What do you think?
Rate this book
鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷
賰賷賮 鬲亘乇賾乇 丕賱丨乇賰丕鬲 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲賷丞 丕賱賲毓丕氐乇丞 賳卮丕胤賴丕 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷責 賲丕 賴賷 丕賱丕賳賯胤丕毓丕鬲 賵丕賱丕爻鬲賲乇丕乇丕鬲 賮賷 禺胤丕亘丕鬲賴丕 賵賳氐賵氐賴丕 賯賷丕爻丕賸 廿賱賶 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱鬲賯賱賷丿賷責 賵賲丕 丕賱兀爻亘丕亘 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷丞 賱賱賳噩丕丨 丕賱馗丕賴乇賷 賱賴匕賴 丕賱丨乇賰丕鬲責
賱賷爻 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺賷 兀賵 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱丿賷賳賷貙 賮賷 賯丿乇鬲賴 毓賱賶 丕賱丕賳丿乇丕噩 賮賷 丕賱兀賳馗賲丞 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱丨丿賷孬丞. 丕賱賲胤乇賵丨 賴賵 丕賱丨乇賰丕鬲 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲賷丞 丕賱賲毓丕氐乇丞 賵賲丕 鬲賯賵賱賴 毓賳 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱匕賷 賷賮鬲乇囟 亘賴 鬲亘乇賷乇 賳卮丕胤賴丕.
賷乇賶 丕賱賲丐賱賾賮 兀賳 丕賱賲乇亍 賱丕 賷爻鬲胤賷毓 兀賳 賷禺賮賷 廿禺賮丕賯 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷貙 賵賯丿 鬲乇賰 丕賱廿禺賮丕賯 亘氐賲丕鬲賴 毓賱賶 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賵丕賳毓賰爻 毓亘乇 丕賱囟丨丕賱丞 丕賱孬賯丕賮賷丞 賱賱賲卮乇賵毓 賳賮爻賴. 賵賴匕丕 賱丕 賷毓賳賷 毓丿賲 丕賱賯丿乇丞 毓賱賶 丕賱賵氐賵賱 廿賱賶 丕賱爻賱胤丞貙 賱賰賳賴 賷賮鬲乇囟 毓噩夭 丕賱丨乇賰丕鬲 丕賱兀氐賵賱賷丞 毓賳 廿賳卮丕亍 賲噩鬲賲毓 噩丿賷丿.
賱賷爻 賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺賷 兀賵 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱丿賷賳賷貙 賮賷 賯丿乇鬲賴 毓賱賶 丕賱丕賳丿乇丕噩 賮賷 丕賱兀賳馗賲丞 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕賱丨丿賷孬丞. 丕賱賲胤乇賵丨 賴賵 丕賱丨乇賰丕鬲 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲賷丞 丕賱賲毓丕氐乇丞 賵賲丕 鬲賯賵賱賴 毓賳 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱匕賷 賷賮鬲乇囟 亘賴 鬲亘乇賷乇 賳卮丕胤賴丕.
賷乇賶 丕賱賲丐賱賾賮 兀賳 丕賱賲乇亍 賱丕 賷爻鬲胤賷毓 兀賳 賷禺賮賷 廿禺賮丕賯 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷貙 賵賯丿 鬲乇賰 丕賱廿禺賮丕賯 亘氐賲丕鬲賴 毓賱賶 丕賱賵丕賯毓 賵丕賳毓賰爻 毓亘乇 丕賱囟丨丕賱丞 丕賱孬賯丕賮賷丞 賱賱賲卮乇賵毓 賳賮爻賴. 賵賴匕丕 賱丕 賷毓賳賷 毓丿賲 丕賱賯丿乇丞 毓賱賶 丕賱賵氐賵賱 廿賱賶 丕賱爻賱胤丞貙 賱賰賳賴 賷賮鬲乇囟 毓噩夭 丕賱丨乇賰丕鬲 丕賱兀氐賵賱賷丞 毓賳 廿賳卮丕亍 賲噩鬲賲毓 噩丿賷丿.
213 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1992
29 people are currently reading
1376 people want to read
About the author
Olivier Roy
85听books194听followersA professor at the European University Institute in Florence (Italy); he was previously a research director at the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and a lecturer for both the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS) and the Institut d'脡tudes Politiques de Paris (IEP).
From 1984 to 2008, he has acted as a consultant to the French Foreign Ministry.
In 1988, Roy served as a United Nations Office for Coordinating Relief in Afghanistan (UNOCA) consultant.
Beginning in August 1993, Roy served as special OSCE representative to Tajikistan until February 1994, at which time he was selected as head of the OSCE mission to Tajikistan, a position he held until October 1994.
Roy received an "Agr茅gation" in Philosophy and a Master's in Persian language and civilization in 1972 from the French Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales.
In 1996, he received his PhD in Political Science from the IEP.
Roy is the author of numerous books on subjects including Iran, Islam, Asian politics. These works include Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah, Today's Turkey: A European State? and The Illusions of September 11.
He also serves on the editorial board of the academic journal Central Asian Survey.
His best-known book, L'Echec de l'Islam politique; The Failure of Political Islam. It is a standard text for students of political Islam.
Roy wrote widely on the subject of the 2005 civil unrest in France saying they should not be seen as religiously inspired as some commentators said.
His most recent work is Secularism Confronts Islam (Columbia, 2007). The book offers a perspective on the place of Islam in secular society and looks at the diverse experiences of Muslim immigrants in the West. Roy examines how Muslim intellectuals have made it possible for Muslims to live in a secularized world while maintaining the identity of a "true believer."
From 1984 to 2008, he has acted as a consultant to the French Foreign Ministry.
In 1988, Roy served as a United Nations Office for Coordinating Relief in Afghanistan (UNOCA) consultant.
Beginning in August 1993, Roy served as special OSCE representative to Tajikistan until February 1994, at which time he was selected as head of the OSCE mission to Tajikistan, a position he held until October 1994.
Roy received an "Agr茅gation" in Philosophy and a Master's in Persian language and civilization in 1972 from the French Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales.
In 1996, he received his PhD in Political Science from the IEP.
Roy is the author of numerous books on subjects including Iran, Islam, Asian politics. These works include Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah, Today's Turkey: A European State? and The Illusions of September 11.
He also serves on the editorial board of the academic journal Central Asian Survey.
His best-known book, L'Echec de l'Islam politique; The Failure of Political Islam. It is a standard text for students of political Islam.
