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倬乇爻卮鈥屬囏й� 讴卮賳丿賴
Thomas Nagel's Mortal Questions explores some fundamental issues concerning the meaning, nature and value of human life. Questions about our attitudes to death, sexual behaviour, social inequality, war and political power are shown to lead to more obviously philosophical problems about personal identity, consciousness, freedom, and value. This original and illuminating book aims at a form of understanding that is both theoretical and personal in its lively engagement with what are literally issues of life and death.
315 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1979
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4887 people want to read
About the author
Thomas Nagel
74听books498听followersThomas Nagel is an American philosopher, currently University Professor and Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. His main areas of philosophical interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics. He is well-known for his critique of reductionist accounts of the mind in his essay "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), and for his contributions to deontological and liberal moral and political theory in The Possibility of Altruism (1970) and subsequent writings.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
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January 16, 2023
Analiti膷ka filozofija zna da bude suva, zamorna, 膰o拧kasta, pa i za膷u膽uju膰e isklju膷iva, posebno prema kontinentalnim filozofima koji se, u najboljem slu膷aju, do啪ivljavaju kao nadahnuti smutljivci. I to je, naravno, lo拧e, ali o tome detaljnije neki drugi put. Duga je to pri膷a i ne mo啪e se ni zapo膷eti bez nerviranja.
Ipak, treba ista膰i da je Nejgel prvak analiti膷ke filozofije, blistavi student D啪ona Rolsa, profesor na Prinstonu i Berkliju i autor respektabilnog opusa, u kome se posebno izdvajaju eseji uvr拧teni u knjizi 鈥濸itanja jednog smrtnika鈥�. Zanimljiv podatak vezan za na拧u sredinu, ali nipo膷emu presudan za Nejgelovo delo, jeste da je ro膽en u Beogradu 1937. godine, a njegovi roditelji su se iselili u SAD dve godine kasnije. Da je bilo malo vi拧e pameti i dobre volje, veza izme膽u Nejgela i Beograda mogla je da se osna啪i, makar i simboli膷no. Sad to, na啪alost, deluje prekasno. No i to me odvodi u neke druge pri膷e, koje nisu povezane sa delom, pa da ne okoli拧am, najbolje bi bilo da sa啪eto izlo啪im sadr啪aj knjige. Ukoliko je neko zainteresovan, a nema vremena ili 啪elje da pro膷ita celu knjigu (a 膷itanje, da upozorim, ovde ne ide glatko), neka pro膷ita drugo i, obavezno, dvanaesto poglavlje.
听
1) SMRT
Gotovo banalan zaklju膷ak: smrt je lo拧a. Dobro je postojati i lo拧e je ne postojati. Ipak, postoji za膷u膽uju膰a asimetrija izme膽u do啪ivljaja prenatalnog i posthumnog nepostojanja 鈥� 膷itavu ve膷nost nismo postojali, onda smo se rodili, 啪ivimo neko, zanemarljivo kratko vreme a onda umiremo i vra膰amo se u nepostojanje. Ali dok za prvim nepostojanjem niko ne 啪ali, sa drugim nepostojanjem stvari sasvim druk膷ije stoje. Za Nejgela filozofija nije priprema za umiranje (Plato) niti je smrt savr拧eni mir, odmor, radost i pravednost (Sv. Avgustin), ve膰 prekid mogu膰nosti. A to je ono 拧to rastu啪uje i 拧to pravi razliku. Tokom 啪ivota upoznajemo se sa dobrima kojih nas li拧ava smrt (27) i tu je problem. Ne radi se, dakle, o neminovnosti smrti, ve膰 o prekidu 鈥瀗edefinisanog spektra mogu膰ih dobara鈥�. Rez, dakle.
2) APSURD
鈥濧ko se ni拧ta ne mo啪e opravdati osim ako se ne opravda ne膷im van sebe, 拧to tako膽e ima opravdanje, onda nastaje beskona膷ni regres i nijedan niz opravdanja ne mo啪e se zavr拧iti.鈥� (30)
鈥濷no za 拧ta mi mislimo da ima smisao, opravdanje, zna膷aj, takvo je zato 拧to posle odre膽ene granice ne tra啪imo dalje razloge.鈥� (35)
鈥濻kepticizam po膷inje kada sebe uklju膷imo u svet o kom tvrdimo da ne拧to znamo.鈥� (36)
鈥濳ada bismo se u potpunosti oslonili na razum, i u tome preterali, na拧i 啪ivoti i verovanja bi se uru拧ili 鈥� nastupilo bi ludili ako bi se unutra拧nja mo膰 shvatanja sveta i 啪ivota zdravo za gotovo nekako izgubila.鈥� (39)
Ina膷e, Nejgel za膷u膽uju膰e retko citira. Ovde je, ipak, na拧ao za shodno da spomene Kamija i to ne, usudio bih se re膰i, sa punim razumevanjem. Nejgelovo razumevanje apsurdnosti je da je to ono 拧to je kod 膷oveka najljudskije: 鈥瀖anifestacija na拧ih najnaprednijih i najinteresantnijih karakteristika鈥� (42), 拧to suprotstavlja Kamijevoj strategiji odbrane od apsurda kroz prkos i podsmeh, zaboravljaju膰i, na primer, da Sizifa treba, po Kamijevim re膷ima, da zamislimo sa osmehom. Ovakvo Nejgelovo pojednostavljivanje Kamijeve misli je razo膷aravaju膰e.
3) MORALNA SRE膯A
Termin vara. Moralna sre膰a nije happiness ve膰 luck. Ukratko bi se mogla ovako objasniti: ukoliko po膷inilac, na primer, snajperista, zbog nekog nepredvi膽enog doga膽aja ili okolnosti (poput pancira 啪rtve) ne izvr拧i svoj naum, ta spre膷enost potpada pod moralnu sre膰u. Ipak, ni u jednom pravnom sistemu na svetu namera i realizacija se ne ka啪njavaju isto. Kako to opravdati imaju膰i u vidu da neizvr拧enje zlo膷ina predstavlja splet okolnosti, a nipo拧to ne odluku po膷inioca?
Mo啪e se navesti i ovaj primer: neko pijan vozi. U prvom slu膷aju, slupa se, u drugom je sve kako treba. Iako je nemarnost ista u oba slu膷aja, u drugom je osoba imala moralnu sre膰u.
鈥濽klju膷ivanje posledica u na拧e shvatanje vlastitih postupaka jeste priznanje da smo deo sveta. (59)
4) SEKSUALNA PERVERZIJA
Mislim da je ovo najklimavije poglavlje u celoj knjizi. 膶ini se, 拧tavi拧e, da je Nejgelov pogled na perverzije neo膷ekivano proizvoljan, iako se 膷ini da je jasno ome膽en. To mo啪da proizlazi iz slabog konsultovanja literature.
Na primer, gotovo trapavo izgledaju nedoumice vezane za razumevanje sadizma i mazohizma kao seksualnih perverzija jer 鈥瀒m nedostaje interpersonalna uzajmnost鈥� (74).
Ipak, zanimljive su mi zapa啪anja vezana za fenomenologiju hrane, kao 拧to je, na primer, da na拧 odnos prema hrani zavisi od na拧e veli膷ine 鈥� za razliku od mnogih drugih organizama, mi u hrani ne 啪ivimo, niti ulazimo u nju. Perverzija bi se tu prona拧la u zameni dimenzija i funkcija.
鈥濻vi stupnjevi seksualnog opa啪aja su forme poistove膰ivanja osobe sa sopstvenim telom.鈥� (70)
Koga ovo zanima neka pogleda Ep拧tejnovu 鈥濬ilozofiju tela鈥�.
Tako膽e, Nejgel ostavlja otvorenim pitanje heteroseksualnost kao prirodnog izraza 鈥瀖u拧kih i 啪enskih seksualnih dispozicija koje nisu poreme膰ene鈥� (75).
Opet jedna Alan Ford misao: 鈥瀕o拧 seks je generalno bolji od nemanja seksa鈥�. (76)
5) RAT I MASAKR
Nije lako odrediti 拧ta je dopu拧teno u ratu. To svi dobro znamo. Iako se sadr啪aj ovog poglavlja pre svega odnosi na Vijetnamski rat, ono je, na啪alost, uznemiruju膰e aktuelno. Od jezive formulacije da su civili pobijeni kao 鈥瀗uspojava akcije鈥� (86) do pitanja u kakvim se sve situacijama mogu pojaviti motivi za ratne zlo膷ine (101).
Nejgel zaklju膷uje da je svet lo拧e i zlo mesto. (102)
6) BEZOBZIRNOST U JAVNOM 沤IVOTU
听
Sukob interesa 鈥� me拧anje javnih i privatnih funkcija, mito & korupcija.
听
Logika institucija druk膷ija je od logike pojedinaca. A koga zanima, na膰i 膰e i obja拧njenje za拧to uzimanje poreza nije plja膷ka (118).
听
7) POLITIKA PRVENSTVA
听
Pozitivna diskriminacija i afirmativne mere 鈥� za i protiv.
听
8) JEDNAKOST
听
Mo啪e biti politi膷ka, pravna, dru拧tvena i ekonomska.
Argumenti jednakosti mogu听 iti komunitaristi膷ki (jednakost je uslov ispravne vrste odnosa me膽u 膷lanovima dru拧tva i obrazovanja zdravih bratskih stavova) i individualisti膷ki (jednakost kao ispravan distributivni princip 鈥� kao ispravan na膷in da odgovorimona suprotstavljene potrebe i interese razli膷itih ljudi). (139鈥�140)
Nejgel daje prednost individualizmu.
Nakon toga polemi拧e sa Rolsom, svojim mentorom 鈥� lome koplja oko vrednosti egalitarnosti.
Sve 啪ivotinje su jednake, ali su neke jednakije od drugih.听
9) FRAGMENTACIJA VREDNOSTI
Na 膷emu vrednosti po膷ivaju i kako se mogu povezati, odnosno, sistematizovati?
Potreban metod za razlaganje ili analiziranje prakti膷nih problema 鈥� Nejgel predla啪e nau膷ni sud (179).听
10) ETIKA BEZ BIOLOGIJE
Vredan esej o odnosu biolo拧kog i eti膷kog, a problemi samo izviru. Ne samo 拧to nemamo op拧te biolo拧ko razumevanje ljudskog mi拧ljenja, ve膰 ni etika nije nepromenljivi skup biheviornih i intelektualnih navika, ve膰 proces. (182)听
11) BISEKCIJA MOZGA I JEDINSTVO SVESTI听
Eksperimenti 鈥� 拧ta se de拧ava kada kod ma膷aka prese膷emo 啪uljevito telo koje povezuje levu i desnu mo啪danu hemisferu? (192)
Mo啪e li se govoriti o vi拧e umova u jednom telu?
12) AKO JE TO BITI SLEPI MI艩?听
膶uveni i vrlo uticajni tekst o problemu svesti.听
鈥炁絜lim da znam kako je za slepog mi拧a da bude slepi mi拧. A opet, kada to poku拧am da zamislim, bivam ograni膷en sredstvima svog sopstvenog uma, a ona nisu adekvatna za takav zadatak.鈥� (214)听
鈥濱ako negde u univerzumu ima svesnog 啪ivota, velike su 拧anse da ne膰emo mo膰i da ga opi拧emo 膷ak ni najop拧tijim terminima.鈥� (214)
鈥濻vakako je mogu膰e da ljudsko bi膰e vveruje da postoje 膷injenice za 膷ije predstavljanje ili razumevanje ljudi nikada ne膰e imati potrebne pojmove.鈥� (216)听
鈥瀂a膷udo, mo啪emo imati dokaz za istinu ne膷ega 拧to ne mo啪emo zaista da razumemo.鈥� (224)
13) PANPSIHIZAM听
Kako biti mistik kroz sasvim nemisti膷no izlaganje.
鈥濧ko je materija dospela na zemlju, pa je na njoj izrasla trava, pa travu jela krava, a njeno mleko pila trudnica, onda je i mozak njenog deteta delom sa膷injen od te materije.鈥� (227)
(Mene je ovo podsetilo na 膷uvenu Hamletovu repliku upu膰enu Klaudiju o, mogu re膰i, 鈥瀔ru啪enju mateije鈥� 鈥� riba, crv, kralj.)
鈥濸anpsihizam u ovom smislu ne povla膷i panpsihizam u onom poznatijem smislu, prema kome drve膰e i cve膰e, a mo啪da 膷ak i kamenje, jezera i krvna zrnca, imaju nekakvu svest. Ali toliko malo znamo o tome kako svest nastaje iz materije u slu膷aju nas i 啪ivotinja u kojima prepoznajemo svest, da bi bilo dogmati膷no pretpostaviti听 da ona ne postoji u drugim kompleksnim sistemima, ili 膷ak u sistemima veli膷ine jedne galaksije, kao rezultat onih istih osnovnih svojstava materije koja su odgovorna i za nas.鈥� (243)听
14)听听听听SUBJEKTIVNO I OBJEKTIVNO听
鈥濺azlika izme膽u subjektivnog i objektivnog je relativna, Op拧ta ljudska ta膷ka gledi拧ta je objektivnija od na拧eg li膷nog gledi拧ta, ali manje objektivna od gledi拧ta fizike.鈥� (256)听
Zadatak prihvatanja polariteta treba da bude kreativan i kao takav je dragocen. Susret je sve. Ukr拧taj, dodajem ja.
