Masha Gessen (born 1967) is an American-Russian journalist, translator, and nonfiction author. They identify as non-binary and use they/them pronouns.
Born into an Ashkenazi Jewish family in Russia, in 1981 they moved with their family to the United States to escape anti-Semitism. They returned in 1991 to Moscow, where they worked as a journalist, and covered Russian military activities during the Chechen Wars. In 2013, they were publicly threatened by prominent Russian politicians for their political activism and were forced to leave Russia for the United States.
They write in both Russian and English, and has contributed to The New Republic, New Statesman, Granta and Slate. Gessen is a staff writer at The New Yorker, covering international politics, Russia, LGBT rights, and gender issues.
I feel about this book the way I felt about . It is clearly written by an emigrant from Russia who hates EVERYTHING about Russia. There is no attempt to be objective here, vitriol in every sentence, where even the most innocuous things are described as depressing and dire and BAD - free, government sponsored, mind you, preschools portrayed as a "cross between baby prisons and warehouses" - really? how did we all make it then after attending them? this is just one of the most ridiculous exaggerations. My memories of my standard preschool include playing a lot outside, eating and taking naps and doing arts and learning songs and dancing and going to the beach!
Well, I guess this is how Masha Gessen is making her name in the West. She can come up with ridiculously convoluted theories of why Russians welcome and love Putin (homo soveticus my ass), but the reality is simple - not many Russians could make it in a cut-throat, unregulated post-perestroika capitalist Russia, including my parents who could barely keep it together in the new "free market." Is this so hard to comprehend that majority wanted to go back to the time of paltry, but guaranteed income, free medical services and quality education? They thought Putin would bring back the, often imagined, rosy past, and they still think the same way now!
Read for something more balanced, a criticism with a perspective and understanding.
4 stars for the content and 3 stars for the audio.
In The Future Is History, Masha Gessen looks at Russia since the mid 1980s to today. It's not a pretty picture. She focuses on three young people born in the mid-1980s, from different backgrounds. She weaves in a lot of history and political theory. She essentially argues that contemporary Russia is under a totalitarian regime, zeroing on themes like the lack of true elections and state sanctioned homophobia.
For anyone interested in recent Russian history and contemporary politics, Gessen's book is very rich. It has a real human dimension, while providing a lot of deeper political and historical context. Gessen herself is originally from Russia, so it also feels like her book comes from a place of deep understanding. This is a sympathetic portrait of people living in difficult circumstances.
But because there is so much to this book, I really don't recommend the audio. It was sometimes hard to keep track of people and events. Also Gessen narrates this one herself, and she reads very fast in a bit of an odd staccato voice.
Great book for those interested in the topic. But read it, don't listen to it.
The slow transition from one form to another: We see this process, this morphing, through the lives of several individuals - professionals in the 1970/80s USSR, and children born under Soviet control - who witness the shifts through each decade of their lives, and the paths they each take into adulthood.
Gessen is an artful researcher and interviewer. They share the lives subjects without judgement, reserving criticisms for the government (there is a lengthy discussion on how to define the modern Russian state - authoritarian, totalitarian, illiberal democracy, etc), but bears these out with the systematic abuses of power and human rights violations, and how they affect the lives of all subjects.
We trace the days of Gorbachev and perestroika, through the "fall", and rise of Yeltsin, and finally the long tenure of Putin, as it plays out to 2016, and there's been more since. She spends chapters on Ukraine and the Orange Revolution, the protests in 2010 (and on), the dissidence of Pussy Riot and other activists, and the encroachment in Crimea (including a short history of the region and the various ethnic cleansings that took place there in the over the last century.) Perhaps the most interesting thing that Gessen shows is the mental state and health of a country (or several countries, as former Soviet states now stand independent) and how hopelessness, depression, and anxiety are used as control measures.
I will be chewing on this one for a long while. It is a dense read ~500 pages, interspersing history and politics with personal stories, and one of the most important and prescient books that I have read in years.
Gessen is a top-tier writer, and I want to return to their work very soon.
One of the most stunningly brilliant books I have read this year. If you are interested in Russia, Putinism, and the depth psychology of totalitarianism, you will find this book fascinating. Gessen is utterly brilliant.
I refuse to believe that our common future is already history, but I feel like to make a future for my continent happen, we all need to get as many facts as possible and join the public conversation.
Admittedly this book took me longer to read than most I've read in the last year 鈥� it's because there's at least five books with in this one! The quality of journalism, paired with the incredible insight to the timelines of the USSR are unprecedented. Masha's reporting illustrates far more than the growth of a totalitarian culture 鈥� it gives you the personal, socioeconomic, mental 1984-like capacity, and so much more that all comes along with it! I just hope she keeps writing~
Nem olvastam m茅g olyan k枚nyvet, ami ilyen er艖vel volt k茅pes 谩br谩zolni azt az erjed茅st, ami a putyinista Oroszorsz谩g kialakul谩s谩ig vezetett. Gessen m贸dszer茅nek l茅nyege, hogy a leg煤jabb kori t枚rt茅nelmi szakmunk谩k 茅s politikatudom谩nyi olvas贸k枚nyvek inform谩ci贸gazdags谩g谩t 枚tv枚zi a csal谩dreg茅nyek szem茅lyess茅g茅vel 茅s lend眉let茅vel. Olyan (val贸s) egy茅neket v谩laszt ki, akik k茅pesek reflekt谩lni saj谩t k枚rnyezet眉k 谩talakul谩s谩ra, ellenz茅kieket, tud贸sokat 茅s 眉zletembereket emel be a sz枚vegbe, hogy az 艖 tapasztalataikon kereszt眉l ker眉lj枚n k枚zelebb a "Mi a franc t枚rt茅nt Oroszhonban?" rejt茅ly felold谩s谩hoz. A v茅geredm茅ny f茅l tucat kompakt csal谩dt枚rt茅net, amelyek egyenk茅nt is meg茅rdemeln茅nek egy nagyreg茅nyt, 茅s amelyeket Gessen folyamatosan t谩rsadalomt枚rt茅neti, politikat枚rt茅neti 茅s t枚megpszichol贸giai szempontb贸l komment谩l.
A t枚rt茅net m谩r a Szovjetuni贸 regn谩l谩sa alatt elkezd艖dik: a Szt谩lin hal谩l谩t k枚vet艖 id艖szakban a rendszer relat铆v enyh眉l茅sek 茅s befesz眉l茅sek 眉temes v谩ltogat谩s谩val tesztelte a szocialista t谩rsadalom szak铆t贸szil谩rds谩g谩t. Szt谩lint Hruscsov k枚vette, Hruscsovot Brezsnyev, 茅s 铆gy tov谩bb, am铆g el nem 茅rkezt眉nk Gorbacsovig 茅s Jelcinig, akik (akaratuk ellen茅re) assziszt谩ltak a Szovjetuni贸 枚sszeoml谩s谩hoz. Ez az id艖szak z疟rzavaros volt, maguk a politikai aktorok sem tudt谩k, mi is t枚rt茅nik 茅ppen - nem csoda, ha maga az 谩llampolg谩r majd esz茅t vesztette a bizonytalans谩gt贸l, 茅s 煤gy 茅gett bele tudat谩ba a peri贸dus, mint a k谩osz 茅s talajvesztetts茅g kora. Nem csak arr贸l volt sz贸, hogy a "homo szovjetikuszt"* a munkan茅lk眉lis茅g 茅s a tot谩lis elszeg茅nyed茅s vesz茅lyeztette ekkor, de identit谩sa is megk茅rd艖jelez艖d枚tt. Addig vil谩gos volt, hogy ha 谩llampolg谩ri jogai nem is teljesk枚r疟ek, de egy hatalmas birodalom r茅sze, 茅s ebben a min艖s茅g茅ben a vil谩gpolitika megker眉lhetetlen szerepl艖je. Ez ut贸bbi megsz疟nni l谩tszott, ugyanakkor nem 茅rz茅kelte, hogy cser茅be kapott volna valamit - 煤gy t疟nt, az 谩llampolg谩ri jogokb贸l csak a t谩rsadalom egy r茅sze, az oligarch谩k r茅szes眉ltek. 脡s mivel ez az 谩llampolg谩r sosem tapasztalta meg, milyen egy norm谩lisan m疟k枚d艖 demokr谩cia, az orsz谩g谩ban eluralkod贸 torz k枚z谩llapotokat azonos铆totta a liberalizmussal - 茅s elkezdett visszav谩gyni egy autoriter rendszerbe. Putyin pedig j枚tt, 茅s bet枚lt枚tte az "er艖s vezet艖" 眉resen maradt 枚kol贸giai f眉lk茅j茅t.
