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574 pages, Hardcover
First published December 10, 2019
"By the end of 1938, the Soviet secret police (NKVD) had arrested 1,548,366 citizens, many of them party members, on charges of counter-revolutionary activity and sabotage. Of those, 681,692 were shot. Stalin’s Great Purge would decimate the party and consume almost the entire Fourth Department apparat. [This was the foreign intelligence branch Sorge worked for.] Of the Comintern’s 492 staff, 133 were imprisoned or executed. Three of five Soviet marshals, 90 percent of all Red Army generals, 80 percent of Red Army colonels, and 30,000 officers of lesser rank were arrested."The hollowing out of the Army’s officer corps had devastating repercussions after the Germans invaded Russia. An interesting episode, which I hadn’t heard about before, involved the German effort to goad Stalin on in his decimation of the top Soviet brass.
"The NKVD, tasked with concocting information on a plot by Tukhachevsky [a Marshal] and the other Soviet generals against Stalin, contacted Reinhard Heydrich, the chief of German intelligence (Sicherheitsdienst, or SD) with a request for more information. Heydrich, seeing an excellent opportunity to dupe Stalin into executing his best generals, forged documents implicating Tukhachevsky and other Red Army commanders that he passed back to the Soviets�.In his quest to destroy all his potential enemies and rivals in the Soviet General Staff, Stalin was reader to enlist the help of the Nazis � who were only too happy to help him destroy the best of the USSR’s officer corps.�Sorge’s most impressive achievement was realizing fairly well in advance that Germany intended to invade Russia. Alas, his information and appraisals went unheeded:
"The evidence, from Sorge’s point of view, was crystal clear. Massive preparations were under way to attack Russia. The only outstanding question was exactly when and where the blow would fall. But there was a problem. Centre [his control] in the person of Director Golikov, resolutely refused to believe not only Sorge but also the mounting pile of agent reports from around the world that screamed urgent warnings of the coming offense.�Director Golikov was a survivor, who managed to hold on to his post and his life after several predecessors had been shot:
“The clear lesson of Soviet military intelligence was to tell Stalin precisely what he wanted to hear. As a result, Golikov consistently distorted the information he received about the increasing likelihood of a German attack to conform to Stalin’s skepticism. The result was a fatally self-reinforcing circle of delusion between dictator and intelligence chief.�This is but one of many insights and incidents that kept me engrossed in this book. Elsewhere there is abundant information revealing how the Japanese military strategy shifted during the war. It seems that there was prolonged debate about if or when to invade Russia, ultimately deciding to adopt the position of "jukushishugi � waiting for the persimmon to ripen and fall into your lap.� In other words, once the Germans had pretty much beaten the Soviets, Japan would jump in to prevent the Nazis from claiming Siberia.
“Sorge realized it would be useless to pretend that he had not been collecting sensitive intelligence. But he also understood that his best chance of survival was to pretend to be working for the Reich � or more precisely, to admit to the work he had been doing for German military intelligence, the Abwehr, while concealing his ties to Moscow.�Then suddenly, on day six, Sorge broke. After requesting a short rest, he wrote a long, detailed confession. He was tried and sentenced to death eight months later. He had hopes that the Soviet government would intervene on his behalf, but despite his undeniable value, saving Sorge “did not rank high on their list of priorities.� He was hanged on November 7, 1944.
“The Soviet Union had official canonized Sorge as a hero. Yet all the statues and the books could never quite efface the USSR’s actual suspicion, indifference and ultimate betrayal of its greatest spy. No other Soviet agent served Moscow so well or for so long. The spy network Sorge created was unique in the history of modern espionage in its access to the inner circles of power in both Germany and Japan. Yet at the moment of greatest danger for his adopted country, the atmosphere of paranoia that Stalin had created meant that the intelligence gold that he dutifully cabled to Moscow was ignored. Sorge was a flawed individual, but an impeccable spy � brave, brilliant, and relentless. It was Sorge’s tragedy that his masters were venal cowards who placed their own careers before the vital interests of the country that he laid down his life to serve.