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Very Short Introductions #121
丕賱賵毓賷: 賲賯丿賲丞 賯氐賷乇丞 噩丿丕賸
賲丕 丕賱賵毓賷 賵賲丕 賵馗賷賮鬲賴責 賰賷賮 賷賲賰賳 賱廿胤賱丕賯 丕賱賳亘囟丕鬲 丕賱賰賴乇亘丕卅賷丞 賲賳 賲賱丕賷賷賳 賲賳 禺賱丕賷丕 丕賱丿賲丕睾 丕賱賲鬲賳丕賴賷丞 丕賱氐睾乇 兀賳 鬲禺賱賯 禺亘乇鬲賳丕 亘丕賱毓丕賱賲責
兀氐亘丨 丕賱賵毓賷 丕賱丌賳 賲賵囟賵毓賸丕 賲孬賷乇賸丕貙 賵賯丿 賮鬲丨鬲 丕賱鬲胤賵乇丕鬲 丕賱丨丿賷孬丞 丕賱賲孬賷乇丞 賮賷 毓賱賲 丕賱賳賮爻 賴匕丕 丕賱賲賷丿丕賳 賱毓賱賲丕亍 丕賱亘賷賵賱賵噩賷丕 賵丕賱兀毓氐丕亘 賵毓賱賲丕亍 丕賱賳賮爻 賵丕賱賮賱丕爻賮丞. 賵賷賳丕賯卮 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱噩匕丕亘 賲賳 爻賱爻賱丞 芦賲賯丿賲丞 賯氐賷乇丞 噩丿賸賾丕禄 廿賳 賰賳丕 賳賲鬲賱賰 亘丕賱賮毓賱 廿乇丕丿丞賸 丨乇丞貙 賵賲丕 丕賱匕賷 賷禺賱賯 廿丨爻丕爻賳丕 亘丕賱匕丕鬲貙 賰賲丕 賷鬲賳丕賵賱 亘毓囟 丕賱賳馗乇賷丕鬲 丕賱賲賴賲丞貙 亘賲丕 賮賷賴丕 丕賱鬲噩丕乇亘 丕賱丨丿賷孬丞 丨賵賱 丕賱賮毓賱 賵丕賱賵毓賷貙 賵丕賱乇丐賷丞 賵丕賱丕賳鬲亘丕賴貙 賵丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱賵毓賷 丕賱賲鬲睾賷乇丞貙 賵鬲兀孬賷乇丕鬲 鬲賱賮 丕賱丿賲丕睾 賵丕賱毓賯丕賯賷乇. 鬲鬲爻丕亍賱 爻賵夭丕賳 亘賱丕賰賲賵乇 廿賳 賰丕賳 丕賱賵毓賷 賳賮爻賴 賵賴賲賸丕貙 賵賲賳 禺賱丕賱 匕賱賰 鬲賵囟丨 丕賱氐毓賵亘丞 丕賱卮丿賷丿丞 丕賱鬲賷 賷賵丕噩賴賴丕 丕賱毓賱賲丕亍 賵丕賱賮賱丕爻賮丞 賮賷 氐乇丕毓賴賲 賲賳 兀噩賱 毓亘賵乇 丕賱賴賵丞 丕賱爻丨賷賯丞 亘賷賳 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱賲丕丿賷 賵鬲噩乇亘鬲賳丕 丕賱禺丕氐丞 賮賷賴.
兀氐亘丨 丕賱賵毓賷 丕賱丌賳 賲賵囟賵毓賸丕 賲孬賷乇賸丕貙 賵賯丿 賮鬲丨鬲 丕賱鬲胤賵乇丕鬲 丕賱丨丿賷孬丞 丕賱賲孬賷乇丞 賮賷 毓賱賲 丕賱賳賮爻 賴匕丕 丕賱賲賷丿丕賳 賱毓賱賲丕亍 丕賱亘賷賵賱賵噩賷丕 賵丕賱兀毓氐丕亘 賵毓賱賲丕亍 丕賱賳賮爻 賵丕賱賮賱丕爻賮丞. 賵賷賳丕賯卮 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱噩匕丕亘 賲賳 爻賱爻賱丞 芦賲賯丿賲丞 賯氐賷乇丞 噩丿賸賾丕禄 廿賳 賰賳丕 賳賲鬲賱賰 亘丕賱賮毓賱 廿乇丕丿丞賸 丨乇丞貙 賵賲丕 丕賱匕賷 賷禺賱賯 廿丨爻丕爻賳丕 亘丕賱匕丕鬲貙 賰賲丕 賷鬲賳丕賵賱 亘毓囟 丕賱賳馗乇賷丕鬲 丕賱賲賴賲丞貙 亘賲丕 賮賷賴丕 丕賱鬲噩丕乇亘 丕賱丨丿賷孬丞 丨賵賱 丕賱賮毓賱 賵丕賱賵毓賷貙 賵丕賱乇丐賷丞 賵丕賱丕賳鬲亘丕賴貙 賵丨丕賱丕鬲 丕賱賵毓賷 丕賱賲鬲睾賷乇丞貙 賵鬲兀孬賷乇丕鬲 鬲賱賮 丕賱丿賲丕睾 賵丕賱毓賯丕賯賷乇. 鬲鬲爻丕亍賱 爻賵夭丕賳 亘賱丕賰賲賵乇 廿賳 賰丕賳 丕賱賵毓賷 賳賮爻賴 賵賴賲賸丕貙 賵賲賳 禺賱丕賱 匕賱賰 鬲賵囟丨 丕賱氐毓賵亘丞 丕賱卮丿賷丿丞 丕賱鬲賷 賷賵丕噩賴賴丕 丕賱毓賱賲丕亍 賵丕賱賮賱丕爻賮丞 賮賷 氐乇丕毓賴賲 賲賳 兀噩賱 毓亘賵乇 丕賱賴賵丞 丕賱爻丨賷賯丞 亘賷賳 丕賱毓丕賱賲 丕賱賲丕丿賷 賵鬲噩乇亘鬲賳丕 丕賱禺丕氐丞 賮賷賴.
144 pages, ebook
First published January 1, 2003
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About the author
Susan Blackmore
25听books301听followersSusan Jane Blackmore is a freelance writer, lecturer and broadcaster, and a Visiting Professor at the University of Plymouth. She has a degree in psychology and physiology from Oxford University (1973) and a PhD in parapsychology from the University of Surrey (1980). Her research interests include memes, evolutionary theory, consciousness, and meditation. She practices Zen and campaigns for drug legalization. Sue Blackmore no longer works on the paranormal.
She writes for several magazines and newspapers, blogs for the Guardian newspaper and Psychology Today, and is a frequent contributor and presenter on radio and television. She is author of over sixty academic articles, about fifty book contributions, and many book reviews. Her books include Dying to Live (on near-death experiences, 1993), In Search of the Light (autobiography, 1996),Test Your Psychic Powers (with Adam Hart-Davis, 1997), The Meme Machine (1999, now translated into 13 other languages), Consciousness: An Introduction (a textbook 2003), Conversations on Consciousness (2005) and Ten Zen Questions (2009).
She writes for several magazines and newspapers, blogs for the Guardian newspaper and Psychology Today, and is a frequent contributor and presenter on radio and television. She is author of over sixty academic articles, about fifty book contributions, and many book reviews. Her books include Dying to Live (on near-death experiences, 1993), In Search of the Light (autobiography, 1996),Test Your Psychic Powers (with Adam Hart-Davis, 1997), The Meme Machine (1999, now translated into 13 other languages), Consciousness: An Introduction (a textbook 2003), Conversations on Consciousness (2005) and Ten Zen Questions (2009).
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January 22, 2023
鬲毓乇賮 丕賷賴 毓賳 丕賱賵毓賶 賷丕 賲乇爻賶.
賵賱丕 賷丕 亘賴噩鬲 .. 賴賵 丕丨賳丕 毓賳丿賳丕 丨丕噩賴 賮賶 丕賱賲賳賴噩 丕爻賲賴丕 賵毓賶責
賯丿 鬲毓鬲賯丿 毓賳丿賲丕 鬲賯乇兀 丕賱毓賳賵丕賳 丕賳賰 鬲毓乇賮 賰賱 卮賶亍 賵 賱賰賳 賲毓 鬲賯賱賷亘賰 賱氐賮丨丕鬲 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賵 鬲賯賱亘賰 賮賷賲丕 賮賷賴 賵 賲丿賶 鬲賯亘賱賰 賱兀賮賰丕乇賴 賲賳 毓丿賲賴 爻鬲賰鬲卮賮 丕賳賰 賱丕 鬲毓乇賮 賲毓賳賶 丕賱賵毓賶 丕氐賱丕.
賴賱 賴賵 丕賱匕丕鬲 丕賲 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰 兀賲 賲爻鬲賵賶 丕賱匕賰丕亍 賵 丕賱廿賳鬲亘丕賴. 賴賱 賴賶 丕賱兀賲丕賳賴 賵 丨乇賷丞 丕賱丕禺鬲賷丕乇 賵 丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱丨乇丞. 賴賱 賴賵 丕丿乇丕賰賳丕 賱兀賳賮爻賳丕 賵 賱賱丌禺乇賷賳 兀賲 兀賳 賰賱 匕賱賰 賴賵 賲噩乇丿 賵賴賲 賵 賱賷爻 丕賱丕 孬賲丞 賲丕丿丞 賮賶 賲丕丿丞 賵 禺賱丕賷丕 賵 噩夭賷卅丕鬲 賵 賵賲囟丕鬲 賰賴乇亘賷丞 鬲丨乇賰 噩夭卅丕鬲 賲丕丿賷丞 胤賵丕賱 丕賱賵賯鬲. 賴賱 賳丨賳 馗丕賴乇丞 賱睾賵賷丞 氐賵鬲賷丞 賮賯胤 兀賲 兀賳 賴賳丕賰 毓賯賱 賵 賲禺. 乇賵丨 賵 賲丕丿丞.
禺丕賱賯 賵 賲禺賱賵賯. 丨賷丕丞 賵 賲賵鬲. 噩賲丕丿 賵 兀丨賷丕亍. 賴賱 賴賶 丕孬賳賷賳賷丞 丿丕卅賲丞 兀賲 鬲賵丨賷丿 賵 鬲賵丨丿 兀賵 賴賶 亘丿丕賷丞 賵 賳賴丕賷丞.
賲孬賱賲丕 亘丿兀鬲 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賳鬲賴賷鬲 亘賱 亘丨賷乇丞 兀賰孬乇 賲賲丕 丿禺賱鬲 賵 亘兀爻卅賱丞 鬲丨鬲丕噩 乇亘賲丕 賱毓卮乇丕鬲 丕賱賰鬲亘 賱鬲丿賵賷賳賴丕 賱丕 賱賱廿噩丕亘丞 毓賱賷賴丕
November 10, 2015
The Self is illusion 鈥� so says the Buddha; and Susan Blackmore agrees, albeit with more scientific evidence as backup.
***
The Hard Problem
We are sure that there is a world outside, filled with inanimate and live things. However, we can experience this world only through our senses: the colours, the smells and the feels. They are all we have, to form our idea about our environment. However, they are dependent upon the experiences of our brain, therefore by nature subjective - and when we come to abstract concepts like pleasure and pain, they have no existence other than in the mind.
"Mind" - the fateful word! What is it? Even if we are not read up on philosophy, we assume that it exists independently of our physical body. That is, most of us subscribe to some sort of dualism. All the world's religions, other than Buddhism, posit an indestructible "soul" (although there is a difference between the Hindu Atman and the Levantine soul, a point which I shall touch upon later).
The best-known dualist theory about the mind is the one proposed by Rene Descartes, the famous Seventeenth Century French philosopher. According to Descartes, the mind is non-physical and resides in the pineal gland in the centre of the brain. However, the problem of the interaction of the non-physical mind with the physical brain is not so easily solved, therefore most scientists and philosophers prefer a monistic explanation 鈥� either the mind being fundamental, or the body. Modern science takes the materialistic view that the mind arises from mental processes.
But this does not solve the problem of how a physical brain, made purely of material substances, can give rise to conscious experiences which scientists call the 鈥榪耻补濒颈补鈥�, the indescribable experiences. This is traditionally called the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� of consciousness, a term coined by the Australian philosopher David Chalmers 1n 1994.
***
What does being conscious mean? For example, is my computer which takes inputs from me, interacts with me, and provides output in some way conscious? Most of us would instinctively say no: we are conditioned to think only biologically 鈥渓ive鈥� entities as conscious. But then, is a tree conscious? It is born, lives and dies: reaches towards light, and uses its roots to feed itself. Again, most of us would say no 鈥� it has no brain. But then, is a bat, which has a brain, conscious in the same way that I am conscious?
鈥淲hat is it like to be a bat?鈥� 鈥� This question was made famous by the American philosopher Thomas Nagel 1n 1974. He said that if there is something it is like to be the bat, that is, if the bat is self-aware of being itself, then it is conscious: otherwise it is not. Nagel was using this argument to challenge materialism: since consciousness is subjective, we can never know objectively what it is. What we are talking about here is phenomenal consciousness, which is where self-awareness comes from 鈥� which is to be differentiated from access consciousness, which we use for thinking, acting and speaking.
So here is the million-dollar question: is consciousness an add-on to the physical brain, something which arises out of neural activity yet independent of it (the 鈥榞host in the machine鈥�)? Or is it intrinsic to complex brain processes and inseparable from them, and the idea of an independent consciousness an illusion?
Blackmore subscribes to the latter viewpoint, following the path of the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett. This book is devoted to proving that the self is an illusion, based on the findings of scientific research.
***
The Theatre of the Mind and the Stream of Consciousness
Susan Blackmore says we more or less view our mind as a theatre, where the self sits, seeing the show through the eyes, experiencing smells through the nose, and hearing sound through the ears 鈥� our daily 4D movie show. Also, we add the time element to it, experiencing it as flowing like a stream (hence the term 鈥榮tream of consciousness鈥�). According to Dennett, this is all bunkum. There is no centre point in the mind where everything comes together 鈥� it is all processed in parallel.
The amount of scientific research the author manages to bring to the table to prove her point are impressive. First, the human brain is analysed in detail, how various parts are related to various activities of the consciousness 鈥� also how damage significantly changes human perception in weird ways. Having linked mental processes firmly to physical activity, Blackmore attacks the concept of 鈥榮tream of consciousness鈥� by establishing that the events the brain processes do not enter consciousness at all unless verbally probed - that is, we become aware of doing something only when we introspect. So there is no 鈥榮tream鈥� as such, rather multiple processes which are gathered into a coherent stream later on.
The Grand Illusion
Still there must be something like a consciousness to do all this activity. Blackmore does not disagree 鈥� we do feel a 鈥榗onscious self鈥�, but in scientific terms, it is an illusion. She presents an extensive list of interesting experiments to prove that perception is largely subliminal. Even if we are not 鈥渁ware鈥� of what we perceive, the brain functions just the same. The self, instead of an entity, is a 鈥榖undle of sensations鈥�, to borrow the words of David Hume. This is also very near to the concept of the 鈥楢natman鈥� 鈥� the 鈥榥ot-self鈥� 鈥� posited by the Buddha (a man much ahead of his time, it seems!).
