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螆胃谓畏 魏伪喂 蔚胃谓喂魏喂蟽渭蠈蟼
螖蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿蠀蠂伪委慰 蠈蟿喂 畏 苇谓蟿伪蟽畏 蔚魏未畏位蠋谓蔚蟿伪喂, 蟽萎渭蔚蟻伪 蠈蟺蠅蟼 魏伪喂 维位位慰蟿蔚, 蟽蔚 蟺慰位喂蟿喂魏慰蠉蟼 蟽蠂畏渭伪蟿喂蟽渭慰蠉蟼 蟺慰蠀 未蔚谓 魏伪位蠉蟺蟿慰蠀谓 蟿畏谓 蔚胃谓喂魏喂蟽蟿喂魏萎 蔚蟺喂蟿伪纬萎: 芦螆谓伪 魏蟻维蟿慰蟼, 渭委伪 魏慰蠀位蟿慰蠉蟻伪禄.
韦伪 苇胃谓畏, 蠅蟼 蠁蠀蟽喂魏蠈蟼, 胃蔚蠈蟽蟿伪位蟿慰蟼 蟿蟻蠈蟺慰蟼 蟿伪尉喂谓蠈渭畏蟽畏蟼 蟿蠅谓 伪谓胃蟻蠋蟺蠅谓, 蠅蟼 苇谓伪 蔚纬纬蔚谓苇蟼, 伪谓 魏伪喂 蟺慰位蠉 魏伪胃蠀蟽蟿蔚蟻畏渭苇谓慰, 蟺慰位喂蟿喂魏蠈 蟺蔚蟺蟻蠅渭苇谓慰, 蔚委谓伪喂 渭蠉胃慰蟼. 螣 蔚胃谓喂魏喂蟽渭蠈蟼, 蟺慰蠀 维位位慰蟿蔚 蟺伪委蟻谓蔚喂 蟺蟻慰蠇蟺维蟻蠂慰蠀蟽蔚蟼 魏慰蠀位蟿慰蠉蟻蔚蟼 纬喂伪 谓伪 蟿喂蟼 渭蔚蟿伪蟿蟻苇蠄蔚喂 蟽蔚 苇胃谓畏, 维位位慰蟿蔚 蟿喂蟼 蔚蠁蔚蠀蟻委蟽魏蔚喂, 蟽蠀蠂谓维 未蔚 蟿喂蟼 蔚尉伪位蔚委蠁蔚喂, 伪蠀蟿蠈蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 魏伪位蠋蟼 萎 魏伪魏蠋蟼 渭喂伪 蟺蟻伪纬渭伪蟿喂魏蠈蟿畏蟿伪, 魏伪喂 渭维位喂蟽蟿伪 蟽蔚 纬蔚谓喂魏苇蟼 纬蟻伪渭渭苇蟼 伪谓伪蟺蠈蠁蔚蠀魏蟿畏.
螣 蔚胃谓喂魏喂蟽渭蠈蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 渭喂伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿喂蟼 蟺喂慰 喂蟽蠂蠀蟻苇蟼 未蠀谓维渭蔚喂蟼 蟿慰蠀 谓蔚蠈蟿蔚蟻慰蠀 魏蠈蟽渭慰蠀, 魏喂 蠅蟽蟿蠈蟽慰 蟺伪蟻伪渭苇谓蔚喂 伪谓蔚尉喂蠂谓委伪蟽蟿慰蟼 魏伪喂 伪魏伪蟿伪谓蠈畏蟿慰蟼 纬喂伪 慰蟺伪未慰蠉蟼 魏伪喂 伪谓蟿喂蟺维位慰蠀蟼. 韦慰 尉苇蟽蟺伪蟽渭维 蟿慰蠀 蔚蟻渭畏谓蔚蠉蔚蟿伪喂 蠅蟼 伪谓伪尾委蠅蟽畏 蟺蟻蠅蟿蠈纬慰谓蠅谓, 伪蟿伪尾喂蟽蟿喂魏蠋谓 蔚谓蟽蟿委魏蟿蠅谓 萎 蠅蟼 蟽魏畏谓慰胃蔚蟽委伪 蟿慰蠀 喂蟽蟿慰蟻喂魏慰蠉, 蟺慰位喂蟿喂魏慰蠉 魏伪喂 蟺蟻慰蟺伪纬伪谓未喂蟽蟿喂魏慰蠉 位蠈纬慰蠀. 螣 Gellner 蔚谓蟿慰蟺委味蔚喂 蟿喂蟼 蟻委味蔚蟼 蟿慰蠀 蔚胃谓喂魏喂蟽渭慰蠉 蟽蟿慰 尾喂慰渭畏蠂伪谓喂魏蠈 魏慰喂谓蠅谓喂魏蠈 蟽蠉蟽蟿畏渭伪, 蟺慰蠀 蔚尉伪蟻蟿维 蟿畏谓 蔚蠀畏渭蔚蟻委伪 蟿慰蠀 伪蟺蠈 蟿畏谓 魏慰喂谓蠅谓喂魏萎 魏喂谓畏蟿喂魏蠈蟿畏蟿伪 蔚纬纬蟻维渭渭伪蟿蠅谓 蟺慰位喂蟿蠋谓 蟽蟿慰 蟺位伪委蟽喂慰 渭喂伪蟼 蔚谓喂伪委伪蟼 魏慰蠀位蟿慰蠉蟻伪蟼 蟿伪蠀蟿喂蟽渭苇谓畏蟼 渭蔚 蟿慰 魏蟻维蟿慰蟼.
危蟿慰谓 蟿蠈渭慰 蟺蔚蟻喂位伪渭尾维谓蔚蟿伪喂 魏伪喂 蟿慰 魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰 蟿慰蠀 螕魏苇位位谓蔚蟻 芦螘胃谓喂魏喂蟽渭蠈蟼 魏伪喂 蟺慰位喂蟿喂魏萎 蟽蟿畏谓 螒谓伪蟿慰位喂魏萎 螘蠀蟻蠋蟺畏禄.
韦伪 苇胃谓畏, 蠅蟼 蠁蠀蟽喂魏蠈蟼, 胃蔚蠈蟽蟿伪位蟿慰蟼 蟿蟻蠈蟺慰蟼 蟿伪尉喂谓蠈渭畏蟽畏蟼 蟿蠅谓 伪谓胃蟻蠋蟺蠅谓, 蠅蟼 苇谓伪 蔚纬纬蔚谓苇蟼, 伪谓 魏伪喂 蟺慰位蠉 魏伪胃蠀蟽蟿蔚蟻畏渭苇谓慰, 蟺慰位喂蟿喂魏蠈 蟺蔚蟺蟻蠅渭苇谓慰, 蔚委谓伪喂 渭蠉胃慰蟼. 螣 蔚胃谓喂魏喂蟽渭蠈蟼, 蟺慰蠀 维位位慰蟿蔚 蟺伪委蟻谓蔚喂 蟺蟻慰蠇蟺维蟻蠂慰蠀蟽蔚蟼 魏慰蠀位蟿慰蠉蟻蔚蟼 纬喂伪 谓伪 蟿喂蟼 渭蔚蟿伪蟿蟻苇蠄蔚喂 蟽蔚 苇胃谓畏, 维位位慰蟿蔚 蟿喂蟼 蔚蠁蔚蠀蟻委蟽魏蔚喂, 蟽蠀蠂谓维 未蔚 蟿喂蟼 蔚尉伪位蔚委蠁蔚喂, 伪蠀蟿蠈蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 魏伪位蠋蟼 萎 魏伪魏蠋蟼 渭喂伪 蟺蟻伪纬渭伪蟿喂魏蠈蟿畏蟿伪, 魏伪喂 渭维位喂蟽蟿伪 蟽蔚 纬蔚谓喂魏苇蟼 纬蟻伪渭渭苇蟼 伪谓伪蟺蠈蠁蔚蠀魏蟿畏.
螣 蔚胃谓喂魏喂蟽渭蠈蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 渭喂伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿喂蟼 蟺喂慰 喂蟽蠂蠀蟻苇蟼 未蠀谓维渭蔚喂蟼 蟿慰蠀 谓蔚蠈蟿蔚蟻慰蠀 魏蠈蟽渭慰蠀, 魏喂 蠅蟽蟿蠈蟽慰 蟺伪蟻伪渭苇谓蔚喂 伪谓蔚尉喂蠂谓委伪蟽蟿慰蟼 魏伪喂 伪魏伪蟿伪谓蠈畏蟿慰蟼 纬喂伪 慰蟺伪未慰蠉蟼 魏伪喂 伪谓蟿喂蟺维位慰蠀蟼. 韦慰 尉苇蟽蟺伪蟽渭维 蟿慰蠀 蔚蟻渭畏谓蔚蠉蔚蟿伪喂 蠅蟼 伪谓伪尾委蠅蟽畏 蟺蟻蠅蟿蠈纬慰谓蠅谓, 伪蟿伪尾喂蟽蟿喂魏蠋谓 蔚谓蟽蟿委魏蟿蠅谓 萎 蠅蟼 蟽魏畏谓慰胃蔚蟽委伪 蟿慰蠀 喂蟽蟿慰蟻喂魏慰蠉, 蟺慰位喂蟿喂魏慰蠉 魏伪喂 蟺蟻慰蟺伪纬伪谓未喂蟽蟿喂魏慰蠉 位蠈纬慰蠀. 螣 Gellner 蔚谓蟿慰蟺委味蔚喂 蟿喂蟼 蟻委味蔚蟼 蟿慰蠀 蔚胃谓喂魏喂蟽渭慰蠉 蟽蟿慰 尾喂慰渭畏蠂伪谓喂魏蠈 魏慰喂谓蠅谓喂魏蠈 蟽蠉蟽蟿畏渭伪, 蟺慰蠀 蔚尉伪蟻蟿维 蟿畏谓 蔚蠀畏渭蔚蟻委伪 蟿慰蠀 伪蟺蠈 蟿畏谓 魏慰喂谓蠅谓喂魏萎 魏喂谓畏蟿喂魏蠈蟿畏蟿伪 蔚纬纬蟻维渭渭伪蟿蠅谓 蟺慰位喂蟿蠋谓 蟽蟿慰 蟺位伪委蟽喂慰 渭喂伪蟼 蔚谓喂伪委伪蟼 魏慰蠀位蟿慰蠉蟻伪蟼 蟿伪蠀蟿喂蟽渭苇谓畏蟼 渭蔚 蟿慰 魏蟻维蟿慰蟼.
危蟿慰谓 蟿蠈渭慰 蟺蔚蟻喂位伪渭尾维谓蔚蟿伪喂 魏伪喂 蟿慰 魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰 蟿慰蠀 螕魏苇位位谓蔚蟻 芦螘胃谓喂魏喂蟽渭蠈蟼 魏伪喂 蟺慰位喂蟿喂魏萎 蟽蟿畏谓 螒谓伪蟿慰位喂魏萎 螘蠀蟻蠋蟺畏禄.
272 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1983
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About the author
Ernest Gellner
57听books103听followersErnest Gellner was a prominent British-Czech philosopher, social anthropologist, and writer on nationalism.
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August 2, 2020
The sudden emergence of industrial society required a new type of person as well as a new organizing principle to support itself. Into this breach emerged what we call nationalism, which remains the system that the overwhelming majority of human beings live under today. As defined by Gellner, the nation is a unit large enough to reproduce itself through education, ideologically bound to a single literate culture and consisting mostly of deracinated ("gelded"), interchangeable people who can be moved with little retraining between the various occupations demanded by society. To put it simply the modern nation is characterized by homogeneity, anonymity and functional literacy. Appropriately, this is also the type of person its institutions produce.
One of the key requirements for creating a nation is control of the education system. This system is a lumbering, unconscionably expensive apparatus that can only be administered by an entity the size of a state. In practice it serves the purpose of manufacturing for the state the type of human being that fits its needs. This system is truly a hegemon. In a modern nation, any attempts to create alternate educational structures (and thus separate types of people) will inevitably dissolve into the oceanic culture produced by the state educational apparatus. 鈥淢odern society is one in which no sub-community, below the size of one capable of sustaining an independent education system, can any longer reproduce itself,鈥� Gellner writes. He is structurally deterministic in his view of human behavior en masse and it鈥檚 difficult for me to disagree. Whoever controls the official educational system determines the shape of the citizenry.