Ipak, treba ista膰i da je Nejgel prvak analiti膷ke filozofije, blistavi student D啪ona Rolsa, profesor na Prinstonu i Berkliju i autor respektabilnog opusa, u kome se posebno izdvajaju eseji uvr拧teni u knjizi 鈥濸itanja jednog smrtnika鈥�. Zanimljiv podatak vezan za na拧u sredinu, ali nipo膷emu presudan za Nejgelovo delo, jeste da je ro膽en u Beogradu 1937. godine, a njegovi roditelji su se iselili u SAD dve godine kasnije. Da je bilo malo vi拧e pameti i dobre volje, veza izme膽u Nejgela i Beograda mogla je da se osna啪i, makar i simboli膷no. Sad to, na啪alost, deluje prekasno. No i to me odvodi u neke druge pri膷e, koje nisu povezane sa delom, pa da ne okoli拧am, najbolje bi bilo da sa啪eto izlo啪im sadr啪aj knjige. Ukoliko je neko zainteresovan, a nema vremena ili 啪elje da pro膷ita celu knjigu (a 膷itanje, da upozorim, ovde ne ide glatko), neka pro膷ita drugo i, obavezno, dvanaesto poglavlje.
听
1) SMRT
Gotovo banalan zaklju膷ak: smrt je lo拧a. Dobro je postojati i lo拧e je ne postojati. Ipak, postoji za膷u膽uju膰a asimetrija izme膽u do啪ivljaja prenatalnog i posthumnog nepostojanja 鈥� 膷itavu ve膷nost nismo postojali, onda smo se rodili, 啪ivimo neko, zanemarljivo kratko vreme a onda umiremo i vra膰amo se u nepostojanje. Ali dok za prvim nepostojanjem niko ne 啪ali, sa drugim nepostojanjem stvari sasvim druk膷ije stoje. Za Nejgela filozofija nije priprema za umiranje (Plato) niti je smrt savr拧eni mir, odmor, radost i pravednost (Sv. Avgustin), ve膰 prekid mogu膰nosti. A to je ono 拧to rastu啪uje i 拧to pravi razliku. Tokom 啪ivota upoznajemo se sa dobrima kojih nas li拧ava smrt (27) i tu je problem. Ne radi se, dakle, o neminovnosti smrti, ve膰 o prekidu 鈥瀗edefinisanog spektra mogu膰ih dobara鈥�. Rez, dakle.
2) APSURD
鈥濧ko se ni拧ta ne mo啪e opravdati osim ako se ne opravda ne膷im van sebe, 拧to tako膽e ima opravdanje, onda nastaje beskona膷ni regres i nijedan niz opravdanja ne mo啪e se zavr拧iti.鈥� (30)
鈥濷no za 拧ta mi mislimo da ima smisao, opravdanje, zna膷aj, takvo je zato 拧to posle odre膽ene granice ne tra啪imo dalje razloge.鈥� (35)
鈥濻kepticizam po膷inje kada sebe uklju膷imo u svet o kom tvrdimo da ne拧to znamo.鈥� (36)
鈥濳ada bismo se u potpunosti oslonili na razum, i u tome preterali, na拧i 啪ivoti i verovanja bi se uru拧ili 鈥� nastupilo bi ludili ako bi se unutra拧nja mo膰 shvatanja sveta i 啪ivota zdravo za gotovo nekako izgubila.鈥� (39)
Ina膷e, Nejgel za膷u膽uju膰e retko citira. Ovde je, ipak, na拧ao za shodno da spomene Kamija i to ne, usudio bih se re膰i, sa punim razumevanjem. Nejgelovo razumevanje apsurdnosti je da je to ono 拧to je kod 膷oveka najljudskije: 鈥瀖anifestacija na拧ih najnaprednijih i najinteresantnijih karakteristika鈥� (42), 拧to suprotstavlja Kamijevoj strategiji odbrane od apsurda kroz prkos i podsmeh, zaboravljaju膰i, na primer, da Sizifa treba, po Kamijevim re膷ima, da zamislimo sa osmehom. Ovakvo Nejgelovo pojednostavljivanje Kamijeve misli je razo膷aravaju膰e.
3) MORALNA SRE膯A
Termin vara. Moralna sre膰a nije happiness ve膰 luck. Ukratko bi se mogla ovako objasniti: ukoliko po膷inilac, na primer, snajperista, zbog nekog nepredvi膽enog doga膽aja ili okolnosti (poput pancira 啪rtve) ne izvr拧i svoj naum, ta spre膷enost potpada pod moralnu sre膰u. Ipak, ni u jednom pravnom sistemu na svetu namera i realizacija se ne ka啪njavaju isto. Kako to opravdati imaju膰i u vidu da neizvr拧enje zlo膷ina predstavlja splet okolnosti, a nipo拧to ne odluku po膷inioca?
Mo啪e se navesti i ovaj primer: neko pijan vozi. U prvom slu膷aju, slupa se, u drugom je sve kako treba. Iako je nemarnost ista u oba slu膷aja, u drugom je osoba imala moralnu sre膰u.
鈥濽klju膷ivanje posledica u na拧e shvatanje vlastitih postupaka jeste priznanje da smo deo sveta. (59)
4) SEKSUALNA PERVERZIJA
Mislim da je ovo najklimavije poglavlje u celoj knjizi. 膶ini se, 拧tavi拧e, da je Nejgelov pogled na perverzije neo膷ekivano proizvoljan, iako se 膷ini da je jasno ome膽en. To mo啪da proizlazi iz slabog konsultovanja literature.
Na primer, gotovo trapavo izgledaju nedoumice vezane za razumevanje sadizma i mazohizma kao seksualnih perverzija jer 鈥瀒m nedostaje interpersonalna uzajmnost鈥� (74).
Ipak, zanimljive su mi zapa啪anja vezana za fenomenologiju hrane, kao 拧to je, na primer, da na拧 odnos prema hrani zavisi od na拧e veli膷ine 鈥� za razliku od mnogih drugih organizama, mi u hrani ne 啪ivimo, niti ulazimo u nju. Perverzija bi se tu prona拧la u zameni dimenzija i funkcija.
鈥濻vi stupnjevi seksualnog opa啪aja su forme poistove膰ivanja osobe sa sopstvenim telom.鈥� (70)
Koga ovo zanima neka pogleda Ep拧tejnovu 鈥濬ilozofiju tela鈥�.
Tako膽e, Nejgel ostavlja otvorenim pitanje heteroseksualnost kao prirodnog izraza 鈥瀖u拧kih i 啪enskih seksualnih dispozicija koje nisu poreme膰ene鈥� (75).
Opet jedna Alan Ford misao: 鈥瀕o拧 seks je generalno bolji od nemanja seksa鈥�. (76)
5) RAT I MASAKR
Nije lako odrediti 拧ta je dopu拧teno u ratu. To svi dobro znamo. Iako se sadr啪aj ovog poglavlja pre svega odnosi na Vijetnamski rat, ono je, na啪alost, uznemiruju膰e aktuelno. Od jezive formulacije da su civili pobijeni kao 鈥瀗uspojava akcije鈥� (86) do pitanja u kakvim se sve situacijama mogu pojaviti motivi za ratne zlo膷ine (101).
Nejgel zaklju膷uje da je svet lo拧e i zlo mesto. (102)
6) BEZOBZIRNOST U JAVNOM 沤IVOTU
听
Sukob interesa 鈥� me拧anje javnih i privatnih funkcija, mito & korupcija.
听
Logika institucija druk膷ija je od logike pojedinaca. A koga zanima, na膰i 膰e i obja拧njenje za拧to uzimanje poreza nije plja膷ka (118).
听
7) POLITIKA PRVENSTVA
听
Pozitivna diskriminacija i afirmativne mere 鈥� za i protiv.
听
8) JEDNAKOST
听
Mo啪e biti politi膷ka, pravna, dru拧tvena i ekonomska.
Argumenti jednakosti mogu听 iti komunitaristi膷ki (jednakost je uslov ispravne vrste odnosa me膽u 膷lanovima dru拧tva i obrazovanja zdravih bratskih stavova) i individualisti膷ki (jednakost kao ispravan distributivni princip 鈥� kao ispravan na膷in da odgovorimona suprotstavljene potrebe i interese razli膷itih ljudi). (139鈥�140)
Nejgel daje prednost individualizmu.
Nakon toga polemi拧e sa Rolsom, svojim mentorom 鈥� lome koplja oko vrednosti egalitarnosti.
Sve 啪ivotinje su jednake, ali su neke jednakije od drugih.听
9) FRAGMENTACIJA VREDNOSTI
Na 膷emu vrednosti po膷ivaju i kako se mogu povezati, odnosno, sistematizovati?
Potreban metod za razlaganje ili analiziranje prakti膷nih problema 鈥� Nejgel predla啪e nau膷ni sud (179).听
10) ETIKA BEZ BIOLOGIJE
Vredan esej o odnosu biolo拧kog i eti膷kog, a problemi samo izviru. Ne samo 拧to nemamo op拧te biolo拧ko razumevanje ljudskog mi拧ljenja, ve膰 ni etika nije nepromenljivi skup biheviornih i intelektualnih navika, ve膰 proces. (182)听
11) BISEKCIJA MOZGA I JEDINSTVO SVESTI听
Eksperimenti 鈥� 拧ta se de拧ava kada kod ma膷aka prese膷emo 啪uljevito telo koje povezuje levu i desnu mo啪danu hemisferu? (192)
Mo啪e li se govoriti o vi拧e umova u jednom telu?
12) AKO JE TO BITI SLEPI MI艩?听
膶uveni i vrlo uticajni tekst o problemu svesti.听
鈥炁絜lim da znam kako je za slepog mi拧a da bude slepi mi拧. A opet, kada to poku拧am da zamislim, bivam ograni膷en sredstvima svog sopstvenog uma, a ona nisu adekvatna za takav zadatak.鈥� (214)听
鈥濱ako negde u univerzumu ima svesnog 啪ivota, velike su 拧anse da ne膰emo mo膰i da ga opi拧emo 膷ak ni najop拧tijim terminima.鈥� (214)
鈥濻vakako je mogu膰e da ljudsko bi膰e vveruje da postoje 膷injenice za 膷ije predstavljanje ili razumevanje ljudi nikada ne膰e imati potrebne pojmove.鈥� (216)听
鈥瀂a膷udo, mo啪emo imati dokaz za istinu ne膷ega 拧to ne mo啪emo zaista da razumemo.鈥� (224)
13) PANPSIHIZAM听
Kako biti mistik kroz sasvim nemisti膷no izlaganje.
鈥濧ko je materija dospela na zemlju, pa je na njoj izrasla trava, pa travu jela krava, a njeno mleko pila trudnica, onda je i mozak njenog deteta delom sa膷injen od te materije.鈥� (227)
(Mene je ovo podsetilo na 膷uvenu Hamletovu repliku upu膰enu Klaudiju o, mogu re膰i, 鈥瀔ru啪enju mateije鈥� 鈥� riba, crv, kralj.)
鈥濸anpsihizam u ovom smislu ne povla膷i panpsihizam u onom poznatijem smislu, prema kome drve膰e i cve膰e, a mo啪da 膷ak i kamenje, jezera i krvna zrnca, imaju nekakvu svest. Ali toliko malo znamo o tome kako svest nastaje iz materije u slu膷aju nas i 啪ivotinja u kojima prepoznajemo svest, da bi bilo dogmati膷no pretpostaviti听 da ona ne postoji u drugim kompleksnim sistemima, ili 膷ak u sistemima veli膷ine jedne galaksije, kao rezultat onih istih osnovnih svojstava materije koja su odgovorna i za nas.鈥� (243)听
14)听听听听SUBJEKTIVNO I OBJEKTIVNO听
鈥濺azlika izme膽u subjektivnog i objektivnog je relativna, Op拧ta ljudska ta膷ka gledi拧ta je objektivnija od na拧eg li膷nog gledi拧ta, ali manje objektivna od gledi拧ta fizike.鈥� (256)听
Zadatak prihvatanja polariteta treba da bude kreativan i kao takav je dragocen. Susret je sve. Ukr拧taj, dodajem ja.
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October 19, 2021丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丿乇亘乇诏蹖乇賳丿賴鈥屰� 賲賵囟賵毓鈥屬囏й屰� 亘賴鈥屫贺й屫� 诏蹖乇丕 賵 丿賳亘丕賱鈥屭┴必嗃� 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賴乇 丕賳爻丕賳蹖 丿乇 夭賳丿诏蹖 禺賵丿 賳丕诏夭蹖乇 亘丕 丌賳 丿爻鬲鈥屫ㄙ団€屭臂屫ㄘз� 丕爻鬲貨 賲賵囟賵毓鈥屬囏й屰� 賳馗蹖乇 賲乇诏貙 倬賵趩蹖貙 賲蹖賱 噩賳爻蹖貙 丕禺賱丕賯貙 爻蹖丕爻鬲. 亘丕丕蹖賳鈥屬囐呝囏� 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 讴賴 鬲乇噩賲賴鈥屰� 賳丕禺賵亘 賵 倬購乇诏乇賴貙 倬蹖诏蹖乇蹖 賵 賮賴賲 賳賵卮鬲賴 乇丕 鬲丕 丨丿 夭蹖丕丿蹖 賳丕賲賯丿賵乇 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲. 鬲乇噩賲賴 亘丕丕蹖賳讴賴 丿乇 噩丕賴丕蹖蹖 賮賴賲蹖丿賳蹖 丕爻鬲貙 丿乇 賲噩賲賵毓 賳丕賲賮賴賵賲 賵 賳丕賮丕乇爻蹖 丕爻鬲 賵 亘賴鈥屬嗁堌观� 丕孬乇 乇丕 鬲亘丕賴 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲. 亘賴鈥屫藏呚� 亘蹖卮 丕夭 賳蹖賲蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 禺賵丕賳丿賲 賵 丿蹖诏乇 賳鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賲 丕丿丕賲賴 丿賴賲.
