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Language, Truth and Logic
"A delightful book � I should like to have written it myself." � Bertrand Russell
First published in 1936, this first full-length presentation in English of the Logical Positivism of Carnap, Neurath, and others has gone through many printings to become a classic of thought and communication. It not only surveys one of the most important areas of modern thought; it also shows the confusion that arises from imperfect understanding of the uses of language. A first-rate antidote for fuzzy thought and muddled writing, this remarkable book has helped philosophers, writers, speakers, teachers, students, and general readers alike.
Mr. Ayers sets up specific tests by which you can easily evaluate statements of ideas. You will also learn how to distinguish ideas that cannot be verified by experience � those expressing religious, moral, or aesthetic experience, those expounding theological or metaphysical doctrine, and those dealing with a priori truth. The basic thesis of this work is that philosophy should not squander its energies upon the unknowable, but should perform its proper function in criticism and analysis.
Reprint of the 1936 edition.
First published in 1936, this first full-length presentation in English of the Logical Positivism of Carnap, Neurath, and others has gone through many printings to become a classic of thought and communication. It not only surveys one of the most important areas of modern thought; it also shows the confusion that arises from imperfect understanding of the uses of language. A first-rate antidote for fuzzy thought and muddled writing, this remarkable book has helped philosophers, writers, speakers, teachers, students, and general readers alike.
Mr. Ayers sets up specific tests by which you can easily evaluate statements of ideas. You will also learn how to distinguish ideas that cannot be verified by experience � those expressing religious, moral, or aesthetic experience, those expounding theological or metaphysical doctrine, and those dealing with a priori truth. The basic thesis of this work is that philosophy should not squander its energies upon the unknowable, but should perform its proper function in criticism and analysis.
Reprint of the 1936 edition.
160 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1936
261 people are currently reading
7,719 people want to read
About the author
Alfred Jules Ayer
83Ìýbooks126ÌýfollowersIn 1910, Sir Alfred Jules Ayer was born in London into a wealthy family. His father was a Swiss Calvinist and his mother was of Dutch-Jewish ancestry. Ayer attended Eton College and studied philosophy and Greek at Oxford University. From 1946 to 1959, he taught philosophy at University College London. He then became Wykeham Professor of Logic at the University of Oxford. Ayer was knighted in 1970. Included among his many works are The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940), The Problem of Knowledge (1956), The Origins of Pragmatism (1968), Metaphysics and Common Sense (1969), (1972) and (1980), about philosopher . Later in life, Ayer frequently identified himself as an atheist and became active in humanist causes. He was the first vice president of the British Humanist Association and served as its president from 1965 to 1970. He was an Honorary Associate of the Rationalist Press Association from 1947 until his death. He was also an honorary member of the . In 1988, Ayer had a near-death experience in the United States after choking on salmon and subsequently losing consciousness. He wrote of his experience in “That Undiscovered Countryâ€� (New Humanist, May 1989): “My recent experiences have slightly weakened my conviction that my genuine death, which is due fairly soon, will be the end of me, though I continue to hope that it will be. They have not weakened my conviction that there is no god. I trust that my remaining an atheist will allay the anxieties of my fellow supporters of the British Humanist Association, the Rationalist Press Association and the South Place Ethical Society.â€� He died shortly after at age 78 in London. D. 1989.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 166 reviews
August 19, 2016
[SOCRATES is sitting in his living room on an easy chair, reading a newspaper. Suddenly, he hears a knock on the door, and gets up to answer it. Standing there is AYER, a skinny young man in a grey suit, with short-cropped hair. He is smiling and staring intently at SOCRATES.]
SOC: Hello? How may I help you?
AYER: Hello! My name is Alfred Jules Ayer, but most people call me Freddie. How are you today?
SOC: I’m fine, quite fine, thanks. Are you selling something? Because I’m afraid I am not interested�
AYER: Oh, no—no, no. I’m a member of the Vienna Circle, and I'm going door to door to promote our doctrine of logical positivism. It’s the amazing new doctrine that solves all philosophical problems now and for good. May I come in?
SOC: Really? Is that so? Yes, sure, come in. Sit down here on the couch.
[The two men sit down, SOC on his easy chair, and AYER on the couch.]
AYER: Thanks for letting me in! You’re the first one all week. Most people seem to think I’m a Mormon. [Looks around.] Nice place you got here. What do you do, if I may ask?
SOC: Oh, me? People think I’m a philosopher, but I just like to ask questions.
AYER: A philosopher? Neat! Well, then you’ll be real glad to hear what I have to say!
SOC: I don’t doubt it. So what’s this, um� logical positivism? Is it a religion?
AYER: A religion? Of course not! Logical positivism is the opposite of a religion! It’s a doctrine that tells us everything we ever want to know. If you learn about logical positivism, you’ll never be wrong again. Every problem you’ve ever asked about philosophy will be answered!
SOC: Wow, that sounds impressive� How does it work?
AYER: It’s simple! Here: let me demonstrate it by solving a philosophical problem. What’s something you want resolved?
SOC: Well, I’ve always been a bit puzzled by Hume’s problem of induction. I’m not at all satisfied with Kant’s treatment of it, and even Russell seems to shrug his shoulders.
AYER: The problem of induction? That’s child’s play! Let me read the solution from my new book, and you’ll see the answer clearly. [Pulls out a copy of Language, Truth, and Logic, and starts reading.] “� it appears that there is no possible way of solving the problem of induction, as it is ordinarily conceived. And this means that it is a fictitious problem, since all genuine problems are at least theoretically capable of being solved: and the credit of natural science is not impaired by the fact that some philosophers continue to be puzzled by it.�
SOC: So, wait. You’re saying that because you can’t figure out a way to solve the problem, it’s not a real problem?
AYER: Exactly! That’s the beauty of logical positivism! Anything that you can’t solve you just decide isn’t a real problem. Isn’t that great?
SOC: Really, is that all you have to do?
AYER: Well, you have to wave your hand around a bit, but that’s the general idea.
SOC: Hmm, how about another problem, like ethics. What do logical positivists say about what it means to do the right or wrong thing?
AYER: Ethics? Oh, please! That’s another easy one. Let me find the right passage. Here it is: “We can now see why it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validity of ethical judgements. It is not because they have ‘absolute� validity which is mysteriously independent of ordinary sense-experience, but because they have no objective validity whatsoever.�
SOC: Ah, I understand now. You’re saying that, since you can’t figure out a way to shoehorn ethical statements into your system, they aren’t real statements at all. Is that right?
AYER: Absolutely! That’s how it all works. All you have to do is say what you think—no argument is needed at all! And anyone who disagrees with you, just call them a metaphysician with a sneer.
SOC: So what’s the upshot of all this?
AYER: The upshot? Philosophy is over! It’s really incredible: all these smart philosopher-guys thought about all this stuff for thousands of years. But the solution was so obvious! Just stop having substantive arguments, and start dismissing everyone who disagrees with you as a befuddled moron. That way, you can be sure to get at the truth.
SOC: Wow, that’s quite a strategy. But I’m still a little curious about the specifics. For example, how do logical positivists deal with the question of truth?
AYER: Oh, Socrates, you ask the silliest questions! Well first, we just take an idea from Kant and Hume, and divide up all statements into analytic and synthetic statements. Then, we take an idea from William James, and insist that nothing is meaningful unless it is either a tautology or can be verified in experience. So that’s all of truth, either tautologies or science. It’s called the verification principle.
SOC: Interesting approach there� But, I wonder, what about this ‘verification principle' itself? How does that fit into the system? How is this principle either empirical or a tautology? Clearly, the verification principle itself doesn’t picture any facts; in other words, the principle itself can’t be verified—so it's not empirical. (Also, it would be absurd to verify a principle with the principle itself; that leads to a reductio ad absurdum.) Then, in order for it not to be meaningless, in your view, it must be a tautology. But it clearly isn’t a logical contradiction to assert that there are other criteria we might use to distinguish truth from falsity than the verification principle. So since the principle itself is clearly neither empirical nor a tautology, how can you justify it in your system?
AYER: Justify it? We don’t justify things. We assert that it’s true, and anyone who points out the contradictions we then assert are metaphysicians.
SOC: Wow, I see. Let me see if I get it. First you take ideas from other philosophers, then you throw them together into a half-coherent system, and finally you yell at anyone who disagrees. Is that right?
AYER: You got it! Logical positivism! You know, Socrates, you’re really a quick learner. Now there is no longer any legitimate reason to disagree with someone in philosophy. If they’re logical positivists, they’re right; and if not, they’re wrong. The Vienna Circle has arrived at the truth, and no further work need be done! As I say in my book: "One of the main objects of this treatise has been to show that there is nothing in the nature of philosophy to warrant the existence of conflicting philosophical parties or 'schools.'" In other words, now that we figured everything out, there isn't any good reason to fundamentally disagree with us. So all you have to do is join us, adopt our dogmas, and you will be saved from all falsity and metaphysics; you can believe exactly what we believe, and read the holy books of Russell and Wittgenstein and Hume.
SOC [Getting up from his seat]: Actually, I have to go somewhere� so I’m afraid I’m going to have to ask you to leave. But it was nice talking to you.
AYER [Getting up as well]: Oh, of course! Can I leave a book with you?
SOC: Sure�
AYER: Alright. [Lays book on table.] Nice talking with you. I hope to again!
SOC: Yep, yep.
[AYER leaves through front door, after vigorously shaking SOCRATES� hand. A moment later, SOCRATES� wife XANTHIPPE walks in.]
XAN: Who was that, dear?
SOC: Oh, never mind him, honey. Just a Mormon.
SOC: Hello? How may I help you?
AYER: Hello! My name is Alfred Jules Ayer, but most people call me Freddie. How are you today?
SOC: I’m fine, quite fine, thanks. Are you selling something? Because I’m afraid I am not interested�
AYER: Oh, no—no, no. I’m a member of the Vienna Circle, and I'm going door to door to promote our doctrine of logical positivism. It’s the amazing new doctrine that solves all philosophical problems now and for good. May I come in?
SOC: Really? Is that so? Yes, sure, come in. Sit down here on the couch.
[The two men sit down, SOC on his easy chair, and AYER on the couch.]
AYER: Thanks for letting me in! You’re the first one all week. Most people seem to think I’m a Mormon. [Looks around.] Nice place you got here. What do you do, if I may ask?
SOC: Oh, me? People think I’m a philosopher, but I just like to ask questions.
AYER: A philosopher? Neat! Well, then you’ll be real glad to hear what I have to say!
SOC: I don’t doubt it. So what’s this, um� logical positivism? Is it a religion?
AYER: A religion? Of course not! Logical positivism is the opposite of a religion! It’s a doctrine that tells us everything we ever want to know. If you learn about logical positivism, you’ll never be wrong again. Every problem you’ve ever asked about philosophy will be answered!
SOC: Wow, that sounds impressive� How does it work?
AYER: It’s simple! Here: let me demonstrate it by solving a philosophical problem. What’s something you want resolved?
SOC: Well, I’ve always been a bit puzzled by Hume’s problem of induction. I’m not at all satisfied with Kant’s treatment of it, and even Russell seems to shrug his shoulders.
AYER: The problem of induction? That’s child’s play! Let me read the solution from my new book, and you’ll see the answer clearly. [Pulls out a copy of Language, Truth, and Logic, and starts reading.] “� it appears that there is no possible way of solving the problem of induction, as it is ordinarily conceived. And this means that it is a fictitious problem, since all genuine problems are at least theoretically capable of being solved: and the credit of natural science is not impaired by the fact that some philosophers continue to be puzzled by it.�
SOC: So, wait. You’re saying that because you can’t figure out a way to solve the problem, it’s not a real problem?
AYER: Exactly! That’s the beauty of logical positivism! Anything that you can’t solve you just decide isn’t a real problem. Isn’t that great?
SOC: Really, is that all you have to do?
AYER: Well, you have to wave your hand around a bit, but that’s the general idea.
SOC: Hmm, how about another problem, like ethics. What do logical positivists say about what it means to do the right or wrong thing?
AYER: Ethics? Oh, please! That’s another easy one. Let me find the right passage. Here it is: “We can now see why it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validity of ethical judgements. It is not because they have ‘absolute� validity which is mysteriously independent of ordinary sense-experience, but because they have no objective validity whatsoever.�
SOC: Ah, I understand now. You’re saying that, since you can’t figure out a way to shoehorn ethical statements into your system, they aren’t real statements at all. Is that right?
AYER: Absolutely! That’s how it all works. All you have to do is say what you think—no argument is needed at all! And anyone who disagrees with you, just call them a metaphysician with a sneer.
SOC: So what’s the upshot of all this?
AYER: The upshot? Philosophy is over! It’s really incredible: all these smart philosopher-guys thought about all this stuff for thousands of years. But the solution was so obvious! Just stop having substantive arguments, and start dismissing everyone who disagrees with you as a befuddled moron. That way, you can be sure to get at the truth.
SOC: Wow, that’s quite a strategy. But I’m still a little curious about the specifics. For example, how do logical positivists deal with the question of truth?
