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賴賲踿 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴: 讴賵丿鬲丕蹖 鄄鄹 賲乇丿丕丿 賵 乇蹖卮賴鈥屬囏й� 鬲乇賵乇 丿乇 禺丕賵乇賲蹖丕賳賴
An American Coup & the Roots of Middle East Terror
Half a century ago, the United States overthrew a Middle Eastern government for the first time. The victim was Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran. Although the coup seemed a success at first, today it serves as a chilling lesson about the dangers of foreign intervention.In this book, veteran New York Times correspondent Stephen Kinzer gives the first full account of this fateful operation. His account is centered around an hour-by-hour reconstruction of the events of August 1953, and concludes with an assessment of the coup's "haunting and terrible legacy."Operation Ajax, as the plot was code-named, reshaped the history of Iran, the Middle East, and the world. It restored Mohammad Reza Shah to the Peacock Throne, allowing him to impose a tyranny that ultimately sparked the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Islamic Revolution, in turn, inspired fundamentalists throughout the Muslim world, including the Taliban and terrorists who thrived under its protection."It is not far-fetched," Kinzer asserts in this book, "to draw a line from Operation Ajax through the Shah's repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York."Drawing on research in the United States and Iran, and using material from a long-secret CIA report, Kinzer explains the background of the coup and tells how it was carried out. It is a cloak-and-dagger story of spies, saboteurs, and secret agents. There are accounts of bribes, staged riots, suitcases full of cash, and midnight meetings between the Shah and CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt, who was smuggled in and out of the royal palace under a blanket in the back seat of a car. Roosevelt,the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, was a real-life James Bond in an era when CIA agents operated mainly by their wits. After his first coup attempt failed, he organized a second attempt that succeeded three days later.The colorful cast of characters includes the terrified young Shah, who fled his country at the first sign of trouble; General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, father of the Gulf War commander and the radio voice of "Gang Busters," who flew to Tehran on a secret mission that helped set the coup in motion; and the fiery Prime Minister Mossadegh, who outraged the West by nationalizing the immensely profitable Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The British, outraged by the seizure of their oil company, persuaded President Dwight Eisenhower that Mossadegh was leading Iran toward Communism. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain became the coup's main sponsors.Brimming with insights into Middle Eastern history and American foreign policy, this book is an eye-opening look at an event whose unintended consequences--Islamic revolution and violent anti-Americanism--have shaped the modern world. As the United States assumes an ever-widening role in the Middle East, it is essential reading.
Half a century ago, the United States overthrew a Middle Eastern government for the first time. The victim was Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran. Although the coup seemed a success at first, today it serves as a chilling lesson about the dangers of foreign intervention.In this book, veteran New York Times correspondent Stephen Kinzer gives the first full account of this fateful operation. His account is centered around an hour-by-hour reconstruction of the events of August 1953, and concludes with an assessment of the coup's "haunting and terrible legacy."Operation Ajax, as the plot was code-named, reshaped the history of Iran, the Middle East, and the world. It restored Mohammad Reza Shah to the Peacock Throne, allowing him to impose a tyranny that ultimately sparked the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Islamic Revolution, in turn, inspired fundamentalists throughout the Muslim world, including the Taliban and terrorists who thrived under its protection."It is not far-fetched," Kinzer asserts in this book, "to draw a line from Operation Ajax through the Shah's repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs that engulfed the World Trade Center in New York."Drawing on research in the United States and Iran, and using material from a long-secret CIA report, Kinzer explains the background of the coup and tells how it was carried out. It is a cloak-and-dagger story of spies, saboteurs, and secret agents. There are accounts of bribes, staged riots, suitcases full of cash, and midnight meetings between the Shah and CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt, who was smuggled in and out of the royal palace under a blanket in the back seat of a car. Roosevelt,the grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt, was a real-life James Bond in an era when CIA agents operated mainly by their wits. After his first coup attempt failed, he organized a second attempt that succeeded three days later.The colorful cast of characters includes the terrified young Shah, who fled his country at the first sign of trouble; General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, father of the Gulf War commander and the radio voice of "Gang Busters," who flew to Tehran on a secret mission that helped set the coup in motion; and the fiery Prime Minister Mossadegh, who outraged the West by nationalizing the immensely profitable Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The British, outraged by the seizure of their oil company, persuaded President Dwight Eisenhower that Mossadegh was leading Iran toward Communism. Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain became the coup's main sponsors.Brimming with insights into Middle Eastern history and American foreign policy, this book is an eye-opening look at an event whose unintended consequences--Islamic revolution and violent anti-Americanism--have shaped the modern world. As the United States assumes an ever-widening role in the Middle East, it is essential reading.