One of the great ironies of the modern nation is that it liquidates local "low" folk cultures in the name of championing them. The basis of the nation is inevitably literate, "high" cultures that are capable of both existing and communicating outside of local contexts and homogenizing large groups of people across time and space. A prominent example of this comes from the world of Islam, where the emergence of modern states has led to the eradication of local forms of folk Islamic expression and the centralization of power by text-driven religious authorities tied to national governments. In all contexts nationalism has helped eradicate the local and traditional while giving rise to the mass man. The modern individual is effectively a Mamluk or janissary: a person removed from tribal and familial ties by education and economic factors in order to become the autonomous agent that the modern state demands. What we call corruption in developing countries 鈥� for instance nepotism and tribal patronage 鈥� is often the outcome of mixing modern state institutions into a society where people have not yet been severed from traditional ties of allegiance. The combination is often a disastrous one.
Gellner argues that the modern state ideologically justifies itself to its citizens with the promise of constant material improvement, 鈥渟ocial bribery,鈥� and that its greatest vulnerability is the threat that this river of wellbeing will somehow be stymied. In societies with weak social bonds this certainly seems to be true, though there are nations that seek to bind citizens to them through deeper metaphysical ties. This binding is important because economic life in modernity is deeply unstable. The nature of work is constantly changing, albeit in one general direction. Less and less people work at the 鈥渃oal face鈥� of nature. Instead they are skilled to do a variety of generalist jobs that at their core are about communication and the manipulation of signs and meanings 鈥� what we today call the "knowledge economy." The modern individual is broadly but thinly educated. With a little bit of retraining, they can be shaped and reshaped according to the occupational needs of an economic system in constant flux.
There is a certain lack of solidity to modern society: the overwhelming majority of people live in a controlled environment, distant from the natural world. It is something like an aquarium, highly artificial and requiring constant maintenance. Were this environment to somehow collapse, the type of people who have been reared in it would not be able to survive, at least not without an extremely painful period of readjustment. This is not to romanticize pre-modern agrarian societies where people worked the land and were thus closer to a natural state. These societies were functionally Malthusian in nature, with all the suffering that entails. But it does highlight the dizzying plateau that we all now stand upon.
As Gellner brilliantly articulates in this short book, despite the nostalgia poignantly expressed by Walter Benjamin鈥檚 Angel of History, there is no going back to the world that came before the modern one we inhabit today. The break with the past is total. We live in a world where almost every one of us has been severed from old social ties, hierarchies and structures. Most of us would not welcome such a return to those old systems anyways, as the only hierarchies that can ever be accepted by human beings are those that are somehow hallowed by time or custom. Any attempt to revive the old by coercion can only end in tragedy, farce, or both, as several failed reactionary projects in recent years have demonstrated.
This book is highly recommended. I found myself highlighting almost every page, even if I didn't necessarily accept every one of Gellner's contentions. His work makes a good companion to Benedict Anderson鈥檚 similar inquiries into the creation of homo-nationalisticus, or modern man.
One of the key requirements for creating a nation is control of the education system. This system is a lumbering, unconscionably expensive apparatus that can only be administered by an entity the size of a state. In practice it serves the purpose of manufacturing for the state the type of human being that fits its needs. This system is truly a hegemon. In a modern nation, any attempts to create alternate educational structures (and thus separate types of people) will inevitably dissolve into the oceanic culture produced by the state educational apparatus. 鈥淢odern society is one in which no sub-community, below the size of one capable of sustaining an independent education system, can any longer reproduce itself,鈥� Gellner writes. He is structurally deterministic in his view of human behavior en masse and it鈥檚 difficult for me to disagree. Whoever controls the official educational system determines the shape of the citizenry.
One of the great ironies of the modern nation is that it liquidates local "low" folk cultures in the name of championing them. The basis of the nation is inevitably literate, "high" cultures that are capable of both existing and communicating outside of local contexts and homogenizing large groups of people across time and space. A prominent example of this comes from the world of Islam, where the emergence of modern states has led to the eradication of local forms of folk Islamic expression and the centralization of power by text-driven religious authorities tied to national governments. In all contexts nationalism has helped eradicate the local and traditional while giving rise to the mass man. The modern individual is effectively a Mamluk or janissary: a person removed from tribal and familial ties by education and economic factors in order to become the autonomous agent that the modern state demands. What we call corruption in developing countries 鈥� for instance nepotism and tribal patronage 鈥� is often the outcome of mixing modern state institutions into a society where people have not yet been severed from traditional ties of allegiance. The combination is often a disastrous one.
Gellner argues that the modern state ideologically justifies itself to its citizens with the promise of constant material improvement, 鈥渟ocial bribery,鈥� and that its greatest vulnerability is the threat that this river of wellbeing will somehow be stymied. In societies with weak social bonds this certainly seems to be true, though there are nations that seek to bind citizens to them through deeper metaphysical ties. This binding is important because economic life in modernity is deeply unstable. The nature of work is constantly changing, albeit in one general direction. Less and less people work at the 鈥渃oal face鈥� of nature. Instead they are skilled to do a variety of generalist jobs that at their core are about communication and the manipulation of signs and meanings 鈥� what we today call the "knowledge economy." The modern individual is broadly but thinly educated. With a little bit of retraining, they can be shaped and reshaped according to the occupational needs of an economic system in constant flux.
There is a certain lack of solidity to modern society: the overwhelming majority of people live in a controlled environment, distant from the natural world. It is something like an aquarium, highly artificial and requiring constant maintenance. Were this environment to somehow collapse, the type of people who have been reared in it would not be able to survive, at least not without an extremely painful period of readjustment. This is not to romanticize pre-modern agrarian societies where people worked the land and were thus closer to a natural state. These societies were functionally Malthusian in nature, with all the suffering that entails. But it does highlight the dizzying plateau that we all now stand upon.
As Gellner brilliantly articulates in this short book, despite the nostalgia poignantly expressed by Walter Benjamin鈥檚 Angel of History, there is no going back to the world that came before the modern one we inhabit today. The break with the past is total. We live in a world where almost every one of us has been severed from old social ties, hierarchies and structures. Most of us would not welcome such a return to those old systems anyways, as the only hierarchies that can ever be accepted by human beings are those that are somehow hallowed by time or custom. Any attempt to revive the old by coercion can only end in tragedy, farce, or both, as several failed reactionary projects in recent years have demonstrated.
This book is highly recommended. I found myself highlighting almost every page, even if I didn't necessarily accept every one of Gellner's contentions. His work makes a good companion to Benedict Anderson鈥檚 similar inquiries into the creation of homo-nationalisticus, or modern man.
May 13, 2023
"A nacionalizmus els艖sorban olyan politikai alapelv, amely a politikai 茅s a nemzeti egys茅g t枚k茅letes egybees茅s茅t vallja." Magyar谩n: a nacionalizmus nem m谩s, mint sz谩nd茅k, hogy ha a nemzet眉nk tagjai 谩llamunkon k铆v眉l 茅lnek, akkor toljuk el fel茅j眉k a hat谩rokat, ha pedig az 谩llamunkban 茅lnek olyanok, akik nem nemzet眉nk tagjai, akkor v谩ljanak azz谩, vagy egy茅b m贸don sz疟njenek meg ott lenni. Ha pedig nincs 谩llamunk - akkor csin谩ljunk egyet.
Nehezen r谩z贸dtam bele a sz枚vegbe. 脥gy ut贸lagosan okoskodva az茅rt, mert Gellner igaz谩b贸l teljesen mell艖zi, hogy a nacionalizmus milyens茅g茅r艖l mondjon el b谩rmit is - nagyj谩b贸l megel茅gszik a fenti cit谩tummal. Ennek k枚vetkezt茅ben az 茅rtelmez茅si mez艖 szinte megfoghatatlanul t谩g lesz, nincs k眉l枚nbs茅gt茅tel mondjuk Hitler 茅s Mazzini k枚z枚tt. Ami nyilv谩n 眉dv枚s, ha azt n茅zz眉k, hogy 铆gy elker眉lj眉k az 铆t茅lkez茅st. A szerz艖 szinte megkap贸 mag谩t贸l 茅rtet艖d艖s茅ggel ignor谩lja az 枚sszes gondolkod贸t, aki a nacionalizmusr贸l valaha v茅lem茅nyt nyilv谩n铆tott - a h铆veket az茅rt, mert elfogultak, 茅s 煤gyis pont az ellenkez艖j茅t mondj谩k annak, ami van*, a kritikusokat meg jobb谩ra az茅rt, mert 艖k ezzel az "ellenkez艖vel" vitatkoznak, 茅s h谩t annak meg mi 茅rtelme. Mindebb艖l k枚vetkezik, hogy Gellner sz谩m谩ra a nacionalizmus nem ideol贸gia, pl谩ne nem filoz贸fia, hanem "csak" egy adekv谩t v谩lasz a modernit谩s t谩rsadalmi k枚vetkezm茅nyeire.
Amiben Gellner 煤jat hozott a nacionalizmuskutat谩sba, az egy ok-okozati sorrend megford铆t谩sa. El艖dei azt vallott谩k, hogy a nacionalizmus olyan eszme, ami homogeniz谩l谩sra t枚r - szerinte viszont a homogeniz谩l谩s hozta l茅tre a nacionalizmust**. Az eg茅sz pedig a moderniz谩ci贸 k枚vetkezm茅nye: az agr谩rt谩rsadalmak ugyanis struktur谩lis alapokon hat谩rozt谩k meg magukat. Ott a kult煤r谩t egy sz疟k kisebbs茅g birtokolta, a n茅pess茅g java pedig kap谩lta a krumplit l谩t谩st贸l vakul谩sig. Ebben a konstrukci贸ban semmi sz眉ks茅g nem volt k枚z枚s nemzetk茅pre (s艖t: az nem is volt elk茅pzelhet艖), mert mindenkinek adott helye volt a t谩rsadalomban, amit egyfajta isteni rendel茅snek tekintettek, a k枚zt眉k l茅v艖 谩tj谩r谩st pedig hat谩rozottan blokkolt谩k. Csak h谩t azt谩n j枚tt az iparosod谩s, aminek sz眉ks茅ge volt mobiliz谩lt, rugalmas munkaer艖re - olyan emberek t枚megeire, akik nincsenek odaragadva a kap谩juk nyel茅hez, hanem b谩rmely ipari munkafolyamat elv茅gz茅s茅re betan铆that贸ak. Ez megsz眉lte az ig茅nyt egyfel艖l az 谩ltal谩nos oktat谩sra, 茅s ezen kereszt眉l a k枚z枚s kult煤r谩ra is, ami a kasztok felboml谩sa ut谩n is k茅pes volt 枚sszetartani a t谩rsadalom sz枚ved茅k茅t. Ezen a talajon pedig megsz眉lethetett a nacionalizmus. Ebb艖l k枚vetkezik, hogy a nacionalizmus logikailag levezethet艖 az iparosod谩sb贸l, 谩m ez nem jelenti azt, hogy sz眉ks茅gszer疟 is. Ennek illusztr谩l谩s谩ra Gellner szerkeszt is egy csecse kis modellt, amiben h谩rom v谩ltoz贸b贸l, a "hatalom"-b贸l, az "oktat谩s"-b贸l (ami ebben a kontextusban a kult煤r谩hoz val贸 hozz谩f茅r茅ssel egyenl艖), valamint mag谩b贸l a "kult煤r谩"-b贸l levezet nyolcfajta t谩rsadalmi berendezked茅st - 茅s ebb艖l csak h谩romban lehets茅ges a nacionalizmus. 脡s biza egy谩ltal谩n nem tuti, hogy 艖k h谩rman j谩rtak rosszul.
Invenci贸zus fejteget茅s, annyi bizonyos. N茅mi hi谩ny茅rzetem ugyan van - nagy 茅rdekl艖d茅ssel olvastam volna arr贸l, hogy ha az agr谩rt谩rsadalomb贸l az ipariba val贸 谩tmenet sz眉lte a nacionalizmust, akkor az ipari t谩rsadalomb贸l a szolg谩ltat贸ba val贸 谩tmenet mit csin谩l majd a nacionalizmussal. Meg h谩t azt is meg kell f茅rfiasan vallanom, hogy a szerz艖 szociol贸giai-antropol贸giai megk枚zel铆t茅se esetenk茅nt nehezen em茅szthet艖 volt nekem, t谩n mert a t枚rt茅nelemtudom谩nyi nyelvezethez jobban vagyok szokva. Mindenesetre nagyon r茅gen a k铆v谩ns谩glist谩mon volt m谩r a k枚tet, 茅s most v茅gre levehetem r贸la, 煤gyhogy 枚r眉l枚k. 脡s m茅g a nap is kis眉t枚tt.
