highest valuations seem an infernal stasis, while the boundless horizon, abandonment, the primal and unmeasured appears rife with the promise and thrill of life.
The Last Men wish to abolish suffering: the Higher Men hold that to be an end that makes man contemptible and ridiculous. The discipline of suffering is what allows Man to transcend his limits. Man is both Created and Creator, and so necessarily should and must suffer; be broken, burned, and reformed, that he might create to overcome himself.
Nietzsche explains how cruelty has always been needed for man to break through his comfortable thoughts and notions: the spirit is all too happy to assume masks to maintain illusions鈥攕ometimes the will revels in ignorance. The cruelty of intellectual conscience must be able to break or shatter these other wills in order for man to grow.
The demoralization of Europe is making races and peoples more alike鈥攊s the flattening and the mediocritization of man. This new herd society of good workers will thus be comprised of people as in need of command as of sustenance鈥攖he masses will be produced for slavery in the subtlest sense. But this will allow select individuals to become stronger and richer than ever before imaginable鈥攁n involuntary arrangement for the cultivation of tyrants, taking that word even in the spiritual sense.
Peoples and Fatherlands:
Nietzsche says Wagner wrote perfect German music for his day鈥攊t looked fondly at tomorrow whilst yearning for the past; the Germans were people of yesterday and tomorrow鈥攖hey had no today. Mozart and Beethoven wrote music for Europe, changed Europe. With the birth of the Romantics, German music became dangerous, a music not of Europe but rather of Fatherlands.
Nietzsche further finds the English to be the un-philosophical people, the vulgar nation, creator and implementer of Modern Ideas. They are non-musical鈥攁nd hence succumbed to The Spirit of Gravity from Zarathustra. The French are the creators of Noble ideas in Europe, but their soul is being corrupted by the small virtues of the English.
What is Noble:
Nietzsche holds that all enhancements of man have arisen within an aristocratic society: a noble caste of barbarians, strong in will to power and uncorrupted by anarchy among the instincts, takes advantage of the inherent exploitation that is a primordial fact of all history.
Master Morality and Slave Morality often exist, side-by-side or intermingled, in modern man. Master Morality is value-creating, one wherein good and bad are paired as noble vs contemptible. It creates value from oneself, not from outside judgements. It provides aid to the weak from an excess of power, the source of gifts, never from pity. Pity is contemptible. A hardness of heart is needed. Slave Morality bears the marked distinction of being a morality of pity, acting for others disinterestedly, ie from selflessness, compassionate feelings and a warm heart.
Master Morality possesses a reverence for age and tradition; personal honour in doing one's duties, of which said duty is only to one's peers, for friendships and enmities. The lower castes are treated beyond Good and Evil鈥攂ut duty demands that pity be given its appropriate place downwards. Slave Morality looks to progress and the future, and disrespects tradition. All the world are brothers and equals鈥攑ity is extended and extendable to everyone. It is inherently suspicious towards the values of a Master Morality, and is invariably a morality of utility: industry, happiness, friendship, compassion. It is designed specifically to ease suffering.
In Master Morality, the Good inspire, and wish to inspire, fear. The Bad is the contemptible. In Slave Morality, The Evil are those who inspire fear. However, the Good in a Slave Morality has also to inspire some degree of contempt, because the Good is not dangerous. In all Slave Morality cultures the language tends to bring closer together the words Good and Stupid.
The noble man arises from an area beset by nature and/or neighbours. Only a tradition of hard, firm, unchanging laws and severity allows the state's continued existence; only when one no longer exists within such life and death environs does that hardness thaw and people begin to prize the individual. Corruption sets in as all individuals inevitably learn to preach mediocrity.
The noble soul is egoism鈥攊t has no vanity and only treats thoughtfully with its peers. The noble soul is used to looking straight ahead, slowly, or down: rarely does it stray upwards because it already knows itself to be at a height. It is not vain because it doesn't require the good opinion of others to provide it with a self-confidence or self-esteem it does not have already have. Support from others is alien to the noble soul.