AYER: Oh, Socrates, you ask the silliest questions! Well first, we just take an idea from Kant and Hume, and divide up all statements into analytic and synthetic statements. Then, we take an idea from William James, and insist that nothing is meaningful unless it is either a tautology or can be verified in experience. So that’s all of truth, either tautologies or science. It’s called the verification principle.
SOC: Interesting approach there� But, I wonder, what about this ‘verification principle' itself? How does that fit into the system? How is this principle either empirical or a tautology? Clearly, the verification principle itself doesn’t picture any facts; in other words, the principle itself can’t be verified—so it's not empirical. (Also, it would be absurd to verify a principle with the principle itself; that leads to a reductio ad absurdum.) Then, in order for it not to be meaningless, in your view, it must be a tautology. But it clearly isn’t a logical contradiction to assert that there are other criteria we might use to distinguish truth from falsity than the verification principle. So since the principle itself is clearly neither empirical nor a tautology, how can you justify it in your system?
AYER: Justify it? We don’t justify things. We assert that it’s true, and anyone who points out the contradictions we then assert are metaphysicians.
SOC: Wow, I see. Let me see if I get it. First you take ideas from other philosophers, then you throw them together into a half-coherent system, and finally you yell at anyone who disagrees. Is that right?
AYER: You got it! Logical positivism! You know, Socrates, you’re really a quick learner. Now there is no longer any legitimate reason to disagree with someone in philosophy. If they’re logical positivists, they’re right; and if not, they’re wrong. The Vienna Circle has arrived at the truth, and no further work need be done! As I say in my book: "One of the main objects of this treatise has been to show that there is nothing in the nature of philosophy to warrant the existence of conflicting philosophical parties or 'schools.'" In other words, now that we figured everything out, there isn't any good reason to fundamentally disagree with us. So all you have to do is join us, adopt our dogmas, and you will be saved from all falsity and metaphysics; you can believe exactly what we believe, and read the holy books of Russell and Wittgenstein and Hume.
SOC [Getting up from his seat]: Actually, I have to go somewhere� so I’m afraid I’m going to have to ask you to leave. But it was nice talking to you.
AYER [Getting up as well]: Oh, of course! Can I leave a book with you?
SOC: Sure�
AYER: Alright. [Lays book on table.] Nice talking with you. I hope to again!
SOC: Yep, yep.
[AYER leaves through front door, after vigorously shaking SOCRATES� hand. A moment later, SOCRATES� wife XANTHIPPE walks in.]
XAN: Who was that, dear?
SOC: Oh, never mind him, honey. Just a Mormon.
April 2, 2025
My mind's distracted and diffused;
My thoughts are many miles away -
They lie with you when you're asleep
And kiss you when you start your day.
Paul Simon, Kathy's Song.
My mind WAS "distracted and diffused" in 1968, as I read this little book in the stacks of the Douglas Library.
But my mind was STILL like that seventeen years later - AND my thoughts were many miles away - as I listened to Cliff, a senior Air Force Warrant Officer, dismantle the intricacies of supply logistics in such a way that it was all "too easy," to the assembled lieutenants (with a smidgeon of us civvies).
But not to me, though that flip turn of words was just Cliff's grinning way of closing every lecture that year in Barrie, Ontario.
You see, I was 200 miles away from my new bride in the East.
For two whole months.
When I made my confession to the town priest that lonely snowy February (I can't recall a day when it didn't snow at least half a foot) it was a carbon copy of every one he had heard from all the young Catholic airmen, so go figure.
He was politely bored! Tell it to the Judge.
At least we had a payphone in the Mess. Oh, well.
***
But Logistics made my anxious heart more distracted and diffused...
And Ayer? Get to the point! What of him?
He was a mighty empiricist logician (notice I didn't say LOGISTICian!), and the most powerful catalyst of 20th century British philosophy.
He wrote so plainly that this book is clear to a child.
But not to me.
That's one reason I splurged on the disarmingly delightful memoirs of his daughter, Gully Wells - The House in France (highly recommended, if you're into reminiscent reading, of the kind I like to write)!
So, a lifetime Aspie, it was all clear as mud to me when I read it (BTW, that means the opposite to what I mean, to an airman, to whom it means 'clear as day').
But Aspies can shine scholastically, too. And we can have photographic memories!
***
Imagine my shock and amazement when I placed 2nd in that class of forty airmen in the end.
You see, I took the course because I needed to know it all for my upcoming new career in the purchasing of capital equipment -
It had proved for me to be Too Easy for my Aspie brain -
But now, of course, the Real World coughed and beckoned from the wings.
The honeymoon was over.
No more fooling around!
It was high time that I used real adult intelligence: everyday language, truth and logic, back home, in the Battlefield of my Office.
Where I would surely need it!
And, of course, that presentiment proved right.
My thoughts are many miles away -
They lie with you when you're asleep
And kiss you when you start your day.
Paul Simon, Kathy's Song.
My mind WAS "distracted and diffused" in 1968, as I read this little book in the stacks of the Douglas Library.
But my mind was STILL like that seventeen years later - AND my thoughts were many miles away - as I listened to Cliff, a senior Air Force Warrant Officer, dismantle the intricacies of supply logistics in such a way that it was all "too easy," to the assembled lieutenants (with a smidgeon of us civvies).
But not to me, though that flip turn of words was just Cliff's grinning way of closing every lecture that year in Barrie, Ontario.
You see, I was 200 miles away from my new bride in the East.
For two whole months.
When I made my confession to the town priest that lonely snowy February (I can't recall a day when it didn't snow at least half a foot) it was a carbon copy of every one he had heard from all the young Catholic airmen, so go figure.
He was politely bored! Tell it to the Judge.
At least we had a payphone in the Mess. Oh, well.
***
But Logistics made my anxious heart more distracted and diffused...
And Ayer? Get to the point! What of him?
He was a mighty empiricist logician (notice I didn't say LOGISTICian!), and the most powerful catalyst of 20th century British philosophy.
He wrote so plainly that this book is clear to a child.
But not to me.
That's one reason I splurged on the disarmingly delightful memoirs of his daughter, Gully Wells - The House in France (highly recommended, if you're into reminiscent reading, of the kind I like to write)!
So, a lifetime Aspie, it was all clear as mud to me when I read it (BTW, that means the opposite to what I mean, to an airman, to whom it means 'clear as day').
But Aspies can shine scholastically, too. And we can have photographic memories!
***
Imagine my shock and amazement when I placed 2nd in that class of forty airmen in the end.
You see, I took the course because I needed to know it all for my upcoming new career in the purchasing of capital equipment -
It had proved for me to be Too Easy for my Aspie brain -
But now, of course, the Real World coughed and beckoned from the wings.
The honeymoon was over.
No more fooling around!
It was high time that I used real adult intelligence: everyday language, truth and logic, back home, in the Battlefield of my Office.
Where I would surely need it!
And, of course, that presentiment proved right.
July 30, 2016
To predict tomorrow's weather, I need not take into account the state of mind of the Emperor of Manchukuo.
I remember this book fondly, for in the hauteur of my youth I identified with the author's arguments in toto perhaps because I was the same age as he when he'd written this book.
Ayer operates from an absolute position: all legitimate knowledge is empirical knowledge and everything that exists outside the realm of the senses is mythical mumbo-jumbo one will do well to get rid of. He attacks metaphysics from the get-go and argues for its "elimination" from the philosophical discourse, which, to him, is not worth wasting time over, as it does not lead to conclusions grounded in hard facts. Theology, ethics, aesthetics are stuff of the linguistic mind games of the dark ages.
I kept nodding in agreement to Ayer's argument, taken in by his ability to compress hard discourse in intelligible, impressive language.
I don't know if he matured later on; I did not follow his intellectual journey so I cannot view this treatise in the light of his subsequent writings. But this book remains a stern reminder of the superiority of logical positivism written in a godlike style, that sometimes reads like a gospel to its staunch believers.
I remember this book fondly, for in the hauteur of my youth I identified with the author's arguments in toto perhaps because I was the same age as he when he'd written this book.
Ayer operates from an absolute position: all legitimate knowledge is empirical knowledge and everything that exists outside the realm of the senses is mythical mumbo-jumbo one will do well to get rid of. He attacks metaphysics from the get-go and argues for its "elimination" from the philosophical discourse, which, to him, is not worth wasting time over, as it does not lead to conclusions grounded in hard facts. Theology, ethics, aesthetics are stuff of the linguistic mind games of the dark ages.
“It is possible to be a meta-physician without believing in a transcendent reality; for we shall see that many metaphysical utterances are due to the commission of logical errors, rather than to a conscious desire on the part of their authors to go beyond the limits of experience.�
I kept nodding in agreement to Ayer's argument, taken in by his ability to compress hard discourse in intelligible, impressive language.
I don't know if he matured later on; I did not follow his intellectual journey so I cannot view this treatise in the light of his subsequent writings. But this book remains a stern reminder of the superiority of logical positivism written in a godlike style, that sometimes reads like a gospel to its staunch believers.
“It seems to me that theists of all kinds have very largely failed to make their concept of a deity intelligible; and to the extent that they have made it intelligible, they have given us no reason to think that anything answers to it.�
November 10, 2017
A work that usefully lays out some of the key arguments for seeing the status of metaphysical knowledge as being crucially dependent on the theory of meaning. The arguments (and, especially, the rhetorical maneuvers) provided by this book have crucially contributed to the linguistic turn in 20th century thought, which was a philosophical approach aimed at reducing metaphysical questions to questions about the proper use of symbolism. This is the essence of Ayer's (in)famous "elimination" of metaphysics: he follows the early Wittgenstein in seeing metaphysical problems as the result of a pathological misuse of language. This misuse occurs especially through a reification of grammatical forms which treats these as fundamental ontological structures. This linguistic reification procedure, in Ayer's estimation, basically generates the entire subject matter of metaphysics. On Ayer's view, the metaphysician is not even a failed poet, for the poet sometimes accidentally tells the truth about experience, while the metaphysician never even in principle does. The great problems of metaphysics aren't even fiction; they are nonsense.
Ayer proposes his verification criterion of meaning as a universal acid test of valid philosophical theorizing. That is, the criterion states that a theory is meaningful if and only if it is cobbled together out of observed facts and/or analytic (logical or mathematical) truths. Metaphysics, as a whole, fails his meaningfulness test. Its questions cannot even be coherently formulated. Thus, a metaphysical question such as "What is the meaning of life?" has as much sense as "Gur Gar Glarglr." One might wonder, then, how intelligible debate on these questions is possible at all. And, rightly seen, ethics is just a collection of emotive squeaks of approval and grunts of disapproval.
The question is whether one CAN adopt a metaphysically-neutral stance from which one can go on to critique all other metaphysics, as Ayer attempts to do, or whether any possible perspective implies "ontological commitments," as Quine would go on to point out. I am of the latter persuasion. I hold that any coherent perspective requires, for its explanation, a rather robust metaphysics. Ayer's logical empiricism is no exception. So the first trouble I have with his theory is that it is metaphysically dishonest: it (necessarily, if only implicitly) projects a metaphysics without offering us the resources required to make it explicit and to critically evaluate it. By keeping his metaphysics a closeted affair, he renders it immune from criticism. This leads him to selectively pour acid on all OTHERS' ontological commitments while being self-effacing about his own by affecting a position of absolute neutrality. This move seems fairly commonplace in the Analytic philosophy I have read thus far (i.e. Frege, Russell, Moore, the early Wittgenstein). Linguistic philosophy for this reason cannot provide a basis for eliminating metaphysics.
The second problem I have with his theory of meaning is that it implies an unstable position that nobody can actually occupy. We just can't derive the continuous field of experience from this theory; too much is "eliminated" as senseless that seems crucial to holding an integrated perspective on the world. For one, there's the metaphysical necessity that we must postulate in order to explain the continuity of our experience of the world. That can't be reduced to logical necessity, as Ayer and Wittgenstein suggest. In the end, even if the status of metaphysics may depend on our theory of meaning, the theory of meaning must itself depend on our best account of experience. You can't just build a theory of meaning in a phenomenological vacuum, as if the absurdities that follow when we try to account for lived experience using this theory of meaning don't count. A coherent empiricism must merge with the data of phenomenology.
And whatever happened to Kant? One would think that his first Critique had already in many ways refuted many of the foundational tenets of this analytical approach. Why do all the Analytics basically ignore Kant's arguments for the synthetic a priori as a category of knowledge? Are they right in doing so? Or is it maybe that their failure to understand Kant on this point is what leads to these phenomenologically absurd, eliminativist views that nobody can actually, coherently entertain in practice? My own opinion is that Analytic philosophy is the dead end street you get stuck into when you fail to understand Kant. We can better understand the limits of metaphysical knowledge through Kant's framework, by mapping the structure of cognition from within.
