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趩乇丕 賲賱鬲鈥屬囏� 卮讴爻鬲 賲蹖鈥屫堌辟嗀�
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Nominee for Readers' Favorite Nonfiction (2012)Brilliant and engagingly written, Why Nations Fail answers the question that has stumped the experts for centuries: Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine?
Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of what the right policies are?
Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Otherwise, how to explain why Botswana has become one of the fastest growing countries in the world, while other African nations, such as Zimbabwe, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, are mired in poverty and violence?
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or lack of it). Korea, to take just one of their fascinating examples, is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The south forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people. Sadly, the people of the north have endured decades of famine, political repression, and very different economic institutions鈥攚ith no end in sight. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created these completely different institutional trajectories.
Based on fifteen years of original research Acemoglu and Robinson marshall extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America, England, Europe, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, including:
听听 - China has built an authoritarian growth machine. Will it continue to grow at such high speed and听overwhelm the West?
听听 - Are America鈥檚 best days behind it? Are we moving from a virtuous circle in which efforts by elites to aggrandize power are resisted to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority?
听听 - What is the most effective way to help move billions of people from the rut of poverty to prosperity? More
philanthropy from the wealthy nations of the West? Or learning the hard-won lessons of Acemoglu and Robinson鈥檚 breakthrough ideas on the interplay between inclusive political and economic institutions?
Why Nations Fail will change the way you look at鈥攁nd understand鈥攖he world.
Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of what the right policies are?
Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Otherwise, how to explain why Botswana has become one of the fastest growing countries in the world, while other African nations, such as Zimbabwe, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, are mired in poverty and violence?
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or lack of it). Korea, to take just one of their fascinating examples, is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The south forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people. Sadly, the people of the north have endured decades of famine, political repression, and very different economic institutions鈥攚ith no end in sight. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created these completely different institutional trajectories.
Based on fifteen years of original research Acemoglu and Robinson marshall extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America, England, Europe, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, including:
听听 - China has built an authoritarian growth machine. Will it continue to grow at such high speed and听overwhelm the West?
听听 - Are America鈥檚 best days behind it? Are we moving from a virtuous circle in which efforts by elites to aggrandize power are resisted to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority?
听听 - What is the most effective way to help move billions of people from the rut of poverty to prosperity? More
philanthropy from the wealthy nations of the West? Or learning the hard-won lessons of Acemoglu and Robinson鈥檚 breakthrough ideas on the interplay between inclusive political and economic institutions?
Why Nations Fail will change the way you look at鈥攁nd understand鈥攖he world.
672 pages, Paperback
First published March 1, 2012
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About the author
Daron Acemo臒lu
97听books1,837听followersDaron Acemoglu is the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 2005 he won the prestigious John Bates Clark medal, awarded to the best economist under 40.
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August 21, 2016
The book Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson comes with book-jacket praise from the usual suspects: Steven Levitt of Freakonomics fame, Jared Diamond of Collapse fame, Nobel Prize 鈥渓aureate鈥� George Akerlof, and Niall Ferguson, champion of imperialism. Thomas Freidman dashed off a quick review in his New York Times column for April 1, 2012. Freidman, the giddy fan of globalization, was ecstatic, although he admitted that he was 鈥渞eading鈥� the book, but not that he had 鈥渞ead鈥� it. Freidman points out one of the authors鈥� main points: 鈥淚nclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level playing field, and encourage investments in new technologies and skills are more conducive to economic growth than extractive institutions that are structured to extract resources from the many by the few.鈥� And this is perhaps their main point, albeit one which they share with most neoliberal development economists. Acemoglu and Robinson are professors at MIT and Harvard Universities; Acemoglu is a winner of the John Bates Clark Medal in the Economics department at MIT and Robinson an area specialist in the department of Government (Political Science)at Harvard. The book seems to be aimed at a wider audience than academia, however.
While the authors mine an enormous literature on development to populate their book with dozens of interesting stories of developmental failure and success, at the end of the day, their book devolves into the something similar to most of the neo-liberal thinking of which we see so much from the 鈥渟cience鈥� of economics. Diamond, who is quoted on the book jacket as saying 鈥淟ike me, you may succumb to reading it in one go, and then you may come back to it again and again鈥� is more critical in a review in the New York Review of Books (7 June 2012). There he points out that after presenting a map of Africa that clearly shows the tropical countries of the interior of the continent at the lowest end of the income scale they insist that geographic factors are 鈥淭heories That Don鈥檛 Work鈥� compared to their preferred 鈥渋nstitutional鈥� explanation. Diamond鈥檚 reaction: 鈥淲hile institutions are undoubtedly part of the explanation, they leave much unexplained: some of those richer temperate countries are notorious for their histories of bad institutions (think of Algeria, Argentina, Egypt, and Libya), while some of the tropical countries (e.g., Costa Rica and Tanzania) have had relatively more honest governments. What are the economic disadvantages of a tropical location?鈥� He concludes, 鈥淚n their narrow focus on inclusive institutions, however, the authors ignore or dismiss other factors. I mentioned earlier the effects of an area鈥檚 being landlocked or of environmental damage, factors that they don鈥檛 discuss. Even within the focus on institutions, the concentration specifically on inclusive institutions causes the authors to give inadequate accounts of the ways that natural resources can be a curse.鈥� After describing Acemoglu and Robinson鈥檚 botched job in their explanation of the rise of agriculture 鈥渢o assert, in the complete absence of evidence, that . . . hunter/gatherers had become sedentary because, for unknown reasons, they happened to develop innovative institutions through a hypothesized political revolution鈥� he concludes that 鈥淎cemoglu and Robinson do themselves a disservice by misstating these findings.鈥�
The book has a few points to recommend it in this reviewer鈥檚 mind: 1) Its insistence on uncertainty in the course of human affairs, 2) Its appreciation for the importance of centralized political structure on economic success, 3) Its recognition of the wasted resources that come with gross inequality. But it has glaring blind spots that should cause a critical reader pause.
In the first chapter the authors quote from Fra Bartolome de Las Casas鈥檚 book, A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies. Las Casas is presented by the authors as a hero, who defended the rights of the indigenous people enslaved in the New World by the conquistadores. They seem positively unaware, however, of the irony that motivated Jorge Luis Borges to mention Las Casas in the very first chapter of HIS book, A Universal History of Infamy. For Las Casas鈥檚 answer to the enslavement of the indigenous people of the New World was to import Africans to work in the Antillean gold mines. Thus Borges sees Las Casas not just as the savior of the indigenas of the New World (in which effort he was unsuccessful in any case) but as the father of 鈥淲.C. Handy鈥檚 blues; . . . the mythological dimensions of Abraham Lincoln; the five hundred thousand dead of the Civil War and its three hundred millions spent in military pensions; the entrance of the word 鈥渢o lynch鈥� into the thirteenth edition of the Spanish Academy . .鈥� etc. This kind of irony is well over the heads of our authors.
They take the 鈥渇ailure鈥� of the Mayan civilization to be the result of their favorite themes of 鈥渃reation of extractive political institutions鈥� and lack of 鈥渃reative destruction.鈥� They recognize that 鈥渢he coalescence of these institutions created the basis for an impressive economic expansion鈥� but see its collapse in the ninth century AD to be the result of the overthrow of the political system that had produced this expansion. They recognize that 鈥渆xisting archeological evidence does not allow us to reach a definitive conclusion about why the k鈥檜bul ajaw and elites surrounding him were overthrown鈥� but they take this collapse as evidence nonetheless for their theory that 鈥渆xtractive institutions鈥� were the cause of that collapse. And concerning their diagnosis of 鈥渃ollapse鈥�, should a Mayan society that apparently thrived for close to one thousand years be considered a failure? There is no discussion of the possibility that laterite formation in tropical soils had anything to do with this 鈥渃ollapse.鈥� The story of the Mayans just becomes another example of their pet theory.
I have mentioned 鈥渃reative destruction鈥�. Although there is only one direct mention of the 鈥済reat economist Joseph Schumpeter鈥� in the book, there are references aplenty to Schumpeter鈥檚 most memorable phrase. Creative destruction was explained by Schumpeter as follows: 鈥淭he opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation 鈥� if I may use that biological term 鈥� that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.鈥� (Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, page 83.) Schumpeter was convinced that the entrepreneur is the driving force for development in a capitalistic society. Keynes was not so sure, remarking 鈥渨e are damned if we know鈥� why capitalists invest.
Acemoglu and Robinson seem to take as gospel that creative destruction is necessary for societal advance and always works toward the public good. Someone like Polanyi would no doubt not agree. Schumpeter鈥檚 young Harvard colleague Paul Sweezy certainly did not agree when he participated with Schumpeter in their famous debate at the Harvard Graduate Student鈥檚 Economics Club in the winter of 1946-47 (See 鈥渙n the laws of capitalism, Insights from the Sweezy-Schumpeter Debate鈥� in Monthly Review, May, 2011.) Sweezy鈥檚 notes for the debate say that 鈥淭here is no reason to deny Schumpeter鈥檚 entrepreneurial type, but its significance is quite differently evaluated. For him the entrepreneur occupies the center of the stage; the accumulation process is derivative. For me the accumulation process is primary; the entrepreneur falls in with it and plays a part in it.鈥� Sweezy was, of course, one of the most prominent American Marxist economists of the twentieth century. For him the historical process of evolution of society was crucial, as it was for Marx. And Schumpeter, even as an Austrian economist, had a profound appreciation for this. It is not fair to Acemoglu and Robinson to say that they are oblivious to history; their book is full of historical anecdotes. But this reader gets the sense that for them if a society would just get with the program and encourage capitalists, everything would come out all right.
They rail against the monopolies and resistance to enclosure by the Tudor and Stuart kings in England. This is a typical response of the neo-liberal. The problem is not market economies, they say, but those that interfere with the 鈥渇ree鈥� motion of these economies in society. They attribute the rise of the Industrial Revolution in England to an overcoming of the absolutism of the Tudors and Stuarts by the rise of 鈥渋nclusive institutions鈥� embodied in the Glorious Revolution by the rise of Parliament. But the destruction part of the rise of the entrepreneurial class gets little appreciation. For that we have to read Polanyi and Marx. And they are oblivious to the fact that without Tudor protectionism, the wool-spinning industry in England may never have gotten of the ground. To learn about this we would have to read the Marxist historians or Ha-Joon Chang's Bad Samaritans.
This book contains almost no reference to socialist or even non-free trade capitalist critique of the development policies which the authors prefer. This, of course, is typical of the environment of American academic departments of economics and political science, where our authors reside. In spite of their re-telling of many stories about the corruption and distortion imposed upon the people of the South by European imperialism in the nineteenth century, there is no mention of Lenin鈥檚 Imperialism, Highest Form of Capitalism. No mention of Polanyi. The only significant mention of Marx is in a passage where they say 鈥淟enin and his Communist Party were inspired by Marx, but the practice could not have been more different than the theory. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was a bloody affair, and there was no humane aspect to it.鈥� In fact, the Russian Revolution was remarkably bloodless, since the army went wholly over to the Revolution very early in the process. There is no question that much blood was spilled during the Civil War and that enormous suffering was caused by the Stalinist purges and forced collectivization of agriculture in Russia, but that the authors would assume uncritically that this meant that the Revolution itself was 鈥渁 bloody affair鈥� is a telling indicator of biases that shield them from facts that don鈥檛 fit their view of reality. In a book that is so filled with facts, this ignorance seems systematic; as if they were searching out only the facts that fit their theory.
The authors make an off-hand reference to current day Iraq (on page 444) with amazing lack of empathy for the impact of the 鈥渟hock and awe鈥� imposed on that country by the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld regime and the UN Sanctions that preceded it. They use Iraq鈥檚 recent history to argue against the 鈥渢heory of modernization鈥� that they say 鈥渕aintains that all societies, as they grow, are headed toward a more modern, developed, and civilized existence, and in particular toward democracy.鈥� They mention the 鈥渄isastrous economic performance under Saddam Hussein鈥檚 regime鈥� without mentioning the years of pain imposed by continuing NATO-enforced sanctions and bombardment. For a more realistic estimate of that impact the reader is directed to Iraq Under Siege, The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, published in 2000, three years before 鈥渟hock and awe.鈥� There the reader will find another reason behind that 鈥渄isastrous economic performance鈥� of the previous decade. Anthony Arnove in the introduction to Iraq under Siege quotes from a Wall Street Journal article in 1999 citing unnamed US officials saying, 鈥淎fter eight years of enforcing a 鈥榥o-fly zone鈥� in northern [and sourthern] Iraq, few military targets remain. . . . We are down to the last outhouse.鈥� Acemoglu and Robinson say that hopes for 鈥減luralism鈥� were 鈥渄ashed as chaos and civil war descended upon Iraqi society.鈥� This implies that the 鈥渃haos and civil war鈥� were the result of some internal dynamic in Iraq without considering that what had descended onto Iraqi society was not just the 鈥渆xtractive institutions鈥� of Saddam Hussein but also the wrath of the American Empire, imposed over a decade of economic sanctions and bombardment since the end of the first Iraq war, 鈥淒esert Storm鈥�. They fail to mention the possibility that 6,000 sorties and 1,800 bombs as part of the 鈥渓ongest sustained US air operation since the Vietnam War鈥� had anything to do with the dissolution of Iraqi society that followed the second US land invasion by Bush, the younger. Iraq had long since been 鈥渂ombed back to the stone age鈥� to quote an earlier American general talking about that earlier war. Acemoglu and Robinson make no mention of this.
One of the interesting facts that the authors dredge up from the large anthropological and historical literature upon which they report is a story from the history of Dutch colonialism in the East Indies. They tell the story of the Banda Islands which had established trading relations with English, Portuguese, Indian, and Chinese merchants for mace and nutmeg, which were indigenous to their islands. In 1621 the Dutch governor of Batavia (now Jakarta in Indonesia) Jan Pieterszoon Coen 鈥渟ailed to Banda with a fleet and proceeded to massacre almost the entire population of the islands, probably about fifteen thousand people.鈥� He set up a plantation system in place of the thriving economic activity of the local Banda people and 鈥渄ivided the islands into sixty-eight plantations, awarded to sixty-eight Dutchmen, mostly former and current employees of the Dutch East India Company.鈥� They use this to support their major thesis, that 鈥淓uropean expansion . . . sowed the seeds of underdevelopment in many diverse corners of the world by imposing, or further strengthening existing, extractive institutions.鈥� But their emphasis is on the 鈥渆xtractive institutions鈥� and not on the fact that European imperialism imposed this reality by genocidal force of arms. This is a very strange emphasis to place on these facts.
Diamond鈥檚 critique in his NYRB article provides a good summary of this book. There he points to 鈥渢he authors鈥� resort to assertion unsupported or contradicted by facts.鈥� This book presents what is really a banal conclusion: that authoritarian institutions that impose the will of a small group of elites onto a population is the primary cause of 鈥渦nderdevelopment鈥�. This is not a new theory. It is a re-statement of Aristotle鈥檚 Politics. The real questions are why these authoritarian institutions succeed in taking over power in so many societies and how societies with apparently 鈥渋nclusive鈥� institutions like those in current day United States have evolved into such unequal societies. This book leaves us no closer to an answer to these questions.
The real problem that I have with this book is that it uncritically takes for granted the underlying assumptions from the neoclassical economist鈥檚 tool box. They point out the obvious: 鈥淓uropeans themselves stamped out the possibility of economic growth in many parts of the world that they conquered; . . . the lands where Industrial Revolution originally did not spread remain relatively poor; . . . . the Industrial Revolution and other new technologies are unlikely to spread to places around the world today where a minimum degree of centralization of the state hasn鈥檛 been achieved.鈥� These conclusions are delivered with a tone of great solemnity, but no one but the most dogmatic libertarians or European chauvinists would seriously disagree. The real question is how to change this. Their prescription of more 鈥渋nclusion鈥� the like of which we have in the United States may satisfy some, but it does not satisfy this reviewer.
While the authors mine an enormous literature on development to populate their book with dozens of interesting stories of developmental failure and success, at the end of the day, their book devolves into the something similar to most of the neo-liberal thinking of which we see so much from the 鈥渟cience鈥� of economics. Diamond, who is quoted on the book jacket as saying 鈥淟ike me, you may succumb to reading it in one go, and then you may come back to it again and again鈥� is more critical in a review in the New York Review of Books (7 June 2012). There he points out that after presenting a map of Africa that clearly shows the tropical countries of the interior of the continent at the lowest end of the income scale they insist that geographic factors are 鈥淭heories That Don鈥檛 Work鈥� compared to their preferred 鈥渋nstitutional鈥� explanation. Diamond鈥檚 reaction: 鈥淲hile institutions are undoubtedly part of the explanation, they leave much unexplained: some of those richer temperate countries are notorious for their histories of bad institutions (think of Algeria, Argentina, Egypt, and Libya), while some of the tropical countries (e.g., Costa Rica and Tanzania) have had relatively more honest governments. What are the economic disadvantages of a tropical location?鈥� He concludes, 鈥淚n their narrow focus on inclusive institutions, however, the authors ignore or dismiss other factors. I mentioned earlier the effects of an area鈥檚 being landlocked or of environmental damage, factors that they don鈥檛 discuss. Even within the focus on institutions, the concentration specifically on inclusive institutions causes the authors to give inadequate accounts of the ways that natural resources can be a curse.鈥� After describing Acemoglu and Robinson鈥檚 botched job in their explanation of the rise of agriculture 鈥渢o assert, in the complete absence of evidence, that . . . hunter/gatherers had become sedentary because, for unknown reasons, they happened to develop innovative institutions through a hypothesized political revolution鈥� he concludes that 鈥淎cemoglu and Robinson do themselves a disservice by misstating these findings.鈥�
The book has a few points to recommend it in this reviewer鈥檚 mind: 1) Its insistence on uncertainty in the course of human affairs, 2) Its appreciation for the importance of centralized political structure on economic success, 3) Its recognition of the wasted resources that come with gross inequality. But it has glaring blind spots that should cause a critical reader pause.
In the first chapter the authors quote from Fra Bartolome de Las Casas鈥檚 book, A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies. Las Casas is presented by the authors as a hero, who defended the rights of the indigenous people enslaved in the New World by the conquistadores. They seem positively unaware, however, of the irony that motivated Jorge Luis Borges to mention Las Casas in the very first chapter of HIS book, A Universal History of Infamy. For Las Casas鈥檚 answer to the enslavement of the indigenous people of the New World was to import Africans to work in the Antillean gold mines. Thus Borges sees Las Casas not just as the savior of the indigenas of the New World (in which effort he was unsuccessful in any case) but as the father of 鈥淲.C. Handy鈥檚 blues; . . . the mythological dimensions of Abraham Lincoln; the five hundred thousand dead of the Civil War and its three hundred millions spent in military pensions; the entrance of the word 鈥渢o lynch鈥� into the thirteenth edition of the Spanish Academy . .鈥� etc. This kind of irony is well over the heads of our authors.
They take the 鈥渇ailure鈥� of the Mayan civilization to be the result of their favorite themes of 鈥渃reation of extractive political institutions鈥� and lack of 鈥渃reative destruction.鈥� They recognize that 鈥渢he coalescence of these institutions created the basis for an impressive economic expansion鈥� but see its collapse in the ninth century AD to be the result of the overthrow of the political system that had produced this expansion. They recognize that 鈥渆xisting archeological evidence does not allow us to reach a definitive conclusion about why the k鈥檜bul ajaw and elites surrounding him were overthrown鈥� but they take this collapse as evidence nonetheless for their theory that 鈥渆xtractive institutions鈥� were the cause of that collapse. And concerning their diagnosis of 鈥渃ollapse鈥�, should a Mayan society that apparently thrived for close to one thousand years be considered a failure? There is no discussion of the possibility that laterite formation in tropical soils had anything to do with this 鈥渃ollapse.鈥� The story of the Mayans just becomes another example of their pet theory.
I have mentioned 鈥渃reative destruction鈥�. Although there is only one direct mention of the 鈥済reat economist Joseph Schumpeter鈥� in the book, there are references aplenty to Schumpeter鈥檚 most memorable phrase. Creative destruction was explained by Schumpeter as follows: 鈥淭he opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation 鈥� if I may use that biological term 鈥� that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.鈥� (Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, page 83.) Schumpeter was convinced that the entrepreneur is the driving force for development in a capitalistic society. Keynes was not so sure, remarking 鈥渨e are damned if we know鈥� why capitalists invest.
Acemoglu and Robinson seem to take as gospel that creative destruction is necessary for societal advance and always works toward the public good. Someone like Polanyi would no doubt not agree. Schumpeter鈥檚 young Harvard colleague Paul Sweezy certainly did not agree when he participated with Schumpeter in their famous debate at the Harvard Graduate Student鈥檚 Economics Club in the winter of 1946-47 (See 鈥渙n the laws of capitalism, Insights from the Sweezy-Schumpeter Debate鈥� in Monthly Review, May, 2011.) Sweezy鈥檚 notes for the debate say that 鈥淭here is no reason to deny Schumpeter鈥檚 entrepreneurial type, but its significance is quite differently evaluated. For him the entrepreneur occupies the center of the stage; the accumulation process is derivative. For me the accumulation process is primary; the entrepreneur falls in with it and plays a part in it.鈥� Sweezy was, of course, one of the most prominent American Marxist economists of the twentieth century. For him the historical process of evolution of society was crucial, as it was for Marx. And Schumpeter, even as an Austrian economist, had a profound appreciation for this. It is not fair to Acemoglu and Robinson to say that they are oblivious to history; their book is full of historical anecdotes. But this reader gets the sense that for them if a society would just get with the program and encourage capitalists, everything would come out all right.
They rail against the monopolies and resistance to enclosure by the Tudor and Stuart kings in England. This is a typical response of the neo-liberal. The problem is not market economies, they say, but those that interfere with the 鈥渇ree鈥� motion of these economies in society. They attribute the rise of the Industrial Revolution in England to an overcoming of the absolutism of the Tudors and Stuarts by the rise of 鈥渋nclusive institutions鈥� embodied in the Glorious Revolution by the rise of Parliament. But the destruction part of the rise of the entrepreneurial class gets little appreciation. For that we have to read Polanyi and Marx. And they are oblivious to the fact that without Tudor protectionism, the wool-spinning industry in England may never have gotten of the ground. To learn about this we would have to read the Marxist historians or Ha-Joon Chang's Bad Samaritans.
This book contains almost no reference to socialist or even non-free trade capitalist critique of the development policies which the authors prefer. This, of course, is typical of the environment of American academic departments of economics and political science, where our authors reside. In spite of their re-telling of many stories about the corruption and distortion imposed upon the people of the South by European imperialism in the nineteenth century, there is no mention of Lenin鈥檚 Imperialism, Highest Form of Capitalism. No mention of Polanyi. The only significant mention of Marx is in a passage where they say 鈥淟enin and his Communist Party were inspired by Marx, but the practice could not have been more different than the theory. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was a bloody affair, and there was no humane aspect to it.鈥� In fact, the Russian Revolution was remarkably bloodless, since the army went wholly over to the Revolution very early in the process. There is no question that much blood was spilled during the Civil War and that enormous suffering was caused by the Stalinist purges and forced collectivization of agriculture in Russia, but that the authors would assume uncritically that this meant that the Revolution itself was 鈥渁 bloody affair鈥� is a telling indicator of biases that shield them from facts that don鈥檛 fit their view of reality. In a book that is so filled with facts, this ignorance seems systematic; as if they were searching out only the facts that fit their theory.
The authors make an off-hand reference to current day Iraq (on page 444) with amazing lack of empathy for the impact of the 鈥渟hock and awe鈥� imposed on that country by the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld regime and the UN Sanctions that preceded it. They use Iraq鈥檚 recent history to argue against the 鈥渢heory of modernization鈥� that they say 鈥渕aintains that all societies, as they grow, are headed toward a more modern, developed, and civilized existence, and in particular toward democracy.鈥� They mention the 鈥渄isastrous economic performance under Saddam Hussein鈥檚 regime鈥� without mentioning the years of pain imposed by continuing NATO-enforced sanctions and bombardment. For a more realistic estimate of that impact the reader is directed to Iraq Under Siege, The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War, published in 2000, three years before 鈥渟hock and awe.鈥� There the reader will find another reason behind that 鈥渄isastrous economic performance鈥� of the previous decade. Anthony Arnove in the introduction to Iraq under Siege quotes from a Wall Street Journal article in 1999 citing unnamed US officials saying, 鈥淎fter eight years of enforcing a 鈥榥o-fly zone鈥� in northern [and sourthern] Iraq, few military targets remain. . . . We are down to the last outhouse.鈥� Acemoglu and Robinson say that hopes for 鈥減luralism鈥� were 鈥渄ashed as chaos and civil war descended upon Iraqi society.鈥� This implies that the 鈥渃haos and civil war鈥� were the result of some internal dynamic in Iraq without considering that what had descended onto Iraqi society was not just the 鈥渆xtractive institutions鈥� of Saddam Hussein but also the wrath of the American Empire, imposed over a decade of economic sanctions and bombardment since the end of the first Iraq war, 鈥淒esert Storm鈥�. They fail to mention the possibility that 6,000 sorties and 1,800 bombs as part of the 鈥渓ongest sustained US air operation since the Vietnam War鈥� had anything to do with the dissolution of Iraqi society that followed the second US land invasion by Bush, the younger. Iraq had long since been 鈥渂ombed back to the stone age鈥� to quote an earlier American general talking about that earlier war. Acemoglu and Robinson make no mention of this.
One of the interesting facts that the authors dredge up from the large anthropological and historical literature upon which they report is a story from the history of Dutch colonialism in the East Indies. They tell the story of the Banda Islands which had established trading relations with English, Portuguese, Indian, and Chinese merchants for mace and nutmeg, which were indigenous to their islands. In 1621 the Dutch governor of Batavia (now Jakarta in Indonesia) Jan Pieterszoon Coen 鈥渟ailed to Banda with a fleet and proceeded to massacre almost the entire population of the islands, probably about fifteen thousand people.鈥� He set up a plantation system in place of the thriving economic activity of the local Banda people and 鈥渄ivided the islands into sixty-eight plantations, awarded to sixty-eight Dutchmen, mostly former and current employees of the Dutch East India Company.鈥� They use this to support their major thesis, that 鈥淓uropean expansion . . . sowed the seeds of underdevelopment in many diverse corners of the world by imposing, or further strengthening existing, extractive institutions.鈥� But their emphasis is on the 鈥渆xtractive institutions鈥� and not on the fact that European imperialism imposed this reality by genocidal force of arms. This is a very strange emphasis to place on these facts.
Diamond鈥檚 critique in his NYRB article provides a good summary of this book. There he points to 鈥渢he authors鈥� resort to assertion unsupported or contradicted by facts.鈥� This book presents what is really a banal conclusion: that authoritarian institutions that impose the will of a small group of elites onto a population is the primary cause of 鈥渦nderdevelopment鈥�. This is not a new theory. It is a re-statement of Aristotle鈥檚 Politics. The real questions are why these authoritarian institutions succeed in taking over power in so many societies and how societies with apparently 鈥渋nclusive鈥� institutions like those in current day United States have evolved into such unequal societies. This book leaves us no closer to an answer to these questions.
The real problem that I have with this book is that it uncritically takes for granted the underlying assumptions from the neoclassical economist鈥檚 tool box. They point out the obvious: 鈥淓uropeans themselves stamped out the possibility of economic growth in many parts of the world that they conquered; . . . the lands where Industrial Revolution originally did not spread remain relatively poor; . . . . the Industrial Revolution and other new technologies are unlikely to spread to places around the world today where a minimum degree of centralization of the state hasn鈥檛 been achieved.鈥� These conclusions are delivered with a tone of great solemnity, but no one but the most dogmatic libertarians or European chauvinists would seriously disagree. The real question is how to change this. Their prescription of more 鈥渋nclusion鈥� the like of which we have in the United States may satisfy some, but it does not satisfy this reviewer.
January 6, 2013
This could be written in one chapter or a long magazine piece. Has an interesting theory, but it just goes on for too long and not worth spending the time.
September 15, 2017
This economic history is, as far as it goes, excellent. The main thesis is ultra simple: nations must develop inclusive economic and political institutions if they are to achieve prosperity. Such political institutions include fair and free elections, an independent judiciary, uncorrupt legislative and executive branches etc etc. Inclusive economic institutions include financial controls such as (in the U.S.) the Fed, the SEC, trust breaking litigation, and so forth. The authors say all of these things are mutually reinforcing. In the U.S., for instance, all three main governmental institutions at the federal level hold each other in check. This is also more or less true in Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Botswana. Yes, that Botswana. The stories of Botswana -- and the rest of post-colonial Africa -- are ones I have not come across elsewhere and for which I am especially grateful.
Nations with inclusive economic and political institutions allow something called "creative destruction." This is what happens when new technologies appear and cause a redistribution of wealth. Perhaps the most recent example of creative destruction has been the impact of computers and the internet. So many industries have been upset by these new technologies: publishing, the music industry, retail stores, manufacturing, etc etc. Nations which do not have inclusive economic and political institutions are called "extractive." An extractive nation is one in which an elite prospers from the misfortune of the rest of the population. One example of this is the post-colonial African nation of Sierra Leone. When the British left Sierra Leone, and it was thought that the extractive mechanisms they had put in place would be abolished, just the opposite happened. Local strong men came along and upped the ante. This had the effect of disincentivizing entrepreneurs. After all, why work hard if 90% of one's output will be seized by the junta? Moreover, such extractive nations will not permit creative destruction because it threatens to undermine the power of the governing elite. So the extractive states tend to be backward because they shun new technologies. Though examples from antiquity are adduced -- Rome, Mayan civilization, for instance, both extractive -- the authors are mostly concerned with what happened starting with the Industrial Revolution on. They show how the English Civil War and subsequent Glorious Revolution set the stage for the growth of inclusive political and economic institutions in England and how these became mutually reinforcing over time.
The book is compelling. I hope people living in these extractive nations will get a translation because it is so eye-opening. But that's unlikely, isnt it? Since a major feature of extractive nations is suppression of the media, which is transparency.
This is a view of history, on the other hand, that does not question its foundations. It's a great cheering section for capitalism generally. But there's a huge problem with this economic-growth-at-all-costs mentality. It may have been fine for a century or so but now it's no longer tenable. In fact, it's killing us: climate change, loss of biodiversity, global deforestation; our oceans are covered, by one recent estimate, with 480 billion cubic tons of plastic. GDP is the wrong measure of our "progress" now. We need new sustainable economic models. So the book, while being a captivating history of how capitalism has worked historically, offers no solutions for how it might change. New models are badly needed. If, that is, we haven't already passed the ecological tipping point.
Nations with inclusive economic and political institutions allow something called "creative destruction." This is what happens when new technologies appear and cause a redistribution of wealth. Perhaps the most recent example of creative destruction has been the impact of computers and the internet. So many industries have been upset by these new technologies: publishing, the music industry, retail stores, manufacturing, etc etc. Nations which do not have inclusive economic and political institutions are called "extractive." An extractive nation is one in which an elite prospers from the misfortune of the rest of the population. One example of this is the post-colonial African nation of Sierra Leone. When the British left Sierra Leone, and it was thought that the extractive mechanisms they had put in place would be abolished, just the opposite happened. Local strong men came along and upped the ante. This had the effect of disincentivizing entrepreneurs. After all, why work hard if 90% of one's output will be seized by the junta? Moreover, such extractive nations will not permit creative destruction because it threatens to undermine the power of the governing elite. So the extractive states tend to be backward because they shun new technologies. Though examples from antiquity are adduced -- Rome, Mayan civilization, for instance, both extractive -- the authors are mostly concerned with what happened starting with the Industrial Revolution on. They show how the English Civil War and subsequent Glorious Revolution set the stage for the growth of inclusive political and economic institutions in England and how these became mutually reinforcing over time.
The book is compelling. I hope people living in these extractive nations will get a translation because it is so eye-opening. But that's unlikely, isnt it? Since a major feature of extractive nations is suppression of the media, which is transparency.
This is a view of history, on the other hand, that does not question its foundations. It's a great cheering section for capitalism generally. But there's a huge problem with this economic-growth-at-all-costs mentality. It may have been fine for a century or so but now it's no longer tenable. In fact, it's killing us: climate change, loss of biodiversity, global deforestation; our oceans are covered, by one recent estimate, with 480 billion cubic tons of plastic. GDP is the wrong measure of our "progress" now. We need new sustainable economic models. So the book, while being a captivating history of how capitalism has worked historically, offers no solutions for how it might change. New models are badly needed. If, that is, we haven't already passed the ecological tipping point.
March 6, 2019
The central idea of the book is that states fail because of their political institutions, namely because of their extractive nature. This thesis is, in my opinion, extremely simplistic.
Economic processes are never this one-dimensional. The authors argue that the three theories of poverty (nations are poor because of their unfortunate geographic location, their culture does not facilitate growth and the West simply does not know how to transform poor countries into rich ones) are completely irrelevant which I disagree with (as in, I think that there are probably multiple causes as to why some nations are rich and some poor). The assumption that only politics and political institutions determine whether a country is 'poor or prosperous' is simply too one-sided. The authors do back their ideas up with countless examples from history but these sometimes tend to be irrelevant and random. For example:
They state that disease is not the reason why Africa is poor, it is rather the consequence of Africa already being poor. A possible solution: African governments should invest in health care just like England did in the 19th century. Firstly, the leader of the Industrial Revolution was by no means a poor country. They had the means and resources to do lots of things that contemporary Africa can only dream of. Therefore, this solution is not really much of a solution. Assuming that the political elite in some of the poorest nations in Africa have the resources to build up a new system of health care (this would also mean that the government should provide education for the public which in turn would mean that the mostly agricultural nature of the society would have to change because the country would need educated professionals) is not feasible. That is not to say that African nations are not capable of achieving success, in fact quite a few of them have already done so in various fields but in general, building a country essentially from scratch is not that simple.
The authors also argue that growth under extractive institutions is possible. However, the Caribbean islands were extremely wealthy in the 17th and 18th centuries despite their extractive institutions. They were not poor and definitely not 'failed'. The authors then argue elsewhere that several countries in the Middle East only thrive because of oil, should oil prices fall, they would quickly lose some of their wealth. This is probably true but we cannot ignore the fact that those states are wealthy even though they operate under extractive institutions, just like those of 17-18th century Caribbean. And calling the Ottoman Empire and the Mayans failed is simply incorrect. If a civilization manages to thrive for hundreds and hundreds of years, it is definitely not failed.