Nietzsche is saying herein that the noble soul has reverence for itself. Many aspire to be noble鈥攁nd none can say who will be a genius and great鈥攂ut this self-honour must be innate. Everywhere that men gather, there also will gather the urge to commonality. The noble soul will be drawn to what are virtues for it: solitude, courage, insight, sympathy. Raphael, born without hands, would still be a great artist!
The perception through illusion and mask that true life is a great and endless suffering causes nausea鈥攖he non-noble soul will choke on this nausea and learn to loathe himself and life; the noble soul will spit out the nausea and continue revering life.
Man invented the good conscience in order to be able to enjoy his soul as simple. In this way the entirety of his morality is an enduringly opaque veil allowing him enjoyment of the sight of the soul.
[Dionysus] once said: "Under certain circumstances I love what is human"鈥攁nd with this he alluded to Ariadne who was present鈥�"man is to my mind an agreeable, courageous, inventive animal that has no equal on earth; it finds its way in any labyrinth. I am well disposed towards him: I often reflect how I might yet advance him and make him stronger, more evil, and more profound than he is."
"Stronger, more evil, and more profound?" I asked startled. "Yes," he said once more; "stronger, more evil, and more profound; also more beautiful"鈥攁nd at that the tempter god smiled with his halcyon smile as though he had just paid an enchanting compliment. Here we also see: what this divinity lacks is not only a sense of shame鈥攁nd there are also other good reasons for conjecturing that in several respects all of the gods could learn from us humans. We humans are鈥攎ore humane.
March 30, 2023
i can imagine Nietzsche sitting in his room, twisting his moustache between his fingers and furiously writing down these ideas while sweating profusely, stinking of cigarettes and believing that he鈥檚 the most intelligent man to have ever lived.
can u tell that i deeply dislike him?
although i found myself sometimes agreeing and being intrigued by some of his ideas, the rest i found ridiculous. if u feel the need to call other philosophers dumb to prove ur point and also minimise women to a birth-giving machine that does not know reason, i am no longer interested in what u have to say.
also, this was deliberately written so densely that it would become incomprehensible for the majority of readers and would therefore deem him as a mind that 鈥渘ot a lot of simple thinkers would be able to understand鈥�. which infuriated me.
to simplify the second half of this book; 鈥渋 am right and if u disagree with me, u are wrong and dumb and i feel bad for u. also women are inferior and stupid.鈥�
oh, to have the ego of a white man in the 19th century.
can u tell that i deeply dislike him?
although i found myself sometimes agreeing and being intrigued by some of his ideas, the rest i found ridiculous. if u feel the need to call other philosophers dumb to prove ur point and also minimise women to a birth-giving machine that does not know reason, i am no longer interested in what u have to say.
also, this was deliberately written so densely that it would become incomprehensible for the majority of readers and would therefore deem him as a mind that 鈥渘ot a lot of simple thinkers would be able to understand鈥�. which infuriated me.
to simplify the second half of this book; 鈥渋 am right and if u disagree with me, u are wrong and dumb and i feel bad for u. also women are inferior and stupid.鈥�
oh, to have the ego of a white man in the 19th century.
December 30, 2023
In honor of my birthday today, I am sending you all a copy of my Bible, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: If the survival of the human race depended on one book (and it does) this would be it. If we continue on this road of absolute morality based on a millennial fairy tale from Jerusalem we are doomed. Nietzsche provides a manifesto for the end of Christian slave mores and the re-birth of the aristocrat of the soul.
December 17, 2018
The hardest part of this whole process is to declare this book as "read". I'm not done with it. I've reread chapters, flipped back and forth to weave the necessary web to link up the scattered pieces, the clues. I've reread and re-interpreted aphorisms over and over... how can I say I'm "done" when I'm only becoming acquainted?
