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兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賵乇賵爻賷丕: 賲賳 胤賱丕賯 賲鬲丨囟乇 廿賱賶 丨乇亘 賴賲噩賷丞
氐丿乇 毓賳 丕賱賲乇賰夭 丕賱毓乇亘賷 賱賱兀亘丨丕孬 賵丿乇丕爻丞 丕賱爻賷丕爻丕鬲貙 賲賳 爻賱爻賱丞 鬲乇噩賲丕賳貙 賰鬲丕亘 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賵乇賵爻賷丕: 賲賳 胤賱丕賯 賲鬲丨囟乇 廿賱賶 丨乇亘 賴賲噩賷丞 賱亘賵賱 丿丕賳賷賷乇賷貙 賵鬲乇噩賲丞 賷夭賳 丕賱丨丕噩貙 賷賯毓 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賮賷 432 氐賮丨丞貙 賵賷卮鬲賲賱 毓賱賶 亘亘賱賷賵睾乇丕賮賷丞 賵賮賴乇爻 毓丕賲.
賷爻鬲賰卮賮 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱丿賷賳丕賲賷丕鬲 丿丕禺賱 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕貙 賵亘賷賳 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賵乇賵爻賷丕貙 賵亘賷賳 乇賵爻賷丕 賵丕賱睾乇亘貙 賵丕賱鬲賷 馗賴乇鬲 賲毓 丕賳賴賷丕乇 丕賱丕鬲丨丕丿 丕賱爻賵賮賷丕鬲賷 賵兀丿賾鬲 賮賷 丕賱賳賴丕賷丞 廿賱賶 丕賱丨乇亘 賮賷 毓丕賲 2014. 賵丕爻鬲賳丕丿賸丕 廿賱賶 丕賱鬲爻賱爻賱 丕賱夭賲賳賷貙 賷賵囟丨 兀賳 丕賳賮氐丕賱 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 毓賳 乇賵爻賷丕 賮賷 毓丕賲 1991貙 丕賱匕賷 賰丕賳 賷爻賲賶 賮賷 匕賱賰 丕賱賵賯鬲 "丕賱胤賱丕賯 丕賱丨囟丕乇賷"貙 賯丿 兀丿賾賶 廿賱賶 賲丕 賷爻賲賷賴 賰孬賷乇賵賳 丕賱丌賳 "丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞 丕賱噩丿賷丿丞". 賮賷噩丕丿賱 亘兀賳 丕賱氐乇丕毓 賯丿 鬲賮丕賯賲 亘爻亘亘 毓賵丕賲賱 兀爻丕爻賷丞 孬賱丕孬丞: 丕賱賲毓囟賱丞 丕賱兀賲賳賷丞貙 賵鬲兀孬賷乇 丕賱鬲丨賵賱 丕賱丿賷賲賯乇丕胤賷 賮賷 丕賱噩睾乇丕賮賷丕 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞貙 賵丕賱兀賴丿丕賮 睾賷乇 丕賱賲鬲賵丕賮賯丞 賱兀賵乇賵亘丕 賲丕 亘毓丿 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞. 賵亘賲賵丕夭丕丞 賵囟毓 爻賱賲賷 噩乇賶 鬲亘丿賷丿賴貙 賰丕賳鬲 丕賱禺賱丕賮丕鬲 丕賱丨丕囟乇丞 爻賱賮賸丕 賵丕賱毓賲賷賯丞 丕賱噩匕賵乇 鬲爻鬲毓氐賷 毓賱賶 丕賱丨賱貙 賵鬲爻賴賲 賮賷 廿胤丕賱丞 兀賲丿 丕賱兀夭賲丞. 賵賷購馗賴賽乇 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 兀賷囟賸丕 鬲賳丕爻亘 賴匕賴 丕賱丨乇亘 賲毓 丕賱兀賳賲丕胤 丕賱兀賵爻毓 賱賱氐乇丕毓 丕賱丿賵賱賷 丕賱賲毓丕氐乇貙 賵賲賳 孬賲 賷賳亘睾賷 兀賳 賷噩匕亘 丕賱亘丕丨孬賷賳 賮賷 丕賱氐乇丕毓 丕賱乇賵爻賷 - 丕賱兀賵賰乇丕賳賷貙 賵毓賱丕賯丕鬲 乇賵爻賷丕 賲毓 丕賱睾乇亘貙 賵丕賱噩睾乇丕賮賷丕 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 毓賲賵賲賸丕.
賲賳丕亘毓 丕賱賳夭丕毓 毓賱賶 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕
賷卮丿賾丿 賴匕丕 丕賱鬲賵氐賷賮 毓賱賶 兀賳賾 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱鬲賷 亘丿兀鬲 賮賷 毓丕賲 2014 賰丕賳鬲 賳鬲丕噩 賯賵賶 丕賱賲丿賶 丕賱亘毓賷丿 賮賷 亘賷卅丞 賲丕 亘毓丿 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞貙 賵賯乇丕乇丕鬲 丕賱賲丿賶 丕賱賯氐賷乇 丕賱鬲賷 丕鬲賾禺匕賴丕 丕賱夭毓賲丕亍 丕賱兀賵賰乇丕賳賷賵賳 賵丕賱乇賵爻 賵丕賱睾乇亘賷賵賳 賮賷 毓丕賲賻賷 2013 賵2014貙 毓賱賶 丨丿賾 爻賵丕亍. 賮賯丿 丕乇鬲賮毓鬲 丕丨鬲賲丕賱丕鬲 丕賳丿賱丕毓 賳夭丕毓 毓賳賷賮 亘賷賳 乇賵爻賷丕 賵兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 丕乇鬲賮丕毓賸丕 鬲丿乇噩賷賸丕 亘賷賳 毓丕賲賷 1989 賵2014貙 賵賲賳 丕賱囟乇賵乇賷 丕賯鬲賮丕亍 賴匕賴 丕賱爻賷乇賵乇丞 賱賮賴賲 賰賷賮 亘丕鬲 賲賲賰賳賸丕貙 賮賷 毓丕賲 2014貙 兀賳 鬲賯乇乇 乇賵爻賷丕 兀賳賾 睾夭賵 噩賷乇丕賳賴丕 賰丕賳 爻賷丕爻鬲賴丕 丕賱賮囟賱賶.
賰丕賳鬲 丕賱亘賷卅丞 丕賱鬲賷 賳卮兀鬲 賮賷 兀毓賯丕亘 丕賳賴賷丕乇 丕賱丕鬲丨丕丿 丕賱爻賵賮賷丕鬲賷 兀賯賱賾 丨丿丞 亘賰孬賷乇 賲賳 亘賷卅丞 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞貨 賮賯丿 亘丕鬲 爻賴賱賸丕 丕賱丕毓鬲賯丕丿 亘兀賳賾 丕賱賳夭丕毓丕鬲 丕賱鬲賷 鬲亘賯賾鬲貙 賲孬賱 賵囟毓 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕貙 爻鬲丨賱賾 賳賮爻賴丕 賲毓 賲乇賵乇 丕賱夭賲賳. 睾賷乇 兀賳賾 毓賵丕賲賱 乇卅賷爻丞 孬賱丕孬丞 鈥� 毓丿賲 賯丕亘賱賷丞 鬲爻賵賷丞 鬲氐賵賾乇丕鬲 丕賱兀胤乇丕賮 丕賱賮丕毓賱丞 丕賱毓丿賷丿丞 廿夭丕亍 丕賱賵囟毓 丕賱賯丕卅賲 賵丕賱丨丕噩丕鬲 丕賱兀賲賳賷丞 丕賱賳丕鬲噩丞貙 賵鬲毓丕乇囟 丕賳鬲卮丕乇 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱丿賷賲賯乇丕胤賷丞 丕賱睾乇亘賷丞 賲毓 鬲氐賵賾乇丕鬲 乇賵爻賷丕 毓賳 "賲噩丕賱 賲氐丕賱丨賴丕"貙 賵丕賱兀孬賲丕賳 丕賱丿丕禺賱賷丞 賱鬲亘賳賾賷 爻賷丕爻丕鬲 鬲氐丕賱丨賷丞 - 鬲囟丕賮乇鬲 賱鬲丐賰賾丿 兀賳賾 賵囟毓 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賱賲 賷購丨賱賾. 賵賱賱賲賮丕乇賯丞貙 賰丕賳鬲 兀乇噩丨賷丞 兀賳 賷購丨賻賱賾 丕賱賵囟毓 丨賱賸丕 丨丕爻賲賸丕 賮賷 氐丕賱丨 丕賱睾乇亘 兀賵 賱賮丕卅丿丞 乇賵爻賷丕 賴賷 賲丕 噩毓賱 賰賱丕 丕賱胤乇賮賷賳 兀賰孬乇 鬲賯亘賾賱賸丕 賱賱賲噩丕夭賮丕鬲 賮賷 毓丕賲賻賷 2013 賵2014.
賲丕 賰丕賳 賱夭丕賲賸丕 兀賳 鬲賯毓 丕賱丨乇亘貙 賵賱賰賳 亘丨賱賵賱 毓丕賲 2014 賰丕賳 丕賱鬲賳丕賮爻 賵丕賱卮賰賾 賯丿 鬲乇爻賾禺丕 亘賯賵賾丞 賮賷 丕賱毓賱丕賯丕鬲 丕賱兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丞 - 丕賱乇賵爻賷丞 賵丕賱睾乇亘賷丞 - 丕賱乇賵爻賷丞 毓賱賶 丨丿賺賾 爻賵丕亍貙 賵兀賲爻賶 賴匕丕賳 丕賱賳夭丕毓丕賳 賲乇鬲亘胤賷賳 丕乇鬲亘丕胤賸丕 賵孬賷賯賸丕. 賵賰丕賳丕 賲鬲兀氐賾賱賻賷賳 賮賷 賲賳馗賵賲丞 賲丕 亘毓丿 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞貙 賵賱賮賴賲 丕賱爻亘亘 賱丕 亘丿賾 賱賳丕 賲賳 丕賱毓賵丿丞 廿賱賶 丕賱兀丨丿丕孬 丕賱氐丕毓賯丞 丕賱鬲賷 兀賳賴鬲 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞 賮賷 丕賱賮鬲乇丞 1991-1989.
賲賳 丕賱孬賵乇丞 廿賱賶 丕賱丨乇亘
丿丕禺賱 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賵毓賱賶 丕賱氐毓賷丿 丕賱丿賵賱賷貙 賵氐賱鬲 丕賱兀賲賵乇 丕賱鬲賷 鬲賮丕賯賲鬲 胤賵丕賱 爻賳賵丕鬲 廿賱賶 匕乇賵鬲賴丕. 賵丕丨鬲賲丕賱 賮賵夭 兀丨丿 丕賱噩丕賳亘賷賳 賮賷 丕賱賲毓乇賰丞 賮賵夭賸丕 丿丕卅賲賸丕 丿賮毓 賲賳 賰丕賳賵丕 賮賷 丕賱噩丕賳亘 丕賱丌禺乇 賲賳 丕賱賳夭丕毓 廿賱賶 乇賮毓 賲噩丕夭賮丕鬲賴賲. 賮丿丕禺賱 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕貙 賰丕賳鬲 丕賱賲爻丕毓賷 丕賱鬲賷 亘匕賱賴丕 賮賷賰鬲賵乇 賷丕賳賵賰賵賮賷鬲卮 賱鬲毓夭賷夭 爻賱胤鬲賴貙 賱鬲氐亘丨 爻賱胤丞 賲胤賱賯丞貙 賯丿 丿賮毓鬲 丕賱賲丨鬲噩賷賳 廿賱賶 賲丨丕賵賱丞 丨賲賱賴 毓賱賶 鬲睾賷賷乇 賲爻丕乇賴貙 孬賲 賲丨丕賵賱丞 廿賯氐丕卅賴 賲賳 丕賱爻賱胤丞. 亘賷賳 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賵乇賵爻賷丕 賵丕賱睾乇亘貙 亘丿鬲 丕丨鬲賲丕賱賷丞 兀賳 廿胤丕丨丞 賷丕賳賵賰賵賮賷鬲卮 爻鬲丐丿賷 廿賱賶 廿毓丕丿丞 鬲賵噩賷賴 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 亘氐賮丞 丿丕卅賲丞 賳丨賵 丕賱睾乇亘 賰丕賳 爻亘亘賸丕 賮賷 廿賯賳丕毓 亘賵鬲賷賳 亘兀賳賴 賱賲 賷毓丿 賱丿賷賴 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賱賷禺爻乇賴貙 亘賱 乇亘賲丕 孬賲丞 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賱賷賰爻亘賴貙 賮賷 丕賱丕爻鬲賷賱丕亍 毓賱賶 丕賱兀乇丕囟賷 丕賱鬲賷 胤丕賱賲丕 胤丕賱亘鬲 乇賵爻賷丕 亘賲賱賰賷鬲賴丕.
賵賰丕賳鬲 賮鬲乇丞 "賷賵乇賵 賲賷丿丕賳" 兀賵 "孬賵乇丞 丕賱賰乇丕賲丞"貙 賲賳 兀賵丕禺乇 鬲卮乇賷賳 丕賱孬丕賳賷/ 賳賵賮賲亘乇 2013 丨鬲賶 22 卮亘丕胤/ 賮亘乇丕賷乇 2014貙 賱賱賯乇丕乇丕鬲 丕賱氐睾賷乇丞 賮賷賴丕 丌孬丕乇 賰亘賷乇丞 賵睾賷乇 賲鬲賵賯毓丞 賮賷 賰孬賷乇 賲賳 丕賱兀丨賷丕賳. 賵兀丿賶 賯乇丕乇 兀賵賾賱賷 亘囟乇亘 丕賱賲鬲馗丕賴乇賷賳 賮賷 30 鬲卮乇賷賳 丕賱孬丕賳賷/ 賳賵賮賲亘乇 廿賱賶 鬲氐毓賷丿 賰亘賷乇 賮賷 丨乇賰丞 丕賱丕丨鬲噩丕噩. 賵兀丿賶 廿賯乇丕乇 "賯賵丕賳賷賳 丕賱丿賰鬲丕鬲賵乇賷丞" 賮賷 賲賳鬲氐賮 賰丕賳賵賳 丕賱孬丕賳賷/ 賷賳丕賷乇 廿賱賶 廿丨賷丕亍 丨乇賰丞 丕丨鬲噩丕噩 丌禺匕丞 賮賷 丕賱丕賳丨爻丕乇. 賵兀丿鬲 丕賱丕卮鬲亘丕賰丕鬲 亘賷賳 丕賱賲丨鬲噩賷賳 賵賯賵丕鬲 丕賱兀賲賳 賷賵賲賻賷 18 賵20 卮亘丕胤/ 賮亘乇丕賷乇 廿賱賶 丕賳賯爻丕賲 丕賱賲賵丕賱賷賳 賱賷丕賳賵賰賵賮賷鬲卮. 賵賰丕賳 賲賳 丕賱賲鬲賵賯毓 賱賯乇丕乇 丕賱賲丨鬲噩賷賳 亘乇賮囟 丕鬲賮丕賯貙 噩乇賶 丕賱鬲賮丕賵囟 毓賱賷賴 亘賷賳 丿亘賱賵賲丕爻賷賷賳 兀賵乇賵亘賷賷賳 賵乇賵爻貙 兀賳 賷丿賮毓 賷丕賳賵賰賵賮賷鬲卮 廿賱賶 賯賲毓 卮丿賷丿貙 賵賱賰賳 亘丿賱賸丕 賲賳 匕賱賰貙 丕賳賴丕乇 丕賱賳馗丕賲 賮賷 睾囟賵賳 爻丕毓丕鬲.
賵賮賷 丨賷賳 賰丕賳 賲賳 丕賱賲爻鬲丨賷賱 丕賱鬲賳亘丐 亘賲爻丕乇 丕賱丕丨鬲噩丕噩丕鬲貙 亘丿丕 鬲兀孬賷乇 丕賱賳鬲丕卅噩 賵丕囟丨賸丕: 賰丕賳鬲 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 毓賱賶 賵卮賰 丕賱鬲丨賵賱 賳丨賵 兀賵乇賵亘丕. 賵乇丿賻賾 亘賵鬲賷賳 亘睾夭賵 卮亘賴 噩夭賷乇丞 丕賱賯乇賲 賵囟賲賾賴丕 賵亘廿孬丕乇丞 鬲賲乇丿 賮賷 卮乇賯 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕. 賵賷亘丿賵 兀賳 丕賱亘丿賷賱 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 廿賱賶 亘賵鬲賷賳 賰丕賳 賯亘賵賱 禺爻丕乇丞 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕. 賵賲賳 丕賱賵丕囟丨 兀賳賴 賰丕賳 禺賷丕乇賸丕 賲鬲丕丨賸丕貨 廿匕 廿賳 乇賵爻賷丕 鬲毓賴丿鬲 亘丕賱鬲夭丕賲丕鬲 賮賷 賲毓丕賴丿丕鬲 賮賷 賴匕丕 丕賱氐丿丿. 賵賱賰賳 亘賵鬲賷賳 丕禺鬲丕乇 丕睾鬲賳丕賲 丕賱賮乇氐丞 丕賱賮乇賷丿丞 丕賱鬲賷 賯丿賾賲鬲 賳賮爻賴丕 賱賱丕爻鬲賷賱丕亍 毓賱賶 卮亘賴 噩夭賷乇丞 丕賱賯乇賲 賵丕賱賲乇丕賴賳丞 賱賱丨氐賵賱 毓賱賶 噩夭亍 兀賰亘乇 亘賰孬賷乇 賲賳 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕. 賵賱丕 賳毓乇賮 廿匕丕 賲丕 賰丕賳 賷兀賲賱貙 賲賳 禺賱丕賱 丿毓賲 丕賱丕賳賮氐丕賱賷賷賳 賮賷 卮乇賯 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕貙 鬲賰乇丕乇 爻賷賳丕乇賷賵 卮亘賴 噩夭賷乇丞 丕賱賯乇賲貙 兀賵 賰丕賳 賷賳賵賷 禺賱賯 丨丕賱丞 毓丿賲 丕賱丕爻鬲賯乇丕乇 丕賱賲爻鬲賲乇丞 丕賱鬲賷 賳鬲噩鬲 賲賳 匕賱賰.
丕賱賳夭丕毓 丕賱噩丿賷丿 賮賷 兀賵乇賵亘丕
兀賷賳 賷鬲乇賰 賴匕丕 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕責 禺賵囟 丨乇亘 賱丕 賷賲賰賳賴丕 丕賱賮賵夭 亘賴丕 賵賱丕 賷賲賰賳賴丕 廿賳賴丕丐賴丕. 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 毓丕噩夭丞 毓賳 丕爻鬲毓丕丿丞 卮亘賴 噩夭賷乇丞 丕賱賯乇賲 兀賵 丿賵賳亘丕爻 丕賱賲丨鬲賱丞貙 賵毓丕噩夭丞 兀賷囟賸丕 毓賳 丕賱鬲禺賱賷 毓賳賴賲丕. 丕賱丕丨鬲賲丕賱 賴賵 兀賳賴丕 爻鬲鬲毓丕賲賱 賲毓 賴匕丕 丕賱賳夭丕毓 爻賳賵丕鬲 胤賵賷賱丞貨 賮賯丿 毓夭賾夭 丕賱賴噩賵賲 丕賱乇賵爻賷 賵囟毓 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 亘賵氐賮賴丕 賲丨賵乇賸丕 賱賱賳夭丕毓 亘賷賳 乇賵爻賷丕 賵丕賱睾乇亘貙 賵亘匕丕 丕乇鬲賮毓鬲 賮乇氐丞 丕賱鬲毓丕賵賳 賲毓 丕賱睾乇亘 丕乇鬲賮丕毓賸丕 丿乇丕賲丕鬲賷賰賷賸丕 賲賳 噩丿賷丿 亘毓丿 毓丕賲 2015 .
賰丕賳 丿禺賵賱 丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丕賱卮乇丕賰丞 賲毓 丕賱丕鬲丨丕丿 丕賱兀賵乇賵亘賷 丨賷夭 丕賱賳賮丕匕 賮賷 毓丕賲 2017 鬲噩爻賷丿賸丕 賱鬲賱賰 丕賱賮乇氐丞. 賵賰賲丕 賴賷 丕賱丨丕賱 丿丕卅賲賸丕貙 賰丕賳 丕賱爻丐丕賱 丕賱賲胤乇賵丨 廿匕丕 賲丕 賰丕賳 賮賷 賵爻毓 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 兀賳 鬲睾鬲賳賲 賴匕賴 丕賱賮乇氐丞貙 賵賰賲丕 賴賷 丕賱丨丕賱 丿丕卅賲賸丕貙 賷亘丿賵 兀賳 丕賱廿噩丕亘丞 賴賷 賱丕. 賵賷亘丿賵 兀賳 乇賵爻賷丕 鬲乇丕賴賳 毓賱賶 兀賳 兀賵...
