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笑械 薪械 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪. 袩芯写芯褉芯卸 薪邪 胁褨泄薪褍 锌褉芯褌懈 褉械邪谢褜薪芯褋褌褨
笑褟 泻薪懈卸泻邪 锌褉芯 胁械谢懈褔械蟹薪褍 褨薪写褍褋褌褉褨褞 屑邪薪褨锌褍谢褞胁邪薪薪褟 薪邪褕懈屑懈 写褍屑泻邪屑懈, 褉褨褕械薪薪褟屑懈, 斜邪卸邪薪薪褟屑懈, 锌褉芯 薪芯胁褨 褌邪 褋褌邪褉褨 褨薪褋褌褉褍屑械薪褌懈 蟹邪谢褟泻褍胁邪薪薪褟 褨 斜褉械褏薪褨, 褟泻褨 胁懈泻芯褉懈褋褌芯胁褍褞褌褜 锌芯谢褨褌懈泻懈 褨 薪邪褉泻芯屑邪褎褨褟, 褉械谢褨谐褨泄薪褨 褎邪薪邪褌懈泻懈 褨 锌芯锌褍谢褨褋褌懈, 褨 褖芯 屑芯卸薪邪 褩屑 锌褉芯褌懈褋褌邪胁懈褌懈.
笑褟 泻薪懈卸泻邪 锌褉芯 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨泄薪褨 胁褨泄薪懈, 斜芯褌褨胁 褨 锌芯谐芯薪懈褔褨胁 斜芯褌褨胁, 锌褉芯 褌褉芯谢褨胁 褨 褏邪泻械褉褨胁, 锌褉芯 褎械泄泻芯胁褨 薪芯胁懈薪懈 褨 胁褌褉邪褌褍 锌褉芯蟹芯褉芯褩 锌芯谢褨褌懈褔薪芯褩 写懈褋泻褍褋褨褩. 袗 褖械 鈥� 锌褉芯 啸啸 褋褌芯谢褨褌褌褟, 锌褉芯 泄芯谐芯 褨薪褌械谢械泻褌褍邪谢褜薪懈泄 褋锌邪写芯泻, 锌褉芯 啸芯谢芯写薪褍 胁褨泄薪褍 褨 袣覑袘, 锌褉芯 胁褌褉邪褔械薪褍 褨谢褞蟹褨褞, 褖芯 斜褨谢褜褕械 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨褩 芯蟹薪邪褔邪褌懈屑械 斜褨谢褜褕械 褋胁芯斜芯写懈 褌邪 谐谢懈斜褕褨 写懈褋泻褍褋褨褩, 锌褉芯 锌芯褕褍泻 薪邪写褨褩. 笑械 褌邪泻芯卸 褋褨屑械泄薪邪 褨褋褌芯褉褨褟, 泄 褨褋褌芯褉褨褟 写懈褋懈写械薪褌褋褌胁邪, 褟泻邪, 蟹写邪胁邪谢芯褋褟, 蟹邪泻褨薪褔懈褌褜褋褟 褍 啸啸 褋褌芯谢褨褌褌褨, 邪谢械 褌褉懈胁邪褦.
笑褟 泻薪懈卸泻邪 锌褉芯 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨泄薪褨 胁褨泄薪懈, 斜芯褌褨胁 褨 锌芯谐芯薪懈褔褨胁 斜芯褌褨胁, 锌褉芯 褌褉芯谢褨胁 褨 褏邪泻械褉褨胁, 锌褉芯 褎械泄泻芯胁褨 薪芯胁懈薪懈 褨 胁褌褉邪褌褍 锌褉芯蟹芯褉芯褩 锌芯谢褨褌懈褔薪芯褩 写懈褋泻褍褋褨褩. 袗 褖械 鈥� 锌褉芯 啸啸 褋褌芯谢褨褌褌褟, 锌褉芯 泄芯谐芯 褨薪褌械谢械泻褌褍邪谢褜薪懈泄 褋锌邪写芯泻, 锌褉芯 啸芯谢芯写薪褍 胁褨泄薪褍 褨 袣覑袘, 锌褉芯 胁褌褉邪褔械薪褍 褨谢褞蟹褨褞, 褖芯 斜褨谢褜褕械 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨褩 芯蟹薪邪褔邪褌懈屑械 斜褨谢褜褕械 褋胁芯斜芯写懈 褌邪 谐谢懈斜褕褨 写懈褋泻褍褋褨褩, 锌褉芯 锌芯褕褍泻 薪邪写褨褩. 笑械 褌邪泻芯卸 褋褨屑械泄薪邪 褨褋褌芯褉褨褟, 泄 褨褋褌芯褉褨褟 写懈褋懈写械薪褌褋褌胁邪, 褟泻邪, 蟹写邪胁邪谢芯褋褟, 蟹邪泻褨薪褔懈褌褜褋褟 褍 啸啸 褋褌芯谢褨褌褌褨, 邪谢械 褌褉懈胁邪褦.
288 pages, Hardcover
First published July 30, 2019
634 people are currently reading
12048 people want to read
About the author
Peter Pomerantsev
14听books499听followersPeter Pomerantsev is a Senior Fellow at the Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University, and at the Institute of Global Affairs at the London School of Economics where he runs the Arena Initiative, dedicated to investigating the roots of disinformation and what to about them. He has testified on the challenges of information war to the US House Foreign Affairs Committee, US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the UK Parliament Defense Select Committee. He is a Contributing Editor and columnist at the American Interest. His first book, Nothing is True and Everything is Possible, won the 2016 Royal Society of Literature Ondaatje Prize, was nominated for the Samuel Johnson, Guardian First Book, Pushkin House and Gordon Burns Prizes.
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September 6, 2020
By Their Language Ye Shall Know Them
All use of language is intentional. All speech. All conversation. All writing. If it weren鈥檛 intentional, speech and writing would have no purpose and therefore they would be not just vain but incomprehensible, less communicative than the twittering of birds or the chattering of the mad. The purpose of all human communication is to convince or endear or to intimidate or any of thousands of other intentions. Sometimes it鈥檚 purpose is to deceive. But it is never mere chat; the substance of any communication is indistinguishable from its purpose.
The intention of propaganda is to develop a mass acceptance of some point of view. Propaganda is used by governments, large corporations, news media, and other interest groups by which it may be referred to as public relations, lobbying, advertising, or merely public information. Propaganda usually is employed reactively to counter an existing commonly held idea or defensively to prevent the dissemination of such an idea. Propaganda may or may not involve overt deception; but it will always be tendentious, selecting to communicate only that material favourable to the idea in question.
The problem of distinguishing deceptive or misleading language - intentional and not - from all the other purposes to which language may be put is a persistent one throughout human existence. Philosophers, theologians, scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, biologists, engineers, and criminologists are among those who have tried to crack the problem over the last several millennia but with no notable success. It appears to be impossible to connect what people say or write to what we casually call reality.
This is not to say that we don鈥檛 come to conclusions about the veracity of things we hear and read. Judicial juries are required to do so everyday to arrive at unambiguous verdicts. Physical and social scientists pride themselves on their ability to separate the factual wheat from the merely career-promoting chaff. Almost everyone takes what politicians have to say with at least some skepticism. My wife knows that if she reads something in the Daily Telegraph it鈥檚 probably correct even if the Guardian denies it. Are these responsible activities?
Most likely they are, but not for the reason we typically give: a comparison between what we are told or read with reality. None of the decisions we come to about the truthfulness about what we hear and read has anything to do with the connection between language and reality. There is no reliable connection between language and that which is not-language. Call this latter category of not-language 鈥榚vents鈥� or 鈥榬eality鈥� in order to simplify things. But note that even in so doing we can鈥檛 escape the universal pull of the black-hole of language. 鈥楨vents鈥� and 鈥榬eality鈥� are, of course, nothing but words. Language has us by the throat and it鈥檚 not letting go.
What we do when we come to our conclusions is to rely entirely on language and nothing else. Jurors consider documents or other products of language and its derivative technologies (like tape-recording and CCTV footage).* Scientists review alternative ideas and conflicting test results, all presented in appropriate technical jargon. Voters believe a candidate鈥檚 pronouncements not because they know what is in the candidate鈥檚 heart but because of other things he or other people report. Even my wife occasionally checks up on the Telegraph, usually by reference to the daily Mail. Only language can be used to verify language.
So events and reality are not just elusive ideas, they play no role at all in our decisions about what and who to believe. This situation is not a consequence of new technologies like the internet or surveillance cameras, or rogue government agencies in Moscow, Beijing, or Washington. From the moment the first Neanderthal lied to his mate about sleeping with the woman in the next village, the proof of the truth of any statement, story, or testimony has always been other statements, stories, and testimonies. Reality has nothing to do with it. It鈥檚 all inside the bubble of language. The reality of language is the only reality we can discuss. Propaganda is as subject to this ironclad law as much as any other communication.
It takes someone of above average intelligence to recognise this law of the utter dominance of language. Peter Pomerantsev appears to be such a person. I know he is intelligent because the title of his book indicates that he understands the precariousness of his position as an exposer of propagandistic deception. He recognises that his expos茅 is yet another document within language that references many other such documents but that has no firm footing in anything else. So he makes a joke.
But he is not joking. Pomerantsev starts his story by reminding the reader that it used to be the case that mass deceivers could be identified by the way in which they restricted what was said, or written, heard or read. Any government or other authority that imposed such restrictions was probably guilty of deception in direct proportion to their restrictiveness. The Soviet Union was top of the list, along with most other dictatorial states.
But today, while there are still what might be called restrictive information practices, deception of a different mode has become dominant. This is 鈥渢he flood of disinformation, 鈥榝ake news鈥�, 鈥榠nformation war鈥� and the 鈥榳ar on information鈥�.鈥� The flood is produced not just by governments, and organised interest groups, but by technically talented individuals who can 鈥榤ake their bones鈥� in the high-tech establishment by disrupting the world... or who just want to have a little fun.***
Pomerantsev provides a great deal of descriptive material about Russian troll farms; social media mobs, and cyber-militias. But I don鈥檛 think this is the core of his book. He successfully avoids what can be called the epistemological trap of trying to prove the falsity of language by reference to what is not-language by two insights which are buried within his narrative. The first of these is fairly obvious but can鈥檛 be restated enough: real power is power over language. Those with power and who seek power always do so through language.
The information flood is no different in this respect than restrictions on information. The implication is clear: communication emanating directly or indirectly from power are always suspect. This is so regardless of the nature of the power, that is to say, civil, military, religious, commercial, democratic, monarchical, or dictatorial. The reliability of communication is inversely proportionate to the power which is its source. This seems to me the only remnant of Kantian epistemology that has any relevance in today鈥檚 world.
The second insight, which Pomerantsev declines to make explicit, is that the language of propaganda reveals itself for what it is if we allow ourselves to appreciate it. What the language of leaders like Duterte, Mobi, Putin, Trump, Erdogan, Zeman, and Bolsonaro have in common is an intentional coarseness as well as poverty of vocabulary (See also Viktor Klemperer鈥檚 analysis of the language of Nazism: /book/show/1...) They use toilet humour and 鈥榣ocker-room鈥� remarks. They are purposely insensitive to physical infirmities and social 鈥榓bnormalities鈥� of any sort. They use racist, sexist, and violent innuendo to great effect in generating mob feeling. Their vocabulary includes frequent mention of Communist, homosexual (and its variants), fake news, vassal, dupe, whore, traitor, slut.
This recognition is not a trivial criticism of the cultural education or intelligence of these men (it is interesting to note the absence of women among these leaders). Rather it is a significant general conclusion about the nature of their use of language. It quite literally calls attention to the words, not to the grammar and certainly not to the pragmatic results of the words, but to the raw vocabulary. And I think he鈥檚 right: the words are the giveaway. The BBC is substantially less propagandistic than Breitbart. But, interestingly, the British Prime Minister鈥檚 office is also far less propagandistic than the White House.
So I think Pomerantsev has missed a chance. There is an intentionality within vulgar, imprecise, and a noticeably limited vocabulary. It is the inversion of Periclean rhetoric that is the modern form of propaganda. The banality of the words themselves is the key signal. When these words are produced by power, propaganda is certainly afoot.
* Demeanour, of course, is also part of human language. 鈥淢ake my day鈥� is a phrase with considerably different import spoken by Dirty Harry or by my boss who is expecting news about a prospective contract.
** All societies are of course subjected to a mix of information suppression and propaganda. The mix itself helps to identify the nature of the society in which it is employed. The one society which has consistently used both to great effect is that of the Christian Church. Pomerantsev claims to derive inspiration from the French philosopher Jacques Ellul who wrote a book entitled Propaganda in 1962 about its coming dangers. It happens, however, that Ellul was also a fundamentalist Christian who despised Islam. Good credentials for one claiming to know about the subject therefore.
*** Pomerantsev fails to make the point that this technique of 鈥榠nformation abundance鈥� has always been the preferred option in democratic societies. It is expected, for example, in all political campaigns. And it has been used routinely by government (cf. 1950鈥檚 promotion of Cold War 鈥榬eadiness鈥�), by the dominant media of the day (cf. the Hearst newspaper campaign for the Spanish-American War), and by commercial interests that are dependent upon favourable public policy (cf. the National Rifle Association鈥檚 successful reinterpretation if the 2nd Amendment of the U.S. Constitution over the last 30 years). This article, forwarded to me today by another GR member suggests just how pervasive propaganda is within democratic societies:
All use of language is intentional. All speech. All conversation. All writing. If it weren鈥檛 intentional, speech and writing would have no purpose and therefore they would be not just vain but incomprehensible, less communicative than the twittering of birds or the chattering of the mad. The purpose of all human communication is to convince or endear or to intimidate or any of thousands of other intentions. Sometimes it鈥檚 purpose is to deceive. But it is never mere chat; the substance of any communication is indistinguishable from its purpose.
The intention of propaganda is to develop a mass acceptance of some point of view. Propaganda is used by governments, large corporations, news media, and other interest groups by which it may be referred to as public relations, lobbying, advertising, or merely public information. Propaganda usually is employed reactively to counter an existing commonly held idea or defensively to prevent the dissemination of such an idea. Propaganda may or may not involve overt deception; but it will always be tendentious, selecting to communicate only that material favourable to the idea in question.
The problem of distinguishing deceptive or misleading language - intentional and not - from all the other purposes to which language may be put is a persistent one throughout human existence. Philosophers, theologians, scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, biologists, engineers, and criminologists are among those who have tried to crack the problem over the last several millennia but with no notable success. It appears to be impossible to connect what people say or write to what we casually call reality.
This is not to say that we don鈥檛 come to conclusions about the veracity of things we hear and read. Judicial juries are required to do so everyday to arrive at unambiguous verdicts. Physical and social scientists pride themselves on their ability to separate the factual wheat from the merely career-promoting chaff. Almost everyone takes what politicians have to say with at least some skepticism. My wife knows that if she reads something in the Daily Telegraph it鈥檚 probably correct even if the Guardian denies it. Are these responsible activities?
Most likely they are, but not for the reason we typically give: a comparison between what we are told or read with reality. None of the decisions we come to about the truthfulness about what we hear and read has anything to do with the connection between language and reality. There is no reliable connection between language and that which is not-language. Call this latter category of not-language 鈥榚vents鈥� or 鈥榬eality鈥� in order to simplify things. But note that even in so doing we can鈥檛 escape the universal pull of the black-hole of language. 鈥楨vents鈥� and 鈥榬eality鈥� are, of course, nothing but words. Language has us by the throat and it鈥檚 not letting go.
What we do when we come to our conclusions is to rely entirely on language and nothing else. Jurors consider documents or other products of language and its derivative technologies (like tape-recording and CCTV footage).* Scientists review alternative ideas and conflicting test results, all presented in appropriate technical jargon. Voters believe a candidate鈥檚 pronouncements not because they know what is in the candidate鈥檚 heart but because of other things he or other people report. Even my wife occasionally checks up on the Telegraph, usually by reference to the daily Mail. Only language can be used to verify language.
So events and reality are not just elusive ideas, they play no role at all in our decisions about what and who to believe. This situation is not a consequence of new technologies like the internet or surveillance cameras, or rogue government agencies in Moscow, Beijing, or Washington. From the moment the first Neanderthal lied to his mate about sleeping with the woman in the next village, the proof of the truth of any statement, story, or testimony has always been other statements, stories, and testimonies. Reality has nothing to do with it. It鈥檚 all inside the bubble of language. The reality of language is the only reality we can discuss. Propaganda is as subject to this ironclad law as much as any other communication.
It takes someone of above average intelligence to recognise this law of the utter dominance of language. Peter Pomerantsev appears to be such a person. I know he is intelligent because the title of his book indicates that he understands the precariousness of his position as an exposer of propagandistic deception. He recognises that his expos茅 is yet another document within language that references many other such documents but that has no firm footing in anything else. So he makes a joke.
But he is not joking. Pomerantsev starts his story by reminding the reader that it used to be the case that mass deceivers could be identified by the way in which they restricted what was said, or written, heard or read. Any government or other authority that imposed such restrictions was probably guilty of deception in direct proportion to their restrictiveness. The Soviet Union was top of the list, along with most other dictatorial states.
But today, while there are still what might be called restrictive information practices, deception of a different mode has become dominant. This is 鈥渢he flood of disinformation, 鈥榝ake news鈥�, 鈥榠nformation war鈥� and the 鈥榳ar on information鈥�.鈥� The flood is produced not just by governments, and organised interest groups, but by technically talented individuals who can 鈥榤ake their bones鈥� in the high-tech establishment by disrupting the world... or who just want to have a little fun.***
Pomerantsev provides a great deal of descriptive material about Russian troll farms; social media mobs, and cyber-militias. But I don鈥檛 think this is the core of his book. He successfully avoids what can be called the epistemological trap of trying to prove the falsity of language by reference to what is not-language by two insights which are buried within his narrative. The first of these is fairly obvious but can鈥檛 be restated enough: real power is power over language. Those with power and who seek power always do so through language.
The information flood is no different in this respect than restrictions on information. The implication is clear: communication emanating directly or indirectly from power are always suspect. This is so regardless of the nature of the power, that is to say, civil, military, religious, commercial, democratic, monarchical, or dictatorial. The reliability of communication is inversely proportionate to the power which is its source. This seems to me the only remnant of Kantian epistemology that has any relevance in today鈥檚 world.
The second insight, which Pomerantsev declines to make explicit, is that the language of propaganda reveals itself for what it is if we allow ourselves to appreciate it. What the language of leaders like Duterte, Mobi, Putin, Trump, Erdogan, Zeman, and Bolsonaro have in common is an intentional coarseness as well as poverty of vocabulary (See also Viktor Klemperer鈥檚 analysis of the language of Nazism: /book/show/1...) They use toilet humour and 鈥榣ocker-room鈥� remarks. They are purposely insensitive to physical infirmities and social 鈥榓bnormalities鈥� of any sort. They use racist, sexist, and violent innuendo to great effect in generating mob feeling. Their vocabulary includes frequent mention of Communist, homosexual (and its variants), fake news, vassal, dupe, whore, traitor, slut.
This recognition is not a trivial criticism of the cultural education or intelligence of these men (it is interesting to note the absence of women among these leaders). Rather it is a significant general conclusion about the nature of their use of language. It quite literally calls attention to the words, not to the grammar and certainly not to the pragmatic results of the words, but to the raw vocabulary. And I think he鈥檚 right: the words are the giveaway. The BBC is substantially less propagandistic than Breitbart. But, interestingly, the British Prime Minister鈥檚 office is also far less propagandistic than the White House.
So I think Pomerantsev has missed a chance. There is an intentionality within vulgar, imprecise, and a noticeably limited vocabulary. It is the inversion of Periclean rhetoric that is the modern form of propaganda. The banality of the words themselves is the key signal. When these words are produced by power, propaganda is certainly afoot.
* Demeanour, of course, is also part of human language. 鈥淢ake my day鈥� is a phrase with considerably different import spoken by Dirty Harry or by my boss who is expecting news about a prospective contract.
** All societies are of course subjected to a mix of information suppression and propaganda. The mix itself helps to identify the nature of the society in which it is employed. The one society which has consistently used both to great effect is that of the Christian Church. Pomerantsev claims to derive inspiration from the French philosopher Jacques Ellul who wrote a book entitled Propaganda in 1962 about its coming dangers. It happens, however, that Ellul was also a fundamentalist Christian who despised Islam. Good credentials for one claiming to know about the subject therefore.
*** Pomerantsev fails to make the point that this technique of 鈥榠nformation abundance鈥� has always been the preferred option in democratic societies. It is expected, for example, in all political campaigns. And it has been used routinely by government (cf. 1950鈥檚 promotion of Cold War 鈥榬eadiness鈥�), by the dominant media of the day (cf. the Hearst newspaper campaign for the Spanish-American War), and by commercial interests that are dependent upon favourable public policy (cf. the National Rifle Association鈥檚 successful reinterpretation if the 2nd Amendment of the U.S. Constitution over the last 30 years). This article, forwarded to me today by another GR member suggests just how pervasive propaganda is within democratic societies:
February 25, 2020
Over the years I've developed a set of rules to choose the books to pack as my Christmas reading. Based on bitter experience, I no longer choose large hardbacks, apocalypses, genocides, or Kafka. However, it is very difficult to avoid reading anything depressing over the festive season, simply because depressing things are often interesting and worth reading about. 'This Is Not Propaganda' is my accidental depressing Christmas reading this year. It's fascinating, but deeply alarming. I enjoyed Pomerantsev's previous book , which described Russia's destabilised sense of reality. This is essentially a sequel, describing through specific examples how this instability has been exported around the world. It is structured very neatly around the experience of Pomerantsev's parents leaving the USSR. This enables disquieting contrasts to be drawn between KGB tactics then and now. I found it a more powerful book than , and just as readable and thought-provoking.