However, Blackmore goes further in denying the self 鈥� she refuses to equate it with any brain process. Quoting Dennett, she says that the self is a total illusion created by the way we use our language:
In the same way, Susan Blackmore also negates free will. Quoting an interesting experiment by Wegner, she argues that the same unconscious impulses give rise to the action and the thought behind the action: only thing is that the thought occurs a fraction of a second before the action, so we conclude that we have willed it!
(This is a truly radical approach. I must confess, even though it is argued flawlessly, it is a bit hard for me to accept. But I must admit that I have lived with this consciousness for such a long time that it is very difficult to let the chap go!)
***
This is a good book, which talks on a difficult subject in a readable manner. The author鈥檚 erudition and credentials also cannot be faulted. Hence the four stars.
However, a couple of caveats:
Firstly, this is not an introduction to the subject 鈥� it is an introduction to particular theory of consciousness. History of scientific and philosophical research on the subject is largely ignored, and competing theories are presented only so that they can be refuted. I am definitely interested in the subject, and shall be reading more 鈥� and not just Dennett鈥檚 theory.
Secondly, materialism and monism is taken as a given. True, the Levantine concept of an indestructible soul occupying the destructible body cannot be treated scientifically (though it鈥檚 a valid religious concept)鈥� but the Hindu concept of Atman and Brahman is slightly different.
The Mandukya Upanishad talks extensively of consciousness. It posits four 鈥楶urushas鈥� (we may think of them as various types of consciousness). The first one, which is outward-looking and connected to the waking state, experiences the 鈥榬eal鈥� world. The second one, which is inward-looking and connected to the dreaming state, experiences the phenomenal world. The third one, which is connected with dreamless sleep, experiences the real and phenomenal worlds at the same time. And the fourth one, the most profound, goes beyond all these experiences and transcends the phenomenal existence. I guess it is here that the Atman identifies with the Brahman.
The concept of the Brahman in Hinduism can be most closely approximated as 鈥榰n-distilled sentience鈥�: a sort of cosmic consciousness of which each and every atom of reality is but a part. The individual Atman is but an imperfect reflection of the Brahman: the realisation that it is part of the big whole is said to be the whole purpose of enlightenment.
At the present level of scientific knowledge, materialism seems to be the only valid worldview. But in the light of quantum phenomena, is the concept of reality as sentience wholly off the mark? I don鈥檛 think so.
Susan Blackmore could have dwelt a bit more on the philosophical aspects of the question also, I feel. But maybe it鈥檚 unfair to expect it from a book which is basically scientific in nature.
***
The Hard Problem
We are sure that there is a world outside, filled with inanimate and live things. However, we can experience this world only through our senses: the colours, the smells and the feels. They are all we have, to form our idea about our environment. However, they are dependent upon the experiences of our brain, therefore by nature subjective - and when we come to abstract concepts like pleasure and pain, they have no existence other than in the mind.
"Mind" - the fateful word! What is it? Even if we are not read up on philosophy, we assume that it exists independently of our physical body. That is, most of us subscribe to some sort of dualism. All the world's religions, other than Buddhism, posit an indestructible "soul" (although there is a difference between the Hindu Atman and the Levantine soul, a point which I shall touch upon later).
The best-known dualist theory about the mind is the one proposed by Rene Descartes, the famous Seventeenth Century French philosopher. According to Descartes, the mind is non-physical and resides in the pineal gland in the centre of the brain. However, the problem of the interaction of the non-physical mind with the physical brain is not so easily solved, therefore most scientists and philosophers prefer a monistic explanation 鈥� either the mind being fundamental, or the body. Modern science takes the materialistic view that the mind arises from mental processes.
But this does not solve the problem of how a physical brain, made purely of material substances, can give rise to conscious experiences which scientists call the 鈥榪耻补濒颈补鈥�, the indescribable experiences. This is traditionally called the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� of consciousness, a term coined by the Australian philosopher David Chalmers 1n 1994.
***
What does being conscious mean? For example, is my computer which takes inputs from me, interacts with me, and provides output in some way conscious? Most of us would instinctively say no: we are conditioned to think only biologically 鈥渓ive鈥� entities as conscious. But then, is a tree conscious? It is born, lives and dies: reaches towards light, and uses its roots to feed itself. Again, most of us would say no 鈥� it has no brain. But then, is a bat, which has a brain, conscious in the same way that I am conscious?
鈥淲hat is it like to be a bat?鈥� 鈥� This question was made famous by the American philosopher Thomas Nagel 1n 1974. He said that if there is something it is like to be the bat, that is, if the bat is self-aware of being itself, then it is conscious: otherwise it is not. Nagel was using this argument to challenge materialism: since consciousness is subjective, we can never know objectively what it is. What we are talking about here is phenomenal consciousness, which is where self-awareness comes from 鈥� which is to be differentiated from access consciousness, which we use for thinking, acting and speaking.
So here is the million-dollar question: is consciousness an add-on to the physical brain, something which arises out of neural activity yet independent of it (the 鈥榞host in the machine鈥�)? Or is it intrinsic to complex brain processes and inseparable from them, and the idea of an independent consciousness an illusion?
Blackmore subscribes to the latter viewpoint, following the path of the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett. This book is devoted to proving that the self is an illusion, based on the findings of scientific research.
***
The Theatre of the Mind and the Stream of Consciousness
Susan Blackmore says we more or less view our mind as a theatre, where the self sits, seeing the show through the eyes, experiencing smells through the nose, and hearing sound through the ears 鈥� our daily 4D movie show. Also, we add the time element to it, experiencing it as flowing like a stream (hence the term 鈥榮tream of consciousness鈥�). According to Dennett, this is all bunkum. There is no centre point in the mind where everything comes together 鈥� it is all processed in parallel.
The amount of scientific research the author manages to bring to the table to prove her point are impressive. First, the human brain is analysed in detail, how various parts are related to various activities of the consciousness 鈥� also how damage significantly changes human perception in weird ways. Having linked mental processes firmly to physical activity, Blackmore attacks the concept of 鈥榮tream of consciousness鈥� by establishing that the events the brain processes do not enter consciousness at all unless verbally probed - that is, we become aware of doing something only when we introspect. So there is no 鈥榮tream鈥� as such, rather multiple processes which are gathered into a coherent stream later on.
The Grand Illusion
Still there must be something like a consciousness to do all this activity. Blackmore does not disagree 鈥� we do feel a 鈥榗onscious self鈥�, but in scientific terms, it is an illusion. She presents an extensive list of interesting experiments to prove that perception is largely subliminal. Even if we are not 鈥渁ware鈥� of what we perceive, the brain functions just the same. The self, instead of an entity, is a 鈥榖undle of sensations鈥�, to borrow the words of David Hume. This is also very near to the concept of the 鈥楢natman鈥� 鈥� the 鈥榥ot-self鈥� 鈥� posited by the Buddha (a man much ahead of his time, it seems!).
However, Blackmore goes further in denying the self 鈥� she refuses to equate it with any brain process. Quoting Dennett, she says that the self is a total illusion created by the way we use our language:
Finally, a completely different approach is provided by Dennett. Having rejected the Cartesian theatre, he also rejects its audience of one who watches the show. The self, he claims, is something that needs to be explained, but it does not exist in the way that a physical object (or even a brain process) exists. Like a centre of gravity in physics, it is a useful abstraction. Indeed, he calls it a 鈥榗entre of narrative gravity鈥�. Our language spins the story of a self and so we come to believe that there is, in addition to our single body, a single inner self who has consciousness, holds opinions, and makes decisions. Really, there is no inner self but only multiple parallel processes that give rise to a benign user illusion 鈥� a useful fiction.
It seems we have some tough choices in thinking about our own precious self. We can hang on to the way it feels and assume that a persisting self or soul or spirit exists, even though it cannot be found and leads to deep philosophical troubles. We can equate it with some kind of brain process and shelve the problem of why this brain process should have conscious experiences at all, or we can reject any persisting entity that corresponds to our feeling of being a self.
I think that intellectually we have to take this last path. The trouble is that it is very hard to accept in one鈥檚 own personal life. It means taking a radically different view of every experience. It means accepting that there is no one who is having these experiences. It means accepting that every time I seem to exist, this is just a temporary fiction and not the same 鈥榤e鈥� who seemed to exist a moment before, or last week, or last year. This is tough, but I think it gets easier with practice.
In the same way, Susan Blackmore also negates free will. Quoting an interesting experiment by Wegner, she argues that the same unconscious impulses give rise to the action and the thought behind the action: only thing is that the thought occurs a fraction of a second before the action, so we conclude that we have willed it!
(This is a truly radical approach. I must confess, even though it is argued flawlessly, it is a bit hard for me to accept. But I must admit that I have lived with this consciousness for such a long time that it is very difficult to let the chap go!)
***
This is a good book, which talks on a difficult subject in a readable manner. The author鈥檚 erudition and credentials also cannot be faulted. Hence the four stars.
However, a couple of caveats:
Firstly, this is not an introduction to the subject 鈥� it is an introduction to particular theory of consciousness. History of scientific and philosophical research on the subject is largely ignored, and competing theories are presented only so that they can be refuted. I am definitely interested in the subject, and shall be reading more 鈥� and not just Dennett鈥檚 theory.
Secondly, materialism and monism is taken as a given. True, the Levantine concept of an indestructible soul occupying the destructible body cannot be treated scientifically (though it鈥檚 a valid religious concept)鈥� but the Hindu concept of Atman and Brahman is slightly different.
The Mandukya Upanishad talks extensively of consciousness. It posits four 鈥楶urushas鈥� (we may think of them as various types of consciousness). The first one, which is outward-looking and connected to the waking state, experiences the 鈥榬eal鈥� world. The second one, which is inward-looking and connected to the dreaming state, experiences the phenomenal world. The third one, which is connected with dreamless sleep, experiences the real and phenomenal worlds at the same time. And the fourth one, the most profound, goes beyond all these experiences and transcends the phenomenal existence. I guess it is here that the Atman identifies with the Brahman.
The concept of the Brahman in Hinduism can be most closely approximated as 鈥榰n-distilled sentience鈥�: a sort of cosmic consciousness of which each and every atom of reality is but a part. The individual Atman is but an imperfect reflection of the Brahman: the realisation that it is part of the big whole is said to be the whole purpose of enlightenment.
At the present level of scientific knowledge, materialism seems to be the only valid worldview. But in the light of quantum phenomena, is the concept of reality as sentience wholly off the mark? I don鈥檛 think so.
Susan Blackmore could have dwelt a bit more on the philosophical aspects of the question also, I feel. But maybe it鈥檚 unfair to expect it from a book which is basically scientific in nature.
March 25, 2018
Found this a fascinating book insofar as some of the ideas suggested in it were things I had never thought of. See for example the sections Theories of consciousness (p. 43), The nature of illusion (p. 50), The timing of conscious acts (p. 86), Memes (p. 127) and The future of consciousness (p. 128) She mentions Daniel Dennett frequently, citing in particular his Consciousness Explained (1991) and seems to agree which many of his ideas.
By the way, see this review
/review/show...
... for a much more ambitious and useful overview of what Blackmore's book contains!
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Previous review: The Hobbit
Next review: The French Revolution VSI
More recent review: Main Street Sinclair Lewis
Previous library review: History of Philosophy, Copleston reflections on
Next library review: Collected Dialogues Plato
By the way, see this review
/review/show...
... for a much more ambitious and useful overview of what Blackmore's book contains!
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Previous review: The Hobbit
Next review: The French Revolution VSI
More recent review: Main Street Sinclair Lewis
Previous library review: History of Philosophy, Copleston reflections on
Next library review: Collected Dialogues Plato
March 15, 2017
This is a very clear, well-written exposition on a difficult subject, but it is by no means a neutral review of the field as one might expect from a 'very short introduction'. Instead, Susan Blackmore promotes her own thesis, sympathetic to the work of Daniel Dennett, in which a single inner self with subjective experience, holding opinions and acting on decisions is a useful fiction or benign illusion created by the brain. Our ordinary intuition that there is a center to conscious experience is a useful abstraction, but not something grounded in scientific fact. This very partial view probably helps to make the book a pleasurable read, but also makes it a conspicuous target for anti-materialists like me.
It is commonly agreed that the idea of subjectivity lies at the heart of the problem of consciousness. What it is 鈥榣ike鈥� for a person to have experiences, make plans or perform actions does not seem fathomable with standard rational techniques. My personal experience of the redness of an object might be completely different to your experience of the same object, and though we use the same terminology to describe redness, we can never really be sure that we have the same thing in mind. It deeply offends a certain class of objectively-minded people that something like this could be so fundamental to our being and yet scientifically unexplainable, and they adopt two major strategies for coping. The first soft-naturalistic strategy is to isolate this peculiar phenomenal experience from the physical world and neural processes. It is allowed to 鈥榚merge鈥� from the evolved physical brain but has no causal effects and is only describable in ordinary language or special codes such as 鈥榤emes鈥�. The second approach is to marginalize and diffuse the phenomenal experience, treat it as illusory, and hope that scientific advance will eventually do away with it. This latter hard-naturalistic approach is the one that Blackmore and Dennett promote. They say that most of what we do is unconscious, and when we finally succeed in understanding how all our individual mental capacities such as intelligence, perception, thinking or language function, we will understand consciousness.
Blackmore has many arguments to support her case. She describes a neurological condition called agnosia, in which the patient has normal visual ability but appears to lack the experience of seeing. He is able to reach out, pick up and post a letter, but cannot describe the shape of the letter or say what it is. One way of interpreting this is to say that the patient is able to see unconsciously; that agnosia is a disassociation between vision and consciousness. Blackmore says no; dualistic hogwash! There is no conscious 鈥榗entral processing unit鈥� able to 'observe' the visual stream and then act on it. Experiments on brain organization show that there are many different visual streams with distinct functions, and that agnosia is better described as a disassociation between action and perception. Although she argues forcefully in this way against representational dualism, Blackmore fails to recognize that her own interpretation fares little better as an explanation of visual perception. Perception has a qualitative richness, such as the aspect of the letter, that a stream of electrical energy lacks. Moreover, vision is always vision of something, just like pain is always pain somewhere, so how is our 'rapport' with an external letter incorporated in this stream? How is the patient `related appropriately' to the letter if his awareness of it is just a brain response? Awareness of external objects is different from awareness of physical mechanisms. The outside world of objects would be wholly mythical were it not for our primitive understanding of it.