("Tess茅k, Vlagyimir. Itt van ez az orsz谩g. Tedd magad茅v谩.")
Ezek a polg谩rok Eric Fromm defin铆ci贸j谩t alapul v茅ve "tekint茅lyelv疟 szem茅lyis茅gk茅nt" 铆rhat贸ak le. Olyan emberek 艖k, akik a m谩sok szabads谩g谩t贸l jobban f茅lnek, mint amennyire 贸hajtj谩k saj谩t szem茅lyes szabads谩gukat - k枚vetkez茅sk茅ppen hajland贸ak al谩vetni magukat egy olyan vezet艖nek, aki a stabilit谩s茅rt** 茅s n茅mi 茅letsz铆nvonal-n枚veked茅s茅rt cser茅be ig茅nyt tart 谩llampolg谩ri jogaik egy r茅sz茅re. S艖t, ami a slusszpo茅n: m茅g az 茅letsz铆nvonal-n枚veked茅st艖l is hajlamosak eltekinteni. A putyinizmus egyik legriaszt贸bb tapasztalata ugyanis 茅ppen az, hogy a gazdas谩gi m茅lyrep眉l茅s egy眉tt j谩rhat a vez茅r n茅pszer疟s茅g茅nek n枚veked茅s茅vel. Ez t枚rt茅nt p茅ld谩ul 2014 ut谩n, amikor a Kr铆m "repatri谩l谩s谩nak" m谩mora teljesen elfedte azt a t茅nyt, hogy az orosz gazdas谩g elkezdett bele谩llni a f枚ldbe. Tal谩n mert annak, akinek nincs semmije, m茅g nagyobb sz眉ks茅ge van arra, hogy legal谩bb a nemzeti k枚z枚ss茅ghez tartoz谩son kereszt眉l siker茅lm茅nyekben legyen r茅sze. Ebben az 谩ltal谩nos ment谩lis 谩llapotban a hatalmon nincsen f茅k, 茅s beindul az, amit Szolzsenyicin "v枚r枚s ker茅knek" nevez: a hat贸s谩gok azon hozz谩谩ll谩s谩r贸l van sz贸, miszerint amit elkezdt眉nk, be kell fejezni, ha pedig ellen谩ll谩st 茅rz茅kel眉nk, azon 谩t kell g谩zolni. A kompromisszum a gyenges茅g jele, a t谩rgyal谩s 茅s egyeztet茅s a haldokl贸 Nyugat tr眉kkje, m谩kony, t谩vol 谩ll az orosz n茅pl茅lekt艖l. 脷gyhogy menj眉nk csak el艖re er艖b艖l, mint a tank.
V茅gtelen眉l keser疟 k枚tet - keser疟s茅ge jobb谩ra abb贸l fakad, hogy szerepl艖i pontosan 茅rz茅kelik, merre tart Oroszorsz谩g, de k茅ptelenek arra, hogy ezzel a tud谩ssal megv谩ltoztass谩k a folyamat ir谩ny谩t. K眉zdenek, verg艖dnek, de bedar谩lja 艖ket a "v枚r枚s ker茅k". Premier pl谩nban v茅gign茅zik, ahogy a hatalom szisztematikusan feler艖s铆ti a t谩rsadalom 枚npuszt铆t贸 枚szt枚neit, 茅s v茅g眉l ellen眉k ford铆tja a saj谩t haz谩jukat. Ha Gessler nem t枚rt茅nelmet 铆rna, hanem irodalmat, lehet艖s茅ge lenne valamif茅le happy enddel megaj谩nd茅kozni sokat pr贸b谩lt szerepl艖it - de itt legjobb esetben is csak a szerencs茅s elmenek眉l茅st dokument谩lhatja. Mert ha a "v枚r枚s ker茅k" beindul, akkor m谩r r茅gen rossz. Tal谩n az a legokosabb, ha eleve nem engedj眉k, hogy elkezdjen forogni.
* A "homo szovjetikusz" a Szovjetuni贸val foglalkoz贸 t谩rsadalomt枚rt茅net egyik kulcsszava. Olyan embert jel枚l, akinek egyik legf艖bb jellemz艖je a "kett艖s gondolkod谩s" - k茅pes ak谩r egym谩ssal teljesen ellent茅tes 谩ll铆t谩sokat is elhinni 茅s vallani, m茅gpedig nem sz谩m铆t谩sb贸l, hanem 艖szint茅n azonosulva azok tartalm谩val. Ez voltak茅ppen egyfajta t煤l茅l茅si strat茅gia, amire a totalit谩rius 谩llam k枚r眉lm茅nyei kondicion谩lj谩k az egy茅nt. ** Az autoriter 谩llamok stabilit谩sa azonban val贸j谩ban csak m铆tosz. Hisz am铆g a liber谩lis demokr谩ci谩ban lehet arra sz谩m铆tani, hogy a t枚rv茅nyek holnap 茅s holnaput谩n is biztos铆tj谩k az ismert k枚r眉lm茅nyeket, addig a diktat煤r谩ban a vezet艖 szem茅lyes elk茅pzel茅sei egyik napr贸l a m谩sikra 煤j helyzetet teremthetnek, ami lehetetlenn茅 teszi az egy茅n sz谩m谩ra saj谩t j枚v艖je megtervez茅s茅t.
Imagine the United States collapses in the near future. And imagine someone decides to write about the collapse of contemporary America 20-25 years from now, focusing only on Trump, racism, poverty, health care, etc... In order to do so, this person follows the rise of Richard Spencer and the lives of a bunch of liberal, middle-class individuals from NYC, LA and, let's say, Houston. Would this be a fair depiction of life in the U.S.? Yet this is what Masha Gessen does with the Soviet Union and Russia in her book. Gessen is a Jewish woman who was told by her parents that, in order to beat the 鈥淪oviet antisemitic machine,鈥� they 鈥渃ould no longer live in our country,鈥� something that she herself would tell her children years later before leaving Moscow for New York. This is what the reader is warned about in the prologue, some sort of guidelines to frame the events narrated in the book. Gessen traces the life trajectories of six different people who grew up in the post-Soviet space, plus Aleksandr Dugin, who makes sporadic and, at times, incomprehensible appearances here and there. The idea of using other people lives seems to give a lot of credibility to the point Gessen tries to make which, to put it bluntly, can be summed up as 鈥渢he Soviet Union was a terrible place to be and Russia is not any better.鈥� The problem, though, is that if you choose to portray the life of the son of a party official, of the daughter of a famous politician, of the grandson of Alexander Yakovlev etc. the picture that you get will get cannot possibly be complete. And that's understandable. Masha Gessen, together with some of her protagonists, is an intelligent, and she tells the stories of the people she knows and relates to. Keep that in mind: she tells the story. What we hear in the book are not the voices of the six protagonists, but their stories filtered by the author's voice, which makes all the difference in the world. Gessen is a journalist with a specific agenda, she is not Svetlana Alexievich. The result is a book that tries to explain the slow descent of Russia into totalitarianism without really portraying the people who have been supporting Putin for more than twenty years, because she dismisses them as the embodiment of Homo Sovieticus, who was (and is) only able of 鈥渄oublethink.鈥� And the reason is that Gessen doesn't know these people, she doesn't want to acknowledge them, like Clinton saying that Trump's supporters were 鈥渄eplorables.鈥� When Gessen talks about 鈥淥ccupy Pedophilia鈥�, a short-lived movement active in 2013-14, she uses the word 鈥渢hug鈥� to describe the guys involved in it, but the underlying reasoning is the same. Gessen is angry at Russia, therefore she props up her biased account with negative comments about every possible aspect of life there: from the Cathedral of Christ the Savior that looks like a 鈥済audy giant wedding cake鈥� to the geometric tiles of the sidewalks in Moscow resembling tombstones, from 鈥渢he small number of movies that had been produced in the Soviet Union鈥� (which is false) to grand statements about the Soviet Union such as 鈥渒nowing which way the wind was blowing could mean the difference between life and death.鈥� Gessen's account on contemporary Russia is more about how Russia is not America than how Russia really is. At one point she writes: 鈥淚ntellectuals were always falling into the trap of mistaking the written word for a true mirror of life.鈥� I hope the readers of this book won't fall into the same trap.