賷爻鬲賰卮賮 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱丿賷賳丕賲賷丕鬲 丿丕禺賱 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕貙 賵亘賷賳 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賵乇賵爻賷丕貙 賵亘賷賳 乇賵爻賷丕 賵丕賱睾乇亘貙 賵丕賱鬲賷 馗賴乇鬲 賲毓 丕賳賴賷丕乇 丕賱丕鬲丨丕丿 丕賱爻賵賮賷丕鬲賷 賵兀丿賾鬲 賮賷 丕賱賳賴丕賷丞 廿賱賶 丕賱丨乇亘 賮賷 毓丕賲 2014. 賵丕爻鬲賳丕丿賸丕 廿賱賶 丕賱鬲爻賱爻賱 丕賱夭賲賳賷貙 賷賵囟丨 兀賳 丕賳賮氐丕賱 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 毓賳 乇賵爻賷丕 賮賷 毓丕賲 1991貙 丕賱匕賷 賰丕賳 賷爻賲賶 賮賷 匕賱賰 丕賱賵賯鬲 "丕賱胤賱丕賯 丕賱丨囟丕乇賷"貙 賯丿 兀丿賾賶 廿賱賶 賲丕 賷爻賲賷賴 賰孬賷乇賵賳 丕賱丌賳 "丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞 丕賱噩丿賷丿丞". 賮賷噩丕丿賱 亘兀賳 丕賱氐乇丕毓 賯丿 鬲賮丕賯賲 亘爻亘亘 毓賵丕賲賱 兀爻丕爻賷丞 孬賱丕孬丞: 丕賱賲毓囟賱丞 丕賱兀賲賳賷丞貙 賵鬲兀孬賷乇 丕賱鬲丨賵賱 丕賱丿賷賲賯乇丕胤賷 賮賷 丕賱噩睾乇丕賮賷丕 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞貙 賵丕賱兀賴丿丕賮 睾賷乇 丕賱賲鬲賵丕賮賯丞 賱兀賵乇賵亘丕 賲丕 亘毓丿 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞. 賵亘賲賵丕夭丕丞 賵囟毓 爻賱賲賷 噩乇賶 鬲亘丿賷丿賴貙 賰丕賳鬲 丕賱禺賱丕賮丕鬲 丕賱丨丕囟乇丞 爻賱賮賸丕 賵丕賱毓賲賷賯丞 丕賱噩匕賵乇 鬲爻鬲毓氐賷 毓賱賶 丕賱丨賱貙 賵鬲爻賴賲 賮賷 廿胤丕賱丞 兀賲丿 丕賱兀夭賲丞. 賵賷購馗賴賽乇 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 兀賷囟賸丕 鬲賳丕爻亘 賴匕賴 丕賱丨乇亘 賲毓 丕賱兀賳賲丕胤 丕賱兀賵爻毓 賱賱氐乇丕毓 丕賱丿賵賱賷 丕賱賲毓丕氐乇貙 賵賲賳 孬賲 賷賳亘睾賷 兀賳 賷噩匕亘 丕賱亘丕丨孬賷賳 賮賷 丕賱氐乇丕毓 丕賱乇賵爻賷 - 丕賱兀賵賰乇丕賳賷貙 賵毓賱丕賯丕鬲 乇賵爻賷丕 賲毓 丕賱睾乇亘貙 賵丕賱噩睾乇丕賮賷丕 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 毓賲賵賲賸丕.
賲賳丕亘毓 丕賱賳夭丕毓 毓賱賶 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕
賷卮丿賾丿 賴匕丕 丕賱鬲賵氐賷賮 毓賱賶 兀賳賾 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱鬲賷 亘丿兀鬲 賮賷 毓丕賲 2014 賰丕賳鬲 賳鬲丕噩 賯賵賶 丕賱賲丿賶 丕賱亘毓賷丿 賮賷 亘賷卅丞 賲丕 亘毓丿 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞貙 賵賯乇丕乇丕鬲 丕賱賲丿賶 丕賱賯氐賷乇 丕賱鬲賷 丕鬲賾禺匕賴丕 丕賱夭毓賲丕亍 丕賱兀賵賰乇丕賳賷賵賳 賵丕賱乇賵爻 賵丕賱睾乇亘賷賵賳 賮賷 毓丕賲賻賷 2013 賵2014貙 毓賱賶 丨丿賾 爻賵丕亍. 賮賯丿 丕乇鬲賮毓鬲 丕丨鬲賲丕賱丕鬲 丕賳丿賱丕毓 賳夭丕毓 毓賳賷賮 亘賷賳 乇賵爻賷丕 賵兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 丕乇鬲賮丕毓賸丕 鬲丿乇噩賷賸丕 亘賷賳 毓丕賲賷 1989 賵2014貙 賵賲賳 丕賱囟乇賵乇賷 丕賯鬲賮丕亍 賴匕賴 丕賱爻賷乇賵乇丞 賱賮賴賲 賰賷賮 亘丕鬲 賲賲賰賳賸丕貙 賮賷 毓丕賲 2014貙 兀賳 鬲賯乇乇 乇賵爻賷丕 兀賳賾 睾夭賵 噩賷乇丕賳賴丕 賰丕賳 爻賷丕爻鬲賴丕 丕賱賮囟賱賶.
賰丕賳鬲 丕賱亘賷卅丞 丕賱鬲賷 賳卮兀鬲 賮賷 兀毓賯丕亘 丕賳賴賷丕乇 丕賱丕鬲丨丕丿 丕賱爻賵賮賷丕鬲賷 兀賯賱賾 丨丿丞 亘賰孬賷乇 賲賳 亘賷卅丞 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞貨 賮賯丿 亘丕鬲 爻賴賱賸丕 丕賱丕毓鬲賯丕丿 亘兀賳賾 丕賱賳夭丕毓丕鬲 丕賱鬲賷 鬲亘賯賾鬲貙 賲孬賱 賵囟毓 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕貙 爻鬲丨賱賾 賳賮爻賴丕 賲毓 賲乇賵乇 丕賱夭賲賳. 睾賷乇 兀賳賾 毓賵丕賲賱 乇卅賷爻丞 孬賱丕孬丞 鈥� 毓丿賲 賯丕亘賱賷丞 鬲爻賵賷丞 鬲氐賵賾乇丕鬲 丕賱兀胤乇丕賮 丕賱賮丕毓賱丞 丕賱毓丿賷丿丞 廿夭丕亍 丕賱賵囟毓 丕賱賯丕卅賲 賵丕賱丨丕噩丕鬲 丕賱兀賲賳賷丞 丕賱賳丕鬲噩丞貙 賵鬲毓丕乇囟 丕賳鬲卮丕乇 丕賱賲丐爻爻丕鬲 丕賱丿賷賲賯乇丕胤賷丞 丕賱睾乇亘賷丞 賲毓 鬲氐賵賾乇丕鬲 乇賵爻賷丕 毓賳 "賲噩丕賱 賲氐丕賱丨賴丕"貙 賵丕賱兀孬賲丕賳 丕賱丿丕禺賱賷丞 賱鬲亘賳賾賷 爻賷丕爻丕鬲 鬲氐丕賱丨賷丞 - 鬲囟丕賮乇鬲 賱鬲丐賰賾丿 兀賳賾 賵囟毓 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賱賲 賷購丨賱賾. 賵賱賱賲賮丕乇賯丞貙 賰丕賳鬲 兀乇噩丨賷丞 兀賳 賷購丨賻賱賾 丕賱賵囟毓 丨賱賸丕 丨丕爻賲賸丕 賮賷 氐丕賱丨 丕賱睾乇亘 兀賵 賱賮丕卅丿丞 乇賵爻賷丕 賴賷 賲丕 噩毓賱 賰賱丕 丕賱胤乇賮賷賳 兀賰孬乇 鬲賯亘賾賱賸丕 賱賱賲噩丕夭賮丕鬲 賮賷 毓丕賲賻賷 2013 賵2014.
賲丕 賰丕賳 賱夭丕賲賸丕 兀賳 鬲賯毓 丕賱丨乇亘貙 賵賱賰賳 亘丨賱賵賱 毓丕賲 2014 賰丕賳 丕賱鬲賳丕賮爻 賵丕賱卮賰賾 賯丿 鬲乇爻賾禺丕 亘賯賵賾丞 賮賷 丕賱毓賱丕賯丕鬲 丕賱兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丞 - 丕賱乇賵爻賷丞 賵丕賱睾乇亘賷丞 - 丕賱乇賵爻賷丞 毓賱賶 丨丿賺賾 爻賵丕亍貙 賵兀賲爻賶 賴匕丕賳 丕賱賳夭丕毓丕賳 賲乇鬲亘胤賷賳 丕乇鬲亘丕胤賸丕 賵孬賷賯賸丕. 賵賰丕賳丕 賲鬲兀氐賾賱賻賷賳 賮賷 賲賳馗賵賲丞 賲丕 亘毓丿 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞貙 賵賱賮賴賲 丕賱爻亘亘 賱丕 亘丿賾 賱賳丕 賲賳 丕賱毓賵丿丞 廿賱賶 丕賱兀丨丿丕孬 丕賱氐丕毓賯丞 丕賱鬲賷 兀賳賴鬲 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱亘丕乇丿丞 賮賷 丕賱賮鬲乇丞 1991-1989.
賲賳 丕賱孬賵乇丞 廿賱賶 丕賱丨乇亘
丿丕禺賱 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賵毓賱賶 丕賱氐毓賷丿 丕賱丿賵賱賷貙 賵氐賱鬲 丕賱兀賲賵乇 丕賱鬲賷 鬲賮丕賯賲鬲 胤賵丕賱 爻賳賵丕鬲 廿賱賶 匕乇賵鬲賴丕. 賵丕丨鬲賲丕賱 賮賵夭 兀丨丿 丕賱噩丕賳亘賷賳 賮賷 丕賱賲毓乇賰丞 賮賵夭賸丕 丿丕卅賲賸丕 丿賮毓 賲賳 賰丕賳賵丕 賮賷 丕賱噩丕賳亘 丕賱丌禺乇 賲賳 丕賱賳夭丕毓 廿賱賶 乇賮毓 賲噩丕夭賮丕鬲賴賲. 賮丿丕禺賱 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕貙 賰丕賳鬲 丕賱賲爻丕毓賷 丕賱鬲賷 亘匕賱賴丕 賮賷賰鬲賵乇 賷丕賳賵賰賵賮賷鬲卮 賱鬲毓夭賷夭 爻賱胤鬲賴貙 賱鬲氐亘丨 爻賱胤丞 賲胤賱賯丞貙 賯丿 丿賮毓鬲 丕賱賲丨鬲噩賷賳 廿賱賶 賲丨丕賵賱丞 丨賲賱賴 毓賱賶 鬲睾賷賷乇 賲爻丕乇賴貙 孬賲 賲丨丕賵賱丞 廿賯氐丕卅賴 賲賳 丕賱爻賱胤丞. 亘賷賳 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 賵乇賵爻賷丕 賵丕賱睾乇亘貙 亘丿鬲 丕丨鬲賲丕賱賷丞 兀賳 廿胤丕丨丞 賷丕賳賵賰賵賮賷鬲卮 爻鬲丐丿賷 廿賱賶 廿毓丕丿丞 鬲賵噩賷賴 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 亘氐賮丞 丿丕卅賲丞 賳丨賵 丕賱睾乇亘 賰丕賳 爻亘亘賸丕 賮賷 廿賯賳丕毓 亘賵鬲賷賳 亘兀賳賴 賱賲 賷毓丿 賱丿賷賴 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賱賷禺爻乇賴貙 亘賱 乇亘賲丕 孬賲丞 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賱賷賰爻亘賴貙 賮賷 丕賱丕爻鬲賷賱丕亍 毓賱賶 丕賱兀乇丕囟賷 丕賱鬲賷 胤丕賱賲丕 胤丕賱亘鬲 乇賵爻賷丕 亘賲賱賰賷鬲賴丕.
賵賰丕賳鬲 賮鬲乇丞 "賷賵乇賵 賲賷丿丕賳" 兀賵 "孬賵乇丞 丕賱賰乇丕賲丞"貙 賲賳 兀賵丕禺乇 鬲卮乇賷賳 丕賱孬丕賳賷/ 賳賵賮賲亘乇 2013 丨鬲賶 22 卮亘丕胤/ 賮亘乇丕賷乇 2014貙 賱賱賯乇丕乇丕鬲 丕賱氐睾賷乇丞 賮賷賴丕 丌孬丕乇 賰亘賷乇丞 賵睾賷乇 賲鬲賵賯毓丞 賮賷 賰孬賷乇 賲賳 丕賱兀丨賷丕賳. 賵兀丿賶 賯乇丕乇 兀賵賾賱賷 亘囟乇亘 丕賱賲鬲馗丕賴乇賷賳 賮賷 30 鬲卮乇賷賳 丕賱孬丕賳賷/ 賳賵賮賲亘乇 廿賱賶 鬲氐毓賷丿 賰亘賷乇 賮賷 丨乇賰丞 丕賱丕丨鬲噩丕噩. 賵兀丿賶 廿賯乇丕乇 "賯賵丕賳賷賳 丕賱丿賰鬲丕鬲賵乇賷丞" 賮賷 賲賳鬲氐賮 賰丕賳賵賳 丕賱孬丕賳賷/ 賷賳丕賷乇 廿賱賶 廿丨賷丕亍 丨乇賰丞 丕丨鬲噩丕噩 丌禺匕丞 賮賷 丕賱丕賳丨爻丕乇. 賵兀丿鬲 丕賱丕卮鬲亘丕賰丕鬲 亘賷賳 丕賱賲丨鬲噩賷賳 賵賯賵丕鬲 丕賱兀賲賳 賷賵賲賻賷 18 賵20 卮亘丕胤/ 賮亘乇丕賷乇 廿賱賶 丕賳賯爻丕賲 丕賱賲賵丕賱賷賳 賱賷丕賳賵賰賵賮賷鬲卮. 賵賰丕賳 賲賳 丕賱賲鬲賵賯毓 賱賯乇丕乇 丕賱賲丨鬲噩賷賳 亘乇賮囟 丕鬲賮丕賯貙 噩乇賶 丕賱鬲賮丕賵囟 毓賱賷賴 亘賷賳 丿亘賱賵賲丕爻賷賷賳 兀賵乇賵亘賷賷賳 賵乇賵爻貙 兀賳 賷丿賮毓 賷丕賳賵賰賵賮賷鬲卮 廿賱賶 賯賲毓 卮丿賷丿貙 賵賱賰賳 亘丿賱賸丕 賲賳 匕賱賰貙 丕賳賴丕乇 丕賱賳馗丕賲 賮賷 睾囟賵賳 爻丕毓丕鬲.
賵賮賷 丨賷賳 賰丕賳 賲賳 丕賱賲爻鬲丨賷賱 丕賱鬲賳亘丐 亘賲爻丕乇 丕賱丕丨鬲噩丕噩丕鬲貙 亘丿丕 鬲兀孬賷乇 丕賱賳鬲丕卅噩 賵丕囟丨賸丕: 賰丕賳鬲 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 毓賱賶 賵卮賰 丕賱鬲丨賵賱 賳丨賵 兀賵乇賵亘丕. 賵乇丿賻賾 亘賵鬲賷賳 亘睾夭賵 卮亘賴 噩夭賷乇丞 丕賱賯乇賲 賵囟賲賾賴丕 賵亘廿孬丕乇丞 鬲賲乇丿 賮賷 卮乇賯 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕. 賵賷亘丿賵 兀賳 丕賱亘丿賷賱 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 廿賱賶 亘賵鬲賷賳 賰丕賳 賯亘賵賱 禺爻丕乇丞 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕. 賵賲賳 丕賱賵丕囟丨 兀賳賴 賰丕賳 禺賷丕乇賸丕 賲鬲丕丨賸丕貨 廿匕 廿賳 乇賵爻賷丕 鬲毓賴丿鬲 亘丕賱鬲夭丕賲丕鬲 賮賷 賲毓丕賴丿丕鬲 賮賷 賴匕丕 丕賱氐丿丿. 賵賱賰賳 亘賵鬲賷賳 丕禺鬲丕乇 丕睾鬲賳丕賲 丕賱賮乇氐丞 丕賱賮乇賷丿丞 丕賱鬲賷 賯丿賾賲鬲 賳賮爻賴丕 賱賱丕爻鬲賷賱丕亍 毓賱賶 卮亘賴 噩夭賷乇丞 丕賱賯乇賲 賵丕賱賲乇丕賴賳丞 賱賱丨氐賵賱 毓賱賶 噩夭亍 兀賰亘乇 亘賰孬賷乇 賲賳 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕. 賵賱丕 賳毓乇賮 廿匕丕 賲丕 賰丕賳 賷兀賲賱貙 賲賳 禺賱丕賱 丿毓賲 丕賱丕賳賮氐丕賱賷賷賳 賮賷 卮乇賯 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕貙 鬲賰乇丕乇 爻賷賳丕乇賷賵 卮亘賴 噩夭賷乇丞 丕賱賯乇賲貙 兀賵 賰丕賳 賷賳賵賷 禺賱賯 丨丕賱丞 毓丿賲 丕賱丕爻鬲賯乇丕乇 丕賱賲爻鬲賲乇丞 丕賱鬲賷 賳鬲噩鬲 賲賳 匕賱賰.
丕賱賳夭丕毓 丕賱噩丿賷丿 賮賷 兀賵乇賵亘丕
兀賷賳 賷鬲乇賰 賴匕丕 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕責 禺賵囟 丨乇亘 賱丕 賷賲賰賳賴丕 丕賱賮賵夭 亘賴丕 賵賱丕 賷賲賰賳賴丕 廿賳賴丕丐賴丕. 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 毓丕噩夭丞 毓賳 丕爻鬲毓丕丿丞 卮亘賴 噩夭賷乇丞 丕賱賯乇賲 兀賵 丿賵賳亘丕爻 丕賱賲丨鬲賱丞貙 賵毓丕噩夭丞 兀賷囟賸丕 毓賳 丕賱鬲禺賱賷 毓賳賴賲丕. 丕賱丕丨鬲賲丕賱 賴賵 兀賳賴丕 爻鬲鬲毓丕賲賱 賲毓 賴匕丕 丕賱賳夭丕毓 爻賳賵丕鬲 胤賵賷賱丞貨 賮賯丿 毓夭賾夭 丕賱賴噩賵賲 丕賱乇賵爻賷 賵囟毓 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 亘賵氐賮賴丕 賲丨賵乇賸丕 賱賱賳夭丕毓 亘賷賳 乇賵爻賷丕 賵丕賱睾乇亘貙 賵亘匕丕 丕乇鬲賮毓鬲 賮乇氐丞 丕賱鬲毓丕賵賳 賲毓 丕賱睾乇亘 丕乇鬲賮丕毓賸丕 丿乇丕賲丕鬲賷賰賷賸丕 賲賳 噩丿賷丿 亘毓丿 毓丕賲 2015 .
賰丕賳 丿禺賵賱 丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丕賱卮乇丕賰丞 賲毓 丕賱丕鬲丨丕丿 丕賱兀賵乇賵亘賷 丨賷夭 丕賱賳賮丕匕 賮賷 毓丕賲 2017 鬲噩爻賷丿賸丕 賱鬲賱賰 丕賱賮乇氐丞. 賵賰賲丕 賴賷 丕賱丨丕賱 丿丕卅賲賸丕貙 賰丕賳 丕賱爻丐丕賱 丕賱賲胤乇賵丨 廿匕丕 賲丕 賰丕賳 賮賷 賵爻毓 兀賵賰乇丕賳賷丕 兀賳 鬲睾鬲賳賲 賴匕賴 丕賱賮乇氐丞貙 賵賰賲丕 賴賷 丕賱丨丕賱 丿丕卅賲賸丕貙 賷亘丿賵 兀賳 丕賱廿噩丕亘丞 賴賷 賱丕. 賵賷亘丿賵 兀賳 乇賵爻賷丕 鬲乇丕賴賳 毓賱賶 兀賳 兀賵...
432 pages, Paperback
First published October 31, 2019
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About the author
Paul D'Anieri
27听books10听followersPaul D鈥橝nieri is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of California, Riverside.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 34 reviews
April 14, 2023
Ever since the Russia invaded into Ukrainian territory, I have read many articles, blog posts, opinion pieces and YouTube videos analysing the motives behind it. Most of them are obviously biased, more interested in assigning blame on any one party among the three that are involved and not particularly bothered about objectivity. I scanned several books written on the subject, to find at least a partially objective one that can help me understand the conflict.
I found such a book when I came up on Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce To Uncivil War by Paul D'anieri,听 a political scientist who is an expert on Ukraine and Russia. The uncivil war referred in the title is not the present conflict. It is the one in 2014 in which Russia annexed Crimea after a protest in Ukraine that ousted its government, which Russia backed. In that sense, the book is incomplete by a very small degree for my purpose, but it can be still crucial in comprehending the current episode.
February 24, 2022
Update: Lord, have mercy.
At this moment, a Russian invasion of Ukraine seems virtually inevitable. Though Russia claims no intent of 鈥渁ggressive鈥� action toward Ukraine, it is steadily amassing troops at the border and making a number of demands from NATO that the latter is unwilling to countenance and the former is unwilling to abandon. Russia demands that the United States provide a legally-binding guarantee that Ukraine will never be permitted to join NATO, and that it limit military exercises in eastern NATO member states like Poland, Estonia, and Latvia. Russia will not tolerate the permanent incorporation of Ukraine鈥攐ne of the three core Slavic states, alongside Belarus and Russia itself, that formed the Soviet Union in 1922鈥攊nto the NATO/EU alliance structure, while the West will not allow the membership negotiations of that structure to be 鈥渧etoed鈥� by an external power.
Russia has long viewed the subjection of Ukraine to its own sphere of influence to be nearly as vital a national security interest as if Ukraine were Russian territory; which, of course, it was from the eighteenth century until 1991, though less formally so during the Soviet era. Conversely, even the most Russophilic Ukrainian politicians have been consistently adamant in their assertions of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity; and according to survey data, a majority of the population supports greater cooperation with the EU, even after鈥攐r perhaps especially after鈥攖he Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 and its continued support for separatists in the Donbas.