It is difficult to write clearly about the dissolution of truth and facts in recent years, although we're all living in this weird age. I'd been back for Christmas with my parents for less than 24 hours before my Dad made a completely untrue statement based on something he'd read on facebook. Luckily he's willing to listen when such falsehoods are pointed out. I have less fortunate friends who've fallen out badly with their parents over Brexit or the Hong Kong protests. The insidious manipulation enabled by public life playing out on social media is illustrated particularly well here. Notably, Pomerantsev draws upon examples from all over the world, with a particular focus on Ukraine. America inevitably tends to dominate when such global trends are discussed, in light of Trump, so this makes a nice change. In the first chapter, Pomerantsev recounts the experience of a woman who investigated a Russian troll farm by getting a job there:
Subsequent chapters consider how increasingly authoritarian states use social media to mimic and undermine the tactics used by protest movements. In practically every example Pomerantsev cites, this leads to serious violence. He also makes some insightful comments on conspiracy theories:
It is a source of some bitter amusement to me that a single obscure sci-fi novel published in 2000 saw this coming, sort of. by Melissa Scott features a main character whose job is to lie on the internet. She's very good at getting information to go viral, including fad diets and exclusive new products. What that novel didn't foresee, as far as I can remember, is that the same skills and methods could be used for political purposes. This is very alarming to read:
One thing I deeply dislike on twitter is the culture of instantaneously forming an opinion for or against something. It seems dangerous in a number of ways: normalising an adversarial and binary perspective on the world; precipitating commitment to strongly-held views on the basis of extremely limited evidence; encouraging opinion formation on a reflexively emotional rather than considered basis; building an aggressive defensiveness against people holding a different view; and promoting the habit of consistency with a virtual peer group over research, discussion, and thought. On top of that, social media is designed to monopolise attention, time, and energy. It presents itself as a neutral filter through which to see the world and interact with others, but that is not so.
'This Is Not Propaganda' demonstrates how people are radicalised by alt-right and Islamist material online, including a fascinating account of a former ISIS recruit who now tries to de-radicalise others. The chapter on the battle for Aleppo, Syria is another highlight, albeit a horrifying one. Nonetheless, the most striking narrative concerns Russia and the way it now projects global influence in the ambiguous and confusing form of 'Information War'. Pomerantsev is ambivalent about that term:
Thus the book contains the most thorough explanation of the Ukraine conflict, which we're still not calling a war for some reason, that I've yet come across. The approach described above certainly recalls the methods of prior totalitarian regimes, not least the USSR. Now, however, they can be achieved much more quickly, cheaply, and easily, whether the government is ostensibly democratic or not:
The chapter commenting on Brexit, especially the sheer meaninglessness of its slogans ('Take Back Control', 'Brexit Means Brexit', 'Get Brexit Done'), was particularly enraging given the recent election result. The most depressing part, however, was this sadly convincing analysis:
Beyond the extremely short term, this is of course disastrous. Voting against the existence of climate change won't make it go away. I also found this description of populism, a term much bandied around these days, very useful:
Pomerantsev doesn't claim to have any solutions to the problems caused by disinformation and growing political polarisation, but this book is a nuanced and compelling diagnosis. It looks deeper than most into how social media manipulates our need to constantly create our identity and imagine our reality, showing the damaging consequences around the world. Not very festive, but really important.
It is difficult to write clearly about the dissolution of truth and facts in recent years, although we're all living in this weird age. I'd been back for Christmas with my parents for less than 24 hours before my Dad made a completely untrue statement based on something he'd read on facebook. Luckily he's willing to listen when such falsehoods are pointed out. I have less fortunate friends who've fallen out badly with their parents over Brexit or the Hong Kong protests. The insidious manipulation enabled by public life playing out on social media is illustrated particularly well here. Notably, Pomerantsev draws upon examples from all over the world, with a particular focus on Ukraine. America inevitably tends to dominate when such global trends are discussed, in light of Trump, so this makes a nice change. In the first chapter, Pomerantsev recounts the experience of a woman who investigated a Russian troll farm by getting a job there:
No-one who worked at the farm described themselves as trolls. Instead, they talked about their work in the passive voice ("a piece was written", "a comment was made"). Most treated the farm as if it was just another job, doing the minimum required and then clocking off. Many of them seemed pleasant enough young people, with open, pretty faces, and yet they didn't blink when asked to smear, degrade, insult, and humiliate their victims. [...] During the day Lyudmilla would see a fake reality being pumped out by the trolls. In the evening she would come home hoping to put the place behind her, only to hear relatives and acquaintances quote lines churned out by the farm back at her. People who considered themselves hardened enough to withstand the barrage of television still seemed susceptible to social media messages which slithered into and enveloped your most personal online spaces, spun themselves into the texture of your life.
Subsequent chapters consider how increasingly authoritarian states use social media to mimic and undermine the tactics used by protest movements. In practically every example Pomerantsev cites, this leads to serious violence. He also makes some insightful comments on conspiracy theories:
Conspiracy theories have long been used to maintain power: the Soviet leadership saw capitalist and counter-revolutionary conspiracies everywhere; the Nazis, Jewish ones. But those conspiracies were ultimately there to buttress an ideology, whether class warfare for Communists or race for Nazis. With today's regimes, which struggle to formulate a single ideology - indeed, which can't if they want to continue sending different messages to different people - the idea that one lives in a world full of conspiracies becomes the world view itself. Conspiracy does not support ideology; it replaces it. [...] Conspiracy is a way to maintain control. In a world where even the most authoritarian regimes struggle to impose censorship, one has to surround audiences with so much cynicism about anybody's motives, persuade them that behind every seemingly benign motivation is a nefarious, if impossible-to-prove, plot, they lose faith in the possibility of an alternative, a tactic a renowned Russian media analyst called Vasily Gatov calls 'white jamming'.
It is a source of some bitter amusement to me that a single obscure sci-fi novel published in 2000 saw this coming, sort of. by Melissa Scott features a main character whose job is to lie on the internet. She's very good at getting information to go viral, including fad diets and exclusive new products. What that novel didn't foresee, as far as I can remember, is that the same skills and methods could be used for political purposes. This is very alarming to read:
Today, bots, trolls, and cyborgs [sockpuppets] could create the simulation of a climate of opinion, of support or hate, which was more insidious, more all-enveloping than the old broadcast media. And this simulation would then become reinforced as people modified their behaviour to fall in line with what they thought was reality. In their analysis of the role of bots, researchers at the University of Oxford called this process 'manufacturing consensus'.
It is not the case that one online account changes someone's mind; it's that en masse they create an ersatz normality.
One thing I deeply dislike on twitter is the culture of instantaneously forming an opinion for or against something. It seems dangerous in a number of ways: normalising an adversarial and binary perspective on the world; precipitating commitment to strongly-held views on the basis of extremely limited evidence; encouraging opinion formation on a reflexively emotional rather than considered basis; building an aggressive defensiveness against people holding a different view; and promoting the habit of consistency with a virtual peer group over research, discussion, and thought. On top of that, social media is designed to monopolise attention, time, and energy. It presents itself as a neutral filter through which to see the world and interact with others, but that is not so.
'This Is Not Propaganda' demonstrates how people are radicalised by alt-right and Islamist material online, including a fascinating account of a former ISIS recruit who now tries to de-radicalise others. The chapter on the battle for Aleppo, Syria is another highlight, albeit a horrifying one. Nonetheless, the most striking narrative concerns Russia and the way it now projects global influence in the ambiguous and confusing form of 'Information War'. Pomerantsev is ambivalent about that term:
There are some things that a few experts can at least occasionally agree on. First, that the Russian approach smudges the borders between war and peace, resulting in a state of permanent conflict that is neither fully on nor fully off. And in this conflict information campaigns play a remarkably important role. Summarising the aims of Russian 'next-generation warfare', J膩nis B膿rzi艈拧 of the Latvian Military Academy describes a shift from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay; from a war with conventional forces to irregular groupings; from direct clash to contactless war; from the physical environment to the human consciousness; from war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.
This leaves us with a paradox. On the one hand, it is necessary to recognise and reveal the way the Kremlin, with a military mindset, uses information to confuse, dismay, divide, and delay. On the other, one risks reinforcing the Kremlin's world view in the very act of responding to it. It is in Ukraine where this paradox plays out at its most intense.
Thus the book contains the most thorough explanation of the Ukraine conflict, which we're still not calling a war for some reason, that I've yet come across. The approach described above certainly recalls the methods of prior totalitarian regimes, not least the USSR. Now, however, they can be achieved much more quickly, cheaply, and easily, whether the government is ostensibly democratic or not:
War used to be about capturing territory and planting flags, but something different was playing out here. Moscow needed to create a narrative about how pro-democracy revolutions like the Maidan led to chaos and civil war. Kiev needed to show that separatism leads to misery. What actually happened on the ground was almost irrelevant; the two governments just needed enough footage to back their respective stories. Propaganda has always accompanied war, usually as a handmaiden to the actual fighting. But the information age means that this equation has been flipped: military operations are now handmaidens to the more important information effect. It would be like a heavily scripted reality TV show if it weren't for the very real deaths.
The chapter commenting on Brexit, especially the sheer meaninglessness of its slogans ('Take Back Control', 'Brexit Means Brexit', 'Get Brexit Done'), was particularly enraging given the recent election result. The most depressing part, however, was this sadly convincing analysis:
But if the need for facts is predicated on a vision of a concrete future that you are trying to achieve, then when that future disappears, what is the point of facts? Why would you want them if they tell you that your children will be poorer than you? That all versions of the future are unpromising? And why should you trust the purveyors of facts - the media and academics, think tanks, statesmen?
And so the politicians who makes a big show of rejecting facts, who validates the pleasure of spouting nonsense, who indulges in full, anarchic liberation from coherence, from glum reality, becomes attractive. That enough Americans could vote for someone like Donald Trump, a man with so little regard for making sense, whose many contradictory messages never add up to any stable meaning, was partly possible because voters felt they weren't invested in any larger evidence-based future. [...] And it's no coincidence that so many of the new breed of political actors are also nostalgists.
Beyond the extremely short term, this is of course disastrous. Voting against the existence of climate change won't make it go away. I also found this description of populism, a term much bandied around these days, very useful:
This sort of micro-targeting, where one set of voters shouldn't necessarily know about the others, requires some big, empty identity to unite all these different groups, something so broad these voters can project themselves into it - a category like 'the people' or 'the many'. The 'populism' that is thus created is not a sign of 'the people' coming together in a great groundswell of unity, but a consequence of 'the people' being more fractured than ever, of their barely existing as one nation.
Pomerantsev doesn't claim to have any solutions to the problems caused by disinformation and growing political polarisation, but this book is a nuanced and compelling diagnosis. It looks deeper than most into how social media manipulates our need to constantly create our identity and imagine our reality, showing the damaging consequences around the world. Not very festive, but really important.
November 20, 2019
This book is excellent--it is well-written and it does what all the other books about this topic don't do, which is to give an insider account of the rest of the world--especially Russia. My favorite part of this whole book is when these Russian hackers hear facebook talk about Russian hacking and they crack up laughing because Americans are so freaking naive. This is a must-read.
April 8, 2024
胁褋褟 薪械芯写薪芯蟹薪邪褔薪褨褋褌褜 邪胁褌芯褉邪 胁 褑褨泄 泻薪懈蟹褨 写褍卸械 胁褨写褔褍胁邪褦褌褜褋褟.
蟹 褉芯褋褨褩 锌芯褩褏邪褌懈 屑芯卸薪邪, 邪谢械 胁芯薪芯 蟹 褌械斜械 薪械 锌芯褩写械.
胁褉邪卸械薪薪褟, 薪邪褔械 泻薪懈谐邪 薪邪锌懈褋邪薪邪 蟹 锌芯蟹懈褑褨褩 褉褍褋褜泻芯谐芯 芯锌芯蟹懈褑褨芯薪械褉邪 芦屑懈 蟹邪 屑懈褉, 袣褉懈屑 薪械 斜褍褌械褉斜褉芯写禄 蟹 薪邪褋褌褉芯褦屑 小谢邪胁械薪泻懈 袛褉邪泻褍谢褨褔 芦褉褍褋褜泻褨屑 屑邪褌械褉褟屑 褌械卸 锌谢芯褏芯!禄 褨 褌芯屑褍 薪邪 褋褜芯谐芯写薪褨 褑械 褔懈褌邪褌懈 胁泻褉邪泄 薪械锌褉懈褦屑薪芯.
蟹胁懈褔邪泄薪芯, 褖芯 芯褔褨泻褍胁邪褌懈 胁褨写 泻薪懈谐懈 锌褉芯褍泻褉邪褩薪褋褜泻芯褩 锌芯蟹懈褑褨褩 鈥� 褋械斜械 芯斜屑邪薪褞胁邪褌懈. 褌邪 褑械 泄 褌邪泻械 鈥� 褋褍斜始褦泻褌懈胁薪芯.
褨 芯褌 褟泻褖芯 写懈胁懈褌懈褋褟 谢懈褕械 褔械褉械蟹 锌褉懈蟹屑褍 锌褉懈泻谢邪写褨胁 褋胁褨褌芯胁懈褏 胁 褌械泻褋褌褨, 褌芯 褌褍褌 褌械卸 褔懈褌邪褔邪 褋锌褨褌泻邪褦 薪械锌褉懈褦屑薪褨褋褌褜: 胁褋褨 褨褋褌芯褉褨褩 褉芯蟹泻邪蟹邪薪褨 锌芯胁械褉褏薪械胁芯, 褋褌褉褍泻褌褍褉懈 薪械屑邪褦, 锌械胁薪芯褩 屑械褌芯写芯谢芯谐褨褩 褔懈 锌芯褟褋薪械薪褜 褨薪褋褌褉褍屑械薪褌褨胁 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写懈 薪械屑邪褦, 褑褨谢褨褋薪芯褋褌褨 胁 泻薪懈蟹褨 薪械屑邪褦, 锌褉芯褌械 薪邪胁褨褖芯褋褜 褦 胁褋褌邪胁泻懈 屑械屑褍邪褉褨胁.
写褍卸械 斜邪谐邪褌芯 褦 锌懈褌邪薪褜 写芯 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁邪 锌芯 褌械泻褋褌褍 褨 胁 泄芯谐芯 褋谢懈蟹褜泻芯褋褌褨 屑褨褉泻褍胁邪薪褜, 胁懈褋薪芯胁泻褨胁.
谢褞写懈, 褟泻褨 薪邪胁褨褌褜 薪械 蟹邪屑懈褋谢褞褞褌褜褋褟, 褖芯 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 褨褋薪褍褦 胁 写褉褨斜薪懈褔泻邪褏, 胁 泻薪懈蟹褨 写褨泄褋薪芯 褖芯褋褜 薪芯胁械 褨 蟹薪邪泄写褍褌褜 (屑芯卸谢懈胁芯).
锌芯泻懈 褖芯, 褑械 薪邪泄薪芯胁褨褕邪 泻薪懈谐邪, 薪邪锌懈褋邪薪邪 锌褉芯 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写褍. 褏芯褔 薪邪锌懈褋邪薪邪 褨 泻械锌褋褜泻芯 (褨屑褏芯), 邪谢械 褌邪泻懈 薪邪锌懈褋邪薪邪.
(褟泻褖芯 蟹薪邪褦褌械 褨薪褕褨 泻薪懈谐懈 薪邪 褌械屑褍 鈥� 写邪泄褌械 蟹薪邪褌懈 胁 泻芯屑械薪褌邪褉褟褏).
褔械褋薪芯, 褟 斜褨谢褜褕械 蟹邪褑褨泻邪胁懈谢邪褋褟 泻薪懈谐邪屑懈 褌邪 写卸械褉械谢邪屑懈, 褟泻褨 褑懈褌褍褦 邪胁褌芯褉. 邪 芯褌 褨薪褕褨 泻薪懈谐懈 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁邪 褔懈褌邪褌懈 褟 薪械 斜褍写褍.
2.5/5 鈽�
蟹 褉芯褋褨褩 锌芯褩褏邪褌懈 屑芯卸薪邪, 邪谢械 胁芯薪芯 蟹 褌械斜械 薪械 锌芯褩写械.
胁褉邪卸械薪薪褟, 薪邪褔械 泻薪懈谐邪 薪邪锌懈褋邪薪邪 蟹 锌芯蟹懈褑褨褩 褉褍褋褜泻芯谐芯 芯锌芯蟹懈褑褨芯薪械褉邪 芦屑懈 蟹邪 屑懈褉, 袣褉懈屑 薪械 斜褍褌械褉斜褉芯写禄 蟹 薪邪褋褌褉芯褦屑 小谢邪胁械薪泻懈 袛褉邪泻褍谢褨褔 芦褉褍褋褜泻褨屑 屑邪褌械褉褟屑 褌械卸 锌谢芯褏芯!禄 褨 褌芯屑褍 薪邪 褋褜芯谐芯写薪褨 褑械 褔懈褌邪褌懈 胁泻褉邪泄 薪械锌褉懈褦屑薪芯.
蟹胁懈褔邪泄薪芯, 褖芯 芯褔褨泻褍胁邪褌懈 胁褨写 泻薪懈谐懈 锌褉芯褍泻褉邪褩薪褋褜泻芯褩 锌芯蟹懈褑褨褩 鈥� 褋械斜械 芯斜屑邪薪褞胁邪褌懈. 褌邪 褑械 泄 褌邪泻械 鈥� 褋褍斜始褦泻褌懈胁薪芯.
褨 芯褌 褟泻褖芯 写懈胁懈褌懈褋褟 谢懈褕械 褔械褉械蟹 锌褉懈蟹屑褍 锌褉懈泻谢邪写褨胁 褋胁褨褌芯胁懈褏 胁 褌械泻褋褌褨, 褌芯 褌褍褌 褌械卸 褔懈褌邪褔邪 褋锌褨褌泻邪褦 薪械锌褉懈褦屑薪褨褋褌褜: 胁褋褨 褨褋褌芯褉褨褩 褉芯蟹泻邪蟹邪薪褨 锌芯胁械褉褏薪械胁芯, 褋褌褉褍泻褌褍褉懈 薪械屑邪褦, 锌械胁薪芯褩 屑械褌芯写芯谢芯谐褨褩 褔懈 锌芯褟褋薪械薪褜 褨薪褋褌褉褍屑械薪褌褨胁 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写懈 薪械屑邪褦, 褑褨谢褨褋薪芯褋褌褨 胁 泻薪懈蟹褨 薪械屑邪褦, 锌褉芯褌械 薪邪胁褨褖芯褋褜 褦 胁褋褌邪胁泻懈 屑械屑褍邪褉褨胁.
写褍卸械 斜邪谐邪褌芯 褦 锌懈褌邪薪褜 写芯 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁邪 锌芯 褌械泻褋褌褍 褨 胁 泄芯谐芯 褋谢懈蟹褜泻芯褋褌褨 屑褨褉泻褍胁邪薪褜, 胁懈褋薪芯胁泻褨胁.
谢褞写懈, 褟泻褨 薪邪胁褨褌褜 薪械 蟹邪屑懈褋谢褞褞褌褜褋褟, 褖芯 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 褨褋薪褍褦 胁 写褉褨斜薪懈褔泻邪褏, 胁 泻薪懈蟹褨 写褨泄褋薪芯 褖芯褋褜 薪芯胁械 褨 蟹薪邪泄写褍褌褜 (屑芯卸谢懈胁芯).
锌芯泻懈 褖芯, 褑械 薪邪泄薪芯胁褨褕邪 泻薪懈谐邪, 薪邪锌懈褋邪薪邪 锌褉芯 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写褍. 褏芯褔 薪邪锌懈褋邪薪邪 褨 泻械锌褋褜泻芯 (褨屑褏芯), 邪谢械 褌邪泻懈 薪邪锌懈褋邪薪邪.
(褟泻褖芯 蟹薪邪褦褌械 褨薪褕褨 泻薪懈谐懈 薪邪 褌械屑褍 鈥� 写邪泄褌械 蟹薪邪褌懈 胁 泻芯屑械薪褌邪褉褟褏).
褔械褋薪芯, 褟 斜褨谢褜褕械 蟹邪褑褨泻邪胁懈谢邪褋褟 泻薪懈谐邪屑懈 褌邪 写卸械褉械谢邪屑懈, 褟泻褨 褑懈褌褍褦 邪胁褌芯褉. 邪 芯褌 褨薪褕褨 泻薪懈谐懈 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁邪 褔懈褌邪褌懈 褟 薪械 斜褍写褍.
2.5/5 鈽�
September 24, 2020
褔懈褌邪薪薪褟 褑褨褦褩 泻薪懈卸泻懈 鈥� 褑械 褌邪泻邪 褋褍褑褨谢褜薪邪 褋锌褉芯斜邪 褋泻谢邪褋褌懈 褎褉邪蟹褍 芦褖械 薪械 胁褋械 锌褉芯锌邪谢芯禄 蟹 谢褨褌械褉 卸, 芯, 锌 褨 邪: 褨薪芯写褨 褟泻褨褋褜 薪邪胁褨褌褜 褋褌邪褞褌褜 薪邪 屑褨褋褑械, 邪谢械 蟹 薪械褌褉懈胁泻懈屑 褨 薪械胁褌褨褕薪懈屑 褉械蟹褍谢褜褌邪褌芯屑.
June 3, 2019
This Is Not Propaganda is an alternate history of the present, a different view of the world. There is some irony in this, because it is all about how nothing is what it seems. The reason is the information revolution, and specifically social media. All sides and all factions make their biggest efforts misinforming others, while calling their own to glory. Some win by simply sowing confusion in general, and no topic is too trivial to abuse. The book is a survey of this disease all over the world, employed by politicians, religions and haters.