All objections aside, this work has set the agenda for a thriving cottage industry in Anglo-American philosophy during the last century. The overriding motive seems to be to show how the philosophical tradition is nothing but a cesspool of delusion. One can win at this game if one can show that everybody - but oneself! - is a fool that is duped by his own comforting illusions. As a philosopher, one must above all stand apart as the intransingent illusion-busting demystifier. There's something of a hero rescue narrative that Ayer is rhetorically playing up here, and one that his countless ideological clones among the Analysts would also attempt to replicate. This hero narrative supplies a large part of the force that his arguments alone fails to generate. Contemporaries such as Dan Dennett are indebted for much of their rhetorical ammo to Ayer. He has defined what philosophy means for at least two generations of philosophers around these parts, and continues to do so to this day, for better or for worse. Thus, he is an intellectual force for everyone to contend with.
Ayer proposes his verification criterion of meaning as a universal acid test of valid philosophical theorizing. That is, the criterion states that a theory is meaningful if and only if it is cobbled together out of observed facts and/or analytic (logical or mathematical) truths. Metaphysics, as a whole, fails his meaningfulness test. Its questions cannot even be coherently formulated. Thus, a metaphysical question such as "What is the meaning of life?" has as much sense as "Gur Gar Glarglr." One might wonder, then, how intelligible debate on these questions is possible at all. And, rightly seen, ethics is just a collection of emotive squeaks of approval and grunts of disapproval.
The question is whether one CAN adopt a metaphysically-neutral stance from which one can go on to critique all other metaphysics, as Ayer attempts to do, or whether any possible perspective implies "ontological commitments," as Quine would go on to point out. I am of the latter persuasion. I hold that any coherent perspective requires, for its explanation, a rather robust metaphysics. Ayer's logical empiricism is no exception. So the first trouble I have with his theory is that it is metaphysically dishonest: it (necessarily, if only implicitly) projects a metaphysics without offering us the resources required to make it explicit and to critically evaluate it. By keeping his metaphysics a closeted affair, he renders it immune from criticism. This leads him to selectively pour acid on all OTHERS' ontological commitments while being self-effacing about his own by affecting a position of absolute neutrality. This move seems fairly commonplace in the Analytic philosophy I have read thus far (i.e. Frege, Russell, Moore, the early Wittgenstein). Linguistic philosophy for this reason cannot provide a basis for eliminating metaphysics.
The second problem I have with his theory of meaning is that it implies an unstable position that nobody can actually occupy. We just can't derive the continuous field of experience from this theory; too much is "eliminated" as senseless that seems crucial to holding an integrated perspective on the world. For one, there's the metaphysical necessity that we must postulate in order to explain the continuity of our experience of the world. That can't be reduced to logical necessity, as Ayer and Wittgenstein suggest. In the end, even if the status of metaphysics may depend on our theory of meaning, the theory of meaning must itself depend on our best account of experience. You can't just build a theory of meaning in a phenomenological vacuum, as if the absurdities that follow when we try to account for lived experience using this theory of meaning don't count. A coherent empiricism must merge with the data of phenomenology.
And whatever happened to Kant? One would think that his first Critique had already in many ways refuted many of the foundational tenets of this analytical approach. Why do all the Analytics basically ignore Kant's arguments for the synthetic a priori as a category of knowledge? Are they right in doing so? Or is it maybe that their failure to understand Kant on this point is what leads to these phenomenologically absurd, eliminativist views that nobody can actually, coherently entertain in practice? My own opinion is that Analytic philosophy is the dead end street you get stuck into when you fail to understand Kant. We can better understand the limits of metaphysical knowledge through Kant's framework, by mapping the structure of cognition from within.
All objections aside, this work has set the agenda for a thriving cottage industry in Anglo-American philosophy during the last century. The overriding motive seems to be to show how the philosophical tradition is nothing but a cesspool of delusion. One can win at this game if one can show that everybody - but oneself! - is a fool that is duped by his own comforting illusions. As a philosopher, one must above all stand apart as the intransingent illusion-busting demystifier. There's something of a hero rescue narrative that Ayer is rhetorically playing up here, and one that his countless ideological clones among the Analysts would also attempt to replicate. This hero narrative supplies a large part of the force that his arguments alone fails to generate. Contemporaries such as Dan Dennett are indebted for much of their rhetorical ammo to Ayer. He has defined what philosophy means for at least two generations of philosophers around these parts, and continues to do so to this day, for better or for worse. Thus, he is an intellectual force for everyone to contend with.
July 29, 2007
Polemical? Yes. Dogmatic? Sure. Pretentious? Absolutely.
This is still among my favorite books of all time. You will never look at the world the same way ever again after reading it. It changed my life. And for the better.
This is still among my favorite books of all time. You will never look at the world the same way ever again after reading it. It changed my life. And for the better.
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September 3, 2019Logical positivism, while massively influential, is widely regarded as a failure, and this is the manifesto of that failed movement. For that reason, unless you are a serious student of philosophy, there's not much point in reading Language, Truth, and Logic, especially given that Ayer's own principle of verification has been more or less completely replaced in the scientific community by Popper's principle of falsification. And I mean, the very concept of analytic vs. synthetic propositions on which the book is based was undercut by Quine... and Ayer, honest man that he was, owned up to this. The one thing that remains awesome that a young Ayer pioneered was the notion of something not even being false, just being meaningless. That's about as good a bitchslap as any.
July 17, 2020
“It is indeed misleading to draw a sharp distinction, as we have been doing, between philosophy and science. What we should rather do is to distinguish between the speculative and the logical aspects of science, and assert that philosophy must develop into the logic of science. That is to say, we distinguish between the activity of formulating hypotheses, and the activity of displaying the logical relationship of these hypotheses and defining the symbols that occur in them. It is of no importance whether we call one who is engaged in the latter activity a philosopher or a scientist. What we must recognise, is that it is necessary for a philosopher to become a scientist, in this sense, if he is to make any substantial contribution towards the growth of human knowledge.� (p. 153)
This, in a nutshell, is Alfred J. Ayer’s thesis in Language, Truth and Logic (1936). In this book, Ayer offers a new philosophical programme, which occupies itself mainly with linguistic analysis of the concepts of science and logical relationship between these concepts. What Ayer does, is basically explain the programme of the logical-positivists, a philosophical school which rose to prominence in the early twentieth century. Logical-positivism was highly steeped in science, especially the natural sciences, and tried to distance itself as much as possible from metaphysical philosophy.
Although logical-positivism is associated with Germany and Austria, Bertrand Russell and his protégé Ludwig Wittgenstein had already made name in England by taking logic and analytical philosophy to a whole new level. Ayer, in a sense, synthesizes the insights of both strands of philosophy.
The book itself is easy to follow, provided one has some background knowledge of modern philosophy and the scientific developments of the last couple of centuries. It can be summarized as follows:
Within the domain of knowledge, there is a distinction (made first by David Hume) between analytic and synthetic propositions. Analytic propositions are tautologies, in the sense that through deductions, conclusions are discovered which were already contained in their premises. If the premises are true and if the deduction is valid, then the conclusion is true. Only in analytical propositions can the truth-question be raised: logic leads to certain propositions, true propositions. The problem? They are empty tautologies � they don’t say anything about the world.
In Ayer’s view, and he’s following Russell in this, even mathematics can be reduced to logical propositions. Mathematics is logic. And logic is nothing but a system of tautologies. The truth of this view of mathematics is illustrated by the status of geometry around the time Ayer was writing. For millennia, people thought that Euclidean geometry � a set of definitions, axioms and deduced propositions � was certain knowledge about the world. For example, based on Euclidean axioms, the three angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees.
But then, in the nineteenth century, new non-Euclidean geometries were discovered. New self-contained, consistent systems of axioms and propositions were all equally possible. Now the question became: which geometry is the true geometry? Or the same: which geometry describes the objective reality? With the invention of new geometric systems, geometry became an empirical science, in need of verification through observations in the real world.
Ultimately, all mathematical systems are systems of tautologies, and the logician can reduce all these systems to logical propositions. Or rather, they ARE logical systems (i.e. relationships between symbols).
This might sound abstract, but it really is a fundamental break with the past: from now on, mathematics and logic were seen to be mere tools, devices, to be employed by the philosopher to analyse the symbols and the relationship between these symbols in science.
So, we have analytic propositions, which are empty. But the other type of propositions, synthetic propositions, are the stuff of science. Synthetic means that something new is added to the conclusions, which was not contained in the premises. In effect, this means that our experiences in the objective world are the only means to gather knowledge � empirical science. The problem with this type of knowledge is, that it’s based on induction. We observe a given amount of instances, try to establish general causal relationships between observed variables, and then generalize these relationships along space and time. So for example, we observe objects falling, we draw the implication the gravity causes objects to fall, and then generalize that gravity makes objects fall everywhere and always � past, present and future.
But as David Hume already pointed out, inductive propositions can never be conclusively confirmed or established. It’s always possible to doubt whether the next observation will refute the laws hitherto discovered. So, the empirical sciences are the only means to gather knowledge about the world, yet philosophy is the only means to establish certain truths � this is Ayer’s main problem.
For Ayer, logical propositions concern themselves with truth and falsehood, but they are empty, mere tools � they don’t say anything about the world. Empirical hypotheses, on the other hand, do add knowledge about the world, but they concern themselves with validity and invalidity. Asking truth-questions about scientific knowledge, hence, is literally senseless. The best we can do, is ask if an empirical hypothesis is rendered probable by the confirmation of observations.
And this brings us to the core of Ayer’s programme. According to him, verification is the criterion with which we can distinguish between meaningful and meaningless propositions. If we can verify the empirical claims contained in a proposition, this is a factual proposition and hence meaningful. In other words: if we can decide on the probability of an hypothesis through observation, it is a meaningful proposition. All the rest is literally meaningless and hence not the domain of science and philosophy.
This verification criterion of truth has severe implications, which Ayer works out more fully in the latter part of the book. For example, metaphysics � always regarded to be a major branch in philosophy � occupies itself with making factual claims about an unintelligible other world. Hence, metaphysics is meaningless and should be left to poets. Also, values are not factual propositions and hence can’t be verified through observation. Morality, as far it is concerned with normative statements, is nothing but expression of emotions. This renders ethics a non-science and cuts it from philosophy � very radical, indeed. (Descriptive morality, such as the study of different moral systems or the way human beings behave, is a scientific object.)
Also, religion, or theology, occupies itself with the existence of a transcendental Being and hence is metaphysical. Hence, it is literally meaningless. Any form of intuitionism, the view that intuition gives me knowledge, � be it mathematical, theological, moral or otherwise � is according to Ayer, “material for the psychoanalyst.�
But doesn’t this view lead to the contradiction that if the only synthetic knowledge is through my sense-experiences (i.e. observing) then I can never verify the existence of other people, or the world in general. All that is accessible to me, is my own sense-experience, not the sense-experience of others. Well, according to Ayer, based on all my prior observations, I have formed the hypothesis that all objects which look, act and are like me, are conscious agents and hence exist as such. This prediction is constantly verified by my sense-experience and hence it is rational for me to have confidence in the probability of other people and the world.
So, to sum up. Science is the only means to gather knowledge about the world. Science consists in (1) logical apparatus –systems of tautologies, used as devices by the philosopher and scientist � with which to define symbols and investigate the relationship between symbols. Invention of new symbolic systems helps philosophers discover new truths contained in the premises; truths, which we otherwise, with our limited thinking, never would have discovered. And science consists in (2) empirical hypotheses � the formulation of verifiable propositions and the testing of these hypotheses through sense-experience (observation). The only meaningful propositions are those that can be verified, all other propositions are meaningless and hence unscientific � metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and theology should be ditched.
The task of the philosopher is to investigate the empirical sciences through studying the symbols and their relationships. The philosopher occupies himself solely with linguistic analysis and clarification of definitions. With the rise of logical-positivism, philosophy ate its part of the humble pie.
All throughout Language, Truth & Logic, you can almost see Wittgenstein nodding his head in approval of Ayer’s presentation: “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.�
As a last remark, it is very important to stress what Ayer is not saying. He is not arguing for the falsehood of metaphysics, ethics or religion, he is simply stating that we cannot count these types of propositions as knowledge. For example, Ayer is not an atheist or agnostic, since atheists make a factual claim about a transcendental Being (i.e. He does not exist), while agnostics acknowledge the possible truth of both theism and atheism. Ayer simply says: it is meaningless to talk about these subjects, since they’re literally senseless. Hush.
Logical-positivism is a very refreshing perspective in philosophy, since through rigorous logical analysis, many philosophical problems can be resolved as linguistic issues. We use language to convey meaning, and the symbolism of language forces us to use symbols that sometimes might lead us into fallacious thinking. The philosopher should just resolve all the ancient philosophical debates and expose them for what they are: flawed linguistics. This view is refreshing, because it shows us clearly that not all sentences we utter are, although grammatically correct, meaningful and it offers us a way out of the endless philosophical duelling � realism versus idealism, rationalism versus empiricism, monism versus pluralism.
If you truly grasp what people like Ayer are aiming at and the truth in their analyses, it tends to ease one’s mind about all the difficult subjects. They’re difficult because they’re senseless. Anyway, I find this way of thinking truly beautiful and this book has convinced me once more of this view on knowledge. It’s a definite recommendation!