Roy wrote widely on the subject of the 2005 civil unrest in France saying they should not be seen as religiously inspired as some commentators said.
His most recent work is Secularism Confronts Islam (Columbia, 2007). The book offers a perspective on the place of Islam in secular society and looks at the diverse experiences of Muslim immigrants in the West. Roy examines how Muslim intellectuals have made it possible for Muslims to live in a secularized world while maintaining the identity of a "true believer."
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
January 29, 2011
The one review of this book on this site does not do it justice. Hence, this is my take: This book is perhaps the best statement and explanation on why Islamism as a political tool has failed miserably. Far from being rooted in the Islamic scholarly tradition, political Islam is a reactionary movement whose ideological philosophy is rooted in Marxism and the violent revolutionary program that gave so much expression to the Independence Movements during the 50s, 60s and 70s. Though I do not agree with 100% of Olivier Roy's conclusions, the book nonetheless is a must read for anyone interested in global politics and the role that Islam is blamed for playing in global terrorism. Far from being the consequences of the teachings of a 7th century Prophet (Allah bless him and give him peace), it is more of a case of chickens and roosting. Daniel Pipes hates the book. That has to count for something... The fact that critics of the book cannot see how September 11th proves the authors thesis only demonstrates that when people have made up their minds, facts mean absolutely nothing. I would highly recommend that this book be read in conjunction with Imperial Hubris and War at the Top of the World. I am a Muslim and I do not disagree with the author. Not all Orientalists are bad.
September 6, 2022
丕賱賲噩鬲賲毓 丕賱賲鬲夭賲鬲 賮賷 夭賲賳 丕賱丨丿丕孬丞 賵丕賱鬲賰賳賵賱賵噩賷丕
賷賵丕噩賴 賮氐丕賲丕 賮賷 丕賱禺丕乇噩 賵丕賱丿丕禺賱
噩賷丿 賵賵丕賯毓賷
賱賵賱丕 丕賱鬲乇噩賲丞
賷賵丕噩賴 賮氐丕賲丕 賮賷 丕賱禺丕乇噩 賵丕賱丿丕禺賱
噩賷丿 賵賵丕賯毓賷
賱賵賱丕 丕賱鬲乇噩賲丞
July 30, 2016
兀賷 賴乇丕亍 丕爻鬲卮乇丕賯賷 賴匕丕責!
爻胤丨賷丞 賮賷 丕賱鬲丨賱賷賱 賵 囟毓賮 賮賷 丕賱乇丐賷丞 賵 賲丨丕賵賱丞 丕爻鬲賳胤丕賯 賵丕賯毓 賲鬲禺賷賱貙賰賱 賴匕丕 賵 兀賰孬乇 賷丿賮毓賳賷 賱丕爻賯丕胤 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲賳 賰賵賳賴 賲乇噩毓 賱賳賯丿 賮毓賱賷 賱鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱丕爻賱丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 貙丕賱鬲賷 賷乇丕賴丕 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賮丕卮賱丞 亘賳丕亍 毓賱賶 賲毓胤賷丕鬲 賵丕賯毓賴丕 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 賵 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷 賵 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 丨鬲賶 毓丕賲 1991 賲賵毓丿 氐丿賵乇 丕賱賰鬲丕亘貙丕賱賵丕賯毓 丕賱賲鬲禺賷賱 丕賱匕賷 賷賳胤賱賯 賲賳賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 丕賱賲爻鬲卮乇賯 丕賵賱賷賮賷賷賴 乇賵丕 賵 丕賱匕賷 賲賰孬 賮鬲乇丞 賱丕 亘兀爻 亘賴丕 賮賷 丕賮睾丕賳爻鬲丕賳貙噩毓賱賴 賷爻鬲卮乇賯 賲爻鬲賯亘賱丕 賲鬲賵丕囟毓丕 賱賱爻賱賮賷丞 丕賱氐丕毓丿丞 丕賱鬲賷 賳賮賶 毓賳賴丕 兀賷 丕賲賰丕賳賷丞 賱鬲丨賵賱 孬賵乇賷貙賵 賴賵 賲丕 丨丿孬 毓賰爻賴 鬲賲丕賲丕 賰賲丕 賳卮丕賴丿 丕賱賷賵賲 賲賳 鬲丨賵賱 丕賱爻賱賮賷丞 賱亘丐乇丞 鬲氐丿賷乇 賱賱鬲賷丕乇丕鬲 丕賱乇丕丿賷賰丕賱賷丞 丕賱孬賵乇賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 睾賷乇鬲 噩夭亍丕 賲賳 丕賱賵丕賯毓 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 賵 丕賱丿賷賲賵睾乇丕賮賷 賵 丨鬲賶 丕賱噩睾乇丕賮賷 賱賱卮乇賯 丕賱兀賵爻胤 毓賰爻 賲丕 鬲賳亘卅 亘賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賲賳胤賱賯丕 賲賳 鬲丨賱賷賱賴 丕賱毓亘孬賷 賱賱鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱爻賱賮賷丞.
丕賱賳賯丿 丕賱丕毓鬲亘丕胤賷 賱賱賰丕鬲亘 噩毓賱賴 賷鬲氐賵乇 丕賷乇丕賳 鬲鬲噩賴 賱賳賲胤 毓賱賲丕賳賷 丨鬲賶 賮賷 馗賱 賵噩賵丿 丕賱賲乇噩毓賷丕鬲 丕賱卮賷毓賷丞貙賵 賴賵 賲丕 噩毓賱賴 賷毓噩亘 亘鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱孬賵乇丞 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷丞 賮賷 鬲丨賵賱丕鬲賴丕 氐賵亘 卮賰賱 孬賷賵賯乇丕胤賷 禺賮賷 毓賳 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賵丨丿賴! 丨鬲賶 丕賱賳賯丿 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 丕賱匕賷 胤乇丨賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賱丨乇賰丕鬲 丕賱丕爻賱丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 賰丕賳 賯丕氐乇丕 賵 賲賳丨氐乇丕 丕賱賶 丨丿 亘毓賷丿 亘賲賵丕囟賷毓 丕賱賲氐丕乇賮 丕賱丕爻賱丕賲賷丞 賵 丕賱鬲賯賵賶 賮賷 丕賱鬲毓丕賲賱丕鬲 賵 丕賱鬲賷 兀爻亘睾賴丕 毓賱賶 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賲賳 兀亘賵丕亘 賳賯丿賴 賱賴匕賴 丕賱丨乇賰丕鬲貙賵 賴賵 賲丕 噩毓賱賴 賷鬲胤乇賯 賱賱丕禺賵丕賳 丕賱賲爻賱賲賷賳 賲孬賱丕 賰噩賲丕毓丞 丿賵賳 丨夭亘賷丞 賱丕 鬲賲鬲賱賰 賯丿乇丕鬲 鬲賳馗賷賲賷丞 鬲賲賰賳賴丕 賲賳 賲噩丕乇丕丞 丕賱賵丕賯毓 丕賱賵胤賳賷 賮賷 亘賱丿丕賳賴丕 毓賱賶 丕賱毓賰爻 鬲賲丕賲丕 賲賲丕 丨氐賱 亘丕賱胤亘毓!