The result is so much noise that lying is not just routine but acceptable, and 鈥渘o amount of proof leads to accountability鈥� says Peter Pomerantsev in his most revealing statement. He cites Donald Trump as the poster child for getting away with absolutely anything, lying continually, backtracking, doubling down and going his own way despite laws, tradition, the Constitution, or morality. But Trump is just the tip of the iceberg in this telling.
Pomerantsev escaped the USSR as a child. His parents were persecuted for reading the wrong publications and fled to the west via a tiny program that allowed some Jewish emigration to boost the USSR鈥檚 chances in trade negotiations. He grew up in Germany and England where his father could continue the good fight, legitimately and openly, on BBC overseas radio services.
The bulk of the book reveals the extent of the noise in attempts to manipulate the populous. He cites the stated strategy in Russia towards other nations: 鈥淭he population doesn鈥檛 even feel it is being acted upon. So, the state doesn鈥檛 switch on its self-defense mechanisms.鈥� This comes from the actual manual, published in 2011, Information-Psychological War Operations. It is one of the bases of Russia鈥檚 massive and ubiquitous intervention machine. It fills the internet with lies in numerous countries, in countless forums, employing thousands to publish drivel continuously. The result is the locals can鈥檛 trust anything they see, and lose faith in their institutions, their leaders and their countries. That is precisely the goal.
It鈥檚 not just Russia, either. The whole world is onto this game and pushes for everyone to employ it. 鈥淥n parts of Reddit and 4Chan,鈥� Pomerantsev says, 鈥渁nonymous administrators provide crash courses in mass persuasion that in the Cold War would have been the provenance of secret services and their civilian psy-ops.鈥� Misinforamtion and disinformation have been democratized to do-it-yourself universality.
On the inside, the process is called advanced meme warfare and Successful Guerrilla PR. While it once applied to launching new products, today it is ideologies that are the leading users. The signal-to-noise ratio has gone negative on a global scale.
Pomerantsev also tackles the problem of people all over the world being converted to Islamic fundamentalism. It is of course a conscious, organized and aggressive campaign. It employs the same tactics: find a topic that resonates because of all the confusion, exploit that weakness to get a foot in the door, and convert the lead to a sale.
There are people on the other side as well. Pomerantsev cites a Muslim school chum who went through the whole process and now tries to salvage lives. He has become a globally respected expert is Islamic teachings and teachers worldwide, and calls a lie a lie when he sees it. And he sees it all the time. He tells converts that 鈥淚SIS is to Islam what adultery is to marriage.鈥� Sometimes that works.
The book weaves the present ocean of lies and manipulation with his parents鈥� voyage of escape from Soviet-controlled Ukraine to careers in the west, speaking to those left behind. These are Peter Pomerantsev鈥檚 credentials. He has leveraged them, followed in his parents鈥� footsteps in the media, and has made himself an expert in global media manipulation, amply demonstrated in this book.
One large weakness in This Is Not Propaganda is the credit. Pomerantsev gives credit to all kinds of claimants. One firm took credit for the Brexit referendum 鈥渧ictory鈥� by claiming to have offered so many vague promises that there was something for everyone. The truth is, only 24% of eligible Britons voted Leave. There are similar claims for one man vaulting Putin to power because the data said Russians wanted a superspy as leader. Corruption played no part in this telling. Then there is Trump and the Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal. It is not only inaccurate but silly to say these single efforts turned the tide of history. Correlation does not imply causation, as we keep forgetting. Things aren鈥檛 as simple as claiming to have changed millions of minds with Big Data. Were it that straightforward, every company in the world be using it to sell product, since that鈥檚 where the theory and the methodology originated.
He even wrongly claims China won minds all over southeast Asia into thinking all those tiny rock islands in the South China Sea have always belonged to China. That the war of ideas is more powerful than the wars of soldiers. That the direct result was that China never had to fire a shot in their takeover. The simple truth is none of the countries involved was willing to declare war on China to get their rock back. In taking over the islands, China turned them into military ports and landing strips, imposing an overwhelming military presence and advantage for itself. It was naked aggression. It changed no hearts and no minds in the process.
Then, the conclusion doesn鈥檛 go nearly far enough (It is a tribute to his parents). From his own description, what has happened is that we have all come full circle. Before there was mass communication, knowledge was scarce, and proof even moreso. Today, lies rule. Anyone can say anything and it doesn鈥檛 matter, be they world leaders or teenage trolls. The result is the same: we know little and can trust less of what we choose to believe of it all. For all of information technology and the global village, as truth seekers we are no farther ahead.
Welcome back to the Dark Ages, Facebook edition.
David Wineberg
The result is so much noise that lying is not just routine but acceptable, and 鈥渘o amount of proof leads to accountability鈥� says Peter Pomerantsev in his most revealing statement. He cites Donald Trump as the poster child for getting away with absolutely anything, lying continually, backtracking, doubling down and going his own way despite laws, tradition, the Constitution, or morality. But Trump is just the tip of the iceberg in this telling.
Pomerantsev escaped the USSR as a child. His parents were persecuted for reading the wrong publications and fled to the west via a tiny program that allowed some Jewish emigration to boost the USSR鈥檚 chances in trade negotiations. He grew up in Germany and England where his father could continue the good fight, legitimately and openly, on BBC overseas radio services.
The bulk of the book reveals the extent of the noise in attempts to manipulate the populous. He cites the stated strategy in Russia towards other nations: 鈥淭he population doesn鈥檛 even feel it is being acted upon. So, the state doesn鈥檛 switch on its self-defense mechanisms.鈥� This comes from the actual manual, published in 2011, Information-Psychological War Operations. It is one of the bases of Russia鈥檚 massive and ubiquitous intervention machine. It fills the internet with lies in numerous countries, in countless forums, employing thousands to publish drivel continuously. The result is the locals can鈥檛 trust anything they see, and lose faith in their institutions, their leaders and their countries. That is precisely the goal.
It鈥檚 not just Russia, either. The whole world is onto this game and pushes for everyone to employ it. 鈥淥n parts of Reddit and 4Chan,鈥� Pomerantsev says, 鈥渁nonymous administrators provide crash courses in mass persuasion that in the Cold War would have been the provenance of secret services and their civilian psy-ops.鈥� Misinforamtion and disinformation have been democratized to do-it-yourself universality.
On the inside, the process is called advanced meme warfare and Successful Guerrilla PR. While it once applied to launching new products, today it is ideologies that are the leading users. The signal-to-noise ratio has gone negative on a global scale.
Pomerantsev also tackles the problem of people all over the world being converted to Islamic fundamentalism. It is of course a conscious, organized and aggressive campaign. It employs the same tactics: find a topic that resonates because of all the confusion, exploit that weakness to get a foot in the door, and convert the lead to a sale.
There are people on the other side as well. Pomerantsev cites a Muslim school chum who went through the whole process and now tries to salvage lives. He has become a globally respected expert is Islamic teachings and teachers worldwide, and calls a lie a lie when he sees it. And he sees it all the time. He tells converts that 鈥淚SIS is to Islam what adultery is to marriage.鈥� Sometimes that works.
The book weaves the present ocean of lies and manipulation with his parents鈥� voyage of escape from Soviet-controlled Ukraine to careers in the west, speaking to those left behind. These are Peter Pomerantsev鈥檚 credentials. He has leveraged them, followed in his parents鈥� footsteps in the media, and has made himself an expert in global media manipulation, amply demonstrated in this book.
One large weakness in This Is Not Propaganda is the credit. Pomerantsev gives credit to all kinds of claimants. One firm took credit for the Brexit referendum 鈥渧ictory鈥� by claiming to have offered so many vague promises that there was something for everyone. The truth is, only 24% of eligible Britons voted Leave. There are similar claims for one man vaulting Putin to power because the data said Russians wanted a superspy as leader. Corruption played no part in this telling. Then there is Trump and the Facebook Cambridge Analytica scandal. It is not only inaccurate but silly to say these single efforts turned the tide of history. Correlation does not imply causation, as we keep forgetting. Things aren鈥檛 as simple as claiming to have changed millions of minds with Big Data. Were it that straightforward, every company in the world be using it to sell product, since that鈥檚 where the theory and the methodology originated.
He even wrongly claims China won minds all over southeast Asia into thinking all those tiny rock islands in the South China Sea have always belonged to China. That the war of ideas is more powerful than the wars of soldiers. That the direct result was that China never had to fire a shot in their takeover. The simple truth is none of the countries involved was willing to declare war on China to get their rock back. In taking over the islands, China turned them into military ports and landing strips, imposing an overwhelming military presence and advantage for itself. It was naked aggression. It changed no hearts and no minds in the process.
Then, the conclusion doesn鈥檛 go nearly far enough (It is a tribute to his parents). From his own description, what has happened is that we have all come full circle. Before there was mass communication, knowledge was scarce, and proof even moreso. Today, lies rule. Anyone can say anything and it doesn鈥檛 matter, be they world leaders or teenage trolls. The result is the same: we know little and can trust less of what we choose to believe of it all. For all of information technology and the global village, as truth seekers we are no farther ahead.
Welcome back to the Dark Ages, Facebook edition.
David Wineberg
September 29, 2020
袛褍卸械 褑褨泻邪胁邪 泻薪懈卸泻邪, 锌褨褋谢褟 锌褉芯褔懈褌邪薪薪褟 褏芯褔械褌褜褋褟 蟹褉芯斜懈褌懈 褕邪锌芯褔泻褍 蟹 褎芯谢褜谐懈 褨 胁褌褨泻褌懈 卸懈褌懈 胁 谢褨褋.
August 6, 2020
袩邪谢懈胁芯屑 褋芯褑屑械褉械卸 褦 锌褉芯褋褌褨 械屑芯褑褨褩. 袧邪锌褉懈泻谢邪写 芯斜褍褉械薪薪褟 - 泻芯谢懈 屑懈 薪邪 锌褍斜谢褨泻褍 褔懈屑芯褋褜 芯斜褍褉褞褦屑芯褋褟, 褌芯 胁 薪邪褋 胁懈写褨谢褟褞褌褜褋褟 谐芯褉屑芯薪懈 褖邪褋褌褟, 斜芯 屑懈 胁褨写褔褍胁邪褦屑芯 褋械斜械 锌褉懈褔械褌薪懈屑懈 写芯 斜褨谢褜褕芯谐芯. 袗斜芯 薪械薪邪胁懈褋褌褜 - 褔懈屑 斜褨谢褜褕械 写芯锌懈褋 胁懈泻谢懈泻邪褦 泻芯屑械薪褌邪褉褨胁 褨 褋胁邪褉芯泻, 褌懈屑 锌芯锌褍谢褟褉薪褨褕懈屑 胁褨薪 斜褍写械 褍 褎斜 褨 泄芯谐芯 锌芯泻邪蟹褍胁邪褌懈屑褍褌褜 胁褋械 斜褨谢褜褕褨泄 泻褨谢褜泻芯褋褌褨 谢褞写械泄. 袗斜芯 泻芯褌懈泻懈.
携 胁褨写 谢褨褌邪 胁懈褉褨褕懈谢邪 锌懈褋邪褌懈 屑械薪褕械 胁 褋褌懈谢褨 鈥炐葱拘盒拘谎斺€�, 斜芯 薪械 褏芯褔褍 蟹斜褨谢褜褕褍胁邪褌懈 锌芯褌芯泻褍 薪械薪邪胁懈褋褌褨 褍 褋胁褨褌褨 褨 胁 褋胁芯褩褏 褋锌褨谢褜薪芯褌邪褏 薪邪 褉邪写褨褋褌褜 褉械泻谢邪屑芯写邪胁褑褟屑. 袣褉邪褖械 薪邪锌懈褋邪褌懈 褋褌邪褌褌褞 褔懈 泻薪懈卸泻褍. 袗斜芯 褏芯褔邪 斜 锌芯褔懈褌邪褌懈 褋褌邪褌褌褞 褔懈 泻薪懈卸泻褍
袧邪锌褉懈泻谢邪写 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁邪- 褨褋褌芯褉褨褞 褌芯谐芯, 褟泻 褍 褋褍褔邪褋薪芯屑褍 褋胁褨褌褨 锌芯锌褍谢褨褋褌褋褜泻褨 谢褨写械褉懈 胁懈泻芯褉懈褋褌芯胁褍褞褌褜 褋芯褑屑械褉械卸褨 褨 屑械写褨邪, 薪械 锌褉芯褋褌芯 锌褉芯锌芯薪褍褞褔懈 褋胁芯褞 胁械褉褋褨褞 锌芯写褨泄, 邪 褉芯蟹屑懈胁邪褞褔懈 屑械卸褨 屑褨卸 锌褉邪胁写芯褞 褨 薪械锌褉邪胁写芯褞. 袪芯褋褨褟, 褟泻褨泄 褍 褑褨泄 泻薪懈卸褑褨 胁褨写胁械写械薪械 褑械薪褌褉邪谢褜薪械 屑褨褋褑械, 锌褉邪谐薪械 锌械褉械泻芯薪邪褌懈 褋胁褨褌, 褖芯 胁褋褨 斜褉械褕褍褌褜, 邪卸 锌芯泻懈 谢褞写懈 薪械 褉芯蟹褔邪褉褍褞褌褜褋褟 胁 薪芯胁懈薪邪褏 褨 屑芯卸谢懈胁芯褋褌褨 蟹薪邪泄褌懈 锌褉邪胁写褍. 孝械 褋邪屑械 胁褨写斜褍胁邪褦褌褜褋褟 薪邪 肖褨谢褨锌褨薪邪褏, 褍 泻芯谢懈褕薪褨褏 褞谐芯褋谢邪胁褋褜泻懈褏 写械褉卸邪胁邪褏, 褍 小懈褉褨褩. 袩褉懈 褑褜芯屑褍 锌芯写褨谢懈 褨 泻谢褨泻懈, 褟泻褨 褎芯褉屑褍褞褌褜褋褟 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨泄薪懈屑懈 锌芯褌芯泻邪屑懈 胁懈泻褉懈胁谢褞褞褌褜, 褖芯 褦 鈥炐垦€邪胁懈屑鈥�, 邪 褖芯 鈥炐谎栃残感尖€� 褨 邪褍写懈褌芯褉褨褞 蟹芯屑斜褍褞褌褜 写褨谢褟褔懈 蟹邪 薪邪写褍屑邪薪懈屑懈 锌褉懈薪褑懈锌邪屑懈. 袧邪锌褉懈泻谢邪写, 锌褨写 褔邪褋 袘褉械泻褋褨褌褍, 锌褉懈褏懈谢褜薪懈泻懈 胁褨写鈥櫻斝葱叫靶叫窖� 褕褍泻邪谢懈 谢褞斜懈褌械谢褨胁 褌胁邪褉懈薪 褨 锌芯褕懈褉褞胁邪谢懈 薪邪 褑褨 邪褍写懈褌芯褉褨褩 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨褞 锌褉芯 褌械, 褖芯 袆小 写芯蟹胁芯谢褟褦 斜芯褩 斜懈泻褨胁.
袩邪褉邪谢械谢褜薪懈屑 褌械泻褋褌芯屑 泄写械 褨褋褌芯褉褨褟 泄芯谐芯 斜邪褌褜泻邪-写懈褋懈写械薪褌邪, 褟泻懈泄 胁褌褨泻邪胁 蟹 小袪小袪 褨 胁褔懈胁褋褟 卸懈褌懈 蟹邪薪芯胁芯 褍 薪芯胁褨泄 褋懈褋褌械屑褨. 些懈褉芯 泻邪卸褍褔懈, 屑械薪褨 褑褨 写胁褨 褨褋褌芯褉褨褩 褔懈褌邪谢懈褋褟 褉邪写褕械 褟泻 芯泻褉械屑褨, 邪 薪械 褟泻 褔邪褋褌懈薪邪 芯写薪褨褦褩 泻薪懈卸泻懈.
袟邪谐邪谢芯屑, 锌褨褋谢褟 锌褉芯褔懈褌邪薪薪褟 蟹鈥櫻徯残谎徰斞傃屟佈� 褌邪泻懈泄 谢械谐泻懈泄 械褎械泻褌 褌械芯褉褨褩 蟹屑芯胁懈 - 褏芯褔邪, 褟泻褖芯 褑械 蟹屑褍褋懈褌褜 褋械褉泄芯蟹薪褨褕械 褋褌邪胁懈褌懈褋褟 写芯 薪芯胁懈薪, 褌芯 褔褍写芯胁芯. 袣褨谢褜泻褨褋褌褜 锌懈褌邪薪褜, 褟泻褨 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 褋褌邪胁懈褌褜 锌械褉械写 褔懈褌邪褔械屑 褍 泻褨薪褑褨 写芯胁褕懈泄, 邪薪褨卸 泻褨谢褜泻褨褋褌褜 胁褨写锌芯胁褨写械泄 - 褨, 屑械薪褨 褑械 锌芯写芯斜邪褦褌褜褋褟. 效懈 屑芯卸薪邪 胁谢邪褕褌褍胁邪褌懈 屑械褉械卸褨 褌邪泻, 褖芯斜 屑懈 褉芯蟹褍屑褨谢懈 褔芯屑褍 褨 褟泻 锌褉懈褏芯写懈褌褜 写芯 薪邪褋 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨褟? 袗 屑芯卸谢懈胁芯 胁邪褉褌芯 褌胁芯褉懈褌懈 薪芯胁褍 鈥炐盒拘窖佈傃€褍泻褌懈胁薪褍 卸褍褉薪邪谢褨褋褌懈泻褍鈥�, 褟泻邪 薪械 谢懈褕械 斜褍写械 锌芯泻邪蟹褍胁邪褌懈 褎邪泻褌懈, 胁褨写锌芯胁褨写薪芯 写芯 褔懈泄芯谐芯褋褜 褋胁褨褌芯谐谢褟写褍, 邪谢械 泄 锌褉芯锌芯薪褍胁邪褌懈屑械 褉褨褕械薪薪褟.
鈥炐溞� 胁懈褏芯写懈屑芯 胁 芯薪谢邪泄薪, 褕褍泻邪褞褔懈 械屑芯褑褨泄薪芯谐芯 锌褨写斜邪写褜芯褉褞胁邪薪薪褟 褍 谢邪泄泻邪褏 褨 褉械褌胁褨褌邪褏. 小芯褑褨邪谢褜薪褨 屑械褉械卸褨 褦 褋胁芯谐芯 褉芯写褍 屑褨薪褨薪邪褉褑懈褋懈褔薪懈屑 写胁懈谐褍薪芯屑, 褟泻懈泄 薪褨泻芯谢懈 薪械 屑芯卸薪邪 写芯 泻褨薪褑褟 蟹邪写芯胁芯谢褜薪懈褌懈 褨 褟泻懈泄 褌褟谐薪械 薪邪褋 写芯 褉邪写懈泻邪谢褜薪褨褕懈褏 锌芯蟹懈褑褨泄 写谢褟 锌褉懈胁械褉薪械薪薪褟 斜褨谢褜褕芯褩 褍胁邪谐懈. 袧邪褋锌褉邪胁写褨 薪械 屑邪褦 蟹薪邪褔械薪薪褟, 褔懈 锌褉邪胁写懈胁褨 褨褋褌芯褉褨褩, 薪械 泻邪卸褍褔懈 胁卸械 锌褉芯 薪械褍锌械褉械写卸械薪褨褋褌褜: 胁懈 薪械 锌褉邪谐薪械褌械 锌械褉械屑芯谐褌懈 胁 褋褍锌械褉械褔褑褨 褍 锌褍斜谢褨褔薪芯屑褍 锌褉芯褋褌芯褉褨 锌械褉械写 薪械泄褌褉邪谢褜薪芯褞 邪褍写懈褌芯褉褨褦褞, 胁懈 锌褉芯褋褌芯 褏芯褔械褌械 芯褌褉懈屑邪褌懈 斜褨谢褜褕械 褍胁邪谐懈 胁褨写 芯写薪芯写褍屑褑褨胁. 笑械 斜芯谢褨褋薪邪 锌邪褋褌泻邪: 褋芯褑褨邪谢褜薪褨 屑械写褨邪 褦 褉褍褕褨褟屑懈 锌芯谢褟褉懈蟹芯胁邪薪褨褕芯褩 锌芯胁械写褨薪泻懈, 褟泻邪 锌褉懈蟹胁芯写懈褌褜 写芯 锌芯锌懈褌褍 薪邪 褋械薪褋邪褑褨泄薪褨褕懈泄 泻芯薪褌械薪褌 邪斜芯 卸 锌褉芯褋褌芯 斜褉械褏薪褞鈥�.
