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Досвід і судження. Дослідження генеалогії логіки
У творі «Досвід і судження» Едмунд Гусерль пропонує феноменологічне розуміння генеалогії логіки як походження форм судження з допредикативного досвіду. Він впроваджує поняття внутрішнього і зовнішнього горизонту досвіду, а також запропоновує специфічне феноменологічне розв’язанн� проблеми утворення загальних понять за допомогою концепції вільної варіації у фантазії. Розраховано на викладачів філософії, студентів філософських і гуманітарних факультетів, а також на широке коло інтелектуалів, що цікавляться сучасною онтологією, епістемологією і логікою.
356 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1939
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About the author
Edmund Husserl
467books507followersEdmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (Dr. phil. hab., University of Halle-Wittenberg, 1887; Ph.D., Mathematics, University of Vienna, 1883) was a philosopher who is deemed the founder of phenomenology. He broke with the positivist orientation of the science and philosophy of his day, believing that experience is the source of all knowledge, while at the same time he elaborated critiques of psychologism and historicism.
Born into a Moravian Jewish family, he was baptized as a Lutheran in 1887. Husserl studied mathematics under Karl Weierstrass, completing a Ph.D. under Leo Königsberger, and studied philosophy under Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. Husserl taught philosophy, as a Privatdozent at Halle from 1887, then as professor, first at Göttingen from 1901, then at Freiburg im Breisgau from 1916 until his 1928 retirement.
Born into a Moravian Jewish family, he was baptized as a Lutheran in 1887. Husserl studied mathematics under Karl Weierstrass, completing a Ph.D. under Leo Königsberger, and studied philosophy under Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. Husserl taught philosophy, as a Privatdozent at Halle from 1887, then as professor, first at Göttingen from 1901, then at Freiburg im Breisgau from 1916 until his 1928 retirement.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
May 29, 2018
This is one of my favorite philosophy texts of all time: it’s a treat to watch a thinker try with all of his formidable might, long before the field of neuroscience had brought so much to the discussion, to write around or try to describe that which can’t be thought. That is to say, his chasing of the “quark of thought� (via such constructs as pre-predication, etc), of thinking around the void that is the unknown barrier that separates the neurobiological flash from what we call “thought�, makes him, in this reader’s estimation, one of the most fascinating, pleasurable, and difficult philosophers we’ve ever had.
February 18, 2025
The basic idea of this book is interesting: to connect basic sentences like "A cube is red" to perceptual processes and to continue to build a foundation for logic in perception. It is effectively an approach that is very connected to process philosophy in that it seeks to ground expressions of permanence in temporal processes and related to the unfolding of the phenomenally given. It is good to note that this book does not represent the deepest level of Husserl's thought, as it does not take on the task of addressing the conditions of possibility of objects but only the relation of the nature of the givenness of the objects to predicative thought. So, it's not a full system and can't be evaluated as such. The merit of this book lies instead in its attempt to reverse the core assumptions surrounding both verificationism and more regular correspondence theories in positing a harmonious relation between logic and perception. Logic is not viewed as an isolated model entity and neither is it viewed as a method of organizing a chaotic flux of experience. In effect, the project taken on here constitutes both a logicization of perception as well as perceptualization of logic.
Does it work, then? With Husserl there's always a problem his robust output overflowing the significance of any one work and perhaps his writings on transcendental logic are the most fundamental ones, as he indicates here. Within the limits of this book, though, it tends to fall into a very obscure gray area between description and invention. The dual form mentioned in the last chapter goes a long way in summarizing the problem: it is as if the goal is "logico-perception" and the way to get there is by using the already-logically-constituted perception as a reference of a descriptive explanation in the language of logic. There could be ways around this problem but I don't know if this book always succeeds in getting there from here, so to speak. In truth, the side of predicative objects is doubled and it comes across as describing a series of already made presumptions using the language of perception: this is true especially when he starts talking about generality and how it is born from perceptions of likeness and variation of irrelevant things in perception while holding one thing steady.