爻胤丨賷丞 賮賷 丕賱鬲丨賱賷賱 賵 囟毓賮 賮賷 丕賱乇丐賷丞 賵 賲丨丕賵賱丞 丕爻鬲賳胤丕賯 賵丕賯毓 賲鬲禺賷賱貙賰賱 賴匕丕 賵 兀賰孬乇 賷丿賮毓賳賷 賱丕爻賯丕胤 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲賳 賰賵賳賴 賲乇噩毓 賱賳賯丿 賮毓賱賷 賱鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱丕爻賱丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 貙丕賱鬲賷 賷乇丕賴丕 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賮丕卮賱丞 亘賳丕亍 毓賱賶 賲毓胤賷丕鬲 賵丕賯毓賴丕 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 賵 丕賱丕噩鬲賲丕毓賷 賵 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 丨鬲賶 毓丕賲 1991 賲賵毓丿 氐丿賵乇 丕賱賰鬲丕亘貙丕賱賵丕賯毓 丕賱賲鬲禺賷賱 丕賱匕賷 賷賳胤賱賯 賲賳賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 丕賱賲爻鬲卮乇賯 丕賵賱賷賮賷賷賴 乇賵丕 賵 丕賱匕賷 賲賰孬 賮鬲乇丞 賱丕 亘兀爻 亘賴丕 賮賷 丕賮睾丕賳爻鬲丕賳貙噩毓賱賴 賷爻鬲卮乇賯 賲爻鬲賯亘賱丕 賲鬲賵丕囟毓丕 賱賱爻賱賮賷丞 丕賱氐丕毓丿丞 丕賱鬲賷 賳賮賶 毓賳賴丕 兀賷 丕賲賰丕賳賷丞 賱鬲丨賵賱 孬賵乇賷貙賵 賴賵 賲丕 丨丿孬 毓賰爻賴 鬲賲丕賲丕 賰賲丕 賳卮丕賴丿 丕賱賷賵賲 賲賳 鬲丨賵賱 丕賱爻賱賮賷丞 賱亘丐乇丞 鬲氐丿賷乇 賱賱鬲賷丕乇丕鬲 丕賱乇丕丿賷賰丕賱賷丞 丕賱孬賵乇賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 睾賷乇鬲 噩夭亍丕 賲賳 丕賱賵丕賯毓 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 賵 丕賱丿賷賲賵睾乇丕賮賷 賵 丨鬲賶 丕賱噩睾乇丕賮賷 賱賱卮乇賯 丕賱兀賵爻胤 毓賰爻 賲丕 鬲賳亘卅 亘賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賲賳胤賱賯丕 賲賳 鬲丨賱賷賱賴 丕賱毓亘孬賷 賱賱鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱爻賱賮賷丞.
丕賱賳賯丿 丕賱丕毓鬲亘丕胤賷 賱賱賰丕鬲亘 噩毓賱賴 賷鬲氐賵乇 丕賷乇丕賳 鬲鬲噩賴 賱賳賲胤 毓賱賲丕賳賷 丨鬲賶 賮賷 馗賱 賵噩賵丿 丕賱賲乇噩毓賷丕鬲 丕賱卮賷毓賷丞貙賵 賴賵 賲丕 噩毓賱賴 賷毓噩亘 亘鬲噩乇亘丞 丕賱孬賵乇丞 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷丞 賮賷 鬲丨賵賱丕鬲賴丕 氐賵亘 卮賰賱 孬賷賵賯乇丕胤賷 禺賮賷 毓賳 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賵丨丿賴! 丨鬲賶 丕賱賳賯丿 丕賱丕賯鬲氐丕丿賷 丕賱匕賷 胤乇丨賴 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賱丨乇賰丕鬲 丕賱丕爻賱丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 賰丕賳 賯丕氐乇丕 賵 賲賳丨氐乇丕 丕賱賶 丨丿 亘毓賷丿 亘賲賵丕囟賷毓 丕賱賲氐丕乇賮 丕賱丕爻賱丕賲賷丞 賵 丕賱鬲賯賵賶 賮賷 丕賱鬲毓丕賲賱丕鬲 賵 丕賱鬲賷 兀爻亘睾賴丕 毓賱賶 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賲賳 兀亘賵丕亘 賳賯丿賴 賱賴匕賴 丕賱丨乇賰丕鬲貙賵 賴賵 賲丕 噩毓賱賴 賷鬲胤乇賯 賱賱丕禺賵丕賳 丕賱賲爻賱賲賷賳 賲孬賱丕 賰噩賲丕毓丞 丿賵賳 丨夭亘賷丞 賱丕 鬲賲鬲賱賰 賯丿乇丕鬲 鬲賳馗賷賲賷丞 鬲賲賰賳賴丕 賲賳 賲噩丕乇丕丞 丕賱賵丕賯毓 丕賱賵胤賳賷 賮賷 亘賱丿丕賳賴丕 毓賱賶 丕賱毓賰爻 鬲賲丕賲丕 賲賲丕 丨氐賱 亘丕賱胤亘毓!
April 18, 2017
鬲丨賱賷賱 賵 丿乇丕爻丞 賱賱丕爻賱丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 丕賱賲毓丕氐乇 賵 鬲卮賰賷賱賴 賵 胤亘賷毓鬲賴
賱賱亘丕丨孬 丕賵賱賷賮賷賴 乇賵丕 賳賮爻 胤賵賷賱 賮賷 鬲賯爻賷 丕賱鬲賮丕氐賷賱 賵 丕賱鬲睾賷乇丕鬲
賰鬲丕亘 賲賮賷丿 賱賮賴賲 噩夭亍 賵賱賵 亘爻賷胤 毓賳 夭賲丕賳賳丕 丕賱丨丕賱賷
賱賱亘丕丨孬 丕賵賱賷賮賷賴 乇賵丕 賳賮爻 胤賵賷賱 賮賷 鬲賯爻賷 丕賱鬲賮丕氐賷賱 賵 丕賱鬲睾賷乇丕鬲
賰鬲丕亘 賲賮賷丿 賱賮賴賲 噩夭亍 賵賱賵 亘爻賷胤 毓賳 夭賲丕賳賳丕 丕賱丨丕賱賷
September 15, 2014
Why cannot be Islam accepted like Christianity in the West? Is it because Islam and politics don't mix or is Islam actually a culture in itself?