This book won the National Book Award in 2017. It is an oddly constructed read tracing the last thirty years of Russia. Four Russians born in the 1980鈥檚 at the dawn of democracy are profiled as they grow into adulthood of the new Millennium. Due to their political beliefs and in some cases sexual identities they become opponents of the Putin regime 鈥� on the losing side of this political struggle. But the story also tracks Yeltsin and Putin so there are in effect six parallel stories.
In the mid to late 90鈥檚 disillusioned Russians felt outrage towards NATO鈥檚 involvement in the Balkans which included the airstrikes in Serbia. Additionally the militants in Chechnya were causing a great deal of outrage too. Many Russians were nostalgic for the old days of motherland. Lo and behold into the void steps Vladimir Putin. He wins an election promoting his neo-nationalist agenda. Bit by bit his regime dismantles Russia鈥檚 鈥榮emi-democratic鈥� trajectory into what is a totalitarian state today.
3 stars. In a nutshell, the writing is good and the author has a great deal of knowledge about Russia but the storytelling is sub-par. The author should have followed, at most, one person鈥檚 story in tandem with the over-arching theme of Russia鈥檚 march to autocracy. The book is not particularly dramatic. At times it feels like a regurgitation of well integrated newspaper articles about Russia over this period. This is understandable since the author is a journalist but in the end the read just fell flat for me.
Really brilliant, really heartbreaking and really well-written. Gessen's ability to interweave different stories to tell the sweeping story of Russia from the heady days of glasnost till now is masterful.
She chooses the lives and work of four young people and three "experts" (a psychoanalyst, a political philosopher and a sociologist) to exemplify what would otherwise be a history too big to get your arms around, and the effect is even more heartbreaking, as it becomes personal. Gessen doesn't lecture - rather, she adds up damning facts, but neither is she dry, this huge non-fiction tome moved at the same pace that many novels do for me.
For those looking for lessons about current American politics, my takeaways would be a) don't - because if Gessen shows us nothing else, she demonstrates that Russia's history makes it unique; and b) that we don't even have a clue what authoritarian rule looks like when we shout that the current administration is "fascist" or "totalitarian" (which is not to say that we should stop shouting, but a little perspective is healthy). But still (c), it can be useful to have some indicia of how absolute power, and citizen lethargy, are formed, even if not all the lessons will be (because of Russia's very different origin stories) apples to apples applicable.
Masha Gessen - O futuro 茅 hist贸ria - como o totalitarismo se apoderou da R煤ssia Gletkin nasceu em Tumui na margem esquerda do rio Lena, na R煤ssia siberiana em 1905, ano em que se iniciaram os movimentos sociais na R煤ssia. Esta coincid锚ncia com o ano das convuls玫es sociais veio a gravar-lhe o destino-me a forma como encarou a vida, o mundo e a sua amada R煤ssia. Filho de camponeses pobres, muito pobres, viu o ser pai morto 脿s m茫os de guardas ao servi莽o de Nicolau II e do Kul谩k do feudo. A sua inf芒ncia foi muito diferente do que imaginamos. Gletkin limitava-se a sobreviver. E nesse processo, sempre que poss铆vel apoiava a m茫e no sustento dos seus quatro irm茫os todos mais novos. Tentava o sustento, express茫o curiosa para tempos em que a tentativa era bem mais frequente que o sustento. A irm茫 Mitcha e o irm茫o Ivanildo morreram antes dos dois anos. A sua morte n茫o lhe causou constrangimento. Sabia que eram dois anjos que tinham partido para os dom铆nios do Senhor. E isso n茫o era de forma alguma um castigo. Para os que partiam aliviava-se-lhes a puni莽茫o terrena, para os que ficavam haveria mais mis茅ria para distribuir. N茫o foi com sobressalto que aos doze anos Gletikin que assistiu 脿 revolu莽茫o bolchevique. Jovem, mas n茫o o demasiado para ver a verdade das convuls玫es sociais, estava disposto a deixar-se levar na torrente. N茫o conhecia Marx ou Engels, nunca tinha ouvido falar no manifesto comunista, n茫o conhecia Lenine, mas sabia sim o que a era mis茅ria, e a opress茫o dos que ainda seres humanos iguais a si, nunca tinham passado uma 铆nfima parte dos tormentos a que nos seus magros 12 anos tinha assistido. Viver n茫o poderia ser um castelo de supl铆cios, mis茅ria e injusti莽as. Com a revolu莽茫o de Outubro abria-se agora uma janela para um mundo novo e ele, o jovem Gletkin de 12 anos n茫o estava disposto a ficar apeado no cais enquanto o sonho passava como um turbilh茫o no tempo e na hist贸ria. Logo que a oportunidade lhe trespassou a soleira, agarrou-a, n茫o como um desesperado que se pretendesse salvar, mas antes como algu茅m que achava ser seu dever tomar o seu destino nas m茫os e impedir que homens, outros quaisquer seres humanos viessem a ser espezinhados por um semelhante. A oportunidade surgiu quando junto 脿s margens do rio Lena constru铆ram a maior f谩brica de carris de a莽o da europa. Arranjou lugar entre os oper谩rios, todos eles camponeses na semana anterior. E n茫o lhe foi dif铆cil fazer-se notar e subir na hierarquia. Primeiro da f谩brica, onde o seu 铆mpeto e empenho revolucion谩rio se fez notar, e poucos anos depois em Moscovo para onde foi enviado para ser integrado nos quadros do PCUS. N茫o participou na primeira guerra mundial, nem na guerra civil russa que terminou em 1922, tinha na altura 17 anos. Na d茅cada de 20, teve o seu encontro com a revolu莽茫o, aprendeu a ler, leu os pais fundadores da nova sociedade e participou com empenho na constru莽茫o da mesma. Assistiu 脿 revolta de Kronstadt e ao 鈥渘avio dos fil贸sofos鈥�. Estes processos de elimina莽茫o f铆sica ou de expatriamento de todos aqueles que n茫o entendiam que o ser humano, o individual, nunca se poderia sobrepor ao coletivo, nunca o incomodaram. Muito pelo contr谩rio, sempre os viu como sacrif铆cios que teriam de ser cometidos para que o individuo fosse uma parcela do coletivo e nunca ver a sociedade como um coletivo de indiv铆duos. A unidade era a sociedade. E quem n茫o entendesse isso deveria ser apagado da sociedade. N茫o havia qualquer 贸dio a quem assim n茫o fosse, apenas a sociedade, o coletivo rejeitaria como um corpo estranho quem de alguma forma quisesse que a sua individualidade fosse notada. Era notada e imediatamente expurgada. N茫o foi ent茫o estranho que na d茅cada de 30, aos 30 anos tivesse integrado os corpos da NKVD, e ao servi莽o do partido tivesse participado nos expurgos. E f锚-lo sempre com empenho e abdicando da individualidade. O mesmo empenho com que aos 14 anos, na f谩brica de carris de a莽o de Tumui, denunciou todos aqueles que pela in茅rcia e falta de furor revolucion谩rio boicotavam a alvorada da nova sociedade. Foi sim com a responsabilidade do coletivo que assistiu ao fuzilamento do seu irm茫o mais novo, Yure, que tinha sido denunciado numa actividade do mercado negro. Ningu茅m era mais importante que o coletivo e a m茫e r煤ssia. Ningu茅m, nem a fam铆lia. Norteado desta convic莽茫o estava disposto a faz锚-la valer contra todos os reacion谩rios com que cruzasse. N茫o havia meio termo, a transforma莽茫o da sociedade e a revolu莽茫o eram ainda como uma pequena crian莽a indefesa que se n茫o protegida dos