July 30, 2009
Fourteen essays in this book tie together the question of how philosophy applies in everyday life. Nagel鈥檚 writing drags a bit in places, and not all the essays are of equal interest. The personal nature of the inquiry is the book's main draw and the best reason for reading it. The most helpful approach to this kind of book is to list its topics and give my ratings, as follows:
TOPIC:
Death 鈥� A rather short discussion asking why death is thought of as such a bad event. ****
Absurdity 鈥� Excellent topic with good insights
Sexual Perversion -- A logically poor survey of sexual attitudes, but a fascinating look at how philosophy doubly abstracts the subject from its instinctive and psychological nature. ***
War 鈥� Dated; of little interest to me. *
Public Life 鈥� Less here than meets the eye **
Affirmative Action 鈥� Dated look at a trendy but exhausted subject. *
Equality 鈥� Excellent comparison of individual rights, utilitarianism and egalitarianism
Fragmentation of Value 鈥� Must all our values derive from one source?
Ethics and Biology 鈥� Short and uninteresting *
Unity of Consciousness 鈥� Outdated by modern brain research *
On Being a Bat 鈥� Excellent discussion of subjective experience
Panpsychism 鈥� Channeling Spinoza ****
Subjective and Objective 鈥� Very interesting. ****
The discussions are a little more technical than others I鈥檝e seen, and the author surveys many concepts. I recommend the book for people having a general interest in philosophy and at least a basic familiarity with its terms.
TOPIC:
Death 鈥� A rather short discussion asking why death is thought of as such a bad event. ****
Absurdity 鈥� Excellent topic with good insights
Sexual Perversion -- A logically poor survey of sexual attitudes, but a fascinating look at how philosophy doubly abstracts the subject from its instinctive and psychological nature. ***
War 鈥� Dated; of little interest to me. *
Public Life 鈥� Less here than meets the eye **
Affirmative Action 鈥� Dated look at a trendy but exhausted subject. *
Equality 鈥� Excellent comparison of individual rights, utilitarianism and egalitarianism
Fragmentation of Value 鈥� Must all our values derive from one source?
Ethics and Biology 鈥� Short and uninteresting *
Unity of Consciousness 鈥� Outdated by modern brain research *
On Being a Bat 鈥� Excellent discussion of subjective experience
Panpsychism 鈥� Channeling Spinoza ****
Subjective and Objective 鈥� Very interesting. ****
The discussions are a little more technical than others I鈥檝e seen, and the author surveys many concepts. I recommend the book for people having a general interest in philosophy and at least a basic familiarity with its terms.
June 28, 2008
One of the most probing and worthwhile philosophic disquisitions of the twentieth century.
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November 4, 2009First time to my knowledge I've seen a philosopher argue that death is really bad and we should be scared of it. And it's a good point about the nature of goodness not being restricted to non-relational properties ascribable to a human at different times. Still, surprising that Nagel would fail to look into the huge variety of other reasons that philosophers have embraced the idea of death.
Which points to a crucial element of Nagel's style. He is arguing with the language of the people, using the people's definitions of the words at stake. It has a certain charm, a feeling of someone sincerely engaged in questioning their way of life, at first it almost feels Socratic. But then one remembers that Socrates (of early Plato particularly) radically questioned the people's definitions and made them think about the definitions they'd been using. Nagel doesn't fuss over words. Is this appropriate?
Let's look at the second essay, on the Absurd. I was excited to read it, as it draws on Camus' Sisyphus essay, which was one of the first works of "real" (i.e. not Christopher Pike's) philosophy I ever read. And I was really getting pleased, when I read Nagel's argument that we learn our standards of meaning within life, therefore we cannot use the same standards when we step outside of life, in order to look at the big picture. I agree entirely. Life cannot as a whole be meaningless, because meaning is only something generated from within life, and no longer makes sense as a tool with which to judge life as a whole. We pull ourselves out of the individual chain of justifications when we look at the big picture, and may no longer ask for another link on that chain. Sadly, I got the same slap in the face from the ending that I'd gotten before with Camus. We should live our lives with IRONY? Wha? Why? He's just demonstrated that we may not look at our overall struggles as meaningless. So what use do we have for irony? It's just as unjustified within the text as Camus' call to defiance.
This lesson about when you can use what words (such as in the second essay, "justification" and "meaning") is throughout the book not taken seriously enough. There is a problem with using work-a-day definitions for philosophic thought, words understood according to their use in certain normal situations are plucked out of their context and made in this innocent form to take part in exotic dances. Naturally, this method leads to mixed up conclusions - unexpected, yet no more rigourous for all that. We're struck by an embarassingly clear example in the essay on Sexual Perversion, written in 1969. The conclusions do not hold and are ridiculously dated. Philosophic truths should exercise a permanent claim on our attention, and not become silly artifacts after a mere forty years. Yet, this is only possible when we examine the concepts we're using. If you take them out of the mouths of those conversing under entirely other circumstances, you end up with stiff nonsense.
Which points to a crucial element of Nagel's style. He is arguing with the language of the people, using the people's definitions of the words at stake. It has a certain charm, a feeling of someone sincerely engaged in questioning their way of life, at first it almost feels Socratic. But then one remembers that Socrates (of early Plato particularly) radically questioned the people's definitions and made them think about the definitions they'd been using. Nagel doesn't fuss over words. Is this appropriate?
Let's look at the second essay, on the Absurd. I was excited to read it, as it draws on Camus' Sisyphus essay, which was one of the first works of "real" (i.e. not Christopher Pike's) philosophy I ever read. And I was really getting pleased, when I read Nagel's argument that we learn our standards of meaning within life, therefore we cannot use the same standards when we step outside of life, in order to look at the big picture. I agree entirely. Life cannot as a whole be meaningless, because meaning is only something generated from within life, and no longer makes sense as a tool with which to judge life as a whole. We pull ourselves out of the individual chain of justifications when we look at the big picture, and may no longer ask for another link on that chain. Sadly, I got the same slap in the face from the ending that I'd gotten before with Camus. We should live our lives with IRONY? Wha? Why? He's just demonstrated that we may not look at our overall struggles as meaningless. So what use do we have for irony? It's just as unjustified within the text as Camus' call to defiance.
This lesson about when you can use what words (such as in the second essay, "justification" and "meaning") is throughout the book not taken seriously enough. There is a problem with using work-a-day definitions for philosophic thought, words understood according to their use in certain normal situations are plucked out of their context and made in this innocent form to take part in exotic dances. Naturally, this method leads to mixed up conclusions - unexpected, yet no more rigourous for all that. We're struck by an embarassingly clear example in the essay on Sexual Perversion, written in 1969. The conclusions do not hold and are ridiculously dated. Philosophic truths should exercise a permanent claim on our attention, and not become silly artifacts after a mere forty years. Yet, this is only possible when we examine the concepts we're using. If you take them out of the mouths of those conversing under entirely other circumstances, you end up with stiff nonsense.
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May 22, 2019Too hard for me! I understood chunks of it, but there was plenty that whizzed past me. Great topics though. Includes the famous 鈥淲hat is it like to be a bat鈥� essay. I guess I need a 鈥淭homas Nagel for Dummies鈥� book.
July 8, 2021
Thomas Nagel was one of the premier analytic philosophers of the 20th Century, and had the remarkable ability to comprehend and write on a variety of subjects. In this anthology of some of Nagel's journal articles he has written (plus two published for the first time in this book), he discusses a wide variety of topics, ranging from death to what it is like to be a bat (the subjective nature of consciousness). Because many of the articles are different in both their topic and their quality, I will list my overall thoughts first and then briefly address each of the chapters.
Overall, this is a well-written book, but it is dense. This work requires concentration and dedicated effort to get through. He does tend to digress at times and sometimes repeats himself, but overall his articles are structured in a fairly logical and straightforward manner. That said, I would recommend that a potential reader have some sort of philosophical background, because these articles presume at times that you already know something about the topic (particularly those topics in the philosophy of mind at the end of the book). Now, on to the individual chapters.
Death
My rating: 4/5
Here, Nagel discusses the topic of death and why humans believe death to be a bad thing or an evil, and how we should think about it in response to that. It was very thought-provoking and left me with quite a few questions.
The Absurd
My rating: 5/5
This chapter is one of the most interesting analyses I've read on the topic of the absurd from a naturalistic/secular lens. He essentially examines the tension between a life that we take very seriously and purposefully with the possibility that it could all be meaningless or arbitrary. It made me grateful that I believe there is a telos to life, but is still a question everyone has to reckon with themselves. It also made me think of the importance of faith in the face of the absurd at times.
Moral Luck
My rating: 5/5
I had not read much on the subject of moral luck until this chapter, though I knew the general premise. Nagel does a terrific job in posing a lot of thought-provoking ideas about how we can assign moral praise or blame to people who do things that seemingly depend on factors outside of their control.
Sexual Perversion
My rating: 3/5
This chapter was interesting to a degree, but I didn't find it quite as compelling as some of the other ones. Perhaps it's only because this topic isn't one that I'm particularly interested in. Nagel does do a good job though of outlining what he believes a perversion to be, and he applies that to sex to show how what are normally healthy sexual desires can become blocked or perverted in a person, from a philosophical standpoint. However, I did wish he had considered the idea of sex having an intentional design or end, but that generally wouldn't fit in his worldview, as I understand it.
War and Massacre
My rating: 5/5
As someone who is interested in military ethics and Just War Theory, this chapter really appealed to me. I thought Nagel made a great argument for why military planners and politicians must consider absolutist ethics in addition to utilitarian ethics when going to war or engaging in combat.
Ruthlessness in Public Life
My rating: 3/5
Just based on the title, I was intrigued and unsure where Nagel would take this line of thinking. While I didn't totally agree with his line of reasoning at some points, he still left me with a lot to think about in terms of public crimes and the type of behavior that politicians or other leaders may use, and if that behavior differs from private morality.
The Policy of Preference
My rating: 4/5
In this chapter, Nagel deals with the morality and justice of preferential policies in society, such as affirmative action. He essentially argues that though justice does not require these sorts of policies in our society, they are not unjust. His line of thinking was interesting to follow, and at times persuasive, though I did leave with a few questions unanswered. This chapter was especially interesting in light of the recent political climate.
Equality
My rating: 5/5
Here, Nagel examines the idea of equality and examines equality from three different perspectives: utilitarian equality, rights-based equality, and egalitarian equality. He ultimately argues that while none of these are wholly sufficient, a mix of utilitarian and egalitarian equality, with some rights protections, is ultimately best for society. While I questioned some of his arguments in this chapter, I thought it was a very interesting read.
The Fragmentation of Value
My rating: 4/5
This chapter deals with the differing types of value and obligations we have in life, and Nagel basically argues that there cannot be one unified standard of value, but rather we must use practical wisdom and judgment to determine which standard of value to apply in a given scenario.
Ethics without Biology
My rating: 3/5
This chapter was one of my less favorite ones, as Nagel's point seemed fairly obvious from the outset, arguing that humans should consider our biology as the starting point of ethics, but he argues that we have surpassed this point now. Therefore, biology is not very helpful to ethics.
Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness
My rating: 2/5
While I'm sure that some people would find this chapter quite interesting (though it may have since been disproven or made irrelevant by modern neuroscience), I was unable to really stay engaged during this chapter. It is the first of three chapters Nagel has on the philosophy of mind, and this one is probably the weakest of the three, in my opinion. That said, some of the examples used were interesting, and he does offer some decent questions to wrestle with, though, as mentioned, I don't know how modern neuroscience would react to it.
What is it like to Be a Bat?
My rating: 5/5
This is one of Nagel's landmark articles in philosophy, and is one of my favorites of his. In it, he argues against physicalism's attempt at reductionism with regard to the mind-body problem, stating that pure physicalism cannot account for the subjective experience of conscious creatures. Even if I knew everything about the physical processes and mechanisms of a bat's brain, I still would not know what it is like to be a bat. There is something missing. Overall, a great read.
Panpsychism
My rating: 3/5
This chapter was interesting at times, though I've never read much on the subject of panpsychism. It is essentially the view that matter must have mental properties as well as physical properties, and when that matter is arranged in such a way in certain organisms, it produces consciousness and mental states. Nagel examines this view, objections to it, and then attempts to refute those objections, concluding that while panpsychism is a little out there, it may be the best theory philosophy of mind has going for it. I was a little irritated by how dismissive Nagel was to the concept of the soul, giving it very little discussion time as an objection to panpsychism, but that seems to be the general trend among many philosophers of mind that I've studied.
Subjective and Objective
My rating: 4/5
This article might have been better positioned earlier in the book, because by the time you reach it, he's already discussed quite a few of the topics he mentions in this article. He also tends to repeat himself. That said, I still gave it four stars because it's such an important topic, and he handles the question well. How can we make sense of both the subjective and objective components of reality if we only create a system of accounting for one of them? For example, if we believe that objectivity is the closest we can get to true reality, we will minimize or discard the subjective, including what it means to be truly human. Likewise, there are problems when you go in the other direction. Nagel doesn't solve this problem, but he does offer a lot of good food for thought.
All said, though I may not have agreed with Nagel on everything, and I may have had issues with some of his arguments, I thought this book was very good because it caused me to wrestle with a lot of important and interesting questions, which ultimately is what philosophy tries to do. I'd recommend this to anyone interested in philosophy and examining Nagel's take on certain big questions in life.
Overall, this is a well-written book, but it is dense. This work requires concentration and dedicated effort to get through. He does tend to digress at times and sometimes repeats himself, but overall his articles are structured in a fairly logical and straightforward manner. That said, I would recommend that a potential reader have some sort of philosophical background, because these articles presume at times that you already know something about the topic (particularly those topics in the philosophy of mind at the end of the book). Now, on to the individual chapters.
Death
My rating: 4/5
Here, Nagel discusses the topic of death and why humans believe death to be a bad thing or an evil, and how we should think about it in response to that. It was very thought-provoking and left me with quite a few questions.
The Absurd
My rating: 5/5
This chapter is one of the most interesting analyses I've read on the topic of the absurd from a naturalistic/secular lens. He essentially examines the tension between a life that we take very seriously and purposefully with the possibility that it could all be meaningless or arbitrary. It made me grateful that I believe there is a telos to life, but is still a question everyone has to reckon with themselves. It also made me think of the importance of faith in the face of the absurd at times.