Could there be a way to found generality in lower-order perceptions? Throughout the book I fixated on Husserl's use of the "backside of the object" as an example in his explanations of basic perceptual processes. It fits nicely with the Jewish conception of olam, a type of worldhood of the world that paradoxically reveals the world as concealed, as per the meaning of alam. If the word "world" is from proto-Germanic weraldiz, or the ages of man, it would suggest a fourth-dimensional perspective(or one-dimensional, depending how you look at it, the really-dumb united with really-smart meme) as opposed to the three-dimensional perspective that is defined by concealed backsides, with the Greek order of kosmos exemplifying a two-dimensional perspective. Even all the perceptual temporally glued processes here are oriented towards revealing a hidden side of the object and further along, towards achieving an internal consistency of repeatability of revelation. The ultimate quality of a prepredicative substrate, then, is its depth. Logic could be an expression of depth. Without depth, it is not really possible to use the word "is" or to predicate one thing of the other because all the surfaces are given problematically as directions of lines just as depth is given problematically as a series of surfaces. There is no "closure" possible there and therefore no identity. With the domination of the surface and the positing of depth, the "threads" of the world are cut, as it were, and there is a sense of desolate space.
This leads to some interesting ideas. For example, if you take a cube, you can switch back and forth between problematical perception of mere surfaces and intuitive depth. Temporal process: 1. you see a surface and connect next impressions to posit depth to it by adding together discrete elements of time, now surfaces, creating cube 2. Now "it" has the quality of depth. Next you notice the lines that make up the depth-object and decompose the object to surfaces, making a transition from problematical 2D perception of lines to the full reality of the surface in depth, within the posited depth 3. Then, you recombine these surfaces again to make up the depth-object cube, but not in a direct Grassmannian transition as in the first but from the resulting sheared surfaces. By this process, you recreate the same object using different time processes and so create a supra-temporal, supra-spatial object that is "general" and not bound by the spatio-temporal presentation because it is given in contradicting ways there.
Generality could. then, be connected to the process: 1) Positing of surface extended to depth through applying it in time, dimensional expansion congruent with time's arrow 2) The simulation of a lower-level process inside the posited depth by simulating the transition from problematic surface-perception in the form of open lines to the objective surface, relation of spatial expansion to time's arrow: two steps back but one step forward 3) Recombining the simulated surfaces thus generated to a previously known depth figure, re-aligning the direction with the time's arrow. The entirety of this process and the confusion it generates could create the need for logical objectification and time-binding behaviour so common among humankind. Generality then means forward-back-back-forward-forward, but without returning to normal as the structure would imply since that other term is constantly passing moments which are also moving, creating a measurement system where all the constraints are in motion in the what Husserl calls actual time (moment being just some lower limit of perceptive capacity).
Perhaps the biggest advance I got from this book was Husserl's implicit philosophy of syntheticity. It's not only individual statements that are essentially synthetic and given to illegitimate use but also the structure of logic in general would be essentially synthetic. The analytic-synthetic debate applies not only to propositions to but to more ultimate types represented by basic propositions like "S is P", categorial, It is the case that S is P, "state-of-affairs", Truth value of the preceding statement, "extended state of affairs etc. Husserl's thought also works to connect divergent systems like term logic, propositional logic and set theory to one whole. For example, the relation of set theory to propositional logic is that of a constructed holistic object to unity of separate parts in a state of affair. There's an interesting analogy here to processes of geometric perception outlined above in that propositional logic would describe a depth-object as a unity of posited surfaces in an evolution through time (the first stage of construction) while set theory would correspond to the cube as already-existing collection of disparate surfaces (the last stage of construction).
What reamins important to Husserl, however, is the notion of explication, the revelation of some substrate as something else. This process I assimilated to the notion of rotation the whole time through. After all, it is in angular motion that depth really becomes defined, since any linear motions can be fixed to however they diverge from the basis as the new default direction and even the collective evolutions can always be interpreted as linear ones from the previous evolution continued: there's no sense in the Grassmannian evolution that the result of the collective evolution would be magically fixed, which might be a problem. However, rotations present phenomena that are either reduced to brute change (standard) or not explicable at all without dimensional breakthrough (asymmetric chiral flips). It seems, then, that rotations of asymmetric objects would be key in motivating the bare form of statement S is P, which according to Husserl is the made in order to make the process repeatable at the limit of further possible determinations. This is why I say only semi-jokingly that G.E. Moore might have been the ultimate thinker in recognizing the HAND in his proof for the external world. The pre-predicative substrate enters the syntactic realm of the subject through its revelation "as" by rotation and by the possibility of repeating that rotation instead of calculating changes of weirdly shaped surfaces. Therefore there's a strange result that the subject of a logical statement is an angular motion, and this could be applied to even non-spatial statements somehow, with concepts like conceptual symmetry and chirality, motion-types in idea-space etc.