With no obvious resolution in sight and the perception of high stakes by all sides, Europe appears to be on the brink of its largest and deadliest war since 1945, with dire implications for Ukraine, Europe, NATO, and the East-West divide. What specific goals Putin would aim to achieve with an invasion is the mystery of the hour, as Russia faced an unexpected degree of resistance in eastern Ukraine during its 2014 incursion and would only face more if it pushed further westward and attempted a prolonged occupation of a wide swath of a country of some 40 million people. Putin may want to further inflame eastern separatism, continuing a strategy of carving out pro-Russian exclaves in former Soviet countries which it employed in Moldova in 1992 and Georgia in 2008; or he may want a formal partition of Ukraine, which would necessitate a larger-scale invasion. Any more ambitious effort to seize all of Ukraine is unlikely to succeed but cannot be ruled out given the desperation felt in Russia at the likely prospect of an historically-crucial strategic asset swinging out of its orbit.
Paul D鈥橝nieri provides a satisfactory primer on the historical roots of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, as well as on the issues at stake both within Ukraine and internationally, that will be helpful for a general readership seeking to better understand ongoing events. What he does not provide, however, is consolation. This account emphasizes the fact that the seeds of the present crisis鈥攊ncompatible perceptions between the West and Russia regarding the post-cold war European security structure, and consequent disagreements about which side was violating the new status quo; the tug-of-war between Russia and Ukraine over the status of Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea fleet; Russia鈥檚 desire to retain its influence over Eastern Europe; and the Western assumption of a united and democratic European future鈥攚ere all present in nascent form even before the USSR was formally dissolved; and over the past thirty years they have all converged into a Gordian knot that has gradually tightened around Ukraine.
In 1989, as the Cold War was thawing and Germany was reunifying, George H.W. Bush spoke of a 鈥淓urope whole and free,鈥� comprised of a constellation of liberal-democratic nation-states integrated within a continental economic union, while Mikhail Gorbachev described 鈥淓urope as a common home,鈥� wherein Russia would retain its great power status as the leader of a reformed (but not eliminated) Eastern Bloc. Twenty-five years later, these mutually incompatible visions would both be considered as axiomatic as ever by their respective advocates, and their inevitable collision would cut through Ukraine like a buzzsaw.
The European Union would see itself as a voluntary partnership of independent states that could incorporate new members based on the consent of their people, while Russia would view it from the outside as a monolithic power bloc that sponsored color revolutions within the former Warsaw Pact with the cynical aim of advancing the frontiers of the new European Empire鈥攖he successor of Hitler and Napoleon鈥攁nd seeking ultimately to overthrow the government of Russia itself. Russia would attempt to deter NATO and EU expansion by its opposition to the NATO campaign against Serbia in the 1990s and its 2008 war with Georgia, but rather than affirming Russia鈥檚 veto power over European affairs, as it hoped, this would only increase the urgency with which Eastern Europe sought integration into the Western system, further alienating Russia. Add to this lethal brew the inevitable conflation of domestic political systems and geopolitical alignments, and the mere exercise of popular sovereignty in Ukraine, either in the form of elections or mass uprisings, would become an acute source of international conflict.
Thus it is easy to see how the Gordian knot is being pulled ever tighter, but lamentably difficult to imagine how it might be undone鈥攅xcept by the sword.
At this moment, a Russian invasion of Ukraine seems virtually inevitable. Though Russia claims no intent of 鈥渁ggressive鈥� action toward Ukraine, it is steadily amassing troops at the border and making a number of demands from NATO that the latter is unwilling to countenance and the former is unwilling to abandon. Russia demands that the United States provide a legally-binding guarantee that Ukraine will never be permitted to join NATO, and that it limit military exercises in eastern NATO member states like Poland, Estonia, and Latvia. Russia will not tolerate the permanent incorporation of Ukraine鈥攐ne of the three core Slavic states, alongside Belarus and Russia itself, that formed the Soviet Union in 1922鈥攊nto the NATO/EU alliance structure, while the West will not allow the membership negotiations of that structure to be 鈥渧etoed鈥� by an external power.
Russia has long viewed the subjection of Ukraine to its own sphere of influence to be nearly as vital a national security interest as if Ukraine were Russian territory; which, of course, it was from the eighteenth century until 1991, though less formally so during the Soviet era. Conversely, even the most Russophilic Ukrainian politicians have been consistently adamant in their assertions of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity; and according to survey data, a majority of the population supports greater cooperation with the EU, even after鈥攐r perhaps especially after鈥攖he Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014 and its continued support for separatists in the Donbas.
With no obvious resolution in sight and the perception of high stakes by all sides, Europe appears to be on the brink of its largest and deadliest war since 1945, with dire implications for Ukraine, Europe, NATO, and the East-West divide. What specific goals Putin would aim to achieve with an invasion is the mystery of the hour, as Russia faced an unexpected degree of resistance in eastern Ukraine during its 2014 incursion and would only face more if it pushed further westward and attempted a prolonged occupation of a wide swath of a country of some 40 million people. Putin may want to further inflame eastern separatism, continuing a strategy of carving out pro-Russian exclaves in former Soviet countries which it employed in Moldova in 1992 and Georgia in 2008; or he may want a formal partition of Ukraine, which would necessitate a larger-scale invasion. Any more ambitious effort to seize all of Ukraine is unlikely to succeed but cannot be ruled out given the desperation felt in Russia at the likely prospect of an historically-crucial strategic asset swinging out of its orbit.
Paul D鈥橝nieri provides a satisfactory primer on the historical roots of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, as well as on the issues at stake both within Ukraine and internationally, that will be helpful for a general readership seeking to better understand ongoing events. What he does not provide, however, is consolation. This account emphasizes the fact that the seeds of the present crisis鈥攊ncompatible perceptions between the West and Russia regarding the post-cold war European security structure, and consequent disagreements about which side was violating the new status quo; the tug-of-war between Russia and Ukraine over the status of Crimea, Sevastopol, and the Black Sea fleet; Russia鈥檚 desire to retain its influence over Eastern Europe; and the Western assumption of a united and democratic European future鈥攚ere all present in nascent form even before the USSR was formally dissolved; and over the past thirty years they have all converged into a Gordian knot that has gradually tightened around Ukraine.
In 1989, as the Cold War was thawing and Germany was reunifying, George H.W. Bush spoke of a 鈥淓urope whole and free,鈥� comprised of a constellation of liberal-democratic nation-states integrated within a continental economic union, while Mikhail Gorbachev described 鈥淓urope as a common home,鈥� wherein Russia would retain its great power status as the leader of a reformed (but not eliminated) Eastern Bloc. Twenty-five years later, these mutually incompatible visions would both be considered as axiomatic as ever by their respective advocates, and their inevitable collision would cut through Ukraine like a buzzsaw.
The European Union would see itself as a voluntary partnership of independent states that could incorporate new members based on the consent of their people, while Russia would view it from the outside as a monolithic power bloc that sponsored color revolutions within the former Warsaw Pact with the cynical aim of advancing the frontiers of the new European Empire鈥攖he successor of Hitler and Napoleon鈥攁nd seeking ultimately to overthrow the government of Russia itself. Russia would attempt to deter NATO and EU expansion by its opposition to the NATO campaign against Serbia in the 1990s and its 2008 war with Georgia, but rather than affirming Russia鈥檚 veto power over European affairs, as it hoped, this would only increase the urgency with which Eastern Europe sought integration into the Western system, further alienating Russia. Add to this lethal brew the inevitable conflation of domestic political systems and geopolitical alignments, and the mere exercise of popular sovereignty in Ukraine, either in the form of elections or mass uprisings, would become an acute source of international conflict.
Thus it is easy to see how the Gordian knot is being pulled ever tighter, but lamentably difficult to imagine how it might be undone鈥攅xcept by the sword.
March 28, 2022
Review to follow
May 1, 2022
I am not a historian but I found this to be an extremely comprehensive, clear, and balanced explanation of how the events between the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990 and the seizure of Crimea ensuing war in southeast Ukraine in 2014 resulted from a long series of security issues and very different assessments by various parties of what the status quo was and what their actions meant. I recommend it very highly as background to the current situation.
Nothing can excuse the invasion of Ukraine in any way. The question is, why did Putin choose to do so? Do his 'justifications' have any basis in fact? D'Anieri (a professor at the University of California, Riverside) repeatedly circles among the major players over the course of 25 years to examine their economic and political choices in the context of their individual perceptions, situations, and values. His underlying premise is that Russia, Ukrained, Western Europe and the United States had very constrained options at any given point in time.
The themes that repeatedly come up are that the West pursued its support for democratic forces in independent states and extension of NATO without a realpolitik realization that Russia would find this threatening as it moved eastward. Similarly, Russia insisted on retaining its full Great Power status, with veto power of European decisions about issues such as NATO and EU membership, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in fact retains a 19th century Grand Alliance view of its security and rights. Of course it also views Ukraine as the historical basis of the Rus nation and cannot accept its independence. For both reasons it expected to retain Ukraine in its sphere of influence, and to eventually reintegrate it. Ukraine, for its part, played both sides off against the other in an attempt to get economic benefits without fully committing to east or west, or to making the reforms that would have allowed it to be fully accepted by the West or to free itself from the power of its own oligarchs. The oligarchs gained especially by cheap energy from Russia (as middle-men, buying cheap and selling high to consumers), and thus resisted adopting the anti-corruption measures demanded by the West.
Finally, Ukraine faces a regionally diverse political situation, with the south and east oriented toward Russia, and its north and west looking to the West. This limited the ability to forge consistent and integrated political and economic policies. Thus the drama of the Orange Revolution in 2004, various corrup elections and convictions, Yukochenko's conversion of a reasonably democratic government into an autocracy, and the 2013/14 Maiden occupation.
I've written a highly simplified version of a detailed and much more extensive review of the period in this book. It is somewhat academic, but does not presume any prior knowledge of the situation. Absolutely worth your while.
Nothing can excuse the invasion of Ukraine in any way. The question is, why did Putin choose to do so? Do his 'justifications' have any basis in fact? D'Anieri (a professor at the University of California, Riverside) repeatedly circles among the major players over the course of 25 years to examine their economic and political choices in the context of their individual perceptions, situations, and values. His underlying premise is that Russia, Ukrained, Western Europe and the United States had very constrained options at any given point in time.
The themes that repeatedly come up are that the West pursued its support for democratic forces in independent states and extension of NATO without a realpolitik realization that Russia would find this threatening as it moved eastward. Similarly, Russia insisted on retaining its full Great Power status, with veto power of European decisions about issues such as NATO and EU membership, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in fact retains a 19th century Grand Alliance view of its security and rights. Of course it also views Ukraine as the historical basis of the Rus nation and cannot accept its independence. For both reasons it expected to retain Ukraine in its sphere of influence, and to eventually reintegrate it. Ukraine, for its part, played both sides off against the other in an attempt to get economic benefits without fully committing to east or west, or to making the reforms that would have allowed it to be fully accepted by the West or to free itself from the power of its own oligarchs. The oligarchs gained especially by cheap energy from Russia (as middle-men, buying cheap and selling high to consumers), and thus resisted adopting the anti-corruption measures demanded by the West.
Finally, Ukraine faces a regionally diverse political situation, with the south and east oriented toward Russia, and its north and west looking to the West. This limited the ability to forge consistent and integrated political and economic policies. Thus the drama of the Orange Revolution in 2004, various corrup elections and convictions, Yukochenko's conversion of a reasonably democratic government into an autocracy, and the 2013/14 Maiden occupation.
I've written a highly simplified version of a detailed and much more extensive review of the period in this book. It is somewhat academic, but does not presume any prior knowledge of the situation. Absolutely worth your while.
April 15, 2022
Thorough, concise, relatively brief, at times rather dry, at times quite interesting, well-researched account of Russian, Ukrainian, European, and United States relations from the end of the Cold War and the independence of Ukraine up until the publication of the book (it is copyright 2019, though primarily the historical accounts of the book go through 2015) and an examination of the roots of the post-Cold War conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. I read the book with an eye towards the current 2022 conflict in Ukraine, why it occurred, was it unavoidable, and if the war is a prelude to further conflicts. In that sense the book succeeded quite well, with the author, though writing before the 2022 invasion, did in addressing the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Donetsk and Luhansk in the easternmost part of Ukraine in effect answered my questions quite well. Put succinctly, no, war was not inevitable (indeed the much more tense Cold War didn鈥檛 result in armed conflict, so certainly war was avoidable here, with the author giving examples of where Russia and Ukraine had also avoided conflict between 1991 and 2014 such as say Russian responses to Ukraine鈥檚 2004 Orange Revolution). However, the author showed that the possibility of war may be a bit overdetermined and whether or not Putin is in office, it is quite possible to continue or resume conflict in the future, with the author discussing how for instance Yeltsin faced pressure in Russia to at least take a much harder stance towards Ukraine than he in fact did (鈥渁 more democratic Russia may not have had a more benign attitude toward Ukraine鈥�).
As early as page two, the author wrote that 鈥渟imply waiting for Putin to depart the stage in Russia鈥ill not bring reconciliation.鈥� Much of the book is spent discussing the deep systemic differences between Ukraine and Russia, going into issues of Russian perceptions of Ukraine as being part of Russia, historical views of Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (such as but not limited to Crimea), long game views of how Russia believed Ukraine would inevitably end up tightly bounded politically, militarily, and economically with Russia, Russian views of being a great power with considerable local influence if not outright veto power over its neighbors actions while Europeans and Americans wanted Russia to become a more 鈥渘ormal鈥� country that respects local sovereignty and internationally accepted borders, and again and again returned to the concept of a security dilemma, of how one country trying to make itself secure can either make its neighbors less secure (Ukraine joining the EU, NATO, and in general having closer ties with the West to become more secure makes Russia less secure whether in fact or in perception) or a country taking action to make itself secure can paradoxically do the opposite (Russia invading Ukraine in 2014 arguably made Russia itself less secure despite being done to in fact increase Russian security).
The author did a good job of laying out the many systemic issues keeping Russia and Ukraine apart. Many were interesting takes that I had not encountered previously, such as the role of oligarchs in Ukraine (who though not democratic, did favor a democratic government to protect their own interests, which Russia saw as threatening at least because a democratic Ukraine was a less-Russian-leaning Ukraine, but also because closer ties to Russia hurt Ukrainian oligarchs), how Russians viewed their role in Europe and the world going all the way back to World War II (鈥淭he defeated Germany accepted that its power was inherently threatening to its neighbors, while the victorious Soviet Union decided that it had earned the right to rule its neighbors鈥�), of how average Russians viewed the 鈥渓oss鈥� of Ukraine (鈥淭he sense of something important being lost was profound. Vladimir Putin invoked this history to justify the seizure of Crimea in 2014鈥�), and how Russian views over its failures to dictate events during the Orange Revolution was a transformative event (鈥淭his was our 9/11鈥�) and how before then Russians had always assumed that 鈥渟ooner or later Ukraine would return to the fold, the Orange Revolution raised the prospect that it might be lost permanently, and western influence was to blame.鈥�
There is also in the book a lot of Ukrainian politics and history, some of it quite interesting such as the Orange Revolution, the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests (complete with a map of Central Kyiv showing where various clashes occurred), the rise and fall and rise and fall of Viktor Yanukovych, and the international campaign to free the imprisoned Yuliya Tymoshenko, and some of it such as the granular particulars of Ukrainian parliamentary election results or the rise and fall of some of Ukraine鈥檚 political parties not quite so interesting.
Reading the book, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine kind of seems obvious. It also seems like Putin didn鈥檛 really learn any lessons from the 2014 invasion either (鈥淚n most of eastern and southern Ukraine, pro-Russian movements had failed to catch on, undermining the widely held belief that all Russophone Ukrainians identified with Russia and wanted to join it鈥�).
It鈥檚 definitely an academic and not popular text, but I think anyone interested in the topic can benefit from reading it. It has extensive footnotes and each chapter closes with a nicely written and succinct conclusion.
As early as page two, the author wrote that 鈥渟imply waiting for Putin to depart the stage in Russia鈥ill not bring reconciliation.鈥� Much of the book is spent discussing the deep systemic differences between Ukraine and Russia, going into issues of Russian perceptions of Ukraine as being part of Russia, historical views of Russian claims to Ukrainian territory (such as but not limited to Crimea), long game views of how Russia believed Ukraine would inevitably end up tightly bounded politically, militarily, and economically with Russia, Russian views of being a great power with considerable local influence if not outright veto power over its neighbors actions while Europeans and Americans wanted Russia to become a more 鈥渘ormal鈥� country that respects local sovereignty and internationally accepted borders, and again and again returned to the concept of a security dilemma, of how one country trying to make itself secure can either make its neighbors less secure (Ukraine joining the EU, NATO, and in general having closer ties with the West to become more secure makes Russia less secure whether in fact or in perception) or a country taking action to make itself secure can paradoxically do the opposite (Russia invading Ukraine in 2014 arguably made Russia itself less secure despite being done to in fact increase Russian security).
The author did a good job of laying out the many systemic issues keeping Russia and Ukraine apart. Many were interesting takes that I had not encountered previously, such as the role of oligarchs in Ukraine (who though not democratic, did favor a democratic government to protect their own interests, which Russia saw as threatening at least because a democratic Ukraine was a less-Russian-leaning Ukraine, but also because closer ties to Russia hurt Ukrainian oligarchs), how Russians viewed their role in Europe and the world going all the way back to World War II (鈥淭he defeated Germany accepted that its power was inherently threatening to its neighbors, while the victorious Soviet Union decided that it had earned the right to rule its neighbors鈥�), of how average Russians viewed the 鈥渓oss鈥� of Ukraine (鈥淭he sense of something important being lost was profound. Vladimir Putin invoked this history to justify the seizure of Crimea in 2014鈥�), and how Russian views over its failures to dictate events during the Orange Revolution was a transformative event (鈥淭his was our 9/11鈥�) and how before then Russians had always assumed that 鈥渟ooner or later Ukraine would return to the fold, the Orange Revolution raised the prospect that it might be lost permanently, and western influence was to blame.鈥�
There is also in the book a lot of Ukrainian politics and history, some of it quite interesting such as the Orange Revolution, the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests (complete with a map of Central Kyiv showing where various clashes occurred), the rise and fall and rise and fall of Viktor Yanukovych, and the international campaign to free the imprisoned Yuliya Tymoshenko, and some of it such as the granular particulars of Ukrainian parliamentary election results or the rise and fall of some of Ukraine鈥檚 political parties not quite so interesting.
Reading the book, the 2022 invasion of Ukraine kind of seems obvious. It also seems like Putin didn鈥檛 really learn any lessons from the 2014 invasion either (鈥淚n most of eastern and southern Ukraine, pro-Russian movements had failed to catch on, undermining the widely held belief that all Russophone Ukrainians identified with Russia and wanted to join it鈥�).
It鈥檚 definitely an academic and not popular text, but I think anyone interested in the topic can benefit from reading it. It has extensive footnotes and each chapter closes with a nicely written and succinct conclusion.
February 26, 2022
Important now
I recommend this book for anyone who wants to dig deeper into what鈥檚 happening in Ukraine. It really explains the historical ties between Russia and Ukraine. The sources of much of the tensions in the area. And how the west and Russian hardliners, like Putin, view the prospect of NATO, the EU, and the rise of Democracy much differently. The first chapter gives you a complete overview of the points made in the book of which each subsequent chapter goes into greater detail. You鈥檒l get a little more out of this than what you鈥檙e getting from the talking heads in the media.
I recommend this book for anyone who wants to dig deeper into what鈥檚 happening in Ukraine. It really explains the historical ties between Russia and Ukraine. The sources of much of the tensions in the area. And how the west and Russian hardliners, like Putin, view the prospect of NATO, the EU, and the rise of Democracy much differently. The first chapter gives you a complete overview of the points made in the book of which each subsequent chapter goes into greater detail. You鈥檒l get a little more out of this than what you鈥檙e getting from the talking heads in the media.
February 18, 2022
Pretty good book on the history of Ukraine-Russia relations, especially over the past 30 years. Well worth a read for anyone curious about what鈥檚 currently going on there.
May 28, 2022
A clear and balanced look at the cultural, economic, and geopolitical forces that have shaped the relations between Ukraine and Russia since the end of the Cold War, necessarily also considering both these countries relationships with the West. The point is made over and over that the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the Donbas region were not inevitable, but resulted instead from a confluence of factors, including corruption and protests in Ukraine, the encroachment of NATO, the support of the West for 'coloured revolutions', revanchism in Russia, tenuous agreements over things like gas pipelines and naval bases, and so much more. This book serves as an important primer not just on the events leading up to the initial 2014 invasion (note that the book was published in 2019) but of course on the far more aggressive and horrific war ongoing in 2022. With all the noise and realpolitik surrounding such a monumental event in human history, context is everything, and I'm grateful that scholars have put work into making that context approachable and understandable.
March 17, 2022
(It took me a long time to finish a book, it was a monumental journey. Depression rendered me unable to do anything besides nothing)
This is a great introduction to modern Ukrainian politics. If you scroll through my 2021 Reading List, you will see that I already read a book about the history of Ukraine. That book was very large in scope and was mainly to do with earlier Ukrainian history as opposed to the current geopolitical problems it faces. I would characterize it as a mainly geopolitical book about the problems Ukraine faces vis-a-vis Russia. However, this book almost seems like a journal article. It won't offer you any moment of peace or time to sink things in. I plan on supplementing this book with something else. Keep watch for some more books I will read this year related to Ukraine. My next stop is going to be
This is a great introduction to modern Ukrainian politics. If you scroll through my 2021 Reading List, you will see that I already read a book about the history of Ukraine. That book was very large in scope and was mainly to do with earlier Ukrainian history as opposed to the current geopolitical problems it faces. I would characterize it as a mainly geopolitical book about the problems Ukraine faces vis-a-vis Russia. However, this book almost seems like a journal article. It won't offer you any moment of peace or time to sink things in. I plan on supplementing this book with something else. Keep watch for some more books I will read this year related to Ukraine. My next stop is going to be
March 20, 2022
I have only read the first chapter, "The sources of the conflit over Ukraine", and the last one, chapter 8 "Conclusion: Ukraine, Russia, and the West - from Cold War to Cold War". Each chapter is like an academic article.
