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A HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY - VOLUME I
The work appears in five volumes. The volumes elaborate Buddhist and Jaina Philosophy and the six systems of Hindu thought; Samkara School of Vedanta besides the philosophy of the Yoga-vasistha and the Bhagavadgita; detailed account of the principal dualistic and pluralistic system; the Bhagavata Purana, Madhva and his school; and Southern Schools of Saivism. Each volume is devoted to the study of the particular school of thought of Indian Philosophy.
5 Volume set.
Hardcover
First published January 1, 1922
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
December 30, 2017
This was really comprehensive. Hard to review because of that fact. Probably on par with Radhakrishnan's first volume on the same topic. Its something you technically could read without having a prior familiarity with Indian philosophy or Hinduism, but it would be hard to follow without a general knowledge of philosophical vocabulary.
Just a few observations about India philosophy which a reader could draw from this: Indian philosophy is loaded with autistically detailed speculations on epistemology and metaphysics, which vary considerably between schools of thought. Pure idealism, idealistic materialism, materialism, atomism, panpsychism, substance monism, substance dualism, substance pluralism, nihilism. It runs the gambit. The epistemological systems are equally diverse but harder to characterize in a list.
However, ethics receives very little attention, and all the metaphysical doctrines uphold a broadly similar picture of the universe.insofar is it contains rebirth, and a soul which is subject to karma and seeks a return to some sort of pure state. Moksha or attainment of Nirvana is the ethical goal of all systems mentioned here. Some of the systems come remarkably close to attaining a scientific understanding of the universe, and then frustratingly turn away from it at the last second. I see this particularly in Nyaya, Navya-Nyaya, Nyaya-Vaisheshika, to an extent Samkhya, and in some of the proto-Mahayana Buddhist schools. These are clearly the most logically correct schools of Indian philosophy, though that may trigger Vedantists.
And sometimes it sounds like they are literally just making things up, and doing really shoddy reasoning. The most common errors which Indian philosophers seem to make are essentialist errors. Even the Buddhists do it to an extent, despite being supposedly anti-essentialist. I.e. seeing a phenomenon or a thing and assuming that it itself has some essential independent existence, as a different substance, or a different non-corporeal entity which somehow is associated with or inheres in or produces physical objects. Rather than assuming that these things don't exist independently of the various components which seemingly produce them (the Buddhists do get this right a lot of the time to be fair).
Just a few observations about India philosophy which a reader could draw from this: Indian philosophy is loaded with autistically detailed speculations on epistemology and metaphysics, which vary considerably between schools of thought. Pure idealism, idealistic materialism, materialism, atomism, panpsychism, substance monism, substance dualism, substance pluralism, nihilism. It runs the gambit. The epistemological systems are equally diverse but harder to characterize in a list.
However, ethics receives very little attention, and all the metaphysical doctrines uphold a broadly similar picture of the universe.insofar is it contains rebirth, and a soul which is subject to karma and seeks a return to some sort of pure state. Moksha or attainment of Nirvana is the ethical goal of all systems mentioned here. Some of the systems come remarkably close to attaining a scientific understanding of the universe, and then frustratingly turn away from it at the last second. I see this particularly in Nyaya, Navya-Nyaya, Nyaya-Vaisheshika, to an extent Samkhya, and in some of the proto-Mahayana Buddhist schools. These are clearly the most logically correct schools of Indian philosophy, though that may trigger Vedantists.
And sometimes it sounds like they are literally just making things up, and doing really shoddy reasoning. The most common errors which Indian philosophers seem to make are essentialist errors. Even the Buddhists do it to an extent, despite being supposedly anti-essentialist. I.e. seeing a phenomenon or a thing and assuming that it itself has some essential independent existence, as a different substance, or a different non-corporeal entity which somehow is associated with or inheres in or produces physical objects. Rather than assuming that these things don't exist independently of the various components which seemingly produce them (the Buddhists do get this right a lot of the time to be fair).
January 18, 2013
This is the most comprehensive study of Hinduism and Indian Philosophy. Dr Surendranath Dasgupta has done a monumental service to all those interesed in the academic study of Hinduism and all its various branches.