males do mundo rapidamente sucumbiria. Foi assim que na sua qualidade de inquiridor participou no 鈥淧rocesso Rubachov鈥�, trazido ao conhecimento p煤blico por Arthur Koestler. Nesse e em muitos outros, e sempre com sucesso obteve dos contra-revolucion谩rios a sua declara莽茫o de marginalidade e como tal o reconhecimento de n茫o mais terem lugar na individualidade do coletivo. Eram corpos estranhos. Participou na segunda guerra mundial, esteve no cerco de Estalinegrado e foi vitorioso. Vitorioso na bravura e no sentimento de coletivo que deu aos seus homens. Terminou esses tempos de prova莽茫o sem uma m茫o que perdeu com uma granada. Perdeu a m茫o, mas n茫o o pulso para tomar as r茅deas do destino do coletivo. E sempre em representa莽茫o do coletivo acompanhou as tropas russas at茅 脿 vitoria em 22 de abril de 1945. Tinha agora 40 anos, uma m茫o a menos, mas um orgulho desmedido na sua p谩tria, na sua na莽茫o e na sua causa. E se at茅 a铆 a tinha abra莽ado com ambas as m茫os, agora n茫o tendo a esquerda, agarrou a causa do coletivo com todo o seu corpo e o seu ser, numa simbiose de onde Gletkin e coletivo eram indissoci谩veis. E que orgulho tinha do que tinham conseguido! Tinham vencido os panzers nazis, tinham expandido o imp茅rio da causa at茅 脿s entranhas do ocidente burgues. Tinha orgulho no seu l铆der que na conferencia de Yalta mostrara ao mundo o que uma ideia e um coletivo podiam conseguir. Orgulho, sim, creio que esse era o 煤nico pecado a que se permitia. Finais de anos 40 e at茅 脿 morte do amado l铆der em 1953 dedicou-se de corpo e alma 脿s suas fun莽玫es no partido e no comit茅 de seguran莽a do estado (KGB). Com a subida de ao poder de Nikita Khrushchev em 1956 e muito em particular ap贸s o XX congresso do PCUS, Gletkin ent茫o com 50 anos inicia o seu processo de desgosto para com a aus锚ncia de sensibilidade, que os dirigentes p贸s Estaline pareciam fadar ao papel do coletivo nos des铆gnios da sociedade. Ao permitirem que o cidad茫o, o individuo fosse o destinat谩rio da pol铆tica, estava-se a negar tudo pelo que se tinha lutado. Todos os sacrif铆cios e atrocidades passariam assim a ser reconhecidos, como sacrif铆cios e atrocidades e n茫o como um caminho glorioso rumo 脿s manh茫s que cantam. Algo de muito errado se estava a passar com a sociedade sovi茅tica. De alguma maneira o sonho era posto em causa, e todos aqueles que dele tinham feito parte de alguma forma sentiam-se tra铆dos, n茫o pelo inimigo externo que sempre tinham denunciado, mas por algo interno, algo que ainda n茫o tinha sido devidamente expurgado. Com a deposi莽茫o de Nikita Khrushchev em 1964, Gletkin ent茫o j谩 perto dos seus 60 anos ainda conseguiu reunir for莽as para prestar um 煤ltimo servi莽o ao coletivo. Antes da sua morte em 1982, aos 77 anos teria de assegurar que os 3 filhos teriam doutrina adequada para seguirem as pisadas do pai na defesa do coletivo para honra e gl贸ria de todos os povos russos e na莽玫es que em liberdade tinham aderido ao coletivo da URSS. Gl贸ria 脿 R煤ssia, gl贸ria a todos os povos da URSS, gl贸ria ao pai fundador, Josef Stalin, que com probidades tinha afirmado a causa coletiva junto da Alemanha nazi e do mundo burgu锚s e capitalista. E a li莽茫o foi bem aprendida tanto pelos descendentes de Gletkin como por tantos outros que com a queda da URSS, a desagrega莽茫o do imp茅rio e o desapontamento da sociedade capitalista e de consumo iniciada formalmente em 1991, com o desastre que foram as pol铆ticas de Gorbatchov da glasnost e perestroika, e posteriormente, com o quase sempre alcoolizado Boris Yeltsin. Gletkin dava voltas na campa e enquanto as dava, 146 milh玫es de russos achavam que o caminho que seguiam, um caminho de degrada莽茫o e degredo, n茫o respeitava a hist贸ria de uma na莽茫o que tinha tido expoentes como Pedro o Grande, Catarina II, e Josef Stalin, todos eles filhos da grande R煤ssia e que agora se via vexada pelo ocidente opressor.
Masha Gressen, no seu livro 鈥淥 Futuro 茅 Hist贸ria鈥� conta-nos a hist贸ria de Masha, Zhanna, Seryozha, e Lyosha, e na hist贸ria destes personagens e suas fam铆lias uma hist贸ria da R煤ssia. Uma R煤ssia recente e de que forma esta mesma hist贸ria se poderia refletir no que 茅 a R煤ssia de 2023 e no seu futuro pr贸ximo. Ao faz锚-lo contudo com base nestas quatro personagens limita-se a observar o que vais acontecendo com talvez menos de 20% da popula莽茫o. 脡 por isso, e por achar que falta um personagem que se identifique com os 80% da popula莽茫o que apoia P煤tin que escrevi esta fic莽茫o. Podemos n茫o gostar, podemos abominar, mas eles est茫o l谩 e s茫o 80% de 146 milh玫es. 脡 demasiada gente para ser negligenciada. Foi este o motivo pelo qual escrevi esta hist贸ria aproveitando a personagem de Gletkin descrita por Arthur Koestler no seu livro 鈥淓clipse do Sol鈥�. Pretendi com este exerc铆cio n茫o justificar as a莽玫es que os russos t锚m, aos meus olhos, cometido. Mas 茅 aos meus, e h谩 seguramente 292 milh玫es de outros que no mundo o v锚m de outra forma.
Gessen's careful telling of the lives of four Russians who saw the Soviet Union collapse and who also saw Putin take power is a thrill to read. Their are three additional characters whose position in Russian society and political influence garners attention.
Despite following the lives of 7 characters across landscapes of city to country life and occupations from psychology to politics, Gessen manages to keep the reader on a path toward making sense of what it was like for these people to live (and in some ways) contribute to the political results.
Gessen emerges less surprised than she was at the project's outset (as a journalist she herself covered this period in Russia). With attention, the reader will too.
My very first memory of a newsreel was the Hungarian revolution against the Soviet Union. It was crushed. The Hungarians had control for a week or two hoping that the US or UN would help out. Good luck with that. The world ignored them, and they were crushed. As a young boy, I watched them being shot down in the streets by Russian soldiers.
The next memory about the Soviet Union that stuck with me was the Czechoslovakian revolution. Led by Alexander Dubcek, the government there tried to create "communism with a human face." Once again: Good luck with that. Soviet tanks rolled in. There was no real pushback. One young Czech man burned himself in front of a tank. Dubcek was assigned to run a parking garage. Then there was this beautiful moment. Dubcek and his wife walked into a movie theater. The audience noticed him and stood spontaneously to sing the Czech national anthem. I was inspired. But they were still under the boot of Russia.
The Russian dissidents became my heroes. In 1969, Andrei Amalrik wrote the book-length essay Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? I always thought they would. They didn't survive much longer. But that government has come back. Amalrik, by the way, died in a car accident in Spain going to a civil rights conference. Broke my heart.
So many other examples caused me to grow up with a decidedly negative view of communism. I have not changed.
This book is solid history and a must read for anyone who cares about Russia. Masha Gessen is the best!
I can't help but wonder if we missed a great opportunity to change Russia and the world. I don't think they ever had a golden age. It always seems so cold and miserable. And the people so depressed. Even in their great literature.