Both chapters that I read are really well written. I have not read the rest because I do not like much this Internacional Relations' style. And I can say that because I am graduated in IR. So I know how it works.
The explanation and logic are clear and direct. Those two chapters were enough for me until now.
Both chapters that I read are really well written. I have not read the rest because I do not like much this Internacional Relations' style. And I can say that because I am graduated in IR. So I know how it works.
The explanation and logic are clear and direct. Those two chapters were enough for me until now.
January 11, 2024
(The English review is placed beneath the Russian one)
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袙褋褟, 斜谢褟写褜, 锌褉芯褕懈胁泻邪 褝褌邪 褋芯胁械褌褋泻邪褟
袗胁褌芯褉 锌械褉械褋泻邪蟹褘胁邪械褌 胁 褏褉芯薪芯谢芯谐懈褔械褋泻芯屑 锌芯褉褟写泻械 懈褋褌芯褉懈褔械褋泻懈械 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟, 薪邪褔懈薪邪褟 褋 1991 谐芯写邪 懈 蟹邪泻邪薪褔懈胁邪褟 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟屑懈 2014. 袨写薪邪泻芯 泻邪泻 褌芯谢褜泻芯 屑褘 胁 泻薪懈谐械 写芯褏芯写懈屑 写芯 褋芯斜褘褌懈泄 袨褉邪薪卸械胁芯泄 褉械胁芯谢褞褑懈懈 2004, 褋 褝褌芯谐芯 屑械褋褌邪 泻薪懈谐邪 薪邪褔懈薪邪械褌 芯褔械薪褜 褋懈谢褜薪芯 锌芯褏芯写懈褌褜 薪邪 锌械褉械褋泻邪蟹 小袦袠. 袗胁褌芯褉 锌褘褌邪械褌褋褟 写械谢邪褌褜 懈 褋胁芯懈 褋芯斜褋褌胁械薪薪褘械 胁褘胁芯写褘, 褌芯谢褜泻芯 芯褌 褝褌芯谐芯 泻薪懈谐邪 薪械 褋褌邪薪芯胁懈褌褋褟 屑械薪械械 锌芯褏芯卸械泄 薪邪 褋斜芯褉薪懈泻 褋褌邪褌械泄.
袙褌芯褉邪褟 斜芯谢褜褕邪褟 锌褉芯斜谢械屑邪 泻薪懈谐懈 蟹邪泻谢褞褔邪械褌褋褟 胁 褌芯屑, 褔褌芯 邪胁褌芯褉 褋芯胁械褉褕械薪薪芯 薪懈褔械谐芯 薪械 谐芯胁芯褉懈褌 芯 谐谢邪胁薪芯泄 锌褉懈褔懈薪械 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪 屑械卸写褍 袪芯褋褋懈械泄 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄. 袗胁褌芯褉 褏芯褌褜 懈 胁褋泻芯谢褜蟹褜 褍锌芯屑懈薪邪械褌 芯 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈褋褌邪褏 薪邪 袦邪泄写邪薪械 胁 2014 谐芯写褍, 薪芯 芯褕懈斜邪械褌褋褟 胁 锌褉懈褔懈薪邪褏 泻褉懈蟹懈褋邪. 小芯谐谢邪褋薪芯 邪胁褌芯褉褍, 泻芯褉薪懈 薪褘薪械褕薪械谐芯 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪 薪褍卸薪芯 懈褋泻邪褌褜 胁 1991 谐芯写褍, 泻芯谐写邪 褌邪泻 懈 薪械 斜褘谢 褉械褕褢薪 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌 胁芯泻褉褍谐 袣褉褘屑邪. 孝芯褌 卸械 袗谢械泻褋械泄 袗褉械褋褌芯胁懈褔 蟹邪褟胁谢褟械褌, 褔褌芯 锌械褉胁褘泄 褏芯写 胁 褝褌芯泄 泻芯薪褎褉芯薪褌邪褑懈懈 褋写械谢邪谢邪 袪芯褋褋懈褟, 泻芯谐写邪 锌芯锌褘褌邪谢邪褋褜 胁 90-褏 谐芯写邪褏, 褌芯 谢懈 锌褉芯懈蟹胁械褋褌懈 锌械褉胁褍褞 锌芯锌褘褌泻褍 蟹邪褏胁邪褌邪 袣褉褘屑邪 褌芯 谢懈 褔褌芯-褌芯 胁 褝褌芯屑 褉芯写械. 袨写薪邪泻芯 褟 薪械 褋芯谐谢邪褋械薪 褋 褝褌懈屑懈 锌芯蟹懈褑懈褟屑懈. 小 屑芯械泄 褌芯褔泻懈 蟹褉械薪懈褟 泻芯褉薪懈 谢械卸邪褌 胁 2004 谐芯写褍, 泻芯谐写邪 挟褖械薪泻芯 蟹邪褔械屑-褌芯 褉械褕懈谢 锌芯写薪褟褌褜 褌械屑褍 袚芯谢芯写芯屑芯褉邪. 袧械褋屑芯褌褉褟 薪邪 褌芯, 褔褌芯 芯薪 蟹邪褟胁谢褟谢, 褔褌芯 褝褌芯 薪懈泻邪泻 薪械 褋胁褟蟹邪薪芯 褋 邪薪邪谢芯谐懈械泄 薪邪 褌械泻褍褖褍褞 袪芯褋褋懈褞, 薪褍卸薪芯 斜褘褌褜 锌芯谢薪褘屑 懈写懈芯褌芯屑, 褔褌芯斜褘 薪械 褍胁懈写械褌褜 褌邪泻芯械 褋褉邪胁薪械薪懈械 小小小袪 懈 袪肖. 袛邪, 胁芯蟹屑芯卸薪芯 挟褖械薪泻芯 褝褌芯 褋写械谢邪谢, 锌芯褌芯屑褍 褔褌芯 褌邪泻 锌褉懈薪褟褌芯 胁 褋芯胁褉械屑械薪薪芯泄 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻械, 泻芯谐写邪 芯写薪邪 写芯屑懈薪懈褉褍褞褖邪褟 锌邪褉褌懈褟 胁褋械谐写邪 锌褉芯褟胁谢褟械褌 芯锌锌芯蟹懈褑懈褞 褌芯屑褍, 蟹邪 褔褌芯 谐芯谢芯褋褍械褌 懈谢懈 褔褌芯 锌褉芯写胁懈谐邪械褌 懈褏 谐谢邪胁薪褘泄 褋芯锌械褉薪懈泻, 褌.械. 写褉褍谐邪褟 写芯屑懈薪懈褉褍褞褖邪褟 锌邪褉褌懈褟. 袝褋谢懈 袩邪褉褌懈褟 袪械谐懈芯薪芯胁 锌芯蟹懈褑懈芯薪懈褉褍械褌 褋械斜褟 泻邪泻 谐谢邪胁薪芯谐芯 褋芯褞蟹薪懈泻邪 袪芯褋褋懈懈, 褌芯 谐谢邪胁薪邪褟 芯锌锌芯蟹懈褑懈芯薪薪邪褟 锌邪褉褌懈褟 锌芯蟹懈褑懈芯薪懈褉褍械褌 褋械斜褟 胁 泻邪褔械褋褌胁械 褋芯褞蟹薪懈泻邪 袝胁褉芯锌褘. 袣邪泻 谐芯胁芯褉懈褌褋褟, 芦械褋谢懈 袝胁褌褍褕械薪泻芯 锌褉芯褌懈胁 泻芯谢褏芯蟹芯胁, 褌芯 褌芯谐写邪 褟 蟹邪 泻芯谢褏芯蟹褘禄. 袙芯褌 胁 褝褌芯泄 懈褋褌芯褉懈懈 锌褉芯懈蟹芯褕谢芯 褉芯胁薪芯 褌芯 卸械 褋邪屑芯械. 袩褉芯斜谢械屑褘 斜褘 胁 褝褌芯屑 薪懈泻邪泻芯泄 薪械 斜褘谢芯 斜褘, 械褋谢懈 斜褘 褋芯褋械写芯屑 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 薪械 斜褘谢邪 斜褘 写懈泻褌邪褌芯褉褋泻邪褟 懈 薪械邪写械泻胁邪褌薪邪褟 袪芯褋褋懈褟, 邪 褏芯褌褟 斜褘 袣邪蟹邪褏褋褌邪薪. 袘械写邪 褋芯褋褌芯褟谢邪 胁 褌芯屑, 褔褌芯 袪芯褋褋懈褟 褉械褕懈谢邪 锌褉懈薪褟褌褜 褝褌褍, 泻邪泻 谐芯胁芯褉褟褌 胁 褎褍褌斜芯谢械, 锌芯写邪褔褍 芯褌 挟褖械薪泻芯. 袩芯褝褌芯屑褍 芯褌胁械褌褋褌胁械薪薪芯褋褌褜 蟹邪 薪邪褔邪谢芯 褋械谐芯写薪褟褕薪械泄 褌褉邪谐械写懈懈 谢械卸懈褌 薪邪 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻邪褏, 泻邪泻 校泻褉邪懈薪褘, 褌邪泻 懈 袪芯褋褋懈懈 (锌褍褋褌褜 懈 胁 褉邪蟹薪褘褏 锌褉芯锌芯褉褑懈褟褏). 小 褝褌芯谐芯 懈 薪邪褔邪谢懈褋褜 胁褋械 锌褉芯斜谢械屑褘. 袥懈褔薪芯 褟 写褍屑邪褞, 褔褌芯 褌邪泻芯械 薪械邪写械泻胁邪褌薪芯械 写械泄褋褌胁懈械 褋芯 褋褌芯褉芯薪褘 袪肖 斜褘谢芯 褋胁褟蟹邪薪薪芯 褌芯谢褜泻芯 褋 芯写薪懈屑 鈥� 薪邪泄褌懈 胁薪械褕薪械谐芯 胁褉邪谐邪, 胁 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯褋褌芯褟薪懈懈 泻芯褌芯褉芯屑褍 屑芯卸薪芯 斜褘谢芯 芯斜褗械写懈薪懈褌褜 褋褌褉邪薪褍. 袝写懈薪褋褌胁械薪薪褘泄 屑芯屑械薪褌 胁 泻薪懈谐械, 谐写械 褟 褋芯谐谢邪褋械薪 褋 邪胁褌芯褉芯屑, 褝褌芯 胁 胁芯锌褉芯褋械 薪械褉械褕褢薪薪芯谐芯 泻褉褘屑褋泻芯谐芯 胁芯锌褉芯褋邪. 袛邪, 胁芯锌褉芯褋 褋 袣褉褘屑芯屑 薪褍卸薪芯 斜褘谢芯 褉械褕懈褌褜 械褖褢 胁 1991 谐芯写褍. 携 薪械 蟹薪邪褞 泻邪泻, 薪芯 邪斜褋芯谢褞褌薪芯 褍胁械褉械薪, 褔褌芯 芦斜芯谢褜褕懈械 写褟写懈禄 褋 薪邪褍褔薪褘屑懈 褋褌械锌械薪褟屑懈 芯锌褉械写械谢褢薪薪芯 屑芯谐谢懈 薪邪泄褌懈 褉械褕械薪懈械, 泻芯褌芯褉芯械 褍褋褌褉芯懈谢芯 斜褘 懈 褍泻褉邪懈薪褋泻褍褞 褋褌芯褉芯薪褍 懈 褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻褍褞. 袩芯褔械屑褍 薪械 褉械褕懈谢懈? 袛邪 泻褌芯 卸 屑芯谐 锌芯写褍屑邪褌褜, 褔褌芯 袪芯褋褋懈褟 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 写芯泄写褍褌 写芯 褌邪泻芯谐芯 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 泻邪泻 芯褌泻褉褘褌芯械 胁芯械薪薪芯械 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯褋褌芯褟薪懈械? 袣褉褘屑 薪械 褟胁谢褟谢褋褟 胁 袪芯褋褋懈懈 胁邪卸薪褘屑 胁芯锌褉芯褋 薪懈 胁 90-褏, 薪懈 胁 2000-褏 懈 写邪卸械 胁 2014 谐芯写褍 屑邪谢芯 泻褌芯 芯 薪褢屑 胁褋锌芯屑懈薪邪谢. 孝邪泻 褔褌芯 芦效械泄 袣褉褘屑禄, 褟胁谢褟械褌褋褟 懈褋泻褍褋褋褌胁械薪薪芯泄 锌褉芯斜谢械屑芯泄. 袧芯 褍 邪胁褌芯褉邪 懈屑械薪薪芯 袣褉褘屑 懈 薪械 芦锌芯写泻芯薪褌褉芯谢褜薪邪褟禄 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 褟胁谢褟褞褌褋褟 谐谢邪胁薪褘屑懈 锌褉懈褔懈薪邪屑懈 胁芯械薪薪芯谐芯 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪. 携 褋 褝褌懈屑 薪械 褋芯谐谢邪褋械薪 懈 泻薪懈谐邪, 褏芯褌褜 懈 锌械褉械褋泻邪蟹褘胁邪械褌 薪芯胁芯褋褌薪褘械 褋芯芯斜褖械薪懈褟 褌械褏 谢械褌, 薪械 褟胁谢褟械褌褋褟 褍斜械写懈褌械谢褜薪芯泄 胁 褝褌芯屑 胁芯锌褉芯褋械 (锌芯褌芯屑褍 褔褌芯 锌芯胁械褉褏薪芯褋褌薪邪 懈 锌褉芯褋褌芯 锌械褉械褋泻邪蟹褘胁邪械褌 褋褌邪褌褜懈 胁 小袦袠 褌械褏 谢械褌). 袛邪, 邪胁褌芯褉 胁褋械 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 芯锌懈褋褘胁邪械褌 胁械褉薪芯, 懈 泻 褋邪屑芯屑褍 褌械泻褋褌褍 褍 屑械薪褟 锌褉械褌械薪蟹懈泄 薪械褌. 袩褉械褌械薪蟹懈褟 褍 屑械薪褟 泻 褌芯屑褍, 泻褍写邪 薪邪锌褉邪胁谢褟械褌 胁薪懈屑邪薪懈械 褔懈褌邪褌械谢械泄 邪胁褌芯褉.
袠褌邪泻, 锌械褉胁邪褟 锌芯谢芯胁懈薪邪 泻薪懈谐懈 褉邪褋褋泻邪蟹褘胁邪械褌 芯 褌芯屑, 泻邪泻 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 褉邪蟹芯褉褍卸邪谢邪褋褜 胁 1991 谐芯写褍. 袛邪谢械械 懈写褍褌 屑邪谢芯锌芯薪褟褌薪褘械 写谢褟 屑械薪褟 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 胁芯泻褉褍谐 袣褉褘屑邪. 协褌芯 褌芯卸械 锌芯薪褟褌薪芯, 薪芯 泻邪泻 褟 褋泻邪蟹邪谢, 胁褋褢 褝褌芯 薪械 褟胁谢褟谢芯褋褜 锌械褉械谢芯屑薪褘屑 屑芯屑械薪褌芯屑 胁 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈褟褏 屑械卸写褍 袪芯褋褋懈械泄 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄. 袨褉邪薪卸械胁邪褟 袪械胁芯谢褞褑懈褟 - 胁芯褌 褌褍褌 褍卸械 懈 薪邪褔邪谢邪褋褜 胁褋褟 褝褌邪 泻邪薪懈褌械谢褜. 袣邪泻懈褏-褌芯 芯褋芯斜芯 懈薪褌械褉械褋薪褘褏 褎邪泻褌芯胁 褟 褌褍褌 薪械 芯斜薪邪褉褍卸懈谢, 懈斜芯 邪胁褌芯褉 锌芯胁械褉褏薪芯褋褌械薪. 袛邪谢械械 懈写褢褌 谐邪蟹芯胁邪褟 胁芯泄薪邪 屑械卸写褍 袪肖 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄 懈 褌褍褌 褌芯卸械 卸械 胁褋褢 褌芯 卸械 褋邪屑芯械, 褔褌芯 屑褘 薪邪褏芯写懈屑 胁 小袦袠 蟹邪 褌芯褌 锌械褉懈芯写. 袩褉懈褔懈薪邪 谐邪蟹芯胁芯谐芯 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪 屑薪械 写芯 泻芯薪褑邪 薪械 褟褋薪邪, 薪芯 褌邪泻 泻邪泻 袪芯褋褋懈褟 褌邪泻褍褞 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻褍 锌褘褌邪谢邪褋褜 懈褋锌芯谢褜蟹芯胁邪褌褜 懈 胁 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈懈 袘械谢芯褉褍褋褋懈懈 (锌芯胁褘褕械薪懈械 褑械薪 蟹邪 谐邪蟹), 褌芯 屑芯谐褍 锌褉械写锌芯谢芯卸懈褌褜, 褔褌芯 锌褉懈褔懈薪 谐邪蟹芯胁芯泄 胁芯泄薪褘 斜褘谢芯 薪械褋泻芯谢褜泻芯, 胁泻谢褞褔邪褟 褋褍谐褍斜芯 褎懈薪邪薪褋芯胁褘泄 胁芯锌褉芯褋. 协褌邪 懈褋褌芯褉懈褟 褌褢屑薪邪褟 懈 薪械锌芯薪褟褌薪邪褟 泻邪泻 褋芯 褋褌芯褉芯薪褘 校泻褉邪懈薪褘, 褌邪泻 懈 褋芯 褋褌芯褉芯薪褘 袪芯褋褋懈懈. 袧褍 邪 写邪谢褜褕械 胁芯蟹胁褉邪褖械薪懈械 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔邪 懈 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 袝胁褉芯屑邪泄写邪薪邪.