There is obviously merit in the authors' argument and I do agree that political and economic institutions have a lot to do with how prosperous and successful a state becomes. History obviously matters but what really annoyed me was the way the book drones on it. The authors constantly repeat themselves and it made me feel as if someone was hitting me in the head with a hammer, making sure that I understand that "Nations fail because of extractive institutions." Okay, I get it already.
To sum up, colonialism and authoritarian governments do indeed stagnate the economy as a whole and create distrust among people. Evil institutions never do too much to help the general public. But they're not the only reason why some countries are poor and some rich.
Edit 06.03.2019: wording and sentence structure.
Economic processes are never this one-dimensional. The authors argue that the three theories of poverty (nations are poor because of their unfortunate geographic location, their culture does not facilitate growth and the West simply does not know how to transform poor countries into rich ones) are completely irrelevant which I disagree with (as in, I think that there are probably multiple causes as to why some nations are rich and some poor). The assumption that only politics and political institutions determine whether a country is 'poor or prosperous' is simply too one-sided. The authors do back their ideas up with countless examples from history but these sometimes tend to be irrelevant and random. For example:
They state that disease is not the reason why Africa is poor, it is rather the consequence of Africa already being poor. A possible solution: African governments should invest in health care just like England did in the 19th century. Firstly, the leader of the Industrial Revolution was by no means a poor country. They had the means and resources to do lots of things that contemporary Africa can only dream of. Therefore, this solution is not really much of a solution. Assuming that the political elite in some of the poorest nations in Africa have the resources to build up a new system of health care (this would also mean that the government should provide education for the public which in turn would mean that the mostly agricultural nature of the society would have to change because the country would need educated professionals) is not feasible. That is not to say that African nations are not capable of achieving success, in fact quite a few of them have already done so in various fields but in general, building a country essentially from scratch is not that simple.
The authors also argue that growth under extractive institutions is possible. However, the Caribbean islands were extremely wealthy in the 17th and 18th centuries despite their extractive institutions. They were not poor and definitely not 'failed'. The authors then argue elsewhere that several countries in the Middle East only thrive because of oil, should oil prices fall, they would quickly lose some of their wealth. This is probably true but we cannot ignore the fact that those states are wealthy even though they operate under extractive institutions, just like those of 17-18th century Caribbean. And calling the Ottoman Empire and the Mayans failed is simply incorrect. If a civilization manages to thrive for hundreds and hundreds of years, it is definitely not failed.
There is obviously merit in the authors' argument and I do agree that political and economic institutions have a lot to do with how prosperous and successful a state becomes. History obviously matters but what really annoyed me was the way the book drones on it. The authors constantly repeat themselves and it made me feel as if someone was hitting me in the head with a hammer, making sure that I understand that "Nations fail because of extractive institutions." Okay, I get it already.
To sum up, colonialism and authoritarian governments do indeed stagnate the economy as a whole and create distrust among people. Evil institutions never do too much to help the general public. But they're not the only reason why some countries are poor and some rich.
Edit 06.03.2019: wording and sentence structure.
July 7, 2012
Such an insightful and shocking book! The examples are very well-explained, and I truly enjoyed thinking and discussing the points raised in this book. Only if more people would read this book and understand that it is not for the lack of aid to poor countries, but the very political and economical structure of the country that makes it poor.
The whole inclusive and extractive political-economical standpoint is very interesting.
The only nitpick I would comment on: the book suffers from excessive repetition. Only if the writers of this book would take some lessons from Jonathan Haidt on how to structure a (non-fiction) book properly.
The whole inclusive and extractive political-economical standpoint is very interesting.
The only nitpick I would comment on: the book suffers from excessive repetition. Only if the writers of this book would take some lessons from Jonathan Haidt on how to structure a (non-fiction) book properly.
June 10, 2012
This is an excellent book about the reasons why some nations are prosperous, while others are steeped in poverty. The authors contend that some nations have "inclusive" economic and political policies. These policies give a political voice to a large segment of the population, rather than only to a small elite. As a result, a set of checks and balances tends toward a positive feedback, sometimes called a "virtuous cycle". This virtuous cycle helps to accelerate the tendencies toward inclusiveness, and to suppress occasional lapses toward power-grabbing.
The other side of the coin are nations with "extractive" economic and political policies. A single person, or a small elite, finds it in their personal interests to grab power and extract as many of the nation's resources for their personal gain. They reject technological innovation, and try their best to maintain the status quo. These nations may temporarily improve their economical conditions, but in the long run their improvements cannot be sustained. Interestingly, the authors claim that China, despite economic improvements in recent decades, is going to be a short-lived phenomenon. At its roots, the political system is still extractive, because it does not allow dissension, does not protect private property, and does not extend the rule of law to everyone.
The authors go into considerable detail, explaining why Western Europe, especially Great Britain, became more economically successful than Eastern Europe. They extend their understanding to North vs. South America. They describe the histories of many other countries as well, to understand why inclusive or extractive policies have helped or hindered progress.
The book tends to be rather repetitive, sometimes too repetitive for my taste. Also, sometimes the sentence constructions are a bit awkward. Nevertheless, the book gives some fascinating insights into political science, and why nations become progressive, or tend toward failure.
The other side of the coin are nations with "extractive" economic and political policies. A single person, or a small elite, finds it in their personal interests to grab power and extract as many of the nation's resources for their personal gain. They reject technological innovation, and try their best to maintain the status quo. These nations may temporarily improve their economical conditions, but in the long run their improvements cannot be sustained. Interestingly, the authors claim that China, despite economic improvements in recent decades, is going to be a short-lived phenomenon. At its roots, the political system is still extractive, because it does not allow dissension, does not protect private property, and does not extend the rule of law to everyone.
The authors go into considerable detail, explaining why Western Europe, especially Great Britain, became more economically successful than Eastern Europe. They extend their understanding to North vs. South America. They describe the histories of many other countries as well, to understand why inclusive or extractive policies have helped or hindered progress.
The book tends to be rather repetitive, sometimes too repetitive for my taste. Also, sometimes the sentence constructions are a bit awkward. Nevertheless, the book gives some fascinating insights into political science, and why nations become progressive, or tend toward failure.
May 2, 2017
I worked for an international affairs journal when this book was first released. I remember the considerable energy the authors seemed to be putting into its marketing 鈥撎齮he articles, the interviews, the debates, the blog, the proliferation of review copies. It seemed like there was a concerted effort to get Why Nations Fail added to that canon of suspect, generalist readings of geopolitics 鈥� your Clash of Civilizations, your Tragedy of Great Power Politics, your End of History and the Last Man 鈥� that worm their way into the lexicons of all first-year IR students alongside the terms 鈥渞ealism,鈥� 鈥渃onstructivism,鈥� and 鈥渘eoliberal institutionalism.鈥� I must confess that at the time I was put off by the baby blue cover (everyone knows that all serious works of poli-sci keep their color schemes to the austere blacks and whites). But it was about time to give it a go.
The book鈥檚 central thesis is very simple. 鈥淓xtractive institutions鈥� limit 鈥渃reative destruction鈥� (borrowing Joseph Schumpeter鈥檚 famous term) as a society run by a 鈥渘arrow elite鈥� with entrenched power fear a disruption of the status quo. This 鈥渋ron law of oligarchy鈥� limits long-term market success. The answer lies in 鈥渋nclusive鈥� economic and political structures that foster a 鈥渧irtuous circle鈥� of innovation and sustainable growth. These phrases are repeated ad nauseam. They season the cherry-picked case studies that span the vast breadth of human history and take up the meat of the read.
If all that seems rather obvious, I don鈥檛 think you鈥檙e alone. Who among those with access to this text remain unconvinced that graft, monopolism, despotism yield limited prosperity for society at large? Vladimir Putin? Viktor Orban? Donald Trump? I鈥檓 sure their motivations stem from very different sources of inspiration than those the authors have in mind. As for the Western academic tradition 鈥� it seems rather conclusive on this matter. Why Nations Fail doesn鈥檛 deal much in nuance. It commits to a definition for neither 鈥渘ationhood鈥� (surely something a bit different than Benedict Anderson鈥檚 imagined communities) nor 鈥渇ailure鈥� (are we talking a runaway Gini coefficient 鈥撎齦arge-scale income inequality? Scarcity? Barbarians at the gates?). So, what are we left with? Almost a tautology. Nations are sets of state-run institutions. They fail when those state-run institutions break down. Naturally.
I鈥檓 going to coin a term here. As a disclaimer: I鈥檝e never studied classics so it鈥檚 probably less-than apt, but here goes. Historrhea (from Ancient Greek 峒毕兿勎肯佄� 丑颈蝉迟辞谤铆补 鈥渉istory鈥� and 峥ノ� rheo 鈥渢o flow鈥�) | noun | hist藱or藱rhea. Historrhea is characterized by excessive and sometimes incoherent tellings of societal events. I find there鈥檚 a lot of historrhea in these sorts of books that attempt to prescribe some grand narrative to human civilization. That seems to be what鈥檚 going on here and I鈥檓 not a huge fan for a few reasons: (1) It comes across as tendentious. I鈥檝e witnessed enough anthropology professors dealing body blows to Guns, Germs, and Steel, the misguided goodwill of Jeffrey Sachs, and the latest Tom Friedman mixed-metaphor to know that things are rarely that simple. A lot of people have lived on planet earth. And collectively they have done a lot of stuff. You can bend the past to fit a linear argument in pretty much any way you want if you try hard enough. That doesn鈥檛 mean you鈥檝e stumbled upon some harmonious truth to the universe, especially if鈥� (2) There is almost no reliance on data/statistical modeling. This was a huge disappointment. I understand that Why Nations Fail was written as a work of pop-history, but Drs. Acemoglu and Robinson are respected economists. Why not play to your strengths and craft a more compelling, rigorous argument in the process? As it stands鈥� (3) The results are not very educational. I read non-fiction to learn. It is very difficult to internalize information 鈥� for me at least 鈥� when the text skips haphazardly throughout time and space, dealing in surface-level treatments of complex issues like a disorganized AP World History study guide. The analysis of events never makes it past the Wikipedia page. I know enough to be suspicious of this.
Drs. Acemoglu and Robinson reject the 鈥渉istorical determinism鈥� of other hypotheses for state success and state failure, but to me that鈥檚 kind of like a proponent of the Cartesian theater rejecting neurological determinism. Sure, you鈥檝e liberated the mind from its fated ends, but how, then, do you do the same for the homunculus you鈥檝e created? Here too, we manage a claim that nations may determine their own fate through the institutions they establish, but where do these institutions come from? Wherein lies the will to will? Really you鈥檙e not getting anywhere at all.
The theories proffered by Why Nations Fail are purely descriptive in nature. Drs. Acemoglu and Robinson acknowledge this lack of predictive power, but I鈥檓 not sure that makes it better. I think the most damning indictment of this sort of work comes at the authors鈥� own hands. As the book concludes, Drs. Acemoglu and Robinson can鈥檛 resist making some tame prognostications based on their thesis. The year is 2012. China is bound for a crash, they write; its authoritarian regime can鈥檛 hold on. Conversely, Brazil鈥檚 future is looking bright as the party of Lula rights the ship. In 2017 we know a bit of how things play out. Xi Jinping consolidates power as the Chinese economy continues its implacable advance. The reports of its demise have been greatly exaggerated. Meanwhile, Brazil remains mired in its worst recession on record while the government is wracked with corruption scandal after corruption scandal. Of course, there is always time for things to turn around. Even those in the Chinese politburo 鈥撎齬iding high 鈥� must know this. The empire,听long divided,听must unite;听long united,听must divide. Thus it has ever been. Perhaps a window will open up in which the authors can claim vindication 鈥� that they were right in the long run. Of course, another famous quotation comes to mind in response.
Two stars. In the long run we are all dead.
The book鈥檚 central thesis is very simple. 鈥淓xtractive institutions鈥� limit 鈥渃reative destruction鈥� (borrowing Joseph Schumpeter鈥檚 famous term) as a society run by a 鈥渘arrow elite鈥� with entrenched power fear a disruption of the status quo. This 鈥渋ron law of oligarchy鈥� limits long-term market success. The answer lies in 鈥渋nclusive鈥� economic and political structures that foster a 鈥渧irtuous circle鈥� of innovation and sustainable growth. These phrases are repeated ad nauseam. They season the cherry-picked case studies that span the vast breadth of human history and take up the meat of the read.
If all that seems rather obvious, I don鈥檛 think you鈥檙e alone. Who among those with access to this text remain unconvinced that graft, monopolism, despotism yield limited prosperity for society at large? Vladimir Putin? Viktor Orban? Donald Trump? I鈥檓 sure their motivations stem from very different sources of inspiration than those the authors have in mind. As for the Western academic tradition 鈥� it seems rather conclusive on this matter. Why Nations Fail doesn鈥檛 deal much in nuance. It commits to a definition for neither 鈥渘ationhood鈥� (surely something a bit different than Benedict Anderson鈥檚 imagined communities) nor 鈥渇ailure鈥� (are we talking a runaway Gini coefficient 鈥撎齦arge-scale income inequality? Scarcity? Barbarians at the gates?). So, what are we left with? Almost a tautology. Nations are sets of state-run institutions. They fail when those state-run institutions break down. Naturally.
I鈥檓 going to coin a term here. As a disclaimer: I鈥檝e never studied classics so it鈥檚 probably less-than apt, but here goes. Historrhea (from Ancient Greek 峒毕兿勎肯佄� 丑颈蝉迟辞谤铆补 鈥渉istory鈥� and 峥ノ� rheo 鈥渢o flow鈥�) | noun | hist藱or藱rhea. Historrhea is characterized by excessive and sometimes incoherent tellings of societal events. I find there鈥檚 a lot of historrhea in these sorts of books that attempt to prescribe some grand narrative to human civilization. That seems to be what鈥檚 going on here and I鈥檓 not a huge fan for a few reasons: (1) It comes across as tendentious. I鈥檝e witnessed enough anthropology professors dealing body blows to Guns, Germs, and Steel, the misguided goodwill of Jeffrey Sachs, and the latest Tom Friedman mixed-metaphor to know that things are rarely that simple. A lot of people have lived on planet earth. And collectively they have done a lot of stuff. You can bend the past to fit a linear argument in pretty much any way you want if you try hard enough. That doesn鈥檛 mean you鈥檝e stumbled upon some harmonious truth to the universe, especially if鈥� (2) There is almost no reliance on data/statistical modeling. This was a huge disappointment. I understand that Why Nations Fail was written as a work of pop-history, but Drs. Acemoglu and Robinson are respected economists. Why not play to your strengths and craft a more compelling, rigorous argument in the process? As it stands鈥� (3) The results are not very educational. I read non-fiction to learn. It is very difficult to internalize information 鈥� for me at least 鈥� when the text skips haphazardly throughout time and space, dealing in surface-level treatments of complex issues like a disorganized AP World History study guide. The analysis of events never makes it past the Wikipedia page. I know enough to be suspicious of this.
Drs. Acemoglu and Robinson reject the 鈥渉istorical determinism鈥� of other hypotheses for state success and state failure, but to me that鈥檚 kind of like a proponent of the Cartesian theater rejecting neurological determinism. Sure, you鈥檝e liberated the mind from its fated ends, but how, then, do you do the same for the homunculus you鈥檝e created? Here too, we manage a claim that nations may determine their own fate through the institutions they establish, but where do these institutions come from? Wherein lies the will to will? Really you鈥檙e not getting anywhere at all.
The theories proffered by Why Nations Fail are purely descriptive in nature. Drs. Acemoglu and Robinson acknowledge this lack of predictive power, but I鈥檓 not sure that makes it better. I think the most damning indictment of this sort of work comes at the authors鈥� own hands. As the book concludes, Drs. Acemoglu and Robinson can鈥檛 resist making some tame prognostications based on their thesis. The year is 2012. China is bound for a crash, they write; its authoritarian regime can鈥檛 hold on. Conversely, Brazil鈥檚 future is looking bright as the party of Lula rights the ship. In 2017 we know a bit of how things play out. Xi Jinping consolidates power as the Chinese economy continues its implacable advance. The reports of its demise have been greatly exaggerated. Meanwhile, Brazil remains mired in its worst recession on record while the government is wracked with corruption scandal after corruption scandal. Of course, there is always time for things to turn around. Even those in the Chinese politburo 鈥撎齬iding high 鈥� must know this. The empire,听long divided,听must unite;听long united,听must divide. Thus it has ever been. Perhaps a window will open up in which the authors can claim vindication 鈥� that they were right in the long run. Of course, another famous quotation comes to mind in response.
Two stars. In the long run we are all dead.
November 5, 2024
袣薪懈谐邪 斜褘谢邪 写谢褟 屑械薪褟 懈薪褌械褉械褋薪邪 薪械胁械褉芯褟褌薪芯 芯谐褉芯屑薪褘屑, 斜芯谐邪褌褘屑 褎邪泻褌芯谢芯谐懈褔械褋泻懈屑 屑邪褌械褉懈邪谢芯屑 懈蟹 泻褍谢褜褌褍褉 懈 懈褋褌芯褉懈懈 褉邪蟹谢懈褔薪褘褏 褋褌褉邪薪. 孝芯谢褜泻芯 褉邪写懈 褝褌芯谐芯 褋褌芯懈谢芯 锌褉芯褔懈褌邪褌褜. 袗胁褌芯褉褘 褋褔懈褌邪褞褌, 褔褌芯 薪邪 胁芯锌褉芯褋, 蟹邪写邪薪薪褘泄 胁 蟹邪谐芯谢芯胁泻械, 芯褌胁械褔邪褞褌 泻邪褔械褋褌胁邪 懈 褋褌褉褍泻褌褍褉邪 懈薪褋褌懈褌褍褌芯胁, 褋芯蟹写邪薪薪褘褏 胁薪褍褌褉懈 褌芯泄 懈谢懈 懈薪芯泄 褋褌褉邪薪褘. 袨薪懈 写械谢褟褌 懈薪褋褌懈褌褍褌褘 薪邪 褝泻褋褌褉邪泻褌懈胁薪褘械 鈥� 褑械谢褜褞 泻芯褌芯褉褘褏 褟胁谢褟械褌褋褟 懈褋泻谢褞褔械薪懈械 斜芯谢褜褕懈薪褋褌胁邪 懈蟹 锌芯谢懈褌懈褔械褋泻懈褏 锌褉芯褑械褋褋芯胁 懈 锌褉芯褑械褋褋邪 褉邪褋锌褉械写械谢械薪懈褟, 懈 懈薪泻谢褞蟹懈胁薪褘械 鈥� 褑械谢褜褞 泻芯褌芯褉褘褏 褟胁谢褟械褌褋褟 蟹邪褖懈褌邪 懈屑褍褖械褋褌胁械薪薪褘褏 锌褉邪胁 褕懈褉芯泻懈褏 褋谢芯械胁 芯斜褖械褋褌胁邪 懈 屑邪泻褋懈屑邪谢褜薪芯械 胁芯胁谢械褔械薪懈械 斜芯谢褜褕懈薪褋褌胁邪 胁 褍泻邪蟹邪薪薪褘械 锌褉芯褑械褋褋褘. 袙 屑芯械泄 褋褌褉邪薪械, 谢褞写懈 薪械 屑芯谐褍褌 胁褘斜懈褉邪褌褜 写邪卸械 邪泻懈屑芯胁 鈥� 屑褝褉芯胁, 褋褍写褘 褍 薪邪褋 薪械 褟胁谢褟褞褌褋褟 薪械蟹邪胁懈褋懈屑褘屑懈. 小褉械写褋褌胁邪 芯褌 薪邪谢芯谐芯胁, 薪邪锌褉邪胁谢褟械屑褘械 薪邪 褋褌褉芯懈褌械谢褜褋褌胁芯 懈 褉邪蟹胁懈褌懈械 懈薪褎褉邪褋褌褉褍泻褌褍褉褘, 胁 屑邪褋褋芯胁芯屑 锌芯褉褟写泻械 褋褌邪薪芯胁褟褌褋褟 芯斜褗械泻褌芯屑 泻芯褉褉褍锌褑懈芯薪薪芯谐芯 锌械褉械褉邪褋锌褉械写械谢械薪懈褟 胁 锌芯谢褜蟹褍 泻褉褍锌薪褘褏 褔懈薪芯胁薪懈泻芯胁 懈 褋胁褟蟹邪薪薪芯谐芯 褋 薪懈屑 斜懈蟹薪械褋邪. 袠 胁褋械 卸械, 褟 写褍屑邪褞, 褔褌芯 褌芯, 褔褌芯 邪胁褌芯褉褘 谐芯胁芯褉褟褌 芯斜 懈薪褋褌懈褌褍褌邪褏, 芯褔械胁懈写薪芯, 斜芯谢褜褕械 芯褌薪芯褋懈褌褋褟 泻 胁芯锌褉芯褋邪屑 薪械褉邪胁械薪褋褌胁邪, 薪械卸械谢懈 斜芯谐邪褌褋褌胁邪 褋褌褉邪薪褘. 袣邪蟹邪褏褋褌邪薪 - 斜芯谐邪褌邪褟 褋褌褉邪薪邪, 斜谢邪谐芯写邪褉褟 褉械薪褌械 懈 褋褘褉褜械胁芯屑褍 褝泻褋锌芯褉褌褍, 薪芯 斜械写薪褘褏 屑薪芯谐芯. 袧械褉邪蟹胁懈褌芯褋褌褜 懈薪褋褌懈褌褍褌芯胁 褋芯蟹写邪械褌 薪械褉邪胁械薪褋褌胁芯.
携 褋褔懈褌邪褞 芯褔械薪褜 胁邪卸薪褘屑, 褔褌芯 懈屑械薪薪芯 邪胁褌芯褉褘 褝褌芯泄 泻薪懈谐懈 褋褌邪谢懈 袧芯斜械谢械胁褋泻懈屑懈 谢邪褍褉械邪褌邪屑懈 锌芯 褝泻芯薪芯屑懈泻械, 锌芯褋泻芯谢褜泻褍 胁谢邪褋褌褟屑 褋褌褉邪薪, 谐写械 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯 卸邪卸写械褌 懈薪褋褌懈褌褍褑懈芯薪邪谢褜薪褘褏 锌械褉械屑械薪, 斜褍写械褌 褋谢芯卸薪械械 懈谐薪芯褉懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 胁械谢械薪懈褟 胁褉械屑械薪懈 懈 写械谢邪褌褜 胁懈写, 褔褌芯 胁褋械 薪芯褉屑邪谢褜薪芯.
携 褋褔懈褌邪褞 芯褔械薪褜 胁邪卸薪褘屑, 褔褌芯 懈屑械薪薪芯 邪胁褌芯褉褘 褝褌芯泄 泻薪懈谐懈 褋褌邪谢懈 袧芯斜械谢械胁褋泻懈屑懈 谢邪褍褉械邪褌邪屑懈 锌芯 褝泻芯薪芯屑懈泻械, 锌芯褋泻芯谢褜泻褍 胁谢邪褋褌褟屑 褋褌褉邪薪, 谐写械 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯 卸邪卸写械褌 懈薪褋褌懈褌褍褑懈芯薪邪谢褜薪褘褏 锌械褉械屑械薪, 斜褍写械褌 褋谢芯卸薪械械 懈谐薪芯褉懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 胁械谢械薪懈褟 胁褉械屑械薪懈 懈 写械谢邪褌褜 胁懈写, 褔褌芯 胁褋械 薪芯褉屑邪谢褜薪芯.
November 11, 2013
Overall: very very interesting and very important topic. I would give it 5 stars except it is very long, detailed, and not an easy read. However well worth it.
Thesis in brief: some countries are properous, and others are not. What causes the difference? Some are right next to each other and the difference in prosperity can not be explained by geography, climate, or even culture. Instead it is the system, and what is it about the system that explains the difference. They elaborate a theory that there are "inclusive" political and economic systems, and there are "extractive" political and economic system. A precondition to either of these is a minimal level of centralized political control.
To distill this to a very simplified level: a region needs to develop a minimal amount of centralized control. At that point it is possible to create a system that is inclusive, where power is somewhat distributed, and economic gains are shared, which helps make the economy grow in a sustained way. At some point it is possible to switch to an extractive system where the people in power manipulate the system to enrich themselves and to stay in power, and at that point sustained growth becomes impossible. The rest of the world passes it up, or in some cases the country descends into ruin.
The bulk of the book is a scholarly and encyclopedic study of different cultures, testing and demonstrating the theory.
Mexico vs. USA: neighboring countries and the difference in climate does not explain the extensive difference in the properity. Surprisingly, 500 years ago Mexico was far more prosperous than the land north of the border. Mexico had 500 times as many people per sq. mile than Virginia, it had an advanced civilization, and tremendous wealth by any measure. How did it come that today USA is so prosperous compared to Mexico? When the Europeans got to mexico, they immediately set up an extractive system to enrich themselves, while in Virginia the Jamestown settlers came close to extinction, and had to set up an inclusive system in order to survive. Once the pattern is set, it is very hard to change, and echos of these patterns survive today.
Chapter 2 addresses all of the common folk theories of why rich countries and poor countries are different: geography, culture, & ignorance. Evidence against is presented. The conclusion: "poor countries are poor because those that have power make choices that create poverty"
Chapter 3 explains extractive and inclusive using the example of South and North Korea which were identical before the border was drawn at the 38th parallel. "Nations fail when they have extractive economic institutions supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic growth." Economic growth requires that 'creative destruction' that Adam Smith referred to, and in an extractive system, those in power oppose change because they fear it will dilute their power and wealth. They actively oppose change. However, without change you can't have growth. Congo and Soviet Union are given as examples of extractive systems that achieved limited growth because the elite actively directed the resources to this end ... but it does not last.
Chapter 4 talks about systems that change from one form to another at a critical juncture. The black death. The Glorious Revolution. Japan in transition from Edo to Meiji.
Chapter 5 is a wide ranging survey of countries (and periods of their history) with extractive systems.
Chapter 6 covers rise and fall scenarios: Venice, Rome, others.
Chapter 7 stands on its own and presents the answer to the question: "Why did the industrial revolution happen in England?" After all, England was not that different from the rest of Europe, but those small differences, and a critical juncture, pushed it in just the right way to be ready for the technological advances of the industrial revolution.
Chapter 8 gives many example (e.g. Somalia) of how the people in power of some countries avoided any advantage from the industrial revolution .. and were left economically behind because of it.
Chapter 9 gives some example (most notably the Spice Islands) where invaders managed actually to destroy inclusive cultures in order to line their own pockets.
Chapter 10 discusses the diffusion of prosperity and how that enabled key countries to benefit from the industrial revolution.
Chapter 11 explains the virtuous circle and how when a country manages to get inclusive economic and political institutions, it tends to stay that way in a stable configuration.
Chapter 12 explains the vicious circle, the pattern where extractive systems tend to reinforce themselves and become stable, even as the country sinks into ruin.
Chapter 13 brings us back to the present day, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leon, Argentina, Korea, and the US south (slave states).
Chapter 14: some positive stories of countries that made a narrow escape: Botswana started very poor, but has grown more than any of its neighbors into a country with the highest per-capta income in sub-saharan Africa. How the south escaped slavery, how those institutions persisted for a hundred years, but finally made it out.
Chapter 15: with all that groundwork behind you, you are finally prepared to fully understand properity, poverty, and their causes. They reject the idea that natural growth will bring prosperity once the country is educated enough. Foreign aid will never work in a country that has extractive institutions -- what has to happen is a change to inclusive, and there is nothing natural or easy about this change.
The book yeilds a lot of insight on the ways that countries can evolve, and indeed patterns that are sure to cause failure. I can't stop wishing that the authors could offer a sure fire way to solve the problem, to turn a country from extractive to inclusive, but alas this is not included in book. It is clear that no simple solutions exist. It would seem that each country to be "saved" would probably need a solution unique to it.
In poor countries they found extractive institutions; in rich countries inclusive institutions; however the cause and effect is not completely clear. We don't really know what causes the form encountered, nor what might cause a change of form. Thus is might simply be that a particular country just happens to be poor and extractive -- it is hard to say whether change to an inclusive structure is even possible. Maybe you have to growing to have inclusive systems. What is the chicken, and what is the egg?
This does not diminish the book in any way. Their 15 years of research are brought to expose patterns that I expect to enhance my way of viewing world politics, economics, and culture, for many years to come.
Thesis in brief: some countries are properous, and others are not. What causes the difference? Some are right next to each other and the difference in prosperity can not be explained by geography, climate, or even culture. Instead it is the system, and what is it about the system that explains the difference. They elaborate a theory that there are "inclusive" political and economic systems, and there are "extractive" political and economic system. A precondition to either of these is a minimal level of centralized political control.
To distill this to a very simplified level: a region needs to develop a minimal amount of centralized control. At that point it is possible to create a system that is inclusive, where power is somewhat distributed, and economic gains are shared, which helps make the economy grow in a sustained way. At some point it is possible to switch to an extractive system where the people in power manipulate the system to enrich themselves and to stay in power, and at that point sustained growth becomes impossible. The rest of the world passes it up, or in some cases the country descends into ruin.
The bulk of the book is a scholarly and encyclopedic study of different cultures, testing and demonstrating the theory.
Mexico vs. USA: neighboring countries and the difference in climate does not explain the extensive difference in the properity. Surprisingly, 500 years ago Mexico was far more prosperous than the land north of the border. Mexico had 500 times as many people per sq. mile than Virginia, it had an advanced civilization, and tremendous wealth by any measure. How did it come that today USA is so prosperous compared to Mexico? When the Europeans got to mexico, they immediately set up an extractive system to enrich themselves, while in Virginia the Jamestown settlers came close to extinction, and had to set up an inclusive system in order to survive. Once the pattern is set, it is very hard to change, and echos of these patterns survive today.
Chapter 2 addresses all of the common folk theories of why rich countries and poor countries are different: geography, culture, & ignorance. Evidence against is presented. The conclusion: "poor countries are poor because those that have power make choices that create poverty"
Chapter 3 explains extractive and inclusive using the example of South and North Korea which were identical before the border was drawn at the 38th parallel. "Nations fail when they have extractive economic institutions supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic growth." Economic growth requires that 'creative destruction' that Adam Smith referred to, and in an extractive system, those in power oppose change because they fear it will dilute their power and wealth. They actively oppose change. However, without change you can't have growth. Congo and Soviet Union are given as examples of extractive systems that achieved limited growth because the elite actively directed the resources to this end ... but it does not last.
Chapter 4 talks about systems that change from one form to another at a critical juncture. The black death. The Glorious Revolution. Japan in transition from Edo to Meiji.
Chapter 5 is a wide ranging survey of countries (and periods of their history) with extractive systems.
Chapter 6 covers rise and fall scenarios: Venice, Rome, others.
Chapter 7 stands on its own and presents the answer to the question: "Why did the industrial revolution happen in England?" After all, England was not that different from the rest of Europe, but those small differences, and a critical juncture, pushed it in just the right way to be ready for the technological advances of the industrial revolution.
Chapter 8 gives many example (e.g. Somalia) of how the people in power of some countries avoided any advantage from the industrial revolution .. and were left economically behind because of it.
Chapter 9 gives some example (most notably the Spice Islands) where invaders managed actually to destroy inclusive cultures in order to line their own pockets.
Chapter 10 discusses the diffusion of prosperity and how that enabled key countries to benefit from the industrial revolution.
Chapter 11 explains the virtuous circle and how when a country manages to get inclusive economic and political institutions, it tends to stay that way in a stable configuration.
Chapter 12 explains the vicious circle, the pattern where extractive systems tend to reinforce themselves and become stable, even as the country sinks into ruin.
Chapter 13 brings us back to the present day, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leon, Argentina, Korea, and the US south (slave states).
Chapter 14: some positive stories of countries that made a narrow escape: Botswana started very poor, but has grown more than any of its neighbors into a country with the highest per-capta income in sub-saharan Africa. How the south escaped slavery, how those institutions persisted for a hundred years, but finally made it out.
Chapter 15: with all that groundwork behind you, you are finally prepared to fully understand properity, poverty, and their causes. They reject the idea that natural growth will bring prosperity once the country is educated enough. Foreign aid will never work in a country that has extractive institutions -- what has to happen is a change to inclusive, and there is nothing natural or easy about this change.
The book yeilds a lot of insight on the ways that countries can evolve, and indeed patterns that are sure to cause failure. I can't stop wishing that the authors could offer a sure fire way to solve the problem, to turn a country from extractive to inclusive, but alas this is not included in book. It is clear that no simple solutions exist. It would seem that each country to be "saved" would probably need a solution unique to it.
In poor countries they found extractive institutions; in rich countries inclusive institutions; however the cause and effect is not completely clear. We don't really know what causes the form encountered, nor what might cause a change of form. Thus is might simply be that a particular country just happens to be poor and extractive -- it is hard to say whether change to an inclusive structure is even possible. Maybe you have to growing to have inclusive systems. What is the chicken, and what is the egg?
This does not diminish the book in any way. Their 15 years of research are brought to expose patterns that I expect to enhance my way of viewing world politics, economics, and culture, for many years to come.
August 12, 2021
賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 趩乇丕 賲賱鬲賴丕 卮讴爻鬲 賲蹖 禺賵乇賳丿 : 乇蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 賯丿乇鬲 貙 卮讴賵賮丕蹖蹖 賵 賮賯乇 鈥� 噩蹖賲夭 乇丕亘蹖賳爻賵賳 賵 丿丕乇賵賳 毓噩賲 丕賵睾賱賵 讴賵卮蹖丿賴 丕賳丿 丿乇 讴鬲丕亘 亘爻蹖丕乇 賲毓乇賵賮 禺賵丿 亘賴 爻賵丕賱 亘爻蹖丕乇 讴賱蹖 毓賱鬲 卮讴賵賮丕蹖蹖 賲賱鬲 賴丕 賵 丿賱丕蹖賱 毓賯亘 賲丕賳丿诏蹖 亘乇禺蹖 讴卮賵乇賴丕 倬丕爻禺 丿賴賳丿 .