Blackmore presents a large quantity of scientific evidence from unusual neurological conditions, split-brains, drug-induced hallucinations and altered mental conditions that she says disabuses us of the notion of a conscious self. Yet, the fact that brain damage makes a difference to what is experienced/perceived, does not account for the experience/perception itself. Moreover, there is ample circumstantial evidence from normal human experience that our intuitive ideas about consciousness are indispensable. We assume that it is proper and useful for us to reflect on our own guilt and motivations and to try to understand other people through patient attention to their beliefs and life histories. Blackmore recommends that we set little store by these touchy-feely aspects of consciousness since they are all part of the illusion. Presumably she also dismisses the idea that this activity of reflecting on ourselves or each other has any inherent value. If science is going to reduce all such mental activities to brain functions there will eventually be no questions about value left to ask. The bleakness of that prospect is startling.
It is commonly agreed that the idea of subjectivity lies at the heart of the problem of consciousness. What it is 鈥榣ike鈥� for a person to have experiences, make plans or perform actions does not seem fathomable with standard rational techniques. My personal experience of the redness of an object might be completely different to your experience of the same object, and though we use the same terminology to describe redness, we can never really be sure that we have the same thing in mind. It deeply offends a certain class of objectively-minded people that something like this could be so fundamental to our being and yet scientifically unexplainable, and they adopt two major strategies for coping. The first soft-naturalistic strategy is to isolate this peculiar phenomenal experience from the physical world and neural processes. It is allowed to 鈥榚merge鈥� from the evolved physical brain but has no causal effects and is only describable in ordinary language or special codes such as 鈥榤emes鈥�. The second approach is to marginalize and diffuse the phenomenal experience, treat it as illusory, and hope that scientific advance will eventually do away with it. This latter hard-naturalistic approach is the one that Blackmore and Dennett promote. They say that most of what we do is unconscious, and when we finally succeed in understanding how all our individual mental capacities such as intelligence, perception, thinking or language function, we will understand consciousness.
Blackmore has many arguments to support her case. She describes a neurological condition called agnosia, in which the patient has normal visual ability but appears to lack the experience of seeing. He is able to reach out, pick up and post a letter, but cannot describe the shape of the letter or say what it is. One way of interpreting this is to say that the patient is able to see unconsciously; that agnosia is a disassociation between vision and consciousness. Blackmore says no; dualistic hogwash! There is no conscious 鈥榗entral processing unit鈥� able to 'observe' the visual stream and then act on it. Experiments on brain organization show that there are many different visual streams with distinct functions, and that agnosia is better described as a disassociation between action and perception. Although she argues forcefully in this way against representational dualism, Blackmore fails to recognize that her own interpretation fares little better as an explanation of visual perception. Perception has a qualitative richness, such as the aspect of the letter, that a stream of electrical energy lacks. Moreover, vision is always vision of something, just like pain is always pain somewhere, so how is our 'rapport' with an external letter incorporated in this stream? How is the patient `related appropriately' to the letter if his awareness of it is just a brain response? Awareness of external objects is different from awareness of physical mechanisms. The outside world of objects would be wholly mythical were it not for our primitive understanding of it.
Blackmore presents a large quantity of scientific evidence from unusual neurological conditions, split-brains, drug-induced hallucinations and altered mental conditions that she says disabuses us of the notion of a conscious self. Yet, the fact that brain damage makes a difference to what is experienced/perceived, does not account for the experience/perception itself. Moreover, there is ample circumstantial evidence from normal human experience that our intuitive ideas about consciousness are indispensable. We assume that it is proper and useful for us to reflect on our own guilt and motivations and to try to understand other people through patient attention to their beliefs and life histories. Blackmore recommends that we set little store by these touchy-feely aspects of consciousness since they are all part of the illusion. Presumably she also dismisses the idea that this activity of reflecting on ourselves or each other has any inherent value. If science is going to reduce all such mental activities to brain functions there will eventually be no questions about value left to ask. The bleakness of that prospect is startling.
December 3, 2017
Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions #121), Susan J. Blackmore
How can a physical brain create our experience of the world? What creates our identity? Do we really have free will? Could consciousness itself be an illusion?
鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 丿賴賲 賲丕賴 賲丕乇爻 爻丕賱 2009 賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳: 丌诏丕賴蹖貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 爻賵夭丕賳 噩蹖. 亘賱讴賲賵乇貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 乇囟丕 乇囟丕蹖蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 賮乇賴賳诏 賲毓丕氐乇貙 1387貨 丿乇 196 氐貨 卮丕亘讴: 9789648637595貨 趩丕倬 丿蹖诏乇: 1388貨 趩丕倬 趩賴丕乇賲 1393貨 賲賵囟賵毓: 禺賵丿丌诏丕賴蹖 賯乇賳 21 賲
丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
How can a physical brain create our experience of the world? What creates our identity? Do we really have free will? Could consciousness itself be an illusion?
鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 丿賴賲 賲丕賴 賲丕乇爻 爻丕賱 2009 賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳: 丌诏丕賴蹖貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 爻賵夭丕賳 噩蹖. 亘賱讴賲賵乇貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 乇囟丕 乇囟丕蹖蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 賮乇賴賳诏 賲毓丕氐乇貙 1387貨 丿乇 196 氐貨 卮丕亘讴: 9789648637595貨 趩丕倬 丿蹖诏乇: 1388貨 趩丕倬 趩賴丕乇賲 1393貨 賲賵囟賵毓: 禺賵丿丌诏丕賴蹖 賯乇賳 21 賲
丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
October 17, 2018
An assortment of consciousness related links or resources:
Bad tempered wherein expounds his idea that the key to its comprehension may be found in the not-yet-understood boundary between quantum and classical physics while simultaneously demonstrating that he would be a good chap to have a drink with in the pub and where shows that being a philosopher does not also prevent you from behaving like a bit of an arse.
Subscription only focusing on his play about the 'Hard Problem' of consciousness.
Below are just my notes on this book rather than a review (which I might do later). Feel free to read if you are interested!
Chapter 1鈥� CONSCIOUSNESS, WHY THE MYSTERY
The 鈥榟ard problem鈥� of consciousness
Consciousness is surprisingly difficult to investigate. Right from the start we are in the paradoxical position of seeming to have to use consciousness itself in order to investigate consciousness.
A historical starting point would be to look at - the mind and the body seem to be two different kinds of thing with no obvious way to bring them together.
On the one hand we have our own experiences - we see the sky, hear music. These ineffable (indescribable) qualities are , although whether they actually exist or whether the concept is meaningful is in dispute. On the other hand if we believe there really is a physical world that gives rise to the qualia then how do we bridge the gap between them things in the real world whose attributes - weight, elemental make-up - we can measure and our private internal experiences of them? This is the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� of consciousness.
Most cultures, including non-western cultures and most religions, are dualists, believing in two different realms of mental and physical things - the world of the spirit and the material world - although their conception may differ between cultures or religions, Children begin to similarly divide the world from 4 or 5 years old. Buddhism and the Hindu school advocate non-dualist philosophical concepts - see .
Dualism, monism (idealism and neutral monism), materialism
Descartes proposed that the mind and brain consisted of different substances and proposed that the two substances meet in the pineal gland (Cartesian Dualism).
The inability to explain how 鈥榤ind鈥� and 鈥榖ody鈥� interact has led to most scientists and philosophers rejecting this type of dualism in favor of - the idea that there is only one kind of reality; note, monism is a broad philosophical concept but here is being applied narrowly to consciousness.
make the mind fundamental, but are then stuck with the problem of explaining a consistent physical world.
reject dualism but can鈥檛 make their mind up about the fundamental nature of the world. Summarised by Bertrand Russell: 鈥�...James's view is that the raw material out of which the world is built up is not of two sorts, one matter and the other mind, but that it is arranged in different patterns by its inter-relations, and that some arrangements may be called mental, while others may be called physical鈥�". Not so sure how this is different from some of the ideas mentioned towards the end.
- which is also a form of philosophical monism - takes the position that matter is the fundamental substance in nature and that all things, including mental aspects and consciousness, are results of material interactions. In a materialist context the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� becomes how to account for conscious experiences or ineffable qualia in a purely physical brain made of material substances.
Controversies and the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� of consciousness
coined the term of consciousness (below 鈥楬ard Problem鈥�) which can be contrasted with the easier problems explaining mental phenomenon such as learning, attention, memory, sleep and similar.
Some claim that the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� does not really exist; it depends on a false conception of consciousness or an underestimation of the 鈥榚asy鈥� problems (below 鈥楨asy Problem(s)鈥�). Is it a false intuition that consciousness is different from the combination of perception, memory, attention and similar?
Defining consciousness
used the question of 鈥榃hat it is like to be a bat鈥� to explore what we mean by consciousness. If there is something it is like to be a bat - something for the bat itself - then the bat is conscious. If there nothing like it is to be a bat then it is not conscious. This test can be applied to other items - what is it like to be a mug of tea? An earthworm? An AI program in a computer?
Nagel argued that we can never know what it is like to be a bat; he chose bats because their experiences are so different from those of a human, using sonar, hanging around upside down in caves and so on. He is a believing that the Hard Problem is insoluble and we have no way of understanding it in the same way a dog has no way of understanding the newspaper he carries back from the shops.
Consciousness and subjectivity
Nagel reminds us that we must deal with the subjectivity of conscious thought. Solving the Easy Problems will not explain how subjectivity arises from the material world. If you claim consciousness is an illusion to escape explaining such subjectivity you must explain why consciousness appears so strongly to exist.
Phenomenality or phenomenal consciousness
Philosopher coined these terms to refer to subjective experience or 鈥榃hat it鈥檚 like to be a鈥︹€�. He divides 鈥榩henomenal consciousness鈥� (what it is like to be in a certain state) from 鈥榓ccess consciousness鈥� (consciousness available for use in thinking or guiding action or speech). As an aside, his thought experiment argues that a non-intelligent system could be used to pass the Turing test.
Consciousness: an 鈥榚xtra ingredient鈥� or not and the philosophical zombie.
A key unresolved divide in consciousness studies is whether consciousness is an 鈥榚xtra ingredient鈥� added on to perception, memory and so on or is it intrinsic to complex biological processes and inseparable from them. Are 鈥榪耻补濒颈补鈥� or subjective experiences something in addition to biological processes or intrinsic to them (a materialist or functionalist view).
If consciousness is an 鈥榚xtra ingredient鈥� other questions are raised: why do we have it, what is it for, what does it do, why did it evolve?
If consciousness arises from natural biological processes then perhaps there is no Hard Problem, there just seems to be one. Any creature with intelligence, perception memory, emotions and so on would necessarily be conscious as well.
The idea of the highlights the question of whether or not consciousness is an 鈥榓dded ingredient鈥� to a biological system. Can someone look like, act like and speak exactly like a human but have no inner world of conscious experiences and no 鈥榪耻补濒颈补鈥�? If philosophical zombies could exist are we just lucky we did evolve a consciousness and didn鈥檛 evolve as them? Or perhaps we did? Or perhaps all my friends are philosophical zombies (not sure about my friends, but some of my co-workers certainly are).
What does consciousness actually do?
We visualise our conscious mind as controlling our bodies and influencing things, but does this really make sense?
We may think that we need consciousness is needed to make decisions, but neuroscience shows that this may not be the case. AI systems are also making decisions without being conscious, often better than humans when playing chess or go. Some actions such as playing table tennis, interrupting fast-flowing conversations, seem to be done consciously but in fact they occur too quickly for the conscious mind.
Are there some special mental phenomenon that need consciousness such as aesthetic appreciation or creativity? If so how would you show these are done wholly or partly by consciousness itself rather than the workings of a clever brain?
is the idea that consciousness is a useless by-product of the mind, but if so why are we worrying about it or even capable of talking about it?
Alternatively anyone capable of the various mental processes of the Easy Problem might inevitable end up believing they are conscious even though they are not. They are simply deluded. But if so, how could we be so wrong in thinking it exists? And what does this imply for free will?
The theater of the mind
A natural way of thinking about consciousness is as a private theater inside my head receiving touches, smells, sounds and so on and using the imagination to conjure up sights and sounds as though seen on a mental screen or heard in an inner ear. These thoughts and sense impressions are the 鈥榗ontents鈥� of my consciousness while 鈥業鈥� am the audience.
challenges this idea, arguing that while people reject dualist thinking they then let it in again through the back door by imagining a - the notion that there is somewhere in the mind a place or time where everything comes together again and 鈥榗onsciousness happens鈥� or some form of finishing line (a Cartesian finishing line?) which if crossed allows things to become mysteriously 鈥榗onscious鈥�.
Dennett rejects the above ideas through seeing the brain as a parallel, distributed processing system with no central headquarters and not place in which an 鈥業鈥� sits making decisions and watching the show as it passes through consciousness. If so how does this feeling of consciousness arise without an inner theatre, no show and no audience?
Chapter 2: THE HUMAN BRAIN
A big brain
The central nervous system comprises the brain and spinal cord; the brain stem connects to the midbrain; behind this the cerebellum and the largest outer layer of the brain the cerebral cortex, divided into four lobes 鈥� occipital at the back, temporal above the ears, parietal at the top and frontal. Specific areas have distinct functions: limbic system (instinctive responses, basic emotions), frontal lobe (planning, decision making, self control), hippocampus in the limbic system (laying down new memories), the temporal lobe (storing and retrieving them).
The brain seems like a parallel, distributed system with no central organization, so why does it seem to be unified?
The unity of consciousness
The unity of consciousness is consistent with it being a theatre or stream of consciousness. We see the unity of 鈥渘ow鈥�: there are some things in my consciousness while many other things are not (on stage or off). Unity over time: there seems to be continuity of consciousness from one moment to the next. Unity of identity: there seems to be a single and continuing experiences. Is this view correct?
The neural correlates of consciousness (the 鈥楴CC鈥檚)
Much of what happens in the brain seems to be outside or inaccessible to consciousness. What does this really mean though+ What is the difference between brain activity that is conscious versus those parts that are not? Where do we find consciousness? One place to start may be identifying when (defined as 鈥渢he minimum neural mechanism sufficient for any one specific conscious percept鈥�)..
Pain can help investigate NCC given a clear subject element and objectively observable pain transmission through chemical changes in the nerves.
Note when A and B correlate reliably there are three possible causal explanations: A causes B, B causes A, both A and B are caused by something else or A and B are actually the same phenomena. Do physical changes create consciousness of pain cause NCC? If so we are back to the Hard Problem. Does consciousness of pain cause physical changes 鈥� unlikely.
Can we observe NCCs by using brain scans to observe when perceptions change of a Necker cube? Maybe 鈥� scans show neural activity in the primary visual cortex stays the same but activity in higher areas changes when reporting of changes to perception of the cube. However when 鈥榥o report鈥� approaches of testing perception are made (e.g. looking at pupil dilation) many of these differences in neural activity disappear.
Perhaps the NCCs we observe related to specific perceptions or thoughts and there are no NCCs for consciousness itself.
Damaged minds
Certain bran damage can cause patients to lose their sense of on half of the world. They may eat only food on one side of a plate, draw only one side of a picture etc. Italian neurologist Eduardo Bisiach carried out an experiment where he asked such patients to describe entering into the cathedral square in Milan from the north and then from the south. Each time they could only remember one half of the square, but each half was different. In other words, they have retained their memory of the square but were only able to bring it into consciousness under these different circumstances.