I wish I have something conclusive and clever to say about this book, but the only conclusive thing I can come up with is that this book treats you like a beast of burden, an enduring ass. It makes you work, and patiently trace back, rework. I'm not the same person now that I've "traversed" the book, the process of struggling with this book changed me, the book itself changed for me, passages no longer mean the same thing to me, but there're still many more puzzles to solve, more works to do.
It may not be a good idea to keep working through the labyrinth though. Labyrinths are built to detain beasts; tracing the clues to its ultimate conclusion, to unconceal, led Oedipus to his final fate.
The book ends with a poem, and the poem ends with laughter. That's what Oedipus should have done, when facing the Sphinx. I'm going to laugh ... for now. I may come back later... if it turns out I am a tempter, an attempter.
I wish I have something conclusive and clever to say about this book, but the only conclusive thing I can come up with is that this book treats you like a beast of burden, an enduring ass. It makes you work, and patiently trace back, rework. I'm not the same person now that I've "traversed" the book, the process of struggling with this book changed me, the book itself changed for me, passages no longer mean the same thing to me, but there're still many more puzzles to solve, more works to do.
It may not be a good idea to keep working through the labyrinth though. Labyrinths are built to detain beasts; tracing the clues to its ultimate conclusion, to unconceal, led Oedipus to his final fate.
The book ends with a poem, and the poem ends with laughter. That's what Oedipus should have done, when facing the Sphinx. I'm going to laugh ... for now. I may come back later... if it turns out I am a tempter, an attempter.
December 7, 2022
3.5 stars - I particularly enjoyed old Freddy getting salty about other philosophers (always here for Kant shade)
December 24, 2022
Herein, Nietzsche argues that the concepts of good and evil are essentially ambiguous social constructs implemented for the control of the peasantry and for the protection and promulgation of the ruling class.
As usual, Nietzsche has religion, specifically christianity, squarely in his crosshairs:
鈥淚t is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn author and that he did not learn it better.鈥�
鈥淥ne should not go into churches if one wishes to breathe pure air.鈥�
Most times, Nietzsche鈥檚 lambasting of the reverent and pious plants him firmly in my good stead but there are other aspects of Beyond Good and Evil that are less than palatable and I would be grossly remiss if I did not acknowledge his shortcomings and hold him accountable.
鈥淲hen we have to change an opinion about any one, we charge heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us.鈥�
Here goes鈥� Nietzsche was a chauvinist. He makes somewhat frequent references to the 鈥渦neducatability鈥� of women and is repeatedly disparaging of their motives.
鈥淔rom the beginning, nothing has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than truth - her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty.鈥�
I suspect, based on that last statement, that the women within his social circle were primarily bourgeoisie. Still, I am reluctant to say that he was simply a product of his era (1844 - 1900), not because it鈥檚 inaccurate but because I have grown a little tired of doling out free passes. Nietzsche, like Aristotle and Kant and Hume, needs to take his lumps.
鈥淎nyone who fights with monsters should take care that he does not in the process become a monster 鈥f you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss gazes back into you.鈥�
As usual, Nietzsche has religion, specifically christianity, squarely in his crosshairs:
鈥淚t is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn author and that he did not learn it better.鈥�
鈥淥ne should not go into churches if one wishes to breathe pure air.鈥�
Most times, Nietzsche鈥檚 lambasting of the reverent and pious plants him firmly in my good stead but there are other aspects of Beyond Good and Evil that are less than palatable and I would be grossly remiss if I did not acknowledge his shortcomings and hold him accountable.
鈥淲hen we have to change an opinion about any one, we charge heavily to his account the inconvenience he thereby causes us.鈥�
Here goes鈥� Nietzsche was a chauvinist. He makes somewhat frequent references to the 鈥渦neducatability鈥� of women and is repeatedly disparaging of their motives.