West has used two methods to deal with Muslim minority, multiculturalism and assimilation. Multiculturalism assumes that the culture remains the same, generation after generation while assimilation means that culture disappears in the mainstream.
The book has probably the best description of Islam-ism and new-fundamentalism I have read thus far.
Check this out, 'Since sovereignty belongs only to God, the Islamists reject the notion of popular sovereignty and accord only contingent value to the elective principle. If no individual comes forward as the evident 'Amir', then he can be elected by an advisory assembly or even by universal suffrage, both of which, in this case, do not express sovereignty, but community consensus.'
Wow, so that's the reason why the Islamists reject all politics and populism movements. Scary stuff, if you hail from Pakistan. But there is good news as well, as most of the leaders of the movement, Maududi, Hasan al-Banna, Syed Qutub, Ali Shariati, Khomeini are dead, with no real decedents leaving only brochures, prayers, feeble glosses and citations of canonical authors. It had to happen when you consider all the leading Islamists apart from Khomeini did not hail from the Ulema heritage, and spent most of their energies taking down recognised Ulema of their eras, therefore it is logical that their fans and supporters had to reject any of their descendants.
Relax Pakistanis, this is only a passing phase. Check out some of the should-be assertions coming out of the current Islamic mouthpiece, 'if everyone is virtuous then harmony automatically exists among men.' Also 'there is no requirement of state, if society is virtuous then it can exist on itself.' And 'in Jihad, there is no obligation to produce result.' The trouble is that Islamists are caught in the vicious cycle of 'no Islamic state without virtuous Muslims and no Muslims without Islamic state?' arguments. I am pretty sure enough individual dialogue will expose the weakness of this Islamic dialogue, eventually.
The book also explains the ideology of the new-fundamentalist, their hate of Western clothing, sports and especially their isolation, where even non-Muslims greeting them with Asalamu Alaikum is frowned upon. They also tend to reject any participation of women in politics and shun intellectual research, replacing it with fideism (reliance on faith), which means that everything Islam says is true and rational.
And what constitutes of a new intellectual of the new fundamentalists? According to Olivier, 'The new intellectual is a mere tinkerer; he creates a montage, as his personal itinerary guides him, of segments of knowledge, using methods that come from a different conceptual universe than the segments he recombines, creating a totality that is more imaginary than theoretical.'
I have found his analysis very relevant and practical when I consider my numerous dialogues with these new intellectuals. Objective analysis like these are instrumental in understanding ever shifting trends in current Islamic thought which are become ever more difficult to grasp in dearth of any literary giants of the now defunct Islamism movement.
The book concludes with a prophetic analysis, how can new fundamentalism succeed when it's predecessor giant Islamists failed to change the mainstream Muslims? The constant hatred and rejection of Western culture is a mere attempt at recognition, with an element of fascination. A fundamentalist society does not represent hated of the other, but rather of oneself and of one's desires. He goes on further, Islamisation is actually an agent in the secularisation of Muslim society because it brings the religious space into the political arena. Wow, what an analysis. Olivier cites Islamic Iran as an example where religious practices are on the down.
West has used two methods to deal with Muslim minority, multiculturalism and assimilation. Multiculturalism assumes that the culture remains the same, generation after generation while assimilation means that culture disappears in the mainstream.
The book has probably the best description of Islam-ism and new-fundamentalism I have read thus far.
Check this out, 'Since sovereignty belongs only to God, the Islamists reject the notion of popular sovereignty and accord only contingent value to the elective principle. If no individual comes forward as the evident 'Amir', then he can be elected by an advisory assembly or even by universal suffrage, both of which, in this case, do not express sovereignty, but community consensus.'
Wow, so that's the reason why the Islamists reject all politics and populism movements. Scary stuff, if you hail from Pakistan. But there is good news as well, as most of the leaders of the movement, Maududi, Hasan al-Banna, Syed Qutub, Ali Shariati, Khomeini are dead, with no real decedents leaving only brochures, prayers, feeble glosses and citations of canonical authors. It had to happen when you consider all the leading Islamists apart from Khomeini did not hail from the Ulema heritage, and spent most of their energies taking down recognised Ulema of their eras, therefore it is logical that their fans and supporters had to reject any of their descendants.
Relax Pakistanis, this is only a passing phase. Check out some of the should-be assertions coming out of the current Islamic mouthpiece, 'if everyone is virtuous then harmony automatically exists among men.' Also 'there is no requirement of state, if society is virtuous then it can exist on itself.' And 'in Jihad, there is no obligation to produce result.' The trouble is that Islamists are caught in the vicious cycle of 'no Islamic state without virtuous Muslims and no Muslims without Islamic state?' arguments. I am pretty sure enough individual dialogue will expose the weakness of this Islamic dialogue, eventually.
The book also explains the ideology of the new-fundamentalist, their hate of Western clothing, sports and especially their isolation, where even non-Muslims greeting them with Asalamu Alaikum is frowned upon. They also tend to reject any participation of women in politics and shun intellectual research, replacing it with fideism (reliance on faith), which means that everything Islam says is true and rational.
And what constitutes of a new intellectual of the new fundamentalists? According to Olivier, 'The new intellectual is a mere tinkerer; he creates a montage, as his personal itinerary guides him, of segments of knowledge, using methods that come from a different conceptual universe than the segments he recombines, creating a totality that is more imaginary than theoretical.'
I have found his analysis very relevant and practical when I consider my numerous dialogues with these new intellectuals. Objective analysis like these are instrumental in understanding ever shifting trends in current Islamic thought which are become ever more difficult to grasp in dearth of any literary giants of the now defunct Islamism movement.
The book concludes with a prophetic analysis, how can new fundamentalism succeed when it's predecessor giant Islamists failed to change the mainstream Muslims? The constant hatred and rejection of Western culture is a mere attempt at recognition, with an element of fascination. A fundamentalist society does not represent hated of the other, but rather of oneself and of one's desires. He goes on further, Islamisation is actually an agent in the secularisation of Muslim society because it brings the religious space into the political arena. Wow, what an analysis. Olivier cites Islamic Iran as an example where religious practices are on the down.