袣邪褋邪褌械谢褜薪芯 袝胁褉芯屑邪泄写邪薪邪 胁 2014 谐芯写褍 薪褍卸薪芯 芯褌写邪褌褜 写芯谢卸薪芯械 邪胁褌芯褉褍, 懈斜芯 芯薪 薪械锌谢芯褏芯 锌械褉械写邪褢褌 胁薪褍褌褉械薪薪褞褞 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻褍 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔邪, 泻芯谐写邪 褌芯褌 锌褉懈褕褢谢 泻 胁谢邪褋褌懈. 袗胁褌芯褉 薪械锌谢芯褏芯, 褏芯褌褟 懈 锌芯胁械褉褏薪芯褋褌薪芯, 芯锌懈褋邪谢 锌芯褋褌褉芯械薪懈械 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔械屑 邪胁褌芯褉懈褌邪褉薪芯泄 胁谢邪褋褌懈. 袙锌褉芯褔械屑, 褌芯褌 褎邪泻褌, 褔褌芯 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔 锌褘褌邪谢褋褟 斜褘褌褜 (褋褌邪褌褜) 写懈泻褌邪褌芯褉芯屑 写谢褟 屑械薪褟 薪械 褟胁谢褟械褌褋褟 薪芯胁芯褋褌褜褞, 褋褞褉锌褉懈蟹芯屑. 袛械泄褋褌胁懈褟 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔邪 锌芯 褉邪蟹谐芯薪褍 邪斜褋芯谢褞褌薪芯 斜械蟹胁褉械写薪芯谐芯 写谢褟 薪械谐芯 屑懈褌懈薪谐邪 薪邪 袦邪泄写邪薪械 胁褘写邪褢褌 胁 薪褢屑 褔械谢芯胁械泻邪 谐谢褍锌芯谐芯 懈 薪械写邪谢褜薪芯胁懈写薪芯谐芯. 袨写薪邪泻芯 泻邪褋邪械屑芯 袝胁褉芯屑邪泄写邪薪邪 邪胁褌芯褉 薪懈褔械谐芯 薪械 谐芯胁芯褉懈褌 芯 谐谢邪胁薪芯屑, 褌.械. 芯 褌芯屑, 褔褌芯 胁械谢芯 褋懈褌褍邪褑懈褞 泻 泻褉芯胁邪胁芯泄 褉邪蟹胁褟蟹泻械 鈥� 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯褋褌芯褟薪懈懈 屑械卸写褍 蟹邪锌邪写薪芯泄 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄 懈 胁芯褋褌芯褔薪芯泄 懈 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯锌芯褋褌邪胁谢械薪懈懈 袝胁褉芯锌褘 懈 袪芯褋褋懈懈 胁 泻芯薪褌械泻褋褌械 褍泻褉邪懈薪褋泻芯谐芯 芯斜褖械褋褌胁邪. 袝褋谢懈 懈蟹褍褔邪褌褜 褌械 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 锌芯 褝褌芯泄 泻薪懈谐械 胁芯蟹薪懈泻薪械褌 芯褖褍褖械薪懈械, 褔褌芯 薪懈泻邪泻芯泄 邪薪褌懈褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 锌芯胁械褋褌泻懈 薪械 斜褘谢芯 薪懈 胁 2004, 薪懈 胁 2014. 袛邪, 斜褘谢懈 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈褋褌褘, 薪芯 芯薪懈 锌褉芯 袪芯褋褋懈褞 薪懈褔械谐芯 薪械 谐芯胁芯褉懈谢懈. 袘芯谢械械 褌芯谐芯, 褌邪泻芯械 褔褍胁褋褌胁芯, 褔褌芯 邪胁褌芯褉 胁芯芯斜褖械 薪械 胁 泻褍褉褋械 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯褋褌芯褟薪懈褟 屑械卸写褍 胁芯褋褌芯褔薪芯泄 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄 懈 蟹邪锌邪写薪芯泄. 袣邪泻 褟 薪邪锌懈褋邪谢 胁褘褕械, 褟 褋褔懈褌邪褞 褝褌芯 芯褋薪芯胁薪芯泄 锌褉懈褔懈薪芯泄. 携 写邪卸械 写褍屑邪褞, 褔褌芯 械褋谢懈 斜褘 褉械胁芯谢褞褑懈褞 写械谢邪谢懈 斜褘 褋褍谐褍斜芯 薪邪 邪薪褌懈邪胁褌芯褉懈褌邪褉薪褘褏 谢芯蟹褍薪谐邪褏 懈 薪懈泻邪泻 薪械 褍锌芯屑懈薪邪谢懈 斜褘 袪芯褋褋懈褞, 邪 褌邪泻卸械 薪械 懈屑械谢懈 褌邪泻芯械 褋懈谢褜薪芯械 薪邪锌褉褟卸械薪懈械 屑械卸写褍 胁芯褋褌芯褔薪芯泄 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄 懈 蟹邪锌邪写薪芯泄, 褌芯 薪懈泻邪泻芯谐芯 斜褘 胁芯械薪薪芯谐芯 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪 薪械 斜褘谢芯 斜褘. 袘芯谢械械 褌芯谐芯, 褟 褋懈谢褜薪芯 褋芯屑薪械胁邪褞褋褜, 褔褌芯 袪芯褋褋懈褟 斜褘谢邪 斜褘 褌邪泻 褋懈谢褜薪芯 锌褉芯褌懈胁 胁褋褌褍锌谢械薪懈褟 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 胁 袝小. 携 锌芯薪懈屑邪褞, 褔褌芯 屑芯懈 褋谢芯胁邪 屑芯谐褍褌 斜褘褌褜 褍胁懈写械薪褘 泻邪泻 锌芯锌褘褌泻邪 锌械褉械谢芯卸懈褌褜 胁褋褞 芯褌胁械褌褋褌胁械薪薪芯褋褌褜 蟹邪 褋械谐芯写薪褟褕薪械械 褋 袪肖 薪邪 校泻褉邪懈薪褍, 薪芯 褋屑褘褋谢 胁 褌芯屑, 褔褌芯 懈屑械薪薪芯 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻懈 袪芯褋褋懈懈 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 (懈 芯褌褔邪褋褌懈 袝小 懈 小楔袗) 褋写械谢邪谢懈 胁褋褢 胁芯蟹屑芯卸薪芯械, 褔褌芯斜褘 胁芯泄薪邪 褋谢褍褔懈谢邪褋褜. 袣芯褉芯褔械 谐芯胁芯褉褟, 锌芯谢褍褔邪械褌褋褟, 褔褌芯 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻懈 芯斜械懈褏 褋褌芯褉芯薪 薪械 卸械谢邪谢懈 褉械褕邪褌褜 褋褍褖械褋褌胁褍褞褖懈械 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌褘 薪懈 胁 90-褏, 泻芯褌芯褉褘械 斜褘谢懈 褋胁褟蟹邪薪褘 褋 袣褉褘屑芯屑 懈 小械胁邪褋褌芯锌芯谢械屑 薪懈 胁 2004, 泻芯褌芯褉褘械 斜褘谢懈 褋胁褟蟹邪薪褘 褋 袚芯谢芯写芯屑芯褉芯屑 懈 褉芯谢褜褞 小小小袪 薪懈 胁 2014, 泻芯谐写邪 校泻褉邪懈薪褍 褉邪蟹写械谢懈谢懈 薪邪 锌褉芯褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻褍褞 懈 锌褉芯械胁褉芯锌械泄褋泻褍褞.
效懈褌邪褟 泻薪懈谐褍 褟 褍胁懈写械谢 褌芯, 褔械谐芯 薪械 胁懈写械谢 褉邪薪褜褕械: 泻邪褉褌懈薪褍 褌芯谐芯 泻邪泻 懈褋褌芯褉懈褞 褋 袝胁褉芯屑邪泄写邪薪芯屑 胁懈写械谢懈 懈蟹 芯泻芯薪 袣褉械屑谢褟. 小薪邪褔邪谢邪 胁褘斜褉邪谢懈 挟褖械薪泻芯, 蟹邪 锌芯斜械写芯泄 泻芯褌芯褉芯谐芯 褋褌芯褟谢懈 蟹邪锌邪写薪褘械 褋褌褉邪薪褘 (褋 褌芯褔泻懈 蟹褉械薪懈褟 袣褉械屑谢褟). 啸芯褉芯褕芯, 袪芯褋褋懈褟 胁 懈褌芯谐械 褋芯谐谢邪褋懈谢邪褋褜, 薪芯 胁 芯褌屑械褋褌泻褍, 锌褉械写锌芯谢芯卸懈褌械谢褜薪芯, 薪邪褔邪谢邪 谐邪蟹芯胁褍褞 胁芯泄薪褍 (胁芯蟹屑芯卸薪芯 胁 泻邪褔械褋褌胁械 褋锌械泻褌邪泻谢褟 写谢褟 械写懈薪械薪懈褟 褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯谐芯 薪邪褉芯写邪 胁芯泻褉褍谐 谢懈写械褉邪). 袛邪谢械械 锌褉懈褏芯写懈褌 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔, 褋 泻芯褌芯褉褘屑 锌褉芯懈褋褏芯写懈褌 薪械锌褉懈褟褌薪邪褟 褋懈褌褍邪褑懈褟 - 锌褉懈 写褍褉邪褑泻芯泄 锌芯锌褘褌泻懈 褉邪蟹芯谐薪邪褌褜 屑懈褌懈薪谐 薪邪 袦邪泄写邪薪械 胁 懈褌芯谐械 褉邪蟹谐芯薪褟褞褌 械谐芯 锌邪褉褌懈褞 懈 械谐芯 褋邪屑芯谐芯. 袧芯 泻邪泻 褝褌芯 胁懈写懈褌褋褟 懈蟹 袦芯褋泻胁褘? 袙芯 胁褉械屑褟 袦邪泄写邪薪邪 胁芯芯褉褍卸褢薪薪褘械 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈褋褌褘 (蟹邪 泻芯褌芯褉褘屑懈, 褋 褌芯褔泻懈 蟹褉械薪懈褟 袣褉械屑谢褟, 褋褌芯褟褌 袝小 懈 小楔袗) 蟹邪褏胁邪褌褘胁邪褞褌 邪写屑懈薪懈褋褌褉邪褌懈胁薪褘械 蟹写邪薪懈褟, 芯泻邪蟹褘胁邪褞褌 褋芯锌褉芯褌懈胁谢械薪懈械 锌褉邪胁芯芯褏褉邪薪懈褌械谢褜薪褘屑 芯褉谐邪薪邪屑 懈 褌邪泻懈屑 芯斜褉邪蟹芯屑 胁褘薪褍卸写邪褞褌 褍泄褌懈 蟹邪泻芯薪薪芯 懈蟹斜褉邪薪薪芯谐芯 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔邪. 袩芯谢褍褔邪械褌褋褟, 褔褌芯 褋褌邪胁谢械薪薪懈泻 袝小 懈 小楔袗 - 挟褖械薪泻芯 - 写芯褋懈写械谢 胁械褋褜 褋胁芯泄 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌褋泻懈泄 褋褉芯泻, 邪 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔褍 薪械 写邪谢懈 (懈屑械薪薪芯 褌褍褌 屑芯卸薪芯 薪邪泄褌懈 芯斜褗褟褋薪械薪懈械 褋谢芯胁 袩褍褌懈薪邪, 褔褌芯 芦袪芯褋褋懈褞 芯斜屑邪薪褍谢懈禄). 袛邪谢械械, 薪邪 胁芯褋褌芯泻械 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 褍褔邪褋褌薪懈泻懈 邪薪褌懈-袦邪泄写邪薪邪 薪邪褔懈薪邪褞褌 泻芯锌懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 写械泄褋褌胁懈褟 谢褞写械泄 胁 袣懈械胁械, 褌.械. 薪邪褔懈薪邪褞褌 蟹邪褏胁邪褌褘胁邪褌褜 邪写屑懈薪懈褋褌褉邪褌懈胁薪褘械 蟹写邪薪懈褟, 薪邪 褔褌芯 薪芯胁邪褟 胁谢邪褋褌褜 褉械褕邪械褌 锌芯褋谢邪褌褜 写邪卸械 薪械 袘械褉泻褍褌, 邪 褋褉邪蟹褍 褌邪薪泻懈. 携 写褍屑邪褞, 懈屑械薪薪芯 褌邪泻 褍胁懈写械谢懈 褋懈褌褍邪褑懈褞 谢褞写懈 胁 袣褉械屑谢械. 袟邪锌邪写 卸械 薪懈泻邪泻 薪邪 褝褌芯 薪械 芯褌褉械邪谐懈褉芯胁邪谢, 褌.械. 薪懈泻邪泻 薪械 芯褌褉械邪谐懈褉芯胁邪谢 薪邪 褍泻褉邪懈薪褋泻懈泄 邪薪邪谢芯谐 泻芯薪褌褉褌械褉褉芯褉懈褋褌懈褔械褋泻芯泄 芯锌械褉邪褑懈懈 胁 效械褔薪械 懈谢懈 泻邪泻 芯斜芯蟹薪邪褔懈谢懈 械褢 胁 校泻褉邪懈薪械 鈥� 袗孝袨. 袩芯褋谢械 褝褌芯谐芯 胁 袣褉械屑谢械 褉械褕懈谢懈 写械泄褋褌胁芯胁邪褌褜 斜芯谢械械 芯褌泻褉褘褌芯, 懈斜芯 芦袪芯褋褋懈褞 芯斜屑邪薪褍谢懈禄. 袨锌褟褌褜 卸械, 锌褉懈褔懈薪邪 褝褌懈褏 褌褉邪谐懈褔械褋泻懈褏 褋芯斜褘褌懈泄 - 薪械褉械褕褢薪薪褘械 锌褉芯斜谢械屑褘 械褋谢懈 薪械 1991, 褌芯 2004 谐芯写邪, 泻芯褌芯褉褘械, 锌芯写芯斜薪芯 褋薪械卸薪芯屑褍 泻芯屑褍, 谢懈褕褜 褍胁械谢懈褔懈胁邪谢邪褋褜 胁 褉邪蟹屑械褉械 懈 褍胁械谢懈褔懈胁邪谢邪褋褜, 写芯褋褌懈谐薪褍胁 锌懈泻邪 胁 2014 懈 2022. 袠 褝褌芯 褌芯褌 褋谢褍褔邪泄, 泻芯谐写邪 褟 褋芯谐谢邪褋械薪 褋 邪胁褌芯褉芯屑, 褔褌芯 薪械褉械褕褢薪薪褘泄 胁芯锌褉芯褋 褋 袣褉褘屑芯屑 懈 胁 褑械谢芯屑, 褋 褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯-褍泻褉邪懈薪褋泻懈屑懈 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈褟屑懈, 锌褉懈胁褢谢 胁 懈褌芯谐械 泻 斜芯谢褜褕芯泄 胁芯泄薪械. 袨写薪邪泻芯 褟 褏芯褔褍 锌芯写褔械褉泻薪褍褌褜 谐谢邪胁薪芯械 鈥� 胁 泻薪懈谐械 薪械褌 薪懈褔械谐芯 锌褉芯 邪薪褌懈褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻懈泄 写懈褋泻褍褉褋, 泻芯褌芯褉褘泄 薪邪褔邪谢褋褟 胁 校泻褉邪懈薪械 褋 2004 谐芯写邪. 袗胁褌芯褉 褝褌芯泄 泻薪懈谐懈 胁褋褢 褋胁芯写懈褌 泻 谐械芯锌芯谢懈褌懈泻械 懈 斜芯褉褜斜械 蟹邪 薪械蟹邪胁懈褋懈屑芯褋褌褜 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 芯褌 袦芯褋泻胁褘. 袝写懈薪褋褌胁械薪薪芯械 褔褌芯 褌褍褌 褋褌芯懈褌 芯褌屑械褌懈褌褜, 褝褌芯 泻芯谐写邪 邪胁褌芯褉 锌懈褕械褌, 褔褌芯 袪芯褋褋懈褟 锌褉褟屑芯 蟹邪褟胁懈谢邪 褋褌褉邪薪邪屑 袧袗孝袨 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪械 褔褌芯 芯薪邪 薪邪褔薪褢褌 胁芯泄薪褍, 械褋谢懈 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 胁褋褌褍锌懈褌 胁 袧袗孝袨, 胁褋谢械写褋褌胁懈械 褔械谐芯 屑薪械 薪械 锌芯薪褟褌薪芯, 锌芯褔械屑褍 斜褘谢懈 锌褉芯懈谐薪芯褉懈褉芯胁邪薪褘 褝褌懈 芯褌泻褉芯胁械薪薪褘械 锌褉械写褍锌褉械卸写械薪懈褟 褋芯 褋褌芯褉芯薪褘 袪肖? 袙械写褜 胁 褌邪泻芯屑 褋谢褍褔邪懈 薪褍卸薪芯 斜褘谢芯 谢懈斜芯 薪邪褔邪褌褜 锌械褉械谐芯胁芯褉褘 锌芯 薪芯褉屑邪谢懈蟹邪褑懈懈 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈泄 褋 袪肖 懈 芯褌泻邪蟹邪 芯褌 胁褋褌褍锌谢械薪懈褟 胁 袧袗孝袨 谢懈斜芯 蟹邪薪懈屑邪褌褜褋褟 锌芯写谐芯褌芯胁泻芯泄 泻 胁芯泄薪械 褋 袪芯褋褋懈械泄, 褌.械. 屑懈薪懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 褌械褉褉懈褌芯褉懈褞, 胁芯蟹写胁懈谐邪褌褜 褎芯褉褌懈褎懈泻邪褑懈芯薪薪褘械 褋芯芯褉褍卸械薪懈褟, 褋芯蟹写邪胁邪褌褜 芦蟹褍斜褘 写褉邪泻芯薪邪禄 懈 锌褉. 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 锌芯褕谢邪 褌褉械褌褜懈屑 锌褍褌械屑, 褌.械. 褉械褕懈谢邪 懈 写邪谢褜褕械 谐芯褌芯胁懈褌褜褋褟 泻 胁褋褌褍锌谢械薪懈褞 胁 袧袗孝袨, 锌芯谢薪芯褋褌褜褞 芯褌泻邪蟹邪胁褕懈褋褜 芯褌 懈写械懈 锌芯写谐芯褌芯胁泻懈 泻 胁芯泄薪械. 袩芯卸邪谢褍泄, 褝褌芯 褋邪屑邪褟 斜械蟹褍屑薪邪褟 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻邪, 泻芯褌芯褉褍褞 褟 胁懈写械谢. 袘械蟹褍屑薪械泄 褌芯谢褜泻芯 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻邪 小小小袪 懈 褋邪屑芯泄 袪芯褋褋懈懈.
The author retells historical events in chronological order, starting from 1991 and ending with the events of 2014. However, as soon as we get to the events of the Orange Revolution 2004, the book starts to look very much like a media retelling. The author tries to make his own conclusions, but this does not make the book any less like a collection of articles.
The second big problem with the book is that the author says nothing about the main reason for the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Although the author mentions, in passing, the nationalists on the Maidan in 2014, he is wrong about the causes of the crisis. According to the author, the roots of the current conflict should be sought in 1991, when the conflict over Crimea was not resolved. The same Alexei Arestovich states that Russia had made the first move in this confrontation when Russia tried in the 90s to make the first attempt to seize Crimea or something like that. However, I do not agree with these positions. From my point of view, the roots lie in 2004, when Yushchenko decided to bring up the Holodomor for some reason. Despite the fact that he claimed that it had nothing to do with the analogy to current Russia, one would have to be a complete idiot not to see such a comparison between the USSR and the Russian Federation. Yes, Yushchenko may have done it because that's the way modern politics works, where one dominant party always shows opposition to what their main rival, i.e., the other dominant party, votes for or promotes. If the Party of Regions positions itself as Russia's main ally, the main opposition party positions itself as Europe's ally. As the saying goes, "If Yevtushenko is against collective farms, then I am for collective farms". The same thing happened in this story. There would have been no problem if Ukraine's neighbor had not been the dictatorial and inadequate Russia, but at least Kazakhstan. The trouble was that Russia decided to accept this, as they say in soccer, pitch from Yushchenko. Therefore, the responsibility for the beginning of today's tragedy lies with the politicians of both Ukraine and Russia (albeit in different proportions). This is where all the problems started. Personally, I think that such an inadequate action on the part of the Russian Federation was connected only with one thing - to find an external enemy to unite the country against. The only point in the book where I agree with the author is on the unresolved Crimean issue. Yes, the Crimea issue should have been resolved back in 1991. I don't know how, but I'm sure that smart people with scientific degrees could definitely find a solution that would suit both the Ukrainian side and the Russian side. Why didn't they? Who would have thought that Russia and Ukraine would reach such an event as an open military confrontation? Crimea was not an important issue in Russia either in the 90s or in the 2000s, and even in 2014, few people remembered it. So "Whose Crimea" is an artificial problem. But for the author, it was Crimea and not "controlled" Ukraine that are the main reasons for the military conflict. I do not agree with this, and the book, although it retells news reports of those years, is not convincing in this matter (because it is superficial and simply retells articles in the media of those years). Yes, the author describes all the events correctly, and I have no complaints about the text itself. I have a complaint about where the author directs the readers' attention.
So, the first half of the book is about how Ukraine was disarmed in 1991. Then there are the events around Crimea, which are not very clear to me. This is also understandable, but as I said, none of this was a turning point in relations between Russia and Ukraine. The Orange Revolution - that's where the whole mess started. I did not find any particularly interesting facts here because the author is superficial. Then comes the gas war between Russia and Ukraine, and here, too, all the same things that we find in the media for that period. The reason for the gas conflict is not completely clear to me, but, since Russia tried to use the same policy for Belarus (an increase in gas prices), I can assume that there were several reasons for the gas war, including a purely financial issue. This story is dark and incomprehensible both on the part of Ukraine and Russia. And then the return of Yanukovych and the events of Euromaidan.
Regarding the Euromaidan in 2014, the author should be given credit, for he did a pretty good job of conveying the internal politics of Yanukovych when he came to power. The author does a good, albeit superficial, job of describing Yanukovych's construction of an authoritarian government. However, the fact that Yanukovych tried to become a dictator is not a surprise to me. Yanukovych's actions in dispersing the Maidan rally, which was harmless to him, made him look foolish and shortsighted. However, about Euromaidan, the author says nothing about the main thing, i.e., what led the situation to a bloody denouement - the confrontation between Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine and the opposition between Europe and Russia in the context of Ukrainian society. If you study those events according to this book, you will get the feeling that there was no anti-Russian agenda in 2004 or 2014. Yes, there were nationalists, but they did not say anything about Russia. Moreover, it feels like the author is not aware of the confrontation between eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine at all. As I wrote above, I think this is the main reason. I even think that if the revolution had been made purely on anti-authoritarian slogans, and would not have mentioned Russia in any way, and would not have had such a strong tension between eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine, there would not have been any military conflict. Moreover, I highly doubt that Russia would be so much against Ukraine joining the EU. I realize that my words can be seen as an attempt to shift all responsibility for today's war from Russia to Ukraine, but the point is that it was the politicians of Russia and Ukraine (and partly the EU and the US) who did everything possible to make the war happen. In short, it turns out that politicians on both sides were unwilling to resolve the existing conflicts neither in the 90s, which were related to Crimea and Sevastopol, nor in 2004, which were related to the Holodomor and the role of the USSR, nor in 2014 when Ukraine was divided into pro-Russian and pro-European.
Reading the book, I saw something I had not seen before - a picture of how the Euromaidan story was seen from the windows of the Kremlin. First, Yushchenko was elected, whose victory was backed by Western countries (from the Kremlin's point of view). OK, Russia eventually agreed, but in retaliation, supposedly started a gas war (perhaps as a spectacle to unite the Russian people around a leader). Then comes Yanukovych, with whom an unpleasant situation occurs - in a foolish attempt to disperse a rally on the Maidan, his party and himself are eventually dispersed. But how is this seen from Moscow? During the Maidan, armed nationalists (who, from the Kremlin's point of view, are backed by the EU and the U.S.) seized administrative buildings, resisted law enforcement, and thus forced the legally elected President Yanukovych to step down. It turns out that Yushchenko, a prot茅g茅 of the EU and the US, sat out his entire presidential term, while Yanukovych was overthrown (this is where one can find an explanation for Putin's words that "Russia was deceived"). Further, in the east of Ukraine, the anti-Maidan participants begin to copy the actions of people in Kiev, i.e., they begin to seize administrative buildings, against which the new government decides to send not even Berkut but tanks. I think this is how people in the Kremlin saw the situation. The West did not react to it, i.e., did not react to the Ukrainian analog of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, or as it is called in Ukraine - the ATO. After that, the Kremlin decided to act more openly because "Russia was deceived". Again, the reason for these tragic events is the unresolved problems, if not 1991, then 2004, which, like a snowball, only increased in size, reaching a peak in 2014 and 2022. This is the case when I agree with the author that the unresolved issue with Crimea and Russian-Ukrainian relations in general led to a big war. However, I want to emphasize the main thing - there is nothing in the book about the anti-Russian discourse that began in Ukraine in 2004. The author of this book reduces everything to geopolitics and the struggle for Ukraine's independence from Moscow. The only thing worth noting here is when the author writes that Russia has explicitly told NATO countries and Ukraine that it will start a war if Ukraine joins NATO, so I don't understand why these explicit warnings from Russia were ignored. After all, in such a case, it was necessary either to start negotiations on normalization of relations with Russia and refusal to join NATO or to prepare for war with Russia, i.e., to mine the territory, erect fortifications, create Dragon's teeth (fortifications), etc. Ukraine took the third way, i.e., decided to continue to prepare for NATO membership, abandoning the idea of preparing for war. This is probably the craziest policy I have seen. Only the policy of the USSR and Russia itself is more insane.