Moral Luck
My rating: 5/5
I had not read much on the subject of moral luck until this chapter, though I knew the general premise. Nagel does a terrific job in posing a lot of thought-provoking ideas about how we can assign moral praise or blame to people who do things that seemingly depend on factors outside of their control.
Sexual Perversion
My rating: 3/5
This chapter was interesting to a degree, but I didn't find it quite as compelling as some of the other ones. Perhaps it's only because this topic isn't one that I'm particularly interested in. Nagel does do a good job though of outlining what he believes a perversion to be, and he applies that to sex to show how what are normally healthy sexual desires can become blocked or perverted in a person, from a philosophical standpoint. However, I did wish he had considered the idea of sex having an intentional design or end, but that generally wouldn't fit in his worldview, as I understand it.
War and Massacre
My rating: 5/5
As someone who is interested in military ethics and Just War Theory, this chapter really appealed to me. I thought Nagel made a great argument for why military planners and politicians must consider absolutist ethics in addition to utilitarian ethics when going to war or engaging in combat.
Ruthlessness in Public Life
My rating: 3/5
Just based on the title, I was intrigued and unsure where Nagel would take this line of thinking. While I didn't totally agree with his line of reasoning at some points, he still left me with a lot to think about in terms of public crimes and the type of behavior that politicians or other leaders may use, and if that behavior differs from private morality.
The Policy of Preference
My rating: 4/5
In this chapter, Nagel deals with the morality and justice of preferential policies in society, such as affirmative action. He essentially argues that though justice does not require these sorts of policies in our society, they are not unjust. His line of thinking was interesting to follow, and at times persuasive, though I did leave with a few questions unanswered. This chapter was especially interesting in light of the recent political climate.
Equality
My rating: 5/5
Here, Nagel examines the idea of equality and examines equality from three different perspectives: utilitarian equality, rights-based equality, and egalitarian equality. He ultimately argues that while none of these are wholly sufficient, a mix of utilitarian and egalitarian equality, with some rights protections, is ultimately best for society. While I questioned some of his arguments in this chapter, I thought it was a very interesting read.
The Fragmentation of Value
My rating: 4/5
This chapter deals with the differing types of value and obligations we have in life, and Nagel basically argues that there cannot be one unified standard of value, but rather we must use practical wisdom and judgment to determine which standard of value to apply in a given scenario.
Ethics without Biology
My rating: 3/5
This chapter was one of my less favorite ones, as Nagel's point seemed fairly obvious from the outset, arguing that humans should consider our biology as the starting point of ethics, but he argues that we have surpassed this point now. Therefore, biology is not very helpful to ethics.
Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness
My rating: 2/5
While I'm sure that some people would find this chapter quite interesting (though it may have since been disproven or made irrelevant by modern neuroscience), I was unable to really stay engaged during this chapter. It is the first of three chapters Nagel has on the philosophy of mind, and this one is probably the weakest of the three, in my opinion. That said, some of the examples used were interesting, and he does offer some decent questions to wrestle with, though, as mentioned, I don't know how modern neuroscience would react to it.
What is it like to Be a Bat?
My rating: 5/5
This is one of Nagel's landmark articles in philosophy, and is one of my favorites of his. In it, he argues against physicalism's attempt at reductionism with regard to the mind-body problem, stating that pure physicalism cannot account for the subjective experience of conscious creatures. Even if I knew everything about the physical processes and mechanisms of a bat's brain, I still would not know what it is like to be a bat. There is something missing. Overall, a great read.
Panpsychism
My rating: 3/5
This chapter was interesting at times, though I've never read much on the subject of panpsychism. It is essentially the view that matter must have mental properties as well as physical properties, and when that matter is arranged in such a way in certain organisms, it produces consciousness and mental states. Nagel examines this view, objections to it, and then attempts to refute those objections, concluding that while panpsychism is a little out there, it may be the best theory philosophy of mind has going for it. I was a little irritated by how dismissive Nagel was to the concept of the soul, giving it very little discussion time as an objection to panpsychism, but that seems to be the general trend among many philosophers of mind that I've studied.
Subjective and Objective
My rating: 4/5
This article might have been better positioned earlier in the book, because by the time you reach it, he's already discussed quite a few of the topics he mentions in this article. He also tends to repeat himself. That said, I still gave it four stars because it's such an important topic, and he handles the question well. How can we make sense of both the subjective and objective components of reality if we only create a system of accounting for one of them? For example, if we believe that objectivity is the closest we can get to true reality, we will minimize or discard the subjective, including what it means to be truly human. Likewise, there are problems when you go in the other direction. Nagel doesn't solve this problem, but he does offer a lot of good food for thought.
All said, though I may not have agreed with Nagel on everything, and I may have had issues with some of his arguments, I thought this book was very good because it caused me to wrestle with a lot of important and interesting questions, which ultimately is what philosophy tries to do. I'd recommend this to anyone interested in philosophy and examining Nagel's take on certain big questions in life.
January 25, 2018
Thomas Nagel began with the most abstract issues and areas in philosophy to reach concrete issues: metaphysics-> epistemoligy,-> philosophy of mind-> Ethics-> political philosophy-> economics.
Thomas Nagel in all areas of philosophy: "metaphysics, epistemology, ethics", and some of the most important branches of philosophy: "philosophy, ethics, philosophy of law, political philosophy, philosophy of mind", has had a huge contribution.
He discusses the most abstract philosophical issues, such as "consciousness", "point of veiw / perspective" (from objective and subjective point of view), "altruism and egoism" (all in philosophy of mind); Virtue and Vice, duty and responsibility(in Ethics); Equality and partiality, Justice, Legitimacy(in politic and Law).
In this collection of essays (this book), he addresses concrete issues. In this book, he has discussed articles (topics), and referring to nearly 2,600 books. Nearly all of the papers in the past 40 years have been at the center of the philosophical controversy: death, absurd, moral luck, war and massacre, sexual perversion, ruthlessness in public life,
the policy preference, equality, etc.
Perhaps it can be said that all fourteen articles, with all their initial differences, look at one issue: the meaning of life.
I have repeatedly read the essay "Absurd" and is still one of the most profound articles of philosophy that I have read about the sense of "absurd" and perhaps "the meaning of life.
Thomas Nagel in all areas of philosophy: "metaphysics, epistemology, ethics", and some of the most important branches of philosophy: "philosophy, ethics, philosophy of law, political philosophy, philosophy of mind", has had a huge contribution.
He discusses the most abstract philosophical issues, such as "consciousness", "point of veiw / perspective" (from objective and subjective point of view), "altruism and egoism" (all in philosophy of mind); Virtue and Vice, duty and responsibility(in Ethics); Equality and partiality, Justice, Legitimacy(in politic and Law).
In this collection of essays (this book), he addresses concrete issues. In this book, he has discussed articles (topics), and referring to nearly 2,600 books. Nearly all of the papers in the past 40 years have been at the center of the philosophical controversy: death, absurd, moral luck, war and massacre, sexual perversion, ruthlessness in public life,
the policy preference, equality, etc.
Perhaps it can be said that all fourteen articles, with all their initial differences, look at one issue: the meaning of life.
I have repeatedly read the essay "Absurd" and is still one of the most profound articles of philosophy that I have read about the sense of "absurd" and perhaps "the meaning of life.
March 15, 2023
Each essay here hits you with the force of a freight train! It is probably true to say that the first three of them completely changed my outlook on death, the meaning of life, and moral luck. It is a difficult book, but one worth going through.
February 7, 2024
I picked this up because I focused on Nagel's "What is it like to be a bat?" essay for a philosophy assessment. I enjoyed the majority of writings in this book and thought some were especially impressive commentaries on the respective topic. My favourite essays were: Death, The Absurd, Moral Luck, Sexual Perversion, What is it like to be a bat?, Panpsychism, Subjective and Objective.
Would highly recommend, even for those already acquainted with the field of philosophy.
Would highly recommend, even for those already acquainted with the field of philosophy.
February 10, 2021
Always fun but also extremely challenging and frustrating to read philosophy. This is no beginner鈥檚 intro to philosophy and I definitely but off more than I can chew.
The essays on war and massacre, the fragmentation of value, and the subjective objective were my favourites.
War and massacre because I鈥檓 a utilitarian/consequentialist and Nagel wrote a convincing argument against utilitarianism and for absolutism. I鈥�
The fragmentation of value was excellent because it鈥檚 so applicable (like many of the ideas in this book) to everyday life. We are all faced with decisions and will face many difficult decisions that really offer no solution. What makes these decisions so difficult is the fact that each one has multiple values of varying degrees. How should we then evaluate each of those values comparatively? Nagel provides a useful framework for bettering our judgement and at the very least made me feel better about not always having to make the best decision.
Subjective and objective was also persuasive on the inaccuracy of claiming there is an objective reality.
Overall I found Nagel鈥檚 approach of 鈥渢he middle鈥� way, multiple solutions, 鈥渢here鈥檚 not really a solution that comes to my mind this is just the problem鈥� to be slightly annoying because I want definitive answers. But I also realize that that鈥檚 just a fact of life and philosophy. Not many rules can really be strictly applied and the rules to be applied will likely require a case by case analysis.
(3 stars bc honestly it was quite technical and I didn鈥檛 understand a decent amount of this book)
The essays on war and massacre, the fragmentation of value, and the subjective objective were my favourites.
War and massacre because I鈥檓 a utilitarian/consequentialist and Nagel wrote a convincing argument against utilitarianism and for absolutism. I鈥�
The fragmentation of value was excellent because it鈥檚 so applicable (like many of the ideas in this book) to everyday life. We are all faced with decisions and will face many difficult decisions that really offer no solution. What makes these decisions so difficult is the fact that each one has multiple values of varying degrees. How should we then evaluate each of those values comparatively? Nagel provides a useful framework for bettering our judgement and at the very least made me feel better about not always having to make the best decision.
Subjective and objective was also persuasive on the inaccuracy of claiming there is an objective reality.
Overall I found Nagel鈥檚 approach of 鈥渢he middle鈥� way, multiple solutions, 鈥渢here鈥檚 not really a solution that comes to my mind this is just the problem鈥� to be slightly annoying because I want definitive answers. But I also realize that that鈥檚 just a fact of life and philosophy. Not many rules can really be strictly applied and the rules to be applied will likely require a case by case analysis.
(3 stars bc honestly it was quite technical and I didn鈥檛 understand a decent amount of this book)
December 5, 2019
First half of this book is a 3, while the second half is a 5..had I known it'd have a much more interesting finish, I probably would have prioritized reading it a bit more! Nagel's ideas on consciousness, value fragmentation, and the dichotomous issues of objectivity/subjectivity are seemingly timeless, and great food for thought for those that don't fall in the same camp as him on these particular issues.
October 12, 2024
Really, my only issue with this book, aside from a few of the essays not being as interesting, is that this format necessarily doesn鈥檛 allow for much depth. Nagel was obviously focused on the subjective vs objective vein in philosophy and it shows, but the outer shell that this interest takes on can vary from philosophy of mind, the absurd, morality, politics, etc. So, we go from topic to topic and this isn鈥檛 bad, but it did leave me wishing for a longer, deeper, and more nuanced treatment on some of these topics. More reading, I guess.
Read
January 24, 2019Tried using this as a broad introduction to philosophy. Too dense / abstractly written for me to really get into. Now I get why everyone who read the New Yorker likes philosophy so much...
Maybe this is one I try again later in life when I'm a more sophisticated and wise guy
Maybe this is one I try again later in life when I'm a more sophisticated and wise guy
February 10, 2018
The title of Thomas Nagel鈥檚 Mortal Questions may appear to promise a set of inquiries with reachable termination points, but in fact the opposite is true. This collection of short essays explores a slew of multifaceted and often-insouble problems surrounding the nature of human society and experiential life that Nagel pondered during the 1970s. Nagel is nobly driven to confront issues that are 鈥渕ultiple, complex, often cloudy, and mixed up with many others,鈥� and to plumb the intellectual depths of situations where 鈥渨e may have evidence for the truth of something we cannot really understand鈥� (141, 177).
While I applaud this approach and enjoy Nagel鈥檚 able writing, I find his arguments to be of inconsistent quality. The essays that explore scientific topics are quite dated and will prove generally unimpressive to anyone familiar with the last few decades of research in experimental psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience. The essay 鈥淧anpsychism,鈥� while containing a few nuggets of good sense, is rife with musings that could pass muster in the 鈥�70s but seem laughable now. There are similar problems with the essays that address sexuality, the relationship between biology and ethics, and the mind-body problem.
The obvious exception is 鈥淲hat Is It Like To Be A Bat?鈥�, which remains a landmark statement of why consciousness is such a difficult subject to wrap our heads around. Nagel focuses on the specificity of what it is like to be various kinds of conscious or semi-conscious entities, as well as the intellectual commitments that follow from accepting consciousness as a gradated and pluralistic phenomenon. Even for those who accept a physicalist/materialist account of consciousness and view internal experience as essentially an illusion (which I do), this essay survives as an apt articulation of thorny questions that still tease us today.
The pieces that really shine in this collection are Nagel鈥檚 existential and sociopolitical critiques. I am especially impressed with the 鈥淭he Absurd,鈥� 鈥淢oral Luck,鈥� and 鈥淭he Policy of Preference.鈥� I shall analyze the first two together since I see them as attacking the same set of intellectual queries, and then discuss the third on its own.
鈥淭he Absurd鈥� is a terrific expansion of the idea that popularized in his classic essay . While Camus posits the absurd as the taunting contrast between the world as we find it and the world as we imagine it might be, Nagel argues that the absurd 鈥渄erives not from a collision between our expectations and the world, but from a collision within ourselves鈥� (17). This collision arises from our understanding of two opposing viewpoints: (1) from an outside perspective, human life is patently meaningless, and (2) from an internal perspective, we cannot help but take ourselves seriously. This is a clever reinterpretation of Camus鈥檚 original conundrum, one that I believe has important consequences for how we should understand free will (or rather, the absence of free will).