亘丿賵賳 鬲乇丿蹖丿 蹖丕賮鬲賳 噩賵丕亘蹖 噩丕賲毓 亘乇丕蹖 爻賵丕賱蹖 讴賱蹖 賮賵賯 讴丕乇 亘爻蹖丕乇 爻禺鬲蹖 丕蹖爻鬲 貙 賴賲丕賳賳丿 讴鬲丕亘 賴丕蹖 賲卮丕亘賴 貙 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 賴賲 倬蹖卮 丕夭 胤乇丨 賳馗乇蹖賴 賵 鬲卅賵乇蹖 禺賵丿 丕亘鬲丿丕 鬲賱丕卮 讴乇丿賴 丕賳丿 鬲丕 噩賵丕亘賴丕蹖 乇丕蹖噩 亘賴 倬乇爻卮 乇丕 亘乇乇爻蹖 讴賳賳丿 .
卮丕蹖丿 賲丨亘賵亘 鬲乇蹖賳 倬丕爻禺 亘賴 毓賱鬲 卮讴賵賮丕蹖蹖 賲賱鬲 賴丕 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕 賵 鬲賮丕賵鬲 賴丕蹖 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕蹖蹖 亘丕卮丿 丕賲丕 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 賲孬丕賱 丌賵乇丿賳 卮賴乇蹖 賲乇夭蹖 亘蹖賳 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 賵 賲讴夭蹖讴 丕蹖賳 丿賱蹖賱 乇丕 乇丿 賲蹖 讴賳賳丿 . ( 卮丕蹖丿 賲賴賲 鬲乇蹖賳 賲卮讴賱 讴鬲丕亘 賴賲蹖賳 丿蹖丿 讴賵鬲丕賴 賵 乇丿 讴乇丿賳 蹖讴 賮乇囟蹖賴 亘丕 蹖讴 賲孬丕賱 賳賯囟 亘丕卮丿 貙 丕賲乇賵夭賴 賲蹖 丿丕賳蹖賲 讴賴 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 丿賱丕蹖賱 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 睾乇亘 貙 賳夭丿蹖讴蹖 卮賴乇賴丕 亘賴 賴賲丿蹖诏乇 亘賴 毓賱鬲 丌亘 賵 賴賵丕蹖 賲胤賱賵亘 賵 亘丕乇賳丿诏蹖 夭蹖丕丿 亘賵丿賴 貙 丕蹖賳 丕賲乇 丕乇鬲亘丕胤丕鬲 賵 賲乇丕賵丿丕鬲 鬲噩丕乇蹖 賲蹖丕賳 卮賴乇賴丕 亘賴 賵蹖跇賴 丿乇 賮乇丕賳爻賴 貙 丌賱賲丕賳 賮毓賱蹖 貙 爻賵蹖蹖爻 貙 丕鬲乇蹖卮 賵 卮賲丕賱 丕蹖鬲丕賱蹖丕 乇丕 丕賮夭丕蹖卮 丿丕丿賴 貙 卮賴乇賴丕 亘賴 賴賲丿蹖诏乇 賵丕亘爻鬲賴 卮丿賴 賵 讴賲 讴賲 賲丕夭丕丿 鬲賵賱蹖丿 噩賴鬲 鬲噩丕乇鬲 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 丌賲丿 貙 亘丕賳讴丿丕乇蹖 噩賴鬲 乇賵賳賯 丿丕丿賳 亘丕夭乇诏丕賳蹖 丿乇 丕乇賵倬丕 賵 亘賴 賵蹖跇賴 丿乇 丕蹖鬲丕賱蹖丕 貙 賵賳蹖夭 賵 噩賳賵丕 倬丕 诏乇賮鬲 賵 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴乇丿 貙 丕夭 胤乇賮蹖 丿蹖诏乇 丿爻鬲乇爻蹖 讴卮賵乇賴丕 亘賴 乇賵丿賴丕蹖 倬乇 丌亘 賵 賯丕亘賱 讴卮鬲蹖乇丕賳蹖 賵 賳夭丿蹖讴蹖 亘賴 丕賯蹖丕賳賵爻 賵 丿乇蹖丕賴丕蹖 賲賴賲 賲丕賳賳丿 賲丿蹖鬲乇丕賳賴 亘丕毓孬 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 賯丕亘賱 鬲賵噩賴 讴卮鬲蹖乇丕賳蹖 丿乇 丕蹖鬲丕賱蹖丕 貙 爻倬爻 丿乇 丕爻倬丕賳蹖丕 賵 倬乇鬲睾丕賱 貙 賮乇丕賳爻賴 賵 賴賱賳丿 賵 丿乇 倬丕蹖丕賳 丿乇 丕賳诏賱爻鬲丕賳 卮丿 貙 氐丿賴丕 賵 卮丕蹖丿 賴夭丕乇丕賳 丿乇蹖丕賳賵乇丿 賲丕賳賳丿 賲丕乇讴賵倬賵賱賵 貙 賵丕爻讴賵 丿賵诏丕賲丕 貙 讴乇蹖爻鬲賮 讴賱賲亘 賵 賲丕跇賱丕賳 丕夭 睾乇亘 亘乇丕蹖 鬲噩丕乇鬲 丕亘乇蹖卮賲 貙 丕丿賵蹖賴 丕夭 丕蹖鬲丕賱蹖丕 貙 丕爻倬丕賳蹖丕 賵 倬乇鬲睾丕賱 乇丕賴蹖 丿賳蹖丕賴丕蹖 噩丿蹖丿 卮丿賳丿 .丿乇 丨丕賱蹖 讴賴 丿乇 卮乇賯 亘乇丕蹖 賲孬丕賱 丕蹖乇丕賳 亘賴 毓賱鬲 禺卮讴蹖 爻乇夭賲蹖賳 貙 卮賴乇賴丕 毓賲賵賲丕 亘丕 賮丕氐賱賴 夭蹖丕丿 丕夭 賴賲 亘賳丕 賲蹖 卮丿賳丿 賵 賲噩亘賵乇 亘賴 鬲丕賲蹖賳 賲丕蹖丨鬲丕噩 禺賵丿 丕夭 丿丕禺賱 卮賴乇 亘賵丿賳丿 貙 亘丕夭乇诏丕賳蹖 夭賲蹖賳蹖 亘賴 毓賱鬲 賵噩賵丿 氐丨乇丕 賵 讴賵賴 賴丕蹖 賮乇丕賵丕賳 賵 賳丕丕賲賳蹖 賴賲賵丕乇賴 亘丕 賲卮讴賱 乇賵亘乇賵 亘賵丿賴 貙 亘賳丕亘乇 丕蹖賳 賲丕夭丕丿 鬲噩丕乇蹖 禺丕氐蹖 賴賲 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 賳蹖丕賲丿賴 賵 丕夭 賴賲賴 賲賴賲鬲乇 丕氐賵賱丕 讴卮鬲蹖乇丕賳蹖 賵 鬲噩丕乇鬲 丿乇蹖丕蹖蹖 賴賲賵丕乇 亘賴 噩亘乇 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕 賲賵乇丿 亘蹖 丕毓鬲賳丕蹖蹖 賲胤賱賯 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 亘賵丿. )
乇丕亘蹖賳爻賵賳 賵 丕賵睾賱賵 亘賴 賴賲蹖賳 鬲乇鬲蹖亘 賵丕賱亘鬲賴 亘丕 鬲丕讴蹖丿 亘乇 賲孬丕賱 賴丕蹖 賳賯囟 貙 丿蹖诏乇 賮乇囟蹖賴 賴丕蹖 乇丕蹖噩 賲丕賳賳丿 賮乇囟蹖賴 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 賳跇丕丿 乇丕 賴賲 賳賮蹖 賲蹖 讴賳賳丿 貙 丌賳賴丕 爻倬爻 亘丕 鬲讴蹖賴 亘乇 賵丕跇賴 賴丕蹖蹖 賲丕賳賳丿 賳賴丕丿 賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 貙 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 賵 鬲禺乇蹖亘 禺賱丕賯 賳馗乇蹖賴 禺賵丿 乇丕 亘丕 匕讴乇 賲孬丕賱 卮乇丨 賵 亘爻胤 賲蹖 丿賴賳丿 .
爻丕丿賴 鬲乇蹖賳 賲孬丕賱 亘乇丕蹖 丕孬亘丕鬲 丿乇爻鬲蹖 賳馗乇蹖賴 丌賳丕賳 貙 賲賯丕蹖爻賴 亘蹖賳 讴乇賴 卮賲丕賱蹖 賵 讴乇賴 噩賳賵亘蹖 丕蹖爻鬲 讴賴 亘丕 賵噩賵丿 賲賵賯毓蹖鬲 蹖讴爻丕賳 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕蹖蹖 貙 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 賳跇丕丿 賴賲爻丕賳 貙 讴乇賴 卮賲丕賱蹖 亘賴 爻乇毓鬲 賲爻蹖乇 賯賴賯乇丕 賵賱蹖 讴乇賴 噩賳賵亘蹖 乇丕賴 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 賵 鬲賵爻毓賴 乇丕 賲蹖 倬蹖賲丕蹖丿 . 亘賴 賳馗乇 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 毓賱鬲 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴乇賴 噩賳賵亘蹖 丿乇 丕賳鬲禺丕亘 爻蹖丕爻鬲賴丕 賵 乇賵卮賴丕蹖蹖 丕蹖爻鬲 讴賴 亘丕 禺賵丿 乇卮丿 賳賴丕丿 賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 亘賴 賴賲乇丕賴 丌賵乇丿賴 丕賲丕 丿乇 讴乇賴 卮賲丕賱蹖 亘丕毓孬 诏爻鬲乇卮 賵 鬲賯賵蹖鬲 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲 .
卮丕蹖丿 亘鬲賵丕賳 诏賮鬲 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 睾蹖乇 丕夭 胤乇丨 丕蹖丿賴 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 賵 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 貙 丨乇賮 賵 爻禺賳 丿蹖诏乇蹖 賳丿丕乇丿 貙 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 丌賵乇丿賳 賳賲賵賳賴 賵 賲孬丕賱 賴丕蹖 賮乇丕賵丕賳 賵 匕讴乇 趩乇丕蹖蹖 卮讴爻鬲 賵 蹖丕 倬蹖乇賵夭蹖 丌賳賴丕 貙 亘賴 賴乇 賯蹖賲鬲蹖 丕蹖賳 丿賱丕蹖賱 乇丕 亘賴 賳馗乇蹖賴 禺賵丿 丕乇鬲亘丕胤 賲蹖 丿賴賳丿 貙 丕賲乇蹖 讴賴 亘丕毓孬 鬲讴乇丕乇蹖 亘賵丿賳 賲胤丕賱亘 讴鬲丕亘 卮丿賴 賵 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 乇丕 亘賴 爻乇毓鬲 賵 亘賴 禺丕胤乇 賳蹖丕賮鬲賳 賳讴鬲賴 噩丿蹖丿蹖 丿乇 讴鬲丕亘 禺爻鬲賴 賲蹖 讴賳丿 .
賳讴鬲賴 丕蹖 讴賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇丌賳 丕氐乇丕乇 賮乇丕賵丕賳 丿丕卮鬲賴 丕賳丿 鬲賱丕卮 丿乇 噩賴鬲 蹖丕賮鬲賳 賮乇賲賵賱蹖 乇蹖丕囟蹖 賵丕乇 賵 诏賳噩丕賳丿賳 乇蹖卮賴 賲卮讴賱丕鬲 丿乇 丌賳 丕爻鬲 貙 乇賵卮蹖 爻丕丿賴 賵 丕賱亘鬲賴 賳爻亘鬲丕 睾蹖乇 毓賱賲蹖 亘丕 賳丕丿蹖丿賴 诏乇賮鬲賳 乇蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 鬲丕乇蹖禺蹖 貙 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 丕賱亘鬲賴 丿賱丕蹖賱 賮乇賴賳诏蹖 . 鬲賱丕卮 丌賳丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 鬲讴乇丕乇蹖 賵 禺爻鬲賴 讴賳賳丿賴 讴乇丿賴 賵 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 乇丕 丿乇 趩乇禺賴 丕蹖 亘蹖 倬丕蹖丕賳 丕夭 毓賱鬲 賴丕蹖 蹖讴爻丕賳 丕賳丿丕禺鬲賴 丕爻鬲 .
丿乇 倬丕蹖丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 丕丨鬲賲丕賱丕 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賳鬲蹖噩賴 乇爻蹖丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賳賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳 亘賴 丕蹖賳 倬乇爻卮 倬丕爻禺蹖 讴賱蹖 丿丕丿 貙 蹖丕 丌賳乇丕 丿乇 賯丕賱亘蹖 诏賳噩丕賳丿 貙 亘賱讴賴 賴乇 讴卮賵乇 蹖丕 賲賱鬲蹖 乇丕 亘丕蹖丿 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲蹖 噩丿丕 賵 亘丕 丿乇 賳馗乇 诏乇賮鬲賳 賲噩賲賵毓賴 丕蹖 讴丕賲賱 丕夭 鬲賲丕賲蹖 毓賵丕賲賱 亘乇乇爻蹖 讴乇丿 貙 賲賮丕賴蹖賲蹖 讴賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 讴丕賲賱 賳丕丿蹖丿賴 诏乇賮鬲賴 卮丿賴 丕賳丿 .
亘丿賵賳 鬲乇丿蹖丿 蹖丕賮鬲賳 噩賵丕亘蹖 噩丕賲毓 亘乇丕蹖 爻賵丕賱蹖 讴賱蹖 賮賵賯 讴丕乇 亘爻蹖丕乇 爻禺鬲蹖 丕蹖爻鬲 貙 賴賲丕賳賳丿 讴鬲丕亘 賴丕蹖 賲卮丕亘賴 貙 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 賴賲 倬蹖卮 丕夭 胤乇丨 賳馗乇蹖賴 賵 鬲卅賵乇蹖 禺賵丿 丕亘鬲丿丕 鬲賱丕卮 讴乇丿賴 丕賳丿 鬲丕 噩賵丕亘賴丕蹖 乇丕蹖噩 亘賴 倬乇爻卮 乇丕 亘乇乇爻蹖 讴賳賳丿 .
卮丕蹖丿 賲丨亘賵亘 鬲乇蹖賳 倬丕爻禺 亘賴 毓賱鬲 卮讴賵賮丕蹖蹖 賲賱鬲 賴丕 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕 賵 鬲賮丕賵鬲 賴丕蹖 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕蹖蹖 亘丕卮丿 丕賲丕 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 賲孬丕賱 丌賵乇丿賳 卮賴乇蹖 賲乇夭蹖 亘蹖賳 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 賵 賲讴夭蹖讴 丕蹖賳 丿賱蹖賱 乇丕 乇丿 賲蹖 讴賳賳丿 . ( 卮丕蹖丿 賲賴賲 鬲乇蹖賳 賲卮讴賱 讴鬲丕亘 賴賲蹖賳 丿蹖丿 讴賵鬲丕賴 賵 乇丿 讴乇丿賳 蹖讴 賮乇囟蹖賴 亘丕 蹖讴 賲孬丕賱 賳賯囟 亘丕卮丿 貙 丕賲乇賵夭賴 賲蹖 丿丕賳蹖賲 讴賴 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 丿賱丕蹖賱 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 睾乇亘 貙 賳夭丿蹖讴蹖 卮賴乇賴丕 亘賴 賴賲丿蹖诏乇 亘賴 毓賱鬲 丌亘 賵 賴賵丕蹖 賲胤賱賵亘 賵 亘丕乇賳丿诏蹖 夭蹖丕丿 亘賵丿賴 貙 丕蹖賳 丕賲乇 丕乇鬲亘丕胤丕鬲 賵 賲乇丕賵丿丕鬲 鬲噩丕乇蹖 賲蹖丕賳 卮賴乇賴丕 亘賴 賵蹖跇賴 丿乇 賮乇丕賳爻賴 貙 丌賱賲丕賳 賮毓賱蹖 貙 爻賵蹖蹖爻 貙 丕鬲乇蹖卮 賵 卮賲丕賱 丕蹖鬲丕賱蹖丕 乇丕 丕賮夭丕蹖卮 丿丕丿賴 貙 卮賴乇賴丕 亘賴 賴賲丿蹖诏乇 賵丕亘爻鬲賴 卮丿賴 賵 讴賲 讴賲 賲丕夭丕丿 鬲賵賱蹖丿 噩賴鬲 鬲噩丕乇鬲 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 丌賲丿 貙 亘丕賳讴丿丕乇蹖 噩賴鬲 乇賵賳賯 丿丕丿賳 亘丕夭乇诏丕賳蹖 丿乇 丕乇賵倬丕 賵 亘賴 賵蹖跇賴 丿乇 丕蹖鬲丕賱蹖丕 貙 賵賳蹖夭 賵 噩賳賵丕 倬丕 诏乇賮鬲 賵 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴乇丿 貙 丕夭 胤乇賮蹖 丿蹖诏乇 丿爻鬲乇爻蹖 讴卮賵乇賴丕 亘賴 乇賵丿賴丕蹖 倬乇 丌亘 賵 賯丕亘賱 讴卮鬲蹖乇丕賳蹖 賵 賳夭丿蹖讴蹖 亘賴 丕賯蹖丕賳賵爻 賵 丿乇蹖丕賴丕蹖 賲賴賲 賲丕賳賳丿 賲丿蹖鬲乇丕賳賴 亘丕毓孬 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 賯丕亘賱 鬲賵噩賴 讴卮鬲蹖乇丕賳蹖 丿乇 丕蹖鬲丕賱蹖丕 貙 爻倬爻 丿乇 丕爻倬丕賳蹖丕 賵 倬乇鬲睾丕賱 貙 賮乇丕賳爻賴 賵 賴賱賳丿 賵 丿乇 倬丕蹖丕賳 丿乇 丕賳诏賱爻鬲丕賳 卮丿 貙 氐丿賴丕 賵 卮丕蹖丿 賴夭丕乇丕賳 丿乇蹖丕賳賵乇丿 賲丕賳賳丿 賲丕乇讴賵倬賵賱賵 貙 賵丕爻讴賵 丿賵诏丕賲丕 貙 讴乇蹖爻鬲賮 讴賱賲亘 賵 賲丕跇賱丕賳 丕夭 睾乇亘 亘乇丕蹖 鬲噩丕乇鬲 丕亘乇蹖卮賲 貙 丕丿賵蹖賴 丕夭 丕蹖鬲丕賱蹖丕 貙 丕爻倬丕賳蹖丕 賵 倬乇鬲睾丕賱 乇丕賴蹖 丿賳蹖丕賴丕蹖 噩丿蹖丿 卮丿賳丿 .丿乇 丨丕賱蹖 讴賴 丿乇 卮乇賯 亘乇丕蹖 賲孬丕賱 丕蹖乇丕賳 亘賴 毓賱鬲 禺卮讴蹖 爻乇夭賲蹖賳 貙 卮賴乇賴丕 毓賲賵賲丕 亘丕 賮丕氐賱賴 夭蹖丕丿 丕夭 賴賲 亘賳丕 賲蹖 卮丿賳丿 賵 賲噩亘賵乇 亘賴 鬲丕賲蹖賳 賲丕蹖丨鬲丕噩 禺賵丿 丕夭 丿丕禺賱 卮賴乇 亘賵丿賳丿 貙 亘丕夭乇诏丕賳蹖 夭賲蹖賳蹖 亘賴 毓賱鬲 賵噩賵丿 氐丨乇丕 賵 讴賵賴 賴丕蹖 賮乇丕賵丕賳 賵 賳丕丕賲賳蹖 賴賲賵丕乇賴 亘丕 賲卮讴賱 乇賵亘乇賵 亘賵丿賴 貙 亘賳丕亘乇 丕蹖賳 賲丕夭丕丿 鬲噩丕乇蹖 禺丕氐蹖 賴賲 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 賳蹖丕賲丿賴 賵 丕夭 賴賲賴 賲賴賲鬲乇 丕氐賵賱丕 讴卮鬲蹖乇丕賳蹖 賵 鬲噩丕乇鬲 丿乇蹖丕蹖蹖 賴賲賵丕乇 亘賴 噩亘乇 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕 賲賵乇丿 亘蹖 丕毓鬲賳丕蹖蹖 賲胤賱賯 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 亘賵丿. )
乇丕亘蹖賳爻賵賳 賵 丕賵睾賱賵 亘賴 賴賲蹖賳 鬲乇鬲蹖亘 賵丕賱亘鬲賴 亘丕 鬲丕讴蹖丿 亘乇 賲孬丕賱 賴丕蹖 賳賯囟 貙 丿蹖诏乇 賮乇囟蹖賴 賴丕蹖 乇丕蹖噩 賲丕賳賳丿 賮乇囟蹖賴 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 賳跇丕丿 乇丕 賴賲 賳賮蹖 賲蹖 讴賳賳丿 貙 丌賳賴丕 爻倬爻 亘丕 鬲讴蹖賴 亘乇 賵丕跇賴 賴丕蹖蹖 賲丕賳賳丿 賳賴丕丿 賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 貙 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 賵 鬲禺乇蹖亘 禺賱丕賯 賳馗乇蹖賴 禺賵丿 乇丕 亘丕 匕讴乇 賲孬丕賱 卮乇丨 賵 亘爻胤 賲蹖 丿賴賳丿 .
爻丕丿賴 鬲乇蹖賳 賲孬丕賱 亘乇丕蹖 丕孬亘丕鬲 丿乇爻鬲蹖 賳馗乇蹖賴 丌賳丕賳 貙 賲賯丕蹖爻賴 亘蹖賳 讴乇賴 卮賲丕賱蹖 賵 讴乇賴 噩賳賵亘蹖 丕蹖爻鬲 讴賴 亘丕 賵噩賵丿 賲賵賯毓蹖鬲 蹖讴爻丕賳 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕蹖蹖 貙 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 賳跇丕丿 賴賲爻丕賳 貙 讴乇賴 卮賲丕賱蹖 亘賴 爻乇毓鬲 賲爻蹖乇 賯賴賯乇丕 賵賱蹖 讴乇賴 噩賳賵亘蹖 乇丕賴 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 賵 鬲賵爻毓賴 乇丕 賲蹖 倬蹖賲丕蹖丿 . 亘賴 賳馗乇 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 毓賱鬲 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴乇賴 噩賳賵亘蹖 丿乇 丕賳鬲禺丕亘 爻蹖丕爻鬲賴丕 賵 乇賵卮賴丕蹖蹖 丕蹖爻鬲 讴賴 亘丕 禺賵丿 乇卮丿 賳賴丕丿 賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 亘賴 賴賲乇丕賴 丌賵乇丿賴 丕賲丕 丿乇 讴乇賴 卮賲丕賱蹖 亘丕毓孬 诏爻鬲乇卮 賵 鬲賯賵蹖鬲 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲 .
卮丕蹖丿 亘鬲賵丕賳 诏賮鬲 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 睾蹖乇 丕夭 胤乇丨 丕蹖丿賴 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 賵 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 貙 丨乇賮 賵 爻禺賳 丿蹖诏乇蹖 賳丿丕乇丿 貙 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 丌賵乇丿賳 賳賲賵賳賴 賵 賲孬丕賱 賴丕蹖 賮乇丕賵丕賳 賵 匕讴乇 趩乇丕蹖蹖 卮讴爻鬲 賵 蹖丕 倬蹖乇賵夭蹖 丌賳賴丕 貙 亘賴 賴乇 賯蹖賲鬲蹖 丕蹖賳 丿賱丕蹖賱 乇丕 亘賴 賳馗乇蹖賴 禺賵丿 丕乇鬲亘丕胤 賲蹖 丿賴賳丿 貙 丕賲乇蹖 讴賴 亘丕毓孬 鬲讴乇丕乇蹖 亘賵丿賳 賲胤丕賱亘 讴鬲丕亘 卮丿賴 賵 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 乇丕 亘賴 爻乇毓鬲 賵 亘賴 禺丕胤乇 賳蹖丕賮鬲賳 賳讴鬲賴 噩丿蹖丿蹖 丿乇 讴鬲丕亘 禺爻鬲賴 賲蹖 讴賳丿 .
賳讴鬲賴 丕蹖 讴賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇丌賳 丕氐乇丕乇 賮乇丕賵丕賳 丿丕卮鬲賴 丕賳丿 鬲賱丕卮 丿乇 噩賴鬲 蹖丕賮鬲賳 賮乇賲賵賱蹖 乇蹖丕囟蹖 賵丕乇 賵 诏賳噩丕賳丿賳 乇蹖卮賴 賲卮讴賱丕鬲 丿乇 丌賳 丕爻鬲 貙 乇賵卮蹖 爻丕丿賴 賵 丕賱亘鬲賴 賳爻亘鬲丕 睾蹖乇 毓賱賲蹖 亘丕 賳丕丿蹖丿賴 诏乇賮鬲賳 乇蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 鬲丕乇蹖禺蹖 貙 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 丕賱亘鬲賴 丿賱丕蹖賱 賮乇賴賳诏蹖 . 鬲賱丕卮 丌賳丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 鬲讴乇丕乇蹖 賵 禺爻鬲賴 讴賳賳丿賴 讴乇丿賴 賵 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 乇丕 丿乇 趩乇禺賴 丕蹖 亘蹖 倬丕蹖丕賳 丕夭 毓賱鬲 賴丕蹖 蹖讴爻丕賳 丕賳丿丕禺鬲賴 丕爻鬲 .
丿乇 倬丕蹖丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 丕丨鬲賲丕賱丕 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賳鬲蹖噩賴 乇爻蹖丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賳賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳 亘賴 丕蹖賳 倬乇爻卮 倬丕爻禺蹖 讴賱蹖 丿丕丿 貙 蹖丕 丌賳乇丕 丿乇 賯丕賱亘蹖 诏賳噩丕賳丿 貙 亘賱讴賴 賴乇 讴卮賵乇 蹖丕 賲賱鬲蹖 乇丕 亘丕蹖丿 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲蹖 噩丿丕 賵 亘丕 丿乇 賳馗乇 诏乇賮鬲賳 賲噩賲賵毓賴 丕蹖 讴丕賲賱 丕夭 鬲賲丕賲蹖 毓賵丕賲賱 亘乇乇爻蹖 讴乇丿 貙 賲賮丕賴蹖賲蹖 讴賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 讴丕賲賱 賳丕丿蹖丿賴 诏乇賮鬲賴 卮丿賴 丕賳丿 .
June 23, 2012
I think the premise of this book is fantastic, and the first 50 pages were terrific. Beyond that, I was pretty disappointed by the execution.
The book is built upon the theory that it is not economic policies, but rather "institutions" (such as good governance, social norms and a strong legal system) that play the fundamental role in economic growth and development. I find this to be a compelling theory and I think it is an extremely useful framework from which to view economic and political development. Like most "big theory" books, this book is spent explaining how this theory explains the world. I think the main problem with this approach is that these are economists (and not economic historians) trying to write about history, and their history is awfully simplistic. The economic history of institutions would be fascinating, if done in a comprehensive way, but this reads more like a superficially researched college history paper than a comprehensive history of institutions and their role in economic history. Judging from Acemoglu and Robinson's version of history, institutions explain all major political developments of the past 5 millennia, and there are no counter-examples that contradict their explanations. These are unrealistic positions.
The book is built upon the theory that it is not economic policies, but rather "institutions" (such as good governance, social norms and a strong legal system) that play the fundamental role in economic growth and development. I find this to be a compelling theory and I think it is an extremely useful framework from which to view economic and political development. Like most "big theory" books, this book is spent explaining how this theory explains the world. I think the main problem with this approach is that these are economists (and not economic historians) trying to write about history, and their history is awfully simplistic. The economic history of institutions would be fascinating, if done in a comprehensive way, but this reads more like a superficially researched college history paper than a comprehensive history of institutions and their role in economic history. Judging from Acemoglu and Robinson's version of history, institutions explain all major political developments of the past 5 millennia, and there are no counter-examples that contradict their explanations. These are unrealistic positions.
November 28, 2022
This is the type of book where they take a word (Extractive) and use it to mean something different from what it usually means and then repeat it 3,000 times and act like that explains things. The authors' overall argument is that nations work better after people revolt against oligarchs, except for all the times when that didn't work.
Better books covering similar ground:
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Better books covering similar ground:
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June 10, 2019
The lack of arguments and statements like: "Unlike in Mexico, in the United States the citizens could keep politicians in check and get rid of ones who would use their offices to enrich themselves or create monopolies for their cronies." (In the 19th century? Really?) or 鈥淛ust as the United States in the nineteenth century was more democratic politically than almost any other nation in the world at the time, it was also more democratic than others when it came to innovation.鈥� do not make any sense. I am not going to finish this book.
June 23, 2019
螤慰位蠉 蔚谓未喂伪蠁苇蟻慰谓 魏伪喂 蟽畏渭伪谓蟿喂魏蠈 尾喂尾位委慰. 螛伪 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉蟽蔚 蔚谓伪位位伪魏蟿喂魏维 谓伪 慰谓慰渭伪蟽蟿蔚委 "螤伪纬魏蠈蟽渭喂伪 螣喂魏慰谓慰渭喂魏萎 螜蟽蟿慰蟻委伪".
螤蟻伪纬渭伪蟿喂魏维 蔚委谓伪喂 蔚谓蟿蠀蟺蠅蟽喂伪魏蠈 蟿慰 蔚蠉蟻慰蟼 蟿畏蟼 渭蔚位苇蟿畏蟼 魏伪喂 蟿畏蟼 未慰蠀位蔚喂维蟼 蟺慰蠀 苇蠂慰蠀谓 蟻委尉蔚喂 慰喂 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁蔚委蟼 魏伪喂 伪蠀蟿蠈 蠁伪委谓蔚蟿伪喂. 螤维谓蟿伪 蟽蔚尾蠈渭慰蠀谓 伪蟺蔚蟻喂蠈蟻喂蟽蟿伪 蟿苇蟿慰喂蔚蟼 蟺蟻慰蟽蟺维胃蔚喂蔚蟼, 伪位位维 蟺苇蟻伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿畏谓 伪尉委伪 蟿慰蠀 苇蟻纬慰蠀 蟿蠅谓 未畏渭喂慰蠀蟻纬蠋谓, 蟺蟻蠈魏蔚喂蟿伪喂 魏伪喂 纬喂伪 苇谓伪 尾喂尾位委慰 蟺慰蠀 蟽慰蠀 伪谓慰委纬蔚喂 蟿伪 渭维蟿喂伪 蟽蔚 蟺慰位位维 胃苇渭伪蟿伪 蟺慰位喂蟿喂魏慰-慰喂魏慰谓慰渭喂魏萎蟼 蠁蠉蟽畏蟼, 蟿伪 慰蟺慰委伪 蠅蟼 蔚蟺委 蟿慰 蟺位蔚委蟽蟿慰谓 伪纬谓慰慰蠉渭蔚.
桅蠀蟽喂魏维 未蔚谓 蟺伪蠉蔚喂 谓伪 蔚委谓伪喂 苇谓伪 蟺蠈谓畏渭伪 蟽蟿畏 尾维蟽畏 蟿畏蟼 谓蔚慰蠁喂位蔚位蔚蠉胃蔚蟻畏蟼 伪谓蟿委位畏蠄畏蟼 蟺慰蠀 魏蠀蟻喂伪蟻蠂蔚委 伪蠀蟿萎 蟿畏 蟽蟿喂纬渭萎 蟽蟿慰谓 魏蠈蟽渭慰 蟿蠅谓 慰喂魏慰谓慰渭慰位蠈纬蠅谓, (畏 慰蟺慰委伪 蟺蟻蔚蟽尾蔚蠉蔚喂 蠈蟿喂 胃伪 苇蟺蟻蔚蟺蔚 谓伪 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 谓蠈渭喂渭畏 伪纬慰蟻维 伪谓胃蟻蠅蟺委谓蠅谓 慰蟻纬维谓蠅谓, 纬喂伪蟿委 苇蟿蟽喂 畏 伪纬慰蟻维 胃伪 喂蟽慰蟻蟻慰蟺慰蠉蟽蔚, 胃伪 苇蟺蔚蠁蟿伪谓 慰喂 蟿喂渭苇蟼 魏伪喂 蠈位慰喂 胃伪 苇尾蟻喂蟽魏伪谓 苇谓伪 谓蔚蠁蟻蠈), 魏伪喂 魏维蟿蠅 伪蟺蠈 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟿慰 蟺蟻委蟽渭伪 胃伪 蟺蟻苇蟺蔚喂 谓伪 蟿慰 魏蟻委谓蔚喂 魏伪谓蔚委蟼.
螤伪蟻 蠈位伪 伪蠀蟿维 未蔚谓 蟺伪蠉蔚喂 谓伪 蔚委谓伪喂 苇谓伪 蟽畏渭伪谓蟿喂魏蠈 魏伪喂 维魏蟻蠅蟼 未喂未伪魏蟿喂魏蠈 尾喂尾位委慰 渭蔚 渭喂伪 蟺慰位蠉 蔚谓未喂伪蠁苇蟻慰蠀蟽伪 胃蔚蠅蟻委伪 蟺蔚蟻委 蟿蠅谓 慰喂魏慰谓慰渭喂魏蠋谓 伪谓喂蟽慰蟿萎蟿蠅谓.