袙褋械谐写邪 胁械写褜 薪械褋谢懈 泻褉邪褋芯褌褍
小芯蟹懈写邪谢懈 胁 褋褎械褉械 锌褉械泻褉邪褋薪芯谐芯
袪械蟹褍谢褜褌邪褌 斜褘胁邪谢 褋械薪褌懈屑械薪褌邪谢械薪
小胁械褌谢芯械 褔褌芯-褌芯 锌芯写褋泻邪蟹褘胁邪谢
袦褘 胁 薪邪褕械屑 斜褘褌褍
袨谢懈褑械褌胁芯褉褟谢懈 写褉褍卸斜褍 薪邪褉芯写芯胁 胁 写械泄褋褌胁懈懈
袚芯褉懈 褌褘 胁 邪写褍
袙褋褟, 斜谢褟写褜, 锌褉芯褕懈胁泻邪 褝褌邪 褋芯胁械褌褋泻邪褟
袗胁褌芯褉 锌械褉械褋泻邪蟹褘胁邪械褌 胁 褏褉芯薪芯谢芯谐懈褔械褋泻芯屑 锌芯褉褟写泻械 懈褋褌芯褉懈褔械褋泻懈械 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟, 薪邪褔懈薪邪褟 褋 1991 谐芯写邪 懈 蟹邪泻邪薪褔懈胁邪褟 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟屑懈 2014. 袨写薪邪泻芯 泻邪泻 褌芯谢褜泻芯 屑褘 胁 泻薪懈谐械 写芯褏芯写懈屑 写芯 褋芯斜褘褌懈泄 袨褉邪薪卸械胁芯泄 褉械胁芯谢褞褑懈懈 2004, 褋 褝褌芯谐芯 屑械褋褌邪 泻薪懈谐邪 薪邪褔懈薪邪械褌 芯褔械薪褜 褋懈谢褜薪芯 锌芯褏芯写懈褌褜 薪邪 锌械褉械褋泻邪蟹 小袦袠. 袗胁褌芯褉 锌褘褌邪械褌褋褟 写械谢邪褌褜 懈 褋胁芯懈 褋芯斜褋褌胁械薪薪褘械 胁褘胁芯写褘, 褌芯谢褜泻芯 芯褌 褝褌芯谐芯 泻薪懈谐邪 薪械 褋褌邪薪芯胁懈褌褋褟 屑械薪械械 锌芯褏芯卸械泄 薪邪 褋斜芯褉薪懈泻 褋褌邪褌械泄.
袙褌芯褉邪褟 斜芯谢褜褕邪褟 锌褉芯斜谢械屑邪 泻薪懈谐懈 蟹邪泻谢褞褔邪械褌褋褟 胁 褌芯屑, 褔褌芯 邪胁褌芯褉 褋芯胁械褉褕械薪薪芯 薪懈褔械谐芯 薪械 谐芯胁芯褉懈褌 芯 谐谢邪胁薪芯泄 锌褉懈褔懈薪械 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪 屑械卸写褍 袪芯褋褋懈械泄 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄. 袗胁褌芯褉 褏芯褌褜 懈 胁褋泻芯谢褜蟹褜 褍锌芯屑懈薪邪械褌 芯 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈褋褌邪褏 薪邪 袦邪泄写邪薪械 胁 2014 谐芯写褍, 薪芯 芯褕懈斜邪械褌褋褟 胁 锌褉懈褔懈薪邪褏 泻褉懈蟹懈褋邪. 小芯谐谢邪褋薪芯 邪胁褌芯褉褍, 泻芯褉薪懈 薪褘薪械褕薪械谐芯 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪 薪褍卸薪芯 懈褋泻邪褌褜 胁 1991 谐芯写褍, 泻芯谐写邪 褌邪泻 懈 薪械 斜褘谢 褉械褕褢薪 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌 胁芯泻褉褍谐 袣褉褘屑邪. 孝芯褌 卸械 袗谢械泻褋械泄 袗褉械褋褌芯胁懈褔 蟹邪褟胁谢褟械褌, 褔褌芯 锌械褉胁褘泄 褏芯写 胁 褝褌芯泄 泻芯薪褎褉芯薪褌邪褑懈懈 褋写械谢邪谢邪 袪芯褋褋懈褟, 泻芯谐写邪 锌芯锌褘褌邪谢邪褋褜 胁 90-褏 谐芯写邪褏, 褌芯 谢懈 锌褉芯懈蟹胁械褋褌懈 锌械褉胁褍褞 锌芯锌褘褌泻褍 蟹邪褏胁邪褌邪 袣褉褘屑邪 褌芯 谢懈 褔褌芯-褌芯 胁 褝褌芯屑 褉芯写械. 袨写薪邪泻芯 褟 薪械 褋芯谐谢邪褋械薪 褋 褝褌懈屑懈 锌芯蟹懈褑懈褟屑懈. 小 屑芯械泄 褌芯褔泻懈 蟹褉械薪懈褟 泻芯褉薪懈 谢械卸邪褌 胁 2004 谐芯写褍, 泻芯谐写邪 挟褖械薪泻芯 蟹邪褔械屑-褌芯 褉械褕懈谢 锌芯写薪褟褌褜 褌械屑褍 袚芯谢芯写芯屑芯褉邪. 袧械褋屑芯褌褉褟 薪邪 褌芯, 褔褌芯 芯薪 蟹邪褟胁谢褟谢, 褔褌芯 褝褌芯 薪懈泻邪泻 薪械 褋胁褟蟹邪薪芯 褋 邪薪邪谢芯谐懈械泄 薪邪 褌械泻褍褖褍褞 袪芯褋褋懈褞, 薪褍卸薪芯 斜褘褌褜 锌芯谢薪褘屑 懈写懈芯褌芯屑, 褔褌芯斜褘 薪械 褍胁懈写械褌褜 褌邪泻芯械 褋褉邪胁薪械薪懈械 小小小袪 懈 袪肖. 袛邪, 胁芯蟹屑芯卸薪芯 挟褖械薪泻芯 褝褌芯 褋写械谢邪谢, 锌芯褌芯屑褍 褔褌芯 褌邪泻 锌褉懈薪褟褌芯 胁 褋芯胁褉械屑械薪薪芯泄 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻械, 泻芯谐写邪 芯写薪邪 写芯屑懈薪懈褉褍褞褖邪褟 锌邪褉褌懈褟 胁褋械谐写邪 锌褉芯褟胁谢褟械褌 芯锌锌芯蟹懈褑懈褞 褌芯屑褍, 蟹邪 褔褌芯 谐芯谢芯褋褍械褌 懈谢懈 褔褌芯 锌褉芯写胁懈谐邪械褌 懈褏 谐谢邪胁薪褘泄 褋芯锌械褉薪懈泻, 褌.械. 写褉褍谐邪褟 写芯屑懈薪懈褉褍褞褖邪褟 锌邪褉褌懈褟. 袝褋谢懈 袩邪褉褌懈褟 袪械谐懈芯薪芯胁 锌芯蟹懈褑懈芯薪懈褉褍械褌 褋械斜褟 泻邪泻 谐谢邪胁薪芯谐芯 褋芯褞蟹薪懈泻邪 袪芯褋褋懈懈, 褌芯 谐谢邪胁薪邪褟 芯锌锌芯蟹懈褑懈芯薪薪邪褟 锌邪褉褌懈褟 锌芯蟹懈褑懈芯薪懈褉褍械褌 褋械斜褟 胁 泻邪褔械褋褌胁械 褋芯褞蟹薪懈泻邪 袝胁褉芯锌褘. 袣邪泻 谐芯胁芯褉懈褌褋褟, 芦械褋谢懈 袝胁褌褍褕械薪泻芯 锌褉芯褌懈胁 泻芯谢褏芯蟹芯胁, 褌芯 褌芯谐写邪 褟 蟹邪 泻芯谢褏芯蟹褘禄. 袙芯褌 胁 褝褌芯泄 懈褋褌芯褉懈懈 锌褉芯懈蟹芯褕谢芯 褉芯胁薪芯 褌芯 卸械 褋邪屑芯械. 袩褉芯斜谢械屑褘 斜褘 胁 褝褌芯屑 薪懈泻邪泻芯泄 薪械 斜褘谢芯 斜褘, 械褋谢懈 斜褘 褋芯褋械写芯屑 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 薪械 斜褘谢邪 斜褘 写懈泻褌邪褌芯褉褋泻邪褟 懈 薪械邪写械泻胁邪褌薪邪褟 袪芯褋褋懈褟, 邪 褏芯褌褟 斜褘 袣邪蟹邪褏褋褌邪薪. 袘械写邪 褋芯褋褌芯褟谢邪 胁 褌芯屑, 褔褌芯 袪芯褋褋懈褟 褉械褕懈谢邪 锌褉懈薪褟褌褜 褝褌褍, 泻邪泻 谐芯胁芯褉褟褌 胁 褎褍褌斜芯谢械, 锌芯写邪褔褍 芯褌 挟褖械薪泻芯. 袩芯褝褌芯屑褍 芯褌胁械褌褋褌胁械薪薪芯褋褌褜 蟹邪 薪邪褔邪谢芯 褋械谐芯写薪褟褕薪械泄 褌褉邪谐械写懈懈 谢械卸懈褌 薪邪 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻邪褏, 泻邪泻 校泻褉邪懈薪褘, 褌邪泻 懈 袪芯褋褋懈懈 (锌褍褋褌褜 懈 胁 褉邪蟹薪褘褏 锌褉芯锌芯褉褑懈褟褏). 小 褝褌芯谐芯 懈 薪邪褔邪谢懈褋褜 胁褋械 锌褉芯斜谢械屑褘. 袥懈褔薪芯 褟 写褍屑邪褞, 褔褌芯 褌邪泻芯械 薪械邪写械泻胁邪褌薪芯械 写械泄褋褌胁懈械 褋芯 褋褌芯褉芯薪褘 袪肖 斜褘谢芯 褋胁褟蟹邪薪薪芯 褌芯谢褜泻芯 褋 芯写薪懈屑 鈥� 薪邪泄褌懈 胁薪械褕薪械谐芯 胁褉邪谐邪, 胁 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯褋褌芯褟薪懈懈 泻芯褌芯褉芯屑褍 屑芯卸薪芯 斜褘谢芯 芯斜褗械写懈薪懈褌褜 褋褌褉邪薪褍. 袝写懈薪褋褌胁械薪薪褘泄 屑芯屑械薪褌 胁 泻薪懈谐械, 谐写械 褟 褋芯谐谢邪褋械薪 褋 邪胁褌芯褉芯屑, 褝褌芯 胁 胁芯锌褉芯褋械 薪械褉械褕褢薪薪芯谐芯 泻褉褘屑褋泻芯谐芯 胁芯锌褉芯褋邪. 袛邪, 胁芯锌褉芯褋 褋 袣褉褘屑芯屑 薪褍卸薪芯 斜褘谢芯 褉械褕懈褌褜 械褖褢 胁 1991 谐芯写褍. 携 薪械 蟹薪邪褞 泻邪泻, 薪芯 邪斜褋芯谢褞褌薪芯 褍胁械褉械薪, 褔褌芯 芦斜芯谢褜褕懈械 写褟写懈禄 褋 薪邪褍褔薪褘屑懈 褋褌械锌械薪褟屑懈 芯锌褉械写械谢褢薪薪芯 屑芯谐谢懈 薪邪泄褌懈 褉械褕械薪懈械, 泻芯褌芯褉芯械 褍褋褌褉芯懈谢芯 斜褘 懈 褍泻褉邪懈薪褋泻褍褞 褋褌芯褉芯薪褍 懈 褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻褍褞. 袩芯褔械屑褍 薪械 褉械褕懈谢懈? 袛邪 泻褌芯 卸 屑芯谐 锌芯写褍屑邪褌褜, 褔褌芯 袪芯褋褋懈褟 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 写芯泄写褍褌 写芯 褌邪泻芯谐芯 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 泻邪泻 芯褌泻褉褘褌芯械 胁芯械薪薪芯械 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯褋褌芯褟薪懈械? 袣褉褘屑 薪械 褟胁谢褟谢褋褟 胁 袪芯褋褋懈懈 胁邪卸薪褘屑 胁芯锌褉芯褋 薪懈 胁 90-褏, 薪懈 胁 2000-褏 懈 写邪卸械 胁 2014 谐芯写褍 屑邪谢芯 泻褌芯 芯 薪褢屑 胁褋锌芯屑懈薪邪谢. 孝邪泻 褔褌芯 芦效械泄 袣褉褘屑禄, 褟胁谢褟械褌褋褟 懈褋泻褍褋褋褌胁械薪薪芯泄 锌褉芯斜谢械屑芯泄. 袧芯 褍 邪胁褌芯褉邪 懈屑械薪薪芯 袣褉褘屑 懈 薪械 芦锌芯写泻芯薪褌褉芯谢褜薪邪褟禄 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 褟胁谢褟褞褌褋褟 谐谢邪胁薪褘屑懈 锌褉懈褔懈薪邪屑懈 胁芯械薪薪芯谐芯 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪. 携 褋 褝褌懈屑 薪械 褋芯谐谢邪褋械薪 懈 泻薪懈谐邪, 褏芯褌褜 懈 锌械褉械褋泻邪蟹褘胁邪械褌 薪芯胁芯褋褌薪褘械 褋芯芯斜褖械薪懈褟 褌械褏 谢械褌, 薪械 褟胁谢褟械褌褋褟 褍斜械写懈褌械谢褜薪芯泄 胁 褝褌芯屑 胁芯锌褉芯褋械 (锌芯褌芯屑褍 褔褌芯 锌芯胁械褉褏薪芯褋褌薪邪 懈 锌褉芯褋褌芯 锌械褉械褋泻邪蟹褘胁邪械褌 褋褌邪褌褜懈 胁 小袦袠 褌械褏 谢械褌). 袛邪, 邪胁褌芯褉 胁褋械 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 芯锌懈褋褘胁邪械褌 胁械褉薪芯, 懈 泻 褋邪屑芯屑褍 褌械泻褋褌褍 褍 屑械薪褟 锌褉械褌械薪蟹懈泄 薪械褌. 袩褉械褌械薪蟹懈褟 褍 屑械薪褟 泻 褌芯屑褍, 泻褍写邪 薪邪锌褉邪胁谢褟械褌 胁薪懈屑邪薪懈械 褔懈褌邪褌械谢械泄 邪胁褌芯褉.
袠褌邪泻, 锌械褉胁邪褟 锌芯谢芯胁懈薪邪 泻薪懈谐懈 褉邪褋褋泻邪蟹褘胁邪械褌 芯 褌芯屑, 泻邪泻 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 褉邪蟹芯褉褍卸邪谢邪褋褜 胁 1991 谐芯写褍. 袛邪谢械械 懈写褍褌 屑邪谢芯锌芯薪褟褌薪褘械 写谢褟 屑械薪褟 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 胁芯泻褉褍谐 袣褉褘屑邪. 协褌芯 褌芯卸械 锌芯薪褟褌薪芯, 薪芯 泻邪泻 褟 褋泻邪蟹邪谢, 胁褋褢 褝褌芯 薪械 褟胁谢褟谢芯褋褜 锌械褉械谢芯屑薪褘屑 屑芯屑械薪褌芯屑 胁 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈褟褏 屑械卸写褍 袪芯褋褋懈械泄 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄. 袨褉邪薪卸械胁邪褟 袪械胁芯谢褞褑懈褟 - 胁芯褌 褌褍褌 褍卸械 懈 薪邪褔邪谢邪褋褜 胁褋褟 褝褌邪 泻邪薪懈褌械谢褜. 袣邪泻懈褏-褌芯 芯褋芯斜芯 懈薪褌械褉械褋薪褘褏 褎邪泻褌芯胁 褟 褌褍褌 薪械 芯斜薪邪褉褍卸懈谢, 懈斜芯 邪胁褌芯褉 锌芯胁械褉褏薪芯褋褌械薪. 袛邪谢械械 懈写褢褌 谐邪蟹芯胁邪褟 胁芯泄薪邪 屑械卸写褍 袪肖 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄 懈 褌褍褌 褌芯卸械 卸械 胁褋褢 褌芯 卸械 褋邪屑芯械, 褔褌芯 屑褘 薪邪褏芯写懈屑 胁 小袦袠 蟹邪 褌芯褌 锌械褉懈芯写. 袩褉懈褔懈薪邪 谐邪蟹芯胁芯谐芯 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪 屑薪械 写芯 泻芯薪褑邪 薪械 褟褋薪邪, 薪芯 褌邪泻 泻邪泻 袪芯褋褋懈褟 褌邪泻褍褞 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻褍 锌褘褌邪谢邪褋褜 懈褋锌芯谢褜蟹芯胁邪褌褜 懈 胁 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈懈 袘械谢芯褉褍褋褋懈懈 (锌芯胁褘褕械薪懈械 褑械薪 蟹邪 谐邪蟹), 褌芯 屑芯谐褍 锌褉械写锌芯谢芯卸懈褌褜, 褔褌芯 锌褉懈褔懈薪 谐邪蟹芯胁芯泄 胁芯泄薪褘 斜褘谢芯 薪械褋泻芯谢褜泻芯, 胁泻谢褞褔邪褟 褋褍谐褍斜芯 褎懈薪邪薪褋芯胁褘泄 胁芯锌褉芯褋. 协褌邪 懈褋褌芯褉懈褟 褌褢屑薪邪褟 懈 薪械锌芯薪褟褌薪邪褟 泻邪泻 褋芯 褋褌芯褉芯薪褘 校泻褉邪懈薪褘, 褌邪泻 懈 褋芯 褋褌芯褉芯薪褘 袪芯褋褋懈懈. 袧褍 邪 写邪谢褜褕械 胁芯蟹胁褉邪褖械薪懈械 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔邪 懈 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 袝胁褉芯屑邪泄写邪薪邪.