August 17, 2013
Excellent overview of Indian Philosophy. If you're interested in Eastern philosophy then this is the book to read. Its, obviously, not a casual read and you'll be better of diving into this during vacations but the author doesn't assume any prior introduction to the Vedas or the etymology of Indian philosophy and takes you through the various schools and doctrines with the least effort on your part. I got this free from the Kindle store but I'll be on the look out for a hard copy of this book to keep on my bed side.
October 3, 2022
According to S'ankara, the Upanishads were so named because they "destroy" inborn ignorance, or because they" conduct" to Brahman. Apart from these interpretations, justifiable neither on grounds of philology nor of fact, the word Upanishad is usually explained by Indian writers by rahasyam (i.e. "secret," Anquetil's secretum tegendum).
Again there are other hymns in which the Sun is called the soul (âtman) of all that is movable and all that is immovable. There are also statements to the effect that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the sages. The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the supreme Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hiranyagarbha). In some passages it is said "Brahmanaspati blew forth these births like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent."
"in the beginning this (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent; in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did not exist: there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been declared by the Rishi (Rg-Veda X. 129. I), 'There was then neither the non-existent nor the existent' for Mind was, as it were, neither existent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to become manifest,—more defined, more substantial: it sought after a self (a body); it practised austerity: it acquired consistency."
Brâhmanas were intended for the householders, the Âranyakas for those who in their old age withdrew into the solitude of the forests and the Upanisads for those who renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation.
Upanisads as being of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature as dictating the path of knowledge (jñâna-mârga) as opposed to the path of works (karma-mârga) which forms the content of the latter.
The change of the Brâhmana into the Âranyaka thought is signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we find in the Brhadâranyaka (I.1) that instead of a horse sacrifice the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul, and so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good can its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which is most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolic meditations were taking the place of gross matter and action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productive of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth.
"Then comes the origin of food. The seed of Prajâpati are the gods. The seed of the gods is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done is this man the abode of Brahman
"He the âtman is not this, nor this (neti neti). He is inconceivable, for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed, untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke 45 of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury." He is asat, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he is being, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists by him. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever we can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the unlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the great (mahat), the fixed. He who knows it is released from the jaws of death."
"I teach you indeed but you do not understand; the Âtman is silence"
He is the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through entirely of savour; as in truth this Âtman has no inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest par excellence, our inmost Âtman. All limitation is fraught with pain; it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe, who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (âkâs'a)? It is he who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable one, then has he attained peace.
The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic confidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of emancipation.
The early Buddhist philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena and these were called dhammas.
jâti (birth) is the cause of decay and death, jarâmarana, etc. Jâti is the appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas. Coming to bhava which determines jâti, I cannot think of any better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already suggested, namely, the works (karma) which produce the birth. Upâdâna is an advanced trsnâ leading to positive clinging. It is produced by trsnâ (desire) which again is the result of vedanâ (pleasure and pain). But this vedanâ is of course vedanâ with ignorance (avidyâ), for an Arhat may have also vedanâ but as he has no avidyâ, the vedanâ cannot produce trsnâ in turn. On its development it immediately passes into upâdâna. Vedanâ means pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads to trsnâ (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact (spars'a). Prof. De la Vallée Poussin says that S'rîlâbha distinguishes three processes in the production of vedanâ. Thus first there is the contact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge of the object, and then there is the vedanâ. Depending on Majjhima Nikâya, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in the case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing, so here also vedanâ takes place simultaneously with spars'a for they are "produits par un même complexe de causes (sâmagrî)." Spars'a is produced by sadâyatana, sadâyatana by nâmarûpa, and nâmarûpa by vijñâna, and is said to descend in the womb of the mother and produce the five skandhas as nâmarûpa, out of which the six senses are specialized. Vijñâna in this connection probably means the principle or germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the past karmas (sankhâra) of the dying man and of his past consciousness too. We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next birth. The manner in which the vijñâna produced in the womb is determined by the past vijñâna of the previous existence is according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple, like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life, so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break, but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the vijñâna resulting from his previous karmas and vijñânas enters into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijñâna thus forms the principle of the new life. It is in this vijñâna that name (nâma) and form (rûpa) become associated. The vijñâna is indeed a direct product of the samskâras and the sort of birth in which vijñâna should bring down (nâmayati) the new existence (upapatti) is determined by the samskâras, for in reality the happening of death (maranabhava) and the instillation of the vijñâna as the beginning of the new life (upapattibhava) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijñâna had not entered the womb then no nâmarûpa could have appeared.
Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbâna is either a positive and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as illegitimate.
With the Upanisads the highest truth was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow. This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (âriya sacca)—sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto.
This may be illustrated by the simile of the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidyâ), the waves of mentality (vijñâna) make their appearance. These three (i.e. the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear nor are destroyed."
In the all-conserving mind (âlayavijñâna) ignorance manifests itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (manas).
even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the nature or essence of the thing.
The Madhyamaka or S'ûnya system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (svabhâva) of its own; even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot affirm the essence of other things to it (parabhâva). If we cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (abhâva), but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot speak of anything negative either
The first means that all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind. The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination, existence or destruction. The third means that one should know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire (vâsanâ) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the nature of all things.
all external objects around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.
But the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul.
Cognition is not soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum, and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparable from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is cognized the self also is not cognized.
There is no difference between the cause and the effect, and the effect is but an illusory imposition on the cause—a mere illusion of name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs and call them by so many different names, but it cannot be admitted that they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformations as plates and jugs are only appearances of name and form (nâmarúpa). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect imposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent (vyavahârika) as mere objects of name and form (nâmarûpa), but the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality(pâramârthika).
Again there are other hymns in which the Sun is called the soul (âtman) of all that is movable and all that is immovable. There are also statements to the effect that the Being is one, though it is called by many names by the sages. The supreme being is sometimes extolled as the supreme Lord of the world called the golden egg (Hiranyagarbha). In some passages it is said "Brahmanaspati blew forth these births like a blacksmith. In the earliest age of the gods, the existent sprang from the non-existent."
"in the beginning this (universe) was as it were neither non-existent nor existent; in the beginning this (universe) was as it were, existed and did not exist: there was then only that Mind. Wherefore it has been declared by the Rishi (Rg-Veda X. 129. I), 'There was then neither the non-existent nor the existent' for Mind was, as it were, neither existent nor non-existent. This Mind when created, wished to become manifest,—more defined, more substantial: it sought after a self (a body); it practised austerity: it acquired consistency."
Brâhmanas were intended for the householders, the Âranyakas for those who in their old age withdrew into the solitude of the forests and the Upanisads for those who renounced the world to attain ultimate salvation by meditation.
Upanisads as being of an entirely different type from the rest of the Vedic literature as dictating the path of knowledge (jñâna-mârga) as opposed to the path of works (karma-mârga) which forms the content of the latter.
The change of the Brâhmana into the Âranyaka thought is signified by a transference of values from the actual sacrifices to their symbolic representations and meditations which were regarded as being productive of various earthly benefits. Thus we find in the Brhadâranyaka (I.1) that instead of a horse sacrifice the visible universe is to be conceived as a horse and meditated upon as such. The dawn is the head of the horse, the sun is the eye, wind is its life, fire is its mouth and the year is its soul, and so on. What is the horse that grazes in the field and to what good can its sacrifice lead? This moving universe is the horse which is most significant to the mind, and the meditation of it as such is the most suitable substitute of the sacrifice of the horse, the mere animal. Thought-activity as meditation, is here taking the place of an external worship in the form of sacrifices. The material substances and the most elaborate and accurate sacrificial rituals lost their value and bare meditations took their place. Side by side with the ritualistic sacrifices of the generality of the Brahmins, was springing up a system where thinking and symbolic meditations were taking the place of gross matter and action involved in sacrifices. These symbols were not only chosen from the external world as the sun, the wind, etc., from the body of man, his various vital functions and the senses, but even arbitrary alphabets were taken up and it was believed that the meditation of these as the highest and the greatest was productive of great beneficial results. Sacrifice in itself was losing value in the eyes of these men and diverse mystical significances and imports were beginning to be considered as their real truth.