367 pages, Paperback
First published July 17, 2003
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About the author
Stephen Kinzer
26听books721听followersStephen Kinzer is an award-winning foreign correspondent who has covered more than 50 countries on five continents. His articles and books have led the Washington Post to place him "among the best in popular foreign policy storytelling." ()
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March 26, 2022
鈥淭hings looked bleak for the plotters. They had lost the advantage of surprise. Several of their key agents were out of action. Their anointed prime minister, General Zahedi, was in hiding. The Shah had fled. Foreign Minister Fatemi, free after several hours in rebel custody, was making fiery speeches denouncing the Shah for his collaboration with foreign agents鈥peration Ajax had failed. Radio Tehran reported that the situation was 鈥榳ell under control,鈥� and so it seemed. Shock waves reverberated through CIA headquarters in Washington. Then suddenly, around midevening, [Kermit] Roosevelt cabled a most unexpected message. He had decided to stay in Tehran and improvise another stab at [Mohammed] Mossadegh. The CIA had sent him to overthrow the government of Iran, and he was determined not to leave until he had done it鈥︹€�
- Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah鈥檚 Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
The relationship between Iran and the United States has been so bad, for so long, that it seems like it鈥檚 always been that way.
In 1979, after the exiled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was admitted into the United States for cancer treatment, Iranian revolutionaries stormed the American embassy and took 52 hostages, holding them for 444 days. In response, during the 1980s, the United States supported Iraq in a war that killed an estimated one-million Iranians, and which saw the use of chemical weapons. During the 1990s, the U.S. tightened sanctions against Iran, while after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush gratuitously added it to an 鈥渁xis of evil,鈥� though none of the members (including North Korea and Iraq) had any role in the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington D.C. A corner might have been turned 鈥� ever so slightly 鈥� with the Iran nuclear deal, struck in 2015. However, in 2018, the forty-fifth president withdrew America from the deal, escalating tensions. Matters inched towards war when the United States assassinated Quds Force commander Qasemi Soleimani, and Iran responded with missile attacks on American bases in Iraq.
With all that鈥檚 happened, it鈥檚 hard to believe that things could have gone differently. But that is Stephen Kinzer鈥檚 conclusion in All the Shah鈥檚 Men, his concise, efficiently presented tale about the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. According to Kinzer, this vigorous meddling with Iran鈥檚 sovereignty poisoned the well from which both countries are still drinking.
***
Both the chief virtue and chief flaw of All the Shah鈥檚 Men is its no-nonsense approach to its subject matter. At around 220 pages of text, Kinzer tells a big and complicated story in a fast-paced and pared down way. I never got lost, I effortlessly followed the progression of events, and I could probably give a decent summary at a cocktail party, before being asked to leave the cocktail party.
Nevertheless, the literary merits are a bit less obvious. At no single point did I feel excited to read this. I didn鈥檛 find a single bit of prose worth underlining, or a characterization that really leapt off the page. I am not saying this is poorly written or grammatically unsound or syntactically obtuse. Kinzer conveys his information with clarity and commendable structure. But my connection to the material was dutiful, not visceral, and while this is better than reading an internet summary, the gap between the two is not as large as you would like.
***
After a brief prologue detailing the first aborted attempt at a coup by the CIA, Kinzer backtracks all the way to antiquity, to Cyrus and Xerxes, for a sweeping look at Iranian history that starts before the common era and ends with the mid-twentieth century. Though this is obviously a mile-high view, I found it super-helpful, especially since I had practically zero prior knowledge about this event, or the larger circumstances in which it occurred. Kinzer has a clear passion for Iran and its culture, and that shines through in a book that is otherwise pretty workmanlike in its presentation. It also adds a bit of emotional heft to America鈥檚 betrayal of its own principles.