In December 1989, the great dissident physicist Andre Sakharov died leaving Boris Yeltsin to lead the "democrats." Yeltsin was "locked in mortal combat" with Mikhail Gorbachev, who refused to cede the Communist Party. Gorbachev banned street protests in March 1991. There were tanks in the streets in an effort to stymy democracy protests. Crowds chanted "Yel-tisn!" In June, Yeltsin was elected president. Civil War was narrowly averted.
One after another Eastern European states allowed protests. The Communists and the Russian Army were forced to leave. That makes the current dismantling of Eastern European democracy even more discouraging. Mr. Trump has been a model for fascists everywhere.
A young KGB agent there described the experience as "frightful and humiliating." His name was Vladimir Putin. He would not forget. And the chain reaction did not stop at the Soviet border. Even the great Soviet Union splintered. Slowly the Soviet Republics declared their own independence. Gorbachev resigned his post as President of the USSR.
In August the giant statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, founder of the Soviet secret police, was removed from its pedestal near the Kremlin. It symbolized the dismantling the two pillars of totalitarianism: ideology and terror.
The Soviet state was based on punishment. Children were taught to criticize one another in groups. The same with workers.
Russians were outraged at the American bombings in Serbia.
Vladimir Putin's popularity shot up in 1999. First, a series of apartment building explosions in Russia. Putin used the bombings as a pretext to launch a new offensive in Chechnya. It seemed as if no Russian felt any sympathy for what Chechen civilians were going through. Instead, they admired one utterance by Putin: "We will pursue terrorists wherever they are. At the airport, if they are at the airport. And that means, I apologize, that if we catch them going to the bathroom, then we will rub them out in the outhouse, if it comes to that. That's it, the issue is closed." The Russian people had a new strongman who knew how to talk tough again.
And he had the Russian Orthodox Church on his side.
In 2000, a Russian sub sunk off the coast of Norway. The Norwegians offered to help. Putin would not interrupt his vacation.
Chechens seized a movie theater in Moscow taking more than 900 hostages. The military stormed the theater and 129 hostages died. Sleeping gas pumped into the theater ended up killing many of the hostages. No pictures of dead hostages were shown. Just terrorists.
Russians at first reacted with sympathy to 9/11 attacks on America. Soon it gave way to blaming America itself for the attacks.
Estonia removed the statue of the bronze soldier meant to commemorate Russian WWII victories there. What Russians thought of as "liberation," Estonians thought of as "occupation." Russia attacked Estonia as punishment with cyberwarfare. Sound familiar?
Georgia and Ukraine were prevented from entering NATO by Russian military attacks. I guess you could say it's hard to blame either side of the issue. But those are separate countries and should be respected as such.
If you read the book, take a careful look at the definitions of totalitarianism. They look eerily familiar to our current situation. As Erich Fromm said, ". . . a feeling of superiority over the rest of mankind . . . will compensate them--for at least a time--for the fact that their lives had been impoverished, economically and culturally."
One of the things I most learned was how much Putin used attacks on LGBTQ rights to maintain power and solidify his base. They were constantly referred to as "pedophiles." Again the book goes into great detail.
Putin and Medvedev have a back and forth handover of power. Total corruption. The Russian Orthodox Church helped to promote this power.
And of course there was the usual hatred of Jews.
And of course the need for strong men. You know, like the shirtless Putin.
And of course they now could say that Crimea was "theirs."
And, like climate change and the other problems we face, the worst is yet to come.
A great book. Well worthy of the National Book Award.
The parts where Gessen talks about totalitarianism and authoritarianism and the changes in culture and thinking in Russia are so eye opening. It's a great update to Remnick's Lenin's tomb, but this book did not really work for me because I really don't like it when authors try to tell a story through people's lives. Maybe it's a personal pet peeve, but I think the premise is that Russians are relatable and just like us. I already assume this. I want to know about the regime and I promise I have the attention span for the politics. I don't need the human drama. There was too much of that here--though some of it was woven into the larger picture, but not enough. And also, I really do think I'm in the minority here. I must be because every author does this now.
An essential book for anyone who wants to understand modern Russia, that now almost mythical country making such an (unfortunate) impact on the world.
Masha Gessen is a great writer who focuses on individual human stories in order to give context to the last several decades of Russian history. A cast of academics, protesters, and LGBT characters highlight the immense struggles going on beyond what was once the Iron Curtain.
It's not just about Putinism, but Putin is of course lingering in the background always. As the stories begin, there is a lot to take in about the systems of the Soviet Union, and not just epic battles but very personal things like the national racial categories and how family planning was upended many times resulting in generations of single-mother households. And the fascinating concept of 'Homo Sovieticus.' There is also as good an explanation of how the Soviet Union fell as one could read anywhere--which is quite the complex topic. There's Yeltsin, and the various disappointing mistakes made during the volatile economic transition to the current Russian Federation.
As we lead up to the present we find ourselves in the purposefully confusing world that the political technologists have made: Putin's Russia. It's a place hard to define, although the scholars keep trying: mainly there's the debate over the definitions of authoritarianism and totalitarianism. People get assassinated and politically imprisoned every once in a while but it's not like a big deal to most. Overall the point seems to be that ideology doesn't matter as much as Westerners think it does. Vaguely, Putin support "family values" or something.
The saddest aspect of all is the homophobia of the current state. Pedophilia is equated with homosexuality and this is one of the the big bad enemies used to control the people. It makes for tragic stories to find out how it turns out for people we've been following since the 80s and 90s.
Finally, much culminates in the invasion of the Ukraine. Of course, that story is still unfolding...
As for the future, it's damn hard to say. Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Should we really pretend anyone can know? Well, The Future is History.
So one of the reasons I studied Soviet history during college was to understand this evil empire. Why were they evil and why did they fervently oppose America.
I got my answers and then the Soviet Union fell and my life鈥檚 path went another way, and my interest in Russia became tourist-like at best: Yeltsin, boozing, democracy, economic ups and downs, and Putin, Crimea and Ukraine.鈥ㄢ€℅essen educates me on how fucked up Russia has become, Here鈥檚 some low lights: Gays beaten to death and YouTubed, Volgograd renamed as Stalingrad for an official holiday, TV station cancelled bc it asked if the siege of Leningrad was the best course of action, and my fave - Stalin polls as the most outstanding person of all time - ten years running.鈥ㄢ€≧ussians are starting to remind me of all the Muslim terrorists who exist in perpetual inferiority to the West and so have created an absurd concatenation of lies and distortions to buoy their fragile egos.鈥ㄢ€℉ere鈥檚 my main takeaway. Russia has always thirsted for authoritarianism. The Czar, the Stalin, The Putin. Communism didn鈥檛 fall bc people thirsted for freedom. Communism fell bc it simply couldn鈥檛 pay its bills. As a neophyte Russian scholar I had prized my notion that the Soviet Union鈥檚 fits of glasnost were generationally driven, Several leading scholars came to my same conclusion later and I was justifiably heartened.鈥ㄢ€≒roof: Stalin refuted Trotsky and Bukharin鈥檚 NEP for political and generational notions tied to Lenin. Khruschkhev鈥檚 Secret Speech in 鈥�56 points the finger of Blame on Stalin鈥檚 enforced famine and Purges, while keeping the Great Patriotic War sacrosanct. K was party to the latter but too young for hunger and political internecine murder. Brezhnev ousts K and the Soviet Union gets real old together. Finally, Gorbachev arrives, and over the desiccated remains of the Politburo throws out all of Soviet history, the Warsaw pact, but not the Communist Party.鈥ㄢ€ˋccording to my, and some star scholars鈥� theories, that should be the end as new generations of Russians, less and less fettered by the past, seek a Western model of liberal democracy. But that hasn鈥檛 happened. Russia has reinstituted a strong man in Putin/Stalin, sought a revanchist policy i.e Molotov - Ribbentrop, cast America again as the villain in this newest ideological sequel, and taken aim at homosexuals as a fifth column aka the Jews and Trotskyites of yore.鈥ㄢ€↖ feel like a guy who started reading some epic fantasy series, left off, and returned years later to a completely parallel storyline playing out - or just the guy who saw the original Star Wars movie and then the first of the new series and said WTF it's the same movie!!!