* Jellemz艖 p茅ld谩ul, hogy a nacionalista politikusok nyakra-f艖re az 艖si gy枚kerekre hivatkoznak, holott (mint Gellner is vil谩gosan lesz枚gezi) a nacionalizmus egy茅rtelm疟en friss jelens茅g. A m谩sik anom谩lia, hogy 谩lland贸an az identit谩s v茅delm茅t hirdetik az azt felsz谩mol贸 baloldali 茅s liber谩lis eszm茅kkel szemben - holott 茅pp a nacionalizmus az, aki a sz谩mtalan egy茅ni identit谩st megpr贸b谩lja egyetlen nemzeti keretbe betuszkolni. R茅szben ez茅rt is n茅pszer疟 azok k枚r茅ben, akik t煤l lust谩k vagy t煤l but谩k saj谩t egy茅nis茅get kital谩lni maguknak.
** Persze az, hogy maga a nacionalizmus is kataliz谩lja a homogeniz谩ci贸t, ett艖l m茅g t茅ny.
Nehezen r谩z贸dtam bele a sz枚vegbe. 脥gy ut贸lagosan okoskodva az茅rt, mert Gellner igaz谩b贸l teljesen mell艖zi, hogy a nacionalizmus milyens茅g茅r艖l mondjon el b谩rmit is - nagyj谩b贸l megel茅gszik a fenti cit谩tummal. Ennek k枚vetkezt茅ben az 茅rtelmez茅si mez艖 szinte megfoghatatlanul t谩g lesz, nincs k眉l枚nbs茅gt茅tel mondjuk Hitler 茅s Mazzini k枚z枚tt. Ami nyilv谩n 眉dv枚s, ha azt n茅zz眉k, hogy 铆gy elker眉lj眉k az 铆t茅lkez茅st. A szerz艖 szinte megkap贸 mag谩t贸l 茅rtet艖d艖s茅ggel ignor谩lja az 枚sszes gondolkod贸t, aki a nacionalizmusr贸l valaha v茅lem茅nyt nyilv谩n铆tott - a h铆veket az茅rt, mert elfogultak, 茅s 煤gyis pont az ellenkez艖j茅t mondj谩k annak, ami van*, a kritikusokat meg jobb谩ra az茅rt, mert 艖k ezzel az "ellenkez艖vel" vitatkoznak, 茅s h谩t annak meg mi 茅rtelme. Mindebb艖l k枚vetkezik, hogy Gellner sz谩m谩ra a nacionalizmus nem ideol贸gia, pl谩ne nem filoz贸fia, hanem "csak" egy adekv谩t v谩lasz a modernit谩s t谩rsadalmi k枚vetkezm茅nyeire.
Amiben Gellner 煤jat hozott a nacionalizmuskutat谩sba, az egy ok-okozati sorrend megford铆t谩sa. El艖dei azt vallott谩k, hogy a nacionalizmus olyan eszme, ami homogeniz谩l谩sra t枚r - szerinte viszont a homogeniz谩l谩s hozta l茅tre a nacionalizmust**. Az eg茅sz pedig a moderniz谩ci贸 k枚vetkezm茅nye: az agr谩rt谩rsadalmak ugyanis struktur谩lis alapokon hat谩rozt谩k meg magukat. Ott a kult煤r谩t egy sz疟k kisebbs茅g birtokolta, a n茅pess茅g java pedig kap谩lta a krumplit l谩t谩st贸l vakul谩sig. Ebben a konstrukci贸ban semmi sz眉ks茅g nem volt k枚z枚s nemzetk茅pre (s艖t: az nem is volt elk茅pzelhet艖), mert mindenkinek adott helye volt a t谩rsadalomban, amit egyfajta isteni rendel茅snek tekintettek, a k枚zt眉k l茅v艖 谩tj谩r谩st pedig hat谩rozottan blokkolt谩k. Csak h谩t azt谩n j枚tt az iparosod谩s, aminek sz眉ks茅ge volt mobiliz谩lt, rugalmas munkaer艖re - olyan emberek t枚megeire, akik nincsenek odaragadva a kap谩juk nyel茅hez, hanem b谩rmely ipari munkafolyamat elv茅gz茅s茅re betan铆that贸ak. Ez megsz眉lte az ig茅nyt egyfel艖l az 谩ltal谩nos oktat谩sra, 茅s ezen kereszt眉l a k枚z枚s kult煤r谩ra is, ami a kasztok felboml谩sa ut谩n is k茅pes volt 枚sszetartani a t谩rsadalom sz枚ved茅k茅t. Ezen a talajon pedig megsz眉lethetett a nacionalizmus. Ebb艖l k枚vetkezik, hogy a nacionalizmus logikailag levezethet艖 az iparosod谩sb贸l, 谩m ez nem jelenti azt, hogy sz眉ks茅gszer疟 is. Ennek illusztr谩l谩s谩ra Gellner szerkeszt is egy csecse kis modellt, amiben h谩rom v谩ltoz贸b贸l, a "hatalom"-b贸l, az "oktat谩s"-b贸l (ami ebben a kontextusban a kult煤r谩hoz val贸 hozz谩f茅r茅ssel egyenl艖), valamint mag谩b贸l a "kult煤r谩"-b贸l levezet nyolcfajta t谩rsadalmi berendezked茅st - 茅s ebb艖l csak h谩romban lehets茅ges a nacionalizmus. 脡s biza egy谩ltal谩n nem tuti, hogy 艖k h谩rman j谩rtak rosszul.
Invenci贸zus fejteget茅s, annyi bizonyos. N茅mi hi谩ny茅rzetem ugyan van - nagy 茅rdekl艖d茅ssel olvastam volna arr贸l, hogy ha az agr谩rt谩rsadalomb贸l az ipariba val贸 谩tmenet sz眉lte a nacionalizmust, akkor az ipari t谩rsadalomb贸l a szolg谩ltat贸ba val贸 谩tmenet mit csin谩l majd a nacionalizmussal. Meg h谩t azt is meg kell f茅rfiasan vallanom, hogy a szerz艖 szociol贸giai-antropol贸giai megk枚zel铆t茅se esetenk茅nt nehezen em茅szthet艖 volt nekem, t谩n mert a t枚rt茅nelemtudom谩nyi nyelvezethez jobban vagyok szokva. Mindenesetre nagyon r茅gen a k铆v谩ns谩glist谩mon volt m谩r a k枚tet, 茅s most v茅gre levehetem r贸la, 煤gyhogy 枚r眉l枚k. 脡s m茅g a nap is kis眉t枚tt.
* Jellemz艖 p茅ld谩ul, hogy a nacionalista politikusok nyakra-f艖re az 艖si gy枚kerekre hivatkoznak, holott (mint Gellner is vil谩gosan lesz枚gezi) a nacionalizmus egy茅rtelm疟en friss jelens茅g. A m谩sik anom谩lia, hogy 谩lland贸an az identit谩s v茅delm茅t hirdetik az azt felsz谩mol贸 baloldali 茅s liber谩lis eszm茅kkel szemben - holott 茅pp a nacionalizmus az, aki a sz谩mtalan egy茅ni identit谩st megpr贸b谩lja egyetlen nemzeti keretbe betuszkolni. R茅szben ez茅rt is n茅pszer疟 azok k枚r茅ben, akik t煤l lust谩k vagy t煤l but谩k saj谩t egy茅nis茅get kital谩lni maguknak.
** Persze az, hogy maga a nacionalizmus is kataliz谩lja a homogeniz谩ci贸t, ett艖l m茅g t茅ny.
December 7, 2023
袣褍锌懈褏 褋懈 褌邪蟹懈 泻薪懈谐邪 锌褉械写懈 写械褋械褌懈薪邪 谐芯写懈薪懈 (懈蟹写邪写械薪邪 械 胁 袘褗谢谐邪褉懈褟 锌褉械蟹 1999谐.). 袦邪泻邪褉 褔械 械 褌褗薪懈褔泻邪 懈 薪褟屑邪 懈 写胁械褋褌邪 褋褌褉邪薪懈褑懈, 锌芯褔胁邪褏 褟 薪褟泻芯谢泻芯 锌褗褌懈 懈 薪懈泻芯谐邪 薪械 褋褌懈谐邪褏 屑薪芯谐芯 薪邪胁褗褌褉械 鈥� 芯泻邪蟹邪 褋械, 褔械 薪械 斜褟褏 写芯褋褌邪褌褗褔薪芯 褍屑械薪, 蟹邪 写邪 褉邪蟹斜械褉邪 泻邪泻胁芯 锌懈褕械 胁 薪械褟. 小褌褉邪薪薪芯 薪褟泻邪泻. 袙褋械 锌邪泻, 褋谢械写 懈蟹胁械褋褌薪芯 (褏械褏械) 蟹邪斜邪胁褟薪械, 褍褋锌褟褏 写邪 褋写褗胁褔邪 薪械胁械褉芯褟褌薪芯 泻芯薪褑械薪褌褉懈褉邪薪懈褟 懈 褋谢芯卸械薪 褋褌懈谢 薪邪 锌懈褋邪薪械 薪邪 歇褉薪械褋褌 袚械谢薪褗褉 懈 写邪 褉邪蟹斜械褉邪 泻邪泻 邪写卸械斜邪 褌芯泄 胁懈卸写邪 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈蟹屑邪 懈 泻邪泻胁芯 胁褋褗褖薪芯褋褌 械 褌芯胁邪 薪邪褑懈褟鈥�
袧械, 薪邪褑懈懈褌械 薪械 蟹邪锌芯褔胁邪褌 褋 鈥炑€芯写芯谢褞斜懈械褌芯鈥�. 袝写薪芯 胁褉械屑械 褏芯褉邪褌邪 薪械 褋邪 懈屑邪谢懈 懈写械褟 褔械 褋邪 鈥炐叫把€芯写鈥�, 褔械 褋邪 褋胁褗褉蟹邪薪懈 褋 薪褟泻邪泻胁懈 写褉褍谐懈 褏芯褉邪, 泻芯懈褌芯 薪械 褋邪 胁懈卸写邪谢懈 薪懈泻芯谐邪. 袟邪 屑薪芯谐芯 芯褌 薪邪褋 褌芯胁邪 械 褌褉褍写薪邪 蟹邪 褉邪蟹斜懈褉邪薪械 泻芯薪褑械锌褑懈褟, 蟹邪褖芯褌芯 褋屑械 懈蟹褑褟谢芯 锌芯褌芯锌械薪懈 胁 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢薪懈褟 薪邪褔懈薪 薪邪 屑懈褋谢械薪械 芯褖械 芯褌 写械褑邪. 袧芯 褌芯胁邪 薪械 械 斜懈谢芯 胁懈薪邪谐懈 褌邪泻邪 鈥� 芯褌 谐褉褍斜芯 17 胁. 薪邪写芯谢褍, 褏芯褉邪褌邪 褋屑褟褌邪褌 褋胁芯褟 褉芯写, 褋胁芯械褌芯 褋械谢芯, 褋胁芯褟 谐褉邪写, 褋胁芯褟褌邪 芯斜谢邪褋褌 蟹邪 鈥炑傂笛呅叫糕€� 懈 锌褉懈械屑邪褌 写褉褍谐懈褌械 胁 褌褟褏 蟹邪 褋械斜械锌芯写芯斜薪懈 锌芯 薪褟泻邪泻褗胁 薪邪褔懈薪, 薪芯 胁 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯 褋 屑懈薪懈屑邪谢薪邪 屑芯斜懈谢薪芯褋褌, 斜邪胁薪懈 泻芯屑褍薪懈泻邪褑懈懈 懈 薪懈褋泻邪 谐褉邪屑芯褌薪芯褋褌 (泻邪褌芯 褑褟谢芯 屑薪芯谐芯 薪懈褋泻邪 褋胁褗褉蟹邪薪芯褋褌), 褌邪蟹懈 胁褉褗蟹泻邪 屑薪芯谐芯 斜褗褉蟹芯 懈蟹斜谢械写薪褟胁邪 褋 褉邪蟹褕懈褉褟胁邪薪械 薪邪 谐械芯谐褉邪褎褋泻懈褟 芯斜褏胁邪褌. 袝褌褗褉胁邪褌邪 小懈泄泻邪 械 鈥炐叫把埿� 屑芯屑懈褔械鈥�, 褋褗褋械谢褟薪懈薪褗褌 械 褋褗褋械写, 薪芯 薪褟泻芯泄 芯褌 写褉褍谐邪褌邪 褋褌褉邪薪邪 薪邪 谐芯谢械屑懈褟 斜邪懈褉 械 褌芯褔薪芯 褌芯谢泻芯胁邪 写邪谢械褔械薪 蟹邪 褌械斜, 泻芯谢泻芯褌芯 懈 薪褟泻芯泄 芯褌 写褉褍谐邪褌邪 褋褌褉邪薪邪 薪邪 屑芯褉械褌芯 懈 锌褉懈泻邪蟹胁邪 薪邪 锌芯褔褌懈 薪械褉邪蟹斜懈褉邪械屑 写懈邪谢械泻褌.