鈥淔rom the beginning, nothing has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to woman than truth - her great art is the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance and beauty.鈥�
I suspect, based on that last statement, that the women within his social circle were primarily bourgeoisie. Still, I am reluctant to say that he was simply a product of his era (1844 - 1900), not because it鈥檚 inaccurate but because I have grown a little tired of doling out free passes. Nietzsche, like Aristotle and Kant and Hume, needs to take his lumps.
鈥淎nyone who fights with monsters should take care that he does not in the process become a monster 鈥f you gaze long into an abyss, the abyss gazes back into you.鈥�
November 11, 2024
Beyond Good and Evil is my first introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche and I found the book too complex to fathom the Nietzschean philosophy conveyed by it. I have read philosophical works by other authors, but none was too complex like Beyond Good and Evil. Even though it is a thought-provoking work, I wouldn't claim to have fully comprehended its complex content.
Nietzsche advocated for a theory beyond good and evil. He was against a society framed by good and evil, for he saw these two concepts to be subjective. In other words, good and evil are constructed according to culture and religion. In Nietzsche's eye, they were nothing but a set of laws differing according to specific cultural and religious needs to 'maintain social order'. Instead, Nietzsche was the forerunner of the theory of 'ubermensch'(which meant supermen) which influenced Modern and Postmodern thinking.
Nietzsche was highly critical of existing philosophies, religious practices (as opposed to religion), and government policies. They all called for submission. Through submission, one cannot make supermen. According to him submission, humility, equality, and common good preached in Christianity weakened the strong members of a society who have 'will to power'. For this same reason, he was also against the Marxism-influenced socialist policies. Nietzsche called this meek submission to the existing moral order 'slave morality', and argued that it should be changed to 'master morality', where man is the master of his own destiny. This was the only way to create supermen.
However, Nietzsche's theory/philosophy has a serious flaw. It is good to move beyond good and evil to make strong men who are capable of forming their own destinies. But what if the strong men, whom he called supermen, who have the 'will to power', become dictators? What then? Nietzsche didn't live to see the atrocities committed by the Hitler-led Nazi regime. But his concept of a master morality certainly gives validity to creating such men. It is not Nietzsche's fault of course. He was against nationalism and antisemitism. Nevertheless, the theory of a 'master morality' inadvertently promoted Nazi ideology.
Nietzsche's attempt, however, was genuine. He wanted people to break from the chain of the traditional moral order of good and evil and advance in life to realize their greatest potential. He wanted society to move forward without being stagnated and held down by the traditional moral order and create a new moral order 'beyond good and evil'.
More of my reviews can be found at
Nietzsche advocated for a theory beyond good and evil. He was against a society framed by good and evil, for he saw these two concepts to be subjective. In other words, good and evil are constructed according to culture and religion. In Nietzsche's eye, they were nothing but a set of laws differing according to specific cultural and religious needs to 'maintain social order'. Instead, Nietzsche was the forerunner of the theory of 'ubermensch'(which meant supermen) which influenced Modern and Postmodern thinking.
Nietzsche was highly critical of existing philosophies, religious practices (as opposed to religion), and government policies. They all called for submission. Through submission, one cannot make supermen. According to him submission, humility, equality, and common good preached in Christianity weakened the strong members of a society who have 'will to power'. For this same reason, he was also against the Marxism-influenced socialist policies. Nietzsche called this meek submission to the existing moral order 'slave morality', and argued that it should be changed to 'master morality', where man is the master of his own destiny. This was the only way to create supermen.
However, Nietzsche's theory/philosophy has a serious flaw. It is good to move beyond good and evil to make strong men who are capable of forming their own destinies. But what if the strong men, whom he called supermen, who have the 'will to power', become dictators? What then? Nietzsche didn't live to see the atrocities committed by the Hitler-led Nazi regime. But his concept of a master morality certainly gives validity to creating such men. It is not Nietzsche's fault of course. He was against nationalism and antisemitism. Nevertheless, the theory of a 'master morality' inadvertently promoted Nazi ideology.