***
Kinzer also does a solid job laying out the immediate context in which the 1953 coup took place. Despite a subtitle strongly implying that the 21st century鈥檚 Age of Terror began in Tehran, he makes it clear that the 鈥渞oots鈥� are much deeper than that. (Published in 2003, it鈥檚 likely the misleading subtitle was an attempt to tie into the then-booming post-9/11 genre exploring the attack鈥檚 historical antecedents). In point of fact, the West鈥檚 intriguing in the Middle East began not with America, but with Europe, especially Great Britain, which needed oil for its battleships.
Much of this oil came from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British corporation 鈥� half-owned by the British Government 鈥� which had been founded in 1909. The AIOC single-mindedly exploited Iran鈥檚 natural resources for British profit, exerting absolute control over the reserves, refusing to allow audits, and subjecting Iranian workers to deplorable living conditions.
As it gradually lost its empire over the centuries, Great Britain never quite learned that you can only mercilessly expropriate for so long before there comes a reckoning. In Iran, that reckoning came in the form of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who led the effort to nationalize AIOC.
Fumbling about for a response, Great Britain turned to the United States, which was then rather respected in Iran. Raising the spooky specter of Communists, the Dulles brothers quickly convinced a self-distancing (and plausibly-denying) Dwight Eisenhower to allow the CIA to fund a coup to overthrow Mossadegh and allow Pahlavi to consolidate his hold on power.
The ad hoc, much improvised plan worked, though it was not simply the dark arts of the CIA, but self-interested Iranians as well, that allowed it to 鈥� for lack of a better word 鈥� succeed. The consequences, though, were pretty dire. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi鈥檚 repressive regime ultimately led to revolution, the declaration of an Islamic Republic, and frayed-wire relations that might still someday spark into war.
***
It probably goes too far to lay all blame on the Dulles brothers or Winston Churchill or Kermit Washington. Avoiding shortsightedness is hard, because seeing the future is impossible. Not every bad thing after 1953 happened simply because of the coup. Nothing is inevitable, and there are always possibilities for people to act differently, no matter the past.
Still, in executing the coup, the United States in general, and the CIA in particular, made the same mistake it repeated throughout the Cold War: the failure to believe in its own product.
In its words, America tried to convince the world that its values 鈥� of freedom, openness, and self-determination 鈥� were demonstrably better than the tyranny, oppression, and censorship animating the Soviet Union. In its actions, though, the United States showed no trust in its system, and resorted to undermining popular will and supporting oppressive leaders in the misguided belief that any means justified the ends. The Cold War could have been a contest of ideas. Instead it was a race to the bottom, with the rulebook thrown aside.
The bargain proved bad, and for twenty-five years of the Shah, America destroyed its relationship with Iran, weakened its moral standing in the Middle East and around the globe, and made the world that much more dangerous.
- Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah鈥檚 Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
The relationship between Iran and the United States has been so bad, for so long, that it seems like it鈥檚 always been that way.
In 1979, after the exiled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was admitted into the United States for cancer treatment, Iranian revolutionaries stormed the American embassy and took 52 hostages, holding them for 444 days. In response, during the 1980s, the United States supported Iraq in a war that killed an estimated one-million Iranians, and which saw the use of chemical weapons. During the 1990s, the U.S. tightened sanctions against Iran, while after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush gratuitously added it to an 鈥渁xis of evil,鈥� though none of the members (including North Korea and Iraq) had any role in the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington D.C. A corner might have been turned 鈥� ever so slightly 鈥� with the Iran nuclear deal, struck in 2015. However, in 2018, the forty-fifth president withdrew America from the deal, escalating tensions. Matters inched towards war when the United States assassinated Quds Force commander Qasemi Soleimani, and Iran responded with missile attacks on American bases in Iraq.
With all that鈥檚 happened, it鈥檚 hard to believe that things could have gone differently. But that is Stephen Kinzer鈥檚 conclusion in All the Shah鈥檚 Men, his concise, efficiently presented tale about the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. According to Kinzer, this vigorous meddling with Iran鈥檚 sovereignty poisoned the well from which both countries are still drinking.