袧邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈褋褌懈褔薪懈褌械 懈写械芯谢芯谐懈懈 锌芯 褋胁械褌邪 (胁泻谢. 懈 褍 薪邪褋) 褋屑褟褌邪褌, 褔械 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢薪芯褌芯 褔褍胁褋褌胁芯 胁懈薪邪谐懈 谐芯 械 懈屑邪谢芯 褍 褏芯褉邪褌邪 懈 褌芯 斜懈胁邪 锌褉芯斜褍写械薪芯 芯褌 褌.薪. 鈥炐毖冃葱秆傂敌恍糕€�, 泻芯懈褌芯 锌懈褕邪褌 泻薪懈谐懈 懈 锌褉懈锌芯屑薪褟褌 薪邪 薪邪褉芯写邪 屑懈薪邪谢芯褌芯 屑褍 胁械谢懈褔懈械 胁 械写懈薪 屑芯屑械薪褌, 泻芯谐邪褌芯 褌芯泄 械 锌芯褌懈褋薪邪褌 (袟胁褍褔懈 谢懈 锌芯蟹薪邪褌芯? 孝芯褟 屑芯褌懈胁 械 褍写懈胁懈褌械谢薪芯 械写薪邪泻褗胁 胁 屑薪芯谐芯 写褗褉卸邪胁懈 懈 懈褋褌芯褉懈褔械褋泻懈 锌械褉懈芯写懈). 小邪屑芯 褔械 褋锌芯褉械写 歇褉薪械褋褌 袚械谢薪褗褉 薪械 褋褌邪胁邪 褌邪泻邪, 邪 锌芯-褋泻芯褉芯 薪邪芯斜褉邪褌薪芯 鈥� 薪褟屑邪 薪懈泻邪泻胁芯 鈥炐惭€芯写械薪芯鈥� 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢薪芯 褔褍胁褋褌胁芯 懈 斜褍写懈褌械谢懈褌械 薪械 鈥炑佈娦毖冃缎葱把傗€� 褌谢械械褖懈褌械 屑褍 懈褋泻褉懈 胁 写褍褕懈褌械 薪邪 褏芯褉邪褌邪, 邪 薪邪锌褉邪胁芯 谐芯 褋褗蟹写邪胁邪褌. 袦邪谢泻邪褌邪 谐褉邪屑芯褌薪邪 泻谢邪褋邪 胁 褋褉械写薪芯胁械泻芯胁薪芯褌芯 懈 褉械薪械褋邪薪褋芯胁芯 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯 械 械写懈薪褋褌胁械薪邪褌邪, 泻芯褟褌芯 褔褍胁褋褌胁邪 褋胁褗褉蟹邪薪芯褋褌 褋褗褋 褋械斜械锌芯写芯斜薪懈褌械 褋懈, 薪械蟹邪胁懈褋械褖邪 芯褌 谐械芯谐褉邪褎懈褟褌邪 懈 懈屑械薪薪芯 芯褌 薪械褟 锌褉芯懈蟹谢懈蟹邪褌 懈写械懈褌械 蟹邪 芯斜褖 锌褉芯懈蟹褏芯写, 懈褋褌芯褉懈褟 懈 械蟹懈泻 (锌懈褋屑械薪懈褟褌 械蟹懈泻, 泻芯泄褌芯 芯斜械写懈薪褟胁邪 屑械褋褌薪懈褌械 薪邪褉械褔懈褟 懈 写懈邪谢械泻褌懈) 懈 锌芯 褋褗褖械褋褌胁芯 褋褗蟹写邪胁邪 懈写械褟褌邪 蟹邪 薪邪褑懈褟.
鈥炐澬把喰感� 懈 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈蟹褗屑鈥� 械, 写邪 褋懈 谐芯 泻邪卸械屑 锌褉邪胁芯 鈥� 薪械 屑薪芯谐芯 蟹邪斜邪胁薪邪 蟹邪 褔械褌械薪械, 芯褋胁械薪 邪泻芯 薪邪懈褋褌懈薪邪, 邪屑邪 袧袗袠小孝袠袧袗 懈褋泻邪褕 写邪 褉邪蟹斜械褉械褕 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈蟹屑邪. 袧芯 薪褟屑邪 泻邪泻 写邪 褋懈 泻褉懈胁褟 写褍褕邪褌邪 鈥� 褌褟 芯斜褟褋薪褟胁邪 褌芯褔薪芯 褌芯胁邪. 袧械 胁 锌邪褌械褌懈褔薪懈褟, 鈥炐懷娦恍承把€懈褟 薪邪 褌褉懈 锌谢邪薪械褌懈鈥� 褋褌懈谢 薪邪 褉芯写薪懈褌械 薪懈 鈥炑€芯写芯谢褞斜褑懈鈥�, 薪械 胁 褉芯屑邪薪褌懈褔薪懈褟 鈥炐溞狙徰傂� 薪邪褑懈褟 鈥� 锌褉邪胁邪 懈谢懈 薪械!鈥� 薪邪 小褌懈胁褗薪 袛械泻械泄褌械褉, 邪 胁 邪泻邪写械屑懈褔械薪, 褋褍褏 褋褌懈谢, 泻邪褌芯 薪邪斜谢褗褋泻邪薪 褋 懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟 懈 懈写械懈 褍褔械斜薪懈泻, 胁 泻芯泄褌芯 胁褋褟泻芯 懈蟹褉械褔械薪懈械 蟹薪邪褔懈 薪械褖芯 懈 懈屑邪 薪褍卸写邪 锟斤拷邪 谐芯 芯褋屑懈褋谢懈褕 懈薪邪褔械 懈蟹褌褗褉胁邪褕 褋屑懈褋褗谢邪 薪邪 胁褋懈褔泻芯. 小懈谢薪芯 锌褉械锌芯褉褗褔胁邪屑!
袧械, 薪邪褑懈懈褌械 薪械 蟹邪锌芯褔胁邪褌 褋 鈥炑€芯写芯谢褞斜懈械褌芯鈥�. 袝写薪芯 胁褉械屑械 褏芯褉邪褌邪 薪械 褋邪 懈屑邪谢懈 懈写械褟 褔械 褋邪 鈥炐叫把€芯写鈥�, 褔械 褋邪 褋胁褗褉蟹邪薪懈 褋 薪褟泻邪泻胁懈 写褉褍谐懈 褏芯褉邪, 泻芯懈褌芯 薪械 褋邪 胁懈卸写邪谢懈 薪懈泻芯谐邪. 袟邪 屑薪芯谐芯 芯褌 薪邪褋 褌芯胁邪 械 褌褉褍写薪邪 蟹邪 褉邪蟹斜懈褉邪薪械 泻芯薪褑械锌褑懈褟, 蟹邪褖芯褌芯 褋屑械 懈蟹褑褟谢芯 锌芯褌芯锌械薪懈 胁 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢薪懈褟 薪邪褔懈薪 薪邪 屑懈褋谢械薪械 芯褖械 芯褌 写械褑邪. 袧芯 褌芯胁邪 薪械 械 斜懈谢芯 胁懈薪邪谐懈 褌邪泻邪 鈥� 芯褌 谐褉褍斜芯 17 胁. 薪邪写芯谢褍, 褏芯褉邪褌邪 褋屑褟褌邪褌 褋胁芯褟 褉芯写, 褋胁芯械褌芯 褋械谢芯, 褋胁芯褟 谐褉邪写, 褋胁芯褟褌邪 芯斜谢邪褋褌 蟹邪 鈥炑傂笛呅叫糕€� 懈 锌褉懈械屑邪褌 写褉褍谐懈褌械 胁 褌褟褏 蟹邪 褋械斜械锌芯写芯斜薪懈 锌芯 薪褟泻邪泻褗胁 薪邪褔懈薪, 薪芯 胁 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯 褋 屑懈薪懈屑邪谢薪邪 屑芯斜懈谢薪芯褋褌, 斜邪胁薪懈 泻芯屑褍薪懈泻邪褑懈懈 懈 薪懈褋泻邪 谐褉邪屑芯褌薪芯褋褌 (泻邪褌芯 褑褟谢芯 屑薪芯谐芯 薪懈褋泻邪 褋胁褗褉蟹邪薪芯褋褌), 褌邪蟹懈 胁褉褗蟹泻邪 屑薪芯谐芯 斜褗褉蟹芯 懈蟹斜谢械写薪褟胁邪 褋 褉邪蟹褕懈褉褟胁邪薪械 薪邪 谐械芯谐褉邪褎褋泻懈褟 芯斜褏胁邪褌. 袝褌褗褉胁邪褌邪 小懈泄泻邪 械 鈥炐叫把埿� 屑芯屑懈褔械鈥�, 褋褗褋械谢褟薪懈薪褗褌 械 褋褗褋械写, 薪芯 薪褟泻芯泄 芯褌 写褉褍谐邪褌邪 褋褌褉邪薪邪 薪邪 谐芯谢械屑懈褟 斜邪懈褉 械 褌芯褔薪芯 褌芯谢泻芯胁邪 写邪谢械褔械薪 蟹邪 褌械斜, 泻芯谢泻芯褌芯 懈 薪褟泻芯泄 芯褌 写褉褍谐邪褌邪 褋褌褉邪薪邪 薪邪 屑芯褉械褌芯 懈 锌褉懈泻邪蟹胁邪 薪邪 锌芯褔褌懈 薪械褉邪蟹斜懈褉邪械屑 写懈邪谢械泻褌.