Finally, I find it easy to pillory the new Soviet man. Ensorcelled by inferiority, clinging to the Great Patriotic War as his only achievement, which was now something his great grandfather accomplished, sinking demographically, beholden to oil鈥檚 rise and fall, and besotted by a homophobia that verges on hysteria.鈥� Elections are a sham, the media is run by the State, and the colleges won鈥檛 even teach much of the social sciences, but then I look at America鈥︹€ㄢ€↙ike Russia, the politicans are hated in the United States, but incumbents there are returned to office 96% of the time.鈥ㄢ€≧ussians are brought up on ridiculous charges and sent to prison, AND in America the Feds have around a 95% conviction rate as well.
Russia owns the Media, AND in the US over 90% of reporters are of one party, and of the over 100 major newspapers only two endorsed Trump for President, and by the latest accounting Trump has faced 91% negative coverage.鈥ㄢ€‵inally, the Soviets banned most social science and Putin鈥檚 regime seems bent on wiping out any parts that had felt a resurgence, AND in America, just over this weekend, it was reported that 40% of colleges have NO republican professors, that nearly 80% of these schools have less than 10 faculty who put R鈥檚 by their name.鈥ㄢ€ˋre we that much different then? Shrug, we undoubtedly believe we are, but when you look at the facts it appears we just have a more believable storyline than those of the Rodina.
Little annoys me more than the "blame Russia!" narrative re: Trump. Instead of actually taking a harsh look inward at the brutalities that constitute American social, economic, and political reality, nice people like my Mom's friends seem to look for the scary other as a way of palliating their own shame -- in this case those bad Russians. Red Dawn for Hillary voters.
And I'm afraid Masha Gessen's book seems designed for those same people, which is probably why it won the National Book Award in 2017. While the Putin regime in Russia is indefensible, and Russian institutions are often backward-looking and authoritarian, not to mention homophobic and xenophobic, there's no mention of how shock therapy programs and poorly executed perestroika laid the foundations for reaction. This is a bit like writing a book about Trump's America without mentioning the 2008 economic crisis.
I should point out that Gessen writes well, and I was fascinated by (some of) the young Russians she follows. But the book as a whole left me wanting more, even if I was... entertained.
This explains much about the dichotomies of the Russian citizens' mental, logical, spiritual, economic worldviews. Most of which ride on feelings as much as they do on physical or realistic to quantity facts. It's not just about the period since the 1980's, but that in particular is far more discerned and described through varying well characterized by witness and opinion citizen "eyes"- their life experiences throughout vast (once again) changes.
It's more difficult than just that though. It's also at times erudite and deep in direction. As is the Russian "awareness" and "ideal" dichotomy. And it truly is hard to parse where any individuality or any approach to "equality" is ever a discerning regard or particularly defined within Russia. It's ALWAYS a top down worldview with something like a "father" who "knows better" making nearly every possible bureaucratic, economic, political, work related life decisions. FOR YOU and not with you too. And certain groups are nearly always excluded for advancements. Not only within schooling either. I though the identity bases in their politics and the "coffin" questions to admittance more than enlightening. Because I've heard them from the horse's mouth from Russian immigrants to the Chicago area. Some just in this decade too. Hard to get in, hard to get out. And you better not talk any other language but Russian in the schools, either.
But this book is far more. It's about the patterns of the past and the reality of the now. The USSR days and that break up period is most highlighted here.
In my own life I have been told all through every aspect of my earliest educational paths that Russia was the "enemy". From hiding under desks during the Cuban Missile Crisis to the dire warnings we got when the first Cosmonaut was shot into space. The people who read this have no real concept, I don't believe, of how we were taught that Russia wanted to bury us.
So it really did make me LOL when Obama made that remark about Russia's "power" or status effects being so minimal during those last years of his Presidency. Russia has immense geographical and cognition challenges. It does. It always has and it always will. No one in any country's hierarchy of observing their roles in the world (anywhere on Earth and not in the past, present or future) should ever forget it. When you don't have much at all, you often have "little to lose" and will toss in the lot. Putin's role and progression is typical of Russian past. The system of belief beyond just the Communism ideology has always been to sacrifice large proportions of the population to "same, same" group think. Huge proportions of the population have in every decade been sacrificed, censored/imprisoned, exiled to sure deaths, or full out just killed off in pograms or political "thought" correctness issues re secret police wars. Individuality think is "wrong" by its own prime concept from the get go. Regardless of what the decision or outcome of it will or might be.
These stories from witness in this book are mild compared to the stories I've heard from Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Russians, and Polish or Belgium 2nd generation which originated and in steps came out of Russia proper. The class system is stronger than ever now too. A couple of these people visit about once a decade. So it amazes me that some of the reviewers believe this is only "positing" the hardest facts and reality of politico Russia and mundane issues of Russian living. Commodities, shopping especially. It's far worse in tracts of Russia away from the cities than this book surmises, IMHO. And all the changes that these individuals had to bridge or try to bridge AS INDIVIDUALS through the "changes" (IMHO they always return to a authoritative/ totalitarian form) in this book? They were educated and "lucky" in class or placement- you should hear the stories of those that were not. I've heard dozens. Mostly from home health workers here in the USA and people who had nursing skills and even degrees within Russia. Work does NOT insure a consequence of advancement or profit. Much works exactly the opposite. Slower you go the more you get.
It loses a star for the depth and tangent prose method. But I truly appreciated the chart with name and relationship definition to age and method for naming /title used for this book in the previewed section before the copy began.
Several years ago I read Masha Gessen鈥檚 . It was memorable and ominous, and I meant to follow it up with reading The Future Is History. It has taken me a while to get to it, but now, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I realized that I needed to turn to Gessen to help me understand. What an excellent book.
Gessen focuses primarily on a selection of educated Russians born in the 1980s, exploring how Russia moved from seemingly the collapse of totalitarianism to its resurgence. In doing so, she explores as well how different thinkers have thought about totalitarianism (and its application to Russia), and how social sciences have grown and been constrained in Russia over the past few decades. The chapters exploring one protagonist鈥檚 efforts to build a gender studies department in his university in the face of rising and violent anti-LGBT action (often equated with being against Western- or Jewish-influenced 鈥榩edophilia鈥�) was especially heartbreaking.
And geopolitics. The news cycle is such that what鈥檚 going on now in Ukraine is apt to feel sudden and quite new to many of us. But what an inexorable build-up it鈥檚 been, as Gessen鈥檚 book, even though published in 2017, makes painfully clear. Reading about the Russian reaction to NATO鈥檚 intervention in Kosovo, the valorizing of Russian/Eurasian identity versus Western human-rights-mindedness, the association of the latter with Ukraine鈥檚 Orange Revolution, the annexation of Crimea鈥oupled with the exploration of Putin鈥檚 support in Russia, it鈥檚 apparent the current tragedy has been a long time coming and is not easily fixed.
The only flaw in my reading experience, and it is my flaw, was my difficulty in sorting out who was who, notwithstanding frequent resort to the list of dramatis personae.
It seems to be that I have little enough time for reading this year, let alone writing reviews that might do full justice to a book like this, which will be one of the most important books I read this year.
through telling the stories of seven individuals, Gessen tracks the return slide of Russia into totalitarianism over three decades, after what seemed to be a period of liberalisation following the fall of Stalin and then the disaggregation of the USSR.. Late in the book she asks whether Russia ever really moved away from totalitarian modes of operation and, sadly, seems to conclude that it didn't.
There are fascinating discussions on the nature of totalitarianism, what it demands of populations controlled by totalitarian structures and how people are affected by it. The sections on the psychological and physical effects of living in unpredictable, repressive and dangerous conditions like those in Russia are particularly illuminating.