"Then comes the origin of food. The seed of Prajâpati are the gods. The seed of the gods is rain. The seed of rain is herbs. The seed of herbs is food. The seed of food is seed. The seed of seed is creatures. The seed of creatures is the heart. The seed of the heart is the mind. The seed of the mind is speech. The seed of speech is action. The act done is this man the abode of Brahman
"He the âtman is not this, nor this (neti neti). He is inconceivable, for he cannot be conceived, unchangeable, for he is not changed, untouched, for nothing touches him; he cannot suffer by a stroke 45 of the sword, he cannot suffer any injury." He is asat, non-being, for the being which Brahman is, is not to be understood as such being as is known to us by experience; yet he is being, for he alone is supremely real, for the universe subsists by him. We ourselves are but he, and yet we know not what he is. Whatever we can experience, whatever we can express, is limited, but he is the unlimited, the basis of all. "That which is inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, which cannot be tasted, nor smelt, eternal, without beginning or end, greater than the great (mahat), the fixed. He who knows it is released from the jaws of death."
"I teach you indeed but you do not understand; the Âtman is silence"
He is the seer of all seeing, the hearer of all hearing and the knower of all knowledge. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, knows but is not known. He is the light of all lights. He is like a lump of salt, with no inner or outer, which consists through and through entirely of savour; as in truth this Âtman has no inner or outer, but consists through and through entirely of knowledge. Bliss is not an attribute of it but it is bliss itself. The state of Brahman is thus likened unto the state of dreamless sleep. And he who has reached this bliss is beyond any fear. It is dearer to us than son, brother, wife, or husband, wealth or prosperity. It is for it and by it that things appear dear to us. It is the dearest par excellence, our inmost Âtman. All limitation is fraught with pain; it is the infinite alone that is the highest bliss. When a man receives this rapture, then is he full of bliss; for who could breathe, who live, if that bliss had not filled this void (âkâs'a)? It is he who behaves as bliss. For when a man finds his peace, his fearless support in that invisible, supportless, inexpressible, unspeakable one, then has he attained peace.
The sorrow around us has no fear for us if we remember that we are naturally sorrowless and blessed in ourselves. The pessimistic view loses all terror as it closes in absolute optimistic confidence in one's own self and the ultimate destiny and goal of emancipation.
The early Buddhist philosophy did not accept any fixed entity as determining all reality; the only things with it were the unsubstantial phenomena and these were called dhammas.
jâti (birth) is the cause of decay and death, jarâmarana, etc. Jâti is the appearance of the body or the totality of the five skandhas. Coming to bhava which determines jâti, I cannot think of any better rational explanation of bhava, than that I have already suggested, namely, the works (karma) which produce the birth. Upâdâna is an advanced trsnâ leading to positive clinging. It is produced by trsnâ (desire) which again is the result of vedanâ (pleasure and pain). But this vedanâ is of course vedanâ with ignorance (avidyâ), for an Arhat may have also vedanâ but as he has no avidyâ, the vedanâ cannot produce trsnâ in turn. On its development it immediately passes into upâdâna. Vedanâ means pleasurable, painful or indifferent feeling. On the one side it leads to trsnâ (desire) and on the other it is produced by sense-contact (spars'a). Prof. De la Vallée Poussin says that S'rîlâbha distinguishes three processes in the production of vedanâ. Thus first there is the contact between the sense and the object; then there is the knowledge of the object, and then there is the vedanâ. Depending on Majjhima Nikâya, Poussin gives the other opinion that just as in the case of two sticks heat takes place simultaneously with rubbing, so here also vedanâ takes place simultaneously with spars'a for they are "produits par un même complexe de causes (sâmagrî)." Spars'a is produced by sadâyatana, sadâyatana by nâmarûpa, and nâmarûpa by vijñâna, and is said to descend in the womb of the mother and produce the five skandhas as nâmarûpa, out of which the six senses are specialized. Vijñâna in this connection probably means the principle or germ of consciousness in the womb of the mother upholding the five elements of the new body there. It is the product of the past karmas (sankhâra) of the dying man and of his past consciousness too. We sometimes find that the Buddhists believed that the last thoughts of the dying man determined the nature of his next birth. The manner in which the vijñâna produced in the womb is determined by the past vijñâna of the previous existence is according to some authorities of the nature of a reflected image, like the transmission of learning from the teacher to the disciple, like the lighting of a lamp from another lamp or like the impress of a stamp on wax. As all the skandhas are changing in life, so death also is but a similar change; there is no great break, but the same uniform sort of destruction and coming into being. New skandhas are produced as simultaneously as the two scale pans of a balance rise up and fall, in the same manner as a lamp is lighted or an image is reflected. At the death of the man the vijñâna resulting from his previous karmas and vijñânas enters into the womb of that mother (animal, man or the gods) in which the next skandhas are to be matured. This vijñâna thus forms the principle of the new life. It is in this vijñâna that name (nâma) and form (rûpa) become associated. The vijñâna is indeed a direct product of the samskâras and the sort of birth in which vijñâna should bring down (nâmayati) the new existence (upapatti) is determined by the samskâras, for in reality the happening of death (maranabhava) and the instillation of the vijñâna as the beginning of the new life (upapattibhava) cannot be simultaneous, but the latter succeeds just at the next moment, and it is to signify this close succession that they are said to be simultaneous. If the vijñâna had not entered the womb then no nâmarûpa could have appeared.