In patients with their hippocampus is damaged and they cannot create new long term memories - is damaged although function may remain. Suffers write of how they seem to sometimes suddenly find themselves waking up, similar to how we may feel if we are suddenly conscious of the beauty of a view or by asking ourselves 鈥楢m I conscious now?鈥�. Are sufferers fully conscious? Or conscious in a different way?
Another patient could not recognize or line up shapes, but was able to post a letter through a slot without being conscious of trying to do so. This seems to be due to losing the ability to respond to one of multiple streams of visual input 鈥� the 鈥榙orsal stream鈥� helps fast visuo-motor control while the 鈥榲entral stream鈥� is involved in recognizing objects and perceiving the world.
This is consistent with studies of 鈥渂lindsight鈥� where patients have damage to the visual centers of the brain and cannot consciously see items but are still able to guess their orientation. Does this prove that qualia exist (due to objective vision without subjective consciousness) or rather that there are multiple routes for visual perception only some of which go through the area that also allows consciousness perception?
CONTINUED IN THE COMMENTS
Bad tempered wherein expounds his idea that the key to its comprehension may be found in the not-yet-understood boundary between quantum and classical physics while simultaneously demonstrating that he would be a good chap to have a drink with in the pub and where shows that being a philosopher does not also prevent you from behaving like a bit of an arse.
Subscription only focusing on his play about the 'Hard Problem' of consciousness.
Below are just my notes on this book rather than a review (which I might do later). Feel free to read if you are interested!
Chapter 1鈥� CONSCIOUSNESS, WHY THE MYSTERY
The 鈥榟ard problem鈥� of consciousness
Consciousness is surprisingly difficult to investigate. Right from the start we are in the paradoxical position of seeming to have to use consciousness itself in order to investigate consciousness.
A historical starting point would be to look at - the mind and the body seem to be two different kinds of thing with no obvious way to bring them together.
On the one hand we have our own experiences - we see the sky, hear music. These ineffable (indescribable) qualities are , although whether they actually exist or whether the concept is meaningful is in dispute. On the other hand if we believe there really is a physical world that gives rise to the qualia then how do we bridge the gap between them things in the real world whose attributes - weight, elemental make-up - we can measure and our private internal experiences of them? This is the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� of consciousness.
Most cultures, including non-western cultures and most religions, are dualists, believing in two different realms of mental and physical things - the world of the spirit and the material world - although their conception may differ between cultures or religions, Children begin to similarly divide the world from 4 or 5 years old. Buddhism and the Hindu school advocate non-dualist philosophical concepts - see .
Dualism, monism (idealism and neutral monism), materialism
Descartes proposed that the mind and brain consisted of different substances and proposed that the two substances meet in the pineal gland (Cartesian Dualism).
The inability to explain how 鈥榤ind鈥� and 鈥榖ody鈥� interact has led to most scientists and philosophers rejecting this type of dualism in favor of - the idea that there is only one kind of reality; note, monism is a broad philosophical concept but here is being applied narrowly to consciousness.
make the mind fundamental, but are then stuck with the problem of explaining a consistent physical world.
reject dualism but can鈥檛 make their mind up about the fundamental nature of the world. Summarised by Bertrand Russell: 鈥�...James's view is that the raw material out of which the world is built up is not of two sorts, one matter and the other mind, but that it is arranged in different patterns by its inter-relations, and that some arrangements may be called mental, while others may be called physical鈥�". Not so sure how this is different from some of the ideas mentioned towards the end.
- which is also a form of philosophical monism - takes the position that matter is the fundamental substance in nature and that all things, including mental aspects and consciousness, are results of material interactions. In a materialist context the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� becomes how to account for conscious experiences or ineffable qualia in a purely physical brain made of material substances.
Controversies and the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� of consciousness
coined the term of consciousness (below 鈥楬ard Problem鈥�) which can be contrasted with the easier problems explaining mental phenomenon such as learning, attention, memory, sleep and similar.
Some claim that the 鈥榟ard problem鈥� does not really exist; it depends on a false conception of consciousness or an underestimation of the 鈥榚asy鈥� problems (below 鈥楨asy Problem(s)鈥�). Is it a false intuition that consciousness is different from the combination of perception, memory, attention and similar?
Defining consciousness
used the question of 鈥榃hat it is like to be a bat鈥� to explore what we mean by consciousness. If there is something it is like to be a bat - something for the bat itself - then the bat is conscious. If there nothing like it is to be a bat then it is not conscious. This test can be applied to other items - what is it like to be a mug of tea? An earthworm? An AI program in a computer?
Nagel argued that we can never know what it is like to be a bat; he chose bats because their experiences are so different from those of a human, using sonar, hanging around upside down in caves and so on. He is a believing that the Hard Problem is insoluble and we have no way of understanding it in the same way a dog has no way of understanding the newspaper he carries back from the shops.
Consciousness and subjectivity
Nagel reminds us that we must deal with the subjectivity of conscious thought. Solving the Easy Problems will not explain how subjectivity arises from the material world. If you claim consciousness is an illusion to escape explaining such subjectivity you must explain why consciousness appears so strongly to exist.
Phenomenality or phenomenal consciousness
Philosopher coined these terms to refer to subjective experience or 鈥榃hat it鈥檚 like to be a鈥︹€�. He divides 鈥榩henomenal consciousness鈥� (what it is like to be in a certain state) from 鈥榓ccess consciousness鈥� (consciousness available for use in thinking or guiding action or speech). As an aside, his thought experiment argues that a non-intelligent system could be used to pass the Turing test.
Consciousness: an 鈥榚xtra ingredient鈥� or not and the philosophical zombie.
A key unresolved divide in consciousness studies is whether consciousness is an 鈥榚xtra ingredient鈥� added on to perception, memory and so on or is it intrinsic to complex biological processes and inseparable from them. Are 鈥榪耻补濒颈补鈥� or subjective experiences something in addition to biological processes or intrinsic to them (a materialist or functionalist view).
If consciousness is an 鈥榚xtra ingredient鈥� other questions are raised: why do we have it, what is it for, what does it do, why did it evolve?
If consciousness arises from natural biological processes then perhaps there is no Hard Problem, there just seems to be one. Any creature with intelligence, perception memory, emotions and so on would necessarily be conscious as well.
The idea of the highlights the question of whether or not consciousness is an 鈥榓dded ingredient鈥� to a biological system. Can someone look like, act like and speak exactly like a human but have no inner world of conscious experiences and no 鈥榪耻补濒颈补鈥�? If philosophical zombies could exist are we just lucky we did evolve a consciousness and didn鈥檛 evolve as them? Or perhaps we did? Or perhaps all my friends are philosophical zombies (not sure about my friends, but some of my co-workers certainly are).
What does consciousness actually do?
We visualise our conscious mind as controlling our bodies and influencing things, but does this really make sense?
We may think that we need consciousness is needed to make decisions, but neuroscience shows that this may not be the case. AI systems are also making decisions without being conscious, often better than humans when playing chess or go. Some actions such as playing table tennis, interrupting fast-flowing conversations, seem to be done consciously but in fact they occur too quickly for the conscious mind.
Are there some special mental phenomenon that need consciousness such as aesthetic appreciation or creativity? If so how would you show these are done wholly or partly by consciousness itself rather than the workings of a clever brain?
is the idea that consciousness is a useless by-product of the mind, but if so why are we worrying about it or even capable of talking about it?
Alternatively anyone capable of the various mental processes of the Easy Problem might inevitable end up believing they are conscious even though they are not. They are simply deluded. But if so, how could we be so wrong in thinking it exists? And what does this imply for free will?
The theater of the mind
A natural way of thinking about consciousness is as a private theater inside my head receiving touches, smells, sounds and so on and using the imagination to conjure up sights and sounds as though seen on a mental screen or heard in an inner ear. These thoughts and sense impressions are the 鈥榗ontents鈥� of my consciousness while 鈥業鈥� am the audience.
challenges this idea, arguing that while people reject dualist thinking they then let it in again through the back door by imagining a - the notion that there is somewhere in the mind a place or time where everything comes together again and 鈥榗onsciousness happens鈥� or some form of finishing line (a Cartesian finishing line?) which if crossed allows things to become mysteriously 鈥榗onscious鈥�.
Dennett rejects the above ideas through seeing the brain as a parallel, distributed processing system with no central headquarters and not place in which an 鈥業鈥� sits making decisions and watching the show as it passes through consciousness. If so how does this feeling of consciousness arise without an inner theatre, no show and no audience?
Chapter 2: THE HUMAN BRAIN
A big brain
The central nervous system comprises the brain and spinal cord; the brain stem connects to the midbrain; behind this the cerebellum and the largest outer layer of the brain the cerebral cortex, divided into four lobes 鈥� occipital at the back, temporal above the ears, parietal at the top and frontal. Specific areas have distinct functions: limbic system (instinctive responses, basic emotions), frontal lobe (planning, decision making, self control), hippocampus in the limbic system (laying down new memories), the temporal lobe (storing and retrieving them).
The brain seems like a parallel, distributed system with no central organization, so why does it seem to be unified?
The unity of consciousness
The unity of consciousness is consistent with it being a theatre or stream of consciousness. We see the unity of 鈥渘ow鈥�: there are some things in my consciousness while many other things are not (on stage or off). Unity over time: there seems to be continuity of consciousness from one moment to the next. Unity of identity: there seems to be a single and continuing experiences. Is this view correct?
The neural correlates of consciousness (the 鈥楴CC鈥檚)
Much of what happens in the brain seems to be outside or inaccessible to consciousness. What does this really mean though+ What is the difference between brain activity that is conscious versus those parts that are not? Where do we find consciousness? One place to start may be identifying when (defined as 鈥渢he minimum neural mechanism sufficient for any one specific conscious percept鈥�)..
Pain can help investigate NCC given a clear subject element and objectively observable pain transmission through chemical changes in the nerves.
Note when A and B correlate reliably there are three possible causal explanations: A causes B, B causes A, both A and B are caused by something else or A and B are actually the same phenomena. Do physical changes create consciousness of pain cause NCC? If so we are back to the Hard Problem. Does consciousness of pain cause physical changes 鈥� unlikely.
Can we observe NCCs by using brain scans to observe when perceptions change of a Necker cube? Maybe 鈥� scans show neural activity in the primary visual cortex stays the same but activity in higher areas changes when reporting of changes to perception of the cube. However when 鈥榥o report鈥� approaches of testing perception are made (e.g. looking at pupil dilation) many of these differences in neural activity disappear.
Perhaps the NCCs we observe related to specific perceptions or thoughts and there are no NCCs for consciousness itself.
Damaged minds
Certain bran damage can cause patients to lose their sense of on half of the world. They may eat only food on one side of a plate, draw only one side of a picture etc. Italian neurologist Eduardo Bisiach carried out an experiment where he asked such patients to describe entering into the cathedral square in Milan from the north and then from the south. Each time they could only remember one half of the square, but each half was different. In other words, they have retained their memory of the square but were only able to bring it into consciousness under these different circumstances.
In patients with their hippocampus is damaged and they cannot create new long term memories - is damaged although function may remain. Suffers write of how they seem to sometimes suddenly find themselves waking up, similar to how we may feel if we are suddenly conscious of the beauty of a view or by asking ourselves 鈥楢m I conscious now?鈥�. Are sufferers fully conscious? Or conscious in a different way?
Another patient could not recognize or line up shapes, but was able to post a letter through a slot without being conscious of trying to do so. This seems to be due to losing the ability to respond to one of multiple streams of visual input 鈥� the 鈥榙orsal stream鈥� helps fast visuo-motor control while the 鈥榲entral stream鈥� is involved in recognizing objects and perceiving the world.
This is consistent with studies of 鈥渂lindsight鈥� where patients have damage to the visual centers of the brain and cannot consciously see items but are still able to guess their orientation. Does this prove that qualia exist (due to objective vision without subjective consciousness) or rather that there are multiple routes for visual perception only some of which go through the area that also allows consciousness perception?
CONTINUED IN THE COMMENTS
February 16, 2018
Three stars for giving me a lot to think about, but, as many other reviews have noted, this book falls pretty far from an "Introduction" to the idea of consciousness, and is instead a brief presentation of the evidence for a very particular theory which takes hard materialism as a given and treats consciousness as an illusion. My distaste for how much the author's specific position was taken for granted instead of presented as one view among many was reinforced at the very end when she tacked on Dawkins' memetic theory to attack the idea of religion, which had very little to do with the concept of consciousness and served a solely ideological purpose.
I read this book to gain some better language to approach the "hard problem" of consciousness, a subject that interests me deeply but which I find confusing to articulate in words, and while it did sharpen my thinking about the matter it also left me feeling that there may not actually be a clear way to explain consciousness. Blackmore's language attempting to refute the concept of consciousness (an interesting thing to do in an "Introduction" to it) still implies that there is "someone" to be fooled by the illusion of consciousness; she talks about how it is difficult but necessary to get outside the idea of an "I" but seems to be unable to do so herself. I am left thinking that "intuitive" is too weak a word for the concept of a self-as-observer--if anything, I would call it self-evident.
Reading this book was a good experience, but it leaves me only more frustrated by the concept of consciousness than I was when I started, and not in a helpful way. It also leaves me irritated with the author, who seems to have misunderstood the purpose of the Very Short Introduction series.
I read this book to gain some better language to approach the "hard problem" of consciousness, a subject that interests me deeply but which I find confusing to articulate in words, and while it did sharpen my thinking about the matter it also left me feeling that there may not actually be a clear way to explain consciousness. Blackmore's language attempting to refute the concept of consciousness (an interesting thing to do in an "Introduction" to it) still implies that there is "someone" to be fooled by the illusion of consciousness; she talks about how it is difficult but necessary to get outside the idea of an "I" but seems to be unable to do so herself. I am left thinking that "intuitive" is too weak a word for the concept of a self-as-observer--if anything, I would call it self-evident.
Reading this book was a good experience, but it leaves me only more frustrated by the concept of consciousness than I was when I started, and not in a helpful way. It also leaves me irritated with the author, who seems to have misunderstood the purpose of the Very Short Introduction series.
October 25, 2024
Lots of things to contemplate, but few definite answers. Do I think some animals (besides home egoist) possess some level of consciousness? Yes. Do I think language and executive function and consciousness are all coupled together? Also yes. Am I a dualist? Probably not, but it is easy to fall into that well-worn rut.
Solidly works in communicating the basic space of what we know and just how much we don't know about consciousness. The book was OK. Just not sure I liked how it was structured, but also not sure how to structure this in a VSI that would be much different.
Solidly works in communicating the basic space of what we know and just how much we don't know about consciousness. The book was OK. Just not sure I liked how it was structured, but also not sure how to structure this in a VSI that would be much different.
May 16, 2019
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May 31, 2015
The Book and Me
The book deals with a very hard problem, which Blackmore puts forward in the very first line of the very first chapter: What is consciousness? A question you might have ruminated in past, in some way, at some point in time, but then you let it go in favor of attending to worldly obligations. My version goes like this:
Seventh grade, Biology class
Me and my friend were giving a re-read to our favorite chapter ;-) when these words fell upon my ears.