Nietzsche's attempt, however, was genuine. He wanted people to break from the chain of the traditional moral order of good and evil and advance in life to realize their greatest potential. He wanted society to move forward without being stagnated and held down by the traditional moral order and create a new moral order 'beyond good and evil'.
More of my reviews can be found at
April 17, 2015
賲丕 賵乇丕亍 丕賱禺賷乇 賵丕賱卮乇 / 賱賳賷鬲卮賴
胤亘毓丕 賴匕丕 賲賳 兀賴賲 丕賱賲氐丕丿乇 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷丞 貙 廿匕丕 丕乇丿鬲 兀賳 鬲胤賱毓 毓賱賷 賮賱爻賮丞 賳賷鬲卮賴 丕賱兀禺賱丕賯賷丞 貙 賮賱丕亘丿 兀賳 鬲賲乇 毓賱賷 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 貙 亘丕賱廿囟丕賮丞 賱賰鬲丕亘賴 兀賮賵賱 丕賱兀氐賳丕賲
賮賱丕 睾賳賷 毓賳 賴匕賷賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘賷賳 賱賲毓乇賮丞 賮賱爻賮鬲賴
賲丕 兀毓噩亘賳賷 賮賷 丕爻賱賵亘 賳賷鬲卮賴 - 亘睾囟 丕賱賳馗乇 毓賳 兀賮賰丕乇賴 - 兀爻賱賵亘 丕賱禺賵丕胤乇 丕賱卮毓乇賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 賷毓乇囟 亘賴丕 丕賮賰丕乇賴 貙 鬲匕賰乇賳賷 亘兀爻賱賵亘 噩亘乇丕賳 禺賱賷賱 噩亘乇丕賳 貙 賯賱鬲 賴匕丕 賱兀爻鬲丕匕鬲賷 賮兀禺亘乇鬲賳賷 兀賳 噩亘乇丕賳 亘丕賱賮毓賱 鬲兀孬乇 亘賳賷鬲卮賴 - 賵賱賲 兀賰賳 兀毓賱賲 賴匕丕 廿賱賷 兀賳 賯乇兀鬲 毓賳賴 亘丕賱賮毓賱 / 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 廿賱賷 鬲賯賷賷賲 丕賱丕賮賰丕乇 貙 亘丕賱胤亘毓 丕賱兀賮賰丕乇 賱丕 鬲鬲賳丕爻亘 賲毓 賲毓鬲賯丿丕鬲賷 丕賱丿賷賳賷丞 賵丕賱兀禺賱丕賯賷丞 貙 廿賱丕 兀賳賳賷 兀毓胤賷 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 5 賳噩賲丕鬲 賱賰賵賳賴 賲氐丿乇丕賸 賲賴賲丕 賱賳賷鬲卮賴 賵賱丕 丕爻鬲睾賳丕亍 毓賳賴 賱賲毓乇賮丞 賮賱爻賮鬲賴
胤亘毓丕 賴匕丕 賲賳 兀賴賲 丕賱賲氐丕丿乇 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷丞 貙 廿匕丕 丕乇丿鬲 兀賳 鬲胤賱毓 毓賱賷 賮賱爻賮丞 賳賷鬲卮賴 丕賱兀禺賱丕賯賷丞 貙 賮賱丕亘丿 兀賳 鬲賲乇 毓賱賷 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 貙 亘丕賱廿囟丕賮丞 賱賰鬲丕亘賴 兀賮賵賱 丕賱兀氐賳丕賲
賮賱丕 睾賳賷 毓賳 賴匕賷賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘賷賳 賱賲毓乇賮丞 賮賱爻賮鬲賴
賲丕 兀毓噩亘賳賷 賮賷 丕爻賱賵亘 賳賷鬲卮賴 - 亘睾囟 丕賱賳馗乇 毓賳 兀賮賰丕乇賴 - 兀爻賱賵亘 丕賱禺賵丕胤乇 丕賱卮毓乇賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 賷毓乇囟 亘賴丕 丕賮賰丕乇賴 貙 鬲匕賰乇賳賷 亘兀爻賱賵亘 噩亘乇丕賳 禺賱賷賱 噩亘乇丕賳 貙 賯賱鬲 賴匕丕 賱兀爻鬲丕匕鬲賷 賮兀禺亘乇鬲賳賷 兀賳 噩亘乇丕賳 亘丕賱賮毓賱 鬲兀孬乇 亘賳賷鬲卮賴 - 賵賱賲 兀賰賳 兀毓賱賲 賴匕丕 廿賱賷 兀賳 賯乇兀鬲 毓賳賴 亘丕賱賮毓賱 / 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 廿賱賷 鬲賯賷賷賲 丕賱丕賮賰丕乇 貙 亘丕賱胤亘毓 丕賱兀賮賰丕乇 賱丕 鬲鬲賳丕爻亘 賲毓 賲毓鬲賯丿丕鬲賷 丕賱丿賷賳賷丞 賵丕賱兀禺賱丕賯賷丞 貙 廿賱丕 兀賳賳賷 兀毓胤賷 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 5 賳噩賲丕鬲 賱賰賵賳賴 賲氐丿乇丕賸 賲賴賲丕 賱賳賷鬲卮賴 賵賱丕 丕爻鬲睾賳丕亍 毓賳賴 賱賲毓乇賮丞 賮賱爻賮鬲賴
July 19, 2022
Well! It is a well-known fact that Friedrich Nietzsche was a very profound philosopher of his time. What I don't understand is, how a person with such a depth of knowledge is that wrong about women.
鈥淲oman wants to be independent: and to that end she is beginning to enlighten men about 'woman as such' - this is one of the worst developments in the general uglification of Europe.鈥�
This is not it. It's just one of many ridicules that Nietzsche bestowed upon women. Trust me I tried to overshadow his gender discrimination with his in-depth knowledge of truth and virtues and morals and ethics. But I couldn't help but think of these philosophers with the same perception that Virginia Woolf described in her essay- 鈥淎 Room of one鈥檚 own鈥�.
鈥淭he history of men鈥檚 opposition to women鈥檚 emancipation is more interesting perhaps than the story of that emancipation itself.鈥�
It's a pity to see a person as good of a thinker as Nietzsche can undermine and lack the understanding of those opposite his gender who has also been gifted equally with a brain between two ears, still, he refuses to believe or even notice that.
Anyhow trying not to become Nietzsche myself, by letting my inner feminine dominate and cloud my critical analysis of the work that he has written, he did enlighten me with many theories of his, that did actually make sense. For example,
鈥� But he who has really made sacrifices knows that he wanted and received something in return perhaps something of himself in exchange for something of himself - that he gave away here in order to have more there, perhaps in general to be more or to feel himself 'more'. 鈥�
Whether one agrees with it or not, it is true. And not just this, yes I have another one for you, read this and tell me you don鈥檛 get chills-
鈥淔ew are made for independence - it is a privilege of the strong. And he who attempts it, having the completest right to it but without being compelled to, thereby proves that he is probably not only strong but also daring to the point of recklessness.鈥�
Independence is a jewel that is very rare to find. In Nietzsche鈥檚 language, if someone is someone鈥檚 master, someone is someone鈥檚 slave too. Hence, to break that balance of being master and slave and be free and independent is rare or nearly impossible. Now that the concept of Master and slave has been brought up by me, let me be very clear that I am a huge fan of Nietzsche鈥檚 concept of master and slave morality, check this out-
鈥淗ere is the source of the famous antithesis 'good' and 鈥榚vil'- power and danger were felt to exist in evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety and strength which could not admit of contempt. Thus, according to slave morality the 'evil' inspire fear; according to master morality it is precisely the 'good' who inspire fear and want to inspire it, while the 'bad' man is judged contemptible.鈥�
According to Nietzsche, the qualities like the pity, the kind, and helping hand, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness come into honour are the most useful qualities and virtually the only means of enduring the burden of existence is for poor people, as in slave. Slave morality is essentially the morality of utility.