March 22, 2017
賳丿賲鬲 毓賱賶 賰賱 丿賯賷賯丞 賵兀賳丕 兀賯乇兀 賴匕賴 丕賱鬲乇賴丕鬲 !
賲毓 賰賱 氐賮丨丞 賰賳鬲 兀賯賵賱 賷賲賰賳 賷鬲丨爻賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賮賷 丕賱氐賮丨丕鬲 丕賱賯丕丿賲丞 貙賷賲賰賳 賷賰鬲亘 賲毓賱賵賲丕鬲 賲賵孬賵賯丞 貙 賷賲賰賳 兀乇賶 鬲丨賱賷賱丕鬲 乇氐賷賳丞
賱賰賳
禺賷亘 丕賱馗賳 ..兀爻賵兀 賰鬲丕亘 賯乇兀鬲賴 賴匕丕 丕賱毓丕賲
賲毓 賰賱 氐賮丨丞 賰賳鬲 兀賯賵賱 賷賲賰賳 賷鬲丨爻賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賮賷 丕賱氐賮丨丕鬲 丕賱賯丕丿賲丞 貙賷賲賰賳 賷賰鬲亘 賲毓賱賵賲丕鬲 賲賵孬賵賯丞 貙 賷賲賰賳 兀乇賶 鬲丨賱賷賱丕鬲 乇氐賷賳丞
賱賰賳
禺賷亘 丕賱馗賳 ..兀爻賵兀 賰鬲丕亘 賯乇兀鬲賴 賴匕丕 丕賱毓丕賲
March 26, 2023
Indeed, those who believe in a 鈥榩olitical Islam鈥� have put the proverbial cart before the horse 鈥� it鈥檚 not going anywhere. It is a religion, a subset of its praxis being the social order and political affairs. Those who have not established the 鈥榮tate of Islam鈥� within themselves will always fail when attempting to establish the 鈥業slamic state鈥�.
"The call to fundamentalism, centered on the sharia: this call is as old as Islam itself and yet still new because it has never been fulfilled, It is a tendency that is forever setting the reformer, the censor, and tribunal against the corruption of the times and of sovereigns, against foreign influence, political opportunism, moral laxity, and the forgetting of sacred texts鈥�
As far as his quote; it does point to the concept of tajdid which is a living, self-correcting reality within the tradition embodied by prominent Islamic scholars.
"The call to fundamentalism, centered on the sharia: this call is as old as Islam itself and yet still new because it has never been fulfilled, It is a tendency that is forever setting the reformer, the censor, and tribunal against the corruption of the times and of sovereigns, against foreign influence, political opportunism, moral laxity, and the forgetting of sacred texts鈥�
As far as his quote; it does point to the concept of tajdid which is a living, self-correcting reality within the tradition embodied by prominent Islamic scholars.
Read
February 6, 2025鈥淵eni fundamentalizm 艧eytan谋n谋 bir ba艧ka tanr谋da ar谋yor ama i莽inde ta艧谋d谋臒谋 莽枚l眉 g枚remiyor.鈥�
April 4, 2023
IS ISLAMIC 鈥楴EOFUNDAMENTALISM鈥� INCAPABLE OF CREATING A SOCIETY?
Author Oliver Roy wrote in the Preface to this 1992 book, 鈥淭his book is neither about Islam in general nor about the place of politics in Islamic culture. It is about contemporary Islamist movements---the activist groups who see in Islam as much a political ideology as a religion, and who are therefore breaking with a certain tradition themselves. These are the movements that 鈥� have mounted challenges against both the West and the regimes in place in the Middle East. Does contemporary political Islam offer an alternative to Muslim societies? This is the subject of the pages that follow.鈥� (Pg. vii)
He continues, 鈥淚 will refer to the contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology as 鈥業slamism.鈥� 鈥� from Pakistan to Algeria it is spreading鈥� being integrated into politics, leaving its mark on more and conflicts鈥� But it has lost its original impetus. It has 鈥榮ocial-democratized鈥� itself. It no longer offers a model for a different society or a brighter future. Today, any Islamist political victory in a Muslim country would produce only superficial changes in customs and law. Islamism has been transformed into a type of neofundamentalism concerned solely with reestablishing Islamic law, the sharia, without inventing new political forms 鈥�
鈥淲hy didn鈥檛 it succeed? The failure is primarily an intellectual one. Islamic thought rests on an initial premise that destroys its own innovative elements鈥� In short, the development of Islamist thought 鈥� ends up dissociating itself from the very components of politics (institutions, authorities, an autonomous sphere separate from the private realm), seeing them as mere instruments for raising moral standards and thereby returning, by a different route, to the traditional perception of a ulamas and the reformists鈥� Secon, Islamism is a failure historically: neither in Iran nor in liberated Afghanistan has a new society been established鈥�. Throughout the Muslim world, nation-states are easily resisting the calls for the unity and reforging of the Islamist community鈥� the Islamic revolution is behind us. Yet the crisis still remains鈥� It is manifest in the permanence of autocratic regimes and the influence of tribal, ethnic, and religious segmentation鈥� Islam is not a 鈥榗ause.鈥� Could it have been a cure? I believe that the Islamist movement closed a door: that of revolution and the Islamic state. Only the rhetoric remains.鈥� (Pg. ix-xi)
In the Introduction, he outlines, 鈥淭he Muslim responses to the 鈥極rientalist鈥� discourse are often stereotypical and can be sorted into three categories: (1) the nostalgia argument [鈥榠t was Islam that brought civilization to the West鈥橾; (2) rejection of the hypothesis [鈥榠n what way are Western values superior?鈥橾鈥� (3) the apologia for Islam [鈥榚verything is in the Quran and the Sunna, and Islam is the best religion鈥橾. The first two 鈥� evade the question while accepting as fact that there is a modernity that produces its own values. The third constitutes the topic of this book.鈥� (Pg. 11)
He states, 鈥渢he Islamist movement is in keeping with two preexisting tendencies. One, of course, is the call to fundamentalism鈥� The other tendency鈥� is that of anticolonialism, of anti-imperialism, which today has become simply anti-Westernism鈥� The targets are the same: foreign banks, night clubs, local governments accused of complacency toward the West.鈥� (Pg. 4)
He summarizes, 鈥渋t appears that the political action of the Islamists鈥� falls in either with the logic of the state (Iran), or with traditional, if reconfigured segmentation (Afghanistan)鈥� any political action amounts to the automatic creation of a secular space or a return to traditional segmentation. Herein lies the limit of the politicization of a region, of any religion. Our problem, then, is 鈥� to study a coherent ensemble鈥� of texts, practices, and political organizations that deeply marked the political life of Muslim countries and their relationships with the countries of the North, while tending to alter the Muslims鈥� perception of Islam in a stricter moral direction.鈥� (Pg. 23-24)
He notes, 鈥淭he Islamists reproach the ulamas for two things. One is their servility to the powers in place, which leads them to accept a secular government and laws that do not conform to the sharia. The other is their compromise with Western modernity; the ulamas shave accepted modernity where the Islamists reject it (acceptance of the separation of religion and politics, which necessarily leads to secularization) and maintained the tradition where the Islamists reject it (indifference to modern science, rigid and casuistic teachings, rejection of political and social action).鈥� (Pg. 37)
He asserts, 鈥淭here is no true Islamist political thought, because Islamism rejects political philosophy and the human sciences as such. The magical appeal to virtue masks the impossibility of defining the Islamist political program in terms of the social reality.鈥� (Pg. 71)