携 胁褨写 谢褨褌邪 胁懈褉褨褕懈谢邪 锌懈褋邪褌懈 屑械薪褕械 胁 褋褌懈谢褨 鈥炐葱拘盒拘谎斺€�, 斜芯 薪械 褏芯褔褍 蟹斜褨谢褜褕褍胁邪褌懈 锌芯褌芯泻褍 薪械薪邪胁懈褋褌褨 褍 褋胁褨褌褨 褨 胁 褋胁芯褩褏 褋锌褨谢褜薪芯褌邪褏 薪邪 褉邪写褨褋褌褜 褉械泻谢邪屑芯写邪胁褑褟屑. 袣褉邪褖械 薪邪锌懈褋邪褌懈 褋褌邪褌褌褞 褔懈 泻薪懈卸泻褍. 袗斜芯 褏芯褔邪 斜 锌芯褔懈褌邪褌懈 褋褌邪褌褌褞 褔懈 泻薪懈卸泻褍
袧邪锌褉懈泻谢邪写 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁邪- 褨褋褌芯褉褨褞 褌芯谐芯, 褟泻 褍 褋褍褔邪褋薪芯屑褍 褋胁褨褌褨 锌芯锌褍谢褨褋褌褋褜泻褨 谢褨写械褉懈 胁懈泻芯褉懈褋褌芯胁褍褞褌褜 褋芯褑屑械褉械卸褨 褨 屑械写褨邪, 薪械 锌褉芯褋褌芯 锌褉芯锌芯薪褍褞褔懈 褋胁芯褞 胁械褉褋褨褞 锌芯写褨泄, 邪 褉芯蟹屑懈胁邪褞褔懈 屑械卸褨 屑褨卸 锌褉邪胁写芯褞 褨 薪械锌褉邪胁写芯褞. 袪芯褋褨褟, 褟泻褨泄 褍 褑褨泄 泻薪懈卸褑褨 胁褨写胁械写械薪械 褑械薪褌褉邪谢褜薪械 屑褨褋褑械, 锌褉邪谐薪械 锌械褉械泻芯薪邪褌懈 褋胁褨褌, 褖芯 胁褋褨 斜褉械褕褍褌褜, 邪卸 锌芯泻懈 谢褞写懈 薪械 褉芯蟹褔邪褉褍褞褌褜褋褟 胁 薪芯胁懈薪邪褏 褨 屑芯卸谢懈胁芯褋褌褨 蟹薪邪泄褌懈 锌褉邪胁写褍. 孝械 褋邪屑械 胁褨写斜褍胁邪褦褌褜褋褟 薪邪 肖褨谢褨锌褨薪邪褏, 褍 泻芯谢懈褕薪褨褏 褞谐芯褋谢邪胁褋褜泻懈褏 写械褉卸邪胁邪褏, 褍 小懈褉褨褩. 袩褉懈 褑褜芯屑褍 锌芯写褨谢懈 褨 泻谢褨泻懈, 褟泻褨 褎芯褉屑褍褞褌褜褋褟 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨泄薪懈屑懈 锌芯褌芯泻邪屑懈 胁懈泻褉懈胁谢褞褞褌褜, 褖芯 褦 鈥炐垦€邪胁懈屑鈥�, 邪 褖芯 鈥炐谎栃残感尖€� 褨 邪褍写懈褌芯褉褨褞 蟹芯屑斜褍褞褌褜 写褨谢褟褔懈 蟹邪 薪邪写褍屑邪薪懈屑懈 锌褉懈薪褑懈锌邪屑懈. 袧邪锌褉懈泻谢邪写, 锌褨写 褔邪褋 袘褉械泻褋褨褌褍, 锌褉懈褏懈谢褜薪懈泻懈 胁褨写鈥櫻斝葱叫靶叫窖� 褕褍泻邪谢懈 谢褞斜懈褌械谢褨胁 褌胁邪褉懈薪 褨 锌芯褕懈褉褞胁邪谢懈 薪邪 褑褨 邪褍写懈褌芯褉褨褩 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨褞 锌褉芯 褌械, 褖芯 袆小 写芯蟹胁芯谢褟褦 斜芯褩 斜懈泻褨胁.
袩邪褉邪谢械谢褜薪懈屑 褌械泻褋褌芯屑 泄写械 褨褋褌芯褉褨褟 泄芯谐芯 斜邪褌褜泻邪-写懈褋懈写械薪褌邪, 褟泻懈泄 胁褌褨泻邪胁 蟹 小袪小袪 褨 胁褔懈胁褋褟 卸懈褌懈 蟹邪薪芯胁芯 褍 薪芯胁褨泄 褋懈褋褌械屑褨. 些懈褉芯 泻邪卸褍褔懈, 屑械薪褨 褑褨 写胁褨 褨褋褌芯褉褨褩 褔懈褌邪谢懈褋褟 褉邪写褕械 褟泻 芯泻褉械屑褨, 邪 薪械 褟泻 褔邪褋褌懈薪邪 芯写薪褨褦褩 泻薪懈卸泻懈.
袟邪谐邪谢芯屑, 锌褨褋谢褟 锌褉芯褔懈褌邪薪薪褟 蟹鈥櫻徯残谎徰斞傃屟佈� 褌邪泻懈泄 谢械谐泻懈泄 械褎械泻褌 褌械芯褉褨褩 蟹屑芯胁懈 - 褏芯褔邪, 褟泻褖芯 褑械 蟹屑褍褋懈褌褜 褋械褉泄芯蟹薪褨褕械 褋褌邪胁懈褌懈褋褟 写芯 薪芯胁懈薪, 褌芯 褔褍写芯胁芯. 袣褨谢褜泻褨褋褌褜 锌懈褌邪薪褜, 褟泻褨 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 褋褌邪胁懈褌褜 锌械褉械写 褔懈褌邪褔械屑 褍 泻褨薪褑褨 写芯胁褕懈泄, 邪薪褨卸 泻褨谢褜泻褨褋褌褜 胁褨写锌芯胁褨写械泄 - 褨, 屑械薪褨 褑械 锌芯写芯斜邪褦褌褜褋褟. 效懈 屑芯卸薪邪 胁谢邪褕褌褍胁邪褌懈 屑械褉械卸褨 褌邪泻, 褖芯斜 屑懈 褉芯蟹褍屑褨谢懈 褔芯屑褍 褨 褟泻 锌褉懈褏芯写懈褌褜 写芯 薪邪褋 褨薪褎芯褉屑邪褑褨褟? 袗 屑芯卸谢懈胁芯 胁邪褉褌芯 褌胁芯褉懈褌懈 薪芯胁褍 鈥炐盒拘窖佈傃€褍泻褌懈胁薪褍 卸褍褉薪邪谢褨褋褌懈泻褍鈥�, 褟泻邪 薪械 谢懈褕械 斜褍写械 锌芯泻邪蟹褍胁邪褌懈 褎邪泻褌懈, 胁褨写锌芯胁褨写薪芯 写芯 褔懈泄芯谐芯褋褜 褋胁褨褌芯谐谢褟写褍, 邪谢械 泄 锌褉芯锌芯薪褍胁邪褌懈屑械 褉褨褕械薪薪褟.
鈥炐溞� 胁懈褏芯写懈屑芯 胁 芯薪谢邪泄薪, 褕褍泻邪褞褔懈 械屑芯褑褨泄薪芯谐芯 锌褨写斜邪写褜芯褉褞胁邪薪薪褟 褍 谢邪泄泻邪褏 褨 褉械褌胁褨褌邪褏. 小芯褑褨邪谢褜薪褨 屑械褉械卸褨 褦 褋胁芯谐芯 褉芯写褍 屑褨薪褨薪邪褉褑懈褋懈褔薪懈屑 写胁懈谐褍薪芯屑, 褟泻懈泄 薪褨泻芯谢懈 薪械 屑芯卸薪邪 写芯 泻褨薪褑褟 蟹邪写芯胁芯谢褜薪懈褌懈 褨 褟泻懈泄 褌褟谐薪械 薪邪褋 写芯 褉邪写懈泻邪谢褜薪褨褕懈褏 锌芯蟹懈褑褨泄 写谢褟 锌褉懈胁械褉薪械薪薪褟 斜褨谢褜褕芯褩 褍胁邪谐懈. 袧邪褋锌褉邪胁写褨 薪械 屑邪褦 蟹薪邪褔械薪薪褟, 褔懈 锌褉邪胁写懈胁褨 褨褋褌芯褉褨褩, 薪械 泻邪卸褍褔懈 胁卸械 锌褉芯 薪械褍锌械褉械写卸械薪褨褋褌褜: 胁懈 薪械 锌褉邪谐薪械褌械 锌械褉械屑芯谐褌懈 胁 褋褍锌械褉械褔褑褨 褍 锌褍斜谢褨褔薪芯屑褍 锌褉芯褋褌芯褉褨 锌械褉械写 薪械泄褌褉邪谢褜薪芯褞 邪褍写懈褌芯褉褨褦褞, 胁懈 锌褉芯褋褌芯 褏芯褔械褌械 芯褌褉懈屑邪褌懈 斜褨谢褜褕械 褍胁邪谐懈 胁褨写 芯写薪芯写褍屑褑褨胁. 笑械 斜芯谢褨褋薪邪 锌邪褋褌泻邪: 褋芯褑褨邪谢褜薪褨 屑械写褨邪 褦 褉褍褕褨褟屑懈 锌芯谢褟褉懈蟹芯胁邪薪褨褕芯褩 锌芯胁械写褨薪泻懈, 褟泻邪 锌褉懈蟹胁芯写懈褌褜 写芯 锌芯锌懈褌褍 薪邪 褋械薪褋邪褑褨泄薪褨褕懈泄 泻芯薪褌械薪褌 邪斜芯 卸 锌褉芯褋褌芯 斜褉械褏薪褞鈥�.
December 28, 2019
Brilliant.
March 28, 2022
3,5 猸愶笍
Ten reporta偶 sprawi艂, 偶e mam ochot臋 si臋gn膮膰 po kolejne reporta偶e dotycz膮ce Rosji, USA, czy Chin.
To ksi膮偶ka o wojnie informacyjnej. O technikach stosowanych przez ludzi u w艂adzy. Technikach, kt贸re niekoniecznie s膮 dobre dla zwyk艂ego szarego obywatela.
Zabrak艂o mi logicznego u艂o偶enia pewnych temat贸w. Chaos jest mocno odczuwalny, niestety.
Ten reporta偶 sprawi艂, 偶e mam ochot臋 si臋gn膮膰 po kolejne reporta偶e dotycz膮ce Rosji, USA, czy Chin.
To ksi膮偶ka o wojnie informacyjnej. O technikach stosowanych przez ludzi u w艂adzy. Technikach, kt贸re niekoniecznie s膮 dobre dla zwyk艂ego szarego obywatela.
Zabrak艂o mi logicznego u艂o偶enia pewnych temat贸w. Chaos jest mocno odczuwalny, niestety.
March 18, 2022
Scattered
This is a decent book about state sanctioned troll farming with the intent of social and geopolitical destabilization. However I found it to be too meandering and disjointed to keep my attention. I think a little more of a narration and timeline would've given the book more structure and make it more palatable.
Two books that are better that you should read instead:
/review/show...
/review/show...
This is a decent book about state sanctioned troll farming with the intent of social and geopolitical destabilization. However I found it to be too meandering and disjointed to keep my attention. I think a little more of a narration and timeline would've given the book more structure and make it more palatable.
Two books that are better that you should read instead:
/review/show...
/review/show...
January 10, 2020
Peter Pomerantsev wrote one of the defining books on propaganda and political manipulation under Putin Nothing is True and Everything is Possible. Fingers crossed this will be as good.
September 19, 2019
A book designed to wow dullards.
October 28, 2020
呕yjemy w 艣wiecie protestu. Wychodzimy na ulice, wykrzykujemy, 偶e uprzejmie prosimy o zmiany w prawie (czyli *). To ksi膮偶ka w艂a艣nie dla nas.
Od sierpnia mam wra偶enie, 偶e wsz臋dzie czai si臋 protest. Id膮c na spacer przypadkiem trafiam na szkolenie os贸b aktywistycznych z metod protestu. Ko艂o squatu w kolorowym marszoprote艣cie mijaj膮 mnie trzymaj膮ce si臋 za r臋ce muzu艂manki. Pod ko艣cio艂em z t臋czow膮 flag膮 stoi m贸j s膮siad. Kolejny kupuje wielk膮 flag臋 i wywiesza w oknie.
呕yjemy w 艣wiecie protestu, a Pomerantsev w tej doskona艂ej ksi膮偶ce (t艂um. Aleksandra Paszkowska) pokazuje, 偶e nie jeste艣my w tym osamotnione. S膮 z nami tysi膮ce bot贸w, trolli, aktywist贸w z艂ych zmian, nienawistny komentariat stworzony przy u偶yciu procesor贸w o wysokim taktowaniu. S膮 z nami miejskie kamery i nasze smartfony. S膮 te偶 dobre duchy, ale jak rozpozna膰 kto z nami, a kto przeciw nam? Kim s膮 osoby aktywistyczne XXI wieku? Ksi膮偶ka Pomarantseva jest - mi臋dzy innymi - opowie艣ci膮 o ludziach, kt贸rzy mog膮 by膰 dla nas wzorem. I przestrog膮.
Dzi艣 ju偶 nie ma wstrz膮saj膮cych ksi膮偶ek, tekst贸w, kt贸re musisz przeczyta膰, a pisanie o ksi膮偶ce, 偶e czyta艂o si臋 j膮 czuj膮c ucisk w gardle zdaje si臋 by膰 pretensjonalno艣ci膮 powtarzan膮 w dziesi膮tkach rekomendacji. A przecie偶 bywaj膮 takie ksi膮偶ki. Jak ta.
Pomerantsev w kapitalnym stylu 艂膮cz膮cym informacyjn膮 jako艣膰, reporterski dryg z autobiograficznymi w膮tkami pokazuje nam to, co ukryte za pow艂ok膮 codziennej egzystencji. Poznaje nas z lud藕mi walcz膮cymi z dezinformacj膮, rewolucjonist贸w epoki p贸藕nego kapitalizmu, z tymi, kt贸rzy zrozumieli, 偶e epoka medi贸w spo艂eczno艣ciowych i szybkich obrazk贸w niesie nowe zagro偶enia dla demokracji, wolno艣ci s艂owa i swob贸d obywatelskich. Nowoczesna demokracja poddana manipulacji mo偶e sta膰 si臋 skuteczn膮 broni膮 wymierzon膮 we wszystkich wierz膮cych w艂a艣nie w demokracj臋. Na czym polega ten zakl臋ty kr膮g i czy mo偶emy go przerwa膰 - naprawd臋 to trzeba przeczyta膰.
Ksi膮偶k臋 na ok艂adce polecaj膮 Kasparow i Szot. 艁膮czy nas podziw dla pracy Pomerantseva jak i pewno艣膰, 偶e kr贸lowa jest cz臋sto u偶ywana do podw贸jnego uderzenia. Uszanowanie dla strajkuj膮cych!
Od sierpnia mam wra偶enie, 偶e wsz臋dzie czai si臋 protest. Id膮c na spacer przypadkiem trafiam na szkolenie os贸b aktywistycznych z metod protestu. Ko艂o squatu w kolorowym marszoprote艣cie mijaj膮 mnie trzymaj膮ce si臋 za r臋ce muzu艂manki. Pod ko艣cio艂em z t臋czow膮 flag膮 stoi m贸j s膮siad. Kolejny kupuje wielk膮 flag臋 i wywiesza w oknie.
呕yjemy w 艣wiecie protestu, a Pomerantsev w tej doskona艂ej ksi膮偶ce (t艂um. Aleksandra Paszkowska) pokazuje, 偶e nie jeste艣my w tym osamotnione. S膮 z nami tysi膮ce bot贸w, trolli, aktywist贸w z艂ych zmian, nienawistny komentariat stworzony przy u偶yciu procesor贸w o wysokim taktowaniu. S膮 z nami miejskie kamery i nasze smartfony. S膮 te偶 dobre duchy, ale jak rozpozna膰 kto z nami, a kto przeciw nam? Kim s膮 osoby aktywistyczne XXI wieku? Ksi膮偶ka Pomarantseva jest - mi臋dzy innymi - opowie艣ci膮 o ludziach, kt贸rzy mog膮 by膰 dla nas wzorem. I przestrog膮.
Dzi艣 ju偶 nie ma wstrz膮saj膮cych ksi膮偶ek, tekst贸w, kt贸re musisz przeczyta膰, a pisanie o ksi膮偶ce, 偶e czyta艂o si臋 j膮 czuj膮c ucisk w gardle zdaje si臋 by膰 pretensjonalno艣ci膮 powtarzan膮 w dziesi膮tkach rekomendacji. A przecie偶 bywaj膮 takie ksi膮偶ki. Jak ta.
Pomerantsev w kapitalnym stylu 艂膮cz膮cym informacyjn膮 jako艣膰, reporterski dryg z autobiograficznymi w膮tkami pokazuje nam to, co ukryte za pow艂ok膮 codziennej egzystencji. Poznaje nas z lud藕mi walcz膮cymi z dezinformacj膮, rewolucjonist贸w epoki p贸藕nego kapitalizmu, z tymi, kt贸rzy zrozumieli, 偶e epoka medi贸w spo艂eczno艣ciowych i szybkich obrazk贸w niesie nowe zagro偶enia dla demokracji, wolno艣ci s艂owa i swob贸d obywatelskich. Nowoczesna demokracja poddana manipulacji mo偶e sta膰 si臋 skuteczn膮 broni膮 wymierzon膮 we wszystkich wierz膮cych w艂a艣nie w demokracj臋. Na czym polega ten zakl臋ty kr膮g i czy mo偶emy go przerwa膰 - naprawd臋 to trzeba przeczyta膰.
Ksi膮偶k臋 na ok艂adce polecaj膮 Kasparow i Szot. 艁膮czy nas podziw dla pracy Pomerantseva jak i pewno艣膰, 偶e kr贸lowa jest cz臋sto u偶ywana do podw贸jnego uderzenia. Uszanowanie dla strajkuj膮cych!
May 29, 2021
笑械 泻薪懈谐邪 蟹芯胁褋褨屑 薪械 锌褉芯 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写褍 褨 褟泻 褩褩 褉芯蟹锌褨蟹薪邪胁邪褌懈. 袙褨写 褋谢芯胁邪 "蟹芯胁褋褨屑".
袩褨褌械褉 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 褍 褋胁芯褩泄 泻薪懈蟹褨 "笑械 薪械 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪" 蟹芯褋械褉械写懈胁褋褟 薪邪 薪邪斜邪谐邪褌芯 胁邪卸谢懈胁褨褕芯屑褍 邪褋锌械泻褌褨 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写懈 (薪邪 屑芯褞 写褍屑泻褍) - 褟泻 胁锌谢懈胁邪褦 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 薪邪 谢褞写械泄, 锌芯谢褨褌懈泻褍 褌邪 褋胁褨褌 蟹邪谐邪谢芯屑. 袉 褟 写褍屑邪褞, 褖芯 褑械 褔褍写芯胁芯 馃憣.
6 褨褋褌芯褉褨泄 蟹 褍褋褜芯谐芯 褋胁褨褌褍, 褟泻褨 锌械褉械胁械褉薪褍褌褜 胁邪褕械 斜邪褔械薪薪褟 胁锌谢懈胁褍 褌邪 褔芯屑褍 锌芯薪褟褌褌褟" 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 - 褑械 锌芯谐邪薪芯" 薪械 褦 邪泻褌褍邪谢褜薪懈屑. 袙褨写 小楔袗 褌邪 袦械泻褋懈泻懈 写芯 校泻褉邪褩薪懈 褌邪 袝褋褌芯薪褨褩, 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 泻械褉褍褦 褋胁褨褌芯屑. 袨褌 褌褨谢褜泻懈 褖械 30 褉芯泻褨胁 褌芯屑褍 胁芯薪邪 斜褍谢邪 褍 褉褍泻邪褏 褌械谢械斜邪褔械薪薪褟 褌邪 谐邪蟹械褌, 褋褜芯谐芯写薪褨 卸 胁芯薪邪 蟹邪褏芯锌懈谢邪 褨薪褌械褉薪械褌. 袣褨锌械褉褏邪褉邪褋屑械薪褌, 锌械褉械褋谢褨写褍胁邪薪薪褟 胁 屑械褉械卸褨, 锌芯谐褉芯蟹懈 褌邪" 胁斜懈胁褔褨" 泻芯屑械薪褌邪褉褨 - 褌械锌械褉 蟹薪邪褔薪芯 锌褉芯褋褌褨褕械 褉芯蟹泻褉褍褌懈褌懈 蟹 薪褨褖芯 胁械谢懈泻褍 锌褉芯斜谢械屑褍, 胁泻谢邪褋褌懈 胁 谐芯谢芯胁懈 谢褞写褟屑 "泻芯谐芯 胁芯薪懈 褏芯褔褍褌褜 斜邪褔懈褌懈 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌芯屑" 褌邪 蟹邪 写芯锌芯屑芯谐芯褞 芯写薪芯谐芯 褎芯褌芯 褔懈 褎褉邪蟹懈 褉芯蟹胁'褟蟹邪褌懈 薪械胁械谢懈褔泻褍 胁褨泄薪褍 写械褋褜 薪邪 小褏芯写褨 褔懈 屑褨卸 泻邪褉褌械谢褟屑懈 褍 袦械泻褋懈褑褨.
小褍褔邪褋薪褨褋褌褜 谢械谐泻芯 锌械褉械屑械褉械卸邪薪邪 蟹 屑懈薪褍谢懈屑. 袩褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 胁 小袪小袪, 褌芯写褨 泻芯谢懈 谢懈褕 褋芯褑褨邪谢褨蟹屑 - "胁械褉褕懈薪邪 胁褋褜芯谐芯", "胁褉邪谐懈 薪邪褉芯写邪" 褌邪 写懈褋懈写械薪褋褌胁芯. 袗胁褌芯褉 薪械 蟹 锌械褉械泻邪蟹褨胁 褉芯蟹锌芯胁褨写邪褦 薪械 锌褉芯褋褌褍 锌褉邪胁写褍. 携泻, 褖芯 褨 泻芯谢懈, 褌邪 褔芯屑褍 胁褔械薪薪褟 褋芯褞蟹褍 写芯褋褨 薪械 胁屑械褉谢芯.
笑褨泻邪胁芯, 邪泻褌褍邪谢褜薪芯 褌邪 芯褌胁械褉械蟹谢懈胁芯 - 褋邪屑械 褌械, 褖芯 褌褉械斜邪 鉁旓笍
袩褨褌械褉 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 褍 褋胁芯褩泄 泻薪懈蟹褨 "笑械 薪械 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪" 蟹芯褋械褉械写懈胁褋褟 薪邪 薪邪斜邪谐邪褌芯 胁邪卸谢懈胁褨褕芯屑褍 邪褋锌械泻褌褨 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写懈 (薪邪 屑芯褞 写褍屑泻褍) - 褟泻 胁锌谢懈胁邪褦 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 薪邪 谢褞写械泄, 锌芯谢褨褌懈泻褍 褌邪 褋胁褨褌 蟹邪谐邪谢芯屑. 袉 褟 写褍屑邪褞, 褖芯 褑械 褔褍写芯胁芯 馃憣.