Any one who seeks to discuss whether Nibbâna is either a positive and eternal state or a mere state of non-existence or annihilation, takes a view which has been discarded in Buddhism as heretical. It is true that we in modern times are not satisfied with it, for we want to know what it all means. But it is not possible to give any answer since Buddhism regarded all these questions as illegitimate.
With the Upanisads the highest truth was the permanent self, the bliss, but with the Buddha there was nothing permanent; and all was change; and all change and impermanence was sorrow. This is, then, the cardinal truth of Buddhism, and ignorance concerning it in the above fourfold ways represented the fourfold ignorance which stood in the way of the right comprehension of the fourfold cardinal truths (âriya sacca)—sorrow, cause of the origination of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the means thereto.
This may be illustrated by the simile of the water and the waves which are stirred up in the ocean. Here the water can be said to be both identical and non-identical with the waves. The waves are stirred up by the wind, but the water remains the same. When the wind ceases the motion of the waves subsides, but the water remains the same. Likewise when the mind of all creatures, which in its own nature is pure and clean, is stirred up by the wind of ignorance (avidyâ), the waves of mentality (vijñâna) make their appearance. These three (i.e. the mind, ignorance, and mentality) however have no existence, and they are neither unity nor plurality. When the ignorance is annihilated, the awakened mentality is tranquillized, whilst the essence of the wisdom remains unmolested." The truth or the enlightenment "is absolutely unobtainable by any modes of relativity or by any outward signs of enlightenment. All events in the phenomenal world are reflected in enlightenment, so that they neither pass out of it, nor enter into it, and they neither disappear nor are destroyed."
In the all-conserving mind (âlayavijñâna) ignorance manifests itself; and from non-enlightenment starts that which sees, that which represents, that which apprehends an objective world, and that which constantly particularizes. This is called ego (manas).
even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the nature or essence of the thing.
The Madhyamaka or S'ûnya system does not hold that anything has any essence or nature (svabhâva) of its own; even heat cannot be said to be the essence of fire; for both the heat and the fire are the result of the combination of many conditions, and what depends on many conditions cannot be said to be the nature or essence of the thing. That alone may be said to be the true essence or nature of anything which does not depend on anything else, and since no such essence or nature can be pointed out which stands independently by itself we cannot say that it exists. If a thing has no essence or existence of its own, we cannot affirm the essence of other things to it (parabhâva). If we cannot affirm anything of anything as positive, we cannot consequently assert anything of anything as negative. If anyone first believes in things positive and afterwards discovers that they are not so, he no doubt thus takes his stand on a negation (abhâva), but in reality since we cannot speak of anything positive, we cannot speak of anything negative either
The first means that all things are but creations of the imagination of one's mind. The second means that as things have no essence there is no origination, existence or destruction. The third means that one should know the distinctive sense in which all external things are said either to be existent or non-existent, for their existence is merely like the mirage which is produced by the beginningless desire (vâsanâ) of creating and perceiving the manifold. This brings us to the fourth one, which means the right comprehension of the nature of all things.
all external objects around us are being destroyed every moment, and new ones are being generated at every succeeding moment, but so long as the objects of the succeeding moments are similar to those of the preceding moments, it appears to us that things have remained the same and no destruction has taken place.
But the relation between body or rather the mind associated with it and soul is such that whatever mental phenomena happen in the mind are interpreted as the experience of its soul.
Cognition is not soul, but the soul is manifested in cognition as its substratum, and appears in it as the cognitive element "I" which is inseparable from all cognitions. In deep sleep therefore when no object is cognized the self also is not cognized.