The most basic Husserlian notion is probably that of the lifeworld and the idea of the intersubjectivity of perception; the idea that any object of perception is given in a field or horizon of co-posited realities that are absolutely essential in co-determining it. Sometimes this line of thinking can take an easily objectionable turn when it is applied merely to various social elements, as in Crisis of European Sciences or when you try to prove other minds by forcing various things into the realm of givenness. Here, though, it's handled in a more abstract manner, the positing of co-determinations bringing to mind a Leibnizian philosophy of space. It also reminds one of a kind of gauge theory of perception where every object of actual perception has their given temporality determined by the "gauge group" with the exception of imaginary objects, whose givenness is characterized by lack of determinate temporality. This leads to some interesting lines of thought in that this implies not only a relativity of space but also a relativity of time: every object has its temporality only in terms of the full gauge field but in itself they are not temporal at all, as they can be transferred to imaginary non-temporal perceptions easily. Imagination rests on a space of possible gauge groups and in its effectivity it could be the union of two gauge groups in that in perception you re-interpreted the given data based on different perceptual gauge groups or realities, as described above with the example of the cube which effectively transforms perception into re-imaginable generalities.
Some more notes there but that's totally enough. Just putting this one note that I no longer understand to cap this incredibly anti-Sokalian review off:
P. 143
Interpenetration of explications - intensive magnitude, Exteriorization of explications - extensive --> even an intuitive red square is given as relating to the qualitative side of the form ie. FORM FROM THE INSIDE!!! ie. The type of singularities met by explications!!!
Does it work, then? With Husserl there's always a problem his robust output overflowing the significance of any one work and perhaps his writings on transcendental logic are the most fundamental ones, as he indicates here. Within the limits of this book, though, it tends to fall into a very obscure gray area between description and invention. The dual form mentioned in the last chapter goes a long way in summarizing the problem: it is as if the goal is "logico-perception" and the way to get there is by using the already-logically-constituted perception as a reference of a descriptive explanation in the language of logic. There could be ways around this problem but I don't know if this book always succeeds in getting there from here, so to speak. In truth, the side of predicative objects is doubled and it comes across as describing a series of already made presumptions using the language of perception: this is true especially when he starts talking about generality and how it is born from perceptions of likeness and variation of irrelevant things in perception while holding one thing steady.
Could there be a way to found generality in lower-order perceptions? Throughout the book I fixated on Husserl's use of the "backside of the object" as an example in his explanations of basic perceptual processes. It fits nicely with the Jewish conception of olam, a type of worldhood of the world that paradoxically reveals the world as concealed, as per the meaning of alam. If the word "world" is from proto-Germanic weraldiz, or the ages of man, it would suggest a fourth-dimensional perspective(or one-dimensional, depending how you look at it, the really-dumb united with really-smart meme) as opposed to the three-dimensional perspective that is defined by concealed backsides, with the Greek order of kosmos exemplifying a two-dimensional perspective. Even all the perceptual temporally glued processes here are oriented towards revealing a hidden side of the object and further along, towards achieving an internal consistency of repeatability of revelation. The ultimate quality of a prepredicative substrate, then, is its depth. Logic could be an expression of depth. Without depth, it is not really possible to use the word "is" or to predicate one thing of the other because all the surfaces are given problematically as directions of lines just as depth is given problematically as a series of surfaces. There is no "closure" possible there and therefore no identity. With the domination of the surface and the positing of depth, the "threads" of the world are cut, as it were, and there is a sense of desolate space.