***
Both the chief virtue and chief flaw of All the Shah鈥檚 Men is its no-nonsense approach to its subject matter. At around 220 pages of text, Kinzer tells a big and complicated story in a fast-paced and pared down way. I never got lost, I effortlessly followed the progression of events, and I could probably give a decent summary at a cocktail party, before being asked to leave the cocktail party.
Nevertheless, the literary merits are a bit less obvious. At no single point did I feel excited to read this. I didn鈥檛 find a single bit of prose worth underlining, or a characterization that really leapt off the page. I am not saying this is poorly written or grammatically unsound or syntactically obtuse. Kinzer conveys his information with clarity and commendable structure. But my connection to the material was dutiful, not visceral, and while this is better than reading an internet summary, the gap between the two is not as large as you would like.
***
After a brief prologue detailing the first aborted attempt at a coup by the CIA, Kinzer backtracks all the way to antiquity, to Cyrus and Xerxes, for a sweeping look at Iranian history that starts before the common era and ends with the mid-twentieth century. Though this is obviously a mile-high view, I found it super-helpful, especially since I had practically zero prior knowledge about this event, or the larger circumstances in which it occurred. Kinzer has a clear passion for Iran and its culture, and that shines through in a book that is otherwise pretty workmanlike in its presentation. It also adds a bit of emotional heft to America鈥檚 betrayal of its own principles.
***
Kinzer also does a solid job laying out the immediate context in which the 1953 coup took place. Despite a subtitle strongly implying that the 21st century鈥檚 Age of Terror began in Tehran, he makes it clear that the 鈥渞oots鈥� are much deeper than that. (Published in 2003, it鈥檚 likely the misleading subtitle was an attempt to tie into the then-booming post-9/11 genre exploring the attack鈥檚 historical antecedents). In point of fact, the West鈥檚 intriguing in the Middle East began not with America, but with Europe, especially Great Britain, which needed oil for its battleships.
Much of this oil came from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British corporation 鈥� half-owned by the British Government 鈥� which had been founded in 1909. The AIOC single-mindedly exploited Iran鈥檚 natural resources for British profit, exerting absolute control over the reserves, refusing to allow audits, and subjecting Iranian workers to deplorable living conditions.
As it gradually lost its empire over the centuries, Great Britain never quite learned that you can only mercilessly expropriate for so long before there comes a reckoning. In Iran, that reckoning came in the form of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, who led the effort to nationalize AIOC.
Fumbling about for a response, Great Britain turned to the United States, which was then rather respected in Iran. Raising the spooky specter of Communists, the Dulles brothers quickly convinced a self-distancing (and plausibly-denying) Dwight Eisenhower to allow the CIA to fund a coup to overthrow Mossadegh and allow Pahlavi to consolidate his hold on power.
The ad hoc, much improvised plan worked, though it was not simply the dark arts of the CIA, but self-interested Iranians as well, that allowed it to 鈥� for lack of a better word 鈥� succeed. The consequences, though, were pretty dire. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi鈥檚 repressive regime ultimately led to revolution, the declaration of an Islamic Republic, and frayed-wire relations that might still someday spark into war.
***
It probably goes too far to lay all blame on the Dulles brothers or Winston Churchill or Kermit Washington. Avoiding shortsightedness is hard, because seeing the future is impossible. Not every bad thing after 1953 happened simply because of the coup. Nothing is inevitable, and there are always possibilities for people to act differently, no matter the past.
Still, in executing the coup, the United States in general, and the CIA in particular, made the same mistake it repeated throughout the Cold War: the failure to believe in its own product.
In its words, America tried to convince the world that its values 鈥� of freedom, openness, and self-determination 鈥� were demonstrably better than the tyranny, oppression, and censorship animating the Soviet Union. In its actions, though, the United States showed no trust in its system, and resorted to undermining popular will and supporting oppressive leaders in the misguided belief that any means justified the ends. The Cold War could have been a contest of ideas. Instead it was a race to the bottom, with the rulebook thrown aside.
The bargain proved bad, and for twenty-five years of the Shah, America destroyed its relationship with Iran, weakened its moral standing in the Middle East and around the globe, and made the world that much more dangerous.