This, in a nutshell, is Alfred J. Ayer’s thesis in Language, Truth and Logic (1936). In this book, Ayer offers a new philosophical programme, which occupies itself mainly with linguistic analysis of the concepts of science and logical relationship between these concepts. What Ayer does, is basically explain the programme of the logical-positivists, a philosophical school which rose to prominence in the early twentieth century. Logical-positivism was highly steeped in science, especially the natural sciences, and tried to distance itself as much as possible from metaphysical philosophy.
Although logical-positivism is associated with Germany and Austria, Bertrand Russell and his protégé Ludwig Wittgenstein had already made name in England by taking logic and analytical philosophy to a whole new level. Ayer, in a sense, synthesizes the insights of both strands of philosophy.
The book itself is easy to follow, provided one has some background knowledge of modern philosophy and the scientific developments of the last couple of centuries. It can be summarized as follows:
Within the domain of knowledge, there is a distinction (made first by David Hume) between analytic and synthetic propositions. Analytic propositions are tautologies, in the sense that through deductions, conclusions are discovered which were already contained in their premises. If the premises are true and if the deduction is valid, then the conclusion is true. Only in analytical propositions can the truth-question be raised: logic leads to certain propositions, true propositions. The problem? They are empty tautologies � they don’t say anything about the world.
In Ayer’s view, and he’s following Russell in this, even mathematics can be reduced to logical propositions. Mathematics is logic. And logic is nothing but a system of tautologies. The truth of this view of mathematics is illustrated by the status of geometry around the time Ayer was writing. For millennia, people thought that Euclidean geometry � a set of definitions, axioms and deduced propositions � was certain knowledge about the world. For example, based on Euclidean axioms, the three angles of a triangle equal 180 degrees.
But then, in the nineteenth century, new non-Euclidean geometries were discovered. New self-contained, consistent systems of axioms and propositions were all equally possible. Now the question became: which geometry is the true geometry? Or the same: which geometry describes the objective reality? With the invention of new geometric systems, geometry became an empirical science, in need of verification through observations in the real world.
Ultimately, all mathematical systems are systems of tautologies, and the logician can reduce all these systems to logical propositions. Or rather, they ARE logical systems (i.e. relationships between symbols).
This might sound abstract, but it really is a fundamental break with the past: from now on, mathematics and logic were seen to be mere tools, devices, to be employed by the philosopher to analyse the symbols and the relationship between these symbols in science.
So, we have analytic propositions, which are empty. But the other type of propositions, synthetic propositions, are the stuff of science. Synthetic means that something new is added to the conclusions, which was not contained in the premises. In effect, this means that our experiences in the objective world are the only means to gather knowledge � empirical science. The problem with this type of knowledge is, that it’s based on induction. We observe a given amount of instances, try to establish general causal relationships between observed variables, and then generalize these relationships along space and time. So for example, we observe objects falling, we draw the implication the gravity causes objects to fall, and then generalize that gravity makes objects fall everywhere and always � past, present and future.
But as David Hume already pointed out, inductive propositions can never be conclusively confirmed or established. It’s always possible to doubt whether the next observation will refute the laws hitherto discovered. So, the empirical sciences are the only means to gather knowledge about the world, yet philosophy is the only means to establish certain truths � this is Ayer’s main problem.
For Ayer, logical propositions concern themselves with truth and falsehood, but they are empty, mere tools � they don’t say anything about the world. Empirical hypotheses, on the other hand, do add knowledge about the world, but they concern themselves with validity and invalidity. Asking truth-questions about scientific knowledge, hence, is literally senseless. The best we can do, is ask if an empirical hypothesis is rendered probable by the confirmation of observations.
And this brings us to the core of Ayer’s programme. According to him, verification is the criterion with which we can distinguish between meaningful and meaningless propositions. If we can verify the empirical claims contained in a proposition, this is a factual proposition and hence meaningful. In other words: if we can decide on the probability of an hypothesis through observation, it is a meaningful proposition. All the rest is literally meaningless and hence not the domain of science and philosophy.
This verification criterion of truth has severe implications, which Ayer works out more fully in the latter part of the book. For example, metaphysics � always regarded to be a major branch in philosophy � occupies itself with making factual claims about an unintelligible other world. Hence, metaphysics is meaningless and should be left to poets. Also, values are not factual propositions and hence can’t be verified through observation. Morality, as far it is concerned with normative statements, is nothing but expression of emotions. This renders ethics a non-science and cuts it from philosophy � very radical, indeed. (Descriptive morality, such as the study of different moral systems or the way human beings behave, is a scientific object.)
Also, religion, or theology, occupies itself with the existence of a transcendental Being and hence is metaphysical. Hence, it is literally meaningless. Any form of intuitionism, the view that intuition gives me knowledge, � be it mathematical, theological, moral or otherwise � is according to Ayer, “material for the psychoanalyst.�
But doesn’t this view lead to the contradiction that if the only synthetic knowledge is through my sense-experiences (i.e. observing) then I can never verify the existence of other people, or the world in general. All that is accessible to me, is my own sense-experience, not the sense-experience of others. Well, according to Ayer, based on all my prior observations, I have formed the hypothesis that all objects which look, act and are like me, are conscious agents and hence exist as such. This prediction is constantly verified by my sense-experience and hence it is rational for me to have confidence in the probability of other people and the world.
So, to sum up. Science is the only means to gather knowledge about the world. Science consists in (1) logical apparatus –systems of tautologies, used as devices by the philosopher and scientist � with which to define symbols and investigate the relationship between symbols. Invention of new symbolic systems helps philosophers discover new truths contained in the premises; truths, which we otherwise, with our limited thinking, never would have discovered. And science consists in (2) empirical hypotheses � the formulation of verifiable propositions and the testing of these hypotheses through sense-experience (observation). The only meaningful propositions are those that can be verified, all other propositions are meaningless and hence unscientific � metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and theology should be ditched.
The task of the philosopher is to investigate the empirical sciences through studying the symbols and their relationships. The philosopher occupies himself solely with linguistic analysis and clarification of definitions. With the rise of logical-positivism, philosophy ate its part of the humble pie.
All throughout Language, Truth & Logic, you can almost see Wittgenstein nodding his head in approval of Ayer’s presentation: “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.�
As a last remark, it is very important to stress what Ayer is not saying. He is not arguing for the falsehood of metaphysics, ethics or religion, he is simply stating that we cannot count these types of propositions as knowledge. For example, Ayer is not an atheist or agnostic, since atheists make a factual claim about a transcendental Being (i.e. He does not exist), while agnostics acknowledge the possible truth of both theism and atheism. Ayer simply says: it is meaningless to talk about these subjects, since they’re literally senseless. Hush.
Logical-positivism is a very refreshing perspective in philosophy, since through rigorous logical analysis, many philosophical problems can be resolved as linguistic issues. We use language to convey meaning, and the symbolism of language forces us to use symbols that sometimes might lead us into fallacious thinking. The philosopher should just resolve all the ancient philosophical debates and expose them for what they are: flawed linguistics. This view is refreshing, because it shows us clearly that not all sentences we utter are, although grammatically correct, meaningful and it offers us a way out of the endless philosophical duelling � realism versus idealism, rationalism versus empiricism, monism versus pluralism.
If you truly grasp what people like Ayer are aiming at and the truth in their analyses, it tends to ease one’s mind about all the difficult subjects. They’re difficult because they’re senseless. Anyway, I find this way of thinking truly beautiful and this book has convinced me once more of this view on knowledge. It’s a definite recommendation!
July 27, 2023
This book is the English explanation of the main doctrine of Vienna Circle, an association of philosophers that applied verificationism on Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus which formed the basis for the group's philosophy. Ayer wrote: "Wittgenstein did not then figure in the Oxford curriculum, and I knew nothing about him at all until I started to read this book. Its effect on me was overwhelming ... This was exactly what I wanted, the very conclusions I had been groping towards on my own. All the difficulties that had perplexed me were instantly removed?"
The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, which are themselves the logical outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and David Hume.
Regardless of the problems in the verification principle, saying that senseless propositions are meaningless is wrong. saying that the inexpressible is meaningless is wrong. Ayer later admitted that "the outlook of the Tractatus was misunderstood by the members of the Vienna Circle and the young English philosophers, including myself, who were strongly influenced by it". As Wittgenstein summrised "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical" and "What can be shown cannot be said".
January 3, 2025
“� in so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary ‘scientific� statements; and […] in so far as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true or false� (103)
“The difference between the man who uses language scientifically and the man who uses it emotively is not that the one produces sentences which are incapable of arousing emotion, and the other sentences which have no sense, but that the one is primarily concerned with the expression of true propositions, the other with the creation of a work of art� (44)
Ayer’s principal aim in this book seems to be that of defining the work of philosophy, and it is decidedly not in making metaphysical statements about first principles or in proclaiming any other a priori truths that we treat as out of reach from ordinary tests of verification. The role of philosophy is to clarify our thinking and expression, symbolically, by grounding it in and making it traceable to what can be ascertained empirically about the world.
Ayer advocates a focus on verifiability as a condition by which propositions can be understood as significant (i.e., pointing to the world) and capable of producing knowledge because they can be proven, empirically, to be either true positively (verified in the strong sense of the term) or with some probability (verified in the weak sense of the term). Statements that cannot be verified directly or for which we can not envision ways or conditions under which to verify them, cannot be knowledge because they are “senseless� (i.e., not available to the senses or capable of supporting predictions about what that sensory experience would be). It is this focus on verifiability (as opposed to falsifiability) that I understand to distinguish his approach from garden-variety logical positivism.
The benchmark of verifiability means that any statement that is found to be true only inductively contributes to our overall sense of the world and truth. The more often we make consistently verified observations, the more assured we can become that we are making guaranteed true statements. But we never arrive at guaranteed knowledge of the world, only that which is more and more probable. It is based on the belief that in probability that we find enough that is provisionally true to go on. In this way, I don’t think that Ayer is talking about inductive reasoning so much as he is talking about abductive reasoning, which involves making provisional claims to understanding on the basis of incomplete information and then revising based on the experience of application to find what is true and consistent to take another step forward.
The degree to which statements are coherent within a regime of truth (e.g., science) allows us to rationalize what must be true or what is likely to be true because 1) we understand that all such claims can be verified if needed, 2) that verification has already been done before, 3) we see confirmation in our experience of the world that those truths we accepted as provisional hold with the sense field we are observing, and 4) that we can empirically verify that other people are acting in relation to the world that is consistent with our own rational sense of the world.
I’m sympathetic to what Ayer is attempting to do here, but it also seems like he goes a bit too far and not far enough on some points:
Paradox of Verifiability: Ayer’s model of verifiable knowledge holds that we can know something if we can make verifiable truth claims about it. These should either be truth claims that are directly verifiable and can be proven true or false with sense data. Or we can know things about the world that could be verifiable under “certain conditions� (145). That is, what is true and what is probably true are allowed to stand as facts.
The problem is that “certain conditions� is under-specified. In the spirit of Ayer’s argument, “certain conditions� are supposed to account for situations where if I wanted to, for example, verify that Pluto exists in our solar system, I could do so provided that I was able to get there in my lifetime, have sufficient air, have sufficient warmth, and a suitable vessel to be close enough to Pluto confirm, “yup, there it is.� But the same kind of argument could be made for verifying that gremlins or unicorns exist if the conditions for verification can be specified (e.g., you have to truly believe they exist before you can see them, and only at midnight on the third full moon of the year, etc.). It has the potential to get a bit silly. I think that it has to be necessary to apply the test of verification to the “certain conditions� of verification themselves. Going with the example, we can confirm a condition like the third full moon of the year but can we verify “true belief�? When we start applying the rule of verification to the conditions of verification, however, we can end up with a paradox of never having conditions of verification that do not themselves need to be verified before they can stand as conditions of verification. So, perhaps we swing in the other direction and set a hard limit on what can be verified: anybody must be able to be meet the conditions of verification and be present to make independent observations. So, if we cannot figure out how to travel to a distant planet or to the center of the earth, etc. then we have to admit that there are aspects of the world that are beyond our ability to verify or to conceive of how to verify, meaning that they cannot stand as things that we know. Ayer’s model either restricts what can be know too much or is too permissive.
Apparatus of Verification: Following on the previous point, I would have also liked additional information about the apparatuses of verification that Ayer had in mind. He seems to be assuming that empirical verification is limited to the senses. One refutation of my example about verifying that Pluto exists in our solar system is that the New Horizons spacecraft did this for us. And the sense data that we gathered about Pluto came to us through the instrumentation that received the data from the instruments on New Horizons that gathered data from Pluto. There are at least two levels of mediation here. Our sense data as knowing beings who are capable of making propositions about the world is, strictly speaking, a sensory experience of watching a data stream on an earth-based computer interface. Is that a suitable apparatus of verification such that we would be comfortable making knowledge claims about Pluto? Probably most of us would agree that it is, but that is because we are taking things as true a priori based on faith in science and engineering such that we do not feel a need for further verification, beyond QA testing prior to launch, that the New Horizons spacecraft is a reliable extension of our own senses. Why do we not then afford the same trust to other mediating devices that proclaim to allow access to other knowable truths: video footage of Sasquatch, conspiracy theories, truths about the afterlife in religious texts, etc.?