危螚螠: 螒蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 苇纬蟻伪蠄伪 纬喂伪 蟿畏谓 伪纬慰蟻维 伪谓胃蟻蠅蟺委谓蠅谓 慰蟻纬维谓蠅谓 未蔚谓 蟿慰 苇尾纬伪位伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿慰 渭蠀伪位蠈 渭慰蠀. 危蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟿慰蠀 蟺慰蠀 伪蟺慰蟿蔚位蔚委 蟿慰 蔚蠀伪纬纬苇位喂慰 纬喂伪 蠈位慰蠀蟼 蟿慰蠀蟼 蠁慰喂蟿畏蟿苇蟼 - 蟺蟻慰蟺蟿蠀蠂喂伪魏慰蠉蟼 魏伪喂 渭蔚蟿伪蟺蟿蠀蠂喂伪魏慰蠉蟼 - 蟿蠅谓 慰喂魏慰谓慰渭喂魏蠋谓 蟿渭畏渭维蟿蠅谓 蠈位蠅谓 蟿蠅谓 蟺伪谓蔚蟺喂蟽蟿畏渭委蠅谓 伪谓维 蟿慰谓 魏蠈蟽渭慰, 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 渭喂伪 慰位蠈魏位畏蟻畏 蟺伪蟻维纬蟻伪蠁慰蟼 - 未蔚谓 苇蠂蠅 蟺蟻蠈蠂蔚喂蟻慰 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟿蠋蟻伪 纬喂伪 谓伪 蟽伪蟼 蟺蠅 魏伪喂 蟿畏 蟽蔚位委未伪 - 畏 慰蟺慰委伪 蔚蟺喂蠂蔚喂蟻畏渭伪蟿慰位慰纬蔚委 伪魏蟻喂尾蠋蟼 蟺维谓蠅 蟽蔚 伪蠀蟿蠈: 螛伪 苇蟺蟻蔚蟺蔚 谓伪 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 蔚位蔚蠉胃蔚蟻畏 伪纬慰蟻维 伪谓胃蟻蠅蟺委谓蠅谓 慰蟻纬维谓蠅谓 纬喂伪蟿委 蟿慰 伪蠈蟻伪蟿慰 蠂苇蟻喂 蟿畏蟼 伪纬慰蟻维蟼 胃伪 蟻蠉胃渭喂味蔚 蟿伪 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿伪 苇蟿蟽喂 蠋蟽蟿蔚 慰喂 蟿喂渭苇蟼 谓伪 苇蟺蔚蠁蟿伪谓 魏伪喂 蠈位慰喂 谓伪 苇尾蟻喂蟽魏伪谓 苇谓伪 谓蔚蠁蟻蠈.
螝伪喂 渭蔚蟿维 伪蟺慰蟻慰蠉渭蔚 蟺慰蠀 慰 魏蠈蟽渭慰蟼 渭伪蟼 苇蠂蔚喂 蟿伪 蠂维位喂伪 蟺慰蠀 苇蠂蔚喂.
螤蟻伪纬渭伪蟿喂魏维 蔚委谓伪喂 蔚谓蟿蠀蟺蠅蟽喂伪魏蠈 蟿慰 蔚蠉蟻慰蟼 蟿畏蟼 渭蔚位苇蟿畏蟼 魏伪喂 蟿畏蟼 未慰蠀位蔚喂维蟼 蟺慰蠀 苇蠂慰蠀谓 蟻委尉蔚喂 慰喂 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁蔚委蟼 魏伪喂 伪蠀蟿蠈 蠁伪委谓蔚蟿伪喂. 螤维谓蟿伪 蟽蔚尾蠈渭慰蠀谓 伪蟺蔚蟻喂蠈蟻喂蟽蟿伪 蟿苇蟿慰喂蔚蟼 蟺蟻慰蟽蟺维胃蔚喂蔚蟼, 伪位位维 蟺苇蟻伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿畏谓 伪尉委伪 蟿慰蠀 苇蟻纬慰蠀 蟿蠅谓 未畏渭喂慰蠀蟻纬蠋谓, 蟺蟻蠈魏蔚喂蟿伪喂 魏伪喂 纬喂伪 苇谓伪 尾喂尾位委慰 蟺慰蠀 蟽慰蠀 伪谓慰委纬蔚喂 蟿伪 渭维蟿喂伪 蟽蔚 蟺慰位位维 胃苇渭伪蟿伪 蟺慰位喂蟿喂魏慰-慰喂魏慰谓慰渭喂魏萎蟼 蠁蠉蟽畏蟼, 蟿伪 慰蟺慰委伪 蠅蟼 蔚蟺委 蟿慰 蟺位蔚委蟽蟿慰谓 伪纬谓慰慰蠉渭蔚.
桅蠀蟽喂魏维 未蔚谓 蟺伪蠉蔚喂 谓伪 蔚委谓伪喂 苇谓伪 蟺蠈谓畏渭伪 蟽蟿畏 尾维蟽畏 蟿畏蟼 谓蔚慰蠁喂位蔚位蔚蠉胃蔚蟻畏蟼 伪谓蟿委位畏蠄畏蟼 蟺慰蠀 魏蠀蟻喂伪蟻蠂蔚委 伪蠀蟿萎 蟿畏 蟽蟿喂纬渭萎 蟽蟿慰谓 魏蠈蟽渭慰 蟿蠅谓 慰喂魏慰谓慰渭慰位蠈纬蠅谓, (畏 慰蟺慰委伪 蟺蟻蔚蟽尾蔚蠉蔚喂 蠈蟿喂 胃伪 苇蟺蟻蔚蟺蔚 谓伪 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 谓蠈渭喂渭畏 伪纬慰蟻维 伪谓胃蟻蠅蟺委谓蠅谓 慰蟻纬维谓蠅谓, 纬喂伪蟿委 苇蟿蟽喂 畏 伪纬慰蟻维 胃伪 喂蟽慰蟻蟻慰蟺慰蠉蟽蔚, 胃伪 苇蟺蔚蠁蟿伪谓 慰喂 蟿喂渭苇蟼 魏伪喂 蠈位慰喂 胃伪 苇尾蟻喂蟽魏伪谓 苇谓伪 谓蔚蠁蟻蠈), 魏伪喂 魏维蟿蠅 伪蟺蠈 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟿慰 蟺蟻委蟽渭伪 胃伪 蟺蟻苇蟺蔚喂 谓伪 蟿慰 魏蟻委谓蔚喂 魏伪谓蔚委蟼.
螤伪蟻 蠈位伪 伪蠀蟿维 未蔚谓 蟺伪蠉蔚喂 谓伪 蔚委谓伪喂 苇谓伪 蟽畏渭伪谓蟿喂魏蠈 魏伪喂 维魏蟻蠅蟼 未喂未伪魏蟿喂魏蠈 尾喂尾位委慰 渭蔚 渭喂伪 蟺慰位蠉 蔚谓未喂伪蠁苇蟻慰蠀蟽伪 胃蔚蠅蟻委伪 蟺蔚蟻委 蟿蠅谓 慰喂魏慰谓慰渭喂魏蠋谓 伪谓喂蟽慰蟿萎蟿蠅谓.
危螚螠: 螒蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 苇纬蟻伪蠄伪 纬喂伪 蟿畏谓 伪纬慰蟻维 伪谓胃蟻蠅蟺委谓蠅谓 慰蟻纬维谓蠅谓 未蔚谓 蟿慰 苇尾纬伪位伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿慰 渭蠀伪位蠈 渭慰蠀. 危蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟿慰蠀 蟺慰蠀 伪蟺慰蟿蔚位蔚委 蟿慰 蔚蠀伪纬纬苇位喂慰 纬喂伪 蠈位慰蠀蟼 蟿慰蠀蟼 蠁慰喂蟿畏蟿苇蟼 - 蟺蟻慰蟺蟿蠀蠂喂伪魏慰蠉蟼 魏伪喂 渭蔚蟿伪蟺蟿蠀蠂喂伪魏慰蠉蟼 - 蟿蠅谓 慰喂魏慰谓慰渭喂魏蠋谓 蟿渭畏渭维蟿蠅谓 蠈位蠅谓 蟿蠅谓 蟺伪谓蔚蟺喂蟽蟿畏渭委蠅谓 伪谓维 蟿慰谓 魏蠈蟽渭慰, 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 渭喂伪 慰位蠈魏位畏蟻畏 蟺伪蟻维纬蟻伪蠁慰蟼 - 未蔚谓 苇蠂蠅 蟺蟻蠈蠂蔚喂蟻慰 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟿蠋蟻伪 纬喂伪 谓伪 蟽伪蟼 蟺蠅 魏伪喂 蟿畏 蟽蔚位委未伪 - 畏 慰蟺慰委伪 蔚蟺喂蠂蔚喂蟻畏渭伪蟿慰位慰纬蔚委 伪魏蟻喂尾蠋蟼 蟺维谓蠅 蟽蔚 伪蠀蟿蠈: 螛伪 苇蟺蟻蔚蟺蔚 谓伪 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 蔚位蔚蠉胃蔚蟻畏 伪纬慰蟻维 伪谓胃蟻蠅蟺委谓蠅谓 慰蟻纬维谓蠅谓 纬喂伪蟿委 蟿慰 伪蠈蟻伪蟿慰 蠂苇蟻喂 蟿畏蟼 伪纬慰蟻维蟼 胃伪 蟻蠉胃渭喂味蔚 蟿伪 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿伪 苇蟿蟽喂 蠋蟽蟿蔚 慰喂 蟿喂渭苇蟼 谓伪 苇蟺蔚蠁蟿伪谓 魏伪喂 蠈位慰喂 谓伪 苇尾蟻喂蟽魏伪谓 苇谓伪 谓蔚蠁蟻蠈.
螝伪喂 渭蔚蟿维 伪蟺慰蟻慰蠉渭蔚 蟺慰蠀 慰 魏蠈蟽渭慰蟼 渭伪蟼 苇蠂蔚喂 蟿伪 蠂维位喂伪 蟺慰蠀 苇蠂蔚喂.
January 8, 2018
Francis Fukuyama 1989 y谋l谋nda "Tarihin Sonu mu?" ba艧l谋kl谋 bir makale yazm谋艧, 1992 y谋l谋nda bu makaleyi geni艧leterek kitap haline getirmi艧ti.
Fukuyama'ya g枚re o y谋llarda sadece so臒uk sava艧谋n de臒il, tarihin de sonu gelmi艧, insanl谋臒谋n ideolojik evrimi nihayet tamamlanm谋艧 ve Bat谋 tarz谋 liberal demokrasi, insan uygarl谋臒谋n谋n nihai y枚netim tarz谋 haline gelmi艧ti.
Bu kadar iddial谋 ve iddial谋 oldu臒u 枚l莽眉de fos 莽谋kan bir makale ancak 莽ok uzun s眉rm眉艧 bir d枚nemin en sonunda yaz谋labilirdi. 脰yle de oldu.
1990 y谋l谋nda Japon borsas谋n谋n 莽枚k眉艧眉 ile uzun bir deflasyon d枚nemi ba艧lad谋. 90'lar biterken Uzak Asya kaplanlar谋 莽枚kt眉. Bir ka莽 sene sonra kriz Brezilya, Arjantin ve T眉rkiye'ye s谋莽rad谋. 2000'lerin ba艧谋nda 枚nce teknoloji balonu patlad谋, ard谋ndan 2001 y谋l谋nda ABD'nin ikiz kuleleri vuruldu. 2002 y谋l谋nda Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld rejimi "艧er cephesine kar艧谋 枚nleyici sava艧" stratejisini devreye soktu. 2007 y谋l谋nda yeni bir kriz dalgas谋 daha geldi: ABD'de e艧ik-alt谋 mortgage piyasas谋 莽枚kt眉; banka ve 艧irket iflaslar谋 birbirini izledi. Piyasan谋n "g枚r眉nmez elinin" i艧leri d眉zeltemeyece臒i anla艧谋l谋nca bankalar谋n toksik varl谋klar谋 kamuya devredildi, banka/艧irket kurtarmalar谋na, kendi ayaklar谋 眉zerinde duramayan piyasalara kredi pompalanmaya ba艧land谋. 2010 y谋l谋nda Arap Bahar谋 olarak isimlendirilen isyan dalgas谋nda rejimler birer birer 莽枚kmeye ba艧lad谋. Ayn谋 y谋l Avrupa bor莽 krizi patlad谋. 陌flas etme s谋ras谋 devletlere gelmi艧ti. Batman谋n e艧i臒ine gelen Yunanistan'da devlet bor莽lar谋 silindi, 陌talya, 陌spanya oksijen 莽ad谋r谋na al谋nd谋. 陌flas eden devletlerin kurtar谋lmas谋na kar艧谋 Avrupa'n谋n zengin kuzeyinden itirazlar y眉kseldi. 2014 y谋l谋na gelindi臒inde Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki sandalyelerin 眉莽te biri a艧谋r谋 sa臒c谋/谋rk莽谋/g枚莽men ve AB kar艧谋t谋 partilerin eline ge莽mi艧ti. Ayn谋 g眉nlerde Irak'谋n en b眉y眉k kentleri birer birer kur艧un bile atmadan I艦陌D'in eline ge莽iyordu.
Fukuyama'n谋n fos 莽谋kan 枚ng枚r眉s眉, bug眉n g眉l眉mseme ve alayla an谋l谋yor.
Fukuyama'n谋n, Tarihin Sonu'nu yazd谋臒谋 1990 y谋l谋ndan g眉n眉m眉ze pek 莽ok kitap yay谋nland谋. Uygarl谋klar neden 莽枚ker? Son 眉莽 y眉zy谋ld谋r d眉nyaya ni莽in Bat谋 h眉kmediyor? Acaba bu d枚nemin de sonuna m谋 gelindi? Bat谋 Uygarl谋臒谋 bir 莽枚k眉艧眉n e艧i臒inde mi? gibi sorular sorulmaya, Edward Gibbon'谋n Roma'n谋n Gerileyi艧 ve 脟枚k眉艧 Tarihi kitab谋 yeniden okunmaya ba艧land谋.
Why Nations Fail, Fukuyama'n谋n "tarihin sonu geldi" kitab谋 ile ba艧layan "hmm acaba hen眉z gelmedi mi? bir 艧eyler de ters gidiyor ama..." olarak devam eden serinin, "yok, yok biz do臒ru yolday谋z" anafikirli son kitab谋.
Why Nations Fail? (Uluslar Ni莽in Ba艧ar谋s谋z Olurlar?) T眉rk莽e'ye Uluslar谋n D眉艧眉艧眉 olarak 莽evrildi; hatal谋d谋r 莽眉nk眉 d眉艧眉艧 (fall) ba艧ka bir 艧eydir, ba艧ar谋s谋zl谋k (fail) ba艧ka.
Bu kitab谋n uluslarla da bir ilgisi yok. (Ulusun tan谋m谋, olu艧umu, tarihte modern uluslar谋n ortaya 莽谋k谋艧谋 ve geli艧imi ile ilgili geni艧 bir k眉lliyat var. O kitaplar谋n okunmas谋n谋 tavsiye ederim.) San谋r谋m kitab谋n yazarlar谋 Adam Smith'in Uluslar谋n Zenginli臒i'ne g枚nderme yapmak istemi艧. Bu kitapta uluslar de臒il, ekonomik-siyasal sistemler konu ediliyor. Dahas谋, "uluslar谋n" ni莽in de臒il, nas谋l d眉艧t眉臒眉 anlat谋l谋yor. Ni莽in d眉艧t眉kleri sorusuna yazarlar谋n cevab谋 ise ayr谋ca sorunlu.
Yakla艧谋k 500 sayfal谋k kitap 15 b枚l眉mden olu艧uyor. Bu 15 b枚l眉m眉n 14'眉 atlanarak, sadece 15. b枚l眉m okunabilir ve yazarlar谋n ne demek istedi臒i kolayca anla艧谋labilir. Yazarlar谋n bu kitaba kendilerinden katt谋klar谋 tek unsur, "extractive and inclusive economic, political inclusions" (T眉rk莽e'ye nas谋l 莽evrildi bilmiyorum, T眉rk莽e'de bu kavramlar谋 tam kar艧谋layan s枚zc眉kler yok. Belki "d谋艧lay谋c谋/s枚m眉r眉c眉 ve kapsay谋c谋/kapsaml谋 ekonomik, siyasi kurumlar" olarak 莽evrilebilir.) Yazarlar okuyucuyu b谋kt谋rma pahas谋na, her bir ka莽 sayfada bir bu kavramlar谋 tekrarl谋yorlar. Zaten bu tekrarlar haricindeki t眉m paragraflar, tarihsel bilgilerden ibaret.
Hangi kurumlar谋n "extractive", hangi kurumlar谋n "inclusive" oldu臒u tarif edilmemi艧. B枚ylece belirsiz kalan kavramlar谋n etraf谋nda, tarihin o d枚neminden bu d枚nemine atlayarak neyin extractive, neyin inclusive oldu臒unu (daha do臒rusu yazarlar谋n bu tan谋mlar谋 neye g枚re yapt谋臒谋n谋) okuyorsunuz. Tabi b眉t眉n bu tarihsel atlamalar i莽inde 18. y眉zy谋l 陌ngiltere'si ile 19. y眉zy谋l Kongo'sunu, 15. y眉zy谋l 陌nka imparatorlu臒u ile 20. y眉zy谋l Amerika's谋n谋 kar艧谋la艧t谋ran yazarlar谋n hangi metodolojiyi izlediklerini bir t眉rl眉 kavrayam谋yorsunuz. Extractive ekonomik kurumlar谋n her zaman extractive siyasi kurumlar yaratt谋臒谋n谋 (ama bazen de yaratmad谋臒谋n谋), inclusive ekonomik kurumlar谋n ise inclusive politik kurumlar yaratt谋臒谋n谋 (ama bunun her zaman b枚yle olmad谋臒谋n谋, zaten bu konuda bir tarihsel zorunluluk da bulunmad谋臒谋n谋) okuyor, her seferinde kafan谋z kar谋艧m谋艧 bir halde bir sonraki b枚l眉me ge莽iyorsunuz.
Kitapta yazarlar谋n titizlikle dile getirmekten ka莽谋nd谋klar谋 baz谋 kavramlar var: S谋n谋f, devrim, emperyalizm.
S谋n谋flar yerine s眉rekli elitlere vurgu yap谋l谋yor. Yazarlar sizi, tarihin asl谋nda elitler aras谋ndaki 莽eki艧me/uzla艧ma dinami臒i ile olu艧tu臒una ikna etmeye 莽al谋艧谋yorlar. Elitler birbirlerini tepelemeye kalkarsa extractive, a莽g枚zl眉l眉klerini s谋n谋rlay谋p i艧birli臒i yaparlarsa inclusive yap谋lar olu艧uyor. Kitab谋n alt ba艧l谋臒谋nda vurgulanan refah谋n ve yoksullu臒un gerisinde elitler aras谋ndaki bu 莽eki艧me/uzla艧ma dinami臒i oldu臒unu 枚臒reniyorsunuz. Elbette s谋n谋flar olmay谋nca, Marx ve Weber'i anmaya da gerek kalm谋yor.
Devrim s枚zc眉臒眉 ise mecbur kal谋nmad谋k莽a hi莽 telaffuz edilmiyor. Yazarlar Frans谋z Devrimi'ne ba艧ka bir isim bulamad谋klar谋 i莽in mecburen "Frans谋z devriminden" bahsediyorlar. Bol艧evik Devrimi d枚rt yerde an谋l谋rken, 陌ngiltere'deki Glorius Revolution (Muhte艧em Devrim) her 5-6 sayfada bir kar艧谋n谋za 莽谋k谋yor. Tarihte bunlar谋n d谋艧谋nda devrim yok! Peki ne var? A莽谋k莽a ifade edilmese de Sosyal Darwinizm var: Birbirinden izole olmu艧 genlerin mutasyona u臒rayarak farkl谋 evrim 莽izgileri izlemesi gibi, benzer iki toplum da farkl谋 kurumlar geli艧tirerek farkl谋 yollardan evriliyor. (S. 431) Sonu莽ta birinin yolu yoksullu臒a, di臒erinin yolu refaha 莽谋k谋yor!
S枚m眉rgecilikten s谋k莽a bahsediliyor. Emperyalizmin ise ad谋 bile an谋lm谋yor. B枚ylece s枚m眉rgecili臒in ortadan kalkmaya ba艧lad谋臒谋 19. y眉zy谋ldan itibaren "uluslar谋n" e艧it bir 艧ekilde yar谋艧t谋臒谋 gibi bir izlenime kap谋l谋yorsunuz.
S谋k莽a g枚nderme yap谋lan kavramlardan biri de Creative Destruction (yarat谋c谋 y谋k谋c谋l谋k). S谋k莽a g枚nderme yap谋lmas谋na ra臒men, bu kavram谋n kitapta do臒ru kullan谋ld谋臒谋ndan emin de臒ilim. Sanki bu kavrama bamba艧ka anlamlar y眉klenmi艧 gibi.
Kitapta g枚nderme yap谋lan bir ba艧ka kavram Iron Law of Oligarchy (Oligar艧inin Demir Kanunu). Kongo'da, Rodezya'da, G眉ney Afrika'da bu kanunun nas谋l i艧ledi臒ini okuyorsunuz. G眉n眉m眉zde mesela AB troykas谋nda, ABD pl眉tokrasisinde, 艧ok doktrini ile terbiye edilmi艧 "emerging market" 眉lkelerinde nas谋l i艧ledi臒ini merak ediyorsan谋z ba艧ka kitaplar okuman谋z gerekiyor.
Extractive kurumlar谋 olan toplumlar谋n bulu艧 yapamayaca臒谋n谋 okurken, Nazi Almanya's谋nda ve Sovyet Rusya's谋nda bunca bilim insan谋n谋n nas谋l 莽谋kt谋臒谋n谋, g眉n眉m眉z teknolojisinin alt yap谋s谋n谋 olu艧turan pek 莽ok bulu艧un bu toplumlarda nas谋l yap谋ld谋臒谋n谋 sormadan edemiyorsunuz.
Irak'谋n ve Afganistan'谋n neo-con sald谋rganl谋臒谋 ile de臒il kendi ba艧ar谋s谋zl谋klar谋 ile yoksulla艧t谋臒谋n谋, K眉ba ve Chavez Venezuela's谋n谋n ba艧ar谋s谋z toplumlar oldu臒unu ve bu kafayla sonsuza kadar da ba艧ar谋s谋z kalacaklar谋n谋, yoksulluk ve a莽l谋kla bo臒u艧an 眉lkelerle dayan谋艧man谋n (kitapta yard谋m olarak zikrediliyor) yarars谋zl谋臒谋n谋, 脟in'in b眉y眉mesinin s眉rd眉r眉lemez oldu臒unu (tersinden okursan谋z inclusive kurumlar谋 oldu臒u i莽in ABD, 陌ngiltere, Avustralya, Kanada gibi 眉lkelerin ise sonsuza kadar b眉y眉yece臒ini) 枚臒reniyorsunuz.
脰臒rendikleriniz bunlardan m谋 ibaret? Elbette hay谋r, mesela ben Zimbabwe'de d眉zenlenen bir piyango 莽ekili艧inde b眉y眉k ikramiyenin devlet ba艧kan谋 Mugambe'ye isabet etti臒ini bilmiyordum. Hani derler ya: "Zimbabwe'de bile olmaz". Me臒erse olurmu艧. (Se莽imlere hile kar谋艧t谋rmak extractive kurumlara sahip 眉lkelere 枚zg眉 ise, George W. Bush 2004, Donald Trump 2016 se莽imlerini nas谋l kazand谋 diye sormadan edemedim.)
Kitab谋 bitirdi臒imde yazarlar谋n mesela 陌skandinav 眉lkelerini neden hi莽 zikretmediklerini merak ettim. Acaba modellerine uymad谋臒谋 i莽in mi?
Peki ya T眉rkiye? Tarihinin muhtelif d枚nemlerinde inclusive/extractive s谋n谋fland谋rmalar谋n谋n hangisine dahil olurdu acaba?
Fukuyama'ya g枚re o y谋llarda sadece so臒uk sava艧谋n de臒il, tarihin de sonu gelmi艧, insanl谋臒谋n ideolojik evrimi nihayet tamamlanm谋艧 ve Bat谋 tarz谋 liberal demokrasi, insan uygarl谋臒谋n谋n nihai y枚netim tarz谋 haline gelmi艧ti.
Bu kadar iddial谋 ve iddial谋 oldu臒u 枚l莽眉de fos 莽谋kan bir makale ancak 莽ok uzun s眉rm眉艧 bir d枚nemin en sonunda yaz谋labilirdi. 脰yle de oldu.
1990 y谋l谋nda Japon borsas谋n谋n 莽枚k眉艧眉 ile uzun bir deflasyon d枚nemi ba艧lad谋. 90'lar biterken Uzak Asya kaplanlar谋 莽枚kt眉. Bir ka莽 sene sonra kriz Brezilya, Arjantin ve T眉rkiye'ye s谋莽rad谋. 2000'lerin ba艧谋nda 枚nce teknoloji balonu patlad谋, ard谋ndan 2001 y谋l谋nda ABD'nin ikiz kuleleri vuruldu. 2002 y谋l谋nda Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld rejimi "艧er cephesine kar艧谋 枚nleyici sava艧" stratejisini devreye soktu. 2007 y谋l谋nda yeni bir kriz dalgas谋 daha geldi: ABD'de e艧ik-alt谋 mortgage piyasas谋 莽枚kt眉; banka ve 艧irket iflaslar谋 birbirini izledi. Piyasan谋n "g枚r眉nmez elinin" i艧leri d眉zeltemeyece臒i anla艧谋l谋nca bankalar谋n toksik varl谋klar谋 kamuya devredildi, banka/艧irket kurtarmalar谋na, kendi ayaklar谋 眉zerinde duramayan piyasalara kredi pompalanmaya ba艧land谋. 2010 y谋l谋nda Arap Bahar谋 olarak isimlendirilen isyan dalgas谋nda rejimler birer birer 莽枚kmeye ba艧lad谋. Ayn谋 y谋l Avrupa bor莽 krizi patlad谋. 陌flas etme s谋ras谋 devletlere gelmi艧ti. Batman谋n e艧i臒ine gelen Yunanistan'da devlet bor莽lar谋 silindi, 陌talya, 陌spanya oksijen 莽ad谋r谋na al谋nd谋. 陌flas eden devletlerin kurtar谋lmas谋na kar艧谋 Avrupa'n谋n zengin kuzeyinden itirazlar y眉kseldi. 2014 y谋l谋na gelindi臒inde Avrupa Parlamentosu'ndaki sandalyelerin 眉莽te biri a艧谋r谋 sa臒c谋/谋rk莽谋/g枚莽men ve AB kar艧谋t谋 partilerin eline ge莽mi艧ti. Ayn谋 g眉nlerde Irak'谋n en b眉y眉k kentleri birer birer kur艧un bile atmadan I艦陌D'in eline ge莽iyordu.
Fukuyama'n谋n fos 莽谋kan 枚ng枚r眉s眉, bug眉n g眉l眉mseme ve alayla an谋l谋yor.
Fukuyama'n谋n, Tarihin Sonu'nu yazd谋臒谋 1990 y谋l谋ndan g眉n眉m眉ze pek 莽ok kitap yay谋nland谋. Uygarl谋klar neden 莽枚ker? Son 眉莽 y眉zy谋ld谋r d眉nyaya ni莽in Bat谋 h眉kmediyor? Acaba bu d枚nemin de sonuna m谋 gelindi? Bat谋 Uygarl谋臒谋 bir 莽枚k眉艧眉n e艧i臒inde mi? gibi sorular sorulmaya, Edward Gibbon'谋n Roma'n谋n Gerileyi艧 ve 脟枚k眉艧 Tarihi kitab谋 yeniden okunmaya ba艧land谋.
Why Nations Fail, Fukuyama'n谋n "tarihin sonu geldi" kitab谋 ile ba艧layan "hmm acaba hen眉z gelmedi mi? bir 艧eyler de ters gidiyor ama..." olarak devam eden serinin, "yok, yok biz do臒ru yolday谋z" anafikirli son kitab谋.
Why Nations Fail? (Uluslar Ni莽in Ba艧ar谋s谋z Olurlar?) T眉rk莽e'ye Uluslar谋n D眉艧眉艧眉 olarak 莽evrildi; hatal谋d谋r 莽眉nk眉 d眉艧眉艧 (fall) ba艧ka bir 艧eydir, ba艧ar谋s谋zl谋k (fail) ba艧ka.
Bu kitab谋n uluslarla da bir ilgisi yok. (Ulusun tan谋m谋, olu艧umu, tarihte modern uluslar谋n ortaya 莽谋k谋艧谋 ve geli艧imi ile ilgili geni艧 bir k眉lliyat var. O kitaplar谋n okunmas谋n谋 tavsiye ederim.) San谋r谋m kitab谋n yazarlar谋 Adam Smith'in Uluslar谋n Zenginli臒i'ne g枚nderme yapmak istemi艧. Bu kitapta uluslar de臒il, ekonomik-siyasal sistemler konu ediliyor. Dahas谋, "uluslar谋n" ni莽in de臒il, nas谋l d眉艧t眉臒眉 anlat谋l谋yor. Ni莽in d眉艧t眉kleri sorusuna yazarlar谋n cevab谋 ise ayr谋ca sorunlu.
Yakla艧谋k 500 sayfal谋k kitap 15 b枚l眉mden olu艧uyor. Bu 15 b枚l眉m眉n 14'眉 atlanarak, sadece 15. b枚l眉m okunabilir ve yazarlar谋n ne demek istedi臒i kolayca anla艧谋labilir. Yazarlar谋n bu kitaba kendilerinden katt谋klar谋 tek unsur, "extractive and inclusive economic, political inclusions" (T眉rk莽e'ye nas谋l 莽evrildi bilmiyorum, T眉rk莽e'de bu kavramlar谋 tam kar艧谋layan s枚zc眉kler yok. Belki "d谋艧lay谋c谋/s枚m眉r眉c眉 ve kapsay谋c谋/kapsaml谋 ekonomik, siyasi kurumlar" olarak 莽evrilebilir.) Yazarlar okuyucuyu b谋kt谋rma pahas谋na, her bir ka莽 sayfada bir bu kavramlar谋 tekrarl谋yorlar. Zaten bu tekrarlar haricindeki t眉m paragraflar, tarihsel bilgilerden ibaret.
Hangi kurumlar谋n "extractive", hangi kurumlar谋n "inclusive" oldu臒u tarif edilmemi艧. B枚ylece belirsiz kalan kavramlar谋n etraf谋nda, tarihin o d枚neminden bu d枚nemine atlayarak neyin extractive, neyin inclusive oldu臒unu (daha do臒rusu yazarlar谋n bu tan谋mlar谋 neye g枚re yapt谋臒谋n谋) okuyorsunuz. Tabi b眉t眉n bu tarihsel atlamalar i莽inde 18. y眉zy谋l 陌ngiltere'si ile 19. y眉zy谋l Kongo'sunu, 15. y眉zy谋l 陌nka imparatorlu臒u ile 20. y眉zy谋l Amerika's谋n谋 kar艧谋la艧t谋ran yazarlar谋n hangi metodolojiyi izlediklerini bir t眉rl眉 kavrayam谋yorsunuz. Extractive ekonomik kurumlar谋n her zaman extractive siyasi kurumlar yaratt谋臒谋n谋 (ama bazen de yaratmad谋臒谋n谋), inclusive ekonomik kurumlar谋n ise inclusive politik kurumlar yaratt谋臒谋n谋 (ama bunun her zaman b枚yle olmad谋臒谋n谋, zaten bu konuda bir tarihsel zorunluluk da bulunmad谋臒谋n谋) okuyor, her seferinde kafan谋z kar谋艧m谋艧 bir halde bir sonraki b枚l眉me ge莽iyorsunuz.
Kitapta yazarlar谋n titizlikle dile getirmekten ka莽谋nd谋klar谋 baz谋 kavramlar var: S谋n谋f, devrim, emperyalizm.
S谋n谋flar yerine s眉rekli elitlere vurgu yap谋l谋yor. Yazarlar sizi, tarihin asl谋nda elitler aras谋ndaki 莽eki艧me/uzla艧ma dinami臒i ile olu艧tu臒una ikna etmeye 莽al谋艧谋yorlar. Elitler birbirlerini tepelemeye kalkarsa extractive, a莽g枚zl眉l眉klerini s谋n谋rlay谋p i艧birli臒i yaparlarsa inclusive yap谋lar olu艧uyor. Kitab谋n alt ba艧l谋臒谋nda vurgulanan refah谋n ve yoksullu臒un gerisinde elitler aras谋ndaki bu 莽eki艧me/uzla艧ma dinami臒i oldu臒unu 枚臒reniyorsunuz. Elbette s谋n谋flar olmay谋nca, Marx ve Weber'i anmaya da gerek kalm谋yor.
Devrim s枚zc眉臒眉 ise mecbur kal谋nmad谋k莽a hi莽 telaffuz edilmiyor. Yazarlar Frans谋z Devrimi'ne ba艧ka bir isim bulamad谋klar谋 i莽in mecburen "Frans谋z devriminden" bahsediyorlar. Bol艧evik Devrimi d枚rt yerde an谋l谋rken, 陌ngiltere'deki Glorius Revolution (Muhte艧em Devrim) her 5-6 sayfada bir kar艧谋n谋za 莽谋k谋yor. Tarihte bunlar谋n d谋艧谋nda devrim yok! Peki ne var? A莽谋k莽a ifade edilmese de Sosyal Darwinizm var: Birbirinden izole olmu艧 genlerin mutasyona u臒rayarak farkl谋 evrim 莽izgileri izlemesi gibi, benzer iki toplum da farkl谋 kurumlar geli艧tirerek farkl谋 yollardan evriliyor. (S. 431) Sonu莽ta birinin yolu yoksullu臒a, di臒erinin yolu refaha 莽谋k谋yor!
S枚m眉rgecilikten s谋k莽a bahsediliyor. Emperyalizmin ise ad谋 bile an谋lm谋yor. B枚ylece s枚m眉rgecili臒in ortadan kalkmaya ba艧lad谋臒谋 19. y眉zy谋ldan itibaren "uluslar谋n" e艧it bir 艧ekilde yar谋艧t谋臒谋 gibi bir izlenime kap谋l谋yorsunuz.
S谋k莽a g枚nderme yap谋lan kavramlardan biri de Creative Destruction (yarat谋c谋 y谋k谋c谋l谋k). S谋k莽a g枚nderme yap谋lmas谋na ra臒men, bu kavram谋n kitapta do臒ru kullan谋ld谋臒谋ndan emin de臒ilim. Sanki bu kavrama bamba艧ka anlamlar y眉klenmi艧 gibi.
Kitapta g枚nderme yap谋lan bir ba艧ka kavram Iron Law of Oligarchy (Oligar艧inin Demir Kanunu). Kongo'da, Rodezya'da, G眉ney Afrika'da bu kanunun nas谋l i艧ledi臒ini okuyorsunuz. G眉n眉m眉zde mesela AB troykas谋nda, ABD pl眉tokrasisinde, 艧ok doktrini ile terbiye edilmi艧 "emerging market" 眉lkelerinde nas谋l i艧ledi臒ini merak ediyorsan谋z ba艧ka kitaplar okuman谋z gerekiyor.