袧邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈褋褌懈褔薪懈褌械 懈写械芯谢芯谐懈懈 锌芯 褋胁械褌邪 (胁泻谢. 懈 褍 薪邪褋) 褋屑褟褌邪褌, 褔械 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢薪芯褌芯 褔褍胁褋褌胁芯 胁懈薪邪谐懈 谐芯 械 懈屑邪谢芯 褍 褏芯褉邪褌邪 懈 褌芯 斜懈胁邪 锌褉芯斜褍写械薪芯 芯褌 褌.薪. 鈥炐毖冃葱秆傂敌恍糕€�, 泻芯懈褌芯 锌懈褕邪褌 泻薪懈谐懈 懈 锌褉懈锌芯屑薪褟褌 薪邪 薪邪褉芯写邪 屑懈薪邪谢芯褌芯 屑褍 胁械谢懈褔懈械 胁 械写懈薪 屑芯屑械薪褌, 泻芯谐邪褌芯 褌芯泄 械 锌芯褌懈褋薪邪褌 (袟胁褍褔懈 谢懈 锌芯蟹薪邪褌芯? 孝芯褟 屑芯褌懈胁 械 褍写懈胁懈褌械谢薪芯 械写薪邪泻褗胁 胁 屑薪芯谐芯 写褗褉卸邪胁懈 懈 懈褋褌芯褉懈褔械褋泻懈 锌械褉懈芯写懈). 小邪屑芯 褔械 褋锌芯褉械写 歇褉薪械褋褌 袚械谢薪褗褉 薪械 褋褌邪胁邪 褌邪泻邪, 邪 锌芯-褋泻芯褉芯 薪邪芯斜褉邪褌薪芯 鈥� 薪褟屑邪 薪懈泻邪泻胁芯 鈥炐惭€芯写械薪芯鈥� 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢薪芯 褔褍胁褋褌胁芯 懈 斜褍写懈褌械谢懈褌械 薪械 鈥炑佈娦毖冃缎葱把傗€� 褌谢械械褖懈褌械 屑褍 懈褋泻褉懈 胁 写褍褕懈褌械 薪邪 褏芯褉邪褌邪, 邪 薪邪锌褉邪胁芯 谐芯 褋褗蟹写邪胁邪褌. 袦邪谢泻邪褌邪 谐褉邪屑芯褌薪邪 泻谢邪褋邪 胁 褋褉械写薪芯胁械泻芯胁薪芯褌芯 懈 褉械薪械褋邪薪褋芯胁芯 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯 械 械写懈薪褋褌胁械薪邪褌邪, 泻芯褟褌芯 褔褍胁褋褌胁邪 褋胁褗褉蟹邪薪芯褋褌 褋褗褋 褋械斜械锌芯写芯斜薪懈褌械 褋懈, 薪械蟹邪胁懈褋械褖邪 芯褌 谐械芯谐褉邪褎懈褟褌邪 懈 懈屑械薪薪芯 芯褌 薪械褟 锌褉芯懈蟹谢懈蟹邪褌 懈写械懈褌械 蟹邪 芯斜褖 锌褉芯懈蟹褏芯写, 懈褋褌芯褉懈褟 懈 械蟹懈泻 (锌懈褋屑械薪懈褟褌 械蟹懈泻, 泻芯泄褌芯 芯斜械写懈薪褟胁邪 屑械褋褌薪懈褌械 薪邪褉械褔懈褟 懈 写懈邪谢械泻褌懈) 懈 锌芯 褋褗褖械褋褌胁芯 褋褗蟹写邪胁邪 懈写械褟褌邪 蟹邪 薪邪褑懈褟.
鈥炐澬把喰感� 懈 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈蟹褗屑鈥� 械, 写邪 褋懈 谐芯 泻邪卸械屑 锌褉邪胁芯 鈥� 薪械 屑薪芯谐芯 蟹邪斜邪胁薪邪 蟹邪 褔械褌械薪械, 芯褋胁械薪 邪泻芯 薪邪懈褋褌懈薪邪, 邪屑邪 袧袗袠小孝袠袧袗 懈褋泻邪褕 写邪 褉邪蟹斜械褉械褕 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈蟹屑邪. 袧芯 薪褟屑邪 泻邪泻 写邪 褋懈 泻褉懈胁褟 写褍褕邪褌邪 鈥� 褌褟 芯斜褟褋薪褟胁邪 褌芯褔薪芯 褌芯胁邪. 袧械 胁 锌邪褌械褌懈褔薪懈褟, 鈥炐懷娦恍承把€懈褟 薪邪 褌褉懈 锌谢邪薪械褌懈鈥� 褋褌懈谢 薪邪 褉芯写薪懈褌械 薪懈 鈥炑€芯写芯谢褞斜褑懈鈥�, 薪械 胁 褉芯屑邪薪褌懈褔薪懈褟 鈥炐溞狙徰傂� 薪邪褑懈褟 鈥� 锌褉邪胁邪 懈谢懈 薪械!鈥� 薪邪 小褌懈胁褗薪 袛械泻械泄褌械褉, 邪 胁 邪泻邪写械屑懈褔械薪, 褋褍褏 褋褌懈谢, 泻邪褌芯 薪邪斜谢褗褋泻邪薪 褋 懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟 懈 懈写械懈 褍褔械斜薪懈泻, 胁 泻芯泄褌芯 胁褋褟泻芯 懈蟹褉械褔械薪懈械 蟹薪邪褔懈 薪械褖芯 懈 懈屑邪 薪褍卸写邪 锟斤拷邪 谐芯 芯褋屑懈褋谢懈褕 懈薪邪褔械 懈蟹褌褗褉胁邪褕 褋屑懈褋褗谢邪 薪邪 胁褋懈褔泻芯. 小懈谢薪芯 锌褉械锌芯褉褗褔胁邪屑!
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December 24, 2013Gellner gets quite a bit right about the invention of nationalism-- especially how the practices of high culture become masked as ancient and inviolable folk tradition-- but he also gets quite a bit wrong. Perhaps he's right about the creation of a specific type of nationalism, one that is predicated on an industrial or post-industrial society and expressed most strongly in Central and Western Europe, and he's playing fast and loose with his words, but there seem to be plenty of nationalist movements that have occurred in largely pre-industrial societies, especially outside Europe. I far prefer Benedict Anderson's account, which suggests that it is the printed text and its distribution, above all else, that builds the imagined community requisite for nationalism.
But as I said Gellner is right a lot of the time, and he's thought-provoking and clear-eyed throughout. His illustration of the fictional states of "Ruritania" and "Megalomania" is honestly more entertaining than most of the fiction I've read in recent months.
But as I said Gellner is right a lot of the time, and he's thought-provoking and clear-eyed throughout. His illustration of the fictional states of "Ruritania" and "Megalomania" is honestly more entertaining than most of the fiction I've read in recent months.
June 7, 2022
[Updated - scroll to "Theory of discrimination"]
What do you call it when a book on a gut level alligns with your own worldview but provides no evidence to back itself up? Homework, for me, I reckon.
Broadly, studies of nationalism adhere to one of two schools of thought. There's Benedict Anderson's constructivism that conceives of nationalism as the willed product of a community, and there's Gellner's functionalist approach that sees it as the visible edge of industrial dynamics that act through but themselves precede the nation. Neither is obviously wrong, but they focus on a different moment as to what kickstarts nationalism: Anderson focuses on the printing press and capitalism that enable communities to imagine themselves as nations, while Gellner sees industry-required homogenization that by chance is filled in as nationalism -- the first voluntarist, the second, arguably, materialist. The second dovetails with my own thinking on nationalism and discrimination (see for instance this review on Russian civil-war pogroms).
Gellner discerns two ecologies with different rules for communities.
Once society remakes itself in this industrial mold (Gellner avoids 'capital', which to him is seldom the marker of social strife -- legal and cultural inequality bears much stronger on public consciousness than degrees of capital ownership) strong homogenizing tendencies establish themselves. For the ruling class, the more people pass through the labour market and compete, the stronger the downward pressure on wages; hence every barrier to this market must be torn down. Social structures within this industrial society only survive to the degree that they can accommodate this; other (feudal, religious, caste, etc) are swept away by the forces of industrial entropy. That's not to say that these relics of bygone eras cannot survive for some time, but they cannot on their own terms, and they certainly won't spring up anew.
This homogenization is expressed as nationalism. This is not willed by a particular actor (contra Anderson) but simply the result of industrial revolutions requiring a universally interchangeable workforce.
Theory of discrimination
Especially piercing is Gellner's theory of discrimination. The commonplace liberal view of discrimination is that it's a problem of cumulative attitudes: when enough people dislike a group, they're kept out of places of power. Hence their oppression is the result of ill-will, with the decision to dislike itself the prime mover. In lefty spaces, this is sometimes explained as the result of capitalist propaganda aiming to divide-and-conquer.
Gellner's explanation is functionalist.
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In agrarian civilizations, social mobility is superfluous and castes emphasize their differences. Languages, dress, religious customs and social rituals reflect the qualitative differences between each layer of society. Discrimination is accepted and promoted, the natural product of agrarian stratification, prejudice a social compass.
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In industrial societies, social mobility is existentially necessary. Arbitrary barriers between trades (horizontal) and layers of power and privilege (vertical) are broken down. To the degree that they remain, they're holdouts against the social tide, not the natural expression of industrial society. There is legal equality of individuals. There are no hard and fast inborn characteristics that can preclude a person from occupying a specific social space. The vast majority of people will not be lifted up to the higher echelons of power (encompassing at most 15% of society), not because of specific ill-will but simply because the amount of privileged positions is limited. The will-to-discrimination only asserts itself after society has been stratified along occupational lines.
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Now imagine one social group (Gellner proposes 'blue-pigmented people') occurring predominantly on the lowest social rungs. For instance, in Belgium, the vast majority of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants arrived here to work in low-wage jobs in the booming 60s. Their families and descendants are still mostly situated there.
There is no legal barrier preventing them from climbing up. But doing so requires social capital (education, language fluency, the social networks, opportunities that grow out of graduating at prestigious institutions) which they haven't had the chance to accumulate. The fact that the majority of these groups will for some time remain where they are will prejudice people towards this group, based not on a willed but an observed inferiority. In other words, attitudinal discrimination is a contradictory consequence of the opening up of the labour market in industrial society; the 2 facts of social mobility and social inertia coexisting creates popular prejudice.
In the end, these groups must and will climb and spread out over all layers, until prejudice becomes self-evidently false.
This view has 2 advantages over the under-theorized 'racial-capitalist' explanations of discrimination:
- it is a more universally applicable framework. The American experience seems to show that recreating caste and discrimination are preconditions of capitalism. But segregation is not the norm, and looking at Portuguese, French and other imperialisms it is clear that in some civilizations social entropy breaking down legal barriers to individual social mobility won out over atavistic racial brokerage.
- it shifts the terrain of action. While liberal antiracism focuses on changing attitudes and lifting up individual voices, Gellner makes clear that attitudes don't play a (primary) causal role in discrimination, but rather are a second-order effect of it. To uplift groups from a socially subservient level, respected and well-paid occupations must be made available. This places the burden on the capitalist class unwilling to invest and create decent jobs, instead of on the amorphous mass of the people.
One aspect lacking in Gellner's book, which he himself acknowledges, is an understanding of explicitly racist or fascist civilizations that spring back from liberal democracies. This might be forgiven, as very few fascist states ever developed, while every country small or large developed nationalism.
What do you call it when a book on a gut level alligns with your own worldview but provides no evidence to back itself up? Homework, for me, I reckon.
Broadly, studies of nationalism adhere to one of two schools of thought. There's Benedict Anderson's constructivism that conceives of nationalism as the willed product of a community, and there's Gellner's functionalist approach that sees it as the visible edge of industrial dynamics that act through but themselves precede the nation. Neither is obviously wrong, but they focus on a different moment as to what kickstarts nationalism: Anderson focuses on the printing press and capitalism that enable communities to imagine themselves as nations, while Gellner sees industry-required homogenization that by chance is filled in as nationalism -- the first voluntarist, the second, arguably, materialist. The second dovetails with my own thinking on nationalism and discrimination (see for instance this review on Russian civil-war pogroms).
Gellner discerns two ecologies with different rules for communities.
Agricultural civilizations tend towards social stability and internal cultural differentiation. Occupation-related skills and knowledge are passed on within guilds, families and local communities. Peasant families often inherit their land for generations. Countries, even if governed over by a unitary state machine, are cobbled together from linguistically pockets because physical mobility is neither required nor encouraged and hence no universal language spread. The ruling classes (clergy, state administration) are immanently encouraged to differentiate themselves from the governed: clergies without children or families reduce the risk of nepotism and particularist attachment, as do courts of different linguistic communities than those they rule. Indeed, kings were often imported from different dynasties to govern regions they had no cultural familiarity with.
Industrial civilizations tend towards social mobility and homogenization. Wage relations dominate and redefine working-class individuals as general interchangeable workers instead of members of an organic productive community. One day a man might work as a day labourer in a pin factory, the next as a miner, then again as a metalworker. In service of this horizontal mobility, literacy and printing is encouraged so as to easily store and convey information that before was passed on locally and orally. Education is universalized. The distance between ruled and ruler is erased, isolated ruling castes are dissolved, no longer do eunuchs or celibate priests rule society, the risk of particularist attachments are accepted and counterbalanced by the rapid turnover of political and administrative clerks. In short,
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his 鈥渘atural superiors鈥�, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 鈥渃ash payment鈥�. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom 鈥� Free Trade. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.
Once society remakes itself in this industrial mold (Gellner avoids 'capital', which to him is seldom the marker of social strife -- legal and cultural inequality bears much stronger on public consciousness than degrees of capital ownership) strong homogenizing tendencies establish themselves. For the ruling class, the more people pass through the labour market and compete, the stronger the downward pressure on wages; hence every barrier to this market must be torn down. Social structures within this industrial society only survive to the degree that they can accommodate this; other (feudal, religious, caste, etc) are swept away by the forces of industrial entropy. That's not to say that these relics of bygone eras cannot survive for some time, but they cannot on their own terms, and they certainly won't spring up anew.