Before attempting to cash out that last point, it will be useful to take up Nagel鈥檚 views on 鈥渕oral luck,鈥� which he defines as a situation 鈥淲here a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him鈥s an object of moral judgment鈥� (26). In other words, we become morally lucky if influences outside our control cause events for which we can take (or are granted by others) moral credit, and we become morally unlucky when the opposite is true. Nagel doesn鈥檛 shy away from the weighty implications of this, stating clearly that 鈥渘othing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control鈥� (26).
Though it would be a stretch to claim that the issue of free will has been settled since this essay was first written, contemporary research generally concords with this conclusion, indicating that what we usually call free will is merely a placeholder for our incomplete understanding of nature鈥檚 causal mechanisms. With a little help from Marvin Minsky, Robert Sapolsky explains:
"The artificial intelligence pioneer Marvin Minsky once defined free will as 'internal forces I do not understand.' People intuitively believe in free will, not just because we have this terrible human need for agency but also because most people know next to nothing about those internal forces鈥ur behaviors are constantly shaped by an array of subterranean forces鈥hat, not that long ago, we didn鈥檛 know existed." ( Behave , 603, 605)
The same is true for external forces that enter into our bodies and become themselves internal, subterranean forces (weather, social relationships, nutrients, etc.). As Nagel puts it:
"As the external determinants of what someone has done are gradually exposed, in their effect on consequences, character, and choice itself, it becomes gradually clear that actions are events and people things. Eventually nothing remains that can be ascribed to the responsible self, and we are left with nothing but a portion of the larger sequence of events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed or praised." (37)
Nagel鈥檚 concept of moral luck is a wonderful and humbling way to accept non-agency, and to generate gratitude for whatever moral luck we come across, knowing surely that we did not cause it and therefore do not deserve it. Taking moral luck seriously also prioritizes compassion when dealing with those who are morally unlucky, etiolating arguments that a morally unlucky person deserves a nasty fate as punishment for having executed a series of bad choices that could have been avoided.
Returning now to the absurd, we can see how moral luck interacts with our adolescent but inescapable need to take ourselves seriously. We long for things to matter gravely and crave recognition for bringing about circumstances that are favorable to us and others. But in reality our lives are meaningless and we are rushing downstream, self-reflective but not -controlled passengers riding an endless current of causality that decides moment to moment what we are and where we go. Nagel鈥檚 description is better:
"That is the main condition of absurdity鈥撯€搕he dragooning of an unconvinced transcendent consciousness into the service of an immanent, limited enterprise like a human life." (22)
So, taking or being given moral credit for actions we are not responsible for (which is every action) is just as absurd as receiving blame for actions we are not responsible for (which is every action). These 鈥渁ctions鈥� are just events, observable transpirings of our dragooned nature, like sunsets or winter storms.
Lest we should conclude that the only available route from here is a descent into jaded skepticism about the possibility goodness or meaning in life, Nagel comes to our rescue:
"Our absurdity warrants neither that much distress nor that much defiance鈥 would argue that absurdity is one of the most human things about us: a manifestation of our most advanced and interesting characteristics. Like skepticism in epistomology, it is possible only because we possess a certain kind of insight鈥撯€搕he capacity to transcend ourselves in thought鈥If] there is no reason to believe that anything matters, then that does not matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with irony instead of heroism or despair." (22-3)
This may seem like an intellectual cop-out to some, but I see it as a genuine 鈥渟olution鈥� to an unsolvable problem. Accepting our inability to resolve the absurdity of our lives, we can fall back on the assurance that there is nothing boring or simplistic about humans and the world that contains us. Despite our many negative capacities, we are also endowed with capacities for discovery, for euphoria, for growth, for love. The significance of these small miracles and our gratitude for their unnecessary existence need not be tarnished by the reality that we did not and cannot choose them, and their ultimate meaninglessness need not contravene their meaningfulness to our little lives in the here and now.
The last essay I鈥檇 like to discuss is one that I wish would rise to public prominence is this time of social and political strife. 鈥淭he Policy of Preference鈥� is a nuanced and smart examination of how we should attempt to ameliorate some of the deepest divisions that threaten civil society. For us Americans, the most obvious of these are our despicable histories of , , and , the consequences of which have been dire and pervasive in our national narrative, even as the worst results of embedded inequity have attenuated over time.
Nagel delves into the difficult question of whether the act of creating a policy of preference such as affirmative action is compatible with justice. His fair conclusion is that such policies are compatible with justice, but Nagel is careful to acknowledge that policies of preference do not always solve the problems they purport to address, and also that their implementation does not come without significant cost:
"When we try to deal with the inequality in advantages that results from a disparity in qualifications (however produced) between races or sexes, we are up against a feature of the system which at every turn exacts costs and presents obstacles in response to attempts to reduce the inequalities. We must face the possibility that the primary injustice with which we have to contend lies in this feature itself, and that some of the worst aspects of what we now perceive as racial or sexual injustice are merely conspicuous manifestations of the great social injustice of differential reward." (96)
By 鈥渄ifferential reward,鈥� Nagel means that human resources are everywhere distributed unfairly due to systems that reward people based on certain qualities (skills, accomplishments, inheritance, nepotism, chance, etc.), each of which is not equally accessible to all members of society. And since any quality that can conceivably bring about a reward obtains solely from moral luck, it becomes clear that any system of differential reward is indefensible. No one deserves anything. The logical next step is to conclude that, in a just society, everyone ought to get a fair piece of what鈥檚 available. The struggle to define and distribute a 鈥渇air piece鈥� to everyone is of course not easy or uncomplicated, but the crucial point is that the project of just distribution need not by necessity focus on any particular group or groups that have been discriminated against (although there is certainly no prohibition against that). All people are potentially vulnerable to injustice and suffering, depending on circumstance; no one has a monopoly on lousy moral luck.
In our hyper-polarized political climate, I cannot over-stress the importance of this unifying view, which overrides superficial differences in identity without denying their contextual importance. Solving injustice is not about obsessing over what people look like or how they act or speak, but rather about identifying societal systems that allow for and perpetuate occurrences of unfair distribution and doing the hard work of remaking those systems with the help of allies who also want a better world. Critically, the details of how this 鈥渂etter world鈥� will be and the language used to describe it need not align perfectly in order for people from different backgrounds and experiences to cooperate in common cause; dogmatism in this regard is a surefire way to kill coalitions that would prove otherwise capable of affecting widespread change.
All of this brings us to a well-trodden truth that is sadly sidelined in much of modern discourse: in order to solve the many problems that ail us, we must rediscover our common humanity and insist on its status as our most important (not the only important) policy of preference. We will get there by privileging our capacities for responsible reasoning, compassionate understanding and fair compromise. In the service of this goal, Nagel cautions against two dangers:
"One is the danger of romantic defeatism, which abandons rational theory because it inevitably leaves many problems unsolved. The other is the danger of exclusionary overrationalization, which bars as irrelevant or empty all considerations that cannot be brought within the scope of a general system admitting explicitly defensible conclusions. This yields skewed results by counting only measurable or otherwise precisely describable factors, even when others are in fact relevant. The alternative is to recognize that the legitimate grounds of decision are extremely various and understood to different degrees鈥he lack of a general theory leads too easily into a false dichotomy: either fall back entirely on the unsystematic intuitive judgment of whoever has to make a decision, or else cook up a unified but artificial system鈥hich will grind out decisions on any problem presented to it." (137, 139)
Our political and social lives are currently riddled with these seductive mentalities. On every issue, we see one side clamoring for the abandonment of reason in service of blind ideology, even as the other zealously applies an oversimplified systemic solution that ignores the true complexity of the problem. Those in the middle must devote ourselves to the calm creation and assiduous defense of common ground.
This review was originally published on my blog, .
While I applaud this approach and enjoy Nagel鈥檚 able writing, I find his arguments to be of inconsistent quality. The essays that explore scientific topics are quite dated and will prove generally unimpressive to anyone familiar with the last few decades of research in experimental psychology, cognitive science and neuroscience. The essay 鈥淧anpsychism,鈥� while containing a few nuggets of good sense, is rife with musings that could pass muster in the 鈥�70s but seem laughable now. There are similar problems with the essays that address sexuality, the relationship between biology and ethics, and the mind-body problem.
The obvious exception is 鈥淲hat Is It Like To Be A Bat?鈥�, which remains a landmark statement of why consciousness is such a difficult subject to wrap our heads around. Nagel focuses on the specificity of what it is like to be various kinds of conscious or semi-conscious entities, as well as the intellectual commitments that follow from accepting consciousness as a gradated and pluralistic phenomenon. Even for those who accept a physicalist/materialist account of consciousness and view internal experience as essentially an illusion (which I do), this essay survives as an apt articulation of thorny questions that still tease us today.
The pieces that really shine in this collection are Nagel鈥檚 existential and sociopolitical critiques. I am especially impressed with the 鈥淭he Absurd,鈥� 鈥淢oral Luck,鈥� and 鈥淭he Policy of Preference.鈥� I shall analyze the first two together since I see them as attacking the same set of intellectual queries, and then discuss the third on its own.
鈥淭he Absurd鈥� is a terrific expansion of the idea that popularized in his classic essay . While Camus posits the absurd as the taunting contrast between the world as we find it and the world as we imagine it might be, Nagel argues that the absurd 鈥渄erives not from a collision between our expectations and the world, but from a collision within ourselves鈥� (17). This collision arises from our understanding of two opposing viewpoints: (1) from an outside perspective, human life is patently meaningless, and (2) from an internal perspective, we cannot help but take ourselves seriously. This is a clever reinterpretation of Camus鈥檚 original conundrum, one that I believe has important consequences for how we should understand free will (or rather, the absence of free will).
Before attempting to cash out that last point, it will be useful to take up Nagel鈥檚 views on 鈥渕oral luck,鈥� which he defines as a situation 鈥淲here a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him鈥s an object of moral judgment鈥� (26). In other words, we become morally lucky if influences outside our control cause events for which we can take (or are granted by others) moral credit, and we become morally unlucky when the opposite is true. Nagel doesn鈥檛 shy away from the weighty implications of this, stating clearly that 鈥渘othing or almost nothing about what a person does seems to be under his control鈥� (26).
Though it would be a stretch to claim that the issue of free will has been settled since this essay was first written, contemporary research generally concords with this conclusion, indicating that what we usually call free will is merely a placeholder for our incomplete understanding of nature鈥檚 causal mechanisms. With a little help from Marvin Minsky, Robert Sapolsky explains:
"The artificial intelligence pioneer Marvin Minsky once defined free will as 'internal forces I do not understand.' People intuitively believe in free will, not just because we have this terrible human need for agency but also because most people know next to nothing about those internal forces鈥ur behaviors are constantly shaped by an array of subterranean forces鈥hat, not that long ago, we didn鈥檛 know existed." ( Behave , 603, 605)
The same is true for external forces that enter into our bodies and become themselves internal, subterranean forces (weather, social relationships, nutrients, etc.). As Nagel puts it:
"As the external determinants of what someone has done are gradually exposed, in their effect on consequences, character, and choice itself, it becomes gradually clear that actions are events and people things. Eventually nothing remains that can be ascribed to the responsible self, and we are left with nothing but a portion of the larger sequence of events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed or praised." (37)
Nagel鈥檚 concept of moral luck is a wonderful and humbling way to accept non-agency, and to generate gratitude for whatever moral luck we come across, knowing surely that we did not cause it and therefore do not deserve it. Taking moral luck seriously also prioritizes compassion when dealing with those who are morally unlucky, etiolating arguments that a morally unlucky person deserves a nasty fate as punishment for having executed a series of bad choices that could have been avoided.
Returning now to the absurd, we can see how moral luck interacts with our adolescent but inescapable need to take ourselves seriously. We long for things to matter gravely and crave recognition for bringing about circumstances that are favorable to us and others. But in reality our lives are meaningless and we are rushing downstream, self-reflective but not -controlled passengers riding an endless current of causality that decides moment to moment what we are and where we go. Nagel鈥檚 description is better:
"That is the main condition of absurdity鈥撯€搕he dragooning of an unconvinced transcendent consciousness into the service of an immanent, limited enterprise like a human life." (22)
So, taking or being given moral credit for actions we are not responsible for (which is every action) is just as absurd as receiving blame for actions we are not responsible for (which is every action). These 鈥渁ctions鈥� are just events, observable transpirings of our dragooned nature, like sunsets or winter storms.
Lest we should conclude that the only available route from here is a descent into jaded skepticism about the possibility goodness or meaning in life, Nagel comes to our rescue:
"Our absurdity warrants neither that much distress nor that much defiance鈥 would argue that absurdity is one of the most human things about us: a manifestation of our most advanced and interesting characteristics. Like skepticism in epistomology, it is possible only because we possess a certain kind of insight鈥撯€搕he capacity to transcend ourselves in thought鈥If] there is no reason to believe that anything matters, then that does not matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with irony instead of heroism or despair." (22-3)
This may seem like an intellectual cop-out to some, but I see it as a genuine 鈥渟olution鈥� to an unsolvable problem. Accepting our inability to resolve the absurdity of our lives, we can fall back on the assurance that there is nothing boring or simplistic about humans and the world that contains us. Despite our many negative capacities, we are also endowed with capacities for discovery, for euphoria, for growth, for love. The significance of these small miracles and our gratitude for their unnecessary existence need not be tarnished by the reality that we did not and cannot choose them, and their ultimate meaninglessness need not contravene their meaningfulness to our little lives in the here and now.
The last essay I鈥檇 like to discuss is one that I wish would rise to public prominence is this time of social and political strife. 鈥淭he Policy of Preference鈥� is a nuanced and smart examination of how we should attempt to ameliorate some of the deepest divisions that threaten civil society. For us Americans, the most obvious of these are our despicable histories of , , and , the consequences of which have been dire and pervasive in our national narrative, even as the worst results of embedded inequity have attenuated over time.