There is no difference between the cause and the effect, and the effect is but an illusory imposition on the cause—a mere illusion of name and form. We may mould clay into plates and jugs and call them by so many different names, but it cannot be admitted that they are by that fact anything more than clay; their transformations as plates and jugs are only appearances of name and form (nâmarúpa). This world, inasmuch as it is but an effect imposed upon the Brahman, is only phenomenally existent (vyavahârika) as mere objects of name and form (nâmarûpa), but the cause, the Brahman, is alone the true reality(pâramârthika).
April 9, 2020
Volume 1 of 5 volumes of Indian philosophy. A work of remarkable breadth and depth. I have been reading on and off from all 5 volumes that I have.
First volume gives us a wonderful exposition to schools of Indian Philosophy including Jainism and Buddhism.
In my opinion every Indian and non-Indian should read and study the first volume at least.
Especially in the times that we are in these days !
First volume gives us a wonderful exposition to schools of Indian Philosophy including Jainism and Buddhism.
In my opinion every Indian and non-Indian should read and study the first volume at least.
Especially in the times that we are in these days !
November 13, 2013
Dasgupta is indispensable for a student of philosophy. It is him to who we have to go again and again whenever we face some doubt. I had read the one published by Motilal Banarsidass and there were some mistakes in it.. You need to be careful while quoting him..
June 2, 2014
Essential reading for those looking to deepen their understanding of Indian Philosophies. Not for the feint hearted.
June 2, 2020
Thorough. Very very thorough. Too thorough.
November 6, 2021
Read half of the volume..... was not really interested in the Vedanta philosophy of Sankara, which is almost three hundred sides. Was interested in learning about the Yogacara Samkhya, Buddhist and Jain School, and the Vedas and Upanishads. Certainly illuminated me about the rich philosophical history of the sub continent. Our Western oriented teaching curriculums, never mention the stalwarts of the Indian philosophy, who are in their achievement comparable with the Greek and other western philosophers, who hold the highest esteem amongst thinkers around the world. The Indian philosophy has had direct impact around the world, much more in my thinking than many western thoughts which are given much praise. The reason i say this is because the philosophies of the sub-continent have permeated the general public whereas the western philosophy has been much limited to thinking circles.
Anything less than four star will be disrespecting the amount of effort taken by the author to portray all these ancient thinking systems. Though, the explanations in such a holistic preview could have been a little briefer because it covers all systems rather than any one. A person reading this most probably wants an overview rather than a detailed study. Otherwise, a must read for all interested in philosophy, weather from the subcontinent or not.
Anything less than four star will be disrespecting the amount of effort taken by the author to portray all these ancient thinking systems. Though, the explanations in such a holistic preview could have been a little briefer because it covers all systems rather than any one. A person reading this most probably wants an overview rather than a detailed study. Otherwise, a must read for all interested in philosophy, weather from the subcontinent or not.
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October 10, 2020This is a five-volume work. It is quite heavy and the intricate discussions of metaphysics and epistemology is sometimes abstruse but this, I think, is to be attributed to the original texts themselves rather than the present author. One example is the exposition of Vaisesika cosmology where the author looses all tract of relation between one line and the other. At his most lucid, especially in Samkhya and Vedanta, the author neatly lays down complex arguments with fine comparisons between the many schools of Indian thought.
November 27, 2022
I wish someone would re write it in modern English and in a crisp and easy to read manner. The current book is an illuminating read but it requires the readers utmost attention and a basic understanding of some Sanskrit words.
February 26, 2024
This book should be treated as an encyclopaedia and not something to read as a beginner. There is discrepancy in the level of information shared; sometimes it is beginner friendly and other times it is not.
July 15, 2020
Presented important the information in a paragraph format that needs to be tabulated. Tabulation may create more interest for reading. Author delved deep into many reference books to present us this book in the format available to us. A good work to know about Indian philosophy.
Author comments seems distant, impartial and took no sides - a critical perspective.
Author comments seems distant, impartial and took no sides - a critical perspective.
Want to read
March 6, 2014Note: This set is the result of 30 years of work by the author , but have in mind that the physical death of Mr. Dasgupta in 1952 left somehow incomplete the last book of the collection.
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