He points out, 鈥淥ne of the most striking differences between Islamism and neofundamentalism is the status of women鈥� Islamist politicization allowed women access to the public sphere, which the neofundamentalists are taking away鈥� The question of personal status (wives, family, divorce) is becoming the principal area of neofundamentalist assertions, which brutally reestablish the letter of the sharia without the social and educational measures that the Iranian or Egyptian Islamists favored.鈥� (Pg. 83)
He summarizes, 鈥淭hus the impact of Islamism, aside from the parentheses of the Iranian revolution and the war in Afghanistan, is essentially sociocultural: it marks the streets and customs but has no power relationship in the Middle East. It does not influence either state borders of interests. It has not created a 鈥榯hird force鈥� in the world. It has not even been able to offer the Muslim masses a concrete expression for their anticolonialism. Can it offer an economic alternative or deeply transform a society? The answer seems to be no.鈥� (Pg. 131)
He concludes, 鈥淚slamism now faded into neofundamentalism, is not a geostrategic factor: it will neither unify the Muslim world nor change the balance of power in the Middle East鈥� the Islamists have molded themselves into the framework of existing states, adopting their modes of exercising power, their strategic demands, and their nationalism鈥� Islamism is above all a sociocultural movement embodying the protest and frustration of a generation of youth that has not been integrated socially or politically.鈥� (Pg. 194)
He argues, 鈥淭he politics in which contemporary Islamist movements operates is thus a consequence of a new world-space and not of the return to a traditional cultural space. The triumphant neofundamentalism will be incapable of ensuring the insularity of Islamic societies; it depends economically on the world-space in the very exercise of its power; its society is too permeated with Western models, and no one can stop radio, television, cassettes, and travelers.鈥� (Pg. 202)
He continues, 鈥淭he culture that threatens Muslim society is neither Jewish nor Christian; it is a world culture of consumption and communication, a culture that is secular, atheist, and ultimately empty; it has no values or strategies, but it is already here, in the cassette and the transistor, present in the most remote village. This culture can withstand any reappropriation and reading. It is a code and not a civilization.鈥� (Pg. 203)
This book will interest those studying contemporary Islamic politics and society.
Author Oliver Roy wrote in the Preface to this 1992 book, 鈥淭his book is neither about Islam in general nor about the place of politics in Islamic culture. It is about contemporary Islamist movements---the activist groups who see in Islam as much a political ideology as a religion, and who are therefore breaking with a certain tradition themselves. These are the movements that 鈥� have mounted challenges against both the West and the regimes in place in the Middle East. Does contemporary political Islam offer an alternative to Muslim societies? This is the subject of the pages that follow.鈥� (Pg. vii)
He continues, 鈥淚 will refer to the contemporary movement that conceives of Islam as a political ideology as 鈥業slamism.鈥� 鈥� from Pakistan to Algeria it is spreading鈥� being integrated into politics, leaving its mark on more and conflicts鈥� But it has lost its original impetus. It has 鈥榮ocial-democratized鈥� itself. It no longer offers a model for a different society or a brighter future. Today, any Islamist political victory in a Muslim country would produce only superficial changes in customs and law. Islamism has been transformed into a type of neofundamentalism concerned solely with reestablishing Islamic law, the sharia, without inventing new political forms 鈥�
鈥淲hy didn鈥檛 it succeed? The failure is primarily an intellectual one. Islamic thought rests on an initial premise that destroys its own innovative elements鈥� In short, the development of Islamist thought 鈥� ends up dissociating itself from the very components of politics (institutions, authorities, an autonomous sphere separate from the private realm), seeing them as mere instruments for raising moral standards and thereby returning, by a different route, to the traditional perception of a ulamas and the reformists鈥� Secon, Islamism is a failure historically: neither in Iran nor in liberated Afghanistan has a new society been established鈥�. Throughout the Muslim world, nation-states are easily resisting the calls for the unity and reforging of the Islamist community鈥� the Islamic revolution is behind us. Yet the crisis still remains鈥� It is manifest in the permanence of autocratic regimes and the influence of tribal, ethnic, and religious segmentation鈥� Islam is not a 鈥榗ause.鈥� Could it have been a cure? I believe that the Islamist movement closed a door: that of revolution and the Islamic state. Only the rhetoric remains.鈥� (Pg. ix-xi)
In the Introduction, he outlines, 鈥淭he Muslim responses to the 鈥極rientalist鈥� discourse are often stereotypical and can be sorted into three categories: (1) the nostalgia argument [鈥榠t was Islam that brought civilization to the West鈥橾; (2) rejection of the hypothesis [鈥榠n what way are Western values superior?鈥橾鈥� (3) the apologia for Islam [鈥榚verything is in the Quran and the Sunna, and Islam is the best religion鈥橾. The first two 鈥� evade the question while accepting as fact that there is a modernity that produces its own values. The third constitutes the topic of this book.鈥� (Pg. 11)
He states, 鈥渢he Islamist movement is in keeping with two preexisting tendencies. One, of course, is the call to fundamentalism鈥� The other tendency鈥� is that of anticolonialism, of anti-imperialism, which today has become simply anti-Westernism鈥� The targets are the same: foreign banks, night clubs, local governments accused of complacency toward the West.鈥� (Pg. 4)
He summarizes, 鈥渋t appears that the political action of the Islamists鈥� falls in either with the logic of the state (Iran), or with traditional, if reconfigured segmentation (Afghanistan)鈥� any political action amounts to the automatic creation of a secular space or a return to traditional segmentation. Herein lies the limit of the politicization of a region, of any religion. Our problem, then, is 鈥� to study a coherent ensemble鈥� of texts, practices, and political organizations that deeply marked the political life of Muslim countries and their relationships with the countries of the North, while tending to alter the Muslims鈥� perception of Islam in a stricter moral direction.鈥� (Pg. 23-24)
He notes, 鈥淭he Islamists reproach the ulamas for two things. One is their servility to the powers in place, which leads them to accept a secular government and laws that do not conform to the sharia. The other is their compromise with Western modernity; the ulamas shave accepted modernity where the Islamists reject it (acceptance of the separation of religion and politics, which necessarily leads to secularization) and maintained the tradition where the Islamists reject it (indifference to modern science, rigid and casuistic teachings, rejection of political and social action).鈥� (Pg. 37)