Extractive kurumlar谋 olan toplumlar谋n bulu艧 yapamayaca臒谋n谋 okurken, Nazi Almanya's谋nda ve Sovyet Rusya's谋nda bunca bilim insan谋n谋n nas谋l 莽谋kt谋臒谋n谋, g眉n眉m眉z teknolojisinin alt yap谋s谋n谋 olu艧turan pek 莽ok bulu艧un bu toplumlarda nas谋l yap谋ld谋臒谋n谋 sormadan edemiyorsunuz.
Irak'谋n ve Afganistan'谋n neo-con sald谋rganl谋臒谋 ile de臒il kendi ba艧ar谋s谋zl谋klar谋 ile yoksulla艧t谋臒谋n谋, K眉ba ve Chavez Venezuela's谋n谋n ba艧ar谋s谋z toplumlar oldu臒unu ve bu kafayla sonsuza kadar da ba艧ar谋s谋z kalacaklar谋n谋, yoksulluk ve a莽l谋kla bo臒u艧an 眉lkelerle dayan谋艧man谋n (kitapta yard谋m olarak zikrediliyor) yarars谋zl谋臒谋n谋, 脟in'in b眉y眉mesinin s眉rd眉r眉lemez oldu臒unu (tersinden okursan谋z inclusive kurumlar谋 oldu臒u i莽in ABD, 陌ngiltere, Avustralya, Kanada gibi 眉lkelerin ise sonsuza kadar b眉y眉yece臒ini) 枚臒reniyorsunuz.
脰臒rendikleriniz bunlardan m谋 ibaret? Elbette hay谋r, mesela ben Zimbabwe'de d眉zenlenen bir piyango 莽ekili艧inde b眉y眉k ikramiyenin devlet ba艧kan谋 Mugambe'ye isabet etti臒ini bilmiyordum. Hani derler ya: "Zimbabwe'de bile olmaz". Me臒erse olurmu艧. (Se莽imlere hile kar谋艧t谋rmak extractive kurumlara sahip 眉lkelere 枚zg眉 ise, George W. Bush 2004, Donald Trump 2016 se莽imlerini nas谋l kazand谋 diye sormadan edemedim.)
Kitab谋 bitirdi臒imde yazarlar谋n mesela 陌skandinav 眉lkelerini neden hi莽 zikretmediklerini merak ettim. Acaba modellerine uymad谋臒谋 i莽in mi?
Peki ya T眉rkiye? Tarihinin muhtelif d枚nemlerinde inclusive/extractive s谋n谋fland谋rmalar谋n谋n hangisine dahil olurdu acaba?
October 26, 2024
唳ㄠ唳唳� 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唳距Π唰囙Π 唳-唳︵唳熰 唳曕唳唳熰唳椸Π唳苦Π 唳︵唳曕 唳唳班Δ唳苦Μ唳涏Π 唳嗋Ξ唳距Π 唳唳多 唳ㄠ唳� 唳ム唳曕 唳む 唳灌Σ唰� 唳膏唳灌唳む唳� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む啷� 唳忇 唳唳� 唳︵唳熰 唳唳唳椸唳� 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唳距Π唳� 唳嗋Ξ唳距唰� 唳灌Δ唳距Χ 唳曕Π唰囙唰� (唳Ζ唳苦, 唳膏唳灌唳む唳� 唳唳唳椸 唳灌Δ唳距Χ唳距Π 唳唳唳唳班唳� 唳嗋唳曕唳� 唳呧Ν唰嵿Ο唳距Ω 唳灌Ο唳监 唳椸唳涏)啷� 唳膏唳灌唳む唳 唳唳ㄠ 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唳距Π 唳唳唰囙唰囙Θ, 唳膏唳� 唳灌唳� 唳曕唳�-唳忇Π 唳唳む唳� 唳忇唳熰唳� 唳 唳Α唳监唳涏 ("The Vegetarian") 唳忇Μ唳� 唳膏唳� 唳唳熰 唳涏唳� 唳椸Δ唳唳� 唳嗋Ξ唳距Π 唳Α唳监 唳膏Μ唳氞唳唰� 唳唳侧Δ唰� 唳啷� 唳曕唳ㄠ唳む 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唳距Π唰囙Π 唳栢Μ唳班唳� 唳多唳ㄠ 唳犩唳� 唳灌Δ唳距Χ 唳ㄠ, 唳灌Δ唳Ξ唰嵿Μ 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏啷� 唳唳侧Δ 唳︵唳熰 唳曕唳班Γ唰囙イ
唳唳班Ε唳� 唳曕唳班Γ唳熰 唳膏唳曕唳粪唳 唳Σ唰� 唳︵唳撪Ο唳监 唳唳啷� 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳む 唳ㄠ唳唳� 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唳距Π 唳︵唳撪Ο唳监 唳灌Ο唳� 唳ㄠΔ唰佮Θ 唳嗋Μ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唰冟Δ 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳嗋Σ唰嬥唳苦Δ 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳︵唳曕Θ唳苦Π唰嵿Ζ唰囙Χ唳苦Δ 唳曕唳ㄠ 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唰囙Π 唳溹Θ唰嵿Ο啷� 唳忇 唳唳班唳� 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唰冟Δ 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰唳� 唳唳� 唳唳粪Ο唳监Μ唳膏唳む唳曕 唳唳傕Σ唳距Ο唳� 唳忇唳熰 唳侧唳囙Θ唰� 唳侧唳栢 唳唳侧 唳唳 : 唳忇唳熰 唳︵唳� 唳曕Δ唳熰 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳む 唳曕Π唳 唳膏唳熰 唳ㄠ唳班唳Π 唳曕Π唰� 唳膏唳� 唳︵唳多唳苦Π 唳唳唳ㄠ唳� 唳班唳溹Θ唰堗Δ唳苦, 唳膏唳唳溹唳� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳唳班Δ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唳距Θ唳椸唳侧 唳曕Δ唰嬥唳� 唳膏唳唳о唳ㄠΝ唳距Μ唰�, 唳膏唰嵿Π唳苦Ο唳监Ν唳距Μ唰� 唳� 唳唳ㄠΜ唳曕Σ唰嵿Ο唳距Γ唳唳侧唳唳 唳曕唳� 唳曕Π唳む 唳膏Ξ唳班唳� 唳灌Ο唳�, 唳む唳� 唳夃Κ唳班啷� 唳栢唳 唳呧Ν唳苦Θ唳� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳忇唰嵿唰囙Μ唳距Π唰� 唳ㄠΔ唰佮Θ 唳嗋Μ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唰冟Δ 唳忇唳熰 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ, 唳む唳� 唳ㄠ?
唳唳熰 唳唳� 唳Α唳监唳涏唳侧唳� 唳む唳� 唳忇 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰唳曕 唳多唳о 唳Ω唰嵿Δ唳距Κ唳氞 唳Σ唰囙 唳Θ唰� 唳灌Ο唳监Θ唳�, 唳Θ唰� 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏唳� 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰 唳唳班唳唳班 唳犩唳曕 唳ㄠΟ唳监イ 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳� 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳唳ㄠ唳� 唳曕唳班Γ 唳栢唳佮唳距Π 唳曕唳溹唳� 唳唰� 唳唳班唳氞唳ㄠ唳距Σ 唳ム唳曕 唳氞Σ唰� 唳嗋Ω唳涏啷� 唳嗋Η唰佮Θ唳苦 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む 唳Σ唳, 唳忇 唳呧Θ唰佮Ω唳ㄠ唳о唳ㄠ唳� 唳膏唳氞Θ唳� 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏唳� 唳呧唳唳∴唳� 唳膏唳唳ム唳� 唳溹Ξ唳距Θ唳� 唳ム唳曕啷� 唳曕唳ㄠ唳む 唳曕唳班 唳Ζ唳� 唳曕唳熰唳侧唳唳� 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳多唳膏唳む唳班唳� 唳唳唳唳班 唳唳熰唳唳熰 唳о唳班Γ唳� 唳ム唳曕, 唳む唳ㄠ 唳膏Ξ唳唳熰 唳嗋Π唰� 唳忇-唳灌唳溹唳� 唳唳� 唳唳涏唳唰� 唳︵唳む 唳︵唳唳о 唳曕Π唳唳� 唳ㄠ啷� 唳忇唳熰 唳曕Ξ唳� 唳膏唳ㄠ唳� 唳ム唳曕Σ唰囙 唳唳澿 唳唳, 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳� 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳唳ㄠ唳� 唳唳涏Θ唰� 唳忇唳熰-唳︵唳熰 唳ㄠΟ唳�, 唳呧Θ唰囙唳椸唳侧 唳曕唳班Γ 唳曕唳� 唳曕Π唰囙イ 唳忇Μ唳� 唳膏Μ唳曕唳� 唳曕唳班Γ唳曕唳� 唳 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳灌Δ唰� 唳灌Μ唰� 唳忇Ξ唳ㄠ唳� 唳唳熰唳� 唳ㄠΟ唳监イ
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唳忇 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唰囙Π 唳呧Θ唰嵿Ο唳むΞ 唳Α唳� 唳む唳班唳熰 唳灌唳膏唳 唳唳熰 唳嗋Ξ唳距Π 唳Θ唰� 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏 唳む 唳灌Σ唰�, 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰 唳嗋Η唰佮Θ唳苦 "唳椸唳侧唳唳侧唳囙唰囙Χ唳�" 唳о唳班Γ唳距唰� 唳膏Ξ唰嵿Κ唰傕Π唰嵿Γ 唳忇Α唳监唳唰� 唳椸唳涏啷� 唳忇 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳� 唳嗋Ν唰嵿Ο唳ㄠ唳むΠ唰€唳� 唳唳班Δ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唳距Θ唳椸唳侧唳� 唳曕唳班唳唳距Π唳苦Δ唳距Π 唳曕Ε唳距 唳多唳о 唳Σ唰囙唰囙イ 唳曕唳ㄠ唳む 唳嗋Η唰佮Θ唳苦 唳唳ム唳唳む 唳曕唳ㄠ 唳︵唳多唳� 唳呧Ω唰嵿Δ唳苦Δ唰嵿Μ 唳曕 唳膏唳Δ唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳ム唳曕Δ唰� 唳唳班? 唳唳ム唳唳曕 唳忇唳� 唳Σ唳� 唳灌Ο唳� "唳椸唳侧唳唳� 唳唳侧唳�"啷� 唳班唳溹Θ唰€唳む, 唳曕唳熰Θ唰€唳む, 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む, 唳熰唳曕Θ唰嬥Σ唳溹鈥� 唳忇Π唳曕Ξ 唳唳� 唳曕唳涏 唳溹唳� 唳︵唳唰� 唳膏Ξ唳椸唳� 唳唳ム唳唳曕 唳嗋Ψ唰嵿唰囙Κ唰冟Ψ唰嵿唰� 唳溹Α唳监唳唰� 唳班唳栢 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏啷� 唳忇Ξ唳ㄠ唳� 唳曕Ο唳监唳曕唳� 唳溹Θ唳椸唳粪唳犩唳� 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳む 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳呧Μ唳ㄠΔ唳苦Π 唳唳涏Θ唰� 唳曕唳涏 唳曕唳粪唳む唳班 唳膏Μ唳氞唳唰� 唳Α唳� 唳唳唳曕唳熰Π唳熰唳� 唳ㄠ唳€� "唳囙Δ唳苦唳距Ω" (唳曕唳多唳唳� 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳唳唳侧唳膏唳熰唳囙Θ 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳Ω唳ㄠ唳唳距Π 唳溹Θ唳椸Γ唰囙Π 唳曕Ε唳� 唳氞唳ㄠ唳む 唳曕Π唰佮Θ)啷�
唳忇Μ唳距Π 唳忇 唳唳熰 唳ム唳曕 唳忇唳熰 唳灌唳膏唳唳� 唳夃Ζ唰嵿Η唰冟Δ唳苦Π 唳夃Σ唰嵿Σ唰囙 唳曕Π唳� (唳唳班唳� 唳灌唳膏唳唳� 唳夃Ζ唰嵿Η唰冟Δ唳苦Π 唳呧Ν唳距Μ 唳ㄠ唳� 唳忇 唳唳む)啷� 唳嗋Ξ唰囙Π唳苦唳� 唳曕唳唳ㄠ 唳唳曕唳膏唳曕唳� 唳氞唳唰� 唳Α唳监Σ唰嬥 唳む唳� 唳曕唳班Γ 唳︵Π唰嵿Χ唳距Δ唰� 唳椸唳唰� 唳侧唳栢 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏 :
"Unlike in Mexico, in the United States the citizens could keep politicians in check and get rid of ones who would use their offices to enrich themselves or create monopolies for their cronies."
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唳夃Κ唳班 唳夃Σ唰嵿Σ唳苦唳苦Δ 唳夃Κ唳唳距Ζ唰囙Χ唰€唳 唳囙Δ唳苦唳距Ω唰囙Π 唳Π唳苦Κ唰嵿Π唰囙唰嵿Ψ唳苦Δ唰� 唳嗋Ξ唳距Ζ唰囙Π 唳ㄠ唳唳� 唳侧Π唳苦Ο唳监唳熰Ζ唰囙Π 唳曕唳涏 唳忇Μ唳距Π唰� 唳曕Ο唳监唳曕唳� 唳唳班Χ唰嵿Θ 唳曕Π唳� : 唳膏唳唳唳班Δ唳苦 唳溹唳侧唳� 唳嗋Θ唰嵿Ζ唰嬥Σ唳ㄠ 唳多唳班唳班唳� 唳嗋唳距Δ唳溹Θ唳苦Δ 唳曕唳班Γ唰� 唳曕唳粪Δ唳苦唰嵿Π唳膏唳� 唳忇唳溹Θ 唳唳傕Σ唳距Ζ唰囙Χ唳� 唳涏唳む唳班唳� 唳呧Θ唰嵿Η唳曕唳� 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳Μ唳苦Ψ唰嵿Ο唳む唰� 唳む唳佮Π唳� 唳ㄠ唳溹唳︵唳� extractive-inclusive 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ 唳︵唳唰� 唳曕唳唳 唳唳多唳侧唳粪Γ 唳忇Μ唳� 唳膏Ξ唳距Η唳距Θ 唳曕Π唳唳�? 唳唳唳侧唳膏唳熰唳囙Θ唰囙Π 唳Δ唰� 唳忇唳熰 唳呧Δ唰嵿Ο唳距唳距Π唳苦Δ 唳班唳粪唳熰唳� 唳嗋Κ唳ㄠ唳︵唳� 唳忇 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰 唳唳班Ο唳监唳� 唳曕Π唰� 唳曕唳唳 唳膏唳粪Ξ唳唳 唳Π唳苦唳距Σ唳ㄠ 唳曕Π唳 唳む唳︵唳� 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳 唳唳班Δ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唳距Θ唳椸唳侧唳曕? 唳唳班Δ唰囙Π 唳唳距Π唳距Ψ唰嵿唰嵿Π 唳忇Μ唳� 唳灌Π唳苦Ο唳监唳ㄠ 唳班唳溹唳唳� 唳︵唳溹Θ 唳涏唳む唳班鈥� 唳唳︵唳� 唳忇唳溹Θ 唳唳班唳灌唳Γ (唳唳ㄠ 唳唳距Π唳距Ψ唰嵿唰嵿Π唰囙Π) 唳忇Μ唳� 唳嗋Π唰囙唳溹Θ 唳︵Σ唳苦Δ 唳膏Ξ唰嵿Κ唰嵿Π唳︵唳唳唳曕唳� (唳唳ㄠ 唳灌Π唳苦Ο唳监唳ㄠ唳�)鈥� 唳唳多唳Μ唳苦Ζ唰嵿Ο唳距Σ唳 唳Π唰嵿Ο唳ㄠ唳� 唳︵唳溹Θ唰囙Π 唳呧唳唳曕唳∴唳唳� 唳班唳曕Π唰嵿Α 唳Ζ唳� 唳灌唳唰� 唳忇唳� 唳灌Ο唳�, 唳撪唰� 唳ㄠ唳唳� 唳侧Π唳苦Ο唳监唳熰唳�, 唳嗋Κ唳ㄠ唳班 唳曕 唳溹唳ㄠ唳�, 唳むΜ唰佮 唳む唳︵唳� 唳忇唳溹Θ唰囙Π 唳Μ唳苦Ψ唰嵿Ο唳� 唳灌Δ唰� 唳唳班 唳夃唰嵿唰嵿Μ唳� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳嗋Π唰囙唳溹Θ唰囙Π 唳ㄠ唳曕Ψ 唳呧Θ唰嵿Η唳曕唳�? (唳Ζ唳� 唳唳班Δ唰€唳 唳夃Ζ唳距唳班Γ 唳唳ㄠ唳� 唳ㄠ 唳灌Ο唳� 唳む唳灌Σ唰� 唳嗋Κ唳ㄠ唳︵唳� 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳� 唳︵唳� 唳嗋Ξ唰囙Π唳苦唳� 唳ム唳曕唳� 唳夃Ζ唳距唳班Γ 唳︵唳む 唳唳班)啷� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳忇 唳呧Θ唰嵿Η唳曕唳� 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳夃唰嵿唰嵿Μ唳� 唳灌唳唳距Π 唳膏唰嵿唰� 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳曕唳ㄠ 唳膏Ξ唰嵿Κ唳班唳� 唳ㄠ唳�!
唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳唳� 唳ㄠ唳 唳唳班唳む唳 唳溹唳苦Σ 唳膏Ξ唰€唳曕Π唳｀唳苦Π 唳忇唳熰 唳溹Σ唳唳多唳ㄠ 唳囙唳熰唳唳唳距Θ 唳唳多唳侧唳粪Γ唳曕 唳忇Μ唳距Π唰囙Π 唳ㄠ唳唳� 唳Ζ唳� 唳︵唳唳班 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唰冟Δ 唳曕Π唳� 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏啷� 唳唳班唳!
唳唳班Ε唳� 唳曕唳班Γ唳熰 唳膏唳曕唳粪唳 唳Σ唰� 唳︵唳撪Ο唳监 唳唳啷� 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳む 唳ㄠ唳唳� 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唳距Π 唳︵唳撪Ο唳监 唳灌Ο唳� 唳ㄠΔ唰佮Θ 唳嗋Μ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唰冟Δ 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳嗋Σ唰嬥唳苦Δ 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳︵唳曕Θ唳苦Π唰嵿Ζ唰囙Χ唳苦Δ 唳曕唳ㄠ 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唰囙Π 唳溹Θ唰嵿Ο啷� 唳忇 唳唳班唳� 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唰冟Δ 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰唳� 唳唳� 唳唳粪Ο唳监Μ唳膏唳む唳曕 唳唳傕Σ唳距Ο唳� 唳忇唳熰 唳侧唳囙Θ唰� 唳侧唳栢 唳唳侧 唳唳 : 唳忇唳熰 唳︵唳� 唳曕Δ唳熰 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳む 唳曕Π唳 唳膏唳熰 唳ㄠ唳班唳Π 唳曕Π唰� 唳膏唳� 唳︵唳多唳苦Π 唳唳唳ㄠ唳� 唳班唳溹Θ唰堗Δ唳苦, 唳膏唳唳溹唳� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳唳班Δ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唳距Θ唳椸唳侧 唳曕Δ唰嬥唳� 唳膏唳唳о唳ㄠΝ唳距Μ唰�, 唳膏唰嵿Π唳苦Ο唳监Ν唳距Μ唰� 唳� 唳唳ㄠΜ唳曕Σ唰嵿Ο唳距Γ唳唳侧唳唳 唳曕唳� 唳曕Π唳む 唳膏Ξ唳班唳� 唳灌Ο唳�, 唳む唳� 唳夃Κ唳班啷� 唳栢唳 唳呧Ν唳苦Θ唳� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳忇唰嵿唰囙Μ唳距Π唰� 唳ㄠΔ唰佮Θ 唳嗋Μ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唰冟Δ 唳忇唳熰 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ, 唳む唳� 唳ㄠ?
唳唳熰 唳唳� 唳Α唳监唳涏唳侧唳� 唳む唳� 唳忇 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰唳曕 唳多唳о 唳Ω唰嵿Δ唳距Κ唳氞 唳Σ唰囙 唳Θ唰� 唳灌Ο唳监Θ唳�, 唳Θ唰� 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏唳� 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰 唳唳班唳唳班 唳犩唳曕 唳ㄠΟ唳监イ 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳� 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳唳ㄠ唳� 唳曕唳班Γ 唳栢唳佮唳距Π 唳曕唳溹唳� 唳唰� 唳唳班唳氞唳ㄠ唳距Σ 唳ム唳曕 唳氞Σ唰� 唳嗋Ω唳涏啷� 唳嗋Η唰佮Θ唳苦 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む 唳Σ唳, 唳忇 唳呧Θ唰佮Ω唳ㄠ唳о唳ㄠ唳� 唳膏唳氞Θ唳� 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏唳� 唳呧唳唳∴唳� 唳膏唳唳ム唳� 唳溹Ξ唳距Θ唳� 唳ム唳曕啷� 唳曕唳ㄠ唳む 唳曕唳班 唳Ζ唳� 唳曕唳熰唳侧唳唳� 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳多唳膏唳む唳班唳� 唳唳唳唳班 唳唳熰唳唳熰 唳о唳班Γ唳� 唳ム唳曕, 唳む唳ㄠ 唳膏Ξ唳唳熰 唳嗋Π唰� 唳忇-唳灌唳溹唳� 唳唳� 唳唳涏唳唰� 唳︵唳む 唳︵唳唳о 唳曕Π唳唳� 唳ㄠ啷� 唳忇唳熰 唳曕Ξ唳� 唳膏唳ㄠ唳� 唳ム唳曕Σ唰囙 唳唳澿 唳唳, 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳� 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳唳ㄠ唳� 唳唳涏Θ唰� 唳忇唳熰-唳︵唳熰 唳ㄠΟ唳�, 唳呧Θ唰囙唳椸唳侧 唳曕唳班Γ 唳曕唳� 唳曕Π唰囙イ 唳忇Μ唳� 唳膏Μ唳曕唳� 唳曕唳班Γ唳曕唳� 唳 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳灌Δ唰� 唳灌Μ唰� 唳忇Ξ唳ㄠ唳� 唳唳熰唳� 唳ㄠΟ唳监イ
唳忇 唳唳熰唳む 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳 唳唳班Δ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唳距Θ唳椸唳侧唳曕 唳唳熰唳︵唳椸 唳︵唳囙Ν唳距唰� 唳唳� 唳曕Π唳� 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏啷� 唳忇唳熰唳� 唳ㄠ唳� extractive, 唳唳班 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳� 唳呧Σ唰嵿Κ唳曕唳涏 唳о唳ㄠ唳︵唳唳� 唳唳ㄠ唳粪唳� 唳溹Θ唰嵿Ο 唳曕唳� 唳曕Π唰� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳膏唳栢唳唳椸Π唳苦Ψ唰嵿 唳膏唳о唳班Γ 唳唳ㄠ唳粪唰� 唳多唳粪Γ 唳曕Π唰囙イ 唳嗋Π唰囙唳熰唳� 唳ㄠ唳� inclusive, 唳唳班 唳椸Γ唳む唳ㄠ唳む唳班唳曕Ν唳距Μ唰� 唳曕唳� 唳曕Π唰� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳灌唳む唳椸唳ㄠ 唳曕Ο唳监唳曕唳� 唳唳唰嵿Δ唳苦Μ唳苦Χ唰囙Ψ唰囙Π 唳膏唳唳班唳ム唳� 唳夃Ζ唰嵿Ζ唰囙Χ唰嵿Ο唰� 唳ㄠΟ唳�, 唳Π唳� 唳嗋Ξ唳溹Θ唳む唳� 唳曕Ε唳� 唳唳 唳曕唳� 唳曕Π唰囙イ 唳忇 唳忇唳熰唳唳む唳� 唳呧Δ唳苦Ω唳班Σ唰€唳曕唳� 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳曕 唳唳班Δ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唳� 唳曕Π唳距Π 唳溹Θ唰嵿Ο 唳唳唰囙Π 唳侧唳栢唳班 唳膏唳∴唰�-唳氞唳班Χ唰�-唳唳粪唳犩唳唳唳 唳曕唳班Ξ唳距唳� 唳唳 唳曕Π唰� 唳椸唳涏唳� (唳忇Μ唳� 唳呧唳膏唳� 唳むΕ唰嵿Ο唳曕 "唳氞唳班-唳唳曕唳�" 唳曕Π唰� 唳椸唳涏唳�)啷� 唳唳班唳氞唳� 唳班唳唳� 唳膏唳唳班唳溹唳� 唳ム唳曕 唳嗋Η唰佮Θ唳苦 唳夃Δ唰嵿Δ唳�-唳嗋Ξ唰囙Π唳苦唳距Π 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳む唳� 唳呧唳膏唳� 唳夃Ζ唳距唳班Γ 唳︵唳栢唳唰囙唰囙Θ啷� 唳忇Μ唳� 唳Σ唳む 唳氞唳唰囙唰囙Θ, 唳ㄠ唳む唳む唳む唳唳� 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳唳椸唳侧唳� 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳愢Δ唳苦唳距Ω唳苦 唳曕唳ㄠ 唳曕唳班Γ 唳ㄠΟ唳�, 唳忇唳熰 唳︵唳多唳� 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳む唳� 唳唳涏Θ唰� 唳む唳佮Ζ唰囙Π 唳忇 extractive-inclusive 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰唳� 唳唳班唰冟Δ 唳氞唳侧唳曕唳多唰嵿Δ唳苦イ
唳忇 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唰囙Π 唳呧Θ唰嵿Ο唳むΞ 唳Α唳� 唳む唳班唳熰 唳灌唳膏唳 唳唳熰 唳嗋Ξ唳距Π 唳Θ唰� 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏 唳む 唳灌Σ唰�, 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰 唳嗋Η唰佮Θ唳苦 "唳椸唳侧唳唳侧唳囙唰囙Χ唳�" 唳о唳班Γ唳距唰� 唳膏Ξ唰嵿Κ唰傕Π唰嵿Γ 唳忇Α唳监唳唰� 唳椸唳涏啷� 唳忇 唳むΔ唰嵿Δ唰嵿Μ唳熰 唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳� 唳嗋Ν唰嵿Ο唳ㄠ唳むΠ唰€唳� 唳唳班Δ唳苦Ψ唰嵿唳距Θ唳椸唳侧唳� 唳曕唳班唳唳距Π唳苦Δ唳距Π 唳曕Ε唳距 唳多唳о 唳Σ唰囙唰囙イ 唳曕唳ㄠ唳む 唳嗋Η唰佮Θ唳苦 唳唳ム唳唳む 唳曕唳ㄠ 唳︵唳多唳� 唳呧Ω唰嵿Δ唳苦Δ唰嵿Μ 唳曕 唳膏唳Δ唳ㄠ唳む唳� 唳ム唳曕Δ唰� 唳唳班? 唳唳ム唳唳曕 唳忇唳� 唳Σ唳� 唳灌Ο唳� "唳椸唳侧唳唳� 唳唳侧唳�"啷� 唳班唳溹Θ唰€唳む, 唳曕唳熰Θ唰€唳む, 唳呧Π唰嵿Ε唳ㄠ唳む, 唳熰唳曕Θ唰嬥Σ唳溹鈥� 唳忇Π唳曕Ξ 唳唳� 唳曕唳涏 唳溹唳� 唳︵唳唰� 唳膏Ξ唳椸唳� 唳唳ム唳唳曕 唳嗋Ψ唰嵿唰囙Κ唰冟Ψ唰嵿唰� 唳溹Α唳监唳唰� 唳班唳栢 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏啷� 唳忇Ξ唳ㄠ唳� 唳曕Ο唳监唳曕唳� 唳溹Θ唳椸唳粪唳犩唳� 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳む 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳呧Μ唳ㄠΔ唳苦Π 唳唳涏Θ唰� 唳曕唳涏 唳曕唳粪唳む唳班 唳膏Μ唳氞唳唰� 唳Α唳� 唳唳唳曕唳熰Π唳熰唳� 唳ㄠ唳€� "唳囙Δ唳苦唳距Ω" (唳曕唳多唳唳� 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳唳唳侧唳膏唳熰唳囙Θ 唳曕唳傕Μ唳� 唳Ω唳ㄠ唳唳距Π 唳溹Θ唳椸Γ唰囙Π 唳曕Ε唳� 唳氞唳ㄠ唳む 唳曕Π唰佮Θ)啷�
唳忇Μ唳距Π 唳忇 唳唳熰 唳ム唳曕 唳忇唳熰 唳灌唳膏唳唳� 唳夃Ζ唰嵿Η唰冟Δ唳苦Π 唳夃Σ唰嵿Σ唰囙 唳曕Π唳� (唳唳班唳� 唳灌唳膏唳唳� 唳夃Ζ唰嵿Η唰冟Δ唳苦Π 唳呧Ν唳距Μ 唳ㄠ唳� 唳忇 唳唳む)啷� 唳嗋Ξ唰囙Π唳苦唳� 唳曕唳唳ㄠ 唳唳曕唳膏唳曕唳� 唳氞唳唰� 唳Α唳监Σ唰嬥 唳む唳� 唳曕唳班Γ 唳︵Π唰嵿Χ唳距Δ唰� 唳椸唳唰� 唳侧唳栢 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏 :
"Unlike in Mexico, in the United States the citizens could keep politicians in check and get rid of ones who would use their offices to enrich themselves or create monopolies for their cronies."
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唳班唳粪唳熰唳班唳 唳夃Θ唰嵿Θ唳唳� 唳ㄠ唳 唳唳班唳む唳 唳溹唳苦Σ 唳膏Ξ唰€唳曕Π唳｀唳苦Π 唳忇唳熰 唳溹Σ唳唳多唳ㄠ 唳囙唳熰唳唳唳距Θ 唳唳多唳侧唳粪Γ唳曕 唳忇Μ唳距Π唰囙Π 唳ㄠ唳唳� 唳Ζ唳� 唳︵唳唳班 唳唳班Ω唰嵿唰冟Δ 唳曕Π唳� 唳灌Ο唳监唳涏啷� 唳唳班唳!
October 22, 2020
禺蹖賱蹖 丕夭 倬乇爻卮 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 丿乇 蹖讴 匕賴賳 讴賳噩讴丕賵 卮讴賱 賲蹖诏蹖乇賴 乇蹖卮賴 丿乇 丿賵乇丕賳 讴賵丿讴蹖 丿丕乇賴 賵 亘丕毓孬 卮讴賱 诏蹖乇蹖 賵 讴賳讴丕卮 丿乇 爻賳蹖賳 亘丕賱丕鬲乇 賲蹖卮賴 .
蹖丕丿賲賴 賲毓賱賲蹖 丿丕卮鬲蹖賲 丿乇 丿賵乇丕賳 丕亘鬲丿丕蹖蹖 亘賴 賳丕賲 丌賯丕蹖 卮乇蹖毓鬲蹖 貙賲蹖诏賮鬲 丕诏乇 賲蹖禺賵丕蹖蹖丿 丕蹖乇丕賳 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴賳賴 賵 亘賴 蹖讴 讴卮賵乇 鬲賵爻毓賴 蹖丕賮鬲賴 鬲亘丿蹖賱 亘卮賴 賮賯胤 蹖讴 乇丕賴 丿丕乇賴 貙 蹖讴 卮亘賴 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖 賴丕 賳丕倬丿蹖丿 亘卮賵賳丿 賵 亘賴 噩丕蹖 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 跇丕倬賳蹖 賴丕 亘賴 丕蹖賳 讴卮賵乇 亘蹖丕蹖賳丿 貙 爻賵丕賱 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 丿乇 匕賴賳 賲賳 賲蹖趩乇禺蹖丿 丌蹖丕 亘賴 賵丕賯毓 賲丕 賲卮讴賱 賳跇丕丿蹖 丿丕乇蹖賲 賵 賴蹖趩 賵賯鬲 賳賲蹖鬲賵賳蹖賲 噩丕賲毓賴 丕蹖 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲賴 丕夭 賴乇 賳馗乇 賵 賲鬲乇賯蹖 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮蹖賲 貙 禺亘 丕賱亘鬲賴 讴賴 賳賴 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 蹖讴 噩丕賲毓賴 丕夭 賳馗乇 爻蹖丕爻蹖 貙 賮乇賴賳诏蹖 貙丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖貙丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖貙 賴蹖趩 乇亘胤蹖 亘賴 賳跇丕丿 賵 禺蹖賱蹖 丕夭 賲爻丕卅賱 丿蹖诏賴 賳丿丕乇賴 貙 賲孬丕賱 賳賯囟 丕蹖賳 賯囟蹖賴 讴乇賴 卮賲丕賱蹖 賵 噩賳賵亘蹖 賴乇 丿賵 蹖讴 賳跇丕丿 賵 蹖讴 夭亘丕賳 賵 蹖讴 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 丨鬲蹖 蹖讴 丕爻賲 貙 丕蹖賳 讴噩丕 賵 丌賳 讴噩丕 貙 賵 禺蹖賱蹖 丕夭 卮賴乇賴丕蹖 賲乇夭蹖 亘蹖賳 丿賵 讴卮賵乇 鬲賵爻毓賴 蹖丕賮鬲賴 賵 賮賯蹖乇 讴賴 亘賴 賮丕氐賱賴 趩賳丿 賲鬲乇 丿乇 丿賵 丿賳蹖丕蹖 賲禺鬲賱賮 夭賳丿诏蹖 賲蹖讴賳賳丿 .
丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 亘賳丿賴 胤亘賯 賳賵卮鬲賴 賴丕蹖 讴鬲丕亘 丕夭 鬲賵爻毓賴 賳蹖丕賮鬲诏蹖 讴卮賵乇賲 丿乇 鄞鄄 爻丕賱 丕禺蹖乇 丕蹖賳诏賵賳賴 丕爻鬲 :
芦賳亘賵丿 讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 賵噩賵丿 丕賱蹖诏丕乇卮蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲蹖禄
倬丕爻禺 禺蹖賱蹖 爻賵丕賱丕鬲 丕夭 亘賳丿 亘賳丿 賲孬丕賱 賴丕蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳 丕爻鬲禺乇丕噩 讴乇丿 賲孬賱丕 丕蹖賳讴賴 :
趩乇丕 丕亘鬲丿丕蹖 丕賳賯賱丕亘 丌賳丕賳 讴賴 丕賲乇賵夭賴 卮毓丕乇賴丕蹖 氐賳毓鬲蹖 賵 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 爻乇賲蹖丿賴賳丿鈥� 賵 賴乇 爻丕賱 乇丕 亘丕 丕蹖賳 丕爻丕賲蹖 賳丕賲 诏匕丕乇蹖 賲蹖讴賳賳丿 貙 鬲賲丕賲 氐賳丕蹖毓 丕蹖乇丕賳 乇丕 賳丕亘賵丿 讴乇丿賳丿賵 亘賴 夭賵乇 丌賳 氐賳丕蹖毓 乇丕 鬲氐丕丨亘 賵 賵乇卮讴爻鬲賴 讴乇丿賳丿 (鬲乇爻 丕夭 讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 賵噩賵丿 丕賱蹖诏丕乇卮蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲蹖)
趩乇丕 丕賲乇賵夭賴 丕夭 丌夭丕丿蹖 亘蹖丕賳 賵 亘賴 禺氐賵氐 卮亘讴賴 賴丕蹖 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 賴乇丕爻 丿丕乇賳丿 賴賲丕賳丕賳 讴賴 賲乇丿賲 丕蹖乇丕賳 乇丕 賲乇丿賲蹖 賮賴蹖賲 賵 倬乇 卮賵乇 賵 丕賳賯賱丕亘蹖 賲蹖賳丕賲賳丿 (鬲乇爻 丕夭 讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 賵噩賵丿 丕蹖诏丕乇卮蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲蹖)
趩乇丕 乇爻丕賳賴 賴丕蹖 賲賱蹖 賲丕 亘丕蹖丿 丿爻鬲 蹖讴 丕乇诏丕賳 禺丕氐 賵 賲丨丿賵丿 亘丕卮丿 賵 爻丕賳爻賵乇 丿乇 賴乇 乇爻丕賳賴 噩賲毓蹖 賵 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 氐賵乇鬲 亘诏蹖乇丿 (鬲乇爻 丕夭 讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 賵噩賵丿 丕賱蹖诏丕乇卮蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲蹖)
趩乇丕 賴乇 賮讴乇 禺賱丕賯 賵 丌蹖賳丿賴 賳诏乇蹖 賲丨讴賵賲 亘賴 卮讴爻鬲 賵 賲賴丕噩乇鬲 丕爻鬲 貙 賵 賲乇丿賲 乇丕 亘丕 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 鬲丨乇蹖賮 卮丿賴 爻乇诏乇賲 賲蹖讴賳賳丿 ..... .
讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 亘丕毓孬 鬲賯爻蹖賲 賯丿乇鬲 丿乇 丿爻鬲丕賳 丕讴孬乇蹖鬲 噩丕賲毓賴 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 丿蹖诏乇 賴蹖趩 丿蹖讴鬲丕鬲賵乇蹖 亘丕 鬲賮讴乇丕鬲 夭賳诏 夭丿賴 賳賲蹖鬲賵丕賳丿 丿乇 賲氐丿乇 賯丿乇鬲 亘丕賯蹖 亘賲丕賳丿 賵 亘賴 夭賵乇诏賵蹖蹖 鬲丕 丌禺乇 毓賲乇 丕丿丕賲賴 丿賴丿 貙 丕蹖賳 丕氐賱 賲賴賲 亘丕毓孬 倬賵蹖丕蹖蹖 噩丕賲毓賴 賵 卮讴賱 诏蹖乇蹖 鬲賮讴乇丕鬲蹖 禺賱丕賯 丿乇 毓乇氐賴 爻蹖丕爻蹖 貙 賮乇賴賳诏蹖貙 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 賵..... 賲蹖卮賵丿 讴賴 噩賵丕賲毓 賲鬲乇賯蹖 乇丕 丕夭 毓賯亘 賲丕賳丿賴 賲鬲賲丕蹖夭 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲 貙 賲诏乇 賲蹖卮賵丿 丿乇 蹖讴 讴卮賵乇 趩賳丿 丿賴 賲賱蹖賵賳蹖 鬲賲丕賲 賯丿乇鬲賲賳丿丕賳 爻蹖丕爻蹖 亘丕 賴賲 賯賵賲 賵 禺賵蹖卮 亘丕卮賳丿 賵 丌賯丕夭丕丿賴 賴丕蹖 鬲丕夭賴 丕夭 乇丕賴 乇爻蹖丿賴 禺賵丿 乇丕 丿乇 賲賳丕氐亘 賲賴賲 丿賵賱鬲蹖 亘丿賵賳 卮丕蹖爻鬲诏蹖 亘诏匕丕乇賳丿 賵 丌賳 讴卮賵乇 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴賳丿 貙 賵 亘賴 鬲賲丕賲蹖 噩賵丕賳丕賳蹖 讴賴 亘丕 卮賵乇 賵 卮賵賯 亘乇丕蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴 讴卮賵乇 爻毓蹖 賵 鬲賱丕卮 賲蹖讴賳賳丿 丕賳诏 亘蹖 丿蹖賳蹖 夭丿賴 卮賵丿 賵 賲噩亘賵乇 亘賴 賲賴丕噩乇鬲 丕噩亘丕乇蹖 丕夭 賵胤賳 禺賵蹖卮 亘卮賵賳丿 .
蹖丕丿賲賴 賲毓賱賲蹖 丿丕卮鬲蹖賲 丿乇 丿賵乇丕賳 丕亘鬲丿丕蹖蹖 亘賴 賳丕賲 丌賯丕蹖 卮乇蹖毓鬲蹖 貙賲蹖诏賮鬲 丕诏乇 賲蹖禺賵丕蹖蹖丿 丕蹖乇丕賳 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴賳賴 賵 亘賴 蹖讴 讴卮賵乇 鬲賵爻毓賴 蹖丕賮鬲賴 鬲亘丿蹖賱 亘卮賴 賮賯胤 蹖讴 乇丕賴 丿丕乇賴 貙 蹖讴 卮亘賴 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖 賴丕 賳丕倬丿蹖丿 亘卮賵賳丿 賵 亘賴 噩丕蹖 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 跇丕倬賳蹖 賴丕 亘賴 丕蹖賳 讴卮賵乇 亘蹖丕蹖賳丿 貙 爻賵丕賱 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 丿乇 匕賴賳 賲賳 賲蹖趩乇禺蹖丿 丌蹖丕 亘賴 賵丕賯毓 賲丕 賲卮讴賱 賳跇丕丿蹖 丿丕乇蹖賲 賵 賴蹖趩 賵賯鬲 賳賲蹖鬲賵賳蹖賲 噩丕賲毓賴 丕蹖 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲賴 丕夭 賴乇 賳馗乇 賵 賲鬲乇賯蹖 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮蹖賲 貙 禺亘 丕賱亘鬲賴 讴賴 賳賴 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 蹖讴 噩丕賲毓賴 丕夭 賳馗乇 爻蹖丕爻蹖 貙 賮乇賴賳诏蹖 貙丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖貙丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖貙 賴蹖趩 乇亘胤蹖 亘賴 賳跇丕丿 賵 禺蹖賱蹖 丕夭 賲爻丕卅賱 丿蹖诏賴 賳丿丕乇賴 貙 賲孬丕賱 賳賯囟 丕蹖賳 賯囟蹖賴 讴乇賴 卮賲丕賱蹖 賵 噩賳賵亘蹖 賴乇 丿賵 蹖讴 賳跇丕丿 賵 蹖讴 夭亘丕賳 賵 蹖讴 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 丨鬲蹖 蹖讴 丕爻賲 貙 丕蹖賳 讴噩丕 賵 丌賳 讴噩丕 貙 賵 禺蹖賱蹖 丕夭 卮賴乇賴丕蹖 賲乇夭蹖 亘蹖賳 丿賵 讴卮賵乇 鬲賵爻毓賴 蹖丕賮鬲賴 賵 賮賯蹖乇 讴賴 亘賴 賮丕氐賱賴 趩賳丿 賲鬲乇 丿乇 丿賵 丿賳蹖丕蹖 賲禺鬲賱賮 夭賳丿诏蹖 賲蹖讴賳賳丿 .
丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 亘賳丿賴 胤亘賯 賳賵卮鬲賴 賴丕蹖 讴鬲丕亘 丕夭 鬲賵爻毓賴 賳蹖丕賮鬲诏蹖 讴卮賵乇賲 丿乇 鄞鄄 爻丕賱 丕禺蹖乇 丕蹖賳诏賵賳賴 丕爻鬲 :
芦賳亘賵丿 讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 賵噩賵丿 丕賱蹖诏丕乇卮蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲蹖禄
倬丕爻禺 禺蹖賱蹖 爻賵丕賱丕鬲 丕夭 亘賳丿 亘賳丿 賲孬丕賱 賴丕蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳 丕爻鬲禺乇丕噩 讴乇丿 賲孬賱丕 丕蹖賳讴賴 :
趩乇丕 丕亘鬲丿丕蹖 丕賳賯賱丕亘 丌賳丕賳 讴賴 丕賲乇賵夭賴 卮毓丕乇賴丕蹖 氐賳毓鬲蹖 賵 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 爻乇賲蹖丿賴賳丿鈥� 賵 賴乇 爻丕賱 乇丕 亘丕 丕蹖賳 丕爻丕賲蹖 賳丕賲 诏匕丕乇蹖 賲蹖讴賳賳丿 貙 鬲賲丕賲 氐賳丕蹖毓 丕蹖乇丕賳 乇丕 賳丕亘賵丿 讴乇丿賳丿賵 亘賴 夭賵乇 丌賳 氐賳丕蹖毓 乇丕 鬲氐丕丨亘 賵 賵乇卮讴爻鬲賴 讴乇丿賳丿 (鬲乇爻 丕夭 讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 賵噩賵丿 丕賱蹖诏丕乇卮蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲蹖)
趩乇丕 丕賲乇賵夭賴 丕夭 丌夭丕丿蹖 亘蹖丕賳 賵 亘賴 禺氐賵氐 卮亘讴賴 賴丕蹖 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 賴乇丕爻 丿丕乇賳丿 賴賲丕賳丕賳 讴賴 賲乇丿賲 丕蹖乇丕賳 乇丕 賲乇丿賲蹖 賮賴蹖賲 賵 倬乇 卮賵乇 賵 丕賳賯賱丕亘蹖 賲蹖賳丕賲賳丿 (鬲乇爻 丕夭 讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 賵噩賵丿 丕蹖诏丕乇卮蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲蹖)
趩乇丕 乇爻丕賳賴 賴丕蹖 賲賱蹖 賲丕 亘丕蹖丿 丿爻鬲 蹖讴 丕乇诏丕賳 禺丕氐 賵 賲丨丿賵丿 亘丕卮丿 賵 爻丕賳爻賵乇 丿乇 賴乇 乇爻丕賳賴 噩賲毓蹖 賵 丕噩鬲賲丕毓蹖 氐賵乇鬲 亘诏蹖乇丿 (鬲乇爻 丕夭 讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 賵噩賵丿 丕賱蹖诏丕乇卮蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲蹖)
趩乇丕 賴乇 賮讴乇 禺賱丕賯 賵 丌蹖賳丿賴 賳诏乇蹖 賲丨讴賵賲 亘賴 卮讴爻鬲 賵 賲賴丕噩乇鬲 丕爻鬲 貙 賵 賲乇丿賲 乇丕 亘丕 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 鬲丨乇蹖賮 卮丿賴 爻乇诏乇賲 賲蹖讴賳賳丿 ..... .
讴孬乇鬲 诏乇丕蹖蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 亘丕毓孬 鬲賯爻蹖賲 賯丿乇鬲 丿乇 丿爻鬲丕賳 丕讴孬乇蹖鬲 噩丕賲毓賴 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 丿蹖诏乇 賴蹖趩 丿蹖讴鬲丕鬲賵乇蹖 亘丕 鬲賮讴乇丕鬲 夭賳诏 夭丿賴 賳賲蹖鬲賵丕賳丿 丿乇 賲氐丿乇 賯丿乇鬲 亘丕賯蹖 亘賲丕賳丿 賵 亘賴 夭賵乇诏賵蹖蹖 鬲丕 丌禺乇 毓賲乇 丕丿丕賲賴 丿賴丿 貙 丕蹖賳 丕氐賱 賲賴賲 亘丕毓孬 倬賵蹖丕蹖蹖 噩丕賲毓賴 賵 卮讴賱 诏蹖乇蹖 鬲賮讴乇丕鬲蹖 禺賱丕賯 丿乇 毓乇氐賴 爻蹖丕爻蹖 貙 賮乇賴賳诏蹖貙 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 賵..... 賲蹖卮賵丿 讴賴 噩賵丕賲毓 賲鬲乇賯蹖 乇丕 丕夭 毓賯亘 賲丕賳丿賴 賲鬲賲丕蹖夭 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲 貙 賲诏乇 賲蹖卮賵丿 丿乇 蹖讴 讴卮賵乇 趩賳丿 丿賴 賲賱蹖賵賳蹖 鬲賲丕賲 賯丿乇鬲賲賳丿丕賳 爻蹖丕爻蹖 亘丕 賴賲 賯賵賲 賵 禺賵蹖卮 亘丕卮賳丿 賵 丌賯丕夭丕丿賴 賴丕蹖 鬲丕夭賴 丕夭 乇丕賴 乇爻蹖丿賴 禺賵丿 乇丕 丿乇 賲賳丕氐亘 賲賴賲 丿賵賱鬲蹖 亘丿賵賳 卮丕蹖爻鬲诏蹖 亘诏匕丕乇賳丿 賵 丌賳 讴卮賵乇 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴賳丿 貙 賵 亘賴 鬲賲丕賲蹖 噩賵丕賳丕賳蹖 讴賴 亘丕 卮賵乇 賵 卮賵賯 亘乇丕蹖 丌蹖賳丿賴 讴卮賵乇 爻毓蹖 賵 鬲賱丕卮 賲蹖讴賳賳丿 丕賳诏 亘蹖 丿蹖賳蹖 夭丿賴 卮賵丿 賵 賲噩亘賵乇 亘賴 賲賴丕噩乇鬲 丕噩亘丕乇蹖 丕夭 賵胤賳 禺賵蹖卮 亘卮賵賳丿 .
January 23, 2021
丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 趩賴 亘爻丕 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 賴丕蹖蹖 鬲丕夭賴 亘丿賴丿 亘乇丕蹖 賮賴賲賽 賳丕鬲賵丕賳蹖 賴丕蹖 賲丕 丿乇 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 爻丕禺鬲丕乇蹖 讴賴 丿賴賴 賴丕蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 丿乇 诏賵賳賴 賴丕蹖 賲鬲賮丕賵鬲 丕賲丕 亘丕 讴丕乇讴乇丿蹖 蹖讴爻丕賳 爻亘亘 卮丿賴 鬲丕 賴賲賵丕乇賴 亘丕 丕蹖賳 倬乇爻卮 乇賵 丿乇 乇賵 亘丕卮蹖賲 讴賴 鬲丕 讴蹖 丕蹖賳 賵囟毓蹖鬲 賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳丿 丿賵丕賲 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮丿. 丕蹖賳 趩賳蹖賳 丕爻鬲 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 禺賵丕賳丿賳蹖 丕爻鬲 丨鬲丕 丕诏乇 賳禺賵丕賴蹖賲 賳馗乇蹖賴 蹖 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 丌賳 乇丕 丿乇亘爻鬲 亘倬匕蹖乇蹖賲 讴賴 亘蹖 诏賲丕賳 賴賲 賳賲蹖 卮賵丿 賴乇 賳馗乇蹖賴 乇丕 蹖讴 噩丕 倬匕蹖乇賮鬲. 丕夭 賳诏丕賴 丿蹖诏乇 賴賲 鬲丕 夭賲丕賳蹖 讴賴 讴爻丕賳蹖 讴賴 丕丿毓丕蹖 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 卮乇丕蹖胤 乇賵 丿丕乇賳丿 丕賲丕 賳禺賵丕賴賳丿 丿爻鬲 丕夭 夭蹖丕丿賴 禺賵丕賴蹖 亘乇丿丕乇賳丿 賵 亘賴 丕卮鬲亘丕賴丕鬲卮賵賳 丕毓鬲乇丕賮 讴賳賳丿 賵 丕夭 丕賵賳賴丕 丿爻鬲 亘乇丿丕乇賳丿 趩賴 亘爻丕 趩乇禺賴 蹖 賯胤毓蹖賽 卮讴爻鬲 亘賴 诏乇丿卮賽 禺賵丿卮 丕丿丕賲賴 禺賵丕賴丿 丿丕丿 丕诏乇趩賴 賲蹖 卮賵丿 倬丕爻禺 丕賵賳 乇賵 賴賲 丿乇 賲鬲賳 蹖丕賮鬲
丿乇 丕蹖賳 乇賵夭賴丕蹖 爻乇丿乇诏賲蹖 賵 禺丕賳賴 賳卮蹖賳蹖 賵 夭賵丕賱 趩賴 亘爻丕 亘賴鬲乇 亘丕卮丿 讴賴 丕夭 賳賵 乇賮鬲丕乇 賵 爻丕禺鬲丕乇賴丕蹖 賮讴乇蹖 賲賵賳 乇賵 亘丕夭禺賵丕賳蹖 讴賳蹖賲 賵 丿爻鬲 丕夭 蹖讴丿賳诏蹖 賴丕蹖 禺賵丿禺賵丕賴丕賳賴 蹖 賳丕鬲賲丕賲 賵 賵蹖乇丕賳诏乇 亘乇丿丕乇蹖賲 丕诏乇趩賴 讴丕乇蹖 丕爻鬲 亘蹖 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丕賳诏丕乇 賳卮丿賳蹖! 丕賲丕 丕诏乇 賳禺賵丕賴蹖賲 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 讴賳蹖賲 賵 丕夭 禺賵丕亘賽 禺乇诏賵卮蹖賽 賴賲蹖卮诏蹖 亘蹖丿丕乇 亘卮蹖賲貙 诏乇诏賽 胤賲毓賿 亘賴 丿賳丿丕賳 鬲賳賽 鬲賲丕賲賽 睾夭丕賱丕賳 禺賵丕賴丿 丿乇蹖丿貨 趩賳丕賳 讴賴 丕賮鬲丕丿 賵 丿丕賳爻鬲蹖賲
讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 禺賵亘蹖 亘賴 倬丕乇爻蹖 亘乇诏乇丿丕賳丿賴 卮丿賴 賵 亘爻蹖丕乇 賴賲 禺賵卮禺賵丕賳 賵 乇賵丕賳 賴爻鬲 賵 丕蹖賳 爻亘亘 賲蹖 卮賴 賴賳诏丕賲 丿乇 丿爻鬲 诏乇賮鬲賳 賵 禺賵丕賳丿賳卮 亘卮賵丿 亘賴 丌爻丕賳蹖 倬蹖卮 乇賮鬲 賵 丌賳趩賴 乇丕 讴賴 胤乇丨 賲蹖 讴賳賴 丿賯蹖賯 賵 毓賲蹖賯 賮賴賲蹖丿. 丕蹖丿賵賳 亘丕丿丕
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賳賴賲 丌匕乇賲丕賴1399 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖賽 鬲賴乇丕賳卮賴乇賽 丕夭 卮亘賽 倬蹖卮 蹖讴爻乇賴 亘丕乇丕賳
丿乇 丕蹖賳 乇賵夭賴丕蹖 爻乇丿乇诏賲蹖 賵 禺丕賳賴 賳卮蹖賳蹖 賵 夭賵丕賱 趩賴 亘爻丕 亘賴鬲乇 亘丕卮丿 讴賴 丕夭 賳賵 乇賮鬲丕乇 賵 爻丕禺鬲丕乇賴丕蹖 賮讴乇蹖 賲賵賳 乇賵 亘丕夭禺賵丕賳蹖 讴賳蹖賲 賵 丿爻鬲 丕夭 蹖讴丿賳诏蹖 賴丕蹖 禺賵丿禺賵丕賴丕賳賴 蹖 賳丕鬲賲丕賲 賵 賵蹖乇丕賳诏乇 亘乇丿丕乇蹖賲 丕诏乇趩賴 讴丕乇蹖 丕爻鬲 亘蹖 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丕賳诏丕乇 賳卮丿賳蹖! 丕賲丕 丕诏乇 賳禺賵丕賴蹖賲 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 讴賳蹖賲 賵 丕夭 禺賵丕亘賽 禺乇诏賵卮蹖賽 賴賲蹖卮诏蹖 亘蹖丿丕乇 亘卮蹖賲貙 诏乇诏賽 胤賲毓賿 亘賴 丿賳丿丕賳 鬲賳賽 鬲賲丕賲賽 睾夭丕賱丕賳 禺賵丕賴丿 丿乇蹖丿貨 趩賳丕賳 讴賴 丕賮鬲丕丿 賵 丿丕賳爻鬲蹖賲
讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 禺賵亘蹖 亘賴 倬丕乇爻蹖 亘乇诏乇丿丕賳丿賴 卮丿賴 賵 亘爻蹖丕乇 賴賲 禺賵卮禺賵丕賳 賵 乇賵丕賳 賴爻鬲 賵 丕蹖賳 爻亘亘 賲蹖 卮賴 賴賳诏丕賲 丿乇 丿爻鬲 诏乇賮鬲賳 賵 禺賵丕賳丿賳卮 亘卮賵丿 亘賴 丌爻丕賳蹖 倬蹖卮 乇賮鬲 賵 丌賳趩賴 乇丕 讴賴 胤乇丨 賲蹖 讴賳賴 丿賯蹖賯 賵 毓賲蹖賯 賮賴賲蹖丿. 丕蹖丿賵賳 亘丕丿丕
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賳賴賲 丌匕乇賲丕賴1399 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖賽 鬲賴乇丕賳卮賴乇賽 丕夭 卮亘賽 倬蹖卮 蹖讴爻乇賴 亘丕乇丕賳
January 24, 2025
The importance of institutions and a broad base of people profiting from prosperity is detailed in great, diverse detail in this book. Small initial differences in societal structure compound over time in vicious and virtuous circles, with richest and poorest countries remarkably stable over 50, 100 and even 150 year timespans
Hence it arises that there is no one who takes are of the land he enjoys. There is not even anyone to plant a tree, because he knows that he who plants it very rarely gathers the fruit. For the king however, it is useful that they should be so dependent on him.
Very thought provoking and thorough, while still being eminently readable. 2024 Nobel laureates in Economics and examine history to formulate a broad theory why some nations are rich and some are poor, despite similar climates, resources, culture and exposure to technology. Their thesis is that pluralistic political institutions (while having a centralised state that is capable of providing basic public services and maintaining the monopoly on violence) and inclusive economic institutions, that act as a broad-based engine for societal advancement and an avenue for social mobility, are the most determining factor influencing different economic outcomes. While serendipitous influences from natural disasters, foreign intervention and brilliant individuals also shape history, thus making the faith of countries non-deterministic, the theory of is both elegant and compelling.
More thoughts and specific examples as contained in the book to follow!
Hence it arises that there is no one who takes are of the land he enjoys. There is not even anyone to plant a tree, because he knows that he who plants it very rarely gathers the fruit. For the king however, it is useful that they should be so dependent on him.
Very thought provoking and thorough, while still being eminently readable. 2024 Nobel laureates in Economics and examine history to formulate a broad theory why some nations are rich and some are poor, despite similar climates, resources, culture and exposure to technology. Their thesis is that pluralistic political institutions (while having a centralised state that is capable of providing basic public services and maintaining the monopoly on violence) and inclusive economic institutions, that act as a broad-based engine for societal advancement and an avenue for social mobility, are the most determining factor influencing different economic outcomes. While serendipitous influences from natural disasters, foreign intervention and brilliant individuals also shape history, thus making the faith of countries non-deterministic, the theory of is both elegant and compelling.
More thoughts and specific examples as contained in the book to follow!
December 5, 2019
Despite the hutzpah of a title like WHY NATIONS FAIL, there's nothing in the text itself that I found disagreeable, and I've read a lot of different economic and political theories of wealth over the years.
Of course, there have been a lot of armchair historians and armchair economists and armchair politicians, so who knows if 20/20 vision is really accurate? They could all be riffing on one fundamental theory or another and making a messy conclusion. Right?
The beauty of this one is pretty simple in effect if not in the supporting particulars. Tons of examples are given from all kinds of nations and economic policies and politics all throughout history and including a very refreshing survey of modern nations. They first break down the prevailing bad theories that revolve around geography, culture, bad luck, or even the big modern one we see all the time: Ignorance. *laugh* You know, the one that says, "If only you had our experts, you too can have all the wealth we have."
The fundamental difference in this book, fascinatingly so, can be summed up quite easily. And it's kinda obvious, too.
Extractor policies and inclusive policies.
You can translate that into government/economic policies that loot in order to grow or those that give a share of all the profits and incentives to all the people working in the system. Vicious cycles and Happy cycles.
Dictators that keep on taking can keep it up for a long time and even if there are revolutions, the revolutions keep putting the same damn policy in place. Any kind of authoritarian government can work to that same tune. Short term growth, sharp declines.
The politics and the economics of it are perfectly entwined. You can't have one without the other.
On the other hand, there's the other side. If everyone, not just the elite, has a stake in the game, then everyone works harder and with more intelligence to accomplish whatever they have to accomplish.
Use guns, coercion, theft. Or use honest cooperation.
It's pretty obvious that BOTH can be a basis for any nation. As can a wide, wide continuum mixing both elements in any. And that's also the point. Any nation can succeed or fail. No nation is exempt.
But it still requires a rather huge change of heart and it must be truly enacted in both the economics side and the political side. One without the other will perpetuate the same looting cycle.
For fans of other authors and big theories that nail this same idea, look to Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. Or Game Theory.
You will have all types of individuals either working toward a collaborative whole or those who will short the whole damn thing down. The institutions with enough checks and balances DO seem to edge toward the more prosperous equations. Those who dismantle those checks and balances or work together to loot other subsets will take from the total potential benefits of wealth until it is all used up.
It's quite complicated in practice, of course, but for a cohesive underlying theory, it works a lot better than saying Communism! or Capitalism! or Socialism!
All those can be filled with thieves or genuinely cooperative individuals. The difference is in the institutions and economic models that might favor the thieves or the genuinely cooperative.
The real joy of reading this book is the myriads of examples. :)
Of course, there have been a lot of armchair historians and armchair economists and armchair politicians, so who knows if 20/20 vision is really accurate? They could all be riffing on one fundamental theory or another and making a messy conclusion. Right?
The beauty of this one is pretty simple in effect if not in the supporting particulars. Tons of examples are given from all kinds of nations and economic policies and politics all throughout history and including a very refreshing survey of modern nations. They first break down the prevailing bad theories that revolve around geography, culture, bad luck, or even the big modern one we see all the time: Ignorance. *laugh* You know, the one that says, "If only you had our experts, you too can have all the wealth we have."
The fundamental difference in this book, fascinatingly so, can be summed up quite easily. And it's kinda obvious, too.
Extractor policies and inclusive policies.
You can translate that into government/economic policies that loot in order to grow or those that give a share of all the profits and incentives to all the people working in the system. Vicious cycles and Happy cycles.
Dictators that keep on taking can keep it up for a long time and even if there are revolutions, the revolutions keep putting the same damn policy in place. Any kind of authoritarian government can work to that same tune. Short term growth, sharp declines.
The politics and the economics of it are perfectly entwined. You can't have one without the other.
On the other hand, there's the other side. If everyone, not just the elite, has a stake in the game, then everyone works harder and with more intelligence to accomplish whatever they have to accomplish.
Use guns, coercion, theft. Or use honest cooperation.
It's pretty obvious that BOTH can be a basis for any nation. As can a wide, wide continuum mixing both elements in any. And that's also the point. Any nation can succeed or fail. No nation is exempt.
But it still requires a rather huge change of heart and it must be truly enacted in both the economics side and the political side. One without the other will perpetuate the same looting cycle.
For fans of other authors and big theories that nail this same idea, look to Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged. Or Game Theory.
You will have all types of individuals either working toward a collaborative whole or those who will short the whole damn thing down. The institutions with enough checks and balances DO seem to edge toward the more prosperous equations. Those who dismantle those checks and balances or work together to loot other subsets will take from the total potential benefits of wealth until it is all used up.
It's quite complicated in practice, of course, but for a cohesive underlying theory, it works a lot better than saying Communism! or Capitalism! or Socialism!
All those can be filled with thieves or genuinely cooperative individuals. The difference is in the institutions and economic models that might favor the thieves or the genuinely cooperative.
The real joy of reading this book is the myriads of examples. :)
March 12, 2021
丿丕乇賵賳 毓噩賲 丕賵睾賱賵貙 丕爻鬲丕丿 丕賯鬲氐丕丿 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴 丕賽賲.丌蹖.鬲蹖貙 賵 噩蹖賲夭 乇丕亘蹖爻賳賵賳貙 丕爻鬲丕丿 鬲賵爻毓賴 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴 卮蹖讴丕诏賵貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 倬乇噩丿賱鈥屫臂屬� 亘丨孬鈥屬囏й� 賲丨丕賮賱 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 賵 爻蹖丕爻蹖 丿賳蹖丕 賲蹖鈥屬矩必ж操嗀� 蹖毓賳蹖 芦趩乇丕 賲賱鬲鈥屬囏� 賳賲蹖鈥屫堌з嗁嗀� 丌賳噩賵乇 讴賴 亘丕蹖丿 亘賴 孬乇賵鬲貙 賯丿乇鬲 賵 乇賮丕賴 亘乇爻賳丿 賵 丿乇 丕蹖賳 乇丕賴 卮讴爻鬲 賲蹖鈥屫堌辟嗀熉�
鬲夭 丕氐賱蹖 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇 賲亘賳丕蹖 芦鬲賮丕賵鬲鈥屬囏й� 賳賴丕丿蹖禄 丕爻鬲. 讴鬲丕亘 禺賱丕氐賴鈥屫й� 丕爻鬲 丕夭 鬲丕乇蹖禺趩賴 噩賴丕賳 賵 讴卮賵乇賴丕 賵 賮乇丕夭 賵 賮乇賵丿 賲賱鬲鈥屬囏� 丿乇 亘乇賴賴鈥屬囏й� 诏賵賳丕诏賵賳 賵 亘夭賳诏丕賴鈥屬囏й� 鬲丕乇蹖禺.
丕蹖賳 丿賵 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 乇蹖卮賴 孬乇賵鬲貙 賯丿乇鬲 賵 賮賯乇 讴卮賵乇賴丕蹖 诏賵賳丕诏賵賳 噩賴丕賳 丿乇 鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘卮乇 乇丕 賳丕卮蹖 丕夭 鬲賮丕賵鬲鈥屬囏й� 賳賴丕丿蹖 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴卮賵乇賴丕 賲蹖鈥屫з嗁嗀�.
丕诏乇 讴卮賵乇蹖 丿丕乇丕蹖 芦賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇禄 (inclusive institutions) 亘丕卮丿 卮乇胤 賱丕夭賲 亘乇丕蹖 鬲賵爻毓賴 乇丕 丿丕乇丕爻鬲 賵 丕诏乇 讴卮賵乇蹖 丿丕乇丕蹖 芦賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕賳丨氐丕乇蹖禄 (extractive institutions) 亘丕卮丿 亘賴 賮賯乇 賵 囟毓賮 讴卮蹖丿賴 禺賵丕賴丿 卮丿.
賯胤毓丕 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賲賮賴賵賲 賳賴 賲賮丕賴蹖賲蹖 賲胤賱賯 讴賴 賲賮丕賴蹖賲蹖 丕爻鬲 賳爻亘蹖.
丕賵睾賱賵 賵 乇丕亘蹖賳爻賵賳 亘乇 丕蹖賳 賳馗乇 賴爻鬲賳丿 讴賴 賴乇诏丕賴 趩乇禺卮 賯丿乇鬲貙 丌夭丕丿蹖 亘蹖丕賳 賵 賲胤亘賵毓丕鬲貙 丌夭丕丿蹖 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 賵 讴爻亘鈥屬堏┴ж必� 丨賯賵賯 賲丕賱讴蹖鬲 賵 丨丕讴賲蹖鬲 賯丕賳賵賳 丿乇 讴卮賵乇蹖 丨丕讴賲 亘丕卮丿 丕蹖賳 讴卮賵乇 賲爻蹖乇 爻毓丕丿鬲 乇丕 胤蹖 禺賵丕賴丿 讴乇丿.
讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 賳賵毓蹖 賳賯胤賴 鬲賯丕胤毓 毓賱賵賲 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 毓賱賵賲 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 丕爻鬲. 丕賵睾賱賵 賵 乇丕亘蹖賳爻賵賳 丕蹖賳 丿賵 乇丕 賳賴 倬蹖卮賳蹖丕夭 蹖讴蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇蹖 讴賴 丌賳鈥屬囏� 乇丕 賴賲賳蹖丕夭 賴賲 丿丕賳爻鬲賴 賵 賲毓鬲賯丿賳丿 蹖讴蹖 亘丿賵賳 丿蹖诏乇蹖 賲孬賲乇孬賲乇 賳禺賵丕賴丿 亘賵丿 賵 賴乇趩賳丿 賳賲賵賳賴鈥屬囏й屰� 丿乇 鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴 鬲賯丿賲 鬲賵爻毓賴 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 亘乇 爻蹖丕爻蹖 丿賱丕賱鬲 丿丕乇丿 丕賲丕 乇卮丿 丕蹖賳 讴卮賵乇賴丕 倬丕蹖丿丕乇 賳禺賵丕賴賳丿 賲丕賳丿.
賲丨賵乇 丿蹖诏乇 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇 丕氐胤賱丕丨 賲毓乇賵賮 跇賵夭賮 卮賵賲蹖倬鬲乇貙 丕賯鬲氐丕丿丿丕賳 卮賴蹖乇貙 蹖毓賳蹖 芦鬲禺乇蹖亘賽 爻丕夭賳丿賴禄 (creative destruction) 丿賱丕賱鬲 丿丕乇丿. 丕賵睾賱賵 賵 乇丕亘蹖爻賳賵賳 賲毓鬲賯丿賳丿 賴乇诏丕賴 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 丕夭 丕蹖賳 賲賯賵賱賴 亘乇禺賵乇丿丕乇 亘賵丿 賳卮丕賳 丕夭 倬賵蹖丕蹖蹖 賵 丕賳毓胤丕賮 丌賳 丿丕乇丿 賵 亘賴 乇卮丿 丌賳 讴卮賵乇 讴賲讴 禺賵丕賴丿 讴乇丿.