鈥楾he Future is History鈥� is a subtle and unusual work of contemporary history, if that isn鈥檛 too much of a tautology. Masha Gessen attempts to elucidate the last twenty years in Russia through the lives of four people who grew up after the fall of the USSR. It confirms the message of , that life under Putin is characterised by complete disorientation. Gessen discusses the nature of Putin鈥檚 regime from several angles, including consideration of whether it has an actual ideology and to what extent it is authoritarian. What emerges is a complex but fundamentally depressing picture. Whatever it is, Putinism has become more repressive, aggressive, and entrenched as the years have passed. Journalists and activists are at greater and greater risk of imprisonment, beatings, exile, and assassination. Most shockingly, homophobic rhetoric has intensified to a fever pitch on the basis of a hysterical hunt for paedophiles. One of the four subjects of the book is a gay academic who gradually finds his work ignored and suppressed. I hadn鈥檛 realised what a slew of virulently homophobic laws Russia had passed - LGBT people are apparently the current political scapegoat.
The study of social sciences in Russia is a theme throughout the book, as without them it is impossible to understand what鈥檚 happening to society and culture. A psychoanalyst considers the generational impact of Russia鈥檚 traumatic past, while a sociologist tries to capture public sentiment via surveys. Gessen avoids any simple or easy answers about Russia鈥檚 seeming fatalism and confused nostalgia. Not that these symptoms are unique to Russia (Brexit is certainly a manifestation of both), however their Russian version seems especially intense and peculiar. Gessen suggests that many think there is no future in the country and it鈥檚 best to leave; others that a return to the USSR is needed to restore perceived former glories. There is very little mention of Trump and Russia鈥檚 apparent interference in US politics, however the depiction of Putin鈥檚 regime made me realise that America is definitely becoming more like Russia. Trump has brought Putin鈥檚 hardcore nepotism to the US presidency, as well as his contradictory and aggressive rhetoric. Both seem to hold onto power, despite obviously terrible policies, by undermining institutions and inducing a disorientating cognitive dissonance. It鈥檚 funny that after the fall of the iron curtain Russia was expected to imitate the US. Now things are going the other way.
Geopolitics aren鈥檛 the focus of this book, though. It attempts to explain the life experiences of a few Russians in the context of national political changes, making no claims that these handful of people represent the population at large. Gessen asks why protests suddenly erupt, why they seemingly have no lasting consequences, and how nationalist sentiment waxes and wanes. She wonders why life expectancy in Russia is so bad and what happened during the invasion of Ukraine. All this is carefully woven together into a compelling narrative. There is something unsettling about reading a history that鈥檚 within my lifetime. It also makes the pseudo-objective distance of the historian impossible to manufacture, which I appreciated. Gessen tries to reconstruct and contextualise confused, suppressed, and poorly documented events in Russia from 1984 to today, no mean feat. I found 鈥楾he Future is History鈥� a fascinating and unique read, one that made me more worried about Russia鈥檚 current geopolitical activities.
An in-depth look at the rise of totalitarianism in Russia.
This was published in 2017 but still feels so current, and so on track with what is happening. Putin's unswerving dedication to taking more and more and more territory, and pushing back the social progress made since the fall of the Soviet Union.
There are also so many parallels to what is happening in the US right now (and during the Trump presidency), painting a really bleak portrait of the world overall. Especially with the emphasis on "focusing on family values" (read: homophobic values), calling LGBTQ+ people paedophiles, and sowing a general sense of anxiety and hopelessness for the future through media outlets.
It's very clear that difference unites us and makes us stronger. Celebrating difference, accepting difference, cherishing difference. Instead of enforcing conformity and unity, which only turns us inward, making those in power stronger and those without weaker and always looking over their shoulder for danger.
An important book, if a depressing one. Masha Gessen is a gay, Jewish journalist who was born in the Soviet Union - a country that remains, even now re-established as Russia, virulently anti-homosexual, anti-Semitic, and anti-intellectual. She presents the case that Russia is still a totalitarian state, despite its claims of being an election-driven democracy. The underlying message is that creating a totalitarian regime - one that provides answers for everything and exerts control over every aspect of life - requires psychological conditioning and scaffolding that can't be easily dismantled. As a result, the so-called democracy formed in 1993 was ripe for the rise of Putin and his practice of corruption, recrimination, media control, and rigged elections.
Gessen seeks to tell a story of Russian life on many levels, and she does so by jumping from character to character, from poor family to university professor to political elite to political outsider. I listened to the audio book, and it was incredibly hard to follow this large cast. Her pronunciations are of course spot-on, but that makes it hard to Google a name that starts with an "N" but sounds like it starts with a "Y" the way she's saying it. Or she returns to someone we haven't heard about for a while and it's hard to recall their place in the narrative. There was also a character named Masha, and I was confused for a long time, entertaining the possibility that those sections were autobiographical (they're not). The book also jumps chronologically between the rules of Lenin, Stalin, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin (and briefly Medvedev), and many others in between. For someone who lacks a deep understanding of Russian culture and history, this was difficult to track. I still learned a lot, though, and it was helpful to learn the meanings of terms I'd heard before like Perestroika (restructuring to allow more political freedom and free market capitalism that sadly backfired) and Glasnost (openness and transparency).
The stories themselves are depressing. If you try to speak out against the government, you are simply beaten by a police officer. Or paid a visit by a paid thug. Or poisoned. Or thrown in jail as part of a policy against pedophiles. At no point is there an option for appeal, or recourse to right the wrong. The perpetrators are removed from blame or prosecution, and the denials are thick and dishonest. Graft and corruption is just part of daily life, and no one bats an eye. Marriages are assumed to dissolve, and infidelity is expected (especially, and conveniently, for men). The populace has learned that the key to survival is believing and parroting anything the government-run media tells you to believe, and as a result the citizenry (darkly and comedically referred to as "Homo Sovieticus") no longer knows how to harbor its own opinions on matters of state.
This is the worst travel brochure imaginable for Russia, and I have no desire to visit there if I ever did before. These stories are foreboding in our current US climate, in which regard for truth, evidence and common decency is at a frightening low for much of the population. The Future Is History makes it clear just how long the paroxysms of ignorance and corruption can last.
Okay, so meandering story before review, but damn did Gessen ever put this shaggy dog into context. About ten years or so ago, I was looking around for movies featuring an up-and-coming Russian actor. About five years prior, I'd seen him in a great film directed by his father, and he鈥檇 since gone on to do a lot of interesting projects. To my shock and sadness, I learned that said actor had been killed in an avalanche, and in searching for more news, I stumbled across a guy with the same name--and my first mad scientist.
He, along with several other (prominent from what I could tell) Russian scientists had a plan to colonize Antarctica for the purpose of bypassing the worldwide cloning ban in order to (wait for it) harvest...headless...human...clones.
From there, they would have the organ bits to extend life by 500 years, giving them that extra leeway to work on more feasible routes to immortality. I emailed him and asked for an interview. He not only obliged but offered me a knighthood in Antarctica if I could help him bring in Japanese investors. His country had a name: Immortia. His country had national anthem: Forever Young. THAT Forever Young. His country had freshly-minted stamps that passed smoothly through the Russian post. The whole time we were corresponding, I kept wondering if he was actually, really, really for real: My cynical Gen X brain was meeting the X-Men villain from my childhood, and he was just as thoughtful and charming as Magneto. How was this happening? Then I read this book and learned about a scientist who believes space radiation is a cause of ethnic differences. And he is only ONE of a cast of many. Now, mad scientists aren't a surprise in themselves, and America has had its share of anti-vaccer kooks, etc, but those guys tend to run on a mix of willful ignorance and laziness, dabbed with a desire to star in their own SyFy apocalypse dramas. Gessen lays out an environment in which such dangerous kookiness is gestated not from the above, but the powerful desire for knowledge when you鈥檝e only got access to crumbs. Some of these people become heroes, others turn into totalitarians spewing racist, homophobic bile, but at least in the first hundred pages, you鈥檒l admire their stone cold determination to learn and sympathize with their sense of betrayal when confronted with genuine expertise. If Americans are examples of the Dunning-Kruger effect, everyone here is Jude the Obscure. It鈥檚 just that some of them turn into Lex Luthor.
It鈥檚 a terrifying book on a number of levels, particularly its coverage of the rise and then swift decline in support, and finally persecution, of queer people in Russia. I'm pretty sure Emily's story in The Handmaid's Tale series relied more on this book than it did Atwood鈥檚 novel.