Ethical Knowledge: Ayer claims that normative ethical statements cannot result in verifiable propositions (106). How does one, for example, verify that murder is wrong? And in this we get to one of what I understand to be a well-established critique of Ayer, that his formulation strips all normative weight of moral claims to say that they are not significant because of their appeal to inaccessible and unverifiable matters. As others have put it, he is equating the moral force of “murder is wrong!� with “Boo, murder!�. Where his claim does seem to hold up is that a moral law, like the Categorial Imperative (CI) is accepted as true without appeal to the world of experience. That may be true, but if we take an implication of the CI to be, in the case of murder, that I cannot wish for murder to be ethically allowable because in allowing murder we have to allow that it is ethically fine for someone to murder us, we seem to arrive at point where the proposition “murder is okay� is counter to our experience which would lead us to conclude, when our own lives are at risk, that murder IS wrong. But not really. Even though in a situation like this, we can say that murder is not desirable, or murder is counterproductive to establishing community, or murder is detrimental to civil order. But we still can’t say that murder is wrong because what does “wrong� mean? I get this objection on principle, but it does still seem like the normative force of “murder is wrong� is what animates more verifiable statements like “murder (is wrong because it) is counterproductive to establishing society. So is it true that there is no significant ethical knowledge? I don’t quite believe it. It may just be that the language of ethical claims are too abstracted from the empirical realities that they entail.
“The difference between the man who uses language scientifically and the man who uses it emotively is not that the one produces sentences which are incapable of arousing emotion, and the other sentences which have no sense, but that the one is primarily concerned with the expression of true propositions, the other with the creation of a work of art� (44)
Ayer’s principal aim in this book seems to be that of defining the work of philosophy, and it is decidedly not in making metaphysical statements about first principles or in proclaiming any other a priori truths that we treat as out of reach from ordinary tests of verification. The role of philosophy is to clarify our thinking and expression, symbolically, by grounding it in and making it traceable to what can be ascertained empirically about the world.
Ayer advocates a focus on verifiability as a condition by which propositions can be understood as significant (i.e., pointing to the world) and capable of producing knowledge because they can be proven, empirically, to be either true positively (verified in the strong sense of the term) or with some probability (verified in the weak sense of the term). Statements that cannot be verified directly or for which we can not envision ways or conditions under which to verify them, cannot be knowledge because they are “senseless� (i.e., not available to the senses or capable of supporting predictions about what that sensory experience would be). It is this focus on verifiability (as opposed to falsifiability) that I understand to distinguish his approach from garden-variety logical positivism.
The benchmark of verifiability means that any statement that is found to be true only inductively contributes to our overall sense of the world and truth. The more often we make consistently verified observations, the more assured we can become that we are making guaranteed true statements. But we never arrive at guaranteed knowledge of the world, only that which is more and more probable. It is based on the belief that in probability that we find enough that is provisionally true to go on. In this way, I don’t think that Ayer is talking about inductive reasoning so much as he is talking about abductive reasoning, which involves making provisional claims to understanding on the basis of incomplete information and then revising based on the experience of application to find what is true and consistent to take another step forward.
The degree to which statements are coherent within a regime of truth (e.g., science) allows us to rationalize what must be true or what is likely to be true because 1) we understand that all such claims can be verified if needed, 2) that verification has already been done before, 3) we see confirmation in our experience of the world that those truths we accepted as provisional hold with the sense field we are observing, and 4) that we can empirically verify that other people are acting in relation to the world that is consistent with our own rational sense of the world.
I’m sympathetic to what Ayer is attempting to do here, but it also seems like he goes a bit too far and not far enough on some points:
Paradox of Verifiability: Ayer’s model of verifiable knowledge holds that we can know something if we can make verifiable truth claims about it. These should either be truth claims that are directly verifiable and can be proven true or false with sense data. Or we can know things about the world that could be verifiable under “certain conditions� (145). That is, what is true and what is probably true are allowed to stand as facts.
The problem is that “certain conditions� is under-specified. In the spirit of Ayer’s argument, “certain conditions� are supposed to account for situations where if I wanted to, for example, verify that Pluto exists in our solar system, I could do so provided that I was able to get there in my lifetime, have sufficient air, have sufficient warmth, and a suitable vessel to be close enough to Pluto confirm, “yup, there it is.� But the same kind of argument could be made for verifying that gremlins or unicorns exist if the conditions for verification can be specified (e.g., you have to truly believe they exist before you can see them, and only at midnight on the third full moon of the year, etc.). It has the potential to get a bit silly. I think that it has to be necessary to apply the test of verification to the “certain conditions� of verification themselves. Going with the example, we can confirm a condition like the third full moon of the year but can we verify “true belief�? When we start applying the rule of verification to the conditions of verification, however, we can end up with a paradox of never having conditions of verification that do not themselves need to be verified before they can stand as conditions of verification. So, perhaps we swing in the other direction and set a hard limit on what can be verified: anybody must be able to be meet the conditions of verification and be present to make independent observations. So, if we cannot figure out how to travel to a distant planet or to the center of the earth, etc. then we have to admit that there are aspects of the world that are beyond our ability to verify or to conceive of how to verify, meaning that they cannot stand as things that we know. Ayer’s model either restricts what can be know too much or is too permissive.
Apparatus of Verification: Following on the previous point, I would have also liked additional information about the apparatuses of verification that Ayer had in mind. He seems to be assuming that empirical verification is limited to the senses. One refutation of my example about verifying that Pluto exists in our solar system is that the New Horizons spacecraft did this for us. And the sense data that we gathered about Pluto came to us through the instrumentation that received the data from the instruments on New Horizons that gathered data from Pluto. There are at least two levels of mediation here. Our sense data as knowing beings who are capable of making propositions about the world is, strictly speaking, a sensory experience of watching a data stream on an earth-based computer interface. Is that a suitable apparatus of verification such that we would be comfortable making knowledge claims about Pluto? Probably most of us would agree that it is, but that is because we are taking things as true a priori based on faith in science and engineering such that we do not feel a need for further verification, beyond QA testing prior to launch, that the New Horizons spacecraft is a reliable extension of our own senses. Why do we not then afford the same trust to other mediating devices that proclaim to allow access to other knowable truths: video footage of Sasquatch, conspiracy theories, truths about the afterlife in religious texts, etc.?
Ethical Knowledge: Ayer claims that normative ethical statements cannot result in verifiable propositions (106). How does one, for example, verify that murder is wrong? And in this we get to one of what I understand to be a well-established critique of Ayer, that his formulation strips all normative weight of moral claims to say that they are not significant because of their appeal to inaccessible and unverifiable matters. As others have put it, he is equating the moral force of “murder is wrong!� with “Boo, murder!�. Where his claim does seem to hold up is that a moral law, like the Categorial Imperative (CI) is accepted as true without appeal to the world of experience. That may be true, but if we take an implication of the CI to be, in the case of murder, that I cannot wish for murder to be ethically allowable because in allowing murder we have to allow that it is ethically fine for someone to murder us, we seem to arrive at point where the proposition “murder is okay� is counter to our experience which would lead us to conclude, when our own lives are at risk, that murder IS wrong. But not really. Even though in a situation like this, we can say that murder is not desirable, or murder is counterproductive to establishing community, or murder is detrimental to civil order. But we still can’t say that murder is wrong because what does “wrong� mean? I get this objection on principle, but it does still seem like the normative force of “murder is wrong� is what animates more verifiable statements like “murder (is wrong because it) is counterproductive to establishing society. So is it true that there is no significant ethical knowledge? I don’t quite believe it. It may just be that the language of ethical claims are too abstracted from the empirical realities that they entail.
August 5, 2008
Brash, ballsy, brainy, take-no-prisoners philosophy from a guy who was in his mid-twenties.
Now I understand why logical positivism and its ilk got such an enthusiastic response.
Shorter Ayer: Much of what is marketed today as philosophy isn't philosophy. It's so mistaken that it isn't even coherent enough to be wrong. Metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, theology, and their cousins are all hereby banished. All of the opinions that have been expressed on these topics are agglomerations of words that are impenetrable by meaningful philosophical investigation and are therefore meaningless linguistic artifacts that can be of no interest except to disciplines like psychology, sociology, & anthropology. I shall now go on to solve the mind/body and idealism vs. realism non-problems, the monist/pluralist debate, reveal the nature of the self, and abolish all "schools" of philosophy as superfluous, so that we can get on with business.
Now I understand why logical positivism and its ilk got such an enthusiastic response.
Shorter Ayer: Much of what is marketed today as philosophy isn't philosophy. It's so mistaken that it isn't even coherent enough to be wrong. Metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, theology, and their cousins are all hereby banished. All of the opinions that have been expressed on these topics are agglomerations of words that are impenetrable by meaningful philosophical investigation and are therefore meaningless linguistic artifacts that can be of no interest except to disciplines like psychology, sociology, & anthropology. I shall now go on to solve the mind/body and idealism vs. realism non-problems, the monist/pluralist debate, reveal the nature of the self, and abolish all "schools" of philosophy as superfluous, so that we can get on with business.
January 8, 2017
In the preface (to the first edition) Ayer gives his argument in a nutshell. Regarding a metaphysical assertion, he writes “that there is a non-empirical world of values, or that men have immortal souls, or that there is a transcendent god is neither true nor false but literally senseless.� Truth and knowledge are statements that can be validated by experience.* From this, he titles his first chapter, “The Elimination of Metaphysics,� by which he means that metaphysics is not philosophy. Philosophy’s function, rather, is to excise speculative (metaphysics) and a priori truths from language and to prepare assertions of truth (propositions) for scientific validation (verification).
Though he dismisses normative absolutes,** Ayer asks “whether statements of ethical value can be translated into statements of empirical fact.� As I understand his response to this question, Ayer is open to the philosophical-scientific analysis of value, but only after such value is posited (i.e., not as a fact, but simply, as a preferred value). As a patient or a doctor might posit health as a higher-end value, an analysis can indicate those treatment or behavior factors that are necessary to obtain the posited value. Viewed this way, the higher-end values in traditional ethical philosophy such as the Good, freedom, pleasure, justice, equality still are unverifiable metaphysical assertions. But as posited values precisely stipulated, they are nevertheless amenable to analysis regarding what factual steps are necessary as means to obtain the said, posited end.***
Ayer’s argument then seems to morph into a different sort of philosophical (scientific?) analysis that asks about the reasons why one might hold such beliefs such as, “What are the moral habits of a given person or group of people, and what causes them to have precisely those habits and feelings? Rather than consistency, Ayer is now looking at the factual explanation for various, valued beliefs, and this enquiry he says falls wholly within the scope of the existing social sciences. From here, Ayer says we can “account for the Kantian and hedonistic theories of morals. For one finds that one of the chief causes of moral behavior is fear, both conscious and unconscious, of a god’s displeasure, and fear of the enmity of society. And this, indeed, is the reason why moral precepts present themselves to some people as ‘categorical� commands.’� He uses the same approach for aesthetics. We can, he says, look into the causes of aesthetic feeling, “why various societies produced and admired the works of art they did, why taste varies as it does within a given society, and so forth. And these are ordinary psychological or sociological questions.�
But Ayer does not go beyond posited ends. He is jaded, rightly, by assertions of metaphysical absolutes and Kantian-like a priori truths, though he also states that “naturalistic� theories of ethics, which appear to be utilitarian pleasure-pain calculations, are no better. Pleasure and pain are anything but absolute. Ayer states that they are the emotive expressions of the subjective self. But here I lost his trail. In his chapter on “The Self and the Common World,� Ayer says he disagrees with Hume’s belief that there is no self because we are the products of our collective sensory experiences. Ayer seems to be saying that this gives us a self-identity, but it is, and can be, only a sui generis self, a private self that has been formed by life experiences and the environment.****
With the renewed appreciation for the role of evolutionary science in human behavior, Ayer’s objection to a naturalistic ethic needs to be revisited. Who or what, exactly, is this private self? From an evolutionary science perspective, the private self is also an objective self who seeks to live (and replicate). That is a factual statement (though humans can override the survival instinct, that’s quibbling about the main point). Ayer himself seems to acknowledge this when he writes that “our ability to make successful predictions depends the satisfaction of even our simplest desires, including the desire to survive.� Yet with that desire comes a suite of species-wide, and evolutionarily-derived, behaviors that may also be seen as objective. These are the needs for nurture, for security, for protection and for the freedom to pursue and defend these needs. Ayer backs his way into this same line of thought when he writes about the general role of fear and the specific concern about the “enmity of society.� Where does this fear come from? Why does one care about what society thinks? Is there not something about ourselves that precedes and explains the reasons why X, Y, and Z are relevant, as opposed to A, B, and C, and isn’t this, ultimately, about evolutionary survival?