鬲禺乇蹖亘 爻丕夭賳丿賴 乇丕 賳賴 賳賴丕丿蹖 丿爻鬲賵乇 賲蹖鈥屫囏� 賵 賳賴 卮禺氐蹖貙 讴丕乇 鬲禺乇蹖亘 爻丕夭賳丿賴 亘乇 毓賴丿賴 賲讴丕賳蹖夭賲 芦亘丕夭丕乇禄 禺賵丕賴丿 亘賵丿.
丕賳丨氐丕乇蹖 賵 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 亘賵丿賳 賳賴丕丿賴丕 丕孬乇蹖 賲爻鬲賯蹖賲 亘乇 鬲禺乇蹖亘 爻丕夭賳丿賴 禺賵丕賴賳丿 丿丕卮鬲.
丕蹖賳 丿賵 賴賲趩賳蹖賳 賲毓鬲賯丿賳丿 讴賴 丕賮乇丕丿 蹖丕 亘賴 賳賵毓蹖 乇赖亘乇丕賳 賳蹖夭 丿乇 賲爻蹖乇 乇卮丿 賵 爻毓丕丿鬲 蹖丕 賮賯乇 賵 賮賱丕讴鬲 賲賱鬲鈥屬囏� 鬲丕孬蹖乇 亘賴 爻夭丕蹖蹖 禺賵丕賴賳丿 丿丕卮鬲. 禺賱丕氐賴 丕蹖賳讴賴 丕蹖賳 乇赖亘乇丕賳 賵 爻蹖丕爻鬲诏匕丕乇丕賳 讴卮賵乇賴丕 賴爻鬲賳丿 讴賴 鬲氐賲蹖賲 賲蹖鈥屭屫辟嗀� 賳賴丕丿賴丕 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 亘丕卮丿 賵 賲賱鬲 亘賴 爻毓丕丿鬲 亘乇爻丿 蹖丕 丕蹖賳讴賴 賳賴丕丿賴丕 丕賳丨氐丕乇蹖 亘丕卮賳丿 賵 鬲賳賴丕 賳夭丿蹖讴丕賳 賵 禺賵丿 丕賵 丕夭 丕蹖賳 賯丿乇鬲 賵 孬乇賵鬲 亘乇禺賵乇丿丕乇 亘賵丿賴 賵 賲賱鬲鈥� 禺賵蹖卮 丿乇 賮賯乇 賵 鬲賳诏丿爻鬲蹖 亘賴 爻乇 亘乇賳丿.
禺賱丕氐賴 讴賱丕賲 丌賳讴賴 丕賵睾賱賵 賵 乇丕亘蹖爻賳賵賳 乇丕賴鈥屫� 鬲賵爻毓賴 賵 乇卮丿 讴卮賵乇賴丕 乇丕 賳賴 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 讴賴 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賲蹖鈥屫з嗁嗀�. 亘賴 亘蹖丕賳 丿蹖诏乇 丕诏乇 爻蹖丕爻鬲賲丿丕乇丕賳 丕乇丕丿賴 賵 噩爻丕乇鬲 賵 毓夭賲 讴丕賮蹖 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮賳丿 丌賳 賲賱鬲 丿乇 賲爻蹖乇 乇卮丿 賵 鬲賵爻毓賴 賯乇丕乇 禺賵丕賴丿 诏乇賮鬲 賵 丕诏乇 賳賴貙 丌賳 賲賱鬲 丿乇 賲爻蹖乇 賲毓讴賵爻 鬲賵爻毓賴 賯乇丕乇 禺賵丕賴丿 诏乇賮鬲.
鬲夭 丕氐賱蹖 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇 賲亘賳丕蹖 芦鬲賮丕賵鬲鈥屬囏й� 賳賴丕丿蹖禄 丕爻鬲. 讴鬲丕亘 禺賱丕氐賴鈥屫й� 丕爻鬲 丕夭 鬲丕乇蹖禺趩賴 噩賴丕賳 賵 讴卮賵乇賴丕 賵 賮乇丕夭 賵 賮乇賵丿 賲賱鬲鈥屬囏� 丿乇 亘乇賴賴鈥屬囏й� 诏賵賳丕诏賵賳 賵 亘夭賳诏丕賴鈥屬囏й� 鬲丕乇蹖禺.
丕蹖賳 丿賵 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 乇蹖卮賴 孬乇賵鬲貙 賯丿乇鬲 賵 賮賯乇 讴卮賵乇賴丕蹖 诏賵賳丕诏賵賳 噩賴丕賳 丿乇 鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘卮乇 乇丕 賳丕卮蹖 丕夭 鬲賮丕賵鬲鈥屬囏й� 賳賴丕丿蹖 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴卮賵乇賴丕 賲蹖鈥屫з嗁嗀�.
丕诏乇 讴卮賵乇蹖 丿丕乇丕蹖 芦賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇禄 (inclusive institutions) 亘丕卮丿 卮乇胤 賱丕夭賲 亘乇丕蹖 鬲賵爻毓賴 乇丕 丿丕乇丕爻鬲 賵 丕诏乇 讴卮賵乇蹖 丿丕乇丕蹖 芦賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕賳丨氐丕乇蹖禄 (extractive institutions) 亘丕卮丿 亘賴 賮賯乇 賵 囟毓賮 讴卮蹖丿賴 禺賵丕賴丿 卮丿.
賯胤毓丕 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賲賮賴賵賲 賳賴 賲賮丕賴蹖賲蹖 賲胤賱賯 讴賴 賲賮丕賴蹖賲蹖 丕爻鬲 賳爻亘蹖.
丕賵睾賱賵 賵 乇丕亘蹖賳爻賵賳 亘乇 丕蹖賳 賳馗乇 賴爻鬲賳丿 讴賴 賴乇诏丕賴 趩乇禺卮 賯丿乇鬲貙 丌夭丕丿蹖 亘蹖丕賳 賵 賲胤亘賵毓丕鬲貙 丌夭丕丿蹖 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 賵 讴爻亘鈥屬堏┴ж必� 丨賯賵賯 賲丕賱讴蹖鬲 賵 丨丕讴賲蹖鬲 賯丕賳賵賳 丿乇 讴卮賵乇蹖 丨丕讴賲 亘丕卮丿 丕蹖賳 讴卮賵乇 賲爻蹖乇 爻毓丕丿鬲 乇丕 胤蹖 禺賵丕賴丿 讴乇丿.
讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 賳賵毓蹖 賳賯胤賴 鬲賯丕胤毓 毓賱賵賲 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 毓賱賵賲 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 丕爻鬲. 丕賵睾賱賵 賵 乇丕亘蹖賳爻賵賳 丕蹖賳 丿賵 乇丕 賳賴 倬蹖卮賳蹖丕夭 蹖讴蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇蹖 讴賴 丌賳鈥屬囏� 乇丕 賴賲賳蹖丕夭 賴賲 丿丕賳爻鬲賴 賵 賲毓鬲賯丿賳丿 蹖讴蹖 亘丿賵賳 丿蹖诏乇蹖 賲孬賲乇孬賲乇 賳禺賵丕賴丿 亘賵丿 賵 賴乇趩賳丿 賳賲賵賳賴鈥屬囏й屰� 丿乇 鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴 鬲賯丿賲 鬲賵爻毓賴 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 亘乇 爻蹖丕爻蹖 丿賱丕賱鬲 丿丕乇丿 丕賲丕 乇卮丿 丕蹖賳 讴卮賵乇賴丕 倬丕蹖丿丕乇 賳禺賵丕賴賳丿 賲丕賳丿.
賲丨賵乇 丿蹖诏乇 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇 丕氐胤賱丕丨 賲毓乇賵賮 跇賵夭賮 卮賵賲蹖倬鬲乇貙 丕賯鬲氐丕丿丿丕賳 卮賴蹖乇貙 蹖毓賳蹖 芦鬲禺乇蹖亘賽 爻丕夭賳丿賴禄 (creative destruction) 丿賱丕賱鬲 丿丕乇丿. 丕賵睾賱賵 賵 乇丕亘蹖爻賳賵賳 賲毓鬲賯丿賳丿 賴乇诏丕賴 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 丕夭 丕蹖賳 賲賯賵賱賴 亘乇禺賵乇丿丕乇 亘賵丿 賳卮丕賳 丕夭 倬賵蹖丕蹖蹖 賵 丕賳毓胤丕賮 丌賳 丿丕乇丿 賵 亘賴 乇卮丿 丌賳 讴卮賵乇 讴賲讴 禺賵丕賴丿 讴乇丿.
鬲禺乇蹖亘 爻丕夭賳丿賴 乇丕 賳賴 賳賴丕丿蹖 丿爻鬲賵乇 賲蹖鈥屫囏� 賵 賳賴 卮禺氐蹖貙 讴丕乇 鬲禺乇蹖亘 爻丕夭賳丿賴 亘乇 毓賴丿賴 賲讴丕賳蹖夭賲 芦亘丕夭丕乇禄 禺賵丕賴丿 亘賵丿.
丕賳丨氐丕乇蹖 賵 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 亘賵丿賳 賳賴丕丿賴丕 丕孬乇蹖 賲爻鬲賯蹖賲 亘乇 鬲禺乇蹖亘 爻丕夭賳丿賴 禺賵丕賴賳丿 丿丕卮鬲.
丕蹖賳 丿賵 賴賲趩賳蹖賳 賲毓鬲賯丿賳丿 讴賴 丕賮乇丕丿 蹖丕 亘賴 賳賵毓蹖 乇赖亘乇丕賳 賳蹖夭 丿乇 賲爻蹖乇 乇卮丿 賵 爻毓丕丿鬲 蹖丕 賮賯乇 賵 賮賱丕讴鬲 賲賱鬲鈥屬囏� 鬲丕孬蹖乇 亘賴 爻夭丕蹖蹖 禺賵丕賴賳丿 丿丕卮鬲. 禺賱丕氐賴 丕蹖賳讴賴 丕蹖賳 乇赖亘乇丕賳 賵 爻蹖丕爻鬲诏匕丕乇丕賳 讴卮賵乇賴丕 賴爻鬲賳丿 讴賴 鬲氐賲蹖賲 賲蹖鈥屭屫辟嗀� 賳賴丕丿賴丕 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 亘丕卮丿 賵 賲賱鬲 亘賴 爻毓丕丿鬲 亘乇爻丿 蹖丕 丕蹖賳讴賴 賳賴丕丿賴丕 丕賳丨氐丕乇蹖 亘丕卮賳丿 賵 鬲賳賴丕 賳夭丿蹖讴丕賳 賵 禺賵丿 丕賵 丕夭 丕蹖賳 賯丿乇鬲 賵 孬乇賵鬲 亘乇禺賵乇丿丕乇 亘賵丿賴 賵 賲賱鬲鈥� 禺賵蹖卮 丿乇 賮賯乇 賵 鬲賳诏丿爻鬲蹖 亘賴 爻乇 亘乇賳丿.
禺賱丕氐賴 讴賱丕賲 丌賳讴賴 丕賵睾賱賵 賵 乇丕亘蹖爻賳賵賳 乇丕賴鈥屫� 鬲賵爻毓賴 賵 乇卮丿 讴卮賵乇賴丕 乇丕 賳賴 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 讴賴 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賲蹖鈥屫з嗁嗀�. 亘賴 亘蹖丕賳 丿蹖诏乇 丕诏乇 爻蹖丕爻鬲賲丿丕乇丕賳 丕乇丕丿賴 賵 噩爻丕乇鬲 賵 毓夭賲 讴丕賮蹖 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮賳丿 丌賳 賲賱鬲 丿乇 賲爻蹖乇 乇卮丿 賵 鬲賵爻毓賴 賯乇丕乇 禺賵丕賴丿 诏乇賮鬲 賵 丕诏乇 賳賴貙 丌賳 賲賱鬲 丿乇 賲爻蹖乇 賲毓讴賵爻 鬲賵爻毓賴 賯乇丕乇 禺賵丕賴丿 诏乇賮鬲.
May 2, 2018
賷胤乇丨 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 兀胤乇賵丨丞 乇卅賷爻賷丞 賱賱廿噩丕亘丞 毓賱賶 爻丐丕賱 丕賱賰鬲丕亘:"賱賲丕匕丕 鬲賮卮賱 丕賱兀賲賲責"貙 賵賱賲丕匕丕 鬲毓賷卮 兀賵乇賵亘丕 丕賱丨丿賷孬丞 賵丕賱賵賱丕賷丕鬲 丕賱賲鬲丨丿丞 丕夭丿賴丕乇丕賸 丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷丕賸責 賮賷 丨賷賳 兀賳 賲毓馗賲 亘賱丿丕賳 兀賮乇賷賯賷丕 賵兀賲乇賷賰丕 丕賱噩賳賵亘賷丞 賲孬賱丕賸 鬲毓丕賳賷 賲賳 丕賱賮賯乇 賵丕賱鬲乇丿賷 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷責
丕賱噩賵丕亘: 賱賷爻 匕賱賰 亘爻亘亘 丕賱賲賵賯毓 丕賱噩睾乇丕賮賷貙 賵賱丕 丕賱丿賷賳 賵丕賱孬賯丕賮丞貙 賵廿賳賲丕 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賵爻賷丕爻丕鬲賴丕.
賵賱廿孬亘丕鬲 匕賱賰 賷賳胤賱賯 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賮賷 鬲丨賱賷賱 賲胤賵賱 賵賲賯丕乇賳 賱兀氐賵賱 丕賱鬲丨賵賱丕鬲 賵丕賱鬲亘丕賷賳丕鬲 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 亘丿兀鬲 賮賷 賵賯鬲 賲亘賰乇 亘賷賳 丕賱亘賱丿丕賳 賵丕賱賲賳丕胤賯 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲貙 賵亘乇睾賲 兀賳 "賲毓馗賲 賲丕 賷卮賴丿賴 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱丌賳 賲賳 丨丕賱丞 丕賱賱丕賲爻丕賵丕丞 賯丿 馗賴乇 賲賳匕 兀賵丕禺乇 丕賱賯乇賳 丕賱孬丕賲賳 毓卮乇貙 賵亘丕賱鬲丨丿賷丿 賮賷 兀毓賯丕亘 丕賱孬賵乇丞 丕賱氐賳丕毓賷丞"貙 廿賱丕 兀賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 -賮賷 賮氐賵賱賴 丕賱兀賵賱賶- 毓丕丿 賱賱賮鬲乇丞 丕賱鬲賷 鬲爻亘賯 匕賱賰 賱乇氐丿 丕賱亘丿丕賷丕鬲貙 賲丐賰丿丕賸 兀賳 丕賱鬲胤賵乇 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 賴賵 賳鬲賷噩丞 丕賱鬲賮丕毓賱 亘賷賳 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賵丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷丞 賵丕賱兀丨丿丕孬 丕賱賰亘賷乇丞 丕賱鬲賷 鬲毓賲賱 毓賱賶 廿乇亘丕賰 賵夭毓夭毓丞 丕賱鬲賵丕夭賳 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 賵丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 丕賱賯丕卅賲 賮賷 賲噩鬲賲毓 賵丕丨丿 兀賵 賲噩鬲賲毓丕鬲 賰孬賷乇丞. 賲孬賱丕賸 賲乇賾鬲 兀賵乇賵亘丕 丕賱賵爻賷胤丞 亘兀丨丿丕孬 賰亘賷乇丞: [佟]賵亘丕亍 丕賱賲賵鬲 丕賱兀爻賵丿 丕賱匕賷 鬲爻亘亘 賮賷 廿亘丕丿丞 兀賰孬乇 賲賳 50% 賲賳 爻賰丕賳 賲毓馗賲 丕賱賲賳丕胤賯 賮賷 兀賵乇賵亘丕 禺賱丕賱 丕賱賯乇賳 丕賱乇丕亘毓 毓卮乇貙 賵賯丿 兀孬賾乇 丕賱賵亘丕亍 亘卮賰賱 賰亘賷乇 毓賱賶 丕賱賳馗丕賲 丕賱廿賯胤丕毓賷 丕賱賯乇賵爻胤賵賷 亘爻亘亘 賳丿乇丞 丕賱毓賲丕賱丞. [佗] 賮鬲丨 丕賱胤乇賯 丕賱鬲噩丕乇賷丞 毓亘乇 丕賱兀胤賱爻賷. [伲] 丕賱孬賵乇丞 丕賱氐賳丕毓賷丞. 賵賳鬲賷噩丞 賱鬲賮丕毓賱 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱兀賵乇賵亘賷丞 賲毓 賴匕賴 丕賱兀丨丿丕孬 丕賱賰亘乇賶 鬲亘賱賵乇鬲 兀賳賲丕胤 賲毓賷賳丞 賲賳 丕賱賳賲賵 丕賱乇兀爻賲丕賱賷 丕賱賲夭丿賴乇 賮賷 丕賱賯乇賳賷賳 丕賱兀禺賷乇賷賳.
賵噩賵丕亘丕賸 毓賱賶 爻丐丕賱: 賱賲丕匕丕 馗賴乇鬲 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱兀賰孬乇 丿賷賲賵賯乇丕胤賷丞 賵卮賲賵賱賷丞 賮賷 廿賳噩賱鬲乇丕 賵賮乇賳爻丕 丿賵賳 兀賲丕賰賳 兀禺乇賶 賲賳 丕賱毓丕賱賲責 賷乇賶 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 兀賳 匕賱賰 賷毓賵丿 廿賱賶 (鈥�1鈥�) 鬲賵丕賮乇 胤亘賯丞 丕賱鬲噩丕乇 賵乇噩丕賱 丕賱兀毓賲丕賱 丕賱噩丿丿 丕賱乇丕睾亘賷賳 亘廿胤賱丕賯 丕賱賮賵囟賶 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷丞 丕賱禺賱丕賯丞貙 賵(鈥�2鈥�) 丕賱丕卅鬲賱丕賮 丕賱賵丕爻毓 賲賳 丕賱賲噩賲賵毓丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱賲鬲亘丕賷賳丞貙 賵(鈥�3鈥�) 鬲丕乇賷禺 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賮賷 賰賱丕 丕賱亘賱丿賷賳. 爻丕毓丿 賰賱 匕賱賰 胤亘賯丕賸 賱賱鬲胤賵乇丕鬲 丕賱賰孬賷賮丞 毓賱賶 丕賱賳賴賵囟 丕賱賲爻鬲丿丕賲 賵丕賱賲亘賰乇.
賵賷胤乇丨 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 爻丐丕賱丕賸 賲乇賰夭賷丕賸 毓賳 丕賱賳賲賵 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 賮賷 馗賱 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱丕爻鬲亘丿丕丿賷丞 (丕賱氐賷賳 賵丕賱爻毓賵丿賷丞 賲孬賱丕賸) 賵賷乇賶 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 兀賳 賴匕丕 丕賱賳賲賵 賵賯鬲賷 賵賲丐賯鬲 賵賱賳 賷賰賵賳 賲爻鬲丿丕賲丕賸 賱爻亘亘賷賳: (鈥�1鈥�)丕賱賳賲賵 賷鬲胤賱亘 丕賱丕亘鬲賰丕乇貙 賵丕賱丕亘鬲賰丕乇 賱丕 賷賳賮氐賱 毓賳 丕賱賮賵囟賶 兀賵 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 兀賵 丕賱夭毓夭毓丞 丕賱毓賲賷賯丞 賱賱賵囟毓 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 賵丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷 丕賱賯丕卅賲貙 賵丕賱賳禺亘 丕賱賯賲毓賷丞 爻鬲賯丕賵賲 匕賱賰(鈥�2鈥�)丕賱賳禺亘 丕賱丕爻鬲亘丿丕丿賷丞 鬲丨氐賱 毓賱賶 賮乇氐 賰亘賷乇丞 賱賱賳賴亘 賵賲乇丕賰賲丞 丕賱孬乇賵丞 賵丕賱爻賱胤丞 賲賲丕 賷噩毓賱 爻賱胤鬲賴賲 賲胤賲毓 賱賱賰孬賷乇賷賳貙 賵賷賮鬲丨 丕賱賲噩丕賱 賱賱氐乇丕毓 賵丕賱鬲賯丕鬲賱 毓賱賶 丕賱賲丿賶 丕賱賲鬲賵爻胤 賵丕賱亘毓賷丿.
賷卮乇丨 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 亘廿爻賴丕亘 胤賵賷賱 毓亘乇 鈥�6鈥�00氐 兀爻亘丕亘 丕賱廿禺賮丕賯丕鬲 賵丕賱賳噩丕丨丕鬲 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷丞 賮賷 廿賷胤丕賱賷丕 賵兀爻亘丕賳賷丕 賵丕賱賰賵乇賷鬲賷賳 賵丕賱賰賵賳睾賵 賵丕賱亘賷乇賵 賵丕賱兀乇噩賳鬲賷賳 賵丕賱亘乇丕夭賷賱...丕賱禺 賲爻鬲賳丿丕賸 毓賱賶 丕賱鬲丨賱賷賱 丕賱賲乇賰夭賷 賱鬲丕乇賷禺 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賮賷 賴匕賴 丕賱亘丿丕賳 丕賱賲鬲賳賵毓丞貙 賵爻賷丕爻丕鬲 賳禺亘賴丕 丕賱丨丕賰賲丞.
丕賱噩賵丕亘: 賱賷爻 匕賱賰 亘爻亘亘 丕賱賲賵賯毓 丕賱噩睾乇丕賮賷貙 賵賱丕 丕賱丿賷賳 賵丕賱孬賯丕賮丞貙 賵廿賳賲丕 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賵爻賷丕爻丕鬲賴丕.
賵賱廿孬亘丕鬲 匕賱賰 賷賳胤賱賯 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賮賷 鬲丨賱賷賱 賲胤賵賱 賵賲賯丕乇賳 賱兀氐賵賱 丕賱鬲丨賵賱丕鬲 賵丕賱鬲亘丕賷賳丕鬲 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 亘丿兀鬲 賮賷 賵賯鬲 賲亘賰乇 亘賷賳 丕賱亘賱丿丕賳 賵丕賱賲賳丕胤賯 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲貙 賵亘乇睾賲 兀賳 "賲毓馗賲 賲丕 賷卮賴丿賴 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱丌賳 賲賳 丨丕賱丞 丕賱賱丕賲爻丕賵丕丞 賯丿 馗賴乇 賲賳匕 兀賵丕禺乇 丕賱賯乇賳 丕賱孬丕賲賳 毓卮乇貙 賵亘丕賱鬲丨丿賷丿 賮賷 兀毓賯丕亘 丕賱孬賵乇丞 丕賱氐賳丕毓賷丞"貙 廿賱丕 兀賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 -賮賷 賮氐賵賱賴 丕賱兀賵賱賶- 毓丕丿 賱賱賮鬲乇丞 丕賱鬲賷 鬲爻亘賯 匕賱賰 賱乇氐丿 丕賱亘丿丕賷丕鬲貙 賲丐賰丿丕賸 兀賳 丕賱鬲胤賵乇 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 賴賵 賳鬲賷噩丞 丕賱鬲賮丕毓賱 亘賷賳 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賵丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷丞 賵丕賱兀丨丿丕孬 丕賱賰亘賷乇丞 丕賱鬲賷 鬲毓賲賱 毓賱賶 廿乇亘丕賰 賵夭毓夭毓丞 丕賱鬲賵丕夭賳 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 賵丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 丕賱賯丕卅賲 賮賷 賲噩鬲賲毓 賵丕丨丿 兀賵 賲噩鬲賲毓丕鬲 賰孬賷乇丞. 賲孬賱丕賸 賲乇賾鬲 兀賵乇賵亘丕 丕賱賵爻賷胤丞 亘兀丨丿丕孬 賰亘賷乇丞: [佟]賵亘丕亍 丕賱賲賵鬲 丕賱兀爻賵丿 丕賱匕賷 鬲爻亘亘 賮賷 廿亘丕丿丞 兀賰孬乇 賲賳 50% 賲賳 爻賰丕賳 賲毓馗賲 丕賱賲賳丕胤賯 賮賷 兀賵乇賵亘丕 禺賱丕賱 丕賱賯乇賳 丕賱乇丕亘毓 毓卮乇貙 賵賯丿 兀孬賾乇 丕賱賵亘丕亍 亘卮賰賱 賰亘賷乇 毓賱賶 丕賱賳馗丕賲 丕賱廿賯胤丕毓賷 丕賱賯乇賵爻胤賵賷 亘爻亘亘 賳丿乇丞 丕賱毓賲丕賱丞. [佗] 賮鬲丨 丕賱胤乇賯 丕賱鬲噩丕乇賷丞 毓亘乇 丕賱兀胤賱爻賷. [伲] 丕賱孬賵乇丞 丕賱氐賳丕毓賷丞. 賵賳鬲賷噩丞 賱鬲賮丕毓賱 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱兀賵乇賵亘賷丞 賲毓 賴匕賴 丕賱兀丨丿丕孬 丕賱賰亘乇賶 鬲亘賱賵乇鬲 兀賳賲丕胤 賲毓賷賳丞 賲賳 丕賱賳賲賵 丕賱乇兀爻賲丕賱賷 丕賱賲夭丿賴乇 賮賷 丕賱賯乇賳賷賳 丕賱兀禺賷乇賷賳.
賵噩賵丕亘丕賸 毓賱賶 爻丐丕賱: 賱賲丕匕丕 馗賴乇鬲 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱兀賰孬乇 丿賷賲賵賯乇丕胤賷丞 賵卮賲賵賱賷丞 賮賷 廿賳噩賱鬲乇丕 賵賮乇賳爻丕 丿賵賳 兀賲丕賰賳 兀禺乇賶 賲賳 丕賱毓丕賱賲責 賷乇賶 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 兀賳 匕賱賰 賷毓賵丿 廿賱賶 (鈥�1鈥�) 鬲賵丕賮乇 胤亘賯丞 丕賱鬲噩丕乇 賵乇噩丕賱 丕賱兀毓賲丕賱 丕賱噩丿丿 丕賱乇丕睾亘賷賳 亘廿胤賱丕賯 丕賱賮賵囟賶 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷丞 丕賱禺賱丕賯丞貙 賵(鈥�2鈥�) 丕賱丕卅鬲賱丕賮 丕賱賵丕爻毓 賲賳 丕賱賲噩賲賵毓丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱賲鬲亘丕賷賳丞貙 賵(鈥�3鈥�) 鬲丕乇賷禺 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賮賷 賰賱丕 丕賱亘賱丿賷賳. 爻丕毓丿 賰賱 匕賱賰 胤亘賯丕賸 賱賱鬲胤賵乇丕鬲 丕賱賰孬賷賮丞 毓賱賶 丕賱賳賴賵囟 丕賱賲爻鬲丿丕賲 賵丕賱賲亘賰乇.
賵賷胤乇丨 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 爻丐丕賱丕賸 賲乇賰夭賷丕賸 毓賳 丕賱賳賲賵 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 賮賷 馗賱 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱丕爻鬲亘丿丕丿賷丞 (丕賱氐賷賳 賵丕賱爻毓賵丿賷丞 賲孬賱丕賸) 賵賷乇賶 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 兀賳 賴匕丕 丕賱賳賲賵 賵賯鬲賷 賵賲丐賯鬲 賵賱賳 賷賰賵賳 賲爻鬲丿丕賲丕賸 賱爻亘亘賷賳: (鈥�1鈥�)丕賱賳賲賵 賷鬲胤賱亘 丕賱丕亘鬲賰丕乇貙 賵丕賱丕亘鬲賰丕乇 賱丕 賷賳賮氐賱 毓賳 丕賱賮賵囟賶 兀賵 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 兀賵 丕賱夭毓夭毓丞 丕賱毓賲賷賯丞 賱賱賵囟毓 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 賵丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷 丕賱賯丕卅賲貙 賵丕賱賳禺亘 丕賱賯賲毓賷丞 爻鬲賯丕賵賲 匕賱賰(鈥�2鈥�)丕賱賳禺亘 丕賱丕爻鬲亘丿丕丿賷丞 鬲丨氐賱 毓賱賶 賮乇氐 賰亘賷乇丞 賱賱賳賴亘 賵賲乇丕賰賲丞 丕賱孬乇賵丞 賵丕賱爻賱胤丞 賲賲丕 賷噩毓賱 爻賱胤鬲賴賲 賲胤賲毓 賱賱賰孬賷乇賷賳貙 賵賷賮鬲丨 丕賱賲噩丕賱 賱賱氐乇丕毓 賵丕賱鬲賯丕鬲賱 毓賱賶 丕賱賲丿賶 丕賱賲鬲賵爻胤 賵丕賱亘毓賷丿.
賷卮乇丨 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 亘廿爻賴丕亘 胤賵賷賱 毓亘乇 鈥�6鈥�00氐 兀爻亘丕亘 丕賱廿禺賮丕賯丕鬲 賵丕賱賳噩丕丨丕鬲 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷丞 賮賷 廿賷胤丕賱賷丕 賵兀爻亘丕賳賷丕 賵丕賱賰賵乇賷鬲賷賳 賵丕賱賰賵賳睾賵 賵丕賱亘賷乇賵 賵丕賱兀乇噩賳鬲賷賳 賵丕賱亘乇丕夭賷賱...丕賱禺 賲爻鬲賳丿丕賸 毓賱賶 丕賱鬲丨賱賷賱 丕賱賲乇賰夭賷 賱鬲丕乇賷禺 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賮賷 賴匕賴 丕賱亘丿丕賳 丕賱賲鬲賳賵毓丞貙 賵爻賷丕爻丕鬲 賳禺亘賴丕 丕賱丨丕賰賲丞.
April 17, 2016
賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 丿賵 丕賯鬲氐丕丿丿丕賳 丕賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 (丿丕乇賵賳 毓噩賲鈥屫з堌嘿勝� 丕爻鬲丕丿 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴 丕賲鈥屫③屸€屫� 賵 噩蹖賲夭 乇丕亘蹖賳爻賵賳 丕爻鬲丕丿 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴 賴丕乇賵丕乇丿) 賴爻鬲賳丿 讴賴 亘丕 丕乇丕卅賴鈥� 蹖讴 賳馗乇蹖賴鈥屰� 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖-爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 賴賲乇丕賴 亘丕 賲孬丕賱鈥庂囏й� 鬲丕乇蹖禺蹖 賮乇丕賵丕賳 毓賱鬲 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 賵 毓賯亘 賲丕賳丿诏蹖 讴卮賵乇賴丕 乇丕 亘蹖丕賳 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁嗀�. 亘禺卮蹖 丕夭 賳馗乇蹖賴鈥屰� 丌賳賴丕 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲: 芦賴賲 丕賮夭丕蹖蹖 卮丿蹖丿蹖 賲蹖丕賳 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 賵 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿. 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 賯丿乇鬲 乇丕 丿乇 丿爻鬲 诏乇賵賴 讴賵趩讴蹖 丕夭 賮乇丕丿爻鬲丕锟斤拷 賲鬲賲乇讴夭 賲蹖鈥屫池ж操嗀� 賵 賲丨丿賵丿蹖鬲鈥屬囏й� 丕賳丿讴蹖 亘乇 丕蹖賳 賯丿乇鬲 丕毓賲丕賱 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁嗀�. 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 睾丕賱亘丕 鬲賵爻胤 丕蹖賳 賴蹖卅鬲 丨丕讴賲賴貙 亘乇丕蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇 賲賳丕亘毓 丕夭 亘賯蹖賴鈥屰� 噩丕賲毓賴 卮讴賱 丿丕丿賴 賲蹖鈥屫促堌�. 亘賳丕亘乇丕蹖賳 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 胤亘毓丕 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 乇丕 亘賴 賴賲乇丕賴 丿丕乇賳丿. 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 丕蹖賳 诏乇賵賴 丿賵賲 丕夭 賳賴丕丿賴丕 亘乇丕蹖 亘賯丕蹖 禺賵丿 匕丕鬲丕 賵丕亘爻鬲賴 亘賴 诏乇賵賴 丕賵賱 賴爻鬲賳丿. 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 讴賴 賯丿乇鬲 乇丕 亘賴 卮讴賱 賮乇丕诏蹖乇蹖 鬲賵夭蹖毓 讴乇丿賴鈥屫з嗀� 賲蹖賱 亘賴 乇蹖卮賴 讴賳 讴乇丿賳 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖鈥屫й� 丿丕乇賳丿 讴賴 亘乇丕蹖 亘賴乇賴鈥屬呝嗀� 诏乇賵賴蹖 丕賳丿讴貙 丿爻鬲 亘賴 鬲氐丕丨亘 賲賳丕亘毓 丕讴孬乇蹖鬲 賲蹖鈥屫操嗁嗀� 賲賵丕賳毓 賵乇賵丿 亘賴 亘丕夭丕乇 亘乇倬丕 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁嗀� 賵 噩賱賵蹖 讴丕乇讴乇丿賴丕蹖 亘丕夭丕乇 乇丕 賲蹖鈥屭屫辟嗀�. (氐 121)禄
December 12, 2016
A fascinating (albeit difficult to grasp) study on why some nations succeed whilst others fail. The amount of information in this book is astounding, seeing as it is the result of 15 years of research on the topic. This is definitely a book I will re-read, because with a first read you just get the basic argument, but with the second one you get all the subtleties.
I recommend this to anyone with an interest in why our world is the way it is.
I recommend this to anyone with an interest in why our world is the way it is.
October 23, 2019
賮賵賯 丕賱毓丕丿賴 讴鬲丕亘 噩丕賱亘 賵 丌賲賵夭賳丿賴 丕蹖 亘賵丿 賲禺氐賵氐丕 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丕賳賳丿诏丕賳 倬丕乇爻蹖 夭亘丕賳.
丕賲讴丕賳 賳丿丕乇賴 鬲丕 亘賴 丨丕賱 亘賴 丕蹖賳 爻賵丕賱 賮讴乇 賳讴乇丿賴 亘丕卮蹖賲 讴賴 趩賴 卮丿 讴賴 睾乇亘 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴乇丿 賵 鬲賲丿賳 卮乇賯 讴賴 亘乇丕蹖 賯乇賳 賴丕 倬蹖卮乇賵 亘賵丿 鬲丕 丕蹖賳 丨丿 毓賯亘 丕賮鬲丕丿責
賲孬丕賱 噩丕賱亘蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖夭賳賴.