He asserts, 鈥淭here is no true Islamist political thought, because Islamism rejects political philosophy and the human sciences as such. The magical appeal to virtue masks the impossibility of defining the Islamist political program in terms of the social reality.鈥� (Pg. 71)
He points out, 鈥淥ne of the most striking differences between Islamism and neofundamentalism is the status of women鈥� Islamist politicization allowed women access to the public sphere, which the neofundamentalists are taking away鈥� The question of personal status (wives, family, divorce) is becoming the principal area of neofundamentalist assertions, which brutally reestablish the letter of the sharia without the social and educational measures that the Iranian or Egyptian Islamists favored.鈥� (Pg. 83)
He summarizes, 鈥淭hus the impact of Islamism, aside from the parentheses of the Iranian revolution and the war in Afghanistan, is essentially sociocultural: it marks the streets and customs but has no power relationship in the Middle East. It does not influence either state borders of interests. It has not created a 鈥榯hird force鈥� in the world. It has not even been able to offer the Muslim masses a concrete expression for their anticolonialism. Can it offer an economic alternative or deeply transform a society? The answer seems to be no.鈥� (Pg. 131)
He concludes, 鈥淚slamism now faded into neofundamentalism, is not a geostrategic factor: it will neither unify the Muslim world nor change the balance of power in the Middle East鈥� the Islamists have molded themselves into the framework of existing states, adopting their modes of exercising power, their strategic demands, and their nationalism鈥� Islamism is above all a sociocultural movement embodying the protest and frustration of a generation of youth that has not been integrated socially or politically.鈥� (Pg. 194)
He argues, 鈥淭he politics in which contemporary Islamist movements operates is thus a consequence of a new world-space and not of the return to a traditional cultural space. The triumphant neofundamentalism will be incapable of ensuring the insularity of Islamic societies; it depends economically on the world-space in the very exercise of its power; its society is too permeated with Western models, and no one can stop radio, television, cassettes, and travelers.鈥� (Pg. 202)
He continues, 鈥淭he culture that threatens Muslim society is neither Jewish nor Christian; it is a world culture of consumption and communication, a culture that is secular, atheist, and ultimately empty; it has no values or strategies, but it is already here, in the cassette and the transistor, present in the most remote village. This culture can withstand any reappropriation and reading. It is a code and not a civilization.鈥� (Pg. 203)
This book will interest those studying contemporary Islamic politics and society.
June 5, 2024
Roy's The Failure of Political Islam is an interesting prelude to his later work, Globalised Islam. The former raises many important concepts, such as neofundamentalism and how political 'Islam' failed, that will be further expanded in the latter. Roy's important contribution is his not taking anything for granted approach in dissecting the phenomenon of political Islam. Using a wide range of resources from history to sociology to agents and discourse, Roy provides a compelling (and necessarily diverse) picture of political Islam: what it is, what it is not, and most importantly, what it will never become- specifically the transnational, supra-politics, pan-Muslim polity that many Islamist actors and supporters yearned for and feared by the secularist and 'Western' actors.
Roy's contribution lies in his willingness not only to take the various Islamisms (which forms an integral factor to its 'failure') in their own terms but also to critique the project on those terms. One may argue that the individual chapters on Afghanistan and Iran, which probably reflects the author's geographical area of expertise rather than carefully selected case studies, undermines the coherence of the book, or the fact that less attention was given to political Islam that developed at the 'periphery' of the Muslim world (i.e. Indonesia/Malaysia), or that the term neofundamentalism is used too loosely and arbitrary (for example, how is the FIS which contested elections a neofundamentalist as opposed to being just an Islamist?).
Yet, there is no denying this is a book of paramount importance to those committed to a grounded study of Islamism. It does so without exociticising the phenomenon to the point of orientalist essentialism, nor rendering it so flat that the contours, richness, and the exceptional qualities of this tour de force (to a point, if according to Roy) called political Islam cannot be analysed systematically. Failure is certainly a bold statement to make of a phenomenon that saw no abatement. The pulling power of the so-called Caliphate somewhat reified by ISIS puts to the test his theory that the status quo of nationhoods will defeat any calls for a revolutionary statehood. But I believe Roy, through his comprehensive engagements that ranged from the lumpenintelligentsia to the mullahs and the warlords, from imaginations to materialist social life, has earned the credentials to pass such a judgement.
Roy's contribution lies in his willingness not only to take the various Islamisms (which forms an integral factor to its 'failure') in their own terms but also to critique the project on those terms. One may argue that the individual chapters on Afghanistan and Iran, which probably reflects the author's geographical area of expertise rather than carefully selected case studies, undermines the coherence of the book, or the fact that less attention was given to political Islam that developed at the 'periphery' of the Muslim world (i.e. Indonesia/Malaysia), or that the term neofundamentalism is used too loosely and arbitrary (for example, how is the FIS which contested elections a neofundamentalist as opposed to being just an Islamist?).
Yet, there is no denying this is a book of paramount importance to those committed to a grounded study of Islamism. It does so without exociticising the phenomenon to the point of orientalist essentialism, nor rendering it so flat that the contours, richness, and the exceptional qualities of this tour de force (to a point, if according to Roy) called political Islam cannot be analysed systematically. Failure is certainly a bold statement to make of a phenomenon that saw no abatement. The pulling power of the so-called Caliphate somewhat reified by ISIS puts to the test his theory that the status quo of nationhoods will defeat any calls for a revolutionary statehood. But I believe Roy, through his comprehensive engagements that ranged from the lumpenintelligentsia to the mullahs and the warlords, from imaginations to materialist social life, has earned the credentials to pass such a judgement.
February 9, 2008
Seeing Islam from another point of view (orientalist that is)is what we get by reading this book. This book shows us why the Islam political movement (this term is different with Islamic politic) always faces it's obstacle (if failure being to harsh) in the attempt to realize the idealistic Islam 'khilafah'. Case example were showed from the event happened in Algeria, Iran, and other countries. The content is debatable and most Muslims will surely disagree the author's argument, but what more important is that history holds the fact doing political Islam is still not the rightest answer to achieve the goal to create an Islamic society. Still again it's a 'khilafiyah' term, can't blame the author, it's his point of view though.
September 26, 2015
Roy offers a very good sociological study of Political Islam in the 20th Century with special attention as to why it failed as a political movement. The book does a good job of covering the sources, background, and ideology of the movement. It also distinguishes between Fundamentalism, Islamism (Political Islam), and Neo-Fundamentalism, explaining the often porous boundaries--something badly needed to understand much of the conflict taking place in the world today. Although written in the mid-90s, the book still makes for essential reading and debunks the myth that terror is inherently Islamic, showing rather that it is the result of the geo-politics of the last (roughly) century.
November 15, 2024
丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲購丨賰賲 毓賱賲賷丕賸 賵丨賱賱 丕賱丕爻丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 賮賷 賰賷賮賷丞 丕丿丕乇丞 丕賱丿賵賱丞 賵丕賱賲噩鬲賲毓 賵丕禺鬲賱丕賮賴 毓賱賶 丕賱丕禺賷乇 丨賷孬 匕賴亘 噩夭亍 賲賳賴賲 賱兀爻賱賲丞 丕賱丿賵賱丞 賵噩夭亍 賱兀爻賱賲丞 丕賱賲噩鬲賲毓 賮賷 禺賱賯 丕賱賲丐賲賳 丕賱匕賷 賷乇鬲賯賶 丕賱賶 丕賱賮囟賷賱丞 賰賲丕 丨丿孬 毓賳丿賳丕 賮賷 丕禺賵丕賳 丕賱爻賵丿丕賳貙 丕賱賯丕乇卅 賱賱賰鬲丕亘 賷賮賴賲 賰賷賮 賷賮賰乇 噩賲丕毓丞 丕賱丕爻賱丕賲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 賵賰賷賮 鬲亘乇毓 鬲賱賰 丕賱噩賲丕毓丕鬲 賮賷 丕賱亘乇丕睾賲丕鬲賷丞 賵賱賰賳 丨賷賳 鬲兀鬲賷 丕賱噩賷賵爻鬲乇丕鬲賷噩賷丞 賷賳賴夭賲 丕賱賲卮乇賵毓 賮賷 丕賵賱 丕禺鬲亘丕乇 . 丕賱禺賱丕氐丞 丕賱鬲賷 禺乇噩鬲 亘賴丕 賵丕賱賲卮賴丿 丕賲丕賲賷 賮兀賳 丕賱丕爻賱丕賲賵賷丞 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 丕禺匕鬲 鬲噩乇亘鬲賴丕 丕賱鬲賷 丨購賰賲 毓賱賷賴丕 亘丕賱賮卮賱 賲賲丕乇爻丞 賵賮賰乇丕賸 賯丿 鬲禺鬲賮賷 賲賳 丕賱賲卮賴丿 鬲賲丕賲丕賸 賰丕賳賲丕 丕賳鬲賴鬲 丨賯亘鬲賴丕 鬲丕乇賷禺賷丕賸
January 24, 2012
Roy is an expert in examining subtleties within Islam and this book holds up remarkably well. Islamists have gained power after the Arab Spring, but they did not cause it and Roy provides a partial explanation as to why. Moreover, his discussion of Islamic economics is spot-on.
Read
February 2, 2013 The coming to power of movements such as FIS will only make more apparent the emptiness of the phantasm of "Islamic state" #Roy
November 25, 2014
Although I don't agree that political islam failed, but I would say this author is one of the top specialist in the field. his argument makes sense. I must read.
April 1, 2025
It's a good one, as it shows the Muslim way of enlightenment. What made them fail really isn't really taken into account by the book, but social scientists are rarely interested in HBD, therefore it can be forgiven, especially since it already has extensive research. Failed intellectuals are the bedrock of the Muslim revolution, but because of IQ inequality all around the globe, they can't be successful globally because whatever they'll do, whites or asians will do it better. They fail at the start, that's why they turn to the sky in hope for deliverance from the cold embrace of global capitalism. But then again, they fail as the mass education in the west produces midwits, as they're standard deviation lower, they're educating dum-dums. This made the islamic political movements even more dysfunctional and subjected to those Arab movements that have money, Saudis, and their fundamentalism.
December 8, 2024
I learned a lot about the post-WW2 political actors in the Arab & Muslim world, and it's a highly relevant to the current state of that region.
October 7, 2014
While the book contains many good data, insighful questions and discussion, it fails to argue on his primary thesis on the failure of political islam, simply because he fails to define what is and in what terms is he referring about "political islam". Without this definition and clear distinction on semantic conceptual, he falls on fallacy that all of the phenomenon he received as the supporting proof of his hypothesis, which is unfair: look at these examples:
- when the Al Azhar prominent issuing a fatwas to save politics to politician, he refer to "politic islam is fail"
- when MB changing in both practical and conceptual political expression and movement through the times, he simply refer to "political islam is fail"
- when most of the parties in South East Asian (moslem countries) do not refer their platform of politics to "strict islamic terms" he refer to "politic islam is fail"
- when Al Qaeda and alike acting their "war and terrorism to the west, and "opposing the ruler of moslem country" he refer to "politic islam is now fail"
So what is the meaning? This is a verification fallacy, without clear meaning of politic islam and what is the condition for his hypothesis of the failure of political islam, it cannot be falsified and his verfication on fact are basically useless, and scientifically cheating to.
However it is still a good book.
Want to read
January 24, 2016French author. the perversion of Muslim faith into utopian political mvmt ... unable to remain in power very long - 1992
Also wrote Holy Ignorance - when religion and culture part
Also wrote Holy Ignorance - when religion and culture part
October 29, 2018
In this time we have more feel the political Islam in our geography. This book help me understand for past century's political area in middle east, Iraq, Syria, Iran and their people's react.
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
Can't find what you're looking for?
Get help and learn more about the design.