This leads to some interesting ideas. For example, if you take a cube, you can switch back and forth between problematical perception of mere surfaces and intuitive depth. Temporal process: 1. you see a surface and connect next impressions to posit depth to it by adding together discrete elements of time, now surfaces, creating cube 2. Now "it" has the quality of depth. Next you notice the lines that make up the depth-object and decompose the object to surfaces, making a transition from problematical 2D perception of lines to the full reality of the surface in depth, within the posited depth 3. Then, you recombine these surfaces again to make up the depth-object cube, but not in a direct Grassmannian transition as in the first but from the resulting sheared surfaces. By this process, you recreate the same object using different time processes and so create a supra-temporal, supra-spatial object that is "general" and not bound by the spatio-temporal presentation because it is given in contradicting ways there.
Generality could. then, be connected to the process: 1) Positing of surface extended to depth through applying it in time, dimensional expansion congruent with time's arrow 2) The simulation of a lower-level process inside the posited depth by simulating the transition from problematic surface-perception in the form of open lines to the objective surface, relation of spatial expansion to time's arrow: two steps back but one step forward 3) Recombining the simulated surfaces thus generated to a previously known depth figure, re-aligning the direction with the time's arrow. The entirety of this process and the confusion it generates could create the need for logical objectification and time-binding behaviour so common among humankind. Generality then means forward-back-back-forward-forward, but without returning to normal as the structure would imply since that other term is constantly passing moments which are also moving, creating a measurement system where all the constraints are in motion in the what Husserl calls actual time (moment being just some lower limit of perceptive capacity).
Perhaps the biggest advance I got from this book was Husserl's implicit philosophy of syntheticity. It's not only individual statements that are essentially synthetic and given to illegitimate use but also the structure of logic in general would be essentially synthetic. The analytic-synthetic debate applies not only to propositions to but to more ultimate types represented by basic propositions like "S is P", categorial, It is the case that S is P, "state-of-affairs", Truth value of the preceding statement, "extended state of affairs etc. Husserl's thought also works to connect divergent systems like term logic, propositional logic and set theory to one whole. For example, the relation of set theory to propositional logic is that of a constructed holistic object to unity of separate parts in a state of affair. There's an interesting analogy here to processes of geometric perception outlined above in that propositional logic would describe a depth-object as a unity of posited surfaces in an evolution through time (the first stage of construction) while set theory would correspond to the cube as already-existing collection of disparate surfaces (the last stage of construction).
What reamins important to Husserl, however, is the notion of explication, the revelation of some substrate as something else. This process I assimilated to the notion of rotation the whole time through. After all, it is in angular motion that depth really becomes defined, since any linear motions can be fixed to however they diverge from the basis as the new default direction and even the collective evolutions can always be interpreted as linear ones from the previous evolution continued: there's no sense in the Grassmannian evolution that the result of the collective evolution would be magically fixed, which might be a problem. However, rotations present phenomena that are either reduced to brute change (standard) or not explicable at all without dimensional breakthrough (asymmetric chiral flips). It seems, then, that rotations of asymmetric objects would be key in motivating the bare form of statement S is P, which according to Husserl is the made in order to make the process repeatable at the limit of further possible determinations. This is why I say only semi-jokingly that G.E. Moore might have been the ultimate thinker in recognizing the HAND in his proof for the external world. The pre-predicative substrate enters the syntactic realm of the subject through its revelation "as" by rotation and by the possibility of repeating that rotation instead of calculating changes of weirdly shaped surfaces. Therefore there's a strange result that the subject of a logical statement is an angular motion, and this could be applied to even non-spatial statements somehow, with concepts like conceptual symmetry and chirality, motion-types in idea-space etc.
The most basic Husserlian notion is probably that of the lifeworld and the idea of the intersubjectivity of perception; the idea that any object of perception is given in a field or horizon of co-posited realities that are absolutely essential in co-determining it. Sometimes this line of thinking can take an easily objectionable turn when it is applied merely to various social elements, as in Crisis of European Sciences or when you try to prove other minds by forcing various things into the realm of givenness. Here, though, it's handled in a more abstract manner, the positing of co-determinations bringing to mind a Leibnizian philosophy of space. It also reminds one of a kind of gauge theory of perception where every object of actual perception has their given temporality determined by the "gauge group" with the exception of imaginary objects, whose givenness is characterized by lack of determinate temporality. This leads to some interesting lines of thought in that this implies not only a relativity of space but also a relativity of time: every object has its temporality only in terms of the full gauge field but in itself they are not temporal at all, as they can be transferred to imaginary non-temporal perceptions easily. Imagination rests on a space of possible gauge groups and in its effectivity it could be the union of two gauge groups in that in perception you re-interpreted the given data based on different perceptual gauge groups or realities, as described above with the example of the cube which effectively transforms perception into re-imaginable generalities.