Nagel delves into the difficult question of whether the act of creating a policy of preference such as affirmative action is compatible with justice. His fair conclusion is that such policies are compatible with justice, but Nagel is careful to acknowledge that policies of preference do not always solve the problems they purport to address, and also that their implementation does not come without significant cost:
"When we try to deal with the inequality in advantages that results from a disparity in qualifications (however produced) between races or sexes, we are up against a feature of the system which at every turn exacts costs and presents obstacles in response to attempts to reduce the inequalities. We must face the possibility that the primary injustice with which we have to contend lies in this feature itself, and that some of the worst aspects of what we now perceive as racial or sexual injustice are merely conspicuous manifestations of the great social injustice of differential reward." (96)
By 鈥渄ifferential reward,鈥� Nagel means that human resources are everywhere distributed unfairly due to systems that reward people based on certain qualities (skills, accomplishments, inheritance, nepotism, chance, etc.), each of which is not equally accessible to all members of society. And since any quality that can conceivably bring about a reward obtains solely from moral luck, it becomes clear that any system of differential reward is indefensible. No one deserves anything. The logical next step is to conclude that, in a just society, everyone ought to get a fair piece of what鈥檚 available. The struggle to define and distribute a 鈥渇air piece鈥� to everyone is of course not easy or uncomplicated, but the crucial point is that the project of just distribution need not by necessity focus on any particular group or groups that have been discriminated against (although there is certainly no prohibition against that). All people are potentially vulnerable to injustice and suffering, depending on circumstance; no one has a monopoly on lousy moral luck.
In our hyper-polarized political climate, I cannot over-stress the importance of this unifying view, which overrides superficial differences in identity without denying their contextual importance. Solving injustice is not about obsessing over what people look like or how they act or speak, but rather about identifying societal systems that allow for and perpetuate occurrences of unfair distribution and doing the hard work of remaking those systems with the help of allies who also want a better world. Critically, the details of how this 鈥渂etter world鈥� will be and the language used to describe it need not align perfectly in order for people from different backgrounds and experiences to cooperate in common cause; dogmatism in this regard is a surefire way to kill coalitions that would prove otherwise capable of affecting widespread change.
All of this brings us to a well-trodden truth that is sadly sidelined in much of modern discourse: in order to solve the many problems that ail us, we must rediscover our common humanity and insist on its status as our most important (not the only important) policy of preference. We will get there by privileging our capacities for responsible reasoning, compassionate understanding and fair compromise. In the service of this goal, Nagel cautions against two dangers:
"One is the danger of romantic defeatism, which abandons rational theory because it inevitably leaves many problems unsolved. The other is the danger of exclusionary overrationalization, which bars as irrelevant or empty all considerations that cannot be brought within the scope of a general system admitting explicitly defensible conclusions. This yields skewed results by counting only measurable or otherwise precisely describable factors, even when others are in fact relevant. The alternative is to recognize that the legitimate grounds of decision are extremely various and understood to different degrees鈥he lack of a general theory leads too easily into a false dichotomy: either fall back entirely on the unsystematic intuitive judgment of whoever has to make a decision, or else cook up a unified but artificial system鈥hich will grind out decisions on any problem presented to it." (137, 139)
Our political and social lives are currently riddled with these seductive mentalities. On every issue, we see one side clamoring for the abandonment of reason in service of blind ideology, even as the other zealously applies an oversimplified systemic solution that ignores the true complexity of the problem. Those in the middle must devote ourselves to the calm creation and assiduous defense of common ground.
This review was originally published on my blog, .
April 11, 2022
Since being introduced to Thomas Nagel, I just had to read two of his books in one week. Mortal Questions is a collection of essays from Thomas Nagel that cover a variety of topics such as his classic essays on moral luck and consciousness. Personally, one of my favorite essays from the book was on The Absurd. He also has a bunch of really interesting essays in here on social issues such as equality and how we treat each other. I absolutely love Nagel鈥檚 writing and look forward to reading more.
November 14, 2017
"Moral Luck" and "What is it like to be a bat?" are oft-cited works in other books i've read, which is why i initially bought this collection. I'm tempted to call them classic or canonical works in the field.
"Death", ironically(?) the first essay, was a crucial ingredient in , so i read it 3 times. It also influences my reaction to books such as Jason Shiga's series of graphic novels.
"Subjective and Objective" closes the collection and probably was my favorite. It alludes to the fact that Nagel wants to write a larger piece on the subject, which i'm virtually certain is , a book i've attempted to read more than once, each time with the same pittance of understanding as the previous one. The essay makes me want to give it yet another try even though i'll probably fail yet again. I will try to remember to seek out smarter people than i who have written about the essay and about the book in ways that i can understand so that eventually i'll be capable of translating Nagel's words into something i'll retain.
"The Absurd" opened my eyes to this concept. I'd poo-poohed it as just another nihilism but maybe i finally get what Camus et al were going for.
"Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness" adds to the handful of mind-related essays and books i've read in the past ~18months, especially Parfit's .
"Panpsychism": i was excited to read this one, as i hoped it'd make this concept seem less ridiculous, but i can't recall much. Reading it was like trying to pick up 7 peeled mangoes simultaneously.
All the unnamed essays didn't rise to the level of "interested" for me. Even though several of them were ostensibly about moral philosophy, i just couldn't get into them.
I might be done with philosophy books for the year *sigh* though i really want to officially finish reading (vols 1&2) just to move it onto my list of Great Accomplishments.
"Death", ironically(?) the first essay, was a crucial ingredient in , so i read it 3 times. It also influences my reaction to books such as Jason Shiga's series of graphic novels.
"Subjective and Objective" closes the collection and probably was my favorite. It alludes to the fact that Nagel wants to write a larger piece on the subject, which i'm virtually certain is , a book i've attempted to read more than once, each time with the same pittance of understanding as the previous one. The essay makes me want to give it yet another try even though i'll probably fail yet again. I will try to remember to seek out smarter people than i who have written about the essay and about the book in ways that i can understand so that eventually i'll be capable of translating Nagel's words into something i'll retain.
"The Absurd" opened my eyes to this concept. I'd poo-poohed it as just another nihilism but maybe i finally get what Camus et al were going for.
"Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness" adds to the handful of mind-related essays and books i've read in the past ~18months, especially Parfit's .
"Panpsychism": i was excited to read this one, as i hoped it'd make this concept seem less ridiculous, but i can't recall much. Reading it was like trying to pick up 7 peeled mangoes simultaneously.
All the unnamed essays didn't rise to the level of "interested" for me. Even though several of them were ostensibly about moral philosophy, i just couldn't get into them.
I might be done with philosophy books for the year *sigh* though i really want to officially finish reading (vols 1&2) just to move it onto my list of Great Accomplishments.
January 17, 2010
This was really not my cup of tea. I was expecting it to be more interesting or perhaps relevant to questions that I've had on the subject that I've posed to myself. I would say in general that the book was too dry/technical. I'm the last person who would fault something for being excessive in this way, but somehow Thomas Nagel managed to achieve that criticism from me. It's also possible that this wasn't really meant to be a point of entry to his work or for people unfamiliar with this field of inquiry. In any case, I'll have to read the last couple of essays in the future if I ever determine it's necessary to return.
October 16, 2024
A SERIES OF ESSAYS BY THE WELL-KNOWN PHILOSOPHER
Thomas Nagel (born 1937) is an American philosopher, currently University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. He has written many other books, such as 'What Does It All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy,' 'The View From Nowhere,' 'Equality and Partiality,' 'The Possibility of Altruism,' 'The Last Word,' etc.
[NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 215-page paperback edition.]
He wrote in the Preface to this 1979 book, 鈥淢y own philosophical sympathies and antipathies are easily stated. I believe one should trust problems over solutions, intuition over arguments, and pluralistic discord over systematic harmony. Simplicity and elegance are never reasons to think that a philosophical theory is true: on the contrary, they are usually grounds for thinking it false鈥� It is always reasonable in philosophy to have great respect for the intuitive sense of an unsolved problem, because in philosophy our methods are always themselves in question, and this is one way of being prepared to abandon them at any point.
"What ties these views about philosophical practice together is the assumption that to create understanding, philosophy must CONVINCE. That means it must produce or destroy belief, rather than merely provide us with a consistent set of things to say. And belief, unlike utterance, should not be under the control of the will, however motivated. It should be involuntary.鈥� (Pg. x-xi)
He continues, 鈥淭hese essays鈥� are held together by an interest in the point of view of individual human life and the problem of its relation to more impersonal conceptions of reality鈥� The same concern with the place of subjectivity in an objective world motivates the essays on philosophy of mind鈥� and others. It has been at the center of my interests since I began to think about philosophy, determining the problems I work on and the kind of understanding I want to reach. Some of these essays were written while the United States was engaged in a criminal war, criminally conducted鈥︹€� (Pg. xii)
He suggests, 鈥淕iven the limitations on human action, it is na茂ve to suppose that there is a solution to every moral problem to which the world can face us. We have always known that the world is a bad place. It appears that it may be an evil place as well.鈥� (Pg. 74)
He begins an essay with the statement, 鈥淭he great modern crimes are public crimes鈥� The judgments I am presupposing are controversial: not everyone agrees that American policy during the Vietnam War was criminal. But even those who do think so may find it hard to attach the crimes to the criminals, in virtue of the official role in which they were committed. Few old anti-war demonstrators would feel more than mildly uncomfortable about meeting one of these distinguished figures, unless it was just because we were unaccustomed to personal contact with anyone as powerful as the president of the World Bank.鈥� (Pg. 76)
He asserts, 鈥淚f someone with an income of $2000 a year trains a gun on someone with an income of $100,000 a year and makes him hand over his wallet, that is robbery. If the federal government withholds a portion of the second person鈥檚 salary 鈥� and gives some of it to the first person in the form of welfare payments, food stamps, or free health care, that is taxation. In the first case it is (in my opinion) an impermissible use of coercive means to achieve a worthwhile end. In the second case, the means are legitimate, because they are impersonally imposed by an institution designed to promote certain results. Such general methods of distribution are preferable to theft as a form of private initiative and also to individual charity.鈥� (Pg. 88)
He argues, 鈥淔or a defender of rights, the respects in which each person is inviolable present a direct and independent limit to what any other person may do to him. There is no single combination of viewpoints which yields a common goal for everyone, but each of us must limit our actions to a range that is not unacceptable to anyone else in certain respects. Typically, the range of what may be done because it violates no rights is rather large.鈥� (Pg. 115)
He observes, 鈥淭o look for a single general theory of how to decide the right thing to do is like looking for a single theory of how to decide what to believe. Such progress as we have made in the systematic justification and criticism of beliefs has not come mostly from general principles of reasoning but from the understanding of particular areas, marked out by the different sciences, by history, by mathematics. These vary in exactness, and large areas of belief are left out of the scope of any theory. These must be governed by common sense and ordinary, prescientific reasoning.鈥� (Pg. 135)
In his famous essay, 鈥淲hat is it like to be a bat?鈥�, he points out: 鈥淲ithout consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. The most important and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena is very poorly understood. Most reductionist theories do not even try to explain it. And careful examination will show that no currently available concept of reduction is applicable to it. Perhaps a new theoretical form can be devised for the purpose, but such a solution, if it exists, lies in the distant intellectual future.鈥� (Pg. 166)
This book contains some of Nagel鈥檚 most interesting essays, and will be very helpful for anyone studying his philosophy.
Thomas Nagel (born 1937) is an American philosopher, currently University Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. He has written many other books, such as 'What Does It All Mean?: A Very Short Introduction to Philosophy,' 'The View From Nowhere,' 'Equality and Partiality,' 'The Possibility of Altruism,' 'The Last Word,' etc.
[NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 215-page paperback edition.]
He wrote in the Preface to this 1979 book, 鈥淢y own philosophical sympathies and antipathies are easily stated. I believe one should trust problems over solutions, intuition over arguments, and pluralistic discord over systematic harmony. Simplicity and elegance are never reasons to think that a philosophical theory is true: on the contrary, they are usually grounds for thinking it false鈥� It is always reasonable in philosophy to have great respect for the intuitive sense of an unsolved problem, because in philosophy our methods are always themselves in question, and this is one way of being prepared to abandon them at any point.
"What ties these views about philosophical practice together is the assumption that to create understanding, philosophy must CONVINCE. That means it must produce or destroy belief, rather than merely provide us with a consistent set of things to say. And belief, unlike utterance, should not be under the control of the will, however motivated. It should be involuntary.鈥� (Pg. x-xi)
He continues, 鈥淭hese essays鈥� are held together by an interest in the point of view of individual human life and the problem of its relation to more impersonal conceptions of reality鈥� The same concern with the place of subjectivity in an objective world motivates the essays on philosophy of mind鈥� and others. It has been at the center of my interests since I began to think about philosophy, determining the problems I work on and the kind of understanding I want to reach. Some of these essays were written while the United States was engaged in a criminal war, criminally conducted鈥︹€� (Pg. xii)
He suggests, 鈥淕iven the limitations on human action, it is na茂ve to suppose that there is a solution to every moral problem to which the world can face us. We have always known that the world is a bad place. It appears that it may be an evil place as well.鈥� (Pg. 74)
He begins an essay with the statement, 鈥淭he great modern crimes are public crimes鈥� The judgments I am presupposing are controversial: not everyone agrees that American policy during the Vietnam War was criminal. But even those who do think so may find it hard to attach the crimes to the criminals, in virtue of the official role in which they were committed. Few old anti-war demonstrators would feel more than mildly uncomfortable about meeting one of these distinguished figures, unless it was just because we were unaccustomed to personal contact with anyone as powerful as the president of the World Bank.鈥� (Pg. 76)
He asserts, 鈥淚f someone with an income of $2000 a year trains a gun on someone with an income of $100,000 a year and makes him hand over his wallet, that is robbery. If the federal government withholds a portion of the second person鈥檚 salary 鈥� and gives some of it to the first person in the form of welfare payments, food stamps, or free health care, that is taxation. In the first case it is (in my opinion) an impermissible use of coercive means to achieve a worthwhile end. In the second case, the means are legitimate, because they are impersonally imposed by an institution designed to promote certain results. Such general methods of distribution are preferable to theft as a form of private initiative and also to individual charity.鈥� (Pg. 88)
He argues, 鈥淔or a defender of rights, the respects in which each person is inviolable present a direct and independent limit to what any other person may do to him. There is no single combination of viewpoints which yields a common goal for everyone, but each of us must limit our actions to a range that is not unacceptable to anyone else in certain respects. Typically, the range of what may be done because it violates no rights is rather large.鈥� (Pg. 115)
He observes, 鈥淭o look for a single general theory of how to decide the right thing to do is like looking for a single theory of how to decide what to believe. Such progress as we have made in the systematic justification and criticism of beliefs has not come mostly from general principles of reasoning but from the understanding of particular areas, marked out by the different sciences, by history, by mathematics. These vary in exactness, and large areas of belief are left out of the scope of any theory. These must be governed by common sense and ordinary, prescientific reasoning.鈥� (Pg. 135)
In his famous essay, 鈥淲hat is it like to be a bat?鈥�, he points out: 鈥淲ithout consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless. The most important and characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomena is very poorly understood. Most reductionist theories do not even try to explain it. And careful examination will show that no currently available concept of reduction is applicable to it. Perhaps a new theoretical form can be devised for the purpose, but such a solution, if it exists, lies in the distant intellectual future.鈥� (Pg. 166)
This book contains some of Nagel鈥檚 most interesting essays, and will be very helpful for anyone studying his philosophy.