袣邪褋邪褌械谢褜薪芯 袝胁褉芯屑邪泄写邪薪邪 胁 2014 谐芯写褍 薪褍卸薪芯 芯褌写邪褌褜 写芯谢卸薪芯械 邪胁褌芯褉褍, 懈斜芯 芯薪 薪械锌谢芯褏芯 锌械褉械写邪褢褌 胁薪褍褌褉械薪薪褞褞 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻褍 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔邪, 泻芯谐写邪 褌芯褌 锌褉懈褕褢谢 泻 胁谢邪褋褌懈. 袗胁褌芯褉 薪械锌谢芯褏芯, 褏芯褌褟 懈 锌芯胁械褉褏薪芯褋褌薪芯, 芯锌懈褋邪谢 锌芯褋褌褉芯械薪懈械 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔械屑 邪胁褌芯褉懈褌邪褉薪芯泄 胁谢邪褋褌懈. 袙锌褉芯褔械屑, 褌芯褌 褎邪泻褌, 褔褌芯 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔 锌褘褌邪谢褋褟 斜褘褌褜 (褋褌邪褌褜) 写懈泻褌邪褌芯褉芯屑 写谢褟 屑械薪褟 薪械 褟胁谢褟械褌褋褟 薪芯胁芯褋褌褜褞, 褋褞褉锌褉懈蟹芯屑. 袛械泄褋褌胁懈褟 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔邪 锌芯 褉邪蟹谐芯薪褍 邪斜褋芯谢褞褌薪芯 斜械蟹胁褉械写薪芯谐芯 写谢褟 薪械谐芯 屑懈褌懈薪谐邪 薪邪 袦邪泄写邪薪械 胁褘写邪褢褌 胁 薪褢屑 褔械谢芯胁械泻邪 谐谢褍锌芯谐芯 懈 薪械写邪谢褜薪芯胁懈写薪芯谐芯. 袨写薪邪泻芯 泻邪褋邪械屑芯 袝胁褉芯屑邪泄写邪薪邪 邪胁褌芯褉 薪懈褔械谐芯 薪械 谐芯胁芯褉懈褌 芯 谐谢邪胁薪芯屑, 褌.械. 芯 褌芯屑, 褔褌芯 胁械谢芯 褋懈褌褍邪褑懈褞 泻 泻褉芯胁邪胁芯泄 褉邪蟹胁褟蟹泻械 鈥� 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯褋褌芯褟薪懈懈 屑械卸写褍 蟹邪锌邪写薪芯泄 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄 懈 胁芯褋褌芯褔薪芯泄 懈 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯锌芯褋褌邪胁谢械薪懈懈 袝胁褉芯锌褘 懈 袪芯褋褋懈懈 胁 泻芯薪褌械泻褋褌械 褍泻褉邪懈薪褋泻芯谐芯 芯斜褖械褋褌胁邪. 袝褋谢懈 懈蟹褍褔邪褌褜 褌械 褋芯斜褘褌懈褟 锌芯 褝褌芯泄 泻薪懈谐械 胁芯蟹薪懈泻薪械褌 芯褖褍褖械薪懈械, 褔褌芯 薪懈泻邪泻芯泄 邪薪褌懈褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯泄 锌芯胁械褋褌泻懈 薪械 斜褘谢芯 薪懈 胁 2004, 薪懈 胁 2014. 袛邪, 斜褘谢懈 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈褋褌褘, 薪芯 芯薪懈 锌褉芯 袪芯褋褋懈褞 薪懈褔械谐芯 薪械 谐芯胁芯褉懈谢懈. 袘芯谢械械 褌芯谐芯, 褌邪泻芯械 褔褍胁褋褌胁芯, 褔褌芯 邪胁褌芯褉 胁芯芯斜褖械 薪械 胁 泻褍褉褋械 锌褉芯褌懈胁芯褋褌芯褟薪懈褟 屑械卸写褍 胁芯褋褌芯褔薪芯泄 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄 懈 蟹邪锌邪写薪芯泄. 袣邪泻 褟 薪邪锌懈褋邪谢 胁褘褕械, 褟 褋褔懈褌邪褞 褝褌芯 芯褋薪芯胁薪芯泄 锌褉懈褔懈薪芯泄. 携 写邪卸械 写褍屑邪褞, 褔褌芯 械褋谢懈 斜褘 褉械胁芯谢褞褑懈褞 写械谢邪谢懈 斜褘 褋褍谐褍斜芯 薪邪 邪薪褌懈邪胁褌芯褉懈褌邪褉薪褘褏 谢芯蟹褍薪谐邪褏 懈 薪懈泻邪泻 薪械 褍锌芯屑懈薪邪谢懈 斜褘 袪芯褋褋懈褞, 邪 褌邪泻卸械 薪械 懈屑械谢懈 褌邪泻芯械 褋懈谢褜薪芯械 薪邪锌褉褟卸械薪懈械 屑械卸写褍 胁芯褋褌芯褔薪芯泄 校泻褉邪懈薪芯泄 懈 蟹邪锌邪写薪芯泄, 褌芯 薪懈泻邪泻芯谐芯 斜褘 胁芯械薪薪芯谐芯 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌邪 薪械 斜褘谢芯 斜褘. 袘芯谢械械 褌芯谐芯, 褟 褋懈谢褜薪芯 褋芯屑薪械胁邪褞褋褜, 褔褌芯 袪芯褋褋懈褟 斜褘谢邪 斜褘 褌邪泻 褋懈谢褜薪芯 锌褉芯褌懈胁 胁褋褌褍锌谢械薪懈褟 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 胁 袝小. 携 锌芯薪懈屑邪褞, 褔褌芯 屑芯懈 褋谢芯胁邪 屑芯谐褍褌 斜褘褌褜 褍胁懈写械薪褘 泻邪泻 锌芯锌褘褌泻邪 锌械褉械谢芯卸懈褌褜 胁褋褞 芯褌胁械褌褋褌胁械薪薪芯褋褌褜 蟹邪 褋械谐芯写薪褟褕薪械械 褋 袪肖 薪邪 校泻褉邪懈薪褍, 薪芯 褋屑褘褋谢 胁 褌芯屑, 褔褌芯 懈屑械薪薪芯 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻懈 袪芯褋褋懈懈 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 (懈 芯褌褔邪褋褌懈 袝小 懈 小楔袗) 褋写械谢邪谢懈 胁褋褢 胁芯蟹屑芯卸薪芯械, 褔褌芯斜褘 胁芯泄薪邪 褋谢褍褔懈谢邪褋褜. 袣芯褉芯褔械 谐芯胁芯褉褟, 锌芯谢褍褔邪械褌褋褟, 褔褌芯 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻懈 芯斜械懈褏 褋褌芯褉芯薪 薪械 卸械谢邪谢懈 褉械褕邪褌褜 褋褍褖械褋褌胁褍褞褖懈械 泻芯薪褎谢懈泻褌褘 薪懈 胁 90-褏, 泻芯褌芯褉褘械 斜褘谢懈 褋胁褟蟹邪薪褘 褋 袣褉褘屑芯屑 懈 小械胁邪褋褌芯锌芯谢械屑 薪懈 胁 2004, 泻芯褌芯褉褘械 斜褘谢懈 褋胁褟蟹邪薪褘 褋 袚芯谢芯写芯屑芯褉芯屑 懈 褉芯谢褜褞 小小小袪 薪懈 胁 2014, 泻芯谐写邪 校泻褉邪懈薪褍 褉邪蟹写械谢懈谢懈 薪邪 锌褉芯褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻褍褞 懈 锌褉芯械胁褉芯锌械泄褋泻褍褞.
效懈褌邪褟 泻薪懈谐褍 褟 褍胁懈写械谢 褌芯, 褔械谐芯 薪械 胁懈写械谢 褉邪薪褜褕械: 泻邪褉褌懈薪褍 褌芯谐芯 泻邪泻 懈褋褌芯褉懈褞 褋 袝胁褉芯屑邪泄写邪薪芯屑 胁懈写械谢懈 懈蟹 芯泻芯薪 袣褉械屑谢褟. 小薪邪褔邪谢邪 胁褘斜褉邪谢懈 挟褖械薪泻芯, 蟹邪 锌芯斜械写芯泄 泻芯褌芯褉芯谐芯 褋褌芯褟谢懈 蟹邪锌邪写薪褘械 褋褌褉邪薪褘 (褋 褌芯褔泻懈 蟹褉械薪懈褟 袣褉械屑谢褟). 啸芯褉芯褕芯, 袪芯褋褋懈褟 胁 懈褌芯谐械 褋芯谐谢邪褋懈谢邪褋褜, 薪芯 胁 芯褌屑械褋褌泻褍, 锌褉械写锌芯谢芯卸懈褌械谢褜薪芯, 薪邪褔邪谢邪 谐邪蟹芯胁褍褞 胁芯泄薪褍 (胁芯蟹屑芯卸薪芯 胁 泻邪褔械褋褌胁械 褋锌械泻褌邪泻谢褟 写谢褟 械写懈薪械薪懈褟 褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯谐芯 薪邪褉芯写邪 胁芯泻褉褍谐 谢懈写械褉邪). 袛邪谢械械 锌褉懈褏芯写懈褌 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔, 褋 泻芯褌芯褉褘屑 锌褉芯懈褋褏芯写懈褌 薪械锌褉懈褟褌薪邪褟 褋懈褌褍邪褑懈褟 - 锌褉懈 写褍褉邪褑泻芯泄 锌芯锌褘褌泻懈 褉邪蟹芯谐薪邪褌褜 屑懈褌懈薪谐 薪邪 袦邪泄写邪薪械 胁 懈褌芯谐械 褉邪蟹谐芯薪褟褞褌 械谐芯 锌邪褉褌懈褞 懈 械谐芯 褋邪屑芯谐芯. 袧芯 泻邪泻 褝褌芯 胁懈写懈褌褋褟 懈蟹 袦芯褋泻胁褘? 袙芯 胁褉械屑褟 袦邪泄写邪薪邪 胁芯芯褉褍卸褢薪薪褘械 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈褋褌褘 (蟹邪 泻芯褌芯褉褘屑懈, 褋 褌芯褔泻懈 蟹褉械薪懈褟 袣褉械屑谢褟, 褋褌芯褟褌 袝小 懈 小楔袗) 蟹邪褏胁邪褌褘胁邪褞褌 邪写屑懈薪懈褋褌褉邪褌懈胁薪褘械 蟹写邪薪懈褟, 芯泻邪蟹褘胁邪褞褌 褋芯锌褉芯褌懈胁谢械薪懈械 锌褉邪胁芯芯褏褉邪薪懈褌械谢褜薪褘屑 芯褉谐邪薪邪屑 懈 褌邪泻懈屑 芯斜褉邪蟹芯屑 胁褘薪褍卸写邪褞褌 褍泄褌懈 蟹邪泻芯薪薪芯 懈蟹斜褉邪薪薪芯谐芯 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌邪 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔邪. 袩芯谢褍褔邪械褌褋褟, 褔褌芯 褋褌邪胁谢械薪薪懈泻 袝小 懈 小楔袗 - 挟褖械薪泻芯 - 写芯褋懈写械谢 胁械褋褜 褋胁芯泄 锌褉械蟹懈写械薪褌褋泻懈泄 褋褉芯泻, 邪 携薪褍泻芯胁懈褔褍 薪械 写邪谢懈 (懈屑械薪薪芯 褌褍褌 屑芯卸薪芯 薪邪泄褌懈 芯斜褗褟褋薪械薪懈械 褋谢芯胁 袩褍褌懈薪邪, 褔褌芯 芦袪芯褋褋懈褞 芯斜屑邪薪褍谢懈禄). 袛邪谢械械, 薪邪 胁芯褋褌芯泻械 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 褍褔邪褋褌薪懈泻懈 邪薪褌懈-袦邪泄写邪薪邪 薪邪褔懈薪邪褞褌 泻芯锌懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 写械泄褋褌胁懈褟 谢褞写械泄 胁 袣懈械胁械, 褌.械. 薪邪褔懈薪邪褞褌 蟹邪褏胁邪褌褘胁邪褌褜 邪写屑懈薪懈褋褌褉邪褌懈胁薪褘械 蟹写邪薪懈褟, 薪邪 褔褌芯 薪芯胁邪褟 胁谢邪褋褌褜 褉械褕邪械褌 锌芯褋谢邪褌褜 写邪卸械 薪械 袘械褉泻褍褌, 邪 褋褉邪蟹褍 褌邪薪泻懈. 携 写褍屑邪褞, 懈屑械薪薪芯 褌邪泻 褍胁懈写械谢懈 褋懈褌褍邪褑懈褞 谢褞写懈 胁 袣褉械屑谢械. 袟邪锌邪写 卸械 薪懈泻邪泻 薪邪 褝褌芯 薪械 芯褌褉械邪谐懈褉芯胁邪谢, 褌.械. 薪懈泻邪泻 薪械 芯褌褉械邪谐懈褉芯胁邪谢 薪邪 褍泻褉邪懈薪褋泻懈泄 邪薪邪谢芯谐 泻芯薪褌褉褌械褉褉芯褉懈褋褌懈褔械褋泻芯泄 芯锌械褉邪褑懈懈 胁 效械褔薪械 懈谢懈 泻邪泻 芯斜芯蟹薪邪褔懈谢懈 械褢 胁 校泻褉邪懈薪械 鈥� 袗孝袨. 袩芯褋谢械 褝褌芯谐芯 胁 袣褉械屑谢械 褉械褕懈谢懈 写械泄褋褌胁芯胁邪褌褜 斜芯谢械械 芯褌泻褉褘褌芯, 懈斜芯 芦袪芯褋褋懈褞 芯斜屑邪薪褍谢懈禄. 袨锌褟褌褜 卸械, 锌褉懈褔懈薪邪 褝褌懈褏 褌褉邪谐懈褔械褋泻懈褏 褋芯斜褘褌懈泄 - 薪械褉械褕褢薪薪褘械 锌褉芯斜谢械屑褘 械褋谢懈 薪械 1991, 褌芯 2004 谐芯写邪, 泻芯褌芯褉褘械, 锌芯写芯斜薪芯 褋薪械卸薪芯屑褍 泻芯屑褍, 谢懈褕褜 褍胁械谢懈褔懈胁邪谢邪褋褜 胁 褉邪蟹屑械褉械 懈 褍胁械谢懈褔懈胁邪谢邪褋褜, 写芯褋褌懈谐薪褍胁 锌懈泻邪 胁 2014 懈 2022. 袠 褝褌芯 褌芯褌 褋谢褍褔邪泄, 泻芯谐写邪 褟 褋芯谐谢邪褋械薪 褋 邪胁褌芯褉芯屑, 褔褌芯 薪械褉械褕褢薪薪褘泄 胁芯锌褉芯褋 褋 袣褉褘屑芯屑 懈 胁 褑械谢芯屑, 褋 褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻芯-褍泻褉邪懈薪褋泻懈屑懈 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈褟屑懈, 锌褉懈胁褢谢 胁 懈褌芯谐械 泻 斜芯谢褜褕芯泄 胁芯泄薪械. 袨写薪邪泻芯 褟 褏芯褔褍 锌芯写褔械褉泻薪褍褌褜 谐谢邪胁薪芯械 鈥� 胁 泻薪懈谐械 薪械褌 薪懈褔械谐芯 锌褉芯 邪薪褌懈褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻懈泄 写懈褋泻褍褉褋, 泻芯褌芯褉褘泄 薪邪褔邪谢褋褟 胁 校泻褉邪懈薪械 褋 2004 谐芯写邪. 袗胁褌芯褉 褝褌芯泄 泻薪懈谐懈 胁褋褢 褋胁芯写懈褌 泻 谐械芯锌芯谢懈褌懈泻械 懈 斜芯褉褜斜械 蟹邪 薪械蟹邪胁懈褋懈屑芯褋褌褜 校泻褉邪懈薪褘 芯褌 袦芯褋泻胁褘. 袝写懈薪褋褌胁械薪薪芯械 褔褌芯 褌褍褌 褋褌芯懈褌 芯褌屑械褌懈褌褜, 褝褌芯 泻芯谐写邪 邪胁褌芯褉 锌懈褕械褌, 褔褌芯 袪芯褋褋懈褟 锌褉褟屑芯 蟹邪褟胁懈谢邪 褋褌褉邪薪邪屑 袧袗孝袨 懈 校泻褉邪懈薪械 褔褌芯 芯薪邪 薪邪褔薪褢褌 胁芯泄薪褍, 械褋谢懈 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 胁褋褌褍锌懈褌 胁 袧袗孝袨, 胁褋谢械写褋褌胁懈械 褔械谐芯 屑薪械 薪械 锌芯薪褟褌薪芯, 锌芯褔械屑褍 斜褘谢懈 锌褉芯懈谐薪芯褉懈褉芯胁邪薪褘 褝褌懈 芯褌泻褉芯胁械薪薪褘械 锌褉械写褍锌褉械卸写械薪懈褟 褋芯 褋褌芯褉芯薪褘 袪肖? 袙械写褜 胁 褌邪泻芯屑 褋谢褍褔邪懈 薪褍卸薪芯 斜褘谢芯 谢懈斜芯 薪邪褔邪褌褜 锌械褉械谐芯胁芯褉褘 锌芯 薪芯褉屑邪谢懈蟹邪褑懈懈 芯褌薪芯褕械薪懈泄 褋 袪肖 懈 芯褌泻邪蟹邪 芯褌 胁褋褌褍锌谢械薪懈褟 胁 袧袗孝袨 谢懈斜芯 蟹邪薪懈屑邪褌褜褋褟 锌芯写谐芯褌芯胁泻芯泄 泻 胁芯泄薪械 褋 袪芯褋褋懈械泄, 褌.械. 屑懈薪懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 褌械褉褉懈褌芯褉懈褞, 胁芯蟹写胁懈谐邪褌褜 褎芯褉褌懈褎懈泻邪褑懈芯薪薪褘械 褋芯芯褉褍卸械薪懈褟, 褋芯蟹写邪胁邪褌褜 芦蟹褍斜褘 写褉邪泻芯薪邪禄 懈 锌褉. 校泻褉邪懈薪邪 锌芯褕谢邪 褌褉械褌褜懈屑 锌褍褌械屑, 褌.械. 褉械褕懈谢邪 懈 写邪谢褜褕械 谐芯褌芯胁懈褌褜褋褟 泻 胁褋褌褍锌谢械薪懈褞 胁 袧袗孝袨, 锌芯谢薪芯褋褌褜褞 芯褌泻邪蟹邪胁褕懈褋褜 芯褌 懈写械懈 锌芯写谐芯褌芯胁泻懈 泻 胁芯泄薪械. 袩芯卸邪谢褍泄, 褝褌芯 褋邪屑邪褟 斜械蟹褍屑薪邪褟 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻邪, 泻芯褌芯褉褍褞 褟 胁懈写械谢. 袘械蟹褍屑薪械泄 褌芯谢褜泻芯 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻邪 小小小袪 懈 褋邪屑芯泄 袪芯褋褋懈懈.
The author retells historical events in chronological order, starting from 1991 and ending with the events of 2014. However, as soon as we get to the events of the Orange Revolution 2004, the book starts to look very much like a media retelling. The author tries to make his own conclusions, but this does not make the book any less like a collection of articles.
The second big problem with the book is that the author says nothing about the main reason for the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Although the author mentions, in passing, the nationalists on the Maidan in 2014, he is wrong about the causes of the crisis. According to the author, the roots of the current conflict should be sought in 1991, when the conflict over Crimea was not resolved. The same Alexei Arestovich states that Russia had made the first move in this confrontation when Russia tried in the 90s to make the first attempt to seize Crimea or something like that. However, I do not agree with these positions. From my point of view, the roots lie in 2004, when Yushchenko decided to bring up the Holodomor for some reason. Despite the fact that he claimed that it had nothing to do with the analogy to current Russia, one would have to be a complete idiot not to see such a comparison between the USSR and the Russian Federation. Yes, Yushchenko may have done it because that's the way modern politics works, where one dominant party always shows opposition to what their main rival, i.e., the other dominant party, votes for or promotes. If the Party of Regions positions itself as Russia's main ally, the main opposition party positions itself as Europe's ally. As the saying goes, "If Yevtushenko is against collective farms, then I am for collective farms". The same thing happened in this story. There would have been no problem if Ukraine's neighbor had not been the dictatorial and inadequate Russia, but at least Kazakhstan. The trouble was that Russia decided to accept this, as they say in soccer, pitch from Yushchenko. Therefore, the responsibility for the beginning of today's tragedy lies with the politicians of both Ukraine and Russia (albeit in different proportions). This is where all the problems started. Personally, I think that such an inadequate action on the part of the Russian Federation was connected only with one thing - to find an external enemy to unite the country against. The only point in the book where I agree with the author is on the unresolved Crimean issue. Yes, the Crimea issue should have been resolved back in 1991. I don't know how, but I'm sure that smart people with scientific degrees could definitely find a solution that would suit both the Ukrainian side and the Russian side. Why didn't they? Who would have thought that Russia and Ukraine would reach such an event as an open military confrontation? Crimea was not an important issue in Russia either in the 90s or in the 2000s, and even in 2014, few people remembered it. So "Whose Crimea" is an artificial problem. But for the author, it was Crimea and not "controlled" Ukraine that are the main reasons for the military conflict. I do not agree with this, and the book, although it retells news reports of those years, is not convincing in this matter (because it is superficial and simply retells articles in the media of those years). Yes, the author describes all the events correctly, and I have no complaints about the text itself. I have a complaint about where the author directs the readers' attention.
So, the first half of the book is about how Ukraine was disarmed in 1991. Then there are the events around Crimea, which are not very clear to me. This is also understandable, but as I said, none of this was a turning point in relations between Russia and Ukraine. The Orange Revolution - that's where the whole mess started. I did not find any particularly interesting facts here because the author is superficial. Then comes the gas war between Russia and Ukraine, and here, too, all the same things that we find in the media for that period. The reason for the gas conflict is not completely clear to me, but, since Russia tried to use the same policy for Belarus (an increase in gas prices), I can assume that there were several reasons for the gas war, including a purely financial issue. This story is dark and incomprehensible both on the part of Ukraine and Russia. And then the return of Yanukovych and the events of Euromaidan.
Regarding the Euromaidan in 2014, the author should be given credit, for he did a pretty good job of conveying the internal politics of Yanukovych when he came to power. The author does a good, albeit superficial, job of describing Yanukovych's construction of an authoritarian government. However, the fact that Yanukovych tried to become a dictator is not a surprise to me. Yanukovych's actions in dispersing the Maidan rally, which was harmless to him, made him look foolish and shortsighted. However, about Euromaidan, the author says nothing about the main thing, i.e., what led the situation to a bloody denouement - the confrontation between Western Ukraine and Eastern Ukraine and the opposition between Europe and Russia in the context of Ukrainian society. If you study those events according to this book, you will get the feeling that there was no anti-Russian agenda in 2004 or 2014. Yes, there were nationalists, but they did not say anything about Russia. Moreover, it feels like the author is not aware of the confrontation between eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine at all. As I wrote above, I think this is the main reason. I even think that if the revolution had been made purely on anti-authoritarian slogans, and would not have mentioned Russia in any way, and would not have had such a strong tension between eastern Ukraine and western Ukraine, there would not have been any military conflict. Moreover, I highly doubt that Russia would be so much against Ukraine joining the EU. I realize that my words can be seen as an attempt to shift all responsibility for today's war from Russia to Ukraine, but the point is that it was the politicians of Russia and Ukraine (and partly the EU and the US) who did everything possible to make the war happen. In short, it turns out that politicians on both sides were unwilling to resolve the existing conflicts neither in the 90s, which were related to Crimea and Sevastopol, nor in 2004, which were related to the Holodomor and the role of the USSR, nor in 2014 when Ukraine was divided into pro-Russian and pro-European.