It is not inaccurate for Ayer to say that we are formed by our experiences, but it is not quite right either. Fear is a factual, human universal, but the content of fear differs with the situation. Modern-day fears (car accidents) differ from the fears of the hunter-gatherer (drought-famine), but the underlying form, fear, is the same. The need to be part of group life is another human universal but the customs and mores of each group varies. Group life is like language. It’s a universal form that varies in content.
Even if Ayer cannot accept the concept of a universal, biological self, his approach still allows for a philosophical-scientific treatment. Rather than assert that survival, and the underlying species behavioral structures that go with this, is an absolute value, it can be posited as a value. Then Ayer’s approach allows for an analysis about what constitutes, factually, the means to get there. But the answer to that question, ultimately, might be boiled down to two different poles (as seen throughout our history): We can respect the freedom to pursue ends, which limits overly assertive behavior, or we can endorse the “might is right� approach with its winner-take-all approach. Interestingly, from an evolutionary point of view, there is no preference for one approach over the other. Here too Ayer is correct: one cannot state, factually, that one approach is better than the other. Evolution, as with the cosmos, doesn’t care.
I was encouraged to read this book by a philosopher friend. The book was excellent.
*Ayer adds that such validation is and can never be absolute as, in theory, exceptions are possible. He writes that “what is irrational is to look for a guarantee where none can be forthcoming; to demand certainty where probability is all that is obtainable.� He adds, though, that “whereas a scientific generalization is readily admitted to be fallible, the truths of mathematics and logic appear to everyone to be necessary and certain.�
**Their existence in the supra-sensible world means they are not subject to empirical verification.
***“[W]e find that argument is possible on moral questions only if some system of values is presupposed. If our opponent concurs with us in expressing moral disapproval of all actions of a given type t, then we may get him to condemn a particular action A, by bringing forward arguments to show that A is of type t. For the question whether A does or does not belong to that type is a plain question of fact. Given that a man has certain moral principles, we argue that he must, in order to be consistent, react morally to certain things in a certain way. What we do not and cannot argue about is the validity of these moral principles.�
****“We know that a self, if it is not to be treated as a metaphysical entity, must be held to be a logical construction out of sense-experiences. It is, in fact, a logical construction out of the sense-experiences which constitute the actual and possible sense-history of a self�.it follows necessarily that the series of sense-experience which constitute the sense-histories of different selves cannot have any members in common. And this is tantamount to saying that it is logically impossible for a sense-experience to belong to the sense history of more than a single self.�
Philosophy, Ayer says, works with science, not separately from it. Still, there’s a fuzzy line between the two, raising the question whether “philosophy,� as defined by Ayer, has a distinctively significant role to play in scientific analysis.
Though he dismisses normative absolutes,** Ayer asks “whether statements of ethical value can be translated into statements of empirical fact.� As I understand his response to this question, Ayer is open to the philosophical-scientific analysis of value, but only after such value is posited (i.e., not as a fact, but simply, as a preferred value). As a patient or a doctor might posit health as a higher-end value, an analysis can indicate those treatment or behavior factors that are necessary to obtain the posited value. Viewed this way, the higher-end values in traditional ethical philosophy such as the Good, freedom, pleasure, justice, equality still are unverifiable metaphysical assertions. But as posited values precisely stipulated, they are nevertheless amenable to analysis regarding what factual steps are necessary as means to obtain the said, posited end.***
Ayer’s argument then seems to morph into a different sort of philosophical (scientific?) analysis that asks about the reasons why one might hold such beliefs such as, “What are the moral habits of a given person or group of people, and what causes them to have precisely those habits and feelings? Rather than consistency, Ayer is now looking at the factual explanation for various, valued beliefs, and this enquiry he says falls wholly within the scope of the existing social sciences. From here, Ayer says we can “account for the Kantian and hedonistic theories of morals. For one finds that one of the chief causes of moral behavior is fear, both conscious and unconscious, of a god’s displeasure, and fear of the enmity of society. And this, indeed, is the reason why moral precepts present themselves to some people as ‘categorical� commands.’� He uses the same approach for aesthetics. We can, he says, look into the causes of aesthetic feeling, “why various societies produced and admired the works of art they did, why taste varies as it does within a given society, and so forth. And these are ordinary psychological or sociological questions.�
But Ayer does not go beyond posited ends. He is jaded, rightly, by assertions of metaphysical absolutes and Kantian-like a priori truths, though he also states that “naturalistic� theories of ethics, which appear to be utilitarian pleasure-pain calculations, are no better. Pleasure and pain are anything but absolute. Ayer states that they are the emotive expressions of the subjective self. But here I lost his trail. In his chapter on “The Self and the Common World,� Ayer says he disagrees with Hume’s belief that there is no self because we are the products of our collective sensory experiences. Ayer seems to be saying that this gives us a self-identity, but it is, and can be, only a sui generis self, a private self that has been formed by life experiences and the environment.****
With the renewed appreciation for the role of evolutionary science in human behavior, Ayer’s objection to a naturalistic ethic needs to be revisited. Who or what, exactly, is this private self? From an evolutionary science perspective, the private self is also an objective self who seeks to live (and replicate). That is a factual statement (though humans can override the survival instinct, that’s quibbling about the main point). Ayer himself seems to acknowledge this when he writes that “our ability to make successful predictions depends the satisfaction of even our simplest desires, including the desire to survive.� Yet with that desire comes a suite of species-wide, and evolutionarily-derived, behaviors that may also be seen as objective. These are the needs for nurture, for security, for protection and for the freedom to pursue and defend these needs. Ayer backs his way into this same line of thought when he writes about the general role of fear and the specific concern about the “enmity of society.� Where does this fear come from? Why does one care about what society thinks? Is there not something about ourselves that precedes and explains the reasons why X, Y, and Z are relevant, as opposed to A, B, and C, and isn’t this, ultimately, about evolutionary survival?
It is not inaccurate for Ayer to say that we are formed by our experiences, but it is not quite right either. Fear is a factual, human universal, but the content of fear differs with the situation. Modern-day fears (car accidents) differ from the fears of the hunter-gatherer (drought-famine), but the underlying form, fear, is the same. The need to be part of group life is another human universal but the customs and mores of each group varies. Group life is like language. It’s a universal form that varies in content.
Even if Ayer cannot accept the concept of a universal, biological self, his approach still allows for a philosophical-scientific treatment. Rather than assert that survival, and the underlying species behavioral structures that go with this, is an absolute value, it can be posited as a value. Then Ayer’s approach allows for an analysis about what constitutes, factually, the means to get there. But the answer to that question, ultimately, might be boiled down to two different poles (as seen throughout our history): We can respect the freedom to pursue ends, which limits overly assertive behavior, or we can endorse the “might is right� approach with its winner-take-all approach. Interestingly, from an evolutionary point of view, there is no preference for one approach over the other. Here too Ayer is correct: one cannot state, factually, that one approach is better than the other. Evolution, as with the cosmos, doesn’t care.
I was encouraged to read this book by a philosopher friend. The book was excellent.
*Ayer adds that such validation is and can never be absolute as, in theory, exceptions are possible. He writes that “what is irrational is to look for a guarantee where none can be forthcoming; to demand certainty where probability is all that is obtainable.� He adds, though, that “whereas a scientific generalization is readily admitted to be fallible, the truths of mathematics and logic appear to everyone to be necessary and certain.�
**Their existence in the supra-sensible world means they are not subject to empirical verification.
***“[W]e find that argument is possible on moral questions only if some system of values is presupposed. If our opponent concurs with us in expressing moral disapproval of all actions of a given type t, then we may get him to condemn a particular action A, by bringing forward arguments to show that A is of type t. For the question whether A does or does not belong to that type is a plain question of fact. Given that a man has certain moral principles, we argue that he must, in order to be consistent, react morally to certain things in a certain way. What we do not and cannot argue about is the validity of these moral principles.�
****“We know that a self, if it is not to be treated as a metaphysical entity, must be held to be a logical construction out of sense-experiences. It is, in fact, a logical construction out of the sense-experiences which constitute the actual and possible sense-history of a self�.it follows necessarily that the series of sense-experience which constitute the sense-histories of different selves cannot have any members in common. And this is tantamount to saying that it is logically impossible for a sense-experience to belong to the sense history of more than a single self.�
Philosophy, Ayer says, works with science, not separately from it. Still, there’s a fuzzy line between the two, raising the question whether “philosophy,� as defined by Ayer, has a distinctively significant role to play in scientific analysis.
March 28, 2021
2021-03-28 Noticed a friend liked this book and it jogged my memory that I read it in college in my intro to Philosophy class and liked it too.
The book seemed really tightly argued and well said. I was a big fan for quite a few years till I heard about the argument's fatal flaw: the criterion used for judgement was just made up. There was no objective way to assume or prove that it is correct or the best/only criteria.
The book seemed really tightly argued and well said. I was a big fan for quite a few years till I heard about the argument's fatal flaw: the criterion used for judgement was just made up. There was no objective way to assume or prove that it is correct or the best/only criteria.
January 31, 2022
Mental ejaculations. That's what most of philosophy is if you follow Ayer. Metaphysics, theology, aesthetics, and much of ethics is cognitively meaningless. The whole book is pretty simple: it is a phenomenalist account of empiricism in which sense data is all that exists, but adds to traditional empiricist accounts the idea that a priori truths are not subject to empirical verification not because empiricism is limited, but that a-priori truths tell us nothing new. This is the crucial innovation of the logical positivists, that a statement like 2+2=4 doesn't need to be continually proved by experience or shows that there is non-empirical knowledge. Our logical constructions are just that, constructions of language related to the phenomenal world. 7+5=12 is true because 12 is defined as containing those numbers. This is supposedly inspired by Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
All meaningful statements, from the logical empiricist view, are either analytic or synthetic. Analytic statements are tautologies, definitions of particular experiences which are either true or false by non-contradiction based on how they are defined. Synthetic truths are empirical statements about differently defined observations which aren't absolutely true or false but only probabilistically. When we say a causes b, we are really saying A and B occur close together enough that we assume the appearance of A brings to mind the appearance of B. All this is an updated version of David Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact but with logical rather than psychological language.
Ayer invokes the old Epicurean argument against those who say that the senses are flawed, limited, or only give us an incomplete picture of reality. The senses don't lie, they are passive. It is our expectations based on past experience about what will occur in the future which deceives us. And epistemologically, from what standard do we criticize our senses? How do we know there is a real world beyond our senses if we cannot trust the senses? In reality what we view as reality is a selective construction of certain experiences. The "underlying world" is just experience itself as it enters our perception before we categorize it with language and logic.
Of all the traditional philosophy Ayer describes as meaningless, only ethics survives in a limited way. He gives an emotive account of ethics, which does not add truth or falsity to a statement but expresses either our approval or disapproval or a command for someone to do something. All else in ethical discussion is either a logical clarification of language or metaphysical and therefore meaningless.
To be clear, meaningless doesn't mean wrong but not capable of being true or false in terms of language. Metaphysics, aesthetics and theology are valuable in other ways as expressions of an attitude towards life or in terms of the logical/factual content they do have. But in themselves they are not problems to be solved since they cannot be put in a way to be answered.
For philosophy students, I think that the arguments presented here could be a way to get into analytic philosophy, or at least generate some interest. That's what Language, Truth, and Logic did for me in a very accessible way.
The conventional wisdom if there is such a thing among philosophers is that logical positivism especially as presented by Ayer has been refuted. It is said that the verification principle, which gives meaning only to what can be based on sense experience or is analytic, cannot itself be verified or if analytic does not tell us anything. Or that there isn't really a distinction between analytic and synthetic. Just reading it for myself, it is satisfying to believe all truths are either definitions or observations, in the pragmatist sense rather than logical positivist. Still a classic in my opinion
All meaningful statements, from the logical empiricist view, are either analytic or synthetic. Analytic statements are tautologies, definitions of particular experiences which are either true or false by non-contradiction based on how they are defined. Synthetic truths are empirical statements about differently defined observations which aren't absolutely true or false but only probabilistically. When we say a causes b, we are really saying A and B occur close together enough that we assume the appearance of A brings to mind the appearance of B. All this is an updated version of David Hume's distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact but with logical rather than psychological language.
Ayer invokes the old Epicurean argument against those who say that the senses are flawed, limited, or only give us an incomplete picture of reality. The senses don't lie, they are passive. It is our expectations based on past experience about what will occur in the future which deceives us. And epistemologically, from what standard do we criticize our senses? How do we know there is a real world beyond our senses if we cannot trust the senses? In reality what we view as reality is a selective construction of certain experiences. The "underlying world" is just experience itself as it enters our perception before we categorize it with language and logic.
Of all the traditional philosophy Ayer describes as meaningless, only ethics survives in a limited way. He gives an emotive account of ethics, which does not add truth or falsity to a statement but expresses either our approval or disapproval or a command for someone to do something. All else in ethical discussion is either a logical clarification of language or metaphysical and therefore meaningless.