Read
February 21, 2009Thought provoking philosophical considerations. A bit of a slog to get through, but worth it -- especially if you have someone with whom to discuss the material.
August 14, 2010
One of my favorite philosophy books, covering topics such as animal consciousness, panpsychism, death, value judgments, and others.
maybe-read
November 19, 2010Recommended by Julia Galef on 10/24/10 Rationally Speaking podcast.
August 14, 2019
鬲乇噩賲賴 蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 亘丿.
May 17, 2020
A thought-provoking collection of 14 relatively short (~15 page) essays by philosopher Thomas Nagel focusing on topics like death, consciousness, and ethics. Some of the essays were too arcane for me and are probably only of interest to people who have actually studied philosophy. However, a few of the essays make the collection well worth the price of admission, and even if you aren't going to read the entire collection, I'd suggest reading a few them on their own.
In particular, I'd suggest reading Nagel's essays titled "Death," "The Absurd," and "Moral Luck."
"Death" is an essay about whether or not death in itself is a bad thing. In Nagel's own words: "I want to ask whether death in itself is an evil; and how great an evil, and of what kind, it might be."
An excerpt from this essay that I like:
"Think of how an ordinary individual sweats over his appearance, his health, his sex life, his emotional honesty, his social utility, his self-knowledge, the quality of his ties with family, colleagues, and friends, how well he does his job, whether he understands the world and what is going on in it. Leading a human life is a full-time occupation, to which everyone devotes decades of intense concern."
"The Absurd" is an essay about Camus' concept of the absurdity of life. There is a lot of thought provoking discussion here. For example,
"What we say to convey the absurdity of our lives often has to do with space or time: we are tiny specks in the infinite vastness of the universe; our lives are mere instants even on a geological time scale, let alone a cosmic one; we will all be dead any minute. But of course none of these evident facts can be what makes life absurd, if it is absurd. For suppose we lived for ever; would not a life that is absurd if it lasts seventy years be infinitely absurd if it lasted through eternity? And if our lives are absurd given our present size, why would they be any less absurd if we filled the universe (either because we were larger or because the universe was smaller)? Reflection on our minuteness and brevity appears to be intimately connected with the sense that life is meaningless; but it is not clear what the connection is."
Also, a highlight of this essay is when Nagel calls Camus' conclusions romantic and self-pitying: "Camus 鈥� not on uniformly good grounds 鈥� rejects suicide and the other solutions he regards as escapist. What he recommends is defiance or scorn. We can salvage our dignity, he appears to believe, by shaking a fist at the world which is deaf to our pleas, and continuing to live in spite of it. This will not make our lives un-absurd, but it will lend them a certain nobility. This seems to me romantic and slightly self-pitying. Our absurdity warrants neither that much distress nor that much defiance. At the risk of falling into romanticism by a different route, I would argue that absurdity is one of the most human things about us: a manifestation of our most advanced and interesting characteristics. Like skepticism in epistemology, it is possible only because we possess a certain kind of insight 鈥� the capacity to transcend ourselves in thought. [.....] If there is no reason to believe that anything matters, then that does not matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with irony instead of heroism or despair."
"Moral Luck" is an essay on the concept moral luck, which in itself is a very interesting concept that most would benefit from being exposed to. In Nagel's words, "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck. Such luck can be good or bad." If you're only going to read one of these essays, I think this one would give you the most bang for you buck.
In particular, I'd suggest reading Nagel's essays titled "Death," "The Absurd," and "Moral Luck."
"Death" is an essay about whether or not death in itself is a bad thing. In Nagel's own words: "I want to ask whether death in itself is an evil; and how great an evil, and of what kind, it might be."
An excerpt from this essay that I like:
"Think of how an ordinary individual sweats over his appearance, his health, his sex life, his emotional honesty, his social utility, his self-knowledge, the quality of his ties with family, colleagues, and friends, how well he does his job, whether he understands the world and what is going on in it. Leading a human life is a full-time occupation, to which everyone devotes decades of intense concern."
"The Absurd" is an essay about Camus' concept of the absurdity of life. There is a lot of thought provoking discussion here. For example,
"What we say to convey the absurdity of our lives often has to do with space or time: we are tiny specks in the infinite vastness of the universe; our lives are mere instants even on a geological time scale, let alone a cosmic one; we will all be dead any minute. But of course none of these evident facts can be what makes life absurd, if it is absurd. For suppose we lived for ever; would not a life that is absurd if it lasts seventy years be infinitely absurd if it lasted through eternity? And if our lives are absurd given our present size, why would they be any less absurd if we filled the universe (either because we were larger or because the universe was smaller)? Reflection on our minuteness and brevity appears to be intimately connected with the sense that life is meaningless; but it is not clear what the connection is."
Also, a highlight of this essay is when Nagel calls Camus' conclusions romantic and self-pitying: "Camus 鈥� not on uniformly good grounds 鈥� rejects suicide and the other solutions he regards as escapist. What he recommends is defiance or scorn. We can salvage our dignity, he appears to believe, by shaking a fist at the world which is deaf to our pleas, and continuing to live in spite of it. This will not make our lives un-absurd, but it will lend them a certain nobility. This seems to me romantic and slightly self-pitying. Our absurdity warrants neither that much distress nor that much defiance. At the risk of falling into romanticism by a different route, I would argue that absurdity is one of the most human things about us: a manifestation of our most advanced and interesting characteristics. Like skepticism in epistemology, it is possible only because we possess a certain kind of insight 鈥� the capacity to transcend ourselves in thought. [.....] If there is no reason to believe that anything matters, then that does not matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with irony instead of heroism or despair."
"Moral Luck" is an essay on the concept moral luck, which in itself is a very interesting concept that most would benefit from being exposed to. In Nagel's words, "Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck. Such luck can be good or bad." If you're only going to read one of these essays, I think this one would give you the most bang for you buck.
March 20, 2017
This is a second book by Thomas Nagel I've read, first being "Last Word," which I liked a lot and would recommend to anyone fallen under the influence of postmodern denial of objectivity. "Mortal Questions" didn't disappoint, too. I'd read some of the essays collected here previously and was familiar with some of Nagel's claims, but it was great to go back to these texts and learn firsthand about his philosophy. The interesting thing about this book is that many of the "mortal questions" Nagel poses are approached in a very consistent way but left without conclusive answers. Readers are left to ponder upon the big questions of philosophy and morality.
The book was first published in 1979, the year when I was born. Most of these questions are still unresolved, even though some of Nagel's views are challenged by new developments in neuroscience and other philosophers. Especially convincing criticism can be found in works of Derek Parfit, a brilliant philosopher whose groundbreaking books I can't recommend enough.
I found "Death," the first essay in the book, particularly striking. Obvious as the conclusions may be if you ask pretty much anyone these days, it's interesting to read a philosopher carefully exploring the subject and proving why death is actually a bad thing.
"Absurd," a second essay explores the meaning of life, its minuteness and brevity. Here Nagel reiterates some of the ideas expressed by existentialists, this part of the book might seem to be less original for that reason. But Nagel's position is well-argued.
The third essay, "Moral Luck," is a must read. I think everyone should read it or, at least, be aware of what moral luck was. Here's a Wikipedia article about it: .
There are other interesting essays in this book. For instance, "War and Massacre" collides utilitarian ethics with absolutism, "Ruthlessness in Public Life" explores the challenges of public and individual morality, "Equality" summarizes the problems of achieving equality and how it comes into conflict with utility and rights, "Panpsychism" challenges panpsychism (the view that consciousness, mind or soul is a universal and primordial feature of all things.
Nagel's controversial and often quoted "What is it like to be a bat?" shouldn't be missed by anyone interested in consciousness. The preceding chapter "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness" is another interesting piece, but somewhat outdated, I think.
"Subjective and Objective" is the concluding chapter and one of the strongest, in my opinion. This is where we get to the problem of opposition between subjective and objective points of view. We should aim for objectivity, but this is a hard nut to crack. As Nagel claims, "Even on a consequentialist view, what one should do will depend on what one is in a position to do, and on the relative desirability of the possible outcomes. Nevertheless, the consequentialist judgment that one should do something is essentially the judgment that it would be best if one did it - that it ought to happen . The right thing to do is to turn oneself as far as possible into an instrument for the realization of what is best sub specie aeternitatis." But "life is always the life of a particular person, and cannot be lived sub specie aeternitatis." The coexistence of these conflicting points of view (objective and subjective) is not just a practically necessary illusion but an irreducible fact of life, Nagel concludes. Nagel explores this topic further in his following book "View from Nowhere."
I like Nagel's early writings. However, I find some of his claims made here and elsewhere dubious. But then most of us never come to think about these challenging questions, let alone attempt to answer them.
The book was first published in 1979, the year when I was born. Most of these questions are still unresolved, even though some of Nagel's views are challenged by new developments in neuroscience and other philosophers. Especially convincing criticism can be found in works of Derek Parfit, a brilliant philosopher whose groundbreaking books I can't recommend enough.
I found "Death," the first essay in the book, particularly striking. Obvious as the conclusions may be if you ask pretty much anyone these days, it's interesting to read a philosopher carefully exploring the subject and proving why death is actually a bad thing.
"Absurd," a second essay explores the meaning of life, its minuteness and brevity. Here Nagel reiterates some of the ideas expressed by existentialists, this part of the book might seem to be less original for that reason. But Nagel's position is well-argued.
The third essay, "Moral Luck," is a must read. I think everyone should read it or, at least, be aware of what moral luck was. Here's a Wikipedia article about it: .
There are other interesting essays in this book. For instance, "War and Massacre" collides utilitarian ethics with absolutism, "Ruthlessness in Public Life" explores the challenges of public and individual morality, "Equality" summarizes the problems of achieving equality and how it comes into conflict with utility and rights, "Panpsychism" challenges panpsychism (the view that consciousness, mind or soul is a universal and primordial feature of all things.
Nagel's controversial and often quoted "What is it like to be a bat?" shouldn't be missed by anyone interested in consciousness. The preceding chapter "Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness" is another interesting piece, but somewhat outdated, I think.
"Subjective and Objective" is the concluding chapter and one of the strongest, in my opinion. This is where we get to the problem of opposition between subjective and objective points of view. We should aim for objectivity, but this is a hard nut to crack. As Nagel claims, "Even on a consequentialist view, what one should do will depend on what one is in a position to do, and on the relative desirability of the possible outcomes. Nevertheless, the consequentialist judgment that one should do something is essentially the judgment that it would be best if one did it - that it ought to happen . The right thing to do is to turn oneself as far as possible into an instrument for the realization of what is best sub specie aeternitatis." But "life is always the life of a particular person, and cannot be lived sub specie aeternitatis." The coexistence of these conflicting points of view (objective and subjective) is not just a practically necessary illusion but an irreducible fact of life, Nagel concludes. Nagel explores this topic further in his following book "View from Nowhere."
I like Nagel's early writings. However, I find some of his claims made here and elsewhere dubious. But then most of us never come to think about these challenging questions, let alone attempt to answer them.
February 26, 2024
I actually expected NOT to like this book.
I read some Nagel while in college long, long ago. A very short book, and then his article on death, which is actually the first essay in this collection. I don't remember how I felt about the short book, which means I probably didn't have much of a reaction one way or the other. I thought the article on death was awful.
I recently read another book that referenced Nagel repeatedly. I didn't like that book, either, and the references to Nagel were typically in support of arguments that I thought were weak. But I wanted to refresh myself, so I picked up a copy of this book at the used book shop.
I started off with a very critical, skeptical mind.
The first article, the one on death, was exactly like I remembered it from 30 or so years ago. Weak. Irritating.
I kept reading, had my pencil out to underline all the awful arguments in each chapter, but as I went going the essays actually got better. I found myself drawn into a number of them. Some I agreed with, some had me looking at things in different ways, some I thought were a little off base but they were still quite interesting.
I was very pleasantly surprised.
The collection covers a variety of philosophical questions, mostly around ethics and theories of mind/consciousness.
The ethical stuff was a lot of fun to read. He presents a sort of utilitarianism combined with other ethical theories, "guard rails" of a type, which I found fascinating.
The mind stuff was extremely interesting.