Teacher : a cell is the smallest unit of life鈥� millions鈥� single cell organisms鈥� blah, blah鈥�
Me: You mean we are filled with living beings! Do they know they are inside me?
Teacher : No. They don鈥檛 have consciousness.
Me: How can you be sure?
Teacher: Let鈥檚 drop this, it is getting absurd.
It was getting interesting. I never got an answer, as I said, it is a hard problem. It becomes even harder when you ask - Do we have consciousness? Susan Blackmore believes we don鈥檛 and declares it openly in the book, which may put off some readers, but there plenty of theories in here to keep you from falling to one side of the debate. Being a fan of Sam Harris and thus a non-believer in free-will I was much inclined to reject the idea of consciousness, but as pages increased on the left, I was gradually pushed to the center and by the end I didn鈥檛 know what to believe.
Recommendation
Recommended for people who are:
1. Cognizant of the debate, but haven鈥檛 read much; this might be a good start.
2. Convinced of existence/non-existence of consciousness after hearing one side.
3. Looking for fascinating experiments, stories, and psychological conditions( google 鈥淗emispatial Neglect鈥�)
If they had read it
Spider-man and Sandman
SP: Why did you kill my uncle?
SD: I had to, I didn鈥檛 have any choice.
SP: You always have a choice.
SD: But I just read that consciousness is an illusion and so is free-will. A guy named Benjamin Libet proved this by some experiment.
SP: Oh that鈥檚 only half of it, Libet鈥檚 experiment proves that we don鈥檛 have free-will but do have 鈥渇ree-won鈥檛鈥�, ha! Now take this punch and tell me if you feel conscious.
The book deals with a very hard problem, which Blackmore puts forward in the very first line of the very first chapter: What is consciousness? A question you might have ruminated in past, in some way, at some point in time, but then you let it go in favor of attending to worldly obligations. My version goes like this:
Seventh grade, Biology class
Me and my friend were giving a re-read to our favorite chapter ;-) when these words fell upon my ears.
Teacher : a cell is the smallest unit of life鈥� millions鈥� single cell organisms鈥� blah, blah鈥�
Me: You mean we are filled with living beings! Do they know they are inside me?
Teacher : No. They don鈥檛 have consciousness.
Me: How can you be sure?
Teacher: Let鈥檚 drop this, it is getting absurd.
It was getting interesting. I never got an answer, as I said, it is a hard problem. It becomes even harder when you ask - Do we have consciousness? Susan Blackmore believes we don鈥檛 and declares it openly in the book, which may put off some readers, but there plenty of theories in here to keep you from falling to one side of the debate. Being a fan of Sam Harris and thus a non-believer in free-will I was much inclined to reject the idea of consciousness, but as pages increased on the left, I was gradually pushed to the center and by the end I didn鈥檛 know what to believe.
Recommendation
Recommended for people who are:
1. Cognizant of the debate, but haven鈥檛 read much; this might be a good start.
2. Convinced of existence/non-existence of consciousness after hearing one side.
3. Looking for fascinating experiments, stories, and psychological conditions( google 鈥淗emispatial Neglect鈥�)
If they had read it
Spider-man and Sandman
SP: Why did you kill my uncle?
SD: I had to, I didn鈥檛 have any choice.
SP: You always have a choice.
SD: But I just read that consciousness is an illusion and so is free-will. A guy named Benjamin Libet proved this by some experiment.
SP: Oh that鈥檚 only half of it, Libet鈥檚 experiment proves that we don鈥檛 have free-will but do have 鈥渇ree-won鈥檛鈥�, ha! Now take this punch and tell me if you feel conscious.
February 2, 2021
丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲賲賱 賵賱賲 賷賮賷丿賳賷 亘卮卅 毓賳 丕賱賵毓賷 賮賰賱 爻丐丕賱 賷胤乇丨賴 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賷鬲賲 丕賱丕噩丕亘丞 毓賳賴 亘賳馗乇亘丕鬲 賵丕賮賰丕乇 賵賱賰賳 鬲噩丿 丕賱賰丕鬲亘丞 賮賷 賳賴丕賷丞 丕賱賮氐賱 鬲賯賵賱 賱賰 丕賳 鬲賱賰 丕鬲噩丕乇亘 睾賷乇 賲丐賰丿丞 賵丕賳 賴匕丕 丕賱爻丐丕賱 賱賷爻 賱賴 丕噩丕亘丞 胤賷亘 賱賵 丕賱爻丐丕賱 賲賱賴賵卮 丕噩丕亘丞 亘鬲胤乇丨賷賴 賱賷 賱賱賯丕乇卅 賵亘丕賯賷 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賷賵噩丿 亘賴 亘毓囟 丕賱鬲噩丕乇亘 賵丕賱賲賱丕丨馗丕鬲 丕賱賷賵賲賷丞 丕賱賲毓乇賵賮丞 毓賳 丕賱賵毓賷
July 7, 2022
Early on, the author sets out the problem. Is consciousness something extra we have, over and above the physical world, or is it intrinsically a phenomenon of the physical world? If the former, then we鈥檙e entitled to ask (a) how consciousness and world interact with one another, (b) what, if anything, consciousness does, (c) where it comes from, how we get it, and (d) are we special, or do other animals have it too? But if it鈥檚 the latter, such questions look less formidable; what is, though, now a huge problem instead is to explain why we still seem to have this non-physical, purely mental, entity inside our heads. In a nutshell: if there are two realms, how can they ever influence one another; if there is only one, why does it seem as if there are two?
听听听 So what about studying the brain, does that help? It certainly does, particularly since the advent of things like fMRI- and PET-scanning, but only up to a point. One of the main features of consciousness is its apparent unity, both in time and space: it seems to have continuity, from moment to moment, and is experienced as a phenomenon here, i.e. 鈥渕e鈥�. But the brain is pretty much the opposite of all that鈥攄ecentralised, massively parallel, a network of networks.
听听听 Nevertheless there are, and have always been, no end of theories about mind and world, from dualists blithely waving away the 鈥渉ow could they ever influence one another鈥� problem (鈥溾€etails, details鈥︹€�), to today鈥檚 quantum-theory enthusiasts 鈥渆xplaining鈥� one age-old enigma with a modern one.
听听听 Susan Blackmore deals with all this, and much more besides鈥攁nd has her own views on the subject, as we all do, which does give the book a bit of a slant. But for an introduction to this subject it鈥檚 exceptionally well written, the language as plain as you could ask for. And if you are in any doubt yourself about consciousness, 鈥渢he self鈥� and so on, my favourite idea (pps 74-5) might help clarify things: picture a teleporter, the sort of matter-transmitter imagined by science-fiction writers. It looks like a phone booth, you step in at this end, the booth makes a recording of you鈥攅very last cell, every atom of every cell鈥攖hen destroys you and transmits the recording to a second booth on the other side of the world, where you (is it you?) step back out. The journey is free, won鈥檛 cost you a penny. And while in real life nothing is ever completely infallible, for the sake of this thought-experiment assume our teleporter is absolutely, guaranteed, one hundred per cent safe. The question, of course, is: would you go?
听听听 So what about studying the brain, does that help? It certainly does, particularly since the advent of things like fMRI- and PET-scanning, but only up to a point. One of the main features of consciousness is its apparent unity, both in time and space: it seems to have continuity, from moment to moment, and is experienced as a phenomenon here, i.e. 鈥渕e鈥�. But the brain is pretty much the opposite of all that鈥攄ecentralised, massively parallel, a network of networks.
听听听 Nevertheless there are, and have always been, no end of theories about mind and world, from dualists blithely waving away the 鈥渉ow could they ever influence one another鈥� problem (鈥溾€etails, details鈥︹€�), to today鈥檚 quantum-theory enthusiasts 鈥渆xplaining鈥� one age-old enigma with a modern one.
听听听 Susan Blackmore deals with all this, and much more besides鈥攁nd has her own views on the subject, as we all do, which does give the book a bit of a slant. But for an introduction to this subject it鈥檚 exceptionally well written, the language as plain as you could ask for. And if you are in any doubt yourself about consciousness, 鈥渢he self鈥� and so on, my favourite idea (pps 74-5) might help clarify things: picture a teleporter, the sort of matter-transmitter imagined by science-fiction writers. It looks like a phone booth, you step in at this end, the booth makes a recording of you鈥攅very last cell, every atom of every cell鈥攖hen destroys you and transmits the recording to a second booth on the other side of the world, where you (is it you?) step back out. The journey is free, won鈥檛 cost you a penny. And while in real life nothing is ever completely infallible, for the sake of this thought-experiment assume our teleporter is absolutely, guaranteed, one hundred per cent safe. The question, of course, is: would you go?
November 27, 2017
賯乇丕亍丞 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 兀鬲賶 賮賷 賵賯鬲賴 囟賲賳 賯乇丕亍丞 噩賲丕毓賷丞 (賱賲 鬲賰賳 噩丿丕賸 孬乇賷丞 賰賲丕 賰丕賳 賲賮鬲乇囟丕賸) .. 賮丕賱賵毓賷 賲賵囟賵毓 賷兀鬲賷 囟賲賳 毓丿丞 賲賵丕囟賷毓 賮賱爻賮賷丞 兀禺乇賶 賰丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱丨乇丞 賵賲丕賴賷丞 丕賱賵噩賵丿 賵賳馗乇賷丞 丕賱賲毓乇賮丞
賵丕囟丨 廿賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賱賱賲亘鬲丿卅賷賳 賮賷 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賵毓賷
兀毓胤賷 賳噩賲丞 賱賱賰鬲丕亘 賱鬲賳丕賵賱賴 丕賱噩賷丿 賱賲賵囟賵毓 賲賴賲 噩丿丕賸
賵兀毓胤賷 賳噩賲丞 兀禺乇賶 賱賱賰鬲丕亘 毓賱賶 廿賷乇丕丿賴 賲毓賱賵賲丕鬲 賲賴賲丞 賱睾賷乇 丕賱賲胤賱毓賷賳 丨賵賱 丕賱賲賵囟賵毓
賵賱賰賳 賴賳丕賰 賯氐賵乇 賮賷 丕爻鬲毓乇丕囟 丕賱兀賮賰丕乇 (賵賱賵 亘卮賰賱 賲鬲禺鬲氐乇) 丨賵賱 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 .. 賴賱 賱兀賳 丕爻鬲毓乇丕囟賴丕 亘丕爻鬲賮丕囟丞 兀賰孬乇 賷噩毓賱 賲賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲賯丿賲丞 賱爻鬲 賯氐賷乇丞 責 賱乇亘賲丕
賵賴賳丕 鬲兀鬲賷 賳噩賲丞 孬丕賱孬丞 .. 賮賱乇亘賲丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賷爻鬲丨賯 丕賱賯乇丕亍丞 乇睾賲 匕賱賰 賮賮賷賴 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賲賳 丕賱兀爻卅賱丞 賵丕賱鬲爻丕丐賱丕鬲 丕賱兀爻丕爻賷丞 丨賵賱 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賵毓賷 賰賵丨丿丞 賲爻鬲賯賱丞 賵丕賱匕賷 賯丿 賱丕 賷鬲賵賮乇 賮賷 賰鬲亘 兀禺乇賶 丨爻亘 丕胤賱丕毓賷 (賴賳丕賰 賮氐賱 禺丕氐 毓賳 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰 賮賷 丌禺乇 賰鬲丕亘 賮賱爻賮鬲賳丕 賱賱卮賴賷丿 賲丨賲丿 亘丕賯乇 丕賱氐丿乇)
毓賳 匕丕鬲 丕賱賲賵囟賵毓:
亘丕毓鬲賯丕丿賷 .. 廿賳 噩賵賴乇 賲爻兀賱丞 丕賱賵毓賷 賲乇鬲亘胤丞 亘丨賱 賱睾夭 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷丞 .. 孬賳丕卅賷丞 丕賱乇賵丨 賵丕賱噩爻丿 (丕賱毓賯賱 賵丕賱丿賲丕睾)貙 賵賰賵賳 賴匕賴 丕賱賲爻兀賱丞 睾賷乇 賲丨賱賵賱丞 賮賯丿 噩毓賱 賲賳 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賵毓賷 毓亘丕乇丞 毓賳 毓丿丿 賰亘賷乇 賲賳 丕賱兀爻卅賱丞 丕賱睾賷乇 賲丨賱賵賱丞 賵丕賱廿噩丕亘丕鬲 丕賱鬲賷 毓賱賶 亘毓囟 噩賵丕賳亘賴丕 睾賷乇 賳賴丕卅賷丞 賵睾賷乇 賲賰鬲賲賱丞
丕賱賲賵囟賵毓 兀賷囟賸丕 賲乇鬲亘胤 亘賭 "丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱丨乇丞" .. 賵鬲毓亘賷乇 丕賱賰丕鬲亘丞 亘兀賳 "丕賱毓丕賱賲 賲睾賱賯 爻亘亘賷賸丕" 賲丨賱 賳賯丕卮 賰亘賷乇 .. 丕賱兀賲乇 丕賱匕賷 賷噩毓賱 賲賳丕賯卮丞 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賵毓賷 賲賳丕賯卮丞 賱丕丨賯丞 毓賱賶 賲賳丕賯卮丞 賲賵丕囟賷毓 兀禺乇賶
賵丕囟丨 廿賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賱賱賲亘鬲丿卅賷賳 賮賷 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賵毓賷
兀毓胤賷 賳噩賲丞 賱賱賰鬲丕亘 賱鬲賳丕賵賱賴 丕賱噩賷丿 賱賲賵囟賵毓 賲賴賲 噩丿丕賸
賵兀毓胤賷 賳噩賲丞 兀禺乇賶 賱賱賰鬲丕亘 毓賱賶 廿賷乇丕丿賴 賲毓賱賵賲丕鬲 賲賴賲丞 賱睾賷乇 丕賱賲胤賱毓賷賳 丨賵賱 丕賱賲賵囟賵毓
賵賱賰賳 賴賳丕賰 賯氐賵乇 賮賷 丕爻鬲毓乇丕囟 丕賱兀賮賰丕乇 (賵賱賵 亘卮賰賱 賲鬲禺鬲氐乇) 丨賵賱 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 .. 賴賱 賱兀賳 丕爻鬲毓乇丕囟賴丕 亘丕爻鬲賮丕囟丞 兀賰孬乇 賷噩毓賱 賲賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲賯丿賲丞 賱爻鬲 賯氐賷乇丞 責 賱乇亘賲丕
賵賴賳丕 鬲兀鬲賷 賳噩賲丞 孬丕賱孬丞 .. 賮賱乇亘賲丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賷爻鬲丨賯 丕賱賯乇丕亍丞 乇睾賲 匕賱賰 賮賮賷賴 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賲賳 丕賱兀爻卅賱丞 賵丕賱鬲爻丕丐賱丕鬲 丕賱兀爻丕爻賷丞 丨賵賱 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賵毓賷 賰賵丨丿丞 賲爻鬲賯賱丞 賵丕賱匕賷 賯丿 賱丕 賷鬲賵賮乇 賮賷 賰鬲亘 兀禺乇賶 丨爻亘 丕胤賱丕毓賷 (賴賳丕賰 賮氐賱 禺丕氐 毓賳 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰 賮賷 丌禺乇 賰鬲丕亘 賮賱爻賮鬲賳丕 賱賱卮賴賷丿 賲丨賲丿 亘丕賯乇 丕賱氐丿乇)
毓賳 匕丕鬲 丕賱賲賵囟賵毓:
亘丕毓鬲賯丕丿賷 .. 廿賳 噩賵賴乇 賲爻兀賱丞 丕賱賵毓賷 賲乇鬲亘胤丞 亘丨賱 賱睾夭 丕賱孬賳丕卅賷丞 .. 孬賳丕卅賷丞 丕賱乇賵丨 賵丕賱噩爻丿 (丕賱毓賯賱 賵丕賱丿賲丕睾)貙 賵賰賵賳 賴匕賴 丕賱賲爻兀賱丞 睾賷乇 賲丨賱賵賱丞 賮賯丿 噩毓賱 賲賳 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賵毓賷 毓亘丕乇丞 毓賳 毓丿丿 賰亘賷乇 賲賳 丕賱兀爻卅賱丞 丕賱睾賷乇 賲丨賱賵賱丞 賵丕賱廿噩丕亘丕鬲 丕賱鬲賷 毓賱賶 亘毓囟 噩賵丕賳亘賴丕 睾賷乇 賳賴丕卅賷丞 賵睾賷乇 賲賰鬲賲賱丞
丕賱賲賵囟賵毓 兀賷囟賸丕 賲乇鬲亘胤 亘賭 "丕賱廿乇丕丿丞 丕賱丨乇丞" .. 賵鬲毓亘賷乇 丕賱賰丕鬲亘丞 亘兀賳 "丕賱毓丕賱賲 賲睾賱賯 爻亘亘賷賸丕" 賲丨賱 賳賯丕卮 賰亘賷乇 .. 丕賱兀賲乇 丕賱匕賷 賷噩毓賱 賲賳丕賯卮丞 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賵毓賷 賲賳丕賯卮丞 賱丕丨賯丞 毓賱賶 賲賳丕賯卮丞 賲賵丕囟賷毓 兀禺乇賶
March 19, 2018
賴賲賵賳 胤賵乇 讴賴 丕夭 毓賳賵丕賳 丕氐賱蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖鈥屫促� 賲鬲賵噩賴 卮丿 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 蹖賴 賲賯丿賲賴鈥屰� 讴賵鬲丕賴 亘乇丕蹖 丌诏丕賴蹖 丕爻鬲 賵 亘賴 賳馗乇賲 亘乇丕蹖 讴賳噩讴丕賵 卮丿賳 賵 乇賮鬲賳 爻乇丕睾 賲賳丕亘毓 丿蹖诏賴 鬲賵 丕蹖賳 丨賵夭賴 賯賱賯賱讴 禺賵亘蹖 亘賵丿.