This homogenization is expressed as nationalism. This is not willed by a particular actor (contra Anderson) but simply the result of industrial revolutions requiring a universally interchangeable workforce.
Theory of discrimination
Especially piercing is Gellner's theory of discrimination. The commonplace liberal view of discrimination is that it's a problem of cumulative attitudes: when enough people dislike a group, they're kept out of places of power. Hence their oppression is the result of ill-will, with the decision to dislike itself the prime mover. In lefty spaces, this is sometimes explained as the result of capitalist propaganda aiming to divide-and-conquer.
Gellner's explanation is functionalist.
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In agrarian civilizations, social mobility is superfluous and castes emphasize their differences. Languages, dress, religious customs and social rituals reflect the qualitative differences between each layer of society. Discrimination is accepted and promoted, the natural product of agrarian stratification, prejudice a social compass.
[image error]
In industrial societies, social mobility is existentially necessary. Arbitrary barriers between trades (horizontal) and layers of power and privilege (vertical) are broken down. To the degree that they remain, they're holdouts against the social tide, not the natural expression of industrial society. There is legal equality of individuals. There are no hard and fast inborn characteristics that can preclude a person from occupying a specific social space. The vast majority of people will not be lifted up to the higher echelons of power (encompassing at most 15% of society), not because of specific ill-will but simply because the amount of privileged positions is limited. The will-to-discrimination only asserts itself after society has been stratified along occupational lines.
[image error]
Now imagine one social group (Gellner proposes 'blue-pigmented people') occurring predominantly on the lowest social rungs. For instance, in Belgium, the vast majority of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants arrived here to work in low-wage jobs in the booming 60s. Their families and descendants are still mostly situated there.
There is no legal barrier preventing them from climbing up. But doing so requires social capital (education, language fluency, the social networks, opportunities that grow out of graduating at prestigious institutions) which they haven't had the chance to accumulate. The fact that the majority of these groups will for some time remain where they are will prejudice people towards this group, based not on a willed but an observed inferiority. In other words, attitudinal discrimination is a contradictory consequence of the opening up of the labour market in industrial society; the 2 facts of social mobility and social inertia coexisting creates popular prejudice.
In the end, these groups must and will climb and spread out over all layers, until prejudice becomes self-evidently false.
This view has 2 advantages over the under-theorized 'racial-capitalist' explanations of discrimination:
- it is a more universally applicable framework. The American experience seems to show that recreating caste and discrimination are preconditions of capitalism. But segregation is not the norm, and looking at Portuguese, French and other imperialisms it is clear that in some civilizations social entropy breaking down legal barriers to individual social mobility won out over atavistic racial brokerage.
- it shifts the terrain of action. While liberal antiracism focuses on changing attitudes and lifting up individual voices, Gellner makes clear that attitudes don't play a (primary) causal role in discrimination, but rather are a second-order effect of it. To uplift groups from a socially subservient level, respected and well-paid occupations must be made available. This places the burden on the capitalist class unwilling to invest and create decent jobs, instead of on the amorphous mass of the people.
One aspect lacking in Gellner's book, which he himself acknowledges, is an understanding of explicitly racist or fascist civilizations that spring back from liberal democracies. This might be forgiven, as very few fascist states ever developed, while every country small or large developed nationalism.
March 18, 2024
It's comforting to think of nationalism as a ruling class Svengali, whose spell can be broken with the right party educational program and consciousness raising sloganeering. Why else would the workers of the world slaughter each other by the millions, if not for trickery?
Ernest Gellner demolishes this idea. He advances a materialist explanation of nationalism which argues that it is a consequence of industrial modernity. Nationalism isn't just an ideological project cooked up by intellectuals. It's a survival mechanism that makes daily life possible - especially for the working classes
In agrarian society, culture is not thought of vis a vis other cultures. It is simply taken for granted; a person stays in a village or town for their entire life, doing whatever role providence has assigned to them - probably farming - for their entire life.
Industrialization changed this. To quote Marx, it "rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life." It was a painful salvation: all the old ties were torn up and the people were thrown into the ever churning world of the city.
To survive, people need to communicate. We communicate with strangers on a daily basis. It's hard to imagine otherwise, but this wasn't the case for most of human history. With the industrial revolution, millions found themselves shoulder to shoulder with strangers, people with whom they shared no reference point, other than perhaps religion and language. Even then, regional differences such as dialect could make putative members of the same linguistic/religious group incomprehensible to one another (I once read an account of an English boat that had been blown onto shore in Kent after a storm. Local peasants thought the sailors were French when they heard them speak).
Nationalist education made communication possible in this contextless, abstract world. A standardized "high" culture, based on a distorted form of "low", folk culture, as well as mass literacy, replaced the informality of the village. This enabled the social mobility necessary for an industrial economy to function. Mass literacy was the one Enlightenment promise consistently kept by the regimes of the 20th Century. The Soviet Union had a constitution and a legal system: everyone knew that these were jokes. But by 1937, the height of the Stalinist purges, most Soviet citizens could read.
I have issues with Gellner's treatment of those intellectuals who attempted to use nationalism to jumpstart the process of industrial modernity. His is a functionalist argument: industrialization must come before nationalism. Intellectuals or not, nationalism emerges wherever there's industrialization, so nationalist politics don't matter that much. This fails to account for the success of Third World nationalist projects of the Cold War in places like Cuba and Vietnam. Did militarization stand in for industrialization in those cases? That's for another time...
The most important lesson is how nationalism perpetuates itself once it has been established as a force in the political life of country. Nationalism persists not because it is an escape valve for working class grievances, a way to blame the Other instead of the boss. Religion could just as easily fill that role. Nationalism only works when it serves a material purpose by providing a reliable means of facilitating communication in an otherwise contextless environment. If a nationalism can't do this, it remains the dream of an intellectual (or a weirdo on Twitter).
Nationalism is neither proof of our inherent barbarism as a species, nor is it a case of "false consciousness". Nationalist ideology is certainly important, but all the propaganda in the world can't make a nation. Nationalism continues to be a lynchpin of political life because it, at present, makes modern life possible.
Ernest Gellner demolishes this idea. He advances a materialist explanation of nationalism which argues that it is a consequence of industrial modernity. Nationalism isn't just an ideological project cooked up by intellectuals. It's a survival mechanism that makes daily life possible - especially for the working classes
In agrarian society, culture is not thought of vis a vis other cultures. It is simply taken for granted; a person stays in a village or town for their entire life, doing whatever role providence has assigned to them - probably farming - for their entire life.
Industrialization changed this. To quote Marx, it "rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life." It was a painful salvation: all the old ties were torn up and the people were thrown into the ever churning world of the city.
To survive, people need to communicate. We communicate with strangers on a daily basis. It's hard to imagine otherwise, but this wasn't the case for most of human history. With the industrial revolution, millions found themselves shoulder to shoulder with strangers, people with whom they shared no reference point, other than perhaps religion and language. Even then, regional differences such as dialect could make putative members of the same linguistic/religious group incomprehensible to one another (I once read an account of an English boat that had been blown onto shore in Kent after a storm. Local peasants thought the sailors were French when they heard them speak).
Nationalist education made communication possible in this contextless, abstract world. A standardized "high" culture, based on a distorted form of "low", folk culture, as well as mass literacy, replaced the informality of the village. This enabled the social mobility necessary for an industrial economy to function. Mass literacy was the one Enlightenment promise consistently kept by the regimes of the 20th Century. The Soviet Union had a constitution and a legal system: everyone knew that these were jokes. But by 1937, the height of the Stalinist purges, most Soviet citizens could read.
I have issues with Gellner's treatment of those intellectuals who attempted to use nationalism to jumpstart the process of industrial modernity. His is a functionalist argument: industrialization must come before nationalism. Intellectuals or not, nationalism emerges wherever there's industrialization, so nationalist politics don't matter that much. This fails to account for the success of Third World nationalist projects of the Cold War in places like Cuba and Vietnam. Did militarization stand in for industrialization in those cases? That's for another time...
The most important lesson is how nationalism perpetuates itself once it has been established as a force in the political life of country. Nationalism persists not because it is an escape valve for working class grievances, a way to blame the Other instead of the boss. Religion could just as easily fill that role. Nationalism only works when it serves a material purpose by providing a reliable means of facilitating communication in an otherwise contextless environment. If a nationalism can't do this, it remains the dream of an intellectual (or a weirdo on Twitter).
Nationalism is neither proof of our inherent barbarism as a species, nor is it a case of "false consciousness". Nationalist ideology is certainly important, but all the propaganda in the world can't make a nation. Nationalism continues to be a lynchpin of political life because it, at present, makes modern life possible.
November 1, 2013
Gellner's is one of those theories of nationalism that some call 'modernist,' meaning that he believes, like Benedict Anderson, that nations are less natural or ageless historical communities, than they are phenomenons emerging alongside or in reaction to modernity;
The reader having skimmed through Imagined Communities before approaching Gellner might have been left, as I was, disatisfied with Anderson's original but relatively narrow reading of modernity, and expect to find in Gellner's work a more wide-ranging analysis informed by the author's anthropological training;
In this case he might be somewhat disappointed to discover that Gellner's analysis, although dealing with a broader focus than that of print-capitalism, retain something of a sociological biais: to him nationalism arises from the overlapping mismatch of a modern cultural and linguistic tradition and of the state and political boundaries in which it emerged. Industrialization, in his theory, requires an homogenous and educated population to service its everchanging metabolism, which in turn produces a homogenous and identity conscious culture. When the outlinr of the existing state fails to conform to those newly imagined boundaries, the tension take the form of nationalism, which will eventually give birth to nations.
If there is little doubt that nationalism result from the friction between cultural/utopian (imagined) communities and actually existing political ones, Gellner's view fail to take in consideration a number of aspect, such as the extent of the continuity between nationalist and religious communities, imagined communities in their own right (invisible church etc) from whom many elements of the nationalist liturgy has clearly been borrowed.
This surely comes from his dismissal of the nationalist doctrine as a typical case of false consciousness (but a necessary one, insofar as for him there can be no modernity without nationalism) - a point I would be inclined to agree with. Yet, if the nationalist doctrines are fictions they should not be ignored wholesale either, and in my eyes deserve an attention that might have mitigated his reductionism;
Elsewhere (Plough,Sword and Book) Gellner devellops the idea of many-stranded thought to characterize the counterfactual mode of thought of pre-aggrarian cultures: this, to him, allow for the same type of utterance or notion serve both the rational purpose to describe the real, or to express an abstract feeling of belonging to a community of believer. One can only be surprised that he could not call onto this very adroit concept rather than dismiss nationalist content under the title of false consciousness - itself a marxist concept one might have expected him to dismiss as lazy...
The reader having skimmed through Imagined Communities before approaching Gellner might have been left, as I was, disatisfied with Anderson's original but relatively narrow reading of modernity, and expect to find in Gellner's work a more wide-ranging analysis informed by the author's anthropological training;
In this case he might be somewhat disappointed to discover that Gellner's analysis, although dealing with a broader focus than that of print-capitalism, retain something of a sociological biais: to him nationalism arises from the overlapping mismatch of a modern cultural and linguistic tradition and of the state and political boundaries in which it emerged. Industrialization, in his theory, requires an homogenous and educated population to service its everchanging metabolism, which in turn produces a homogenous and identity conscious culture. When the outlinr of the existing state fails to conform to those newly imagined boundaries, the tension take the form of nationalism, which will eventually give birth to nations.
If there is little doubt that nationalism result from the friction between cultural/utopian (imagined) communities and actually existing political ones, Gellner's view fail to take in consideration a number of aspect, such as the extent of the continuity between nationalist and religious communities, imagined communities in their own right (invisible church etc) from whom many elements of the nationalist liturgy has clearly been borrowed.