To be clear, meaningless doesn't mean wrong but not capable of being true or false in terms of language. Metaphysics, aesthetics and theology are valuable in other ways as expressions of an attitude towards life or in terms of the logical/factual content they do have. But in themselves they are not problems to be solved since they cannot be put in a way to be answered.
For philosophy students, I think that the arguments presented here could be a way to get into analytic philosophy, or at least generate some interest. That's what Language, Truth, and Logic did for me in a very accessible way.
The conventional wisdom if there is such a thing among philosophers is that logical positivism especially as presented by Ayer has been refuted. It is said that the verification principle, which gives meaning only to what can be based on sense experience or is analytic, cannot itself be verified or if analytic does not tell us anything. Or that there isn't really a distinction between analytic and synthetic. Just reading it for myself, it is satisfying to believe all truths are either definitions or observations, in the pragmatist sense rather than logical positivist. Still a classic in my opinion
March 22, 2025
Ayer calls out the gibberish of metaphysicians, theologians, moralists, and other charlatans. Whatever its failings, the bold thrust of the argument is just great. Go Freddie, go!
Want to read
August 6, 2017Recommended by on the Ezra Klein Show podcast: Julia Galef on how to argue better and change your mind more [, , ] along with and .
March 7, 2025
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December 5, 2022
Even though it makes controversial claims, many of which are considered by most of the contemporary philosophers to be refuted (the infamous verifiability criterion of meaning and meta-ethics of emotivism being the most prominent examples), I think that it is one of the greatest books from the history of philosophy, which anyone who is interested in basic philosophy should read alongside Kant, Hume, Russell and other classic/essential authors. This can serve not only as an introduction to the main ideas of Logical Positivist movement, but also to what we call empiricist philosophy. The writing is precise and very clear, in fact so much that it makes you wish that every philosopher wrote like Ayer.
So, while I don't think that the book gets everything or most of the things with which it deals right, I still think it was a fantastic read. Recommended for anyone who ever was interested in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, ethics, the nature of philosophy and much more.
So, while I don't think that the book gets everything or most of the things with which it deals right, I still think it was a fantastic read. Recommended for anyone who ever was interested in epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, ethics, the nature of philosophy and much more.
November 26, 2024
you know it's good when you see:
"A delightful book � I should like to have written it myself." � Bertrand Russell
might give a re-read later
Humans can only understand the world through their senses, through observation and verification of phenomena. But what we can think, and how we think it, is determined entirely by language � and language is far from neutral.
Notes:
-They discussed the possibility of philosophy as a tool to express verifiable truth in language, beyond the ethical and metaphysical questions of the past. Their aim was to find truth in the age of science, and craft philosophy that was grounded in verifiable observations, not an idealized world beyond this one.
- the young philosopher found nonsense everywhere in language. On his return to England he wrote Language, Truth, and Logic, a concise and sometimes brutal book that tests the foundations of this nonsense and, finding those foundations wanting, attempts to redefine knowledge for the modern age.
- philosophy in Western cultures has long been occupied with explaining the universe � why things are the way they are, despite the seeming lack of rhyme or reason. From Aristotle to Kant and beyond, this world was often explained by referencing another, be it an unseen realm of ideal forms, or a heavenly realm
- In many ways, their premise was extremely simple: there is no world beyond this one, and philosophy’s aim is to explain it. Since explaining the world was no longer the job of religion or metaphysics, but science, philosophy had to move with the times. But before setting aside centuries-long traditions of ethical and metaphysical inquiry and picking up the project of determining the meaning of life and how to live it, philosophers first had to look at the ways in which truth is expressed.
- logical positivism excludes ethics and morals from philosophical consideration. In fact, it reveals that all moral speech, from “violence is wrong� to “love is the answer� are essentially just statements of personal opinion, no more meaningful than a preference for wearing sweatpants instead of jeans.
- language was almost taken for granted by earlier philosophers. In a BBC interview in the 1970s, Ayer himself spoke of earlier philosophers thinking of language as almost transparent � a neutral form of expression
- what kinds of statements can be made and verified to be true, and what kinds of statements cannot be verified. For instance, “it’s raining outside!� is an easily verifiable statement � everyone can go outside and verify this as a fact. Other statements, like “all bachelors are unmarried men,� don’t need verification, because the statement itself contains a definition of the word bachelor. Thus it is self-referential and defines the condition of being a bachelor.
- Ayer would call sentences like “all bachelors are unmarried men� analytic statements, because the definition of the term is contained within the statement itself. He’d call exclamations like “it's raining outside!� synthetic statements � or those observations about the world that can be verified externally by the senses. But then we arrive at what Ayer would call meaningless statements � things like, “the universe is love� or “time is an illusion.� Since they refer to ideas and concepts beyond the physical world, these sentences cannot be verified by observation or experiment. Therefore, they are meaningless.
- For Ayer and the other logical positivists, these are statements like “kindness is good� or “violence is wrong,� which aren’t claiming to say anything that can be verified about the world. Any moral speech, like “love thy neighbor,� falls into the realm of emotion, not truth
- You might remember when Star Trek’s Mr. Spock quoted the utilitarian belief that the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few before nobly sacrificing himself. This act may have seemed to reflect his logical nature. But in logical positivism this is a purely emotional statement, with no verifiable meaning at all.
- does that mean everything stated as fact needs external corroboration? This is where Ayer offers something else: performative statements. For instance, “I now pronounce you man and wife� is a performative statement. It accomplishes something just by being uttered. It doesn’t verify something about the world; it changes something. Same with a statement like, “I promise to buy you dinner,� because within the statement is an outcome that can be verified or not. If you got dinner, the statement was true. If you never did, then the statement was untrue. But the promise itself links it to a real-world outcome.
- there are other emotional utterances, too. These are things saying, “Ugh! Mondays!� Or, “Oh no! My report is late!� These utterances have meaning, and, though non-verbal, like a sigh or an exclamation, they make the emotional content clear: someone hates Mondays or someone’s report is late. These don’t need external verification, because they simply express emotional content that cannot be verified externally, as it only exists internally.
- So while logical positivism is concerned with truth, there is recognition of emotions, opinions, or preferences in statements. These do not make claims about the world, and thus cannot be verified. But that doesn’t make them meaningless � it just limits the meaning to a particular person. However, this means that they have no place in the philosophy of logical positivism, which is meant to describe the external world.
- In 1921, Ludwig Wittgenstein, an Austrian philosopher, had published a short work called the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which, along with the writings of his teacher Bertrand Russell, had greatly influenced the logical positivist. Later, in the 1950s, Wittgenstein refuted some of his own foundational premises in a work called Philosophical Investigations. This dealt a blow to logical positivism.
- At the heart of Ayer’s philosophical project was a desire to establish a foundation for rational discourse. In order to do this, he classified statements according to their verifiability. He created a hierarchy of verification principles, which helped him determine how firmly rooted in empirical observation any statement might be.
- Probabilistic statements, which make claims about the future based on past observations, can’t be verified by their very nature � but they’re essential in scientific discourse. Such statements include hypotheses, which make predictions about the universe and then set out to verify or falsify them. This weak verification principle was necessary because strong verification just isn’t always possible in the real world. And philosophy, like science, can’t deal in absolutes.
- Karl Popper, for instance, pointed out that verification wasn’t really the most important thing in science anyway. Falsifying a claim was far more important. Any universal claim could be easily falsified with just one direct instance that contradicts it. In other words, to get closer to the truth, proving something wrong is much more important than verifying it.
“It happens to be the case that we cannot, in our language, refer to the sensible properties of a thing without introducing a word or phrase which appears to stand for the thing itself as opposed to anything which may be said about it. And, as a result of this, those who are infected by the primitive superstition that to every name a single real entity must correspond assume that it is necessary to distinguish logically between the thing itself and any, or all, of its sensible properties. And so they employ the term “substance� to
refer to the thing itself. But from the fact that we happen to employ a single word to refer to a thing, and make that word the grammatical subject of the sentences in which we refer to the sensible appearances of the thing, it does not by any means follow that the thing itself is a “simple entity,� or that it cannot be defined in terms of the totality of its appearances. It is true that in talking of “its� appearances we appear to distinguish the thing from the appearances, but that is simply an accident of linguistic usage. Logical analysis shows that what makes these
“appearances� the “appearances of� the same thing is not their relationship to an entity other than themselves, but their relationship
to one another. The metaphysician fails to see this because he is misled by a superficial grammatical feature of his language.�
"A delightful book � I should like to have written it myself." � Bertrand Russell
might give a re-read later
Humans can only understand the world through their senses, through observation and verification of phenomena. But what we can think, and how we think it, is determined entirely by language � and language is far from neutral.
Notes:
-They discussed the possibility of philosophy as a tool to express verifiable truth in language, beyond the ethical and metaphysical questions of the past. Their aim was to find truth in the age of science, and craft philosophy that was grounded in verifiable observations, not an idealized world beyond this one.
- the young philosopher found nonsense everywhere in language. On his return to England he wrote Language, Truth, and Logic, a concise and sometimes brutal book that tests the foundations of this nonsense and, finding those foundations wanting, attempts to redefine knowledge for the modern age.
- philosophy in Western cultures has long been occupied with explaining the universe � why things are the way they are, despite the seeming lack of rhyme or reason. From Aristotle to Kant and beyond, this world was often explained by referencing another, be it an unseen realm of ideal forms, or a heavenly realm
- In many ways, their premise was extremely simple: there is no world beyond this one, and philosophy’s aim is to explain it. Since explaining the world was no longer the job of religion or metaphysics, but science, philosophy had to move with the times. But before setting aside centuries-long traditions of ethical and metaphysical inquiry and picking up the project of determining the meaning of life and how to live it, philosophers first had to look at the ways in which truth is expressed.
- logical positivism excludes ethics and morals from philosophical consideration. In fact, it reveals that all moral speech, from “violence is wrong� to “love is the answer� are essentially just statements of personal opinion, no more meaningful than a preference for wearing sweatpants instead of jeans.
- language was almost taken for granted by earlier philosophers. In a BBC interview in the 1970s, Ayer himself spoke of earlier philosophers thinking of language as almost transparent � a neutral form of expression
- what kinds of statements can be made and verified to be true, and what kinds of statements cannot be verified. For instance, “it’s raining outside!� is an easily verifiable statement � everyone can go outside and verify this as a fact. Other statements, like “all bachelors are unmarried men,� don’t need verification, because the statement itself contains a definition of the word bachelor. Thus it is self-referential and defines the condition of being a bachelor.
- Ayer would call sentences like “all bachelors are unmarried men� analytic statements, because the definition of the term is contained within the statement itself. He’d call exclamations like “it's raining outside!� synthetic statements � or those observations about the world that can be verified externally by the senses. But then we arrive at what Ayer would call meaningless statements � things like, “the universe is love� or “time is an illusion.� Since they refer to ideas and concepts beyond the physical world, these sentences cannot be verified by observation or experiment. Therefore, they are meaningless.
- For Ayer and the other logical positivists, these are statements like “kindness is good� or “violence is wrong,� which aren’t claiming to say anything that can be verified about the world. Any moral speech, like “love thy neighbor,� falls into the realm of emotion, not truth
- You might remember when Star Trek’s Mr. Spock quoted the utilitarian belief that the needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few before nobly sacrificing himself. This act may have seemed to reflect his logical nature. But in logical positivism this is a purely emotional statement, with no verifiable meaning at all.
- does that mean everything stated as fact needs external corroboration? This is where Ayer offers something else: performative statements. For instance, “I now pronounce you man and wife� is a performative statement. It accomplishes something just by being uttered. It doesn’t verify something about the world; it changes something. Same with a statement like, “I promise to buy you dinner,� because within the statement is an outcome that can be verified or not. If you got dinner, the statement was true. If you never did, then the statement was untrue. But the promise itself links it to a real-world outcome.
- there are other emotional utterances, too. These are things saying, “Ugh! Mondays!� Or, “Oh no! My report is late!� These utterances have meaning, and, though non-verbal, like a sigh or an exclamation, they make the emotional content clear: someone hates Mondays or someone’s report is late. These don’t need external verification, because they simply express emotional content that cannot be verified externally, as it only exists internally.
- So while logical positivism is concerned with truth, there is recognition of emotions, opinions, or preferences in statements. These do not make claims about the world, and thus cannot be verified. But that doesn’t make them meaningless � it just limits the meaning to a particular person. However, this means that they have no place in the philosophy of logical positivism, which is meant to describe the external world.
- In 1921, Ludwig Wittgenstein, an Austrian philosopher, had published a short work called the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which, along with the writings of his teacher Bertrand Russell, had greatly influenced the logical positivist. Later, in the 1950s, Wittgenstein refuted some of his own foundational premises in a work called Philosophical Investigations. This dealt a blow to logical positivism.
- At the heart of Ayer’s philosophical project was a desire to establish a foundation for rational discourse. In order to do this, he classified statements according to their verifiability. He created a hierarchy of verification principles, which helped him determine how firmly rooted in empirical observation any statement might be.