And here, I do completely agree with him. In my opinion, power is nothing but fear for you in other people's eyes. But, hey! That's just my opinion.
At the very end of the novel, I realized one thing about philosophers, that each one of them is working on a hypothesis of variations of truth, and working on something for that long creates rigidity and stubbornness where one starts to claim perfection and think of themselves as a perfectionist. Which I think, never ends well for anyone, just like, being excessively intelligent, it didn't end well for Friedrich Nietzsche.
鈥淲oman wants to be independent: and to that end she is beginning to enlighten men about 'woman as such' - this is one of the worst developments in the general uglification of Europe.鈥�
This is not it. It's just one of many ridicules that Nietzsche bestowed upon women. Trust me I tried to overshadow his gender discrimination with his in-depth knowledge of truth and virtues and morals and ethics. But I couldn't help but think of these philosophers with the same perception that Virginia Woolf described in her essay- 鈥淎 Room of one鈥檚 own鈥�.
鈥淭he history of men鈥檚 opposition to women鈥檚 emancipation is more interesting perhaps than the story of that emancipation itself.鈥�
It's a pity to see a person as good of a thinker as Nietzsche can undermine and lack the understanding of those opposite his gender who has also been gifted equally with a brain between two ears, still, he refuses to believe or even notice that.
Anyhow trying not to become Nietzsche myself, by letting my inner feminine dominate and cloud my critical analysis of the work that he has written, he did enlighten me with many theories of his, that did actually make sense. For example,
鈥� But he who has really made sacrifices knows that he wanted and received something in return perhaps something of himself in exchange for something of himself - that he gave away here in order to have more there, perhaps in general to be more or to feel himself 'more'. 鈥�
Whether one agrees with it or not, it is true. And not just this, yes I have another one for you, read this and tell me you don鈥檛 get chills-
鈥淔ew are made for independence - it is a privilege of the strong. And he who attempts it, having the completest right to it but without being compelled to, thereby proves that he is probably not only strong but also daring to the point of recklessness.鈥�
Independence is a jewel that is very rare to find. In Nietzsche鈥檚 language, if someone is someone鈥檚 master, someone is someone鈥檚 slave too. Hence, to break that balance of being master and slave and be free and independent is rare or nearly impossible. Now that the concept of Master and slave has been brought up by me, let me be very clear that I am a huge fan of Nietzsche鈥檚 concept of master and slave morality, check this out-
鈥淗ere is the source of the famous antithesis 'good' and 鈥榚vil'- power and danger were felt to exist in evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety and strength which could not admit of contempt. Thus, according to slave morality the 'evil' inspire fear; according to master morality it is precisely the 'good' who inspire fear and want to inspire it, while the 'bad' man is judged contemptible.鈥�
According to Nietzsche, the qualities like the pity, the kind, and helping hand, the warm heart, patience, industriousness, humility, friendliness come into honour are the most useful qualities and virtually the only means of enduring the burden of existence is for poor people, as in slave. Slave morality is essentially the morality of utility.
And here, I do completely agree with him. In my opinion, power is nothing but fear for you in other people's eyes. But, hey! That's just my opinion.
At the very end of the novel, I realized one thing about philosophers, that each one of them is working on a hypothesis of variations of truth, and working on something for that long creates rigidity and stubbornness where one starts to claim perfection and think of themselves as a perfectionist. Which I think, never ends well for anyone, just like, being excessively intelligent, it didn't end well for Friedrich Nietzsche.
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