This surely comes from his dismissal of the nationalist doctrine as a typical case of false consciousness (but a necessary one, insofar as for him there can be no modernity without nationalism) - a point I would be inclined to agree with. Yet, if the nationalist doctrines are fictions they should not be ignored wholesale either, and in my eyes deserve an attention that might have mitigated his reductionism;
Elsewhere (Plough,Sword and Book) Gellner devellops the idea of many-stranded thought to characterize the counterfactual mode of thought of pre-aggrarian cultures: this, to him, allow for the same type of utterance or notion serve both the rational purpose to describe the real, or to express an abstract feeling of belonging to a community of believer. One can only be surprised that he could not call onto this very adroit concept rather than dismiss nationalist content under the title of false consciousness - itself a marxist concept one might have expected him to dismiss as lazy...
May 27, 2018
An interesting philosophical and anthropological analysis of nations and nationalism. Although this lacked the historical thinking that I find most engaging, it was interesting to look at the concept of nationalism through another lens. Gellner is structured- but I share many of the conceptual and explanatory criticisms this text has faced. This is probably a result of my historical approach.
November 2, 2010
One of about the four major texts on the "modernist" theory of nationalism. And two of the other three guys work off of him. Writing a paper on nationalism for one of my classes- God you find out what a small, idol-worshipping world academia is right quick in this field.
Read
January 17, 2022The book offers an excellent insight into the emergence of nationalism. I cannot recall that I've taken as many notes per page as with this book, I highly recommend it.
April 13, 2015
In an era that is doctrinally anti-(explicit-)doctrine, people like to emphasize that grand theories, even the putatively best ones, have blinders, and that the otherwise orthodox are at their most interesting when they ramble off the plantation to make ad hoc observations. Well, they do, and sometimes they are, but the opposite is at least equally true, even in the case of the worst grand theories. Gellner is at his best and most interesting when he operates within the confines of a not even explicitly acknowledged structural functionalism (even when he raises dissent from, say, Durkheim-cum-Parsons on the degree of differentiation in modern society,) his ad hoc observations, by contrast, add little to the analysis. Like Benedict Anderson, Gellner is interested in the apparent empirical connection between mass literacy and the rise of nationalism, here understood as the demand that political boundaries correspond in some way to cultural ones; his answer is that in mass-literate societies with a complex division of labor the ancient Stands or castes or whatever that made up agricultural civilization are no longer culturally self-reproducing, but that all cultural reproduction now must proceed through the mass educational institutions overseen by the state. Within this framework he is able to provide an at least facially plausible account of the universal rise of nationality, his less systematic attempts to explain the different waves or varieties of nationalism are correspondingly less persuasive, but on the whole, his abstract and general account is not incompatible with alternative accounts (of which there are many) of this latter question.
To a great extent Gellner's proposals have already been absorbed into, and critiqued by, the subsequent literature on nationalism. However, he states them more clearly (and entertainingly!) than you are likely to find elsewhere, and this is a short book, so you have little to lose by giving it a read.
To a great extent Gellner's proposals have already been absorbed into, and critiqued by, the subsequent literature on nationalism. However, he states them more clearly (and entertainingly!) than you are likely to find elsewhere, and this is a short book, so you have little to lose by giving it a read.
April 12, 2019
Nations and Nationalism, Ernest Gellner
Nationalism, according to Ernest Gellner, is a political principle that binds the State and the nation in a tightly knit framework. However, what influences nationalism? Is it the need for a nation that engenders nationalism? Gellner argues that nationalism brings about the formation of the nation; the need for an ideology that is culturally rooted, economically sustainable and politically active generates nationalism.
Gellner affirms that it is the industrial revolution that demanded the formation of nations. An industrial society presupposes the presence of a populace that speaks and writes a common language. Most importantly, people need to possess technical abilities to sustain themselves in the industrial era. A highly centralized education system imbibes these virtues on the people; thereby resulting in the formation of a specific culture which is strengthened by the governmental apparatus.
What is problematic about Gellner鈥檚 argument is that the birth of nationalism has not always followed this pattern, especially in colonized countries or present-day Third World Countries! In the face of sharp colonial oppression, people united to demand an independent nation. It is in the idea of nationalizing the nation that nationalism took a definite pattern in these countries. Hence, those who did not fall within the national frame were considered as minorities. For instance, the Muslims who opted to stay in India after 1947 Partition.
Nationalism, according to Ernest Gellner, is a political principle that binds the State and the nation in a tightly knit framework. However, what influences nationalism? Is it the need for a nation that engenders nationalism? Gellner argues that nationalism brings about the formation of the nation; the need for an ideology that is culturally rooted, economically sustainable and politically active generates nationalism.
Gellner affirms that it is the industrial revolution that demanded the formation of nations. An industrial society presupposes the presence of a populace that speaks and writes a common language. Most importantly, people need to possess technical abilities to sustain themselves in the industrial era. A highly centralized education system imbibes these virtues on the people; thereby resulting in the formation of a specific culture which is strengthened by the governmental apparatus.
What is problematic about Gellner鈥檚 argument is that the birth of nationalism has not always followed this pattern, especially in colonized countries or present-day Third World Countries! In the face of sharp colonial oppression, people united to demand an independent nation. It is in the idea of nationalizing the nation that nationalism took a definite pattern in these countries. Hence, those who did not fall within the national frame were considered as minorities. For instance, the Muslims who opted to stay in India after 1947 Partition.
December 30, 2019
My opinion of this book shouldn't downplay its value as a seminal work in the field; rather, it stems entirely from the fact that such a well-known professor didn't have an editor who told him to stop indiscriminately using commas. My biggest pet peeve about many academic books is the total lack of writing skill and style from authors that takes away from the substance of their books, and this is a prime example. Now that I'm done with my rant, I can say that Gellner's work might seem outdated -- he ignores the Soviet Union almost completely in his work -- but it has salience because it can be debated and picked apart. I'm not convinced that nationalism is a by-product of industrialism, as he claims, or that the rationality of the process necessarily explains why, for example, someone is willing to die for his country.
April 4, 2021
Though I believe his arguments on the subject are fundamentally wrong, his treatment of the topic of nationalism is nonetheless a foundational one and required reading for anyone who seeks to understand it.
January 26, 2021
ulus莽uluk alan谋ndaki en 枚nde gelen kitaplardan biri oldu臒u i莽in ele艧tirmeye hakk谋m olmad谋臒谋n谋 d眉艧眉n眉yorum asl谋nda, nihayetinde s谋radan bir siyaset 枚臒rencisiyim ben. fakat s枚ylemeden ge莽emeyece臒im 艧eyler var;
1) kitap gereksiz uzun, yani ger莽ekten. belki 90-100 sayfada anlatabilece臒i 艧eyi 260 sayfaya yaym谋艧. mevzuyla direkt ba臒lant谋s谋 olmayan (en az谋ndan bana g枚re) konulara 莽ok fazla yer verip verip "bu ba艧ka bir konu" diyerek konuyu kapat谋yor. ba艧ka bir konuysa neden ben 27 sayfa boyunca bunu anlatman谋 okudum 艧imdi? fenal谋k ge莽irdim gereksiz uzat谋lm谋艧 i莽eri臒inden 枚t眉r眉.
2) kitab谋n ger莽ekten 莽ok harika tespitleri var, bunu s枚ylemeden ge莽emeyece臒im tabii ki. 枚zellikle de durkheim'谋n din yorumunu ulus莽ulu臒a 艧u 艧ekilde uyarlamas谋 莽ok ho艧uma gitti ve bir nevi eureka an谋 ya艧att谋 bana: "Durkheim鈥檌n 枚臒retisi bize toplumun dini ibadet yolu ile kendi gizli imaj谋na tapt谋臒谋n谋 s枚yler. Ulus莽u bir 莽a臒da ise toplumlar b枚yle bir kamuflajdan s谋yr谋larak pi艧kinlik ve a莽谋kl谋kla kendilerine tap谋n谋rlar."
ama... ama... kitap 脟OK FAZLA tekrara d眉艧眉yor. belki kitab谋 莽ok uzun ara verip okusayd谋m bu tekrarlar hat谋rlama a莽谋s谋ndan benim i莽in faydal谋 olurdu ama b眉y眉k b枚l眉m眉n眉 bir oturu艧ta okudu臒um i莽in yine fenal谋k ge莽irdi臒im bir durum ortaya 莽谋kt谋. kitab谋n gerekenden uzun olmas谋n谋n bir di臒er nedeni de bu, ayn谋 艧eyi farkl谋 formlarda 936 kere s枚ylemi艧 莽眉nk眉 yazar.
3) son olarak kitap bazen bana 莽ok kar谋艧谋k geldi. yani bu 莽eviriden kaynakl谋 m谋 yoksa kurulan c眉mleleri alg谋layacak kadar iq'ya sahip olmamamdan m谋 kaynaklan谋yor bilmiyorum ama birka莽 kez okuyup da anlamad谋臒谋m 莽ok c眉mle vard谋. bu da do臒al olarak kitaba odaklanmam谋 zorla艧t谋rd谋.
sonu莽 olarak, siyaset bilimi literat眉r眉nde inan谋lmaz 枚nemli ve say谋s谋z kez at谋fta bulunulan bir kaynak oldu臒u kesin olmakla birlikte anlat谋m tarz谋 ve gereksiz uzun tutulmu艧 olmas谋ndan 枚t眉r眉 kitab谋 be臒enemedim ben.
1) kitap gereksiz uzun, yani ger莽ekten. belki 90-100 sayfada anlatabilece臒i 艧eyi 260 sayfaya yaym谋艧. mevzuyla direkt ba臒lant谋s谋 olmayan (en az谋ndan bana g枚re) konulara 莽ok fazla yer verip verip "bu ba艧ka bir konu" diyerek konuyu kapat谋yor. ba艧ka bir konuysa neden ben 27 sayfa boyunca bunu anlatman谋 okudum 艧imdi? fenal谋k ge莽irdim gereksiz uzat谋lm谋艧 i莽eri臒inden 枚t眉r眉.
2) kitab谋n ger莽ekten 莽ok harika tespitleri var, bunu s枚ylemeden ge莽emeyece臒im tabii ki. 枚zellikle de durkheim'谋n din yorumunu ulus莽ulu臒a 艧u 艧ekilde uyarlamas谋 莽ok ho艧uma gitti ve bir nevi eureka an谋 ya艧att谋 bana: "Durkheim鈥檌n 枚臒retisi bize toplumun dini ibadet yolu ile kendi gizli imaj谋na tapt谋臒谋n谋 s枚yler. Ulus莽u bir 莽a臒da ise toplumlar b枚yle bir kamuflajdan s谋yr谋larak pi艧kinlik ve a莽谋kl谋kla kendilerine tap谋n谋rlar."
ama... ama... kitap 脟OK FAZLA tekrara d眉艧眉yor. belki kitab谋 莽ok uzun ara verip okusayd谋m bu tekrarlar hat谋rlama a莽谋s谋ndan benim i莽in faydal谋 olurdu ama b眉y眉k b枚l眉m眉n眉 bir oturu艧ta okudu臒um i莽in yine fenal谋k ge莽irdi臒im bir durum ortaya 莽谋kt谋. kitab谋n gerekenden uzun olmas谋n谋n bir di臒er nedeni de bu, ayn谋 艧eyi farkl谋 formlarda 936 kere s枚ylemi艧 莽眉nk眉 yazar.
3) son olarak kitap bazen bana 莽ok kar谋艧谋k geldi. yani bu 莽eviriden kaynakl谋 m谋 yoksa kurulan c眉mleleri alg谋layacak kadar iq'ya sahip olmamamdan m谋 kaynaklan谋yor bilmiyorum ama birka莽 kez okuyup da anlamad谋臒谋m 莽ok c眉mle vard谋. bu da do臒al olarak kitaba odaklanmam谋 zorla艧t谋rd谋.
sonu莽 olarak, siyaset bilimi literat眉r眉nde inan谋lmaz 枚nemli ve say谋s谋z kez at谋fta bulunulan bir kaynak oldu臒u kesin olmakla birlikte anlat谋m tarz谋 ve gereksiz uzun tutulmu艧 olmas谋ndan 枚t眉r眉 kitab谋 be臒enemedim ben.
June 11, 2021
A magnificently brief and simple, yet comprehensive and broad in its scope account of how modern nationalism has come to create and dominate the contemporary social system of nation-states. Looking at history through a tripartite prism (Hunter-gatherer, agrarian and industrial societies), Ernest Gellner cogently demonstrates how the social conditions of the industrializing and modernizing societies transformed the social structure and made nationalism as a phenomenon unavoidable. While the ideological component of 鈥淣ationalism鈥� is contingent and not mandatory, the generic system of the political nations identified by culture and economy was inevitable after the traditional institutions (church, family, crafts and trades, estates) became deconstructed. The universalization of literacy and clerisy (a.k.a. bureaucracy) was a defining process in this context.
Identifying access to education and to power as two major factors, Gellner produces a useful typology of nationalisms - a 鈥渢ypical鈥�, unificatory nationalism of Western Europe, an 鈥渁typical鈥�, liberation nationalism of Eastern Europe (Habsburg empire and the lands east and south of it), diaspora nationalism (stateless and dispersed nation or nation-in-exile from the colonized homeland), and 5 other situations where differentials in knowledge and power might exist, but the lack of cultural difference fails to produce a nationalism. This includes the early industrial capitalism critiqued by Marx and the mature industrial system, which Marx failed to foresee. Is this latter the future of the global world? Will nationalism lose its importance? Gellner thought not, and the decades since he wrote the book in 1983 have proven him correct.
This simple and so ingenious book has added several dimensions to my understanding of the phenomena of nations and nationalism.
Identifying access to education and to power as two major factors, Gellner produces a useful typology of nationalisms - a 鈥渢ypical鈥�, unificatory nationalism of Western Europe, an 鈥渁typical鈥�, liberation nationalism of Eastern Europe (Habsburg empire and the lands east and south of it), diaspora nationalism (stateless and dispersed nation or nation-in-exile from the colonized homeland), and 5 other situations where differentials in knowledge and power might exist, but the lack of cultural difference fails to produce a nationalism. This includes the early industrial capitalism critiqued by Marx and the mature industrial system, which Marx failed to foresee. Is this latter the future of the global world? Will nationalism lose its importance? Gellner thought not, and the decades since he wrote the book in 1983 have proven him correct.
This simple and so ingenious book has added several dimensions to my understanding of the phenomena of nations and nationalism.
January 15, 2025
An interesting opinion on the development of Nationalist thought and ideas. Ernest Gellner rejects the idea that nationalism is anything more than a formless force, or that it is an ideological construct - even though, it can assume such an artificial form. The point of the book is that, at its purest, nationalism is a necessity of the industrial era. A world where social differences tend to be less and less important - where the economical state dictates an egalitarian social one (not that it happens, just that there is where it tends to be). In such a world, resistant-to-change attributes, such as ethnicity, education or culture tend to come out naturally and re-establish themselves as their own. In an agricultural society, these differences were equalled with social ones, yet in the industrial world, they take a new significance. It is that homogeneity - which some anti-globalists nationalists fear the most - that drives nationalism itself.
A pretty fresh and interesting take on the subject, much better than the polemicist approach that I was somehow expecting.
9/10
A pretty fresh and interesting take on the subject, much better than the polemicist approach that I was somehow expecting.
9/10
dnf
April 20, 2020DNF @ 42%. I was supposed to read this for school, but it's Zoom University time and I feel zero motivation to do anything.
I did enjoy it, though. I would probably have rated it 3-4 stars. Alas.
I did enjoy it, though. I would probably have rated it 3-4 stars. Alas.
December 13, 2020
Skip this one. There are better texts that discuss nationalism. Many of Gellner鈥檚 core claims are overly simplistic; everything meaningful here could be encapsulated in the length of a journal article. He also declined to provide the reader footnotes 鈥� I counted something like 6 in total 鈥� for the reader to pursue further research (or to fact-check him!). Hobsbawm鈥檚 1990 text is a much better introduction to nationalism.
Gellner makes several major arguments about nationalism and nations: that the concept of nation is bound to a specific historical period, that there is no core definition of nation (although 鈥榗ulture鈥� is paramount), and that nationalism is an inevitable corollary of industrial society and modernity. Much of what he says has already been fleshed out by other writers; his only major contribution is the claim that nationalism was the side-product of industrial society鈥檚 division of labour that allows greater social mobility and requires state-wide basic education. This view contrasts with the other 鈥榤odernists,鈥� who emphasize the mass communication and linguistic centralization of modern society. However, most of Gellner鈥檚 arguments supporting this view should have more detail, with some being so implausible. The fact that Gellner doesn鈥檛 cite is not helpful.
There is a major concept Gellner uses that I fundamentally disagree with. He discusses 鈥榗ulture鈥� as a homogeneous shared atmosphere of societies, 鈥渘o longer a diversified, locality-tied鈥� culture, something propagated by the state. To Gellner, this state-made high culture is the bedrock of nationalism.
Culture is not an opaque block of symmetric molecular composition. We can understand that there is such a thing as American culture, but that there are enormous variations within it. That doesn鈥檛 stop America from being a nation, nor do the many local cultures of Germany preclude such a thing as German nationhood. The inadequacies of Gellner鈥檚 view shows when we consider the frontiers of 鈥榥ations鈥� or 鈥榗ultures,鈥� such as in the mostly German-speaking Alsace-Lorraine where plebiscites repeatedly declared for France, in southern France where the local tongue was more comprehensible to a Catalan than a Parisian, or in Scotland wavering between a Scottish or British identity. The ideas of a pan-Arabic or pan-Slavic nation have presently failed, unlike the ideas of a pan-German or pan-Italian nation. The point is that culture too is constructed and inherently in tension 鈥� every individual human being conceptualizes culture and nation differently. Gellner鈥檚 view is unbelievably simplistic, and I would recommend the ethnosymbolists for a deeper understanding of culture. This text is rife with, in my opinion, minor misunderstandings here and there, but this is the biggest one and my biggest criticism.
Gellner makes several major arguments about nationalism and nations: that the concept of nation is bound to a specific historical period, that there is no core definition of nation (although 鈥榗ulture鈥� is paramount), and that nationalism is an inevitable corollary of industrial society and modernity. Much of what he says has already been fleshed out by other writers; his only major contribution is the claim that nationalism was the side-product of industrial society鈥檚 division of labour that allows greater social mobility and requires state-wide basic education. This view contrasts with the other 鈥榤odernists,鈥� who emphasize the mass communication and linguistic centralization of modern society. However, most of Gellner鈥檚 arguments supporting this view should have more detail, with some being so implausible. The fact that Gellner doesn鈥檛 cite is not helpful.
There is a major concept Gellner uses that I fundamentally disagree with. He discusses 鈥榗ulture鈥� as a homogeneous shared atmosphere of societies, 鈥渘o longer a diversified, locality-tied鈥� culture, something propagated by the state. To Gellner, this state-made high culture is the bedrock of nationalism.
Culture is not an opaque block of symmetric molecular composition. We can understand that there is such a thing as American culture, but that there are enormous variations within it. That doesn鈥檛 stop America from being a nation, nor do the many local cultures of Germany preclude such a thing as German nationhood. The inadequacies of Gellner鈥檚 view shows when we consider the frontiers of 鈥榥ations鈥� or 鈥榗ultures,鈥� such as in the mostly German-speaking Alsace-Lorraine where plebiscites repeatedly declared for France, in southern France where the local tongue was more comprehensible to a Catalan than a Parisian, or in Scotland wavering between a Scottish or British identity. The ideas of a pan-Arabic or pan-Slavic nation have presently failed, unlike the ideas of a pan-German or pan-Italian nation. The point is that culture too is constructed and inherently in tension 鈥� every individual human being conceptualizes culture and nation differently. Gellner鈥檚 view is unbelievably simplistic, and I would recommend the ethnosymbolists for a deeper understanding of culture. This text is rife with, in my opinion, minor misunderstandings here and there, but this is the biggest one and my biggest criticism.
December 31, 2014
It's a great book to come up with nationalism. I suppose this book has comprehensive methods to express why nations must exist for modernity process. This book gets an only holistic view about nations and nationalism on this subject. I suggest reading Gellner's theory instead of Anderson and other post-structuralist academics. Of course, they share a common core on some points, but the book differs from other books on historical analysis and the sociological imagination.
I've read many books on 'nation' concept, but only two of them are fascinating to express the concept's complexity. One is Anthony Smith and another one is Ernest Gellner. If you don't know anything about nation and nationalism, but you are curious on this subject, you should read the book to understand the nation concept. Of course, nations, like everything, are socially constructed, but it does not take account of anything anymore.
I've read many books on 'nation' concept, but only two of them are fascinating to express the concept's complexity. One is Anthony Smith and another one is Ernest Gellner. If you don't know anything about nation and nationalism, but you are curious on this subject, you should read the book to understand the nation concept. Of course, nations, like everything, are socially constructed, but it does not take account of anything anymore.
July 18, 2013
Gellner develops a systematic theory of nationalism. The book is self-contained and relatively easy to read. Accessible even to newcomers to the topic as it starts by introducing the nationalist principle and the state. From this point onward, Gellner explores the social causes and pre-conditions to nationalism and its deep connections to culture and education. This analysis and its consequences and implications are the core of the book. I consider the book (especially chapters one to seven) as brilliant and a must-read.
In my opinion, the weakest part of the book is that, although it gives satisfactory explanations of the different phases of nationalism and nationalist action, it says little about the transition between these phases and the forces behind them. I also missed a bit of historical data to back certain claims in the book.
In my opinion, the weakest part of the book is that, although it gives satisfactory explanations of the different phases of nationalism and nationalist action, it says little about the transition between these phases and the forces behind them. I also missed a bit of historical data to back certain claims in the book.
February 16, 2017
Read for Anthropolgy 391: Nation Building and Nationalism
This was a struggle to get through due to complex writing and a lot of references to historical events (I don't have a good handle on world history). But I came out the other side having learned something, and probably able to read the book again and get even more out of it.
Discussed are ideas like:
-The need for a shared experience through some form of mass media
-Folk culture as a precursor to nationalism
-The necessity of "forgetting" as an integral part of nationalist sentiment
This was a struggle to get through due to complex writing and a lot of references to historical events (I don't have a good handle on world history). But I came out the other side having learned something, and probably able to read the book again and get even more out of it.
Discussed are ideas like:
-The need for a shared experience through some form of mass media
-Folk culture as a precursor to nationalism
-The necessity of "forgetting" as an integral part of nationalist sentiment
August 6, 2019
Alman idelizmini lise felsefesi civar谋 枚臒renmi艧 olan bir 莽oklar谋ndan biri daha. Tofflervari bir karikat眉r Kant ve Hegel var arkada. Ayr谋nt谋l谋 notlar ald谋m ama buraya koyamayaca臒谋m - kitab谋n 眉st眉nde var. Kullan谋labilecek az say谋da kavramdan biri entropi d眉艧眉ncesi. Yaln谋zca 艧unu s枚ylemek gerek: Burjuva devrimlerinin varl谋臒谋n谋 unutmu艧 durumda. Daha do臒rusu onlar谋 ulusal devrimlerle 枚zde艧le艧tiriyor. B眉y眉k hata... 3 y谋ld谋z.
October 14, 2019
Starts off as a promising study of the consequences of Calvinist reformation and the mathematicization of the world, tying the emergence of nationalism to the needs of modern capitalism. Yet then, Gellner develops a theory in which nationalism is the glue that holds different factions together. He constantly overlooks the hidden depth beneath the ideological surface of nationalism, the latter being but a tool of the propertied to sustain the systematized exploitation.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 24, 2024
Disclaimer: the 2 stars is because I was simply not interested and there were things that I found hard to follow. But, more importantly, why did I assign myself a thesis-level text? That was foolish. Mr Gellner is, I鈥檓 sure, a well respected and highly skilled academic but he could also have a second career as a sleep coach.
July 19, 2018
Milliyet莽ilik kuramlar谋 literat眉r眉n眉n ba艧 yap谋tlar谋ndan. Ufuk a莽谋c谋. Bilimsel. Ayr谋ca okumay谋 d眉艧眉nenler i莽in:
January 20, 2009
An important book on the theory of nationalism, but it's a dry read and leaves many questions unanswered.
November 29, 2011
En forma breve pero precisa, Gellner muestra la evoluci贸n pol铆tica de la sociedad que ha permitido la gestaci贸n del concepto de naci贸n y nacionalidad.
March 4, 2016
Solid concepts and a good introduction to the concept of nationalism.
February 9, 2019
Too functionalist
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