6 褨褋褌芯褉褨泄 蟹 褍褋褜芯谐芯 褋胁褨褌褍, 褟泻褨 锌械褉械胁械褉薪褍褌褜 胁邪褕械 斜邪褔械薪薪褟 胁锌谢懈胁褍 褌邪 褔芯屑褍 锌芯薪褟褌褌褟" 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 - 褑械 锌芯谐邪薪芯" 薪械 褦 邪泻褌褍邪谢褜薪懈屑. 袙褨写 小楔袗 褌邪 袦械泻褋懈泻懈 写芯 校泻褉邪褩薪懈 褌邪 袝褋褌芯薪褨褩, 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 泻械褉褍褦 褋胁褨褌芯屑. 袨褌 褌褨谢褜泻懈 褖械 30 褉芯泻褨胁 褌芯屑褍 胁芯薪邪 斜褍谢邪 褍 褉褍泻邪褏 褌械谢械斜邪褔械薪薪褟 褌邪 谐邪蟹械褌, 褋褜芯谐芯写薪褨 卸 胁芯薪邪 蟹邪褏芯锌懈谢邪 褨薪褌械褉薪械褌. 袣褨锌械褉褏邪褉邪褋屑械薪褌, 锌械褉械褋谢褨写褍胁邪薪薪褟 胁 屑械褉械卸褨, 锌芯谐褉芯蟹懈 褌邪" 胁斜懈胁褔褨" 泻芯屑械薪褌邪褉褨 - 褌械锌械褉 蟹薪邪褔薪芯 锌褉芯褋褌褨褕械 褉芯蟹泻褉褍褌懈褌懈 蟹 薪褨褖芯 胁械谢懈泻褍 锌褉芯斜谢械屑褍, 胁泻谢邪褋褌懈 胁 谐芯谢芯胁懈 谢褞写褟屑 "泻芯谐芯 胁芯薪懈 褏芯褔褍褌褜 斜邪褔懈褌懈 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌芯屑" 褌邪 蟹邪 写芯锌芯屑芯谐芯褞 芯写薪芯谐芯 褎芯褌芯 褔懈 褎褉邪蟹懈 褉芯蟹胁'褟蟹邪褌懈 薪械胁械谢懈褔泻褍 胁褨泄薪褍 写械褋褜 薪邪 小褏芯写褨 褔懈 屑褨卸 泻邪褉褌械谢褟屑懈 褍 袦械泻褋懈褑褨.
小褍褔邪褋薪褨褋褌褜 谢械谐泻芯 锌械褉械屑械褉械卸邪薪邪 蟹 屑懈薪褍谢懈屑. 袩褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪 胁 小袪小袪, 褌芯写褨 泻芯谢懈 谢懈褕 褋芯褑褨邪谢褨蟹屑 - "胁械褉褕懈薪邪 胁褋褜芯谐芯", "胁褉邪谐懈 薪邪褉芯写邪" 褌邪 写懈褋懈写械薪褋褌胁芯. 袗胁褌芯褉 薪械 蟹 锌械褉械泻邪蟹褨胁 褉芯蟹锌芯胁褨写邪褦 薪械 锌褉芯褋褌褍 锌褉邪胁写褍. 携泻, 褖芯 褨 泻芯谢懈, 褌邪 褔芯屑褍 胁褔械薪薪褟 褋芯褞蟹褍 写芯褋褨 薪械 胁屑械褉谢芯.
笑褨泻邪胁芯, 邪泻褌褍邪谢褜薪芯 褌邪 芯褌胁械褉械蟹谢懈胁芯 - 褋邪屑械 褌械, 褖芯 褌褉械斜邪 鉁旓笍
May 9, 2022
胁褋械-褌邪泻懈 锌械褉械斜褍胁邪薪薪褟 薪邪 褉芯褋褨褩, 锌芯锌褉懈 写芯泻谢邪写薪褨 褨 褉芯蟹谢芯谐褨 芯锌懈褋懈 褌芯谐芯, 褟泻 写褨褦 褉芯褋褨泄褋褜泻邪 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪, 写褨褦 蟹谐褍斜薪芯.
"袞懈褉褨薪芯胁褋褜泻懈泄 屑邪胁 薪邪 褍胁邪蟹褨 斜褍薪褌褨胁薪褍 褉械褋锌褍斜谢褨泻褍 效械褔薪褟, 写械 褔械褉械蟹 褉褨泻 袪芯褋褨褟 胁械褋褌懈屑械 胁褨写褔邪泄写褍褕薪褍 胁褨泄薪褍, 斜械蟹 芯谐谢褟写褍 薪邪 卸械褉褌胁懈 褋械褉械写 屑懈褉薪芯谐芯 薪邪褋械谢械薪薪褟, 褨听写械 褋邪屑械 锌芯褔懈薪邪胁 蟹邪褉芯写卸褍胁邪褌懈褋褟 褨褋谢邪屑褋褜泻懈泄 械泻褋褌褉械屑褨蟹屑 薪芯胁芯谐芯 泻褕褌邪谢褌褍."
"袥褨薪邪 蟹薪褨屑邪谢邪 褨听褔械褔械薪褋褜泻懈褏 褋械锌邪褉邪褌懈褋褌褨胁 褍听谐芯褉邪褏 袣邪胁泻邪蟹褍. 袙芯薪懈 芯锌懈褋褍胁邪谢懈 褋胁芯褞 斜芯褉芯褌褜斜褍 褟泻 薪邪褑褨芯薪邪谢褜薪械 胁懈蟹胁芯谢械薪薪褟, 芯写薪械 蟹-锌芯屑褨卸 褨薪褕懈褏..."
褔械褔械薪褋褜泻褨 褋械锌邪褉邪褌懈褋褌懈? 斜褍薪褌褨胁薪邪 褉械褋锌褍斜谢褨泻邪? 锌褨褋谢褟 写胁芯褏 泻褉懈胁邪胁懈褏 胁褨泄薪, 褟泻褨 褉芯褋褨褟 胁械谢邪, 褨 胁薪邪褋谢褨写芯泻 褟泻懈褏 泻褉邪褩薪邪, 褟 屑邪褞 薪邪 褍胁邪蟹褨, 效械褔薪褞, 斜褍谢邪 蟹薪械泻褉芯胁谢械薪邪, 屑褨褋褌邪 锌芯褉褍泄薪芯胁邪薪褨, 胁褉械褕褌褨 褌邪泻懈 褋褌邪谢邪 锌褉懈写邪褌泻芯屑 褉芯褋褨褩, 褨 褉邪写懈泻邪谢褜薪邪 褨褋谢邪屑褨蟹邪褑褨褟 褋褌邪谢邪 薪邪褋谢褨写泻芯屑 褌芯谐芯, 褖芯 蟹 薪械褞 蟹褉芯斜懈谢邪 褉褎褨褟.
褔械褔械薪褋褜泻褨 褌械褉芯褉懈褋褌懈 褉芯褋褨泄褋褜泻懈泄 薪邪褉邪褌懈胁, 褟泻懈屑 胁懈锌褉邪胁写芯胁褍胁邪谢懈褋褟 胁褨泄薪懈 胁 效械褔薪褨 - 写械 卸 胁邪褕 褎邪泻褌褔械泻褨薪谐, 锌邪薪械 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁?)
"袞懈褉褨薪芯胁褋褜泻懈泄 屑邪胁 薪邪 褍胁邪蟹褨 斜褍薪褌褨胁薪褍 褉械褋锌褍斜谢褨泻褍 效械褔薪褟, 写械 褔械褉械蟹 褉褨泻 袪芯褋褨褟 胁械褋褌懈屑械 胁褨写褔邪泄写褍褕薪褍 胁褨泄薪褍, 斜械蟹 芯谐谢褟写褍 薪邪 卸械褉褌胁懈 褋械褉械写 屑懈褉薪芯谐芯 薪邪褋械谢械薪薪褟, 褨听写械 褋邪屑械 锌芯褔懈薪邪胁 蟹邪褉芯写卸褍胁邪褌懈褋褟 褨褋谢邪屑褋褜泻懈泄 械泻褋褌褉械屑褨蟹屑 薪芯胁芯谐芯 泻褕褌邪谢褌褍."
"袥褨薪邪 蟹薪褨屑邪谢邪 褨听褔械褔械薪褋褜泻懈褏 褋械锌邪褉邪褌懈褋褌褨胁 褍听谐芯褉邪褏 袣邪胁泻邪蟹褍. 袙芯薪懈 芯锌懈褋褍胁邪谢懈 褋胁芯褞 斜芯褉芯褌褜斜褍 褟泻 薪邪褑褨芯薪邪谢褜薪械 胁懈蟹胁芯谢械薪薪褟, 芯写薪械 蟹-锌芯屑褨卸 褨薪褕懈褏..."
褔械褔械薪褋褜泻褨 褋械锌邪褉邪褌懈褋褌懈? 斜褍薪褌褨胁薪邪 褉械褋锌褍斜谢褨泻邪? 锌褨褋谢褟 写胁芯褏 泻褉懈胁邪胁懈褏 胁褨泄薪, 褟泻褨 褉芯褋褨褟 胁械谢邪, 褨 胁薪邪褋谢褨写芯泻 褟泻懈褏 泻褉邪褩薪邪, 褟 屑邪褞 薪邪 褍胁邪蟹褨, 效械褔薪褞, 斜褍谢邪 蟹薪械泻褉芯胁谢械薪邪, 屑褨褋褌邪 锌芯褉褍泄薪芯胁邪薪褨, 胁褉械褕褌褨 褌邪泻懈 褋褌邪谢邪 锌褉懈写邪褌泻芯屑 褉芯褋褨褩, 褨 褉邪写懈泻邪谢褜薪邪 褨褋谢邪屑褨蟹邪褑褨褟 褋褌邪谢邪 薪邪褋谢褨写泻芯屑 褌芯谐芯, 褖芯 蟹 薪械褞 蟹褉芯斜懈谢邪 褉褎褨褟.
褔械褔械薪褋褜泻褨 褌械褉芯褉懈褋褌懈 褉芯褋褨泄褋褜泻懈泄 薪邪褉邪褌懈胁, 褟泻懈屑 胁懈锌褉邪胁写芯胁褍胁邪谢懈褋褟 胁褨泄薪懈 胁 效械褔薪褨 - 写械 卸 胁邪褕 褎邪泻褌褔械泻褨薪谐, 锌邪薪械 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁?)
July 19, 2020
袛谢褟 褉芯蟹褍屑褨薪薪褟 褋懈褌褍邪褑褨褩, 胁 褟泻褨泄 芯锌懈薪懈谢懈褋褟 屑懈褋谢褟褔褨 谢褞写懈 褍褋褜芯谐芯 褋胁褨褌褍. 袦芯卸谢懈胁芯 写芯锌芯屑芯卸械 褌褉芯褏懈 蟹斜邪谐薪褍褌懈 褋锌芯褋芯斜懈 胁懈褏芯写褍 褔懈 锌芯写芯谢邪薪薪褟 褋懈屑褍谢褟泻褉褍 褋屑懈褋谢褨胁 褨 蟹薪邪褔械薪褜.
November 2, 2019
... I see people I have known my whole life slip away from me on social media, reposting conspiracies from sources I have never heard of, some sort of internet undercurrent pulling whole families apart, as if we never really knew each other , as if the algorithms know more about us than we do, as if we are becoming subsets of our own data, which is rearranging our relations and identities with its own logic, or in the cause of someone else's interests we can't even see ...The trick with pro-grade "disinformation" seems to be not just creating one reality for each target audience, but the complete disregard with which you create a separate one for another target audience without alerting the first. Until the disinformer has mastered the art, he or she may be concerned with a unified spread of influence, across a broad range of a target population, but the opposite appears to be true. Narrowing and segmenting the target is much more important than any concern with "consistency". Micro-targeting sets specific mousetraps for specific, shortrange goals, undetectable shifts that can be expanded and later congealed as a position. And eventually a position that nobody would have agreed with in the first place. All is deniable, the important thing is outcome. Let them debate fairness, or moving goalposts, in the unflattering glow of defeat.
Soviet-Kiev born Pomerantsev takes a two-part approach to his book (his update, really, since his first book, which was more Russia-centric) --in which the main stream is his tour of world Information specialists, analysts, dissidents and movement people, who narrate their perspective of a world that is finding that truth is more debateable than ever. Against which he mixes in some elements of biography, his childhood with dissident parents, a family who escaped to the West. His parents worked in film and media, and Pomerantsev grew up in the shadows of his father's new employers, both the BBC and Radio Free Europe. Under each category of narrative in the book, the theme is basically the definition of control. Which entities shape history, and how their manipulation of information deceives the participants.
We get the all-too-familiar, with whispering campaigns, scam, smear, and fake news. Alongside of which we get the new developments, which the Russians call active measures--- where capillarity, white-jamming, sockpuppets, cyborgs, trolls and bot-herders all move among us. And which cumulatively are able to force large change in microscopic interest-groups.
The former Cambridge Analytica analyst Christopher Wylie has placed the blame for access squarely in the hands of Facebook: 鈥淚magine we are on a blind date, we鈥檝e never met before and I start telling you how much I love your favourite musicians, how I watch the same TV as you do etc, and you realise the reason I鈥檓 so perfect for you is because I spent the last two years going through your photo albums, reading your text messages and talking to your friends. Facebook is that stalker.鈥� In the current climate of untrustworthy influence campaigns, using an algorithm-based, non-randomized platform to obtain your news, your politics, your positions-- is to hand over the keys of the car to an unknown driver.
Pomerantsev's book is a kind of intermediate disinfo reader; it hops all over the map, but it's useful to recall the timeline in the narrative. The key dates in the origin of the Information Plague are these: 1991, fall of the Berlin Wall & Soviet Union; 2000, election of Kgb Officer Putin to Russian Federation; 2007, the Russian hack and cyber-shutdown of Estonia; 2014, the Russian invasion and disinfo war with Ukraine; 2016, Brexit, and the assisted appointment of Donald Trump to the US Presidency.
The soaring use of influence campaigns is mirrored by the rise of unregulated new information platforms, only now imaginable via new technologies. Both the Russians and the West-- from the First World War forward, really--have used propaganda techniques to bias and control the facts and fictions that write history. America has always had a culture & soft-power apparatus operating in tandem with its wartime propaganda campaigns; the Cold War expanded and diffused those boundaries. The Russians seem never to have differentiated the two. The fine print under the Russian campaigns seems to be that Life Is Wartime. And to be fair, if your life was the 2oth Century in Ukraine or East Germany, that may not be far off. But it's important to recognize it and label it, define the components and name them. Pomerantsev, along with others, like Wylie, like Masha Gessen-- are doing just that.
It matters. It's personal, it's life and death.
Manufactured Consent-- is not consent.
December 7, 2020
孝械, 褖芯 锌芯褌褨褕懈谢芯 - 褟泻 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁懈 褌褉邪写懈褑褨泄薪芯 锌芯锌褍谢褟褉懈蟹褍褞褌褜 效械褉薪褨胁褑褨 褌邪 校泻褉邪褩薪褍. 袙褔邪褌褜 胁褨写褉褨蟹薪褟褌懈 褩褩 胁褨写 袪芯褋褨褩. 孝邪泻 褋邪屑芯 褌褉邪写懈褑褨泄薪芯 写芯斜褉械 袩褨褌械褉 锌芯泻邪蟹褍褦 蟹邪锌谢褍褌邪薪褨褋褌褜 褉芯褋褨泄褋褜泻芯褩 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写懈, 褋泻谢邪写薪褨褋褌褜 褩褩 褨 褌芯谐芯, 褖芯 写芯 泻褨薪褑褟 褌邪泻懈 薪械胁褨写芯屑芯, 褟泻 褩褩 锌褉芯褌懈褋褌芯褟褌懈. 些芯 褑械 褌邪泻芯卸 锌芯褋懈谢褞褦 屑褨褌芯谢芯谐褨褞 褑褨褦褩 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写懈. 效褍写芯胁芯 褉芯蟹泻邪蟹邪薪芯 锌褉芯 邪泻褌懈胁褨褋褌褨胁 褌邪 写芯 褔芯谐芯 屑芯卸械 锌褉懈蟹胁械褋褌懈 锌褨写褌褉懈屑泻邪 锌芯锌褍谢褨褋褌褨胁, 薪邪胁褨褌褜, 褟泻褖芯 胁芯薪邪 褋懈褌褍邪褌懈胁薪邪.
孝邪泻芯卸 褑褨泻邪胁芯 褋谢褍褏邪褌懈 锌褉芯 械泻褋锌械褉懈屑械薪褌懈 褉邪写褨芯褋胁芯斜芯写褨胁褋褜泻懈褏 褉邪写褨泄薪懈泻褨胁 蟹褨 蟹胁褍泻芯屑. 孝褉械斜邪 斜褍写械 斜褨谢褜褕械 锌芯褕褍泻邪褌懈 械褎褨褉褨胁 锌邪薪邪 袉谐芯褉邪.
孝褉芯褏懈 薪械蟹褉芯蟹褍屑褨谢懈屑 胁懈写邪胁褋褟 褉芯蟹写褨谢 锌褉芯 校泻褉邪褩薪褍. 袟写邪褦褌褜褋褟, 锌邪薪 袩褨褌械褉 薪邪屑邪谐邪胁褋褟 薪邪褋褌褨谢褜泻懈 斜褍褌懈 芯斜'褦泻褌懈胁薪懈屑, 褖芯 褌褉芯褏懈 褨蟹 褑懈屑 锌械褉械谐薪褍胁.
孝褉芯褏懈 斜褉邪泻褍胁邪谢芯 褟泻芯褩褋褜 薪芯胁芯褩, 褋胁褨卸芯褩 褨写械褩, 泻芯褌褉邪 斜懈 褟泻褨褋薪芯 胁褨写褉褨蟹薪褟谢邪 褑褞 泻薪懈卸泻褍 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁邪 胁褨写 锌芯锌械褉械写薪褨褏.
袧褍 褨 褟 褋谢褍褏邪胁 邪褍写褨芯泻薪懈卸泻褍, 褨 褌褉芯褏懈 薪械蟹褉褍褔薪芯 胁 薪褨泄 褌械, 褖芯 泄写械 芯写薪懈屑 褎邪泄谢芯屑, 薪械 锌芯写褨谢械薪邪 褏芯褔邪 斜懈 薪邪 褉芯蟹写褨谢懈. 笑械 写褍卸械 褍褋泻谢邪写薪褞褦 锌芯褕褍泻 褟泻芯谐芯褋褜 锌芯褌褉褨斜薪芯谐芯 屑芯屑械薪褌褍. 袗谢械 褑械 锌褉械褌械薪蟹褨褟 写芯 胁懈写邪胁薪懈褑褌胁邪.
孝邪泻芯卸 褑褨泻邪胁芯 褋谢褍褏邪褌懈 锌褉芯 械泻褋锌械褉懈屑械薪褌懈 褉邪写褨芯褋胁芯斜芯写褨胁褋褜泻懈褏 褉邪写褨泄薪懈泻褨胁 蟹褨 蟹胁褍泻芯屑. 孝褉械斜邪 斜褍写械 斜褨谢褜褕械 锌芯褕褍泻邪褌懈 械褎褨褉褨胁 锌邪薪邪 袉谐芯褉邪.
孝褉芯褏懈 薪械蟹褉芯蟹褍屑褨谢懈屑 胁懈写邪胁褋褟 褉芯蟹写褨谢 锌褉芯 校泻褉邪褩薪褍. 袟写邪褦褌褜褋褟, 锌邪薪 袩褨褌械褉 薪邪屑邪谐邪胁褋褟 薪邪褋褌褨谢褜泻懈 斜褍褌懈 芯斜'褦泻褌懈胁薪懈屑, 褖芯 褌褉芯褏懈 褨蟹 褑懈屑 锌械褉械谐薪褍胁.
孝褉芯褏懈 斜褉邪泻褍胁邪谢芯 褟泻芯褩褋褜 薪芯胁芯褩, 褋胁褨卸芯褩 褨写械褩, 泻芯褌褉邪 斜懈 褟泻褨褋薪芯 胁褨写褉褨蟹薪褟谢邪 褑褞 泻薪懈卸泻褍 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁邪 胁褨写 锌芯锌械褉械写薪褨褏.
袧褍 褨 褟 褋谢褍褏邪胁 邪褍写褨芯泻薪懈卸泻褍, 褨 褌褉芯褏懈 薪械蟹褉褍褔薪芯 胁 薪褨泄 褌械, 褖芯 泄写械 芯写薪懈屑 褎邪泄谢芯屑, 薪械 锌芯写褨谢械薪邪 褏芯褔邪 斜懈 薪邪 褉芯蟹写褨谢懈. 笑械 写褍卸械 褍褋泻谢邪写薪褞褦 锌芯褕褍泻 褟泻芯谐芯褋褜 锌芯褌褉褨斜薪芯谐芯 屑芯屑械薪褌褍. 袗谢械 褑械 锌褉械褌械薪蟹褨褟 写芯 胁懈写邪胁薪懈褑褌胁邪.