賲蹖倬乇爻賴 賴賱賳丿 讴卮賵乇蹖 丕爻鬲 亘丿賵賳 丕乇鬲賮丕毓丕鬲 亘丕 丌亘 賵 賴賵丕蹖 賳賴 趩賳丿丕賳 禺賵亘 賵 爻乇夭賲蹖賳蹖 讴賴 丨鬲蹖 丕夭 爻胤丨 丿乇蹖丕 倬丕蹖蹖賳 鬲乇賴.
丿乇 賲賯丕亘賱 夭丕賲亘蹖丕 讴卮賵乇蹖 丕爻鬲 亘丕 夭賲蹖賳 賴丕蹖 賵爻蹖毓 賯丕亘賱 讴卮丕賵乇夭蹖 賵 丌亘 賵 賴賵丕蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 賲毓鬲丿賱 丿丕乇丕蹖 丕乇鬲賮丕毓丕鬲 夭蹖丕丿 賵 乇賵丿賴丕蹖 倬乇 丌亘 讴賴 賲蹖鬲賵賳賴 亘乇賯 鬲賲丕賲 讴卮賵乇卮 乇賵 丕夭 乇丕賴 爻丿 鬲丕賲蹖賳 讴賳賴
丨丕賱丕 賲蹖诏賴 丕诏賴 蹖賴 賮囟丕蹖蹖 亘蹖丕丿 夭賲蹖賳貙 乇賵 賴賵丕 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賳鬲蹖噩賴 賲蹖乇爻賴 讴賴 氐丿 丿乇氐丿 夭丕賲亘蹖丕 讴卮賵乇 孬乇賵鬲賳賲丿鬲乇蹖賴
丕賲丕 丌蹖丕 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 賴賲 賴賲蹖賳賴責
噩賵丕亘 丕蹖賳 賲丿賱 爻賵丕賱 賴丕 乇賵 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 賯丕亘賱 賯亘賵賱蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖丿賴.
禺賵賳丿賳卮 賲蹖鬲賵賳賴 禺蹖賱蹖 賲賮蹖丿 亘丕卮賴
丕賲讴丕賳 賳丿丕乇賴 鬲丕 亘賴 丨丕賱 亘賴 丕蹖賳 爻賵丕賱 賮讴乇 賳讴乇丿賴 亘丕卮蹖賲 讴賴 趩賴 卮丿 讴賴 睾乇亘 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴乇丿 賵 鬲賲丿賳 卮乇賯 讴賴 亘乇丕蹖 賯乇賳 賴丕 倬蹖卮乇賵 亘賵丿 鬲丕 丕蹖賳 丨丿 毓賯亘 丕賮鬲丕丿責
賲孬丕賱 噩丕賱亘蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖夭賳賴.
賲蹖倬乇爻賴 賴賱賳丿 讴卮賵乇蹖 丕爻鬲 亘丿賵賳 丕乇鬲賮丕毓丕鬲 亘丕 丌亘 賵 賴賵丕蹖 賳賴 趩賳丿丕賳 禺賵亘 賵 爻乇夭賲蹖賳蹖 讴賴 丨鬲蹖 丕夭 爻胤丨 丿乇蹖丕 倬丕蹖蹖賳 鬲乇賴.
丿乇 賲賯丕亘賱 夭丕賲亘蹖丕 讴卮賵乇蹖 丕爻鬲 亘丕 夭賲蹖賳 賴丕蹖 賵爻蹖毓 賯丕亘賱 讴卮丕賵乇夭蹖 賵 丌亘 賵 賴賵丕蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 賲毓鬲丿賱 丿丕乇丕蹖 丕乇鬲賮丕毓丕鬲 夭蹖丕丿 賵 乇賵丿賴丕蹖 倬乇 丌亘 讴賴 賲蹖鬲賵賳賴 亘乇賯 鬲賲丕賲 讴卮賵乇卮 乇賵 丕夭 乇丕賴 爻丿 鬲丕賲蹖賳 讴賳賴
丨丕賱丕 賲蹖诏賴 丕诏賴 蹖賴 賮囟丕蹖蹖 亘蹖丕丿 夭賲蹖賳貙 乇賵 賴賵丕 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賳鬲蹖噩賴 賲蹖乇爻賴 讴賴 氐丿 丿乇氐丿 夭丕賲亘蹖丕 讴卮賵乇 孬乇賵鬲賳賲丿鬲乇蹖賴
丕賲丕 丌蹖丕 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 賴賲 賴賲蹖賳賴責
噩賵丕亘 丕蹖賳 賲丿賱 爻賵丕賱 賴丕 乇賵 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 賯丕亘賱 賯亘賵賱蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖丿賴.
禺賵賳丿賳卮 賲蹖鬲賵賳賴 禺蹖賱蹖 賲賮蹖丿 亘丕卮賴
October 13, 2015
I read this as part of the Mark Zuckerberg book club :) Why are some nations rich and some poor? Is it geographical? Cultural? This book argues that, to a first order approximation, it is the economic and political institutions that influence this property, based on whether they are inclusive and pluralistic, or extractive, where a small elite rules over the population. The book goes over many examples of countries/regions throughout history, e.g. Maya, Rome, Venice, France/Spain/Britain/New World, and in modern days the focus is around South America, North vs. South America, Subsaharan Africa, and China. In each case, the authors point to the institutions as the source of the divide. In short, throughout history, small number of rich and powerful people have incentives to keep it that way. They do this by keeping the population misinformed (e.g. media control), conservative ("keep everything as is"), and by explicitly avoiding creative destruction that is core to sustained progress, but which threatens the status quo and political stability. In these countries there are no incentives for anyone to innovate, since anything you come up with will be extracted anyway, and in some cases might even get you in trouble (e.g. Dai Guofang example in China, along many others). In addition to all the stagnation and corruption, this also leads to more wars, and provides more incentives for unrest and military coups since there is more power to be gained in an authoritarian regime. The only escape are the development of pluralistic institutions with the formation of a broad coalition during critical junctures, which Britain was lucky to experience just before the Industrial Revolution. And yay Democracy and Capitalism. I also found interesting the doubt the book casts on foreign aid near the end, at least in presence of extractive institutions.
I think I learned quite a bit while reading this book, but I wish the book was slightly less repetitive, that it flowed better, and that the authors were more specific and comprehensive on exactly how extractive institutions work since this is at the core of their argument. The discussion could have been more grounded when normally I felt it was slightly too high level, and could have used more stories. I say that not because I want fluffy stories, but because I think we remember them more easily - it makes for a better, less dry, and more memorable exposition. Lastly, I couldn't get rid of the feeling throughout the book that past events were highlighted in retrospect to neatly fit the core thesis, and the authors did not seem genuine enough to discuss other possibilities, or common theories that do not agree with theirs. Instead, they quickly and forcefully reject them. Hence, the book comes across as a possibly cherry-picked, one-sided argument that insists on being right without acknowledging its own faults or weak points.
All that being said, recommended read overall!
I think I learned quite a bit while reading this book, but I wish the book was slightly less repetitive, that it flowed better, and that the authors were more specific and comprehensive on exactly how extractive institutions work since this is at the core of their argument. The discussion could have been more grounded when normally I felt it was slightly too high level, and could have used more stories. I say that not because I want fluffy stories, but because I think we remember them more easily - it makes for a better, less dry, and more memorable exposition. Lastly, I couldn't get rid of the feeling throughout the book that past events were highlighted in retrospect to neatly fit the core thesis, and the authors did not seem genuine enough to discuss other possibilities, or common theories that do not agree with theirs. Instead, they quickly and forcefully reject them. Hence, the book comes across as a possibly cherry-picked, one-sided argument that insists on being right without acknowledging its own faults or weak points.
All that being said, recommended read overall!
October 10, 2023
趩乇丕 丨鬲蹖 丕诏乇 賮賱爻胤蹖賳 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 乇丕 賴賲 亘丕 禺丕讴 蹖讴爻丕賳 讴賳丿貙 亘丕夭 賲賱鬲蹖 卮讴爻鬲 禺賵乇丿賴 禺賵丕賴丿 賲丕賳丿責 夭蹖乇丕 丿乇 蹖讴 趩乇禺賴 卮賵賲 诏乇賮鬲丕乇 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 乇丕賴 乇賴丕蹖蹖 丕夭 丌賳 丌爻丕賳 賳蹖爻鬲. 賴賲丕賳胤賵乇 讴賴 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 讴卮賵乇賴丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇 禺丕賵乇賲蹖丕賳賴 诏乇賮鬲丕乇 卮丿賴鈥屫з嗀�.
賵 趩乇丕 跇丕倬賳 賵 丌賱賲丕賳 丕夭 夭蹖乇 丌賵丕乇 噩賳诏 噩賴丕賳蹖 賴賲 爻乇亘賱賳丿 亘蹖乇賵賳 賲蹖鈥屫③屬嗀�
倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴卮賵乇賴丕貙 賳賴 亘賴 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕貙 賳賴 亘賴 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 賳賴 亘賴 賳跇丕丿 亘爻鬲诏蹖 丿丕乇丿! 亘賱讴賴 賵噩賵丿 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 賵 讴孬乇鬲鈥屭必� (賱蹖亘乇丕賱蹖爻賲 賵 丿賲賵讴乇丕爻蹖) 賴爻鬲賳丿 讴賴 亘丕 丨丕讴賲蹖鬲 賯丕賳賵賳 (賵 賳賴 丨讴賵賲鬲 亘丕 賯丕賳賵賳)貙 丕賳诏蹖夭賴鈥屬囏й� 鬲丨氐蹖賱蹖貙 賳賵丌賵乇蹖 賵 爻乇賲丕蹖賴鈥屭柏ж臂� 乇丕 亘乇丕蹖 噩賵丕賳丕賳 亘賵噩賵丿 賲蹖鈥屫①堌辟嗀� 讴賴 亘丕毓孬 賲蹖鈥屫促堌� 讴卮賵乇 丿乇 蹖讴 趩乇禺賴 鬲讴丕賲賱蹖 亘賴 爻賲鬲 賯賱賴鈥屬囏� 诏丕賲 亘乇丿丕乇丿.
丿乇 賲賯丕亘賱貙 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 亘賴 賳賮毓 毓丿賴鈥屫й� 丕賳丿讴貙 丕夭 賲乇丿賲 爻賵亍丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁嗀� 賵 賮乇氐鬲鈥屬囏й� 亘丕賱賯賵賴 蹖讴 賲賱鬲 乇丕 亘賴 賳丕亘賵丿蹖 賲蹖鈥屭┴簇з嗁嗀� 賵 丿爻鬲 亘賴 賴乇讴丕乇蹖 賲蹖鈥屫操嗁嗀� 鬲丕 亘鬲賵丕賳賳丿 丕夭 賯丿乇鬲 禺賵丿 賲丨丕賮馗鬲 讴賳賳丿. 丕讴孬乇 丕賳賯賱丕亘鈥屬囏й屰� 讴賴 丿乇 趩賳蹖賳 爻蹖爻鬲賲鈥屬囏й屰� 丕鬲賮丕賯 賲蹖鈥屫з佖嗀� 賲賳噩乇 亘賴 賳噩丕鬲 丌賳 賲乇丿賲 賳禺賵丕賴賳丿 卮丿. 乇丕賴 乇賴丕蹖蹖 丕夭 丕蹖賳 趩乇禺賴 卮賵賲貙 讴丕乇 噩賲毓蹖 賴賲丕賴賳诏貙 賵噩賵丿 丕卅鬲賱丕賮鈥屬囏й� 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 賵 讴賲蹖 亘禺鬲 賵 丕賯亘丕賱 丿乇 賲賵丕賯毓 丨爻丕爻 鬲丕乇蹖禺蹖 丕爻鬲.
賲賴乇 鄄鄣鄹鄄
賵 趩乇丕 跇丕倬賳 賵 丌賱賲丕賳 丕夭 夭蹖乇 丌賵丕乇 噩賳诏 噩賴丕賳蹖 賴賲 爻乇亘賱賳丿 亘蹖乇賵賳 賲蹖鈥屫③屬嗀�
倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 讴卮賵乇賴丕貙 賳賴 亘賴 噩睾乇丕賮蹖丕貙 賳賴 亘賴 賮乇賴賳诏 賵 賳賴 亘賴 賳跇丕丿 亘爻鬲诏蹖 丿丕乇丿! 亘賱讴賴 賵噩賵丿 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 賵 讴孬乇鬲鈥屭必� (賱蹖亘乇丕賱蹖爻賲 賵 丿賲賵讴乇丕爻蹖) 賴爻鬲賳丿 讴賴 亘丕 丨丕讴賲蹖鬲 賯丕賳賵賳 (賵 賳賴 丨讴賵賲鬲 亘丕 賯丕賳賵賳)貙 丕賳诏蹖夭賴鈥屬囏й� 鬲丨氐蹖賱蹖貙 賳賵丌賵乇蹖 賵 爻乇賲丕蹖賴鈥屭柏ж臂� 乇丕 亘乇丕蹖 噩賵丕賳丕賳 亘賵噩賵丿 賲蹖鈥屫①堌辟嗀� 讴賴 亘丕毓孬 賲蹖鈥屫促堌� 讴卮賵乇 丿乇 蹖讴 趩乇禺賴 鬲讴丕賲賱蹖 亘賴 爻賲鬲 賯賱賴鈥屬囏� 诏丕賲 亘乇丿丕乇丿.
丿乇 賲賯丕亘賱貙 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 賵 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 亘賴 賳賮毓 毓丿賴鈥屫й� 丕賳丿讴貙 丕夭 賲乇丿賲 爻賵亍丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁嗀� 賵 賮乇氐鬲鈥屬囏й� 亘丕賱賯賵賴 蹖讴 賲賱鬲 乇丕 亘賴 賳丕亘賵丿蹖 賲蹖鈥屭┴簇з嗁嗀� 賵 丿爻鬲 亘賴 賴乇讴丕乇蹖 賲蹖鈥屫操嗁嗀� 鬲丕 亘鬲賵丕賳賳丿 丕夭 賯丿乇鬲 禺賵丿 賲丨丕賮馗鬲 讴賳賳丿. 丕讴孬乇 丕賳賯賱丕亘鈥屬囏й屰� 讴賴 丿乇 趩賳蹖賳 爻蹖爻鬲賲鈥屬囏й屰� 丕鬲賮丕賯 賲蹖鈥屫з佖嗀� 賲賳噩乇 亘賴 賳噩丕鬲 丌賳 賲乇丿賲 賳禺賵丕賴賳丿 卮丿. 乇丕賴 乇賴丕蹖蹖 丕夭 丕蹖賳 趩乇禺賴 卮賵賲貙 讴丕乇 噩賲毓蹖 賴賲丕賴賳诏貙 賵噩賵丿 丕卅鬲賱丕賮鈥屬囏й� 賮乇丕诏蹖乇 賵 讴賲蹖 亘禺鬲 賵 丕賯亘丕賱 丿乇 賲賵丕賯毓 丨爻丕爻 鬲丕乇蹖禺蹖 丕爻鬲.
賲賴乇 鄄鄣鄹鄄
April 30, 2021
賲賱鬲鈥屬囏� 夭賲丕賳蹖 卮讴爻鬲 賲蹖鈥屫堌辟嗀� 讴賴 丿丕乇丕蹖 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 丕賯鬲氐丕丿蹖 丕爻鬲毓賲丕乇蹖 倬卮鬲蹖亘丕賳蹖鈥屫簇� 丕夭 爻賵蹖 賳賴丕丿賴丕蹖 爻蹖丕爻蹖 丕爻鬲孬賲丕乇蹖 賴爻鬲賳丿.
讴鬲丕亘 賮賵賯 丕賱毓丕丿賴 丕蹖 賴爻鬲. 倬蹖卮賳賴丕丿 亘賴 賴賲賴 丿賵爻鬲丕賳
讴鬲丕亘 賮賵賯 丕賱毓丕丿賴 丕蹖 賴爻鬲. 倬蹖卮賳賴丕丿 亘賴 賴賲賴 丿賵爻鬲丕賳
May 6, 2020
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson's
Why Nations Fail
examines the impact our human-created institutions have on our economies and creation of a "good life" for the many. They do this with a lot of detail. Many of their observations both apparent and useful. Despite this, the book has a number of flaws that seem, to this reviewer at least, critical.
Let's start with the good: the author's central thesis seems sound. Governments and the institutions they create do matter. For instance, consider North and South Korea. Both have similar histories (until 1950, that is). Face the same environmental conditions, and arise from the same core Korean culture. And yet the countries are quite the opposite.
In the north, a military regime strips wealth from the regular people and places it in the hands of a few. The state does not incentivize people for trying new things. Instead, the state is organized militarily, the state's sole aim in perpetuating the lives of its ruling class -- specifically the bloodline of the "emperor" Kim Jong-un.
The authors call this an Extractive State. These leaders create institutions that extract wealth and focus it in the hands of the few.
In South Korea, things are different. Less militarily oriented, their government has created institutions that help economic development thrive: a sound currency, a legal system to enforce contracts, and a tax and property structure that rewards individual initiative.
The authors call states like this Inclusive States. They create an ever-increasing standard of living for all and not just the oligarchs.
The results produced by the two Koreas are, of course, 180 degrees apart. South Korea is a thriving, First-World industrial economy. The North impoverished, stifled by the military's inept command-and-control oligarchic dictatorship.
So far, so good. It is a great premise that is beyond reproach. Though often a bit of a pain, there is no doubt that a strong central authority is needed to keep a state intact. And after reading Steven Pinker's The Better Angels of our Nature , I am pretty well convinced that humans in strong states -- even a bad one -- are better off than those in a weak state. Pinker shows, using a remarkably diverse selection of historical data, that fewer people die of war or murder in a centralized state. And that, while we need to watch our leaders lest they lead us astray, Rousseau's "Noble Savage" is a literary construct that does not hold up to closer inspection. And Acemoglu and Robinson's main argument bears this out.
The authors take a step forward and do an excellent job delineating that some of those centralized states are better than others. And they wonder why -- which is again the proper move. My problem with their answer is that it tends to over-emphasize Free-Market dogmatism are the "real reason" these countries thrive. And this is often not the case.
Let us consider the USA. To begin with, the United States was initially a slave nation, with the southern half of the nation shipping raw cotton to British ports -- making the US an extactive state by the author's definitions.
And yet we have risen above this. How?
Acemoglu and Robinson's answer would likely be "by creating institutions that encouraged Creative Destruction of the inefficient industries and encouraging Free Market Capitalism."
This is, of course, a fairy tale told to children by Free Market cheerleaders. The US did not rise to dominance by applying Free Market principles. Instead, through the 19th and into the 20th Century, the US had very high tariffs to protect its fledgling industries.
Acemoglu and Robinson ignore this. Or perhaps their belief in their core argument blinded them to the fact. Whatever the reason, the miss looms, huge.
The authors also gloss over other exceptions to Free Market dogmatism. For instance, South Korea has a very Confucian-style command economy. It created its contemporary industries -- steel, auto, etc. -- by imposing huge tariffs and supplying capital infusions to firms in key industries. Once they were established. the government kicked out the financial supports and lowered the tariffs -- albeit gradually. But the point is that it was not a Free Market that South Korea pursued. It was very Command-and-Control. And yet South Korea succeeded.
Japan is another example of a tightly integrated public/ private economy. A very tight group of elites created and maintain an excellent, stable society that benefits everyone, and not just the privileged few. This is ignored.
Worse is the lack of respect offered to China. Despite its defeats in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, China has a long history of wealth creation, stability, and high standards of living. They have more experience than the West does in feeding billions utilizing a strongly centralized state. While there is little doubt that Mao's "Great Leap Forward" was a disaster, Chinese history stretches back to the Xia Dynasty in 2070 BC -- or over 4,000 years. To focus on Mao's biggest error seems weak. It ignores the Chinese people's historical ability to create stabilizing bureaucracies to administer their large and complex culture.
Even worse for the authors' thesis: China's administrative apparatus included many state-granted monopolies -- in salt, for instance. And yet, until the 1700s, China was the wealthiest nation on the earth.
Acemoglu and Robinson ignore this. As they do with many facts that contradict their Free Market "solution." And the facts they ignore are not "tiny" factoids, but gaping mounds of readily available historical data. Instead, they present only facts that square with their Anglo-American, Free-Market worldview.
The work has other weaknesses as well. My biggest criticism is the refusal to see that there are some real ecological and geographical constraints on growth. All one needs to do is drive west in the United States to notice this.
Where resource-light 17th-century style shipping was easy -- the Atlantic coast, Great Lakes and Mississippi basin -- development is high. People live in closely grouped clusters. You see this development replicated along the Pacific coast. But consider the emptiness in between -- most of Colorado, Utah, Arizona, the Dakotas, Wyoming, Montana, New Mexico, western Kansas, western Nebraska, and Nevada. large population centers there, like Denver and Phoenix. would be unthinkable without modern transportation. And even then, the sparse development bespeaks an inability of the region -- due to the area's inherent dryness -- to sustain populations. And these cities exist for a single reason: mineral mining.
These ecological tendencies limits grow more pronounced as you move into the tropics, however -- especially aboriginals in isolated jungle areas. For instance, consider a rain forest pygmy living in Central Africa. The rivers are unnavigable rivers, the forest, and undergrowth thick and tough to journey through. They are cut off, thousands of miles from the ocean. This limits the connections a person is subject to. And not only in trade, but it limits the tribe's access to information.
How could you compare this part of Africa to an island like Japan or the coast-rich USA? Again, this is ignored.
Worse is how the authors dismiss well-regarded views that are at odds with their Extractive/ Inclusive, Oligarchy/ Free-Market ideas. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson try to dismiss Jared Diamond's wonderful look at the impact of biology and geography on history, Guns, Germs and Steel , ignoring what the book actually says. Diamond presents a birds-eye view of what factors led to advanced culture arising in the West 10,000 years ago. Diamond is tracing long-long-long-term trends. His is a work of anthropology and ancient history. Acemoglu and Robinson ignore this and write it off as unfounded. How? They point to the US/ Mexico border and North/ South Korea. Ignoring that Diamond is referring to events that occurred before written history.
So while I agree with Acemoglu and Robinson's basic premise -- government and institutions can make a difference -- they try too hard to make this observation fit into the Anglo/ American model.
I wanted so bad to rate this book higher. It addresses an important topic: "How do we make societies that work for everyone?" And I was impressed with the level of detail they employed. But the problem I have is their conclusions.
Sure, institutions matter. But I doubt that Free Market Capitalism is the only way to get there. Witness the tight public/private integration in Japan. Or Germany, where all stakeholders -- shareholders, workers, local governments, environmental groups, etc., are given a seat at the table. And there is the example of a resurgent China. Will it continue prospering? Who knows? I suspect they will, at least based on their storied history.
Because of these weaknesses, I cannot give the book over three-stars. The book's topic is meaningful. And this is a necessary first salvo in addressing these questions seriously.
I recommend it to all policy wonks and social science fans.
Let's start with the good: the author's central thesis seems sound. Governments and the institutions they create do matter. For instance, consider North and South Korea. Both have similar histories (until 1950, that is). Face the same environmental conditions, and arise from the same core Korean culture. And yet the countries are quite the opposite.
In the north, a military regime strips wealth from the regular people and places it in the hands of a few. The state does not incentivize people for trying new things. Instead, the state is organized militarily, the state's sole aim in perpetuating the lives of its ruling class -- specifically the bloodline of the "emperor" Kim Jong-un.
The authors call this an Extractive State. These leaders create institutions that extract wealth and focus it in the hands of the few.
In South Korea, things are different. Less militarily oriented, their government has created institutions that help economic development thrive: a sound currency, a legal system to enforce contracts, and a tax and property structure that rewards individual initiative.
The authors call states like this Inclusive States. They create an ever-increasing standard of living for all and not just the oligarchs.
The results produced by the two Koreas are, of course, 180 degrees apart. South Korea is a thriving, First-World industrial economy. The North impoverished, stifled by the military's inept command-and-control oligarchic dictatorship.
So far, so good. It is a great premise that is beyond reproach. Though often a bit of a pain, there is no doubt that a strong central authority is needed to keep a state intact. And after reading Steven Pinker's The Better Angels of our Nature , I am pretty well convinced that humans in strong states -- even a bad one -- are better off than those in a weak state. Pinker shows, using a remarkably diverse selection of historical data, that fewer people die of war or murder in a centralized state. And that, while we need to watch our leaders lest they lead us astray, Rousseau's "Noble Savage" is a literary construct that does not hold up to closer inspection. And Acemoglu and Robinson's main argument bears this out.
The authors take a step forward and do an excellent job delineating that some of those centralized states are better than others. And they wonder why -- which is again the proper move. My problem with their answer is that it tends to over-emphasize Free-Market dogmatism are the "real reason" these countries thrive. And this is often not the case.
Let us consider the USA. To begin with, the United States was initially a slave nation, with the southern half of the nation shipping raw cotton to British ports -- making the US an extactive state by the author's definitions.
And yet we have risen above this. How?
Acemoglu and Robinson's answer would likely be "by creating institutions that encouraged Creative Destruction of the inefficient industries and encouraging Free Market Capitalism."
This is, of course, a fairy tale told to children by Free Market cheerleaders. The US did not rise to dominance by applying Free Market principles. Instead, through the 19th and into the 20th Century, the US had very high tariffs to protect its fledgling industries.
Acemoglu and Robinson ignore this. Or perhaps their belief in their core argument blinded them to the fact. Whatever the reason, the miss looms, huge.
The authors also gloss over other exceptions to Free Market dogmatism. For instance, South Korea has a very Confucian-style command economy. It created its contemporary industries -- steel, auto, etc. -- by imposing huge tariffs and supplying capital infusions to firms in key industries. Once they were established. the government kicked out the financial supports and lowered the tariffs -- albeit gradually. But the point is that it was not a Free Market that South Korea pursued. It was very Command-and-Control. And yet South Korea succeeded.
Japan is another example of a tightly integrated public/ private economy. A very tight group of elites created and maintain an excellent, stable society that benefits everyone, and not just the privileged few. This is ignored.
Worse is the lack of respect offered to China. Despite its defeats in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, China has a long history of wealth creation, stability, and high standards of living. They have more experience than the West does in feeding billions utilizing a strongly centralized state. While there is little doubt that Mao's "Great Leap Forward" was a disaster, Chinese history stretches back to the Xia Dynasty in 2070 BC -- or over 4,000 years. To focus on Mao's biggest error seems weak. It ignores the Chinese people's historical ability to create stabilizing bureaucracies to administer their large and complex culture.
Even worse for the authors' thesis: China's administrative apparatus included many state-granted monopolies -- in salt, for instance. And yet, until the 1700s, China was the wealthiest nation on the earth.
Acemoglu and Robinson ignore this. As they do with many facts that contradict their Free Market "solution." And the facts they ignore are not "tiny" factoids, but gaping mounds of readily available historical data. Instead, they present only facts that square with their Anglo-American, Free-Market worldview.
The work has other weaknesses as well. My biggest criticism is the refusal to see that there are some real ecological and geographical constraints on growth. All one needs to do is drive west in the United States to notice this.
Where resource-light 17th-century style shipping was easy -- the Atlantic coast, Great Lakes and Mississippi basin -- development is high. People live in closely grouped clusters. You see this development replicated along the Pacific coast. But consider the emptiness in between -- most of Colorado, Utah, Arizona, the Dakotas, Wyoming, Montana, New Mexico, western Kansas, western Nebraska, and Nevada. large population centers there, like Denver and Phoenix. would be unthinkable without modern transportation. And even then, the sparse development bespeaks an inability of the region -- due to the area's inherent dryness -- to sustain populations. And these cities exist for a single reason: mineral mining.
These ecological tendencies limits grow more pronounced as you move into the tropics, however -- especially aboriginals in isolated jungle areas. For instance, consider a rain forest pygmy living in Central Africa. The rivers are unnavigable rivers, the forest, and undergrowth thick and tough to journey through. They are cut off, thousands of miles from the ocean. This limits the connections a person is subject to. And not only in trade, but it limits the tribe's access to information.
How could you compare this part of Africa to an island like Japan or the coast-rich USA? Again, this is ignored.
Worse is how the authors dismiss well-regarded views that are at odds with their Extractive/ Inclusive, Oligarchy/ Free-Market ideas. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson try to dismiss Jared Diamond's wonderful look at the impact of biology and geography on history, Guns, Germs and Steel , ignoring what the book actually says. Diamond presents a birds-eye view of what factors led to advanced culture arising in the West 10,000 years ago. Diamond is tracing long-long-long-term trends. His is a work of anthropology and ancient history. Acemoglu and Robinson ignore this and write it off as unfounded. How? They point to the US/ Mexico border and North/ South Korea. Ignoring that Diamond is referring to events that occurred before written history.
So while I agree with Acemoglu and Robinson's basic premise -- government and institutions can make a difference -- they try too hard to make this observation fit into the Anglo/ American model.
I wanted so bad to rate this book higher. It addresses an important topic: "How do we make societies that work for everyone?" And I was impressed with the level of detail they employed. But the problem I have is their conclusions.
Sure, institutions matter. But I doubt that Free Market Capitalism is the only way to get there. Witness the tight public/private integration in Japan. Or Germany, where all stakeholders -- shareholders, workers, local governments, environmental groups, etc., are given a seat at the table. And there is the example of a resurgent China. Will it continue prospering? Who knows? I suspect they will, at least based on their storied history.
Because of these weaknesses, I cannot give the book over three-stars. The book's topic is meaningful. And this is a necessary first salvo in addressing these questions seriously.
I recommend it to all policy wonks and social science fans.
November 29, 2017
Aid's Labor Lost
When it comes to explaining why some nations are rich and others poor, you can hear a lot of theories, some possible, others crackpot. People love to point their fingers at geography or climate, at culture or religion (especially if it's not THEIR religion), or at pure ignorance. Other, more thoughtful theorists have developed extensive arguments for `modernization' or at least the need to tinker with existing institutions or to tolerate dictatorships which may lead to eventual reforms. The USA and other developed nations have spent untold billions since 1945 in trying to lift the nations of the so-called Third World out of poverty. Aid to countries where corrupt elites siphon it off or where organization is weak is mostly, if not completely, lost.
If you undertake to read WHY NATIONS FAIL you will get a very coherent argument as to why aid is often useless and why some nations fail while others get rich. Why did the Industrial Revolution take off in England first ? Why did Russia stagnate after 1970 ? What was the economic result of desegregation in the US South ? Why has Somalia fallen apart ? To follow the arguments you will have to remember a few (very few) terms that are used by the authors to put across their ideas. Two are "inclusive economic and political institutions" and "extractive economic and political institutions". That is, some political institutions include a large number of groups and a broad spectrum of people and some economic institutions work to raise the welfare of large numbers of people in a particular country. Others are run by a small, elite group in their own interests and only a small number (the same people) benefit. "Creative destruction" means that while technological progress may put some people out of business (think slide rule or carbon paper manufacturers), the new technology benefits an even wider section of the population, thus being `creative'. "Critical juncture" is their most jargonistic term, meaning a moment in history when things change and could go in several, different ways. Armed with these terms, you'll be able to read this most ably-written and interesting book. What I liked most about the book is its incredibly wide number of historical portraits drawn from all parts of the world, from the USA, Mexico, and Guatemala to Russia, China, Ethiopia, Somalia, Botswana and Sierra Leone, not forgetting Australia. This is only a partial listing of examples. The maps are also very useful. What I liked least about the book is that the authors hammer you with the same set of ideas over and over. I felt like shouting, "OK, OK, I get it !" The length could have been cut with that in mind. Whether or not Acemoglu and Robinson are totally correct, I can't say, not being so widely-versed in such theories. In some ways it feels a bit reductive. However, I guarantee that if you finish this book, you'll never look at foreign aid in the same way. You may wind up with a number of questions about US foreign policy too. And that's not bad.
When it comes to explaining why some nations are rich and others poor, you can hear a lot of theories, some possible, others crackpot. People love to point their fingers at geography or climate, at culture or religion (especially if it's not THEIR religion), or at pure ignorance. Other, more thoughtful theorists have developed extensive arguments for `modernization' or at least the need to tinker with existing institutions or to tolerate dictatorships which may lead to eventual reforms. The USA and other developed nations have spent untold billions since 1945 in trying to lift the nations of the so-called Third World out of poverty. Aid to countries where corrupt elites siphon it off or where organization is weak is mostly, if not completely, lost.
If you undertake to read WHY NATIONS FAIL you will get a very coherent argument as to why aid is often useless and why some nations fail while others get rich. Why did the Industrial Revolution take off in England first ? Why did Russia stagnate after 1970 ? What was the economic result of desegregation in the US South ? Why has Somalia fallen apart ? To follow the arguments you will have to remember a few (very few) terms that are used by the authors to put across their ideas. Two are "inclusive economic and political institutions" and "extractive economic and political institutions". That is, some political institutions include a large number of groups and a broad spectrum of people and some economic institutions work to raise the welfare of large numbers of people in a particular country. Others are run by a small, elite group in their own interests and only a small number (the same people) benefit. "Creative destruction" means that while technological progress may put some people out of business (think slide rule or carbon paper manufacturers), the new technology benefits an even wider section of the population, thus being `creative'. "Critical juncture" is their most jargonistic term, meaning a moment in history when things change and could go in several, different ways. Armed with these terms, you'll be able to read this most ably-written and interesting book. What I liked most about the book is its incredibly wide number of historical portraits drawn from all parts of the world, from the USA, Mexico, and Guatemala to Russia, China, Ethiopia, Somalia, Botswana and Sierra Leone, not forgetting Australia. This is only a partial listing of examples. The maps are also very useful. What I liked least about the book is that the authors hammer you with the same set of ideas over and over. I felt like shouting, "OK, OK, I get it !" The length could have been cut with that in mind. Whether or not Acemoglu and Robinson are totally correct, I can't say, not being so widely-versed in such theories. In some ways it feels a bit reductive. However, I guarantee that if you finish this book, you'll never look at foreign aid in the same way. You may wind up with a number of questions about US foreign policy too. And that's not bad.
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