Reading the book, I saw something I had not seen before - a picture of how the Euromaidan story was seen from the windows of the Kremlin. First, Yushchenko was elected, whose victory was backed by Western countries (from the Kremlin's point of view). OK, Russia eventually agreed, but in retaliation, supposedly started a gas war (perhaps as a spectacle to unite the Russian people around a leader). Then comes Yanukovych, with whom an unpleasant situation occurs - in a foolish attempt to disperse a rally on the Maidan, his party and himself are eventually dispersed. But how is this seen from Moscow? During the Maidan, armed nationalists (who, from the Kremlin's point of view, are backed by the EU and the U.S.) seized administrative buildings, resisted law enforcement, and thus forced the legally elected President Yanukovych to step down. It turns out that Yushchenko, a prot茅g茅 of the EU and the US, sat out his entire presidential term, while Yanukovych was overthrown (this is where one can find an explanation for Putin's words that "Russia was deceived"). Further, in the east of Ukraine, the anti-Maidan participants begin to copy the actions of people in Kiev, i.e., they begin to seize administrative buildings, against which the new government decides to send not even Berkut but tanks. I think this is how people in the Kremlin saw the situation. The West did not react to it, i.e., did not react to the Ukrainian analog of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, or as it is called in Ukraine - the ATO. After that, the Kremlin decided to act more openly because "Russia was deceived". Again, the reason for these tragic events is the unresolved problems, if not 1991, then 2004, which, like a snowball, only increased in size, reaching a peak in 2014 and 2022. This is the case when I agree with the author that the unresolved issue with Crimea and Russian-Ukrainian relations in general led to a big war. However, I want to emphasize the main thing - there is nothing in the book about the anti-Russian discourse that began in Ukraine in 2004. The author of this book reduces everything to geopolitics and the struggle for Ukraine's independence from Moscow. The only thing worth noting here is when the author writes that Russia has explicitly told NATO countries and Ukraine that it will start a war if Ukraine joins NATO, so I don't understand why these explicit warnings from Russia were ignored. After all, in such a case, it was necessary either to start negotiations on normalization of relations with Russia and refusal to join NATO or to prepare for war with Russia, i.e., to mine the territory, erect fortifications, create Dragon's teeth (fortifications), etc. Ukraine took the third way, i.e., decided to continue to prepare for NATO membership, abandoning the idea of preparing for war. This is probably the craziest policy I have seen. Only the policy of the USSR and Russia itself is more insane.
June 24, 2022
A comprehensive look at the post-Cold War global system being put to the test by the tumultuous relations between a newly resurgent Russia and a globally established Western bloc over the conflict in Ukraine.
The book starts off with analyzing the main sources of the conflict in Ukraine as the "the result of deep 鈥渢ectonic鈥� forces as well as short-term triggers" (p.2), namely the great power status that Russia seeks to claim and maintain as well as the democratization/independence of countries such as Ukraine, all wrapped up in the traditional problem of international relations, the security dilemma. Coupled with the post-Cold War setting in which they found themselves, with the collapse of the USSR having brought a humiliating loss for the nascent Russian state, the status quo wanted to maintain a center of influence in its former 鈥渂ackyard鈥�, which clashed with Ukraine鈥檚 desire for independence (e.g. nuclear disarmament in the 90s). Throughout Kuchma鈥檚 first term, Ukraine-Russia relations were improving amidst the turbulent Yeltsin presidency which was beset with unpopular economic reforms as well as constant agitation by nationalist leaders, culminating in the 1997 Friendship Treaty giving Russia control over its Black Sea Fleet and the pledge to respect Ukrainian sovereignty. However, the ongoing war in Yugoslavia was but the first in a series of events that would pit the West and Russia against each other in a Cold War-style standoff, reflecting different understandings of what the status quo should look like and how to maintain it as such. Just as we enter into the 2000s, Russia sees itself come under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, who initially extended his hand to the West in the case of 9/11 but fiercely criticized it in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq. Along with the second term of Kuchma being beleaguered by the Gongadze affair and his increasing consolidation of power, West-Russia relations would be put to the test once more when the Orange Revolution of 2004 would see two candidates face off with foreign backing from each side, leading to a defeat for the pro-Russian contingent. Afterwards, with Yushchenko as president who unsuccessfully tried to get the EU鈥檚 favor by trying to implement reforms as a means to get access to the European bloc, NATO steps in to offer a 鈥淢embership Action Plan鈥� to Ukraine which rattled Russia, seeing it as an affirmation of its fears concerning NATO expansion, in addition to the 鈥淓astern Partnership鈥� that would develop subsequently (and countered with Russian proposals). Come Yanukovych in power, who fits the stereotype of a corrupt politician (as is often the case in Ukraine unfortunately) quite to the letter (e.g consolidation of power, personal enrichment of his 鈥渇amily鈥� etc.), and Putin鈥檚 switch from president to prime minister, we witness a further deterioration in West-Russia relations exemplified by the diverse actions taken to the upheaval in Libya and the Arab Spring generally, with Western states wholeheartedly supporting them while Russia vehemently opposed them. All of that was to culminate in the fateful events of the Euromaidan uprising in 2013-14, where Yanukovych鈥檚 reluctance to sign the AA with the EU kicked off a series of mass protests in Kiev which gradually got more violent and made stricter demands, leading to his overthrow and the installment of a new government in his stead. This only set the stage for a counter-uprising mainly in the Donbass region, where pro-Russian rebels seized government buildings as a reaction to the events in the west of the country, only to be met with a declaration of war in the name of the ATO, ongoing for almost a decade until recently when Russia launched a full scale invasion of Ukraine. The book ends with a note on the explanatory power of causes for conflict, citing the need to be cautious of assigning blame to any one particular actor since they act in the midst of domestic constraints as well as international relations (e.g Crimea could鈥檝e been a well thought out plan in advance or a quick reaction to a deteriorating situation).
This was a fun read in that it really gets straight to the point to explain almost all there is to know in regards to the Ukraine conflict, both in terms of international relations as well as domestic politics.
The overarching narrative of there being fundamental disagreements regarding what the post-Cold War status quo should resemble hits the nail on the head, although it could do with a bit more emphasis on the role of local oligarchs in the development of Ukrainian politics for instance (see Yuliya Yurchenko鈥檚 鈥淯kraine and the Empire of Capital: From Marketization to Armed Conflict鈥� for a detailed analysis of the interplay between local and international capital in driving politics in Ukraine). Additionally, I feel that the author reveals his bias a bit too openly in regards to the discussion of the events in Maidan (which is almost inevitable), when he hints at the Maidan sniper massacre being committed by Berkut, while not taking into account the work of Ivan Katchanovski regarding his comprehensive analysis of the available evidence, in which he makes admittedly politically inconvenient conclusions regarding who was responsible (see his work (PDF) The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: Revelations from Trials and Investigation | Ivan Katchanovski - Academia.edu for an extensive look at the available evidence revealed from trials and investigations in order to assess which of the parties involved was most likely responsible for the bloodbath of late February).
The book starts off with analyzing the main sources of the conflict in Ukraine as the "the result of deep 鈥渢ectonic鈥� forces as well as short-term triggers" (p.2), namely the great power status that Russia seeks to claim and maintain as well as the democratization/independence of countries such as Ukraine, all wrapped up in the traditional problem of international relations, the security dilemma. Coupled with the post-Cold War setting in which they found themselves, with the collapse of the USSR having brought a humiliating loss for the nascent Russian state, the status quo wanted to maintain a center of influence in its former 鈥渂ackyard鈥�, which clashed with Ukraine鈥檚 desire for independence (e.g. nuclear disarmament in the 90s). Throughout Kuchma鈥檚 first term, Ukraine-Russia relations were improving amidst the turbulent Yeltsin presidency which was beset with unpopular economic reforms as well as constant agitation by nationalist leaders, culminating in the 1997 Friendship Treaty giving Russia control over its Black Sea Fleet and the pledge to respect Ukrainian sovereignty. However, the ongoing war in Yugoslavia was but the first in a series of events that would pit the West and Russia against each other in a Cold War-style standoff, reflecting different understandings of what the status quo should look like and how to maintain it as such. Just as we enter into the 2000s, Russia sees itself come under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, who initially extended his hand to the West in the case of 9/11 but fiercely criticized it in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq. Along with the second term of Kuchma being beleaguered by the Gongadze affair and his increasing consolidation of power, West-Russia relations would be put to the test once more when the Orange Revolution of 2004 would see two candidates face off with foreign backing from each side, leading to a defeat for the pro-Russian contingent. Afterwards, with Yushchenko as president who unsuccessfully tried to get the EU鈥檚 favor by trying to implement reforms as a means to get access to the European bloc, NATO steps in to offer a 鈥淢embership Action Plan鈥� to Ukraine which rattled Russia, seeing it as an affirmation of its fears concerning NATO expansion, in addition to the 鈥淓astern Partnership鈥� that would develop subsequently (and countered with Russian proposals). Come Yanukovych in power, who fits the stereotype of a corrupt politician (as is often the case in Ukraine unfortunately) quite to the letter (e.g consolidation of power, personal enrichment of his 鈥渇amily鈥� etc.), and Putin鈥檚 switch from president to prime minister, we witness a further deterioration in West-Russia relations exemplified by the diverse actions taken to the upheaval in Libya and the Arab Spring generally, with Western states wholeheartedly supporting them while Russia vehemently opposed them. All of that was to culminate in the fateful events of the Euromaidan uprising in 2013-14, where Yanukovych鈥檚 reluctance to sign the AA with the EU kicked off a series of mass protests in Kiev which gradually got more violent and made stricter demands, leading to his overthrow and the installment of a new government in his stead. This only set the stage for a counter-uprising mainly in the Donbass region, where pro-Russian rebels seized government buildings as a reaction to the events in the west of the country, only to be met with a declaration of war in the name of the ATO, ongoing for almost a decade until recently when Russia launched a full scale invasion of Ukraine. The book ends with a note on the explanatory power of causes for conflict, citing the need to be cautious of assigning blame to any one particular actor since they act in the midst of domestic constraints as well as international relations (e.g Crimea could鈥檝e been a well thought out plan in advance or a quick reaction to a deteriorating situation).
This was a fun read in that it really gets straight to the point to explain almost all there is to know in regards to the Ukraine conflict, both in terms of international relations as well as domestic politics.
The overarching narrative of there being fundamental disagreements regarding what the post-Cold War status quo should resemble hits the nail on the head, although it could do with a bit more emphasis on the role of local oligarchs in the development of Ukrainian politics for instance (see Yuliya Yurchenko鈥檚 鈥淯kraine and the Empire of Capital: From Marketization to Armed Conflict鈥� for a detailed analysis of the interplay between local and international capital in driving politics in Ukraine). Additionally, I feel that the author reveals his bias a bit too openly in regards to the discussion of the events in Maidan (which is almost inevitable), when he hints at the Maidan sniper massacre being committed by Berkut, while not taking into account the work of Ivan Katchanovski regarding his comprehensive analysis of the available evidence, in which he makes admittedly politically inconvenient conclusions regarding who was responsible (see his work (PDF) The Maidan Massacre in Ukraine: Revelations from Trials and Investigation | Ivan Katchanovski - Academia.edu for an extensive look at the available evidence revealed from trials and investigations in order to assess which of the parties involved was most likely responsible for the bloodbath of late February).
March 24, 2021
Incredibly lucid and informed historical analysis of the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
Highly recommended for anyone interested in the issue or in general the ongoing ideological and geopolitical struggle between legitimacy of a ideologically pluralistic worldview and democracy as well as the post cold war status quo.
Highly recommended for anyone interested in the issue or in general the ongoing ideological and geopolitical struggle between legitimacy of a ideologically pluralistic worldview and democracy as well as the post cold war status quo.
June 3, 2022
The book gave this reader a thorough, considered and eye-opening education on the intractable issues at the root of Russia鈥檚 annexation of Crimea in 2014 鈥� which equally lie behind this year鈥檚 Russian invasion of Ukraine.
D鈥橝nieri introduces and structures the book along the lines that are de rigeur in academia, which initially worried me the book would be heavy going public recasting of an academic thesis. However, once stuck into the first couple of chapters, I found myself engrossed. D鈥橝nieri鈥檚 careful chronological description of the history of Russia-Ukraine-EU-US relations since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, interspersed with occasional references to socio-political theory, takes on the page-turning nature of a thriller which had begun by revealing the murder scene but not the murderer. It turns out to be an intractable mutual suicide pact.
Unfortunately it is impossible to avoid the book鈥檚 conclusion: a peaceful resolution is very very unlikely because what Russia and the West want are fundamentally incompatible, and a sustainable compromise requires one or the other to accept losing something vitally important to them and which is anchored in their different respective core values. Russia wants to be still considered a world power with a continuing controlling oversight over the Central European nations that formed the ex-USSR in order to buttress what it perceives as it鈥檚 national security; Europe sees the continent鈥檚 security being best underwritten by these same nations adopting independent liberal democracies, strengthening the rule of law, and free to choose to join multi-national institutions such as NATO and the European Union. The West鈥檚 challenge is the difficulty in ascertaining what compromise would ever satisfy Russia; Russia鈥檚 challenge is that for the those newly independent nations the West appears to offer the set of political and economic values that more naturally allow room for that independence (and territorial integrity) and counters Russia鈥檚 new and old forms of influence.
It is possible to read the book as a gradual, yet tragically inevitable 30-year descent from a genuine Russia-West attempt to construct a new common post-Cold War vision of a cooperative Europe-wide political structure, via a progressive erosion of mutual trust, to finally reach the 2022 hardening into sharply demarcated war between the West鈥檚 political system of democratic values and Russia鈥檚 (et al) system favouring autocracy 鈥� with Ukraine caught in the middle.
The book, published in 2019, concludes with the accurate prediction that 鈥渦ntil Russia accepts the West鈥檚 vision for Europe or the West accepts Russia鈥檚, the conflict will endure.鈥� With these two visions being unreconcilable, to this reader it seems we are careering towards an Iron Curtain 2.0: a hard border diving Europe between the two political systems, and maybe leaving Ukraine divided in two down the Dnieper river 鈥� leaving everyone deeply unhappy. The alternative seems even worse: the horrible attritional military conflict draws in other nations and becomes a 鈥渨orld war鈥�.
D鈥橝nieri introduces and structures the book along the lines that are de rigeur in academia, which initially worried me the book would be heavy going public recasting of an academic thesis. However, once stuck into the first couple of chapters, I found myself engrossed. D鈥橝nieri鈥檚 careful chronological description of the history of Russia-Ukraine-EU-US relations since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, interspersed with occasional references to socio-political theory, takes on the page-turning nature of a thriller which had begun by revealing the murder scene but not the murderer. It turns out to be an intractable mutual suicide pact.
Unfortunately it is impossible to avoid the book鈥檚 conclusion: a peaceful resolution is very very unlikely because what Russia and the West want are fundamentally incompatible, and a sustainable compromise requires one or the other to accept losing something vitally important to them and which is anchored in their different respective core values. Russia wants to be still considered a world power with a continuing controlling oversight over the Central European nations that formed the ex-USSR in order to buttress what it perceives as it鈥檚 national security; Europe sees the continent鈥檚 security being best underwritten by these same nations adopting independent liberal democracies, strengthening the rule of law, and free to choose to join multi-national institutions such as NATO and the European Union. The West鈥檚 challenge is the difficulty in ascertaining what compromise would ever satisfy Russia; Russia鈥檚 challenge is that for the those newly independent nations the West appears to offer the set of political and economic values that more naturally allow room for that independence (and territorial integrity) and counters Russia鈥檚 new and old forms of influence.
It is possible to read the book as a gradual, yet tragically inevitable 30-year descent from a genuine Russia-West attempt to construct a new common post-Cold War vision of a cooperative Europe-wide political structure, via a progressive erosion of mutual trust, to finally reach the 2022 hardening into sharply demarcated war between the West鈥檚 political system of democratic values and Russia鈥檚 (et al) system favouring autocracy 鈥� with Ukraine caught in the middle.
The book, published in 2019, concludes with the accurate prediction that 鈥渦ntil Russia accepts the West鈥檚 vision for Europe or the West accepts Russia鈥檚, the conflict will endure.鈥� With these two visions being unreconcilable, to this reader it seems we are careering towards an Iron Curtain 2.0: a hard border diving Europe between the two political systems, and maybe leaving Ukraine divided in two down the Dnieper river 鈥� leaving everyone deeply unhappy. The alternative seems even worse: the horrible attritional military conflict draws in other nations and becomes a 鈥渨orld war鈥�.
March 16, 2025
A clear, scholarly, and - I suggest - impartial consideration of history from the fall o the Soviet Union to just after the invasion in 2022, updated from the first edition (which I understand stopped at 2019).
It is so interesting to see how decisions tend to reflect historical perspectives, and how the modern situation represents the consequences of those perspectives.
I was looking for something to help explain how on earth two countries in Europe, right next to each other, with deep historical connections, might find themselves in a hot war involving invasion. Thanks to D'Anieri it all now makes sense, and the complexities of a solution are now also plain.
As an aside, one thing I am becoming more acutely aware of in current international politics: lies must be called out. There is no excuse for deception. The biggest liar is generally on the wrong side of right. Doubling down is merely doubling the lie. Democracies must have no truck for lies.
It is so interesting to see how decisions tend to reflect historical perspectives, and how the modern situation represents the consequences of those perspectives.
I was looking for something to help explain how on earth two countries in Europe, right next to each other, with deep historical connections, might find themselves in a hot war involving invasion. Thanks to D'Anieri it all now makes sense, and the complexities of a solution are now also plain.
The analysis of underlying causes represented in this book forces us to be pessimistic about the chances of resolving either the Ukraine-Russia conflict or the broader conflict between Russia and the West anytime soon... all of the underlying causes discussed in this book remain in place and have been exacerbated by the war itself, which has strengthened mutual perceptions of aggressiveness and badfaith and has dramatically increased the willingness of the West and Russia to confrnt one another. (p. 320).
As an aside, one thing I am becoming more acutely aware of in current international politics: lies must be called out. There is no excuse for deception. The biggest liar is generally on the wrong side of right. Doubling down is merely doubling the lie. Democracies must have no truck for lies.
Read
July 12, 2022From the Publisher
The dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West, that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually led to war in 2014. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a 'civilized divorce', led to what many are now calling 'a new Cold War'. He argues that the conflict has worsened because of three underlying factors the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the resolution of the Ukraine conflict. The book also shows how this war fits into broader patterns of contemporary international conflict and should therefore appeal to researchers working on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia's relations with the West, and conflict and geopolitics more generally.
The dynamics within Ukraine, between Ukraine and Russia, and between Russia and the West, that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventually led to war in 2014. Proceeding chronologically, this book shows how Ukraine's separation from Russia in 1991, at the time called a 'civilized divorce', led to what many are now calling 'a new Cold War'. He argues that the conflict has worsened because of three underlying factors the security dilemma, the impact of democratization on geopolitics, and the incompatible goals of a post-Cold War Europe. Rather than a peaceful situation that was squandered, D'Anieri argues that these were deep-seated pre-existing disagreements that could not be bridged, with concerning implications for the resolution of the Ukraine conflict. The book also shows how this war fits into broader patterns of contemporary international conflict and should therefore appeal to researchers working on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Russia's relations with the West, and conflict and geopolitics more generally.
July 5, 2022
Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War by Paul D'Anieri is a fantastic survey of the recent history of the bilateral relationship between Russia and Ukraine. It covers a large range of materials, briefly touching upon most of the major events. I found D'Anieri to be a very capable distiller of material and his own judgments, when they appear, were usually quite sensible. If I have a problem with the book, it is that the narrative is dropped perhaps at the most interesting and least understood portion of the war. That is, after the dust settles in 2015. I had hoped for more material on that period, but given the nature of my work, I'll likely be filling in that period myself at some point. Good show, Paul. I'll eagerly read a sequel once its done.
January 16, 2024
D鈥橝nieri provides meaningful chronology and insight leading up to the current war in Ukraine, starting with misaligned expectation between the West and Russia immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union. While at times dense and sometimes repetitive, this book effectively describes the geopolitical environment contextualizing the Russian invasion of Crimea and military action in the Donetsk/Luhansk oblasts leading up to the current war. While the book ultimately concludes that war was avoidable (both earlier in Crimea and perhaps by extension, now), it highlights the respective stakes and political complexities in this conflict for Ukraine, Russia, the EU, NATO, CIS, and the United States.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
August 27, 2022
Short, well written and well researched history of the Russia-Ukraine conflict from the dissolution of the Soviet union around 1990 to 2018. First and last chapter is using an International Relations/Political Science perspective, the rest is a historical explanation and interpretation of the political events leading up to the war in 2014. Not so much focus on economy and culture, except when influenced the politics. The book's style reads like an extended editorial from The Economist. The author's point of view is from the Ukrainian leadership.
August 2, 2022
Only goes up to 2015-16, but an excellent summary and analysis of the relationship and its breakdown. Not a stylistic page-turner, but packed with information as it points out the dilemmas faced by both sides as they dealt with the exigencies of strategic and domestic demands. Would love to read an updated account by this author.
May 5, 2023
"(...) a nossa ideia 茅 alimentar os lobos e proteger as ovelhas. Queremos que a R煤ssia esteja satisfeita e que a Ucr芒nia se mantenha independente e inteira. Alcan莽ar apenas um destes objetivos demonstrou ser dif铆cil. Alcan莽ar os dois, agora parece imposs铆vel."
February 1, 2025
Valuable read for anyone wanting to get a clearer sense of why the conflict started, offering a well-rounded perspective on the conflict between the countries. The book follows a straightforward, chronological approach, which makes it easy to follow the timeline of the events.
Hope the war ends soon. Wishing all the best for Ukrainians.
Hope the war ends soon. Wishing all the best for Ukrainians.
April 3, 2022
A nice discussion of the history of Ukraine and Russia. Helpful perspective in light of the current war.
April 19, 2022
This was a phenomenal analysis which definitely ended up being quite predictive in where the conflict was headed. If you want my full thoughts, see my highlighted notes & comments.
May 9, 2022
An absolute must read if you want to have a nuanced understanding of the current situation between Russia, Ukraine and the world.
June 29, 2022
Might as well make Paul the co author of my dissertation now
July 9, 2022
An outstanding history that provides context to the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia. Tracks in great detail from the end of the Cold War to today.
July 11, 2022
A thorough review of Ukraine鈥� modern history. With the 2022 war, what will be left of this country?
January 23, 2023
Got about half way through. Not exactly a riveting read
February 7, 2024
It was 3 stars but the author came to my class and said he liked my question so 4 stars :)
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