September 16, 2019
4.5 rounded down
June 24, 2022
鈥溞愋盒� 薪械 屑芯卸械褕 写邪 谐懈 褍斜械写懈褕, 芯斜褗褉泻邪泄 谐懈鈥� 械 褕懈褉芯泻芯 褉邪蟹锌褉芯褋褌褉邪薪械薪邪 锌芯谢懈褌懈褔械褋泻邪 褎褉邪蟹邪 褋 写芯薪褟泻褗写械 褋锌芯褉薪芯 邪胁褌芯褉褋褌胁芯 (啸邪褉懈 孝褉褍屑邪薪 懈谢懈 啸懈褌谢械褉?), 褑懈褉泻褍谢懈褉邪褖邪 褉械谐褍谢褟褉薪芯 胁 谢械泻褑懈芯薪薪懈褌械 泻褍褉褋芯胁械 锌芯 锌芯谢懈褌懈褔械褋泻懈 薪邪褍泻懈. 小谢械写 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌褋泻懈褌械 懈蟹斜芯褉懈 胁 小袗些 锌褉械蟹 2016 谐. 泻邪褌芯 褔械 谢懈 蟹邪锌邪写薪芯褌芯 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯 薪邪泄-薪邪泻褉邪褟 褋械 锌芯褉邪蟹斜褍写懈 懈 芯褋褗蟹薪邪 褋懈谢邪褌邪 薪邪 褌芯胁邪 屑芯褌芯 懈 泻芯谢泻芯 锌芯-谢械褋薪芯 懈 褌褉邪泄薪芯 械 写邪 芯斜褗褉泻邪褕 屑邪褋懈褌械, 芯褌泻芯谢泻芯褌芯 写邪 谐懈 褍斜械写懈褕.
袩褉械蟹 1952 谐. 胁 袘芯谢褜褕邪虂褟 褋芯胁械虂褌褋泻邪褟 褝薪褑懈泻谢芯锌械虂写懈褟 械 胁泻谢褞褔械薪芯 芯锌褉械写械谢械薪懈械 蟹邪 褌械褉屑懈薪邪 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟: 鈥溠勑靶谎埿感残� 懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟 褋 褑械谢 蟹邪斜谢褍写邪 薪邪 芯斜褖械褋褌胁械薪芯褌芯 屑薪械薪懈械鈥�, 邪 褍锌褉邪胁谢械薪褋泻懈褌械 褋褌褉褍泻褌褍褉懈 薪邪 袣袚袘 芯褌谢懈褔薪芯 胁薪械写褉褟胁邪褌 懈 芯锌芯谢蟹芯褌胁芯褉褟胁邪褌 锌褗谢薪懈褟 锌芯褌械薪褑懈邪谢 薪邪 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟褌邪 胁 褋胁芯褟褌邪 褌邪泻褌懈褔械褋泻邪 写械泄薪芯褋褌, 薪邪褉械褔械薪邪 邪泻褌懈胁薪懈 屑械褉芯锌褉懈褟褌懈褟.
袝胁芯谢褞褑懈褟褌邪 薪邪 褌邪蟹懈 斜械蟹薪褉邪胁褋褌胁械薪邪 锌褉邪泻褌懈泻邪 械 芯褌谢懈褔薪芯 锌褉芯褋谢械写械薪邪 胁 泻薪懈谐邪褌邪 薪邪 袩懈褌褗褉 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 鈥溞⑿拘残� 薪械 械 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪鈥�. 袠蟹褋谢械写胁邪薪械褌芯 薪邪 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 械 胁褗褉褏褍 褌芯胁邪 泻邪泻 懈薪褌械褉薪械褌, 胁 褔邪褋褌薪芯褋褌 褋芯褑懈邪谢薪懈褌械 屑械写懈懈, 褋械 锌褉械胁褉褗褖邪褌 胁 屑芯褖薪芯 芯褉褗卸懈械 蟹邪 屑邪薪懈锌褍谢懈褉邪薪械 薪邪 芯斜褖械褋褌胁械薪芯褌芯 屑薪械薪懈械, 蟹邪 芯褋薪芯胁薪芯 褋褉械写褋褌胁芯 胁 褉邪蟹锌褉芯褋褌褉邪薪械薪懈械 薪邪 褏懈斜褉懈写薪邪褌邪 胁芯泄薪邪, 蟹邪 褉邪蟹斜懈胁邪薪械 薪邪 褉械锌褍褌邪褑懈懈, 蟹邪 褋褗蟹写邪胁邪薪械 薪邪 褎邪谢褕懈胁懈 褉械邪谢薪芯褋褌懈, 泻芯薪褋锌懈褉邪褑懈懈, 邪谢褌械褉薪邪褌懈胁薪懈 褎邪泻褌懈 懈 胁褋褟泻邪泻胁懈 写褉褍谐懈 褉械邪泻褌懈胁薪懈 懈蟹褉邪褋褌褗褑懈 薪邪 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟褌邪. 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 锌褉械写褋褌邪胁褟 写械褌邪泄谢薪芯 懈 褋 胁薪懈屑邪薪懈械 屑邪褖邪斜邪 薪邪 锌褉芯斜谢械屑邪, 泻芯泄褌芯 薪械 屑芯卸械 写邪 斜褗写械 锌芯写屑懈薪邪褌, 蟹邪褖芯褌芯 泻褉邪泄薪邪褌邪 褑械谢 薪邪 邪褌邪泻懈褌械 褋褉械褖褍 褎邪泻褌懈褌械 械 写械褋褌邪斜懈谢懈蟹邪褑懈褟 薪邪 写械屑芯泻褉邪褑懈褟褌邪 懈 褉邪蟹褑械锌谢械薪懈械 胁 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯褌芯. 笑械薪薪芯褌芯 胁 褉邪斜芯褌邪褌邪 薪邪 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 械 屑薪芯谐芯芯斜褏胁邪褌薪芯褋褌褌邪 薪邪 懈蟹褋谢械写胁邪薪械褌芯, 锌褉械写褋褌邪胁械薪芯 泻邪褌芯 褏褉芯薪芯谢芯谐懈褟 薪邪 芯薪谢邪泄薪 邪褌邪泻懈 胁 褉邪蟹谢懈褔薪懈 褌芯褔泻懈 薪邪 褋胁械褌邪.
袝写薪邪 芯褌 锌褗褉胁懈褌械 卸械褉褌胁懈, 褋 泻芯褟褌芯 薪懈 褋褉械褖邪 邪胁褌芯褉邪 械 褎懈谢懈锌懈薪褋泻邪褌邪 卸褍褉薪邪谢懈褋褌泻邪 袦邪褉懈褟 袪械蟹邪. 袟邪褉邪写懈 邪泻褌懈胁薪邪褌邪 褋懈 斜懈褌泻邪褌邪 褋褉械褖褍 褎邪谢褕懈胁懈褌械 薪芯胁懈薪懈 袪械蟹邪 褋褌邪胁邪 芯褋薪芯胁薪邪 屑懈褕械薪邪 薪邪 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 袛褍褌械褉褌械 懈 薪械锌褉械泻褗褋薪邪褌芯 械 芯斜械泻褌 薪邪 邪褌邪泻懈, 邪褉械褋褌懈 懈 谐褉芯蟹薪懈 芯斜懈写懈. 袩褉械蟹 2021 谐. 袦邪褉懈褟 袪械蟹邪 锌芯谢褍褔懈 袧芯斜械谢芯胁邪 薪邪谐褉邪写邪 蟹邪 屑懈褉 蟹邪械写薪芯 褋 谐谢邪胁薪懈褟 褉械写邪泻褌芯褉 薪邪 褉褍褋泻懈褟 胁械褋褌薪懈泻 鈥溞澬拘残把� 谐邪蟹械褌邪鈥� 袛屑懈褌褉懈 袦褍褉邪褌芯胁.
鈥溞⑿拘残� 薪械 械 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪鈥� 械 薪邪褋懈褌械薪邪 褋 锌褉懈屑械褉懈 蟹邪 泻褉械褏泻芯褋褌褌邪 薪邪 懈褋褌懈薪邪褌邪, 薪械泄薪邪褌邪 褍褟蟹胁懈屑芯褋褌 懈 褑械谢械薪邪褋芯褔械薪芯 锌褉械懈薪邪褔邪胁邪薪械 胁 锌芯褏胁邪褌懈褌械 蟹邪 锌芯泻芯褉褟胁邪薪械 薪邪 屑邪褋懈褌械 懈 芯褋褗褖械褋褌胁褟胁邪薪械 薪邪 泻芯薪褌褉芯谢 胁褗褉褏褍 屑懈褋谢芯胁薪懈褌械 懈屑 薪邪谐谢邪褋懈. 袨褌 褌褉芯谢褋泻懈褌械 褎械褉屑懈 胁 袪褍褋懈褟, 屑褉械卸邪褌邪 芯褌 鈥溞啃敌窖徯毙狙傃佲€� 胁 袦械泻褋懈泻芯, 谐械泄屑褗褉褋泻懈褟褌 泻邪薪邪谢 The Discord Channel 泻邪褌芯 褋斜芯褉械薪 锌褍薪泻褌 蟹邪 泻褉邪泄薪芯 写械褋薪懈, 写芯 屑械写懈泄薪邪褌邪 褋褉械写邪 胁 小褗褉斜懈褟, 校薪谐邪褉懈褟 懈 孝褍褉褑懈褟 鈥� 泻薪懈谐邪褌邪 屑芯卸械 写邪 斜褗写械 褉邪蟹谐谢械卸写邪薪邪 泻邪褌芯 褕懈褉芯泻邪 械泻褋锌芯蟹懈褑懈褟 芯褌 锌褉懈屑械褉懈 蟹邪 褎褉芯薪褌芯胁懈褌械 谢懈薪懈懈 薪邪 懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪懈褌械 胁芯泄薪懈 懈 褎褉邪泻褌褍褉懈褌械, 泻芯懈褌芯 褌械 薪邪薪邪褋褟褌, 芯褋芯斜械薪芯 胁 薪械褍蟹褉械谢懈褌械 芯斜褖械褋褌胁邪, 泻邪泻胁芯褌芯 械 懈 薪邪褕械褌芯.
袛褉褍谐 懈薪写懈泻邪褌懈胁械薪 锌褉懈屑械褉 蟹邪 褍写邪褉, 褋褉械褖褍 写褗褉卸邪胁邪 褌芯蟹懈 锌褗褌, 械 斜械蟹屑懈谢芯褋褌薪邪褌邪 泻懈斜械褉邪褌邪泻邪 褋褉械褖褍 袝褋褌芯薪懈褟 锌褉械蟹 邪锌褉懈谢 2007 谐., 泻芯谐邪褌芯 褋谢械写 褋械褉懈褟 芯褌 褋斜谢褗褋褗褑懈 屑械卸写褍 褉褍褋芯褎懈谢懈 懈 写械褋薪懈 械褋褌芯薪褑懈, 蟹邪褉邪写懈 锌邪屑械褌薪懈泻邪 薪邪 袘褉芯薪蟹芯胁懈褟 胁芯泄薪懈泻 胁 孝邪谢懈薪, 袝褋褌芯薪懈褟 褍褋褗屑胁邪 锌邪褉邪谢懈蟹懈褉邪薪邪 芯褌 薪械褎褍薪泻褑懈芯薪懈褉邪褖懈 褋褗褉胁褗褉懈. 袠蟹锌褗谢薪械薪懈械褌芯 薪邪 芯斜褖械褋褌胁械薪懈 褍褋谢褍谐懈 械 斜谢芯泻懈褉邪薪芯. 袪褍褋泻懈褌械 屑械写懈懈 械泻褋谢芯邪写懈褉邪褌 褋 锌褉械褍胁械谢懈褔械薪懈 懈 褎邪谢褕懈胁懈 薪芯胁懈薪懈, 薪邪谐薪械褌褟胁邪泄泻懈 芯褖械 锌芯胁械褔械 薪邪锌褉械卸械薪懈械褌芯 褋褉械写 褉褍褋泻芯械蟹懈褔薪芯褌芯 薪邪褋械谢械薪懈械 胁 袝褋褌芯薪懈褟.
袩褉懈屑械褉懈褌械 薪械 褋械 懈蟹褔械褉锌胁邪褌 褋 袝褋褌芯薪懈褟 懈 褌褟 薪械 械 械写懈薪褋褌胁械薪邪褌邪 卸械褉褌胁邪 薪邪 褉褍褋泻懈 泻懈斜械褉- 懈 懈薪褎芯邪褌邪泻懈. 袧懈褌芯 械写薪邪 芯褌 褋邪褌械谢懈褌薪懈褌械 薪邪 斜懈胁褕懈褟 小小小袪 写褗褉卸邪胁懈 薪械 械 锌芯褖邪写械薪邪, 薪芯 写芯泻邪褌芯 锌褉懈 械写薪懈 邪褌邪泻懈褌械 褑械谢褟褌 褉邪蟹械写懈薪械薪懈械 懈 写械蟹懈薪褌械谐褉邪褑懈褟 薪邪 芯斜褖械褋褌胁械薪懈褌械 薪邪谐谢邪褋懈 褋锌褉褟屑芯 蟹邪锌邪写薪懈褟 褋胁褟褌 懈 袝小, 褌芯 锌褉懈 写褉褍谐懈 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪懈褌械 泻邪屑锌邪薪懈懈 褋邪 薪邪褋芯褔械锟斤拷懈 泻褗屑 褌械褉懈褌芯褉懈邪谢薪懈 锌褉懈褋胁芯褟胁邪薪懈褟 鈥� 袗斜褏邪蟹懈褟, 挟卸薪邪 袨褋械褌懈褟, 袣褉懈屑.
袩懈褌褗褉 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 胁 褉芯写械薪 胁 袣懈械胁, 胁 褋械屑械泄褋褌胁芯 薪邪 懈薪褌械谢械泻褌褍邪谢褑懈, 泻芯懈褌芯 褋邪 锌褉懈薪褍写械薪懈 写邪 褋褌邪薪邪褌 写懈褋懈写械薪褌懈 懈 写邪 薪邪锌褍褋薪邪褌 校泻褉邪泄薪邪, 泻芯谐邪褌芯 褌芯泄 械 械写胁邪 薪邪 械写薪邪 谐芯写懈薪邪. 小谢械写 锌芯褔褌懈 褔械褌懈褉懈褋械褌谐芯写懈褕薪芯 芯褌褋褗褋褌胁懈械 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 褋械 胁褉褗褖邪 薪邪 褉芯写薪邪 蟹械屑褟, 蟹邪 写邪 懈蟹褋谢械写胁邪 鈥溞叫靶�-薪械胁械褉芯褟褌薪邪褌邪 懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪邪 斜谢懈褑泻褉懈谐 胁芯泄薪邪 胁 懈褋褌芯褉懈褟褌邪鈥� 鈥� 邪薪械泻褋懈褉邪薪械褌芯 薪邪 袣褉懈屑 懈 褉邪蟹锌邪谢械薪懈褟 胁芯械薪械薪 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌 胁 袛芯薪斜邪褋. 小谢械写胁邪褌 褋褉械褖懈 褋 卸褍褉薪邪谢懈褋褌懈, 邪泻褌懈胁懈褋褌懈 懈 褋胁懈写械褌械谢懈 薪邪 斜褉褍褌邪谢薪邪褌邪 褉褍褋泻邪 懈薪胁邪蟹懈褟. 袨褋胁械薪 褉邪蟹泻邪蟹懈褌械 薪邪 芯褔械胁懈写褑懈, 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 锌褉芯褋谢械写褟胁邪 懈 褌褉邪械泻褌芯褉懈褟褌邪 薪邪 褉褍褋泻邪褌邪 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪邪 邪褌邪泻邪, 褔懈械褌芯 胁褗芯斜褉邪卸械薪懈械 锌芯泻芯褉褟胁邪 褌邪泻懈胁邪 邪斜褋褍褉写薪懈 胁褗褉褏芯胁械, 褔械 泻芯谐邪褌芯 懈蟹褋褌褉械谢褟薪邪褌邪 芯褌 褉褍褋薪邪褑懈褌械 褉邪泻械褌邪 褋胁邪谢褟 锌褉械谢懈褌邪褖懈褟 薪邪写 袥褍谐邪薪褋泻邪 芯斜谢邪褋褌 褋邪屑芯谢械褌 薪邪 袦邪谢邪泄蟹懈褋泻懈褌械 邪胁懈芯薪懈谢懈懈, 褉褍褋泻懈褌械 屑械写懈懈 胁褋械泻懈 写械薪 泻褍写泻褍写褟泻邪褌 薪芯胁懈 薪邪谢褍写薪懈 胁械褉褋懈懈 蟹邪 褌褉邪谐械写懈褟褌邪 鈥� 芯褌 褌邪蟹懈, 褔械 械 写械谢芯 薪邪 褍泻褉邪懈薪褑懈褌械, 泻芯懈褌芯 屑懈褋谢械谢懈, 褔械 褌芯胁邪 械 褋邪屑芯谢械褌邪 薪邪 袩褍褌懈薪 写芯 芯薪邪蟹懈, 胁 泻芯褟褌芯 邪屑械褉懈泻邪薪褑懈褌械 薪邪锌褗谢薪懈谢懈 褋邪屑芯谢械褌邪 褋 褌褉褍锌芯胁械 薪邪 械胁褉械懈, 蟹邪 写邪 锌褉械写懈蟹胁懈泻邪褌 褉褍褋薪邪褑懈褌械 懈 写邪 谐懈 芯斜胁懈薪褟褌 锌褉械写 褋胁械褌邪 褋谢械写 褌芯胁邪.
孝邪蟹懈 褔邪褋褌 薪邪 泻薪懈谐邪褌邪, 褎芯泻褍褋懈褉邪褖邪 褋械 胁褗褉褏褍 校泻褉邪泄薪邪, 械 芯褋芯斜械薪芯 锌芯写褉芯斜薪邪 懈 懈薪褌械褉械褋薪邪 懈 泻邪褌械谐芯褉懈褔薪芯 写械褌褉芯薪懈褉邪 胁褋懈褔泻懈 锌褉芯 泻褉械屑褗谢褋泻懈 芯锌芯褉泻懈 蟹邪 袦邪泄写邪薪邪, 锌芯卸邪褉懈褌械 胁 袨写械褋邪, 懈 胁芯泄薪邪褌邪 胁 袛芯薪斜邪褋, 泻芯懈褌芯 褌褉芯谢芯胁械褌械 邪谐褉械褋懈胁薪芯 褉邪蟹锌褉芯褋褌褉邪薪褟胁邪褏邪 胁 锌褗褉胁懈褌械 褋械写屑懈褑懈 褋谢械写 24 褎械胁褉褍邪褉懈. 袧褟屑邪 写邪 懈蟹写邪胁邪屑 锌芯胁械褔械, 蟹邪 写邪 薪械 胁懈 芯褖械褌褟胁邪屑 芯褌 屑芯屑械薪褌懈褌械 薪邪 懈蟹褍屑谢械薪懈械, 泻芯械褌芯 褌械蟹懈 褉械写芯胁械 褖械 胁懈 写芯薪械褋邪褌.
袩褉械蟹 1952 谐. 胁 袘芯谢褜褕邪虂褟 褋芯胁械虂褌褋泻邪褟 褝薪褑懈泻谢芯锌械虂写懈褟 械 胁泻谢褞褔械薪芯 芯锌褉械写械谢械薪懈械 蟹邪 褌械褉屑懈薪邪 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟: 鈥溠勑靶谎埿感残� 懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟 褋 褑械谢 蟹邪斜谢褍写邪 薪邪 芯斜褖械褋褌胁械薪芯褌芯 屑薪械薪懈械鈥�, 邪 褍锌褉邪胁谢械薪褋泻懈褌械 褋褌褉褍泻褌褍褉懈 薪邪 袣袚袘 芯褌谢懈褔薪芯 胁薪械写褉褟胁邪褌 懈 芯锌芯谢蟹芯褌胁芯褉褟胁邪褌 锌褗谢薪懈褟 锌芯褌械薪褑懈邪谢 薪邪 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟褌邪 胁 褋胁芯褟褌邪 褌邪泻褌懈褔械褋泻邪 写械泄薪芯褋褌, 薪邪褉械褔械薪邪 邪泻褌懈胁薪懈 屑械褉芯锌褉懈褟褌懈褟.
袝胁芯谢褞褑懈褟褌邪 薪邪 褌邪蟹懈 斜械蟹薪褉邪胁褋褌胁械薪邪 锌褉邪泻褌懈泻邪 械 芯褌谢懈褔薪芯 锌褉芯褋谢械写械薪邪 胁 泻薪懈谐邪褌邪 薪邪 袩懈褌褗褉 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 鈥溞⑿拘残� 薪械 械 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪鈥�. 袠蟹褋谢械写胁邪薪械褌芯 薪邪 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 械 胁褗褉褏褍 褌芯胁邪 泻邪泻 懈薪褌械褉薪械褌, 胁 褔邪褋褌薪芯褋褌 褋芯褑懈邪谢薪懈褌械 屑械写懈懈, 褋械 锌褉械胁褉褗褖邪褌 胁 屑芯褖薪芯 芯褉褗卸懈械 蟹邪 屑邪薪懈锌褍谢懈褉邪薪械 薪邪 芯斜褖械褋褌胁械薪芯褌芯 屑薪械薪懈械, 蟹邪 芯褋薪芯胁薪芯 褋褉械写褋褌胁芯 胁 褉邪蟹锌褉芯褋褌褉邪薪械薪懈械 薪邪 褏懈斜褉懈写薪邪褌邪 胁芯泄薪邪, 蟹邪 褉邪蟹斜懈胁邪薪械 薪邪 褉械锌褍褌邪褑懈懈, 蟹邪 褋褗蟹写邪胁邪薪械 薪邪 褎邪谢褕懈胁懈 褉械邪谢薪芯褋褌懈, 泻芯薪褋锌懈褉邪褑懈懈, 邪谢褌械褉薪邪褌懈胁薪懈 褎邪泻褌懈 懈 胁褋褟泻邪泻胁懈 写褉褍谐懈 褉械邪泻褌懈胁薪懈 懈蟹褉邪褋褌褗褑懈 薪邪 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈褟褌邪. 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 锌褉械写褋褌邪胁褟 写械褌邪泄谢薪芯 懈 褋 胁薪懈屑邪薪懈械 屑邪褖邪斜邪 薪邪 锌褉芯斜谢械屑邪, 泻芯泄褌芯 薪械 屑芯卸械 写邪 斜褗写械 锌芯写屑懈薪邪褌, 蟹邪褖芯褌芯 泻褉邪泄薪邪褌邪 褑械谢 薪邪 邪褌邪泻懈褌械 褋褉械褖褍 褎邪泻褌懈褌械 械 写械褋褌邪斜懈谢懈蟹邪褑懈褟 薪邪 写械屑芯泻褉邪褑懈褟褌邪 懈 褉邪蟹褑械锌谢械薪懈械 胁 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯褌芯. 笑械薪薪芯褌芯 胁 褉邪斜芯褌邪褌邪 薪邪 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 械 屑薪芯谐芯芯斜褏胁邪褌薪芯褋褌褌邪 薪邪 懈蟹褋谢械写胁邪薪械褌芯, 锌褉械写褋褌邪胁械薪芯 泻邪褌芯 褏褉芯薪芯谢芯谐懈褟 薪邪 芯薪谢邪泄薪 邪褌邪泻懈 胁 褉邪蟹谢懈褔薪懈 褌芯褔泻懈 薪邪 褋胁械褌邪.