As for my prince, he was less dangerous than sweet. In our last exchange, he sent me a photo of his wife. "We're not married anymore," he wrote. 鈥淏ut she is still a princess."
My partner is still mad at me for not taking him up on that knighthood.
I should start by saying that I think Gessen is a fantastic writer and her central thesis is completely on target, if a bit obvious (Russia is going back to it鈥檚 totalitarian ways and we shouldn鈥檛 be surprised).
But I had two main issues: first, this book isn鈥檛 sure if it鈥檚 meant for people who know nothing about Russia or people who are well versed in Russian and soviet history and politics. There鈥檚 a lot of introduction but certainly not enough for the average reader who has no idea about things like the fact that Putin鈥檚 mother almost starved at Stalingrad. I think it misses the mark by trying to cater to both audiences at the same time and ultimately leaves both frustrated.
The second issue is that the book tries to do too much overall. I think the narrative device of telling the story of the USSRs demise and quasi-resurgence through the lens of several different people is a smart one. However, by trying to do both a fair and full accounting of each of their lives/experiences and also telling the more global story of the country as a whole, the reader is really left wanting. I think the most impactful storyline was perhaps the simplest (Lyosha, whose identity as a Russian gay man is the central source of his difficulty finding a place in Russian society). I think if you鈥檙e a die hard Gessen fan you should read this, but I would caveat that if so you probably know a lot of the stuff in this book already.
Quite an amazing book, part history, part novel, with good doses of sociology and philosophy thrown in. I think this is an important book that Americans should read to better understand post-Cold War Russia as well as the present political moment we're living through in our own country.
Masha Gessen tells the story of the late Soviet Union through the eyes of several Russians living in Moscow beginning in the late 80's. Like a Tolstoy novel, the cast is large and includes public figures such as Boris Nemtsov and Aleksandr Dugin as well as less well-known Russians like Lyosha, a young gay man, sociologist Lev Gudkov, a psychoanalyst named Marina Arutyunyan, and a young activist named Masha. The combination of many perspectives within a single narrative against the backdrop of history paints a nuanced picture of present day Russian society, allowing foreigners to perceive a level of complexity and subtlety not easily accessed by merely reading the news.
In one example, Gudkov's years of research conducting opinion surveys provide the reader with insight into Russian attitudes toward many social issues, such as how society should treat LGBT individuals, the handicapped, and other marginalized groups, as well as how these attitudes changed over time. Lyosha's firsthand experience of violence directed toward gay men combined with his difficulty pursuing his academic career serve to kindle empathy for the struggles that hundreds of thousands of Russians face daily.
The most frightening (though enlightening) point of view, however, is Dugin's. The book follows Dugin from his early days as an anti-communist dissident through his present station as a key ideologue within the "Eurasian" movement and nationalist conservatism more generally. Some have drawn comparisons between Steve Bannon and Dugin, as well as to their roles with their respective rulers. At the core of Dugin's philosophy lies the idea of "Fourth Political Theory," meaning that the backward-looking authoritarian traditionalism he espouses represents the fourth great wave in political ideology, with the prior three being liberalism, communism, and fascism. Rather than viewing events in Russian history such as the Mongol occupation like the West typically does (as a period that hindered the development of inclusive political institutions in favor of colonial extraction), Dugin claims that these events have formed a uniquely Eurasian culture with values fundamentally different than those of the democratic West.
Specifically, Dugin views notions such as representative democracy, pluralism, and tolerance as Western cultural exports at odds with the fundamental character of Russian society. His philosophy at its heart rejects modernity and longs for a return to a glorious Russia of the past, loosely defined around a set of rural conservative religious and cultural values that stand in opposition to the liberal beliefs of the West and the urban elite. To Dugin, Francis Fukayama's famous "end of history" embodied in the end of the Cold War meant the triumph of liberalism over communism, following liberalism's earlier defeat of fascism. Rather than accepting the "maternal" view of history represented by the global victory of liberalism and moving steadily toward the implementation of Western-style institutions within modern Russia, Dugin's Fourth Political Theory unapologetically advocates a patriarchal worldview, with liberalism at home and abroad as the chief enemy.
It isn't difficult to see the appeal of Dugin's position to Trumpists and the American alt-right, whose chief adversary also seems to be liberalism. (Racist community organizer Richard Spencer's wife once worked as Dugin's translator.) Gessen's book, however, makes clear that Dugin's ideas are at their core adversarial to the United States, which serves as an object of resentment for the chaos that befell Russian society in the early 90's. Interventions like the US bombing of Serbia that few Americans keenly remember loom large in Russian nationalism and act as a reminder of how the US humiliated Russia at a time of weakness. While most Americans spent the 00's preoccupied with the aftermath of 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia seethed with sense of grievance over what it perceived to be US arrogance and unchecked aggression, including NATO expansion into Russia's East European security buffer.
Masha Gessen's book is eye-opening in more ways than I can easily recount. (I haven't even mentioned her application of Hannah Arendt's ideas on totalitarianism to Russia's current situation.) The similarities between Russia and the United States under Donald Trump are troubling, but I'm optimistic that our institutional fabric will prove unconducive to "Duginism with American characteristics" (to borrow the phrasing the Chinese use to describe their variant of socialism). Yet if large swathes of American society continue to frame their agenda in terms of opposition to "liberalism," we remain vulnerable to Dugin's ideology poisoning our discourse. Eurasianism opposes not liberalism as the word is used in contemporary American parlance, but rather in the sense of the word that places both American liberals and conservatives within the liberal tradition as our founders would have defined it, combined with Adam Smith and David Ricardo's concepts of economic liberalism (in the form of free market capitalism) balanced by democratically enacted social measures to ensure fairness. I hope more people read Gessen's book to better understand contemporary Russia, the nature of modern totalitarianism, and the dangers that Dugin鈥檚 ideas (with Putin as their advocate) pose to the democratic West.
Honestly pretty masterful storytelling. Very impressed with the craft and execution.
Finished with a better sense of both the universal pining for security, dignity, freedom true of Russians and all people, but also the distinct expressions that pining takes peculiar to the Russian people, and that go beyond my understanding.
I think I naively expected certain pro-democratic reactions to the invasion of Ukraine. To my dismay, support for the regime has deepened. I think this book helped me better understand why that is the case. The generational trauma of the Stalin reign of terror, the gulag鈥tc, among other traumas, and a whole history of culture that is definitely not western in the way I understand it. I鈥檓 very thankful for that new awareness, and hungry to learn more.
One application for me is to more strongly pushback against the dehumanizing language people use to talk about the Soviet Union - rather than reference mass starvation campaigns as simply exemplars of the inferiority of communism, can we not just lament the fact that millions of people (image-bearers) died?
Also, that culture is upstream of politics. Meaning, that both politics and political structures are products of the cultures we live in and create. I feel even more committed to this truth, and to the work of cultural transformation here in the US as a means of achieving systemic, political change.
The book could鈥檝e been 100 pages shorter. And didn鈥檛 really need 10 slightly adjusted definitions of totalitarianism in a row. But overall, the stories kept me so engaged in a complex and thorough history. Russia feels like such an enigma to me. But after this, it鈥檚 an enigma I feel more interested in unraveling.
Non posso che consigliare la lettura di questo interessante saggio/racconto di Masha Gessen, che, attraverso la vita di quattro ragazzi nati in Russia nel 1984 , ripercorre le vicende di un paese, in cui non 猫 avvenuto quel passaggio alla democrazia, che si era auspicato al tempo della dissoluzione dell'Unione Sovietica. Abbiamo quattro ragazzi, provenienti da famiglie di diversa estrazione sociale e economica (perch茅 scopriamo che anche nella Russia sovietica c'erano classi, nascoste dietro spessi cancelli), che arriveranno tutti a una medesima amara, dolorosa conclusione. Non c'猫 futuro in Russia. E attraverso questo libro, vediamo quanto di quel futuro 猫 schiacciato dal peso di una storia tragica, da cui non sembra che ci si possa emancipare. Un libro, perci貌, non scritto in modo perfetto, ma a mio parere imprescindibile per iniziare a conoscere temi che non possono essere ignorati.