- Probabilistic statements, which make claims about the future based on past observations, can’t be verified by their very nature � but they’re essential in scientific discourse. Such statements include hypotheses, which make predictions about the universe and then set out to verify or falsify them. This weak verification principle was necessary because strong verification just isn’t always possible in the real world. And philosophy, like science, can’t deal in absolutes.
- Karl Popper, for instance, pointed out that verification wasn’t really the most important thing in science anyway. Falsifying a claim was far more important. Any universal claim could be easily falsified with just one direct instance that contradicts it. In other words, to get closer to the truth, proving something wrong is much more important than verifying it.
“It happens to be the case that we cannot, in our language, refer to the sensible properties of a thing without introducing a word or phrase which appears to stand for the thing itself as opposed to anything which may be said about it. And, as a result of this, those who are infected by the primitive superstition that to every name a single real entity must correspond assume that it is necessary to distinguish logically between the thing itself and any, or all, of its sensible properties. And so they employ the term “substance� to
refer to the thing itself. But from the fact that we happen to employ a single word to refer to a thing, and make that word the grammatical subject of the sentences in which we refer to the sensible appearances of the thing, it does not by any means follow that the thing itself is a “simple entity,� or that it cannot be defined in terms of the totality of its appearances. It is true that in talking of “its� appearances we appear to distinguish the thing from the appearances, but that is simply an accident of linguistic usage. Logical analysis shows that what makes these
“appearances� the “appearances of� the same thing is not their relationship to an entity other than themselves, but their relationship
to one another. The metaphysician fails to see this because he is misled by a superficial grammatical feature of his language.�
February 10, 2017
Historically, this is an important work for the English-and American-speaking worlds because it largely brought the thinking of the Vienna Circle to public attention. Logical positivism has taken a series of blows in the intervening time, including Gödel's Theorem and the uncertainty unleashed by modern physics, and more recently by our increased understanding of neuroscience. There is still much that I would agree with in this synopsis, and more where I would say that Ayer has a point. His rejection of metaphysics, for instance, I cannot really contest as it stands, although I think he defines metaphysics in advance in a way that guarantees his outcome.
Much of logical positivism is recognisable to any adolescent advocate of scientism, or even student of Hume. He basically repeats (and quotes) Hume's dictum that if a work contains neither analytical tautologies nor empirically-verifiable assertions then one should use it as Winter fuel. His case seems solid, but incomplete. There are obviously fields such as law and ethics where values seem to be perfectly useful, or even indispensable. One could use evolutionary science to say that these can be reduced to utilitarian or adaptive predispositions of the physical brain, but this seems a stretch to me. Ethical reasoning may require neural subsystems based on clan life on the Savanna, but the body of reasoning comprising modern law could not be mastered by a pre-literate culture or single brain. It seems to me to be emergent, and therefore legitimately to involve operations which cannot be reduced to evolutionary or neural empirical statements.
Unfortunately, the work is a bit dry and not all that easy to follow. I cannot quite say why, as the English is clear enough, but it somehow lacks an animating spirit that keeps the beginning of a sentence alive until I reach the end.
Much of logical positivism is recognisable to any adolescent advocate of scientism, or even student of Hume. He basically repeats (and quotes) Hume's dictum that if a work contains neither analytical tautologies nor empirically-verifiable assertions then one should use it as Winter fuel. His case seems solid, but incomplete. There are obviously fields such as law and ethics where values seem to be perfectly useful, or even indispensable. One could use evolutionary science to say that these can be reduced to utilitarian or adaptive predispositions of the physical brain, but this seems a stretch to me. Ethical reasoning may require neural subsystems based on clan life on the Savanna, but the body of reasoning comprising modern law could not be mastered by a pre-literate culture or single brain. It seems to me to be emergent, and therefore legitimately to involve operations which cannot be reduced to evolutionary or neural empirical statements.
Unfortunately, the work is a bit dry and not all that easy to follow. I cannot quite say why, as the English is clear enough, but it somehow lacks an animating spirit that keeps the beginning of a sentence alive until I reach the end.
February 19, 2015
This is the classic English language exposition of Logical Positivism, written when it was still more of a movement than a philosophical school. It was one of the books which was suggested for my first college philosophy course, though I never read it then. I have, however, read many other books since by the Logical Positivists (Schlick, Neurath, etc.) and their descendants and relations in the Analytic tradition, and I found them generally much better than this book. While these figures of the Wiener Kreis in particular seem to be tentative, exploring the possibility of eliminating the obscurantism of much previous philosophy (and the politics which went with it) through insisting on the possibility in principle of verification as a criterion for meaning in empirical statements, and recognizing the very real problems involved in that project (which ultimately was not successful), Ayer’s tone is very dogmatic and even arrogant � he has solved all the problems of philosophy, answered all possible as well as actual criticisms, and anyone who disagrees is basically too stupid to understand their own language. After reading the Logical Positivists, I always found it difficult to understand the slighting remarks toward that position by actual philosophers (as opposed to the religious); it seemed to be a caricature of their position. After reading Ayer, I can see that it was a self-caricature � if most English speaking philosophers owed their first knowledge of Logical Positivism to Ayer and this book in particular, I can understand why they rejected it without much ceremony.
February 27, 2008
This book really changed my thinking on many philosophical issues.
Ayer argues that if a statement is to be meaningful, it must be either analytic or capable of being verified empirically. Anything else (ie metaphysics or ethics) is essentially bullshit. Or rather(to use an example) don't bother staying up all night worrying if god exists or not or whether objective facts exist(real nightmare for me personally) : the question itself is senseless.
The beauty of this book is that it is clear, concise and straightforward. A great book.
Ayer argues that if a statement is to be meaningful, it must be either analytic or capable of being verified empirically. Anything else (ie metaphysics or ethics) is essentially bullshit. Or rather(to use an example) don't bother staying up all night worrying if god exists or not or whether objective facts exist(real nightmare for me personally) : the question itself is senseless.
The beauty of this book is that it is clear, concise and straightforward. A great book.
October 26, 2012
A read of this book made it immediately clear why it's a foundational text of the positivist movement. Ayer's thought is strikingly clear and his logic is incisive, dealing the metaphysical idols a mighty blow. While it's my opinion that Russell and Quine successfully resuscitate the non-strictly empirical, this text and Ayer's principle of verification still give the reader a roadmap by which one's sentences may be said to be intelligible or not. As such, it's a great read and of interest to anyone intrigued by philosophy of language.
May 17, 2008
My high rating here comes not from the fact that I agree with Ayer -- I certainly do not -- but that he's written an important, meaningful book.
April 6, 2018
You will never look at the world the same way ever again after reading it. It changed me and I think it will change others too.
January 3, 2023
This work has been so thoroughly refuted and dispelled that I will not bother with justifying my two stars. Philosophically, the logical positivists are, in a sense, dead. Even the author of this book, A.J. Ayer, ended up claiming that what he wrote herein was false. If you want to read a scathing and significant critique of logical positivism, look no further than W.V.O. Quine's paper "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" from 1951.
In another sense, logical positivism remains alive and well in analytic philosophy as an underlying sensibility. This is a provocative statement but it nonetheless appears to be true. Ayer's book, above all else, is an insight into how one goes about philosophising within the Anglo-American tradition. Anything not in the direct or indirect service of the natural sciences is scorned. You witness constructions of models that abstract away from the messy social sphere; you witness impatience with value theories; you witness flippant attitudes toward politics. Ayer helped to solidify the idea that philosophy is a contingent activity and can only realise itself as an underlabourer of science.
Ayer's book is a manifesto with wide-ranging effects. He is cross, brutish, restless, and indiligent when setting up arguments. Frequently he merely makes assertions and waives demonstrating why he believes these assertions to be true. This book is interesting either as a historical document, it did manage to stun analytic philosophy as the reception of it shows, or as an aesthetic text that should be read for its stylistic aspects. Thus, Ayer produced the very thing he claimed to be nonsense. Perfect.
In another sense, logical positivism remains alive and well in analytic philosophy as an underlying sensibility. This is a provocative statement but it nonetheless appears to be true. Ayer's book, above all else, is an insight into how one goes about philosophising within the Anglo-American tradition. Anything not in the direct or indirect service of the natural sciences is scorned. You witness constructions of models that abstract away from the messy social sphere; you witness impatience with value theories; you witness flippant attitudes toward politics. Ayer helped to solidify the idea that philosophy is a contingent activity and can only realise itself as an underlabourer of science.
Ayer's book is a manifesto with wide-ranging effects. He is cross, brutish, restless, and indiligent when setting up arguments. Frequently he merely makes assertions and waives demonstrating why he believes these assertions to be true. This book is interesting either as a historical document, it did manage to stun analytic philosophy as the reception of it shows, or as an aesthetic text that should be read for its stylistic aspects. Thus, Ayer produced the very thing he claimed to be nonsense. Perfect.
May 14, 2023
Philosophers: "The view of philosophy which we have adopted may, I think, fairly he described as a form of empiricism. For it is characteristic of an empiricist to eschew metaphycis on the grounds that every factual proposition must refer to sense experience. And even if the conception of philosophising as an activity of analysis is not to be discovered in the traditional theories of empiricists, we have seen that it is implicit in their practice"
Readers with dirt under their fingernails:
Readers with dirt under their fingernails:
Read
November 5, 2022“In every case the analysis of the sentence would confirm our assumption that the question “What is truth?� is reducible to the question “What is the analysis of the sentence ‘p is true?’� And it is plain that this question raises no genuine problem, since we have shown that to say ‘p� is true is simply a way of asserting ‘p�.�
March 15, 2024
It is hard to not mostly agree with Ayer on Emotovism and Logical Positivism, whilst also intuitively feeling uncomfortable with the lack of a concrete resolution it entails. Ayer's philosophy definately will have quite an impact on your sense experience of the world after reading (although quite challenging).
April 11, 2019
Totally enjoyed. Clear, concise, deeply thought provoking and a modern philosophical approach to reconcile philosophy with science.
June 1, 2021
Language, Truth and Logic provides conceptual clarity that few seminal philosophical works do. The book provides an excellent example of how one can argue on diverse topics structurally and logically to any philosophy student or even aspiring debaters. Its ability to separate what is debatable with the possibility of conclusions and where one is doomed to simply talk past each other forever is its singular achievement.
A J Ayers and his contemporaries were spot on in trying to focus on the structure rather than the content of pre-twentieth-century philosophical discourses. More than most others, this book shows which of the famous philosophical debates were simply because of the ill-defined language usages, which were unprovable, and the areas where philosophers could come together in agreement.
That said, Ayers' precision has many faults. He forces philosophy to be a science, without realizing that the field will always struggle to find the points to work on with such a restricted remit. Everything he deems analytical, synthetic, or empirical will invariably branch off to separate subjects, if already not there, for their own development through subject specialists.
The above is true not just for any empiricist subjects but also Ayers' analytical topics. Analytical frameworks - loosely constructs based on a set of hypotheses - may be tautological, but decent analytical subject matters would always have the potential for limitless growth - like a game of Go between two smart machines or mathematics - even if all the conclusions are deemed contained in the fundamental axioms.
As much as the author refutes it, the largest utility of philosophical discussions is in its audacity to work on questions that other fields cannot answer. Its residual nature makes it metaphysical, speculative, and perpetually inconclusive. In fact, assertions made by philosophers of any age are destined to look naive and laughable in light of more progress in later eras. Ayers' construct is defined to kick away all such discourses to other fields, but in the process disrobing it of anything worthwhile.
Like every other philosophical discussion since time immemorial, many details of the book appear inadequate or wrong considering the scientific and technological progress since its publication. Repurposed to accommodate all we know now, the construct will still contain as much potential as fodder for contemplation on various life issues as when it was penned.
A J Ayers and his contemporaries were spot on in trying to focus on the structure rather than the content of pre-twentieth-century philosophical discourses. More than most others, this book shows which of the famous philosophical debates were simply because of the ill-defined language usages, which were unprovable, and the areas where philosophers could come together in agreement.
That said, Ayers' precision has many faults. He forces philosophy to be a science, without realizing that the field will always struggle to find the points to work on with such a restricted remit. Everything he deems analytical, synthetic, or empirical will invariably branch off to separate subjects, if already not there, for their own development through subject specialists.
The above is true not just for any empiricist subjects but also Ayers' analytical topics. Analytical frameworks - loosely constructs based on a set of hypotheses - may be tautological, but decent analytical subject matters would always have the potential for limitless growth - like a game of Go between two smart machines or mathematics - even if all the conclusions are deemed contained in the fundamental axioms.
As much as the author refutes it, the largest utility of philosophical discussions is in its audacity to work on questions that other fields cannot answer. Its residual nature makes it metaphysical, speculative, and perpetually inconclusive. In fact, assertions made by philosophers of any age are destined to look naive and laughable in light of more progress in later eras. Ayers' construct is defined to kick away all such discourses to other fields, but in the process disrobing it of anything worthwhile.
Like every other philosophical discussion since time immemorial, many details of the book appear inadequate or wrong considering the scientific and technological progress since its publication. Repurposed to accommodate all we know now, the construct will still contain as much potential as fodder for contemplation on various life issues as when it was penned.
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