袝写薪邪 芯褌 锌褗褉胁懈褌械 卸械褉褌胁懈, 褋 泻芯褟褌芯 薪懈 褋褉械褖邪 邪胁褌芯褉邪 械 褎懈谢懈锌懈薪褋泻邪褌邪 卸褍褉薪邪谢懈褋褌泻邪 袦邪褉懈褟 袪械蟹邪. 袟邪褉邪写懈 邪泻褌懈胁薪邪褌邪 褋懈 斜懈褌泻邪褌邪 褋褉械褖褍 褎邪谢褕懈胁懈褌械 薪芯胁懈薪懈 袪械蟹邪 褋褌邪胁邪 芯褋薪芯胁薪邪 屑懈褕械薪邪 薪邪 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 袛褍褌械褉褌械 懈 薪械锌褉械泻褗褋薪邪褌芯 械 芯斜械泻褌 薪邪 邪褌邪泻懈, 邪褉械褋褌懈 懈 谐褉芯蟹薪懈 芯斜懈写懈. 袩褉械蟹 2021 谐. 袦邪褉懈褟 袪械蟹邪 锌芯谢褍褔懈 袧芯斜械谢芯胁邪 薪邪谐褉邪写邪 蟹邪 屑懈褉 蟹邪械写薪芯 褋 谐谢邪胁薪懈褟 褉械写邪泻褌芯褉 薪邪 褉褍褋泻懈褟 胁械褋褌薪懈泻 鈥溞澬拘残把� 谐邪蟹械褌邪鈥� 袛屑懈褌褉懈 袦褍褉邪褌芯胁.
鈥溞⑿拘残� 薪械 械 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写邪鈥� 械 薪邪褋懈褌械薪邪 褋 锌褉懈屑械褉懈 蟹邪 泻褉械褏泻芯褋褌褌邪 薪邪 懈褋褌懈薪邪褌邪, 薪械泄薪邪褌邪 褍褟蟹胁懈屑芯褋褌 懈 褑械谢械薪邪褋芯褔械薪芯 锌褉械懈薪邪褔邪胁邪薪械 胁 锌芯褏胁邪褌懈褌械 蟹邪 锌芯泻芯褉褟胁邪薪械 薪邪 屑邪褋懈褌械 懈 芯褋褗褖械褋褌胁褟胁邪薪械 薪邪 泻芯薪褌褉芯谢 胁褗褉褏褍 屑懈褋谢芯胁薪懈褌械 懈屑 薪邪谐谢邪褋懈. 袨褌 褌褉芯谢褋泻懈褌械 褎械褉屑懈 胁 袪褍褋懈褟, 屑褉械卸邪褌邪 芯褌 鈥溞啃敌窖徯毙狙傃佲€� 胁 袦械泻褋懈泻芯, 谐械泄屑褗褉褋泻懈褟褌 泻邪薪邪谢 The Discord Channel 泻邪褌芯 褋斜芯褉械薪 锌褍薪泻褌 蟹邪 泻褉邪泄薪芯 写械褋薪懈, 写芯 屑械写懈泄薪邪褌邪 褋褉械写邪 胁 小褗褉斜懈褟, 校薪谐邪褉懈褟 懈 孝褍褉褑懈褟 鈥� 泻薪懈谐邪褌邪 屑芯卸械 写邪 斜褗写械 褉邪蟹谐谢械卸写邪薪邪 泻邪褌芯 褕懈褉芯泻邪 械泻褋锌芯蟹懈褑懈褟 芯褌 锌褉懈屑械褉懈 蟹邪 褎褉芯薪褌芯胁懈褌械 谢懈薪懈懈 薪邪 懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪懈褌械 胁芯泄薪懈 懈 褎褉邪泻褌褍褉懈褌械, 泻芯懈褌芯 褌械 薪邪薪邪褋褟褌, 芯褋芯斜械薪芯 胁 薪械褍蟹褉械谢懈褌械 芯斜褖械褋褌胁邪, 泻邪泻胁芯褌芯 械 懈 薪邪褕械褌芯.
袛褉褍谐 懈薪写懈泻邪褌懈胁械薪 锌褉懈屑械褉 蟹邪 褍写邪褉, 褋褉械褖褍 写褗褉卸邪胁邪 褌芯蟹懈 锌褗褌, 械 斜械蟹屑懈谢芯褋褌薪邪褌邪 泻懈斜械褉邪褌邪泻邪 褋褉械褖褍 袝褋褌芯薪懈褟 锌褉械蟹 邪锌褉懈谢 2007 谐., 泻芯谐邪褌芯 褋谢械写 褋械褉懈褟 芯褌 褋斜谢褗褋褗褑懈 屑械卸写褍 褉褍褋芯褎懈谢懈 懈 写械褋薪懈 械褋褌芯薪褑懈, 蟹邪褉邪写懈 锌邪屑械褌薪懈泻邪 薪邪 袘褉芯薪蟹芯胁懈褟 胁芯泄薪懈泻 胁 孝邪谢懈薪, 袝褋褌芯薪懈褟 褍褋褗屑胁邪 锌邪褉邪谢懈蟹懈褉邪薪邪 芯褌 薪械褎褍薪泻褑懈芯薪懈褉邪褖懈 褋褗褉胁褗褉懈. 袠蟹锌褗谢薪械薪懈械褌芯 薪邪 芯斜褖械褋褌胁械薪懈 褍褋谢褍谐懈 械 斜谢芯泻懈褉邪薪芯. 袪褍褋泻懈褌械 屑械写懈懈 械泻褋谢芯邪写懈褉邪褌 褋 锌褉械褍胁械谢懈褔械薪懈 懈 褎邪谢褕懈胁懈 薪芯胁懈薪懈, 薪邪谐薪械褌褟胁邪泄泻懈 芯褖械 锌芯胁械褔械 薪邪锌褉械卸械薪懈械褌芯 褋褉械写 褉褍褋泻芯械蟹懈褔薪芯褌芯 薪邪褋械谢械薪懈械 胁 袝褋褌芯薪懈褟.
袩褉懈屑械褉懈褌械 薪械 褋械 懈蟹褔械褉锌胁邪褌 褋 袝褋褌芯薪懈褟 懈 褌褟 薪械 械 械写懈薪褋褌胁械薪邪褌邪 卸械褉褌胁邪 薪邪 褉褍褋泻懈 泻懈斜械褉- 懈 懈薪褎芯邪褌邪泻懈. 袧懈褌芯 械写薪邪 芯褌 褋邪褌械谢懈褌薪懈褌械 薪邪 斜懈胁褕懈褟 小小小袪 写褗褉卸邪胁懈 薪械 械 锌芯褖邪写械薪邪, 薪芯 写芯泻邪褌芯 锌褉懈 械写薪懈 邪褌邪泻懈褌械 褑械谢褟褌 褉邪蟹械写懈薪械薪懈械 懈 写械蟹懈薪褌械谐褉邪褑懈褟 薪邪 芯斜褖械褋褌胁械薪懈褌械 薪邪谐谢邪褋懈 褋锌褉褟屑芯 蟹邪锌邪写薪懈褟 褋胁褟褌 懈 袝小, 褌芯 锌褉懈 写褉褍谐懈 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪懈褌械 泻邪屑锌邪薪懈懈 褋邪 薪邪褋芯褔械锟斤拷懈 泻褗屑 褌械褉懈褌芯褉懈邪谢薪懈 锌褉懈褋胁芯褟胁邪薪懈褟 鈥� 袗斜褏邪蟹懈褟, 挟卸薪邪 袨褋械褌懈褟, 袣褉懈屑.
袩懈褌褗褉 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 胁 褉芯写械薪 胁 袣懈械胁, 胁 褋械屑械泄褋褌胁芯 薪邪 懈薪褌械谢械泻褌褍邪谢褑懈, 泻芯懈褌芯 褋邪 锌褉懈薪褍写械薪懈 写邪 褋褌邪薪邪褌 写懈褋懈写械薪褌懈 懈 写邪 薪邪锌褍褋薪邪褌 校泻褉邪泄薪邪, 泻芯谐邪褌芯 褌芯泄 械 械写胁邪 薪邪 械写薪邪 谐芯写懈薪邪. 小谢械写 锌芯褔褌懈 褔械褌懈褉懈褋械褌谐芯写懈褕薪芯 芯褌褋褗褋褌胁懈械 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 褋械 胁褉褗褖邪 薪邪 褉芯写薪邪 蟹械屑褟, 蟹邪 写邪 懈蟹褋谢械写胁邪 鈥溞叫靶�-薪械胁械褉芯褟褌薪邪褌邪 懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪邪 斜谢懈褑泻褉懈谐 胁芯泄薪邪 胁 懈褋褌芯褉懈褟褌邪鈥� 鈥� 邪薪械泻褋懈褉邪薪械褌芯 薪邪 袣褉懈屑 懈 褉邪蟹锌邪谢械薪懈褟 胁芯械薪械薪 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌 胁 袛芯薪斜邪褋. 小谢械写胁邪褌 褋褉械褖懈 褋 卸褍褉薪邪谢懈褋褌懈, 邪泻褌懈胁懈褋褌懈 懈 褋胁懈写械褌械谢懈 薪邪 斜褉褍褌邪谢薪邪褌邪 褉褍褋泻邪 懈薪胁邪蟹懈褟. 袨褋胁械薪 褉邪蟹泻邪蟹懈褌械 薪邪 芯褔械胁懈写褑懈, 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 锌褉芯褋谢械写褟胁邪 懈 褌褉邪械泻褌芯褉懈褟褌邪 薪邪 褉褍褋泻邪褌邪 写械蟹懈薪褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪邪 邪褌邪泻邪, 褔懈械褌芯 胁褗芯斜褉邪卸械薪懈械 锌芯泻芯褉褟胁邪 褌邪泻懈胁邪 邪斜褋褍褉写薪懈 胁褗褉褏芯胁械, 褔械 泻芯谐邪褌芯 懈蟹褋褌褉械谢褟薪邪褌邪 芯褌 褉褍褋薪邪褑懈褌械 褉邪泻械褌邪 褋胁邪谢褟 锌褉械谢懈褌邪褖懈褟 薪邪写 袥褍谐邪薪褋泻邪 芯斜谢邪褋褌 褋邪屑芯谢械褌 薪邪 袦邪谢邪泄蟹懈褋泻懈褌械 邪胁懈芯薪懈谢懈懈, 褉褍褋泻懈褌械 屑械写懈懈 胁褋械泻懈 写械薪 泻褍写泻褍写褟泻邪褌 薪芯胁懈 薪邪谢褍写薪懈 胁械褉褋懈懈 蟹邪 褌褉邪谐械写懈褟褌邪 鈥� 芯褌 褌邪蟹懈, 褔械 械 写械谢芯 薪邪 褍泻褉邪懈薪褑懈褌械, 泻芯懈褌芯 屑懈褋谢械谢懈, 褔械 褌芯胁邪 械 褋邪屑芯谢械褌邪 薪邪 袩褍褌懈薪 写芯 芯薪邪蟹懈, 胁 泻芯褟褌芯 邪屑械褉懈泻邪薪褑懈褌械 薪邪锌褗谢薪懈谢懈 褋邪屑芯谢械褌邪 褋 褌褉褍锌芯胁械 薪邪 械胁褉械懈, 蟹邪 写邪 锌褉械写懈蟹胁懈泻邪褌 褉褍褋薪邪褑懈褌械 懈 写邪 谐懈 芯斜胁懈薪褟褌 锌褉械写 褋胁械褌邪 褋谢械写 褌芯胁邪.
孝邪蟹懈 褔邪褋褌 薪邪 泻薪懈谐邪褌邪, 褎芯泻褍褋懈褉邪褖邪 褋械 胁褗褉褏褍 校泻褉邪泄薪邪, 械 芯褋芯斜械薪芯 锌芯写褉芯斜薪邪 懈 懈薪褌械褉械褋薪邪 懈 泻邪褌械谐芯褉懈褔薪芯 写械褌褉芯薪懈褉邪 胁褋懈褔泻懈 锌褉芯 泻褉械屑褗谢褋泻懈 芯锌芯褉泻懈 蟹邪 袦邪泄写邪薪邪, 锌芯卸邪褉懈褌械 胁 袨写械褋邪, 懈 胁芯泄薪邪褌邪 胁 袛芯薪斜邪褋, 泻芯懈褌芯 褌褉芯谢芯胁械褌械 邪谐褉械褋懈胁薪芯 褉邪蟹锌褉芯褋褌褉邪薪褟胁邪褏邪 胁 锌褗褉胁懈褌械 褋械写屑懈褑懈 褋谢械写 24 褎械胁褉褍邪褉懈. 袧褟屑邪 写邪 懈蟹写邪胁邪屑 锌芯胁械褔械, 蟹邪 写邪 薪械 胁懈 芯褖械褌褟胁邪屑 芯褌 屑芯屑械薪褌懈褌械 薪邪 懈蟹褍屑谢械薪懈械, 泻芯械褌芯 褌械蟹懈 褉械写芯胁械 褖械 胁懈 写芯薪械褋邪褌.
November 22, 2022
Very good and probably even more relevant now than when it was written.
February 9, 2023
I was an okay read, pretty instructive one, though I can't say I learnt that many new things or that anything was a huge wake-up game-changer moment here. It definitely is useful in understanding the mechanics behind popular and social media and targeted content though - would definitely recommend.
May 1, 2022
孝懈褋褟褔褨 蟹褨褉芯泻! 携 褑褞 泻薪懈卸泻褍 泻芯胁褌邪谢邪 蟹 褌邪泻芯褞 卸邪写褨斜薪褨褋褌褞 褨 胁写褍屑谢懈胁褨褋褌褞, 褉芯蟹斜懈褉邪谢邪 褩褩 薪邪 褑懈褌邪褌懈, 褔懈褌邪谢邪 胁褋褨 胁泻邪蟹邪薪褨 褉械褎械褉械薪褋懈, 锌邪褉邪谢械谢褜薪芯 胁懈褕褍泻褍褞褔懈 写芯写邪褌泻芯胁褨 褎邪泻褌懈, 斜芯 褏芯褌褨谢芯褋褜 屑邪泻褋懈屑邪谢褜薪芯 谐谢懈斜芯泻芯 蟹邪薪褍褉懈褌懈褋褜 胁 泻芯卸薪褍 褨褋褌芯褉褨褞, 泻芯卸械薪 泻芯薪褌械泻褋褌, 泻芯卸薪褍 锌芯褋褌邪褌褜.
笑褟 泻薪懈卸泻邪 薪械 褌褨谢褜泻懈 锌褉芯 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写褍 褨 褌械, 褟泻 薪邪屑懈 屑邪薪褨锌褍谢褞褞褌褜 (褨 胁芯褞褞褌褜) 屑械写褨邪 褨 锌芯谢褨褌懈泻邪 胁 褉褨蟹薪懈褏 泻褉邪褩薪邪褏: 胁芯薪邪 锌褉芯 褨写械薪褌懈褔薪褨褋褌褜, 锌褉芯 褩褩 蟹薪邪褏芯写卸械薪薪褟 褨 褉芯蟹屑懈胁邪薪薪褟, 锌褉芯 薪械锌褉芯褋褌褨 锌懈褌邪薪薪褟 褨 胁懈蟹薪邪褔械薪薪褟 薪褨斜懈-褌芯 蟹胁懈褔薪懈褏 褋谢褨胁, 褌懈锌褍 薪邪褉芯写, 褋胁芯斜芯写邪, 写械屑芯泻褉邪褌褨褟.
袙 褌械锌械褉褨褕薪褜芯屑褍 泻芯薪褌械泻褋褌褨 胁褨泄薪懈 褋锌褉懈泄屑邪褦褌褜褋褟 芯褋芯斜谢懈胁芯 斜谢懈蟹褜泻芯 褨 谐芯褋褌褉芯, 褔邪褋褌芯 谢芯胁懈谢邪 褋械斜械 薪邪 胁褨写褔褍褌褌褨 屑械屑薪芯谐芯 袣褍褔屑懈 芦褑械 卸 斜褍谢芯 胁卸械禄 邪斜芯 袟械谢械薪褋褜泻芯谐芯 芦褏褌芯 褟?禄.
孝邪泻芯卸 褏芯褔械褌褜褋褟 胁褨写蟹薪邪褔懈褌懈 褋褌芯褉褨褌械谢褨薪谐 褉褨胁薪褟 斜芯卸械薪褜泻邪: 芯斜懈写胁褨 谢褨薪褨褩 (褌械屑邪褌懈褔薪褨 斜谢芯泻懈 褉褨蟹薪懈褏 泻褉邪褩薪 褨 褉芯蟹锌芯胁褨写褜 锌褉芯 (锌芯褋褌)写懈褋懈写械薪褌褋褜泻械 卸懈褌褌褟 褋褨屑鈥櫻� 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁懈褏, 斜邪褌褜泻褨胁 袩褨褌械褉邪 (褔懈 屑芯卸薪邪 袩械褌褉邪?)) 胁械写褍褌褜褋褟 褨 褋锌谢褨褌邪褞褌褜褋褟 斜械蟹 锌械褉械斜褨谢褜褕械薪褜 屑邪泄褋褌械褉薪芯. 孝褍褌 褨写械邪谢褜薪芯 斜邪谢邪薪褋褍褦褌褜褋褟 褎邪泻褌邪卸薪械 褨 谢褞写褋褜泻械.
笑褟 泻薪懈卸泻邪 锌褉芯 斜芯褉芯褌褜斜褍, 褉械胁芯谢褞褑褨褩 褨 谐芯谢芯褋懈 薪械 褌褨谢褜泻懈 褋褍褋锌褨谢褜薪褨, 邪谢械 泄 胁薪褍褌褉褨褕薪褨.
袧邪 芯褋褌邪薪芯泻 胁邪屑 蟹邪谢懈褕懈褌褜褋褟 薪械 褌褨谢褜泻懈 斜邪谐邪褌邪 褩卸邪 写谢褟 褉芯蟹写褍屑褨胁, 邪 褕械 泄 泻褍锌邪 褨薪褕芯褩 谢褨褌械褉邪褌褍褉懈, 褟泻褍 蟹邪褏芯褔械褌褜褋褟 锌芯褔懈褌邪褌懈.
笑褟 泻薪懈卸泻邪 薪械 褌褨谢褜泻懈 锌褉芯 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写褍 褨 褌械, 褟泻 薪邪屑懈 屑邪薪褨锌褍谢褞褞褌褜 (褨 胁芯褞褞褌褜) 屑械写褨邪 褨 锌芯谢褨褌懈泻邪 胁 褉褨蟹薪懈褏 泻褉邪褩薪邪褏: 胁芯薪邪 锌褉芯 褨写械薪褌懈褔薪褨褋褌褜, 锌褉芯 褩褩 蟹薪邪褏芯写卸械薪薪褟 褨 褉芯蟹屑懈胁邪薪薪褟, 锌褉芯 薪械锌褉芯褋褌褨 锌懈褌邪薪薪褟 褨 胁懈蟹薪邪褔械薪薪褟 薪褨斜懈-褌芯 蟹胁懈褔薪懈褏 褋谢褨胁, 褌懈锌褍 薪邪褉芯写, 褋胁芯斜芯写邪, 写械屑芯泻褉邪褌褨褟.
袙 褌械锌械褉褨褕薪褜芯屑褍 泻芯薪褌械泻褋褌褨 胁褨泄薪懈 褋锌褉懈泄屑邪褦褌褜褋褟 芯褋芯斜谢懈胁芯 斜谢懈蟹褜泻芯 褨 谐芯褋褌褉芯, 褔邪褋褌芯 谢芯胁懈谢邪 褋械斜械 薪邪 胁褨写褔褍褌褌褨 屑械屑薪芯谐芯 袣褍褔屑懈 芦褑械 卸 斜褍谢芯 胁卸械禄 邪斜芯 袟械谢械薪褋褜泻芯谐芯 芦褏褌芯 褟?禄.
孝邪泻芯卸 褏芯褔械褌褜褋褟 胁褨写蟹薪邪褔懈褌懈 褋褌芯褉褨褌械谢褨薪谐 褉褨胁薪褟 斜芯卸械薪褜泻邪: 芯斜懈写胁褨 谢褨薪褨褩 (褌械屑邪褌懈褔薪褨 斜谢芯泻懈 褉褨蟹薪懈褏 泻褉邪褩薪 褨 褉芯蟹锌芯胁褨写褜 锌褉芯 (锌芯褋褌)写懈褋懈写械薪褌褋褜泻械 卸懈褌褌褟 褋褨屑鈥櫻� 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁懈褏, 斜邪褌褜泻褨胁 袩褨褌械褉邪 (褔懈 屑芯卸薪邪 袩械褌褉邪?)) 胁械写褍褌褜褋褟 褨 褋锌谢褨褌邪褞褌褜褋褟 斜械蟹 锌械褉械斜褨谢褜褕械薪褜 屑邪泄褋褌械褉薪芯. 孝褍褌 褨写械邪谢褜薪芯 斜邪谢邪薪褋褍褦褌褜褋褟 褎邪泻褌邪卸薪械 褨 谢褞写褋褜泻械.