The writing is often dry. Academic writing for journals. I hate that. The really great philosophers didn't write for journals, they didn't use jargon and formulas to win praise from peers, they wrote for people. But I get it, he's stuck with it, and he manages to present good ideas in spite of the numbness of the writing style.
My only other real criticism is his tendency to view white, Western, European thought as the default thinking on any subject. This stuff was written in the late 60s and throughout the 70s and so I understand that thinking was a bit different, but it's disappointing to see him write on subjects like death or mind or ethics and make general statements as to how "people" conceive of these things without seeming to realize that there are long, rich traditions that have looked at these topics very differently and have a lot to say. His sense that "nonexistence" has always been understood by humans as an evil is funny, given thousands of years of Buddhism striving toward getting off the wheel of existence and such. His writing would be richer if he was informed a bit by other perspectives. And it's not like those perspectives weren't starting to spill into the mainstream by the 60s and 70s.
Still, good book, very glad that I revisited his work.
I read some Nagel while in college long, long ago. A very short book, and then his article on death, which is actually the first essay in this collection. I don't remember how I felt about the short book, which means I probably didn't have much of a reaction one way or the other. I thought the article on death was awful.
I recently read another book that referenced Nagel repeatedly. I didn't like that book, either, and the references to Nagel were typically in support of arguments that I thought were weak. But I wanted to refresh myself, so I picked up a copy of this book at the used book shop.
I started off with a very critical, skeptical mind.
The first article, the one on death, was exactly like I remembered it from 30 or so years ago. Weak. Irritating.
I kept reading, had my pencil out to underline all the awful arguments in each chapter, but as I went going the essays actually got better. I found myself drawn into a number of them. Some I agreed with, some had me looking at things in different ways, some I thought were a little off base but they were still quite interesting.
I was very pleasantly surprised.
The collection covers a variety of philosophical questions, mostly around ethics and theories of mind/consciousness.
The ethical stuff was a lot of fun to read. He presents a sort of utilitarianism combined with other ethical theories, "guard rails" of a type, which I found fascinating.
The mind stuff was extremely interesting.
The writing is often dry. Academic writing for journals. I hate that. The really great philosophers didn't write for journals, they didn't use jargon and formulas to win praise from peers, they wrote for people. But I get it, he's stuck with it, and he manages to present good ideas in spite of the numbness of the writing style.
My only other real criticism is his tendency to view white, Western, European thought as the default thinking on any subject. This stuff was written in the late 60s and throughout the 70s and so I understand that thinking was a bit different, but it's disappointing to see him write on subjects like death or mind or ethics and make general statements as to how "people" conceive of these things without seeming to realize that there are long, rich traditions that have looked at these topics very differently and have a lot to say. His sense that "nonexistence" has always been understood by humans as an evil is funny, given thousands of years of Buddhism striving toward getting off the wheel of existence and such. His writing would be richer if he was informed a bit by other perspectives. And it's not like those perspectives weren't starting to spill into the mainstream by the 60s and 70s.
Still, good book, very glad that I revisited his work.
November 4, 2024
3/5, Wasn鈥檛 For Me.
Mortal Questions was definitely interesting, but not my type of read. If you are looking to get into Philosophy, I wouldn鈥檛 recommend it, which is where I found myself when I bought the book. The author, Thomas Nagel, uses unfamiliar words and phrases like 鈥渆galitarianism鈥�, 鈥渁bsolutist positions鈥�, and 鈥渕eritocratic conception鈥� with no context or introduction, only with the expectation that you are already familiar with this vocabulary. From the use of speech like these (and many more for that matter), I鈥檓 near certain that this is, by no means, an entry level philosophy book. If you have read entry level philosophic readings before and you are looking to challenge yourself, this might be for you. Mortal Questions will make you question sexuality, absurdity, and equality. If you are just getting into philosophy, I鈥檇 recommend Simon Blackburn's Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy, because it鈥檚 more beginner friendly and still dives deep into human essential questions. Nagel鈥檚 writing style was quite difficult to understand for me, and after speaking to others who have read this book for themselves, I've learned that they found it challenging as well. I felt as if I zoned out every other paragraph because of the complicated wording, which had me frustratingly rereading paragraphs over and over. However, there were definitely some parts I understood quite well, and were overwhelmingly interesting. For example, I felt passionately about his essay towards corruption in the national government. Nagel believed that politicians and police become corrupt after they鈥檙e granted power due to the self realization that they're at the top of the chain of command. He stated that they鈥檙e almost never held accountable, from ancient times to modern. That immediately made me wonder what inhumane crimes presidents, kings, and other leaders have committed just 鈥榖ecause they can鈥� and received no backlash for. Mortal Questions is full of ideas that will make you wonder, but they鈥檙e phrased in ways that are confusing, wordy, and challenging.
Mortal Questions was definitely interesting, but not my type of read. If you are looking to get into Philosophy, I wouldn鈥檛 recommend it, which is where I found myself when I bought the book. The author, Thomas Nagel, uses unfamiliar words and phrases like 鈥渆galitarianism鈥�, 鈥渁bsolutist positions鈥�, and 鈥渕eritocratic conception鈥� with no context or introduction, only with the expectation that you are already familiar with this vocabulary. From the use of speech like these (and many more for that matter), I鈥檓 near certain that this is, by no means, an entry level philosophy book. If you have read entry level philosophic readings before and you are looking to challenge yourself, this might be for you. Mortal Questions will make you question sexuality, absurdity, and equality. If you are just getting into philosophy, I鈥檇 recommend Simon Blackburn's Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy, because it鈥檚 more beginner friendly and still dives deep into human essential questions. Nagel鈥檚 writing style was quite difficult to understand for me, and after speaking to others who have read this book for themselves, I've learned that they found it challenging as well. I felt as if I zoned out every other paragraph because of the complicated wording, which had me frustratingly rereading paragraphs over and over. However, there were definitely some parts I understood quite well, and were overwhelmingly interesting. For example, I felt passionately about his essay towards corruption in the national government. Nagel believed that politicians and police become corrupt after they鈥檙e granted power due to the self realization that they're at the top of the chain of command. He stated that they鈥檙e almost never held accountable, from ancient times to modern. That immediately made me wonder what inhumane crimes presidents, kings, and other leaders have committed just 鈥榖ecause they can鈥� and received no backlash for. Mortal Questions is full of ideas that will make you wonder, but they鈥檙e phrased in ways that are confusing, wordy, and challenging.
November 4, 2024
Consciousness and its heaviness.
鈥淚f there is no limit to the amount of life that it would be good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in store for us all.鈥� Daily living, for any sentient person, comes with grappling with the heaviness of existence, morality, and consciousness. These overwhelming thoughts hold the very question of what it means to be human. Thomas Nagel鈥檚 Mortal Questions invites the reader on a philosophical journey that confronts these weights with clarity and insight. It references moral absolutism and its significance in our daily lives, as well as purity. Nagel says a lot of bold statements that he hones in on, like meaning is a phenomenon. This book delves into the complexities of our existence as a whole, as well as tackling niche, individualist questions. I would recommend this book to anyone who鈥檚 stuck in their own head, or struggling with derealization relating to their own consciousness. It illuminates the community and complexities within our nature, when it comes to death, social dynamics, and illusionary comforts or aspects of life. The small, unconscious moments building your most intimate moments are intricately highlighted. It causes the reader to question their own deep rooted biases that they themselves might not even be aware of. In accordance with that, Nagel deconstructs and analyzes sexual perversions. It is a hard read, for people who aren鈥檛 already familiar with or consumed into a philosophical way of thinking. On top of these mind dissecting confrontations, it also weighs in on political corruption and the cycles of abuse. Specifically, the repetition in history of the most devastating acts of violence occurs in public. This book truly makes you reflect on your ethical values, deepest structural points, judgements, and be aware of your behavior鈥檚 implications. Overall, I truly enjoyed the book, and the food for thought it provided me.
鈥淚f there is no limit to the amount of life that it would be good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in store for us all.鈥� Daily living, for any sentient person, comes with grappling with the heaviness of existence, morality, and consciousness. These overwhelming thoughts hold the very question of what it means to be human. Thomas Nagel鈥檚 Mortal Questions invites the reader on a philosophical journey that confronts these weights with clarity and insight. It references moral absolutism and its significance in our daily lives, as well as purity. Nagel says a lot of bold statements that he hones in on, like meaning is a phenomenon. This book delves into the complexities of our existence as a whole, as well as tackling niche, individualist questions. I would recommend this book to anyone who鈥檚 stuck in their own head, or struggling with derealization relating to their own consciousness. It illuminates the community and complexities within our nature, when it comes to death, social dynamics, and illusionary comforts or aspects of life. The small, unconscious moments building your most intimate moments are intricately highlighted. It causes the reader to question their own deep rooted biases that they themselves might not even be aware of. In accordance with that, Nagel deconstructs and analyzes sexual perversions. It is a hard read, for people who aren鈥檛 already familiar with or consumed into a philosophical way of thinking. On top of these mind dissecting confrontations, it also weighs in on political corruption and the cycles of abuse. Specifically, the repetition in history of the most devastating acts of violence occurs in public. This book truly makes you reflect on your ethical values, deepest structural points, judgements, and be aware of your behavior鈥檚 implications. Overall, I truly enjoyed the book, and the food for thought it provided me.
January 4, 2021
Mortal Questions, if I understand correctly, is more a series of works than it is a work in itself, and this is apparent both in its subject matter and in its wildly unequal quality. Nagel's discussion of such topics as Death and morality are incredible, but he has an entire thing about why affirmative action is obviously bad but not like, so bad, and it's weird to read such a dumb take next to so many thoughtful ones.
What's really cool about Nagel though (and the reason my philosophy book club* chose to read it) is that Nagel is very good about his references to other philosophers. Whereas the writing of Simone De Beauvoir might be incomprehensible to someone not already versed in existentialism, each page littered with references to obscure things said by her boyfriend, Nagel is very careful in where he includes the works of other philosophers, only doing so when he believes that their ideas are important to the topic and relevant to his own. He takes great care to explain why he uses each reference, and explains what the original writer meant and picks highly evocative quotations for each. A particular quote by Sartre on Sexuality made me really regret being on a plane, one of the few locations where I couldn't go and download that Sartre book and start reading the rest of it immediately. Nagel rocks, and this book rocks. I originally rated this book 4 stars because of the sections of it that are pretty bad, but I have amended this to 5 stars because those parts that are good are so good that they elevate the whole thing. There were parts of my wedding day where I was just standing around waiting but that doesn't mean it wasn't a perfect day for me.
*I have a philosophy book club, as we all do, because I am very cool, as we all are.
What's really cool about Nagel though (and the reason my philosophy book club* chose to read it) is that Nagel is very good about his references to other philosophers. Whereas the writing of Simone De Beauvoir might be incomprehensible to someone not already versed in existentialism, each page littered with references to obscure things said by her boyfriend, Nagel is very careful in where he includes the works of other philosophers, only doing so when he believes that their ideas are important to the topic and relevant to his own. He takes great care to explain why he uses each reference, and explains what the original writer meant and picks highly evocative quotations for each. A particular quote by Sartre on Sexuality made me really regret being on a plane, one of the few locations where I couldn't go and download that Sartre book and start reading the rest of it immediately. Nagel rocks, and this book rocks. I originally rated this book 4 stars because of the sections of it that are pretty bad, but I have amended this to 5 stars because those parts that are good are so good that they elevate the whole thing. There were parts of my wedding day where I was just standing around waiting but that doesn't mean it wasn't a perfect day for me.
*I have a philosophy book club, as we all do, because I am very cool, as we all are.
November 3, 2024
I found Mortal Questions by Thomas Nagel to be a very interesting and overall good book. I recommend this book only to people who are either situated to philosophical books or are looking for a challenging read. Even though I was neither situated with philosophical books nor a super challenging read, I still enjoyed this a decent amount, even though it was more difficult to comprehend.
This book starts straight into the action of big hard-to-understand words and concepts, that I had to take a second, look up, and learn. It also is a big combination of essays, which even though chosen by Nagel, were not necessarily written by him. The fact that it鈥檚 mostly a ton of essays makes it seem choppy and in some cases sectional, which I didn鈥檛 have a problem within the sense that it breaks up the chapters into even smaller sections.
Thomas Nagel is also one of the only, if not the only, philosophical authors who regard death as just a bad thing. Most philosophical authors don't refer to it as the ultimate end, therefore making it seem less bad. Honestly, most of the topics that he talked about that I had a decent understanding of, I seemed to enjoy, and he covered some really interesting and great points/topics.
My friends and I were trying to find a philosophical book (not my idea) for a school project, and I came across this. Even though it was a more difficult book, I鈥檓 glad we chose it for our project. It discussed topics like equality, death, war, morals, and ethics and even discussed sexual desire.
Overall this book is heavily philosophical and throws really big words at you, but even then I enjoyed the read and would 100% recommend this book to people looking for a challenging philosophical book, or people who are situated in philosophy.
This book starts straight into the action of big hard-to-understand words and concepts, that I had to take a second, look up, and learn. It also is a big combination of essays, which even though chosen by Nagel, were not necessarily written by him. The fact that it鈥檚 mostly a ton of essays makes it seem choppy and in some cases sectional, which I didn鈥檛 have a problem within the sense that it breaks up the chapters into even smaller sections.
Thomas Nagel is also one of the only, if not the only, philosophical authors who regard death as just a bad thing. Most philosophical authors don't refer to it as the ultimate end, therefore making it seem less bad. Honestly, most of the topics that he talked about that I had a decent understanding of, I seemed to enjoy, and he covered some really interesting and great points/topics.
My friends and I were trying to find a philosophical book (not my idea) for a school project, and I came across this. Even though it was a more difficult book, I鈥檓 glad we chose it for our project. It discussed topics like equality, death, war, morals, and ethics and even discussed sexual desire.
Overall this book is heavily philosophical and throws really big words at you, but even then I enjoyed the read and would 100% recommend this book to people looking for a challenging philosophical book, or people who are situated in philosophy.
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