Details an account of his experiences between 1977 and 1981, and an analysis of the achievements and consequences of United States foreign policy during those years
Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski was a Polish-American political scientist, geostrategist, and statesman who served as United States National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981. Known for his hawkish foreign policy at a time when the Democratic Party was increasingly dovish, he is a foreign policy realist and considered by some to be the Democrats' response to Republican realist Henry Kissinger.
Major foreign policy events during his term of office included the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China (and the severing of ties with the Republic of China), the signing of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), the brokering of the Camp David Accords, the transition of Iran to an anti-Western Islamic state, encouraging reform in Eastern Europe, emphasizing human rights in U.S. foreign policy, the arming of the mujaheddin in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet-friendly Afghan government, increase the probability of Soviet invasion and later entanglement in a Vietnam-style war, and later to counter the Soviet invasion, and the signing of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties relinquishing U.S. control of the Panama Canal after 1999.
He was a professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and a member of various boards and councils. He appeared frequently as an expert on the PBS program The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer.
The writer was President Carter's National Security Advisor for his entire term, and he wrote this memoir immediately after Carter's single term ended, when events were still current in his mind and had not yet been filtered by history, making it an important read for those interested in the Carter presidency. While the writer was an academic, and some of this book is presented a bit too theoretically and academically, in general, it is very well written and engaging.
Zbig (as he was often known because of the difficulties of Americans in pronouncing his Polish name!) organized the book around a series of themes instead of in strict chronological order. For those familiar with the times this is okay but today younger readers may have some problems recalling or even knowing the contexts.
What comes across in this book are the failings of the Carter presidency. Despite the author's spin, it is very clear that the President's single minded focus on the "SALT" treaty with the Soviets and "peace" contributed to a perception of weakness that allowed the Soviets to invade Afganistan and align with Cuba to influence swaths of Africa over this period.
The president pushed through a treaty giving the Panama Canal back to Panama, but it caused major political divisions in his own party. Powerful Democratic Congressmen such as Dan Flood, strongly opposed giving the canal back, and it sowed discord in the party which already was not that familiar with the new president, who had come out of nowhere to win the presidency. And it's not clear it was in American interest. Little more than a decade later, President George H W Bush had to send American military forces into Panama to remove a hostile dictator and even today President Donald Trump raises the issue of the canal.
Carter's major foreign policy success was his personal involvement in negotiating a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt that is still in place over 40 years later. But Zbig fails to mention its immediate legacy was the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Sadat who agreed to the treaty. It is also very clear in this book that Israeli Prime Minister Begin was an incredibly irrational hostile man who had no loyalty to Carter. Carter spent so much time on this issue that most Americans never cared about that it took away from the serious domestic issues Carter was facing that ultimately led to his re-election defeat. Today, Israel and Gaza remain at war, and it seems all the time presidents have spent on this issue over the last 40 years was a total waste of time, effort and tax dollars.
The Carter Administration failed most miserably in Iran. They totally missed how unpopular the Shah was and failed to learn of his fatal illness. Carter's serious mismanagement of Iran and the Iranian hostage crisis ultimately doomed his re-election effort.
What also comes across powerfully in this book was how divided Carter's advisors were. It's good to have a wide range of views among advisors, but once the president makes the decision, the entire team must support it. It is painfully clear in reading this book there was a fundamental difference of views between Zbig and the Secretary of State for most of the Carter years, Cyrus Vance. Time and time again in this book the rivalry comes up and they even seek to undercut each other after decisions are made. Carter should have removed one or the other, or at least laid down the law about supporting his final decisions, and he did not.
Despite its shortcomings, this book is an important depiction of the actual internal operations of the Carter Administration in the area of foreign policy and national security strategy and should be read by anyone interested in the Carter years.