July 29, 2008
I just re-read this book in preparation for a book club. This book is the tragic story of a CIA operation that removed one of the only democratically elected leaders in the Middle-East. Mossadegh came into power and angered the British by nationalizing Iranian Oil and the British were determined to oust him from office. After Truman (who opposed a coup) left office and Eisenhower came to office, the Americans also signed on and actually conducted the coup. This story is so tragic (especially if you are Iranian) because although no one can say for certain what would have been, the fundamentalism that has taken over Iran and the entire middle east could have been averted with someone like Mossadegh in power. He was committed to the constitution and democracy. He was called the George Washington of Iran. His flaws were that he nationalized the oil and was not flexible in allowing the British any control of the company and he underestimated the cold war fears of the time. A lot of Anti-American hatred in Iran stems from this operation and the 1978 hostage crisis was a direct result of Iranian fears of a repeat of the 1953 CIA-led overthrow. I think the author could have done a lot more and the writing is certainly not flawless, but I give it five stars because I think everyone should read this book. Kinzer (the author) gives a truncated history of Iran and gets a lot of the psychology of the Iranian people right. I think he doesn't go far enough in saying that had Iran not fallen to Islamic fundamentalism in 1978, the entire Middle East would have been a different place today. The book, in my opinion, is not unjustifiably harsh on America. Eisenhower did not bear as much blame for this as churchill and the author places the blame mostly on two people in his cabinet who were very anxious about covert operations in many countries at the time and we certainly cannot underestimate the cold war fears that dominated the world psyche during the 1950s. But I just cannot help but feel depressed about this and just wonder what would have happened if the Iranian people were allowed to run their own country.
July 19, 2020
All the Shah's Men, Stephen Kinzer
All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror is a book written by American journalist Stephen Kinzer.
Following the 1941 Allied Invasion of Iran, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Shah, who upheld the oil agreement with APOC, which by then had been renamed the "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company".
When the first democratically elected parliament and prime minister in Iran took power in 1950 they planned to seize the oil assets in Iran that had been developed by the British, violating the still running oil contract with British Petroleum.
The British government followed to court in Belgium's International Court, lost the case against Iran's new government and reacted by blockading the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, halting Iran's trade and economy. ...
鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 乇賵夭 亘蹖爻鬲 賵 爻賵賲 賲丕賴 賲蹖 爻丕賱 2004 賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳賴丕: 芦賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴 (讴賵丿鬲丕蹖 28賲乇丿丕丿 賵 乇蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 鬲乇賵乇 丿乇 禺丕賵乇賲蹖丕賳賴)鈥徛回� 芦賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴禄貨 芦賴賲賴 蹖 丌丿賲賴丕蹖 卮丕賴禄貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮 乇賵夭 亘蹖爻鬲 賵 爻賵賲 賲丕 賲蹖 爻丕賱 2004賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴 (讴賵丿鬲丕蹖 28賲乇丿丕丿 賵 乇蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 鬲乇賵乇 丿乇 禺丕賵乇賲蹖丕賳賴)鈥徹� 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 丨爻賳 亘賱蹖睾貨 賲卮禺氐丕鬲 賳卮乇 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 丿丕賳卮诏乇丕賳 賲丨賲賵丿貙 1382貙 丿乇 364氐貙 賲氐賵乇貙 卮丕亘讴 9647992033貨 讴鬲丕亘賳丕賲賴 丿丕乇丿貙 賲賵囟賵毓: 爻蹖丕爻鬲 賵 丨讴賵賲鬲貙 丕蹖乇丕賳貙 丕蹖丕賱丕鬲 賲鬲丨丿賴貙 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴鈥徹� 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 卮賴乇蹖丕乇 禺賵丕噩蹖丕賳貨 賲卮禺氐丕鬲 賳卮乇: 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 丕禺鬲乇丕賳貙 1382貙 丿乇 367氐貙 賲氐賵乇貙 卮丕亘讴 9789647514422貨 讴鬲丕亘賳丕賲賴 丿丕乇丿
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴鈥徹� 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 賱胤賮 丕賱賱賴 賲蹖孬賲蹖貨 賲卮禺氐丕鬲 賳卮乇: 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 氐賲丿蹖賴貙 1383貙 丿乇 360氐貙 賲氐賵乇貙 卮丕亘讴 96475790093貨
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴鈥徹� 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 丨賲蹖丿 賵 爻毓蹖丿 禺丕賲賵卮貨 賲卮禺氐丕鬲 賳卮乇 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 讴鬲丕亘 丌賵賳丿 丿丕賳卮貙 1382貙 丿乇 378 氐貙 賲氐賵乇貙 卮丕亘讴: 丕蹖讴爻 - 964711429貨
丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 毓賳賵丕賳 芦賴賲賴 蹖 丌丿賲賴丕蹖 卮丕賴禄貙 亘丕 鬲乇噩賲賴 賲賳蹖跇賴 亘賴夭丕丿 (卮蹖禺 噩賵丕丿蹖) 賳蹖夭 丿乇 丕賳鬲卮丕乇丕鬲 倬蹖讴丕賳 丿乇 爻丕賱 1382賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖 賲賳鬲卮乇 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲
鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴賳诏丕賲 乇爻丕賳蹖 29/04/1399賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror is a book written by American journalist Stephen Kinzer.