Some more notes there but that's totally enough. Just putting this one note that I no longer understand to cap this incredibly anti-Sokalian review off:
P. 143
Interpenetration of explications - intensive magnitude, Exteriorization of explications - extensive --> even an intuitive red square is given as relating to the qualitative side of the form ie. FORM FROM THE INSIDE!!! ie. The type of singularities met by explications!!!
October 13, 2024
DOES LOGIC DEMAND “AN UNDERLYING THEORY OF EXPERIENCE?�
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859-1938) was a German philosopher who established the school of phenomenology. He was born into a Jewish family (which later caused him to lose his academic position when the Nazis came to power in 1933), but was baptized as a Lutheran in 1886. He wrote many books, such as 'Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,' 'On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time,' 'The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,' 'Cartesian Meditations,' etc.
He begins this posthumously-published book with the statement, “The following inquiries are concerned with a problem of origin. In clarifying the origin of the predicative judgment, they aim at making a contribution to the genealogy of logic in general� In this clarification of origin� the essence of the structure whose origin is sought is to be elucidated. Our task is thus a clarification of the essence of the predicative judgment by means of an exploration of its origin.� (Pg. 11)
He says, “all existents which affect us do so on the ground of the world; they give themselves to us as existents presumed as such, and the activity of cognition, of judgment, aims at examining whether they are truly such as they give themselves to be, as they are presumed in advance to be; whether they are truly of such and such a nature. The world as the existent world is the universal passive pregivenness of all judicative activity, of all engagement of theoretical interest.� (Pg. 31)
He states, “If, therefore, we wish to return to experience in the ultimately original sense which is the object of our inquiry, then it can only be to the original experience of the life-world, an experience still unacquainted with any of these idealizations but whose necessary foundation it is.� (Pg. 45)
He explains, “This simple apprehension and contemplation is the lowest level of common, objectifying activity, the lowest level of the unobstructed exercise of perceptual interest� The higher level of the exercise of this interest is the true explicative contemplation of the object. Even the first apprehension and initial simple contemplation already has its horizons� which are immediately coawakened� The object is present from the first with a character of familiarity; it is apprehended as an object of a type already known in some way or other, even if in a vague generality� If the contemplation then turns into explication, the interest follows the direction of the expectation which has been awakened.� (Pg. 104-105)
He adds, “the process taking place in an original intuition in an original intuition is always already saturated with anticipation; there is always more cointended apperceptively than actually is given by intuition---precisely because every object is not a thing isolated in itself but is always already an object in its horizon of typical familiarity and precognizance. But this horizon is constantly in motion; with every new step of intuitive apprehension, new delineations of the object result, more precise determinations and corrections of what was anticipated.� (Pg. 122)
He observes, “The experiencing consciousness� is not only a flowing consciousness, spreading itself out in the flux of lived experiences, but a consciousness-of, and integrating consciousness. In it, therefore, there is to be distinguished in every phase an objective correlate, and, in each new phase, a new correlate, but only in such a way that all the continuous momentary objects join together in the unity of a SINGLE object, like the moments of consciousness in a SINGLE consciousness-of.� (Pg. 257)
He asserts, “Precisely for this reason the old ontology has fallen short of its objective: it has not seen the enormous task of a systematic exhaustion of ontological concretion and has not clarified the method of the concrete intuition of essence and of an intuition of essences in general. Every concept of essence attained according to an authentic method, even though one-sided, belongs at the same time to universal ontology. All ontological relativity is with respect to essence� As we have seen, empirical concepts are not actual particularizations of pure generalities; they intend typical generalities, realms of experience which await from actual experience an ever new prescription.� (Pg. 364)
This is probably not one of Husserl’s “key� works, but it will still be of keen interest to the student of his philosophy.
Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl (1859-1938) was a German philosopher who established the school of phenomenology. He was born into a Jewish family (which later caused him to lose his academic position when the Nazis came to power in 1933), but was baptized as a Lutheran in 1886. He wrote many books, such as 'Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,' 'On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time,' 'The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,' 'Cartesian Meditations,' etc.
He begins this posthumously-published book with the statement, “The following inquiries are concerned with a problem of origin. In clarifying the origin of the predicative judgment, they aim at making a contribution to the genealogy of logic in general� In this clarification of origin� the essence of the structure whose origin is sought is to be elucidated. Our task is thus a clarification of the essence of the predicative judgment by means of an exploration of its origin.� (Pg. 11)
He says, “all existents which affect us do so on the ground of the world; they give themselves to us as existents presumed as such, and the activity of cognition, of judgment, aims at examining whether they are truly such as they give themselves to be, as they are presumed in advance to be; whether they are truly of such and such a nature. The world as the existent world is the universal passive pregivenness of all judicative activity, of all engagement of theoretical interest.� (Pg. 31)
He states, “If, therefore, we wish to return to experience in the ultimately original sense which is the object of our inquiry, then it can only be to the original experience of the life-world, an experience still unacquainted with any of these idealizations but whose necessary foundation it is.� (Pg. 45)
He explains, “This simple apprehension and contemplation is the lowest level of common, objectifying activity, the lowest level of the unobstructed exercise of perceptual interest� The higher level of the exercise of this interest is the true explicative contemplation of the object. Even the first apprehension and initial simple contemplation already has its horizons� which are immediately coawakened� The object is present from the first with a character of familiarity; it is apprehended as an object of a type already known in some way or other, even if in a vague generality� If the contemplation then turns into explication, the interest follows the direction of the expectation which has been awakened.� (Pg. 104-105)
He adds, “the process taking place in an original intuition in an original intuition is always already saturated with anticipation; there is always more cointended apperceptively than actually is given by intuition---precisely because every object is not a thing isolated in itself but is always already an object in its horizon of typical familiarity and precognizance. But this horizon is constantly in motion; with every new step of intuitive apprehension, new delineations of the object result, more precise determinations and corrections of what was anticipated.� (Pg. 122)
He observes, “The experiencing consciousness� is not only a flowing consciousness, spreading itself out in the flux of lived experiences, but a consciousness-of, and integrating consciousness. In it, therefore, there is to be distinguished in every phase an objective correlate, and, in each new phase, a new correlate, but only in such a way that all the continuous momentary objects join together in the unity of a SINGLE object, like the moments of consciousness in a SINGLE consciousness-of.� (Pg. 257)
He asserts, “Precisely for this reason the old ontology has fallen short of its objective: it has not seen the enormous task of a systematic exhaustion of ontological concretion and has not clarified the method of the concrete intuition of essence and of an intuition of essences in general. Every concept of essence attained according to an authentic method, even though one-sided, belongs at the same time to universal ontology. All ontological relativity is with respect to essence� As we have seen, empirical concepts are not actual particularizations of pure generalities; they intend typical generalities, realms of experience which await from actual experience an ever new prescription.� (Pg. 364)
This is probably not one of Husserl’s “key� works, but it will still be of keen interest to the student of his philosophy.
January 29, 2020
Навіть не пробуйте читати без основ формальної логіки та бази феноменології - це буде просто згаяний час. Безумовно, це фундаментальна праця, але для вузького кола зацікавлених. Я, будучи зацікавленим в розумінні, більшу частину просто не осягнув.
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July 30, 2011Our experiences and judgment are ready to appear when we approach objects. Although it seems like we have original synthesis of immediate arising ideas, we often refute the "suffering through" of arisings that predictably appear from something pre-ego and pre-memory.
Understanding and seperating ones own various arisings may be the practical application. Subjective Phenomenology.
I have a hardbound copy that doesn't seem to be found on goodreads.com or Amazon.
Understanding and seperating ones own various arisings may be the practical application. Subjective Phenomenology.
I have a hardbound copy that doesn't seem to be found on goodreads.com or Amazon.
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