笑褟 泻薪懈卸泻邪 锌褉芯 斜芯褉芯褌褜斜褍, 褉械胁芯谢褞褑褨褩 褨 谐芯谢芯褋懈 薪械 褌褨谢褜泻懈 褋褍褋锌褨谢褜薪褨, 邪谢械 泄 胁薪褍褌褉褨褕薪褨.
袧邪 芯褋褌邪薪芯泻 胁邪屑 蟹邪谢懈褕懈褌褜褋褟 薪械 褌褨谢褜泻懈 斜邪谐邪褌邪 褩卸邪 写谢褟 褉芯蟹写褍屑褨胁, 邪 褕械 泄 泻褍锌邪 褨薪褕芯褩 谢褨褌械褉邪褌褍褉懈, 褟泻褍 蟹邪褏芯褔械褌褜褋褟 锌芯褔懈褌邪褌懈.
March 23, 2020
An utterly horrible read, by which I mean not a bad book, but rather a horrifying book in content. We've all heard about the Russian bots and such, but this book made me realize just how far reaching this sort of activity was.
I've never actually closed a book and turned my head away from disturbing content - but this book managed it.
After saying or that this is recommended for those interested in the modern landscape of politics and how to understand the garbage that goes on in social media and what passes for news media in 2020. Not really recommended to read during a global pandemic as only so much bad news can be tolerated by one's psyche, but definitely recommended reading at some point...
I've never actually closed a book and turned my head away from disturbing content - but this book managed it.
After saying or that this is recommended for those interested in the modern landscape of politics and how to understand the garbage that goes on in social media and what passes for news media in 2020. Not really recommended to read during a global pandemic as only so much bad news can be tolerated by one's psyche, but definitely recommended reading at some point...
August 3, 2020
袛懈胁芯胁懈卸薪褨 胁懈褋薪芯胁泻懈 褉芯斜懈褌褜 袩芯屑械褉邪薪褑械胁 褍 褋胁芯褨褩 泻薪懈蟹褨: 胁褋褨 褏芯褔褍褌褜 褋褌邪褌懈 薪芯胁芯褞 袪芯褋褨褦褞 蟹邪 褋锌芯褋芯斜芯屑 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写懈. 袘芯 胁芯薪邪 写褨褦胁邪. 袉 褑械 锌褨写泻褉褨锌谢褞褦褌褜褋褟 褋褍屑薪懈屑懈 褨褋褌芯褉褨褟屑懈, 褌懈褏 褏褌芯 蟹 薪械褞 斜芯褉械褌褜褋褟. 效芯屑褍 褋褍屑薪芯褞? 袘芯 斜芯褉芯褌褜斜邪 褌邪泻 褋芯斜褨 锌褉邪褑褞褦.
袟邪褏芯锌谢懈胁懈泄 薪芯薪-褎褨泻褕薪, 褟泻芯屑褍 斜褉邪泻褍褦 褑褨谢褨褋薪芯褋褌褨. 袉薪褌械褉胁鈥櫻� 袉谐芯褉褟 屑械卸褍褞褌褜 蟹 芯褋芯斜懈褋褌懈屑懈 褨褋褌芯褉褨褟屑懈 泄芯谐芯 斜邪褌褜泻褨胁 褨 褑械 蟹屑褍褕褍褦 锌芯褋褌褨泄薪芯 锌褉懈谐邪写褍胁邪褌懈 锌芯锌械褉械写薪褨 褉芯蟹写褨谢懈. 袟 屑芯褦褞 锌邪屑鈥櫻徰傃傃� 褑械 褖械 褌芯泄 褔械谢械薪写卸, 邪谢械 胁 褑褨谢芯屑褍 褑械 褏芯褉芯褕邪 泻薪懈谐邪 斜械蟹 胁褋褨谢褟泻懈褏 泻芯薪褋锌褨褉芯谢芯谐褨褔薪懈褏 褌械芯褉褨泄.
袟邪褏芯锌谢懈胁懈泄 薪芯薪-褎褨泻褕薪, 褟泻芯屑褍 斜褉邪泻褍褦 褑褨谢褨褋薪芯褋褌褨. 袉薪褌械褉胁鈥櫻� 袉谐芯褉褟 屑械卸褍褞褌褜 蟹 芯褋芯斜懈褋褌懈屑懈 褨褋褌芯褉褨褟屑懈 泄芯谐芯 斜邪褌褜泻褨胁 褨 褑械 蟹屑褍褕褍褦 锌芯褋褌褨泄薪芯 锌褉懈谐邪写褍胁邪褌懈 锌芯锌械褉械写薪褨 褉芯蟹写褨谢懈. 袟 屑芯褦褞 锌邪屑鈥櫻徰傃傃� 褑械 褖械 褌芯泄 褔械谢械薪写卸, 邪谢械 胁 褑褨谢芯屑褍 褑械 褏芯褉芯褕邪 泻薪懈谐邪 斜械蟹 胁褋褨谢褟泻懈褏 泻芯薪褋锌褨褉芯谢芯谐褨褔薪懈褏 褌械芯褉褨泄.
November 2, 2019
I didn't really learn an awful lot about how the internet works from this book or how governments social media to achieve political objectives.
did-not-finish
December 11, 2019Read up to 43%. This book is about very interesting stuff, but it is not very interesting to read.
July 2, 2020
I want to live in a future where there is a shared reality, a mutually-agreed-upon set of facts, where there is truth. That future is threatened, thanks in part to internet trolls at the behest of rogue states, ideological noise factories like Fox News, and conspiracy theory nitwits like Alex Jones.
This book focuses more on rogue states than 4Chan, primarily the Philippines, Russia, and China. You learn a little bit (more) about Cambridge Analytica, the war thing happening in Crimea, and various intrepid journalist-activists in places like the Philippines and Mexico who are in an information race with their own governments to win hearts and minds.
The same internet that empowered social justice movements has also empowered their foes. The Arab spring could not have happened without social media. Black Lives Matter could not have happened without social media. But autocrats such as Putin and Duterte are quickly learning how to leverage the internet to discredit and suppress any genuine opposition.
The Internet Research Agency is a giant troll farm in St. Petersburg, a four story building where thousands of people work around the clock, maintaining fake Facebook profiles, writing blogs, and posting comments to YouTube videos, all with the purpose of furthering Putin鈥檚 murky political agenda. Other leaders are studying the tactics of protest movements and organizing identical counter-protests. Journalists who ask too many questions of autocratic leaders find themselves the object of targeted harassment campaigns. Here in America, political rancor is stoked by agents of the Kremlin pretending to be right-wing or left-wing extremists who start fights on Facebook.
All of this has the effect of stifling legitimate dissent. It鈥檚 Orwellian. Up is down and 2 + 2 = 5.
The upside of reading a book like this is a better understanding of the information wars that define modern life, and the ways in which social media and digital technology are rewriting the rules of power. The downside of reading a book like this is a mounting sense of dread. It鈥檚 worrying to watch the world sink into a morass of misinformation, propaganda, and conspiracy theories, where telling fact from fiction is an increasingly fraught enterprise. It's worrying to watch friends fall for the nonsense.
Each chapter starts with several pages of italicized font that tell the story of the author's family, growing up in Soviet Ukraine during the Cold War. His father was detained by the KGB for possession and distribution of forbidden materials, including books by William Faulkner, and they fled to Germany and then England when the author was still a toddler. The author tries to thematically link his family's experience of Soviet repression to the weird Orwellian internet zietgiest we're currently experiencing, but honestly these sections felt tangential at best. I thought the story was mildly interesting (though I gotta say the dad's poetry and short stories seemed awful) and the writing style of these sections was different, a sort of literary memoir tone, compared to the straight journalism of the rest of the book.
Here are some quotes I liked:
Conspiracy theories have long been used to maintain power. The Soviet leadership saw capitalist and counterrevolutionary conspiracies everywhere; the Nazis, Jewish ones. Then those conspiracies were used to buttress an ideology, whether class warfare for Communists, or race for Nazis. With today鈥檚 regimes, which struggle to formulate a single ideology, the idea that one lives in a world full of conspiracies becomes the worldview itself. Conspiracy theory replaces ideology with a mix of self-pity, paranoia self-importance, and entertainment. Erdogan, Trump, Putin, Orb谩n, and the rest invoke conspiracies to explain events, often hinting at them without going so far as stating them directly, which only strengthens the sense that what they are establishing is a more general worldview than any single theory.
And as a worldview it grants those who subscribe to it certain rewards: if all the world is a conspiracy, then your failures are no longer all your fault. The fact that you achieved less than you hoped for, that your life is a mess鈥攊t鈥檚 all the fault of the conspiracy.
More important, conspiracy is a way to maintain control. In a world where even the most authoritarian regimes struggle to impose censorship, one has to surround audiences with so much cynicism about anyone鈥檚 motives, persuade them that behind every seemingly benign motivation is a nefarious, if impossible-to-prove plot, so that they lose faith in the possibility of an alternative.
-
During Glasnost, it seemed that the truth would set everybody free. Facts seemed possessed of power, dictators seemed so afraid of facts that they suppressed them. But something has gone drastically wrong: we have access to more information and evidence than ever, but facts seem to have lost their power. There is nothing new about politicians lying, but what seems novel is their acting as if they don鈥檛 care whether what they say is true or false.
-
In the Cold War, both sides were engaged in what had begun as a debate about which system鈥攄emocratic capitalism or communism鈥攚ould deliver a rosier future for all mankind. The only way to prove you were achieving this future was to provide evidence. Communism, for all its many perversities and cruelties, was meant to be the ultimate, scientific, Enlightenment project. Those who lived under it knew it was a sham, but it was connected to a paradigm of Soviet economic growth based in Marxist-Leninist theory, whose objective laws of historical development supposedly were playing out as the theory maintained. Thus, it was also possible to catch the USSR out by exposing how it lied, by broadcasting accurate information, or by confronting its leaders with facts.
-
But . . . if there is no future that your facts are there to prove you are achieving, then what is the appeal of facts? Why would you want facts if they tell you that your children would be poorer then you? That all versions of the future were unpromising? And why should you trust the purveyors of facts, the media and academics, think tanks statesmen?
So the politician who makes a big show of rejecting facts, who validates the pleasure of spouting nonsense, who indulges in a full, anarchic liberation from coherence, from glum reality, becomes attractive. That enough Americans could elect someone like Donald Trump with so little regard for making sense, whose many contradictory messages never add up to any stable meaning, was partly possible because enough voters felt they weren鈥檛 invested in any larger evidence-based future. Indeed, in his very incoherence lies the pleasure. All the madness you feel, you can now let it out and it鈥檚 okay. The joy of Trump is to validate the pleasure of spouting shit, the joy of pure emotion, often anger, without any sense.
This book focuses more on rogue states than 4Chan, primarily the Philippines, Russia, and China. You learn a little bit (more) about Cambridge Analytica, the war thing happening in Crimea, and various intrepid journalist-activists in places like the Philippines and Mexico who are in an information race with their own governments to win hearts and minds.
The same internet that empowered social justice movements has also empowered their foes. The Arab spring could not have happened without social media. Black Lives Matter could not have happened without social media. But autocrats such as Putin and Duterte are quickly learning how to leverage the internet to discredit and suppress any genuine opposition.
The Internet Research Agency is a giant troll farm in St. Petersburg, a four story building where thousands of people work around the clock, maintaining fake Facebook profiles, writing blogs, and posting comments to YouTube videos, all with the purpose of furthering Putin鈥檚 murky political agenda. Other leaders are studying the tactics of protest movements and organizing identical counter-protests. Journalists who ask too many questions of autocratic leaders find themselves the object of targeted harassment campaigns. Here in America, political rancor is stoked by agents of the Kremlin pretending to be right-wing or left-wing extremists who start fights on Facebook.
All of this has the effect of stifling legitimate dissent. It鈥檚 Orwellian. Up is down and 2 + 2 = 5.
The upside of reading a book like this is a better understanding of the information wars that define modern life, and the ways in which social media and digital technology are rewriting the rules of power. The downside of reading a book like this is a mounting sense of dread. It鈥檚 worrying to watch the world sink into a morass of misinformation, propaganda, and conspiracy theories, where telling fact from fiction is an increasingly fraught enterprise. It's worrying to watch friends fall for the nonsense.
Each chapter starts with several pages of italicized font that tell the story of the author's family, growing up in Soviet Ukraine during the Cold War. His father was detained by the KGB for possession and distribution of forbidden materials, including books by William Faulkner, and they fled to Germany and then England when the author was still a toddler. The author tries to thematically link his family's experience of Soviet repression to the weird Orwellian internet zietgiest we're currently experiencing, but honestly these sections felt tangential at best. I thought the story was mildly interesting (though I gotta say the dad's poetry and short stories seemed awful) and the writing style of these sections was different, a sort of literary memoir tone, compared to the straight journalism of the rest of the book.
Here are some quotes I liked:
Conspiracy theories have long been used to maintain power. The Soviet leadership saw capitalist and counterrevolutionary conspiracies everywhere; the Nazis, Jewish ones. Then those conspiracies were used to buttress an ideology, whether class warfare for Communists, or race for Nazis. With today鈥檚 regimes, which struggle to formulate a single ideology, the idea that one lives in a world full of conspiracies becomes the worldview itself. Conspiracy theory replaces ideology with a mix of self-pity, paranoia self-importance, and entertainment. Erdogan, Trump, Putin, Orb谩n, and the rest invoke conspiracies to explain events, often hinting at them without going so far as stating them directly, which only strengthens the sense that what they are establishing is a more general worldview than any single theory.
And as a worldview it grants those who subscribe to it certain rewards: if all the world is a conspiracy, then your failures are no longer all your fault. The fact that you achieved less than you hoped for, that your life is a mess鈥攊t鈥檚 all the fault of the conspiracy.
More important, conspiracy is a way to maintain control. In a world where even the most authoritarian regimes struggle to impose censorship, one has to surround audiences with so much cynicism about anyone鈥檚 motives, persuade them that behind every seemingly benign motivation is a nefarious, if impossible-to-prove plot, so that they lose faith in the possibility of an alternative.
-
During Glasnost, it seemed that the truth would set everybody free. Facts seemed possessed of power, dictators seemed so afraid of facts that they suppressed them. But something has gone drastically wrong: we have access to more information and evidence than ever, but facts seem to have lost their power. There is nothing new about politicians lying, but what seems novel is their acting as if they don鈥檛 care whether what they say is true or false.
-
In the Cold War, both sides were engaged in what had begun as a debate about which system鈥攄emocratic capitalism or communism鈥攚ould deliver a rosier future for all mankind. The only way to prove you were achieving this future was to provide evidence. Communism, for all its many perversities and cruelties, was meant to be the ultimate, scientific, Enlightenment project. Those who lived under it knew it was a sham, but it was connected to a paradigm of Soviet economic growth based in Marxist-Leninist theory, whose objective laws of historical development supposedly were playing out as the theory maintained. Thus, it was also possible to catch the USSR out by exposing how it lied, by broadcasting accurate information, or by confronting its leaders with facts.
-
But . . . if there is no future that your facts are there to prove you are achieving, then what is the appeal of facts? Why would you want facts if they tell you that your children would be poorer then you? That all versions of the future were unpromising? And why should you trust the purveyors of facts, the media and academics, think tanks statesmen?
So the politician who makes a big show of rejecting facts, who validates the pleasure of spouting nonsense, who indulges in a full, anarchic liberation from coherence, from glum reality, becomes attractive. That enough Americans could elect someone like Donald Trump with so little regard for making sense, whose many contradictory messages never add up to any stable meaning, was partly possible because enough voters felt they weren鈥檛 invested in any larger evidence-based future. Indeed, in his very incoherence lies the pleasure. All the madness you feel, you can now let it out and it鈥檚 okay. The joy of Trump is to validate the pleasure of spouting shit, the joy of pure emotion, often anger, without any sense.
November 16, 2019
Lies, especially lies meant to change public opinion, have always been with us. In the old days before the internet, authoritarian governments took over newspapers, radio, and television stations to broadcast their version of reality. Sometimes a simple paper flyer was left at people's doorsteps in a vain hope that they would be read and believed. There has always been a huge market for lies in the service of politicians and their parties.
Today, with 24/7 access to news feeds and information networks all over the world, the propaganda game has gone into overdrive and the stakes couldn't be any larger. Shadowy groups are now trolling internet message feeds and discussions, planting whatever stories they want to make their side look good and the other side look bad. It doesn't seem to matter anymore whether the claims are true, just that they grab eyeballs and are remotely believable.
Peter Pomerantsev is a television producer and writer who spent time in both Moscow and London, and he delivers a first-hand and very personal look into the business of fake news and persuasion. The author contacted and visited some of the people on the front lines in the information war, and it makes me wonder if the US should spend more of its $600 billion defense budget here than on the latest fighter jets.
The book starts with Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines and how he went from an anti-war drug campaign to become an authoritarian president comfortable with wielding troll power over his enemies. Maria Ressa, just featured on 60 minutes this month, is the voice of this chapter as a crusading journalist who has been threatened with death by bot accounts and harassed and arrested because of her stories on Duterte. Somehow the Philippines became linked with troll farms in Russia, and the book details a fascinating behind the scenes story of one of them from a person who worked there and then went to the press about what happened there.
Pomerantsev interviews pro-democracy activists in Serbia and Mexico, skinheads in Germany, and old colleagues in London to present this familiar and depressing story of manipulation and deception. His chapter, "The Greatest Information Blitzkrieg in History" details the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and how much of the war was fought online using stories and video that masked and distorted what was actually happening. The story of Aleppo, a city in Syria that was bombed with hundreds of thousands of casualties, is detailed in sad detail. Even with compelling video of the atrocities there, no one was able to intervene, partially because of disinformation campaigns. The book finishes in China, where the government controls most information getting into the country, and how dissidents are still being treated terribly while their treatment is invisible.
There are so many parallels between what this book details and what we've noticed here in the US. There is a new belief in politics today of radical relativism. Facts don't matter today, partially because many have lost hope and facing the unpleasantness of that reality is too much. So they gleefully deny reality in the hopes that some savior can rescue them from what is. Conspiracies replace ideology, thoughts of the future turn backwards instead to nostalgia about the past, and media is now used to confuse, dismay, divide and delay rational thought so that in the middle of the chaos strong leaders can emerge and claim virtual godhood.
Pomerantsev doesn't go there, but a lot of this could be fixed by the big tech companies like Facebook, You Tube, and Twitter. Fake accounts make up a significant portion of profiles today, and most of them churn out garbage. These companies make money by keeping us engaged on their platforms, even if we do it gobbling up destructive lies. I'm no tech genius, but there has to be an easier way to catch these creeps before they amass millions of fans. The public needs to put more pressure on them. And based on what this book says, we need to be constantly on guard for the agendas of those who want to spread chaos and mischief so that they get what they want from us- money, power, and obedience.
Today, with 24/7 access to news feeds and information networks all over the world, the propaganda game has gone into overdrive and the stakes couldn't be any larger. Shadowy groups are now trolling internet message feeds and discussions, planting whatever stories they want to make their side look good and the other side look bad. It doesn't seem to matter anymore whether the claims are true, just that they grab eyeballs and are remotely believable.
Peter Pomerantsev is a television producer and writer who spent time in both Moscow and London, and he delivers a first-hand and very personal look into the business of fake news and persuasion. The author contacted and visited some of the people on the front lines in the information war, and it makes me wonder if the US should spend more of its $600 billion defense budget here than on the latest fighter jets.
The book starts with Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines and how he went from an anti-war drug campaign to become an authoritarian president comfortable with wielding troll power over his enemies. Maria Ressa, just featured on 60 minutes this month, is the voice of this chapter as a crusading journalist who has been threatened with death by bot accounts and harassed and arrested because of her stories on Duterte. Somehow the Philippines became linked with troll farms in Russia, and the book details a fascinating behind the scenes story of one of them from a person who worked there and then went to the press about what happened there.
Pomerantsev interviews pro-democracy activists in Serbia and Mexico, skinheads in Germany, and old colleagues in London to present this familiar and depressing story of manipulation and deception. His chapter, "The Greatest Information Blitzkrieg in History" details the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, and how much of the war was fought online using stories and video that masked and distorted what was actually happening. The story of Aleppo, a city in Syria that was bombed with hundreds of thousands of casualties, is detailed in sad detail. Even with compelling video of the atrocities there, no one was able to intervene, partially because of disinformation campaigns. The book finishes in China, where the government controls most information getting into the country, and how dissidents are still being treated terribly while their treatment is invisible.
There are so many parallels between what this book details and what we've noticed here in the US. There is a new belief in politics today of radical relativism. Facts don't matter today, partially because many have lost hope and facing the unpleasantness of that reality is too much. So they gleefully deny reality in the hopes that some savior can rescue them from what is. Conspiracies replace ideology, thoughts of the future turn backwards instead to nostalgia about the past, and media is now used to confuse, dismay, divide and delay rational thought so that in the middle of the chaos strong leaders can emerge and claim virtual godhood.
Pomerantsev doesn't go there, but a lot of this could be fixed by the big tech companies like Facebook, You Tube, and Twitter. Fake accounts make up a significant portion of profiles today, and most of them churn out garbage. These companies make money by keeping us engaged on their platforms, even if we do it gobbling up destructive lies. I'm no tech genius, but there has to be an easier way to catch these creeps before they amass millions of fans. The public needs to put more pressure on them. And based on what this book says, we need to be constantly on guard for the agendas of those who want to spread chaos and mischief so that they get what they want from us- money, power, and obedience.
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