噩丿丕 丕夭 亘丨孬鈥屬囏� 賮賱爻賮蹖卮 讴賴 丌诏丕賴蹖 乇賵 賲爻卅賱賴鈥屰� 丿卮賵丕乇 賲蹖鈥屫堎嗁嗀� 亘賴 卮丿鬲 讴賳噩讴丕賵賲 讴乇丿 倬蹖诏蹖乇 賲胤丕賱毓丕鬲 鬲賵 丨賵夭賴鈥屰� 賳賵乇賵爻丕蹖賳爻 丌诏丕賴蹖 亘丕卮賲 丕夭賵賳鈥屫� 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇丕蹖 爻丕賱 鄄郯郯鄣 丕爻鬲 賵 賳賵乇賵爻丕蹖賳爻 亘丕 爻乇毓鬲 趩卮賲诏蹖乇蹖 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 賵丕賯毓丕 賵丕噩亘賴 爻乇丕睾 賲胤丕賱毓丕鬲 噩丿蹖丿 乇賮鬲.
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丿乇 賲賵乇丿 鬲乇噩賲賴鈥屰� 讴鬲丕亘 賴賲 亘诏賲 蹖賴 賲賯丿丕乇 賮丕乇爻蹖鈥屫池ж槽� 丕氐賱丕丨丕鬲 毓賱賲蹖卮 丌夭丕乇丿賴賳丿賴 亘賵丿 亘乇丕賲 賵 丕蹖賳 讴賴 讴丕卮 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖賳 讴賱賲丕鬲 倬丕賳賵蹖爻 賲蹖鈥屫柏ж簇� 賳賴 丕蹖賳 讴賴 亘丿賵賳 丕乇噩丕毓 賴賲賴 乇賵 鬲賵 賳賲丕蹖賴鈥屰� 丌禺乇 讴鬲丕亘 噩丕 亘丿賴丿
噩丿丕 丕夭 亘丨孬鈥屬囏� 賮賱爻賮蹖卮 讴賴 丌诏丕賴蹖 乇賵 賲爻卅賱賴鈥屰� 丿卮賵丕乇 賲蹖鈥屫堎嗁嗀� 亘賴 卮丿鬲 讴賳噩讴丕賵賲 讴乇丿 倬蹖诏蹖乇 賲胤丕賱毓丕鬲 鬲賵 丨賵夭賴鈥屰� 賳賵乇賵爻丕蹖賳爻 丌诏丕賴蹖 亘丕卮賲 丕夭賵賳鈥屫� 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇丕蹖 爻丕賱 鄄郯郯鄣 丕爻鬲 賵 賳賵乇賵爻丕蹖賳爻 亘丕 爻乇毓鬲 趩卮賲诏蹖乇蹖 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 賵丕賯毓丕 賵丕噩亘賴 爻乇丕睾 賲胤丕賱毓丕鬲 噩丿蹖丿 乇賮鬲.
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丿乇 賲賵乇丿 鬲乇噩賲賴鈥屰� 讴鬲丕亘 賴賲 亘诏賲 蹖賴 賲賯丿丕乇 賮丕乇爻蹖鈥屫池ж槽� 丕氐賱丕丨丕鬲 毓賱賲蹖卮 丌夭丕乇丿賴賳丿賴 亘賵丿 亘乇丕賲 賵 丕蹖賳 讴賴 讴丕卮 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖賳 讴賱賲丕鬲 倬丕賳賵蹖爻 賲蹖鈥屫柏ж簇� 賳賴 丕蹖賳 讴賴 亘丿賵賳 丕乇噩丕毓 賴賲賴 乇賵 鬲賵 賳賲丕蹖賴鈥屰� 丌禺乇 讴鬲丕亘 噩丕 亘丿賴丿
February 8, 2019
Prompted by the recently finished work of fiction, I wanted to obtain a summary of the current theory in this area. This book is an easy and worthwhile read. However, the author is firmly in the camp of people stating that the consciousness phenomena is an illusion. So she provide more information to support this view than for the opposite theories.
June 25, 2023
倬丕蹖丕賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 1402.04.03
賮赖乇爻鬲:
1. 趩乇丕 乇丕夭責
賲爻卅賱賴鈥屰� 丿卮賵丕乇
鬲毓乇蹖賮 丌诏丕賴蹖
夭賵賲亘蹖
鬲賲丕卮丕禺丕賳賴鈥屰� 匕賴賳
2. 賲睾夭 丕賳爻丕賳
賵丨丿鬲 丌诏丕賴蹖
賲賱丕夭賲鈥屬囏й� 毓氐亘蹖 丌诏丕賴蹖
匕賴賳鈥屬囏й� 丌爻蹖亘鈥屫屫�
丿蹖丿賳 亘丿賵賳 丿蹖丿賳
3. 夭賲丕賳 賵 賲讴丕賳
夭賲丕賳鈥屫迟嗀� 鬲噩乇亘賴
爻丕毓鬲鈥屬囏� 賵 禺乇诏賵卮鈥屬囏�
乇丕賳賳丿诏蹖 賳丕丌诏丕賴丕賳賴
賳馗乇蹖賴鈥屬囏й� 丌诏丕賴蹖
4. 鬲賵賴賲 亘夭乇诏
趩蹖爻鬲蹖 鬲賵賴賲 亘夭乇诏
倬乇 讴乇丿賳 噩丕賴丕蹖 禺丕賱蹖
讴賵乇蹖 丿乇 亘乇丕亘乇 鬲睾蹖蹖乇
賳馗乇蹖賴鈥屰� 鬲賵賴賲 亘夭乇诏
5. 禺賵丿
乇賵丨 賵 噩丕賳
賲睾夭 丿賵卮賯賴
賴蹖倬賳賵鬲蹖夭賲 賵 诏爻爻鬲
賳馗乇蹖賴鈥屬囏й� 禺賵丿
6. 丕乇丕丿賴鈥屰� 丌诏丕賴丕賳賴 (丕禺鬲蹖丕乇)
丌蹖丕 賲丕 丿丕乇丕蹖 丕禺鬲蹖丕乇 賴爻鬲蹖賲責
夭賲丕賳鈥屫迟嗀� 丕毓賲丕賱 丌诏丕賴丕賳賴
丕丨爻丕爻賽 禺賵丕爻鬲賳
鬲賵賴賲 丕乇丕丿賴鈥屰� 丌诏丕賴丕賳賴 (丕禺鬲蹖丕乇)
7. 丨丕賱鬲鈥屬囏й� 鬲睾蹖蹖乇蹖丕賮鬲賴鈥屰� 丌诏丕賴蹖
禺賵丕亘 賵 乇賵蹖丕
丿丕乇賵賴丕 賵 丌诏丕賴蹖
鬲噩乇亘賴鈥屬囏й� 睾蹖乇賲毓賲賵賱
賲乇丕賯亘赖
8. 鬲讴丕賲賱 丌诏丕賴蹖
丌蹖賳賴鈥屬囏ж� 禺賵丿賴丕 賵 匕賴賳鈥屬囏й� 丿蹖诏乇
讴丕乇讴乇丿 丌诏丕賴蹖
丌蹖賳丿賴鈥屰� 丌诏丕賴蹖
賮赖乇爻鬲:
1. 趩乇丕 乇丕夭責
賲爻卅賱賴鈥屰� 丿卮賵丕乇
鬲毓乇蹖賮 丌诏丕賴蹖
夭賵賲亘蹖
鬲賲丕卮丕禺丕賳賴鈥屰� 匕賴賳
2. 賲睾夭 丕賳爻丕賳
賵丨丿鬲 丌诏丕賴蹖
賲賱丕夭賲鈥屬囏й� 毓氐亘蹖 丌诏丕賴蹖
匕賴賳鈥屬囏й� 丌爻蹖亘鈥屫屫�
丿蹖丿賳 亘丿賵賳 丿蹖丿賳
3. 夭賲丕賳 賵 賲讴丕賳
夭賲丕賳鈥屫迟嗀� 鬲噩乇亘賴
爻丕毓鬲鈥屬囏� 賵 禺乇诏賵卮鈥屬囏�
乇丕賳賳丿诏蹖 賳丕丌诏丕賴丕賳賴
賳馗乇蹖賴鈥屬囏й� 丌诏丕賴蹖
4. 鬲賵賴賲 亘夭乇诏
趩蹖爻鬲蹖 鬲賵賴賲 亘夭乇诏
倬乇 讴乇丿賳 噩丕賴丕蹖 禺丕賱蹖
讴賵乇蹖 丿乇 亘乇丕亘乇 鬲睾蹖蹖乇
賳馗乇蹖賴鈥屰� 鬲賵賴賲 亘夭乇诏
5. 禺賵丿
乇賵丨 賵 噩丕賳
賲睾夭 丿賵卮賯賴
賴蹖倬賳賵鬲蹖夭賲 賵 诏爻爻鬲
賳馗乇蹖賴鈥屬囏й� 禺賵丿
6. 丕乇丕丿賴鈥屰� 丌诏丕賴丕賳賴 (丕禺鬲蹖丕乇)
丌蹖丕 賲丕 丿丕乇丕蹖 丕禺鬲蹖丕乇 賴爻鬲蹖賲責
夭賲丕賳鈥屫迟嗀� 丕毓賲丕賱 丌诏丕賴丕賳賴
丕丨爻丕爻賽 禺賵丕爻鬲賳
鬲賵賴賲 丕乇丕丿賴鈥屰� 丌诏丕賴丕賳賴 (丕禺鬲蹖丕乇)
7. 丨丕賱鬲鈥屬囏й� 鬲睾蹖蹖乇蹖丕賮鬲賴鈥屰� 丌诏丕賴蹖
禺賵丕亘 賵 乇賵蹖丕
丿丕乇賵賴丕 賵 丌诏丕賴蹖
鬲噩乇亘賴鈥屬囏й� 睾蹖乇賲毓賲賵賱
賲乇丕賯亘赖
8. 鬲讴丕賲賱 丌诏丕賴蹖
丌蹖賳賴鈥屬囏ж� 禺賵丿賴丕 賵 匕賴賳鈥屬囏й� 丿蹖诏乇
讴丕乇讴乇丿 丌诏丕賴蹖
丌蹖賳丿賴鈥屰� 丌诏丕賴蹖
April 5, 2019
I just finished this book about 90 seconds ago, and flung it hard across the room.
Which came first-- the onset of readiness potential, or the will to throw it?
In all fairness, I cannot fully explain at this moment why it felt like Susan Blackmore was attempting to specifically hurt me in particular with her arguments. Maybe I will revisit my feelings at a later date. But I'd just like to say that it makes no sense to claim that duality is an illusion and simultaneously posit that all consciousness itself is an illusion. She kept harping on this one particular point: that no theories could explain why consciousness is subjective, and therefore they should all be thrown out the window and we should give up on trying to explain consciousness, because it doesn't really exist. That is the laziest thesis I've ever heard in my life. If duality is illusory, then why would it matter that consciousness is subjective? It makes sense to me that all creatures would have a subjective experience, because we are all observing physical phenomena from different angles. Collectively, we are all observers of reality, part of a network of consciousnesses, and our observations of this universe are subjective because we exist relative to one another in space and time. I don't understand why she thinks that is an impossible idea to wrap one's head around. Like... I can't perceive my cat's reality because my brain is not her brain. Just because everyone else's consciousness is private and relative doesn't mean none of it is real at all. I can get down with the idea that there is no such thing as a fixed and unchanging self / personality. I cannot accept the idea that consciousness itself isn't the natural consequence of life. This book is basically mentioning a lot of cool theories other people have had, and then disparaging them because, like, ~what if the blue I see isn't the blue you see, duuuude?~
I think I'd be happier reading about those theories of quantum consciousness she mentioned. Perhaps that is where I will head the next time I feel like revisiting this topic. But for right now, I feel like licking the psychic wounds this book caused me. I feel genuinely angry! Wow!
Which came first-- the onset of readiness potential, or the will to throw it?
In all fairness, I cannot fully explain at this moment why it felt like Susan Blackmore was attempting to specifically hurt me in particular with her arguments. Maybe I will revisit my feelings at a later date. But I'd just like to say that it makes no sense to claim that duality is an illusion and simultaneously posit that all consciousness itself is an illusion. She kept harping on this one particular point: that no theories could explain why consciousness is subjective, and therefore they should all be thrown out the window and we should give up on trying to explain consciousness, because it doesn't really exist. That is the laziest thesis I've ever heard in my life. If duality is illusory, then why would it matter that consciousness is subjective? It makes sense to me that all creatures would have a subjective experience, because we are all observing physical phenomena from different angles. Collectively, we are all observers of reality, part of a network of consciousnesses, and our observations of this universe are subjective because we exist relative to one another in space and time. I don't understand why she thinks that is an impossible idea to wrap one's head around. Like... I can't perceive my cat's reality because my brain is not her brain. Just because everyone else's consciousness is private and relative doesn't mean none of it is real at all. I can get down with the idea that there is no such thing as a fixed and unchanging self / personality. I cannot accept the idea that consciousness itself isn't the natural consequence of life. This book is basically mentioning a lot of cool theories other people have had, and then disparaging them because, like, ~what if the blue I see isn't the blue you see, duuuude?~
I think I'd be happier reading about those theories of quantum consciousness she mentioned. Perhaps that is where I will head the next time I feel like revisiting this topic. But for right now, I feel like licking the psychic wounds this book caused me. I feel genuinely angry! Wow!
August 15, 2022
This book is a shorter version of Consciousness: An Introduction by the same author. It presents a great many approaches and theories that aim to define 'consciousness' and related concepts such as 'self'. Happily, most of those theories are rendered false by clever evidence that is also described in the book. The evidence is respectable, often based on recent brain scanning techniques or reproducable psychological tests. The author favours the approach where both 'consciousness' and 'self' turn out to be delusions, again with good arguments. I tend to agree. Recommended to anyone interested in the topic.
October 25, 2016
兀賳丕 兀賲賱賰 噩爻丿賷 毓賷賳丕賷 賵 賯丿賲丕賷 賵 乇兀爻賷 賵 賷丿丕賷 賵 丿賲丕睾賷 賵 兀賲毓丕卅賷 兀賷囟丕 賵 賱賰賳 賲賳 兀賳丕 賱丕 卮賶亍 賲賲丕 爻亘賯 賷賲賰賳 兀賳 兀丿毓賵賴 兀賳丕
賴賰匕丕 賴賵 丕賱賵毓賷 賱丕 賷賵噩丿 亘丕賱賮毓賱 賲丕 賷賲孬賱賴 賵 賱丕 丨鬲賷 賲賰丕賳 賲丕 賮賶 丕賱賲禺
丿禺賱鬲 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 亘丨孬丕 毓賳 賲毓賳賷 賱賱賵毓賷 賮禺乇噩鬲 賲賳賴 兀賮鬲卮 毓賳 丕賱兀賳丕
賴賰匕丕 賴賵 丕賱賵毓賷 賱丕 賷賵噩丿 亘丕賱賮毓賱 賲丕 賷賲孬賱賴 賵 賱丕 丨鬲賷 賲賰丕賳 賲丕 賮賶 丕賱賲禺
丿禺賱鬲 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 亘丨孬丕 毓賳 賲毓賳賷 賱賱賵毓賷 賮禺乇噩鬲 賲賳賴 兀賮鬲卮 毓賳 丕賱兀賳丕
March 2, 2022
趩蹖夭蹖 讴賴 丕蹖賳 乇賵夭賴丕 亘卮丿鬲 丿睾丿睾賴 賲賳 亘賵丿 賵 丕夭 禺賵賳丿賳卮 亘爻蹖丕乇 賱匕鬲 亘乇丿賲 賵賱蹖 蹖賴 賳讴鬲賴 賴爻鬲 丕賵賳賲 丕蹖賳賴 讴賴 毓賳賵丕賳 丕氐賱蹖 讴鬲丕亘
Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction
賴爻鬲 讴賴 亘賳馗乇賲 丨賯 賲胤賱亘 讴丕賲賱 丕丿丕 卮丿賴 賵 賲丿禺賱 禺賵亘蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖賳 賲賵囟賵毓 丨爻丕亘 賲蹖卮賴
鬲賳賴丕 丕賳鬲賯丕丿賲 丕蹖賳賴 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘蹖 亘丕 丕蹖賳 毓賳賵丕賳 賳亘丕蹖丿 丨賵賱 賳馗乇 卮禺氐蹖 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 亘诏乇丿賴 賵 亘丕蹖丿 禺蹖賱蹖 亘蹖胤乇賮丕賳賴 賴賲賴 賳馗乇蹖賴 賴丕 乇賵 丕乇丕卅賴 讴賳賴 賵 乇爻丕賱鬲 讴鬲丕亘 讴賴 亘丕亘 丌卮賳丕蹖蹖 賴爻鬲 丕賳噩丕賲 亘卮賴 賵賱蹖 賲鬲丕爻賮丕賳賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 爻毓蹖 賲蹖讴賳賴 丕夭 賴乇 丿乇蹖 賵丕乇丿 禺賵賳賴 禺賵丿卮 亘卮賴 賵 丕诏乇 丕蹖賳 乇賵 賱丨丕馗 賳讴賳蹖賲 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕丨鬲 5 爻鬲丕乇賴 賴爻鬲卮
Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction
賴爻鬲 讴賴 亘賳馗乇賲 丨賯 賲胤賱亘 讴丕賲賱 丕丿丕 卮丿賴 賵 賲丿禺賱 禺賵亘蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖賳 賲賵囟賵毓 丨爻丕亘 賲蹖卮賴
鬲賳賴丕 丕賳鬲賯丕丿賲 丕蹖賳賴 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘蹖 亘丕 丕蹖賳 毓賳賵丕賳 賳亘丕蹖丿 丨賵賱 賳馗乇 卮禺氐蹖 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 亘诏乇丿賴 賵 亘丕蹖丿 禺蹖賱蹖 亘蹖胤乇賮丕賳賴 賴賲賴 賳馗乇蹖賴 賴丕 乇賵 丕乇丕卅賴 讴賳賴 賵 乇爻丕賱鬲 讴鬲丕亘 讴賴 亘丕亘 丌卮賳丕蹖蹖 賴爻鬲 丕賳噩丕賲 亘卮賴 賵賱蹖 賲鬲丕爻賮丕賳賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 爻毓蹖 賲蹖讴賳賴 丕夭 賴乇 丿乇蹖 賵丕乇丿 禺賵賳賴 禺賵丿卮 亘卮賴 賵 丕诏乇 丕蹖賳 乇賵 賱丨丕馗 賳讴賳蹖賲 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕丨鬲 5 爻鬲丕乇賴 賴爻鬲卮
June 11, 2019
丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 丕氐賱丕 丿賵爻鬲 賳丿丕卮鬲賲 賵 丕丨爻丕爻 賲蹖讴賳賲 亘丕 禺賵賳丿賳卮 賵賯鬲賲 鬲賱賮 卮丿賴. 賲禺氐賵氐丕 鄱 賮氐賱 丕賵賱卮 讴賴 亘賴 賳馗乇賲 亘賴 賲賵囟賵毓丕鬲蹖 賲蹖 倬乇丿丕夭賳 讴賴 讴賲讴蹖 亘賴 賮賴賲 亘賴鬲乇 丌诏丕賴蹖 賳賲蹖讴賳賳. 禺賵丿 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賴賲 丿乇 氐賮丨丕鬲 丕賳鬲賴丕蹖蹖 讴鬲丕亘 匕讴乇 賲蹖讴賳賴 讴賴 亘賴 賳馗乇卮 爻賵丕賱丕鬲蹖 讴賴 倬蹖乇丕賲賵賳 丌诏丕賴蹖 倬乇爻蹖丿賴 賲蹖卮賳 丕卮鬲亘丕賴賳 賵 賲丕 乇賵 丕夭 賲賵囟賵毓 丕氐賱蹖 丿賵乇 賲蹖讴賳賳. 亘丕 丕蹖賳 丨爻丕亘 賲鬲賵噩賴 賳賲蹖卮賲 趩乇丕 亘禺卮 毓賲丿賴 蹖 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 亘賴 亘乇乇爻蹖 賴賲蹖賳 爻賵丕賱 賴丕 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴. 亘丕 丕蹖賳 丨丕賱 丿賵 賮氐賱 丌禺乇 噩丕賱亘 鬲乇 亘賵丿賳 賲禺氐賵氐丕 亘禺卮 賲乇亘賵胤 亘賴 賲賵丕丿 乇賵丕賳 诏乇丿丕賳 讴賴 亘賴 賳馗乇賲 丿乇 丌蹖賳丿賴 賳賯卮 禺蹖賱蹖 賲賴賲 鬲乇蹖 乇賵 丿乇 丿乇讴 賲丕 丕夭 丌诏丕賴蹖 賵 賲睾夭 丕蹖賮丕 賲蹖讴賳賴 (丿乇 讴賳丕乇 AI 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘 禺蹖賱蹖 讴賲 亘賴卮 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴 亘賵丿.)
October 28, 2015
I debated between giving this book two or three stars. On the plus side, it is well written, an easy read, and it has a clear and concise description of a lot of what has been done and the state of the art in understanding consciousness. In the end, I went with two stars because I felt this book is fundamentally dishonest, a fatal flaw in an introduction. My problem with this book is that rather than being a review, what the title promises, it considers other theories of consciousness only to dismiss them in favor of the author's theory; this book advocates rather than introduces. I am not sorry I read this book, I have done some reading on this topic already but nonetheless picked up some new information as to where the field is, but then again I read this book on the heels of one of the other authors books, "The Meme Machine" and for that reason and because this was not the first book I had read on this subject, I was able to detect its bias and discount it. In balance, I would only recommend this book to someone who is knowledgable in the subject area and who is interested in completeness and is able to read critically.
February 22, 2016
兀賮賴賲 丕賱賲賯丿賲丞 兀賳 鬲賰賵賳 賲丿禺賱 賲亘爻胤 賱賱賲丕丿丞貙 廿賳 賰丕賳 賮賴賲賷 氐丨賷丨丕賸 賮賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賱賷爻 賲賯丿賲丞..
賲噩賲賵毓丞 賲賳 丕賱賳馗乇賷丕鬲 丕賱毓賱賲賷丞 賵丕賱賮賱爻賮賷丞 賲毓 毓丿丿 賰亘賷乇 賲賳 丕賱鬲噩丕乇亘 鬲丨丕賵賱 丕賱丕噩丕亘丞 毓賳 丕爻卅賱丞 賲賳 賯亘賷賱 賲丕 賴賵 丕賱賵毓賷責 賴賱 賷賲賰賳 丕賱廿丨爻丕爻 亘賴賽責 賴賱 賴賵 賲乇鬲亘胤 亘噩賴丕夭賳丕 丕賱毓氐亘賷責 賴賱 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳 賴賵 丕賱賰丕卅賳 丕賱賵丕毓賷 丕賱賵丨賷丿責
賵丕賱賳鬲賷噩丞 賰丕賳鬲 賱丕 卮賷亍貙 爻賵賶 丕賱賮丕卅丿丞 賲賳 亘毓囟 丕賱賲毓賱賵賲丕鬲 賵丕賱鬲噩丕乇亘..
亘卮賰賱 毓丕賲 兀乇賶 兀賳 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賷噩毓 丕賱賯丕乇卅 兀賰孬乇 丨賷乇丞 亘毓丿 賯乇丕亍鬲賴..
賲噩賲賵毓丞 賲賳 丕賱賳馗乇賷丕鬲 丕賱毓賱賲賷丞 賵丕賱賮賱爻賮賷丞 賲毓 毓丿丿 賰亘賷乇 賲賳 丕賱鬲噩丕乇亘 鬲丨丕賵賱 丕賱丕噩丕亘丞 毓賳 丕爻卅賱丞 賲賳 賯亘賷賱 賲丕 賴賵 丕賱賵毓賷責 賴賱 賷賲賰賳 丕賱廿丨爻丕爻 亘賴賽責 賴賱 賴賵 賲乇鬲亘胤 亘噩賴丕夭賳丕 丕賱毓氐亘賷責 賴賱 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳 賴賵 丕賱賰丕卅賳 丕賱賵丕毓賷 丕賱賵丨賷丿責
賵丕賱賳鬲賷噩丞 賰丕賳鬲 賱丕 卮賷亍貙 爻賵賶 丕賱賮丕卅丿丞 賲賳 亘毓囟 丕賱賲毓賱賵賲丕鬲 賵丕賱鬲噩丕乇亘..
亘卮賰賱 毓丕賲 兀乇賶 兀賳 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賷噩毓 丕賱賯丕乇卅 兀賰孬乇 丨賷乇丞 亘毓丿 賯乇丕亍鬲賴..
November 29, 2017
The book is a decent book to stimulate your curiosity into the 鈥渃onsciousness鈥� subject. It questions more than it answers. The author does well in introducing the different ideas and school of thoughts in this subject. Many concepts are intriguing. If you want definite answers, then this book will not serve your purpose.
August 16, 2021
Great quick review of various definitions and theories of consciousness. Author came on a little strongly with her own views in the last few pages, but I happen to more or less agree with them. Would like to read a 鈥渘ot-quite-so-short鈥� introduction with about the same style and level of difficulty but more in depth鈥�
August 6, 2019
The blurb is misleading. As Blackmore says, this book clarifies some of the ideas that have been proposed, but mainly serves to enhance the confusion. Unless we basically chuck the whole idea that there is such a thing as consciousness.
The thing is, this book is a survey of the scientific and philosophical theories about the very definition of consciousness itself, its shape & characteristics & falsifiability, etc., *and* it also addresses altered states of consciousness, the evolution of consciousness (with divergences into animal psychology), and the question of free will. Because, from the author's perspective, it all hangs together (except when impossibilities are revealed and things hang separately... ;), as one can see if one makes the effort to read the whole darn dense packet.
It is very concise, which makes it, in a way, difficult to get through... no padding to cushion the impact of each and every word, so to speak. There are notes and index and further reading, too. Blackmore herself has a bigger book on the subject. I think I'm going to stop with my holistic overview here, though, at least for now... and you'll know why if you read my entire review.
There's one big takeaway I do get out of it, but I'll save that until the end of these comments, after I've shared a few other worthy tidbits.
And there's one big flaw, imo. Nowhere is there mention of a subconscious. The idea of "attention" seems to me to be the closest that Blackmore gets, and I don't opine that they're exactly the same thing.
So one of the separate tidbits is this: there is a ""sensorimotor theory of vision" proposed by psychologist Kevin O'Regan and philosopher Alva Noe. They take a fundamentally new approach in which vision is not about building internal representations at all, but is a way of acting in the world. Vision is about mastering the sensorimotor contingencies - that is, knowing how your own actions affect the information you get back from the world... On this view... seeing, attending, and acting all become the same thing."
Also: "Tests with monkeys have shown no self-recognition, even though they can use mirrors in other ways, such as reaching for things seen only in a reflection."
And an experiment with hens being kept 'battery' gave them the option of using a cage with litter to scratch in, which is their normal preference. But the birds wouldn't push aside a heavy curtain to get to that cage, staying in the default cage with no litter.
Or closer to home, unless one becomes proficient at meditation, it is biometrically no more relaxing than sitting in a chair listening to music or reading.
More directly to the point of the book, psychologist Daniel Wegner "suggests that unconscious processes give rise to both thoughts about the action and the action itself. We then wrongly infer that our thoughts cause our actions." (This idea works pretty well, imo, to explain the fact that our Readiness Potential precedes our awareness of making the choice to act. If you don't know what experiments I'm referring to, read this book or look elsewhere re' Benjamin Libet.)
But the bit in the book that, imo, provides for the most productive further thinking, and probably even further research, lies in the redefinition of inner self. Basically, Dennett (and, apparently, Blackmore) accept that there is no such thing. That is, there is no continuing or persistent "I" or thing that I am that I also was yesterday (or even a moment ago). It does need to be explained, but it is not a physical object or a process in the brain. It is a story we tell ourselves to make sense of the impressions made upon us and the actions we take. It is a "centre of narrative gravity," "only multiple parallel processes that give rise to a benign user illusion - a useful fiction."
She concludes the chapter on Self: "It means taking a radically different view of every experience. It means accepting that there is no one who is having these experiences. It means that accepting every time I seem to exist, this is just a temporary fiction and not the same 'me` who seemed to exist a moment before, or last week, or last year. This is tough, but I think it gets easier with practice."
Believe me, friends, Blackmore is a scientist. Admittedly, she looks at everything a little differently, but it's no woo-woo psychedelic trip or spiritual vision. And this review doesn't cover the whole book, and the whole book doesn't answer any questions. But I'm glad I read (studied) it as much as I did, and I'll be thinking on it. And I think some of you might feel that reading it yourself is at least interesting, if not satisfying. I'm rounding up my rating from 3.5 to 4 (but not worrying about whether I'm doing it of my own free will ;) because it does not encourage me to feel overwhelmed by a desire to add more books to my to-read lists. ;)
The thing is, this book is a survey of the scientific and philosophical theories about the very definition of consciousness itself, its shape & characteristics & falsifiability, etc., *and* it also addresses altered states of consciousness, the evolution of consciousness (with divergences into animal psychology), and the question of free will. Because, from the author's perspective, it all hangs together (except when impossibilities are revealed and things hang separately... ;), as one can see if one makes the effort to read the whole darn dense packet.
It is very concise, which makes it, in a way, difficult to get through... no padding to cushion the impact of each and every word, so to speak. There are notes and index and further reading, too. Blackmore herself has a bigger book on the subject. I think I'm going to stop with my holistic overview here, though, at least for now... and you'll know why if you read my entire review.
There's one big takeaway I do get out of it, but I'll save that until the end of these comments, after I've shared a few other worthy tidbits.
And there's one big flaw, imo. Nowhere is there mention of a subconscious. The idea of "attention" seems to me to be the closest that Blackmore gets, and I don't opine that they're exactly the same thing.
So one of the separate tidbits is this: there is a ""sensorimotor theory of vision" proposed by psychologist Kevin O'Regan and philosopher Alva Noe. They take a fundamentally new approach in which vision is not about building internal representations at all, but is a way of acting in the world. Vision is about mastering the sensorimotor contingencies - that is, knowing how your own actions affect the information you get back from the world... On this view... seeing, attending, and acting all become the same thing."
Also: "Tests with monkeys have shown no self-recognition, even though they can use mirrors in other ways, such as reaching for things seen only in a reflection."
And an experiment with hens being kept 'battery' gave them the option of using a cage with litter to scratch in, which is their normal preference. But the birds wouldn't push aside a heavy curtain to get to that cage, staying in the default cage with no litter.
Or closer to home, unless one becomes proficient at meditation, it is biometrically no more relaxing than sitting in a chair listening to music or reading.
More directly to the point of the book, psychologist Daniel Wegner "suggests that unconscious processes give rise to both thoughts about the action and the action itself. We then wrongly infer that our thoughts cause our actions." (This idea works pretty well, imo, to explain the fact that our Readiness Potential precedes our awareness of making the choice to act. If you don't know what experiments I'm referring to, read this book or look elsewhere re' Benjamin Libet.)
But the bit in the book that, imo, provides for the most productive further thinking, and probably even further research, lies in the redefinition of inner self. Basically, Dennett (and, apparently, Blackmore) accept that there is no such thing. That is, there is no continuing or persistent "I" or thing that I am that I also was yesterday (or even a moment ago). It does need to be explained, but it is not a physical object or a process in the brain. It is a story we tell ourselves to make sense of the impressions made upon us and the actions we take. It is a "centre of narrative gravity," "only multiple parallel processes that give rise to a benign user illusion - a useful fiction."
She concludes the chapter on Self: "It means taking a radically different view of every experience. It means accepting that there is no one who is having these experiences. It means that accepting every time I seem to exist, this is just a temporary fiction and not the same 'me` who seemed to exist a moment before, or last week, or last year. This is tough, but I think it gets easier with practice."
Believe me, friends, Blackmore is a scientist. Admittedly, she looks at everything a little differently, but it's no woo-woo psychedelic trip or spiritual vision. And this review doesn't cover the whole book, and the whole book doesn't answer any questions. But I'm glad I read (studied) it as much as I did, and I'll be thinking on it. And I think some of you might feel that reading it yourself is at least interesting, if not satisfying. I'm rounding up my rating from 3.5 to 4 (but not worrying about whether I'm doing it of my own free will ;) because it does not encourage me to feel overwhelmed by a desire to add more books to my to-read lists. ;)
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November 21, 2017賱賲 兀爻鬲胤賷毓 廿賰賲丕賱 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 .. 賵噩丿鬲 賮賷 氐毓賵亘丞 賮賷 賮賴賲賷 賱賴貙 賰賲丕 廿賳賳賷 兀卮毓乇 亘兀賳 丕賱賲賵囟賵毓 賲夭毓噩 賵賱丕 賷丨鬲丕噩 賱賴匕丕 丕賱卮乇丨 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷.
賱賲爻鬲 賮賷賴 丕賱賲夭噩 亘賷賳 丕賱胤亘 賵丕賱賮賱爻賮丞..
丕賱馗乇賷賮 廿賳賴 賲賯丿賲丞 .. 賵賯氐賷乇丞 噩丿丕賸 .. 賱丕 兀毓賱賲 賰賷賮 賷爻鬲胤賷毓 丕賱亘賯賷丞 賯乇丕亍丞 賴匕 丕賱賳賵毓 賲賳 丕賱賰鬲亘 "丕賱馗乇賷賮丞"
賱賲爻鬲 賮賷賴 丕賱賲夭噩 亘賷賳 丕賱胤亘 賵丕賱賮賱爻賮丞..
丕賱馗乇賷賮 廿賳賴 賲賯丿賲丞 .. 賵賯氐賷乇丞 噩丿丕賸 .. 賱丕 兀毓賱賲 賰賷賮 賷爻鬲胤賷毓 丕賱亘賯賷丞 賯乇丕亍丞 賴匕 丕賱賳賵毓 賲賳 丕賱賰鬲亘 "丕賱馗乇賷賮丞"
November 20, 2015
Yes, I am stuck on these wonderful "very short introduction" (VSI) books from Oxford University. This one is the perfect follow-up to the one on free will that I recently reviewed.
While the free will book is about logic; how do we think about our consciousness and how can we eliminate false ideas about it through reasoning, this book is all about science and the physical brain. The actual parts of the brain are only mentioned a few times but many studies of brain function and the theories of a few modern philosophers form the foundation of the work.
It's clear the author is a fan of Daniel Dennett. Since I am too, it didn't surprise me that I found myself agreeing with much of what Susan Blackmore presents.
Being purely physical, the case for our possessing something apart from the physical that directs our activity doesn't hold up and no research has ever shown otherwise. That said, the next thing to put aside is the idea that consciousness is localized in a certain part of the brain. Instead, the leading idea is that consciousness is a byproduct of the overall operation of the brain.
Evidence shows that our consciousness is not a continuous thing across time. Instead, it appears to be a very momentary, transient thing that attends to a very limited part of what we sense at any given moment. Our sense that we are aware of the full environment around us at once is illusion our brain constructs.
Filled with intriguing experimental results, this book offers surprises for any reader. It appears the brain is far out in front of our perceptions as many physical activities, such as playing a game of ping-pong, proceed at speeds far beyond that of our consciousness. The brain plays ping-pong and the "me" that we experience is more like a spectator that later claims to have been in charge. And we've all had the experience of driving a car thinking of something else and suddenly coming back to awareness of the driving. Our brain was driving just fine while our mind was elsewhere.
As is the intent of the entire VSI book series, the content of Blackmore's work would be a wonderful source of ideas for a classroom and a full bibliography points the way to further exploration. I highly recommend that you make yourself a classroom of one and take on this little gem!
While the free will book is about logic; how do we think about our consciousness and how can we eliminate false ideas about it through reasoning, this book is all about science and the physical brain. The actual parts of the brain are only mentioned a few times but many studies of brain function and the theories of a few modern philosophers form the foundation of the work.
It's clear the author is a fan of Daniel Dennett. Since I am too, it didn't surprise me that I found myself agreeing with much of what Susan Blackmore presents.
Being purely physical, the case for our possessing something apart from the physical that directs our activity doesn't hold up and no research has ever shown otherwise. That said, the next thing to put aside is the idea that consciousness is localized in a certain part of the brain. Instead, the leading idea is that consciousness is a byproduct of the overall operation of the brain.
Evidence shows that our consciousness is not a continuous thing across time. Instead, it appears to be a very momentary, transient thing that attends to a very limited part of what we sense at any given moment. Our sense that we are aware of the full environment around us at once is illusion our brain constructs.
Filled with intriguing experimental results, this book offers surprises for any reader. It appears the brain is far out in front of our perceptions as many physical activities, such as playing a game of ping-pong, proceed at speeds far beyond that of our consciousness. The brain plays ping-pong and the "me" that we experience is more like a spectator that later claims to have been in charge. And we've all had the experience of driving a car thinking of something else and suddenly coming back to awareness of the driving. Our brain was driving just fine while our mind was elsewhere.
As is the intent of the entire VSI book series, the content of Blackmore's work would be a wonderful source of ideas for a classroom and a full bibliography points the way to further exploration. I highly recommend that you make yourself a classroom of one and take on this little gem!
April 14, 2016
丌诏丕賴蹖 趩蹖爻鬲 賵 丿賯蹖賯丕 趩賴 賲蹖讴賳丿責 丌蹖丕 丌诏丕賴蹖 賳賵毓蹖 鬲賵賴賲 賳蹖爻鬲責
讴鬲丕亘 卮丕賲賱 8 賮氐賱賴 夭亘丕賳 爻丕丿賴 丕蹖 丿丕乇賴. 亘賱讴賲賵乇 爻賵丕賱蹖 乇賵 賲胤乇丨 賲蹖讴賳賴 賵 亘毓丿 丿乇亘丕乇賴 鬲氐賵乇丕鬲 賳丕丿乇爻鬲蹖 讴賴 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賴 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴
禺賵賳丿賳卮 賲賮蹖丿 賵 噩丕賱亘 亘賵丿
賯爻賲鬲蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘
趩胤賵乇 丕夭 卮乇 丕賮讴丕乇 賲夭丕丨賲 乇丕丨鬲 卮賵蹖賲責 亘賴鬲乇蹖賳 鬲賵氐蹖賴 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘丕 丕蹖賳 丕賮讴丕乇 賳噩賳诏蹖賲 亘賱讴賴 賮賯胤 亘诏匕丕乇蹖賲 亘乇賵賳丿
氐 147
讴鬲丕亘 卮丕賲賱 8 賮氐賱賴 夭亘丕賳 爻丕丿賴 丕蹖 丿丕乇賴. 亘賱讴賲賵乇 爻賵丕賱蹖 乇賵 賲胤乇丨 賲蹖讴賳賴 賵 亘毓丿 丿乇亘丕乇賴 鬲氐賵乇丕鬲 賳丕丿乇爻鬲蹖 讴賴 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賴 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賲蹖丿賴
禺賵賳丿賳卮 賲賮蹖丿 賵 噩丕賱亘 亘賵丿
賯爻賲鬲蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘
趩胤賵乇 丕夭 卮乇 丕賮讴丕乇 賲夭丕丨賲 乇丕丨鬲 卮賵蹖賲責 亘賴鬲乇蹖賳 鬲賵氐蹖賴 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘丕 丕蹖賳 丕賮讴丕乇 賳噩賳诏蹖賲 亘賱讴賴 賮賯胤 亘诏匕丕乇蹖賲 亘乇賵賳丿
氐 147
November 14, 2017
乇丕賯賳賷 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賵乇丕賯賳賷 鬲爻賱爻賱 丕賱兀賮賰丕乇 賵丕賱胤乇丨 賵乇亘胤 丕賱賳馗乇賷丕鬲..
丕賱兀爻卅賱丞 丕賱鬲賷 鬲胤乇丨賴丕 丕賱賰丕鬲亘丞 賲孬賷乇丞 賵賲丿毓丕丞 賱賱鬲賮賰賷乇.
賲賯丕乇賳丞 亘毓丿丞 賰鬲亘 兀禺乇賶 賯乇兀鬲賴丕 賮賷 丕賱爻賱爻賱丞 賮廿賳 賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賵毓賷 賴賵 丕賱賲賮囟賱 賱丿賷貙 賵兀乇賶 兀賳 丕賱賰丕鬲亘丞 賳噩丨鬲 賮賷 丕賱賳夭賵賱 賱賲爻鬲賵賶 丕賱賯丕乇卅 丕賱賲亘鬲丿卅 賵禺胤丞 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賵丕囟丨丞 賵賲乇鬲亘丞.
丕賱兀爻卅賱丞 丕賱鬲賷 鬲胤乇丨賴丕 丕賱賰丕鬲亘丞 賲孬賷乇丞 賵賲丿毓丕丞 賱賱鬲賮賰賷乇.
賲賯丕乇賳丞 亘毓丿丞 賰鬲亘 兀禺乇賶 賯乇兀鬲賴丕 賮賷 丕賱爻賱爻賱丞 賮廿賳 賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賵毓賷 賴賵 丕賱賲賮囟賱 賱丿賷貙 賵兀乇賶 兀賳 丕賱賰丕鬲亘丞 賳噩丨鬲 賮賷 丕賱賳夭賵賱 賱賲爻鬲賵賶 丕賱賯丕乇卅 丕賱賲亘鬲丿卅 賵禺胤丞 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賵丕囟丨丞 賵賲乇鬲亘丞.
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