Following the 1941 Allied Invasion of Iran, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Mohammad Reza Shah, who upheld the oil agreement with APOC, which by then had been renamed the "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company".
When the first democratically elected parliament and prime minister in Iran took power in 1950 they planned to seize the oil assets in Iran that had been developed by the British, violating the still running oil contract with British Petroleum.
The British government followed to court in Belgium's International Court, lost the case against Iran's new government and reacted by blockading the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, halting Iran's trade and economy. ...
鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 乇賵夭 亘蹖爻鬲 賵 爻賵賲 賲丕賴 賲蹖 爻丕賱 2004 賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳賴丕: 芦賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴 (讴賵丿鬲丕蹖 28賲乇丿丕丿 賵 乇蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 鬲乇賵乇 丿乇 禺丕賵乇賲蹖丕賳賴)鈥徛回� 芦賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴禄貨 芦賴賲賴 蹖 丌丿賲賴丕蹖 卮丕賴禄貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮 乇賵夭 亘蹖爻鬲 賵 爻賵賲 賲丕 賲蹖 爻丕賱 2004賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴 (讴賵丿鬲丕蹖 28賲乇丿丕丿 賵 乇蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 鬲乇賵乇 丿乇 禺丕賵乇賲蹖丕賳賴)鈥徹� 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 丨爻賳 亘賱蹖睾貨 賲卮禺氐丕鬲 賳卮乇 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 丿丕賳卮诏乇丕賳 賲丨賲賵丿貙 1382貙 丿乇 364氐貙 賲氐賵乇貙 卮丕亘讴 9647992033貨 讴鬲丕亘賳丕賲賴 丿丕乇丿貙 賲賵囟賵毓: 爻蹖丕爻鬲 賵 丨讴賵賲鬲貙 丕蹖乇丕賳貙 丕蹖丕賱丕鬲 賲鬲丨丿賴貙 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴鈥徹� 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 卮賴乇蹖丕乇 禺賵丕噩蹖丕賳貨 賲卮禺氐丕鬲 賳卮乇: 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 丕禺鬲乇丕賳貙 1382貙 丿乇 367氐貙 賲氐賵乇貙 卮丕亘讴 9789647514422貨 讴鬲丕亘賳丕賲賴 丿丕乇丿
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴鈥徹� 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 賱胤賮 丕賱賱賴 賲蹖孬賲蹖貨 賲卮禺氐丕鬲 賳卮乇: 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 氐賲丿蹖賴貙 1383貙 丿乇 360氐貙 賲氐賵乇貙 卮丕亘讴 96475790093貨
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 卮丕賴鈥徹� 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳爻乇 (讴蹖賳夭乇)貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 丨賲蹖丿 賵 爻毓蹖丿 禺丕賲賵卮貨 賲卮禺氐丕鬲 賳卮乇 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 讴鬲丕亘 丌賵賳丿 丿丕賳卮貙 1382貙 丿乇 378 氐貙 賲氐賵乇貙 卮丕亘讴: 丕蹖讴爻 - 964711429貨
丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 毓賳賵丕賳 芦賴賲賴 蹖 丌丿賲賴丕蹖 卮丕賴禄貙 亘丕 鬲乇噩賲賴 賲賳蹖跇賴 亘賴夭丕丿 (卮蹖禺 噩賵丕丿蹖) 賳蹖夭 丿乇 丕賳鬲卮丕乇丕鬲 倬蹖讴丕賳 丿乇 爻丕賱 1382賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖 賲賳鬲卮乇 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲
鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴賳诏丕賲 乇爻丕賳蹖 29/04/1399賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
November 21, 2022
The subject of this book is a coup aimed at overthrowing Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran. The author delves into the details of the coup and explores its ramifications that continue to be felt to this day.
"They stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American diplomats hostage for more than fourteen months."
The hostage-takers were enraged against Americans and their support for the deposed Shah who had been allowed into the United States. The US regarded this crime not only as barbaric but also inexplicable. But was it so inexplicable? Many Iranians feared that Americans would help the Shah return to power as they once did in 1953. What stood behind the fears of many Iranians that the US could help the Shah return to Tehran and to power?
In August 1953 the CIA with the help of some influential figures in Iran orchestrated a coup against Mossadegh. They encouraged and organized the mass protests against Mossadegh that resulted in chaos in the capital city of Tehran.
鈥�The great mob that surged through the streets of Tehran on August 18 was partly mercenary and partly a genuine expression of people鈥檚 loss of faith in Mossadegh.鈥�
Mossadegh was overthrown and, later, arrested. The Shah, who had been forced to flee Iran, returned and embarked on consolidating dictatorial power. That was the path that led to the Islamic revolution in 1979.
Mossadegh is remembered as a politician who nationalized Iranian oil and defied the British who had been exploiting Iranian national resources for decades. The British represented by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were not ready to relinquish what they saw as their legal right. The Iranian government led by Mossadegh was determined to defend their national interests and not step back from the brink of confrontation.
Mossadegh cut an enigmatic figure. TIME magazine chose him as its Man of the Year for 1951.
As the author notes, Mossadegh was not a pragmatist. He was more of a visionary and utopian. Had he been a pragmatic leader, he could have made different decisions and avoided a crises that eventually led to his downfall. He could have agreed to mediation offered by President Truman who wanted to avoid a stalemate.
This well-researched non-fiction book at times reads like a novel. The author did a good job documenting the coup of 1953 and the events, public and clandestine, that preceded it. First, the British tried to dismiss Mossadegh but failed. The Iranian government expelled many of the British agents from the country. Then the British decided to pass the baton to the Americans. Churchill aimed to convince the White House to take action. President Truman was against intervention in Iranian internal affairs.
Only after Eisenhower took office, the Americans were persuaded that the action was needed. Discussing those events we cannot overlook the time period in which they happened. The beginning of the second half of the twentieth century saw the war in Korea which for the US was the proof of a "relentless communist advance." The fear of the expansion of communist power was the factor that to a large extent shaped American policies back then. They could not allow Iran to be drawn into the orbit of the Soviets. While those apprehensions may be partly justified, Kinzer notes that there is no proof that the Soviets were indeed scheming to defend Mossadegh.
Meanwhile, it is difficult to predict how the events could have unfolded without the American intervention. The British blockade of Iranian ports had been suffocating the Iranian economy heavily dependent on exports of oil. Mossadegh had influential opponents. However, the role the US played in those events dealt a blow to the hopes for democracy and liberal ideas and paved the way for fierce anti-Western sentiments in Iran.
It seems that at that time few could have known that this coup would have such an impact both within and beyond Iranian borders. Stephen Kinzer highlights the negative impact that came out of this coup. The author points to a series of rather unintended consequences of the 1953 coup. Some of the short-term and long-term effects are the oppressive rule of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution, the rise of radicalism and fundamentalism, and terror attacks across the world.
Also, Kinzer briefly outlines Iran's history before Mohammad Reza, the last Shah. His father Reza, the first monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty with the reputation of a strongman, came to power in a country that was torn between foreign powers, mainly the British and the Russians at the time. He worked upon the internal contradictions and hatred against the discredited Qajar dynasty and proclaimed himself Shah. Reza Shah insisted his country be referred to as Iran. Persia was considered the name used mainly by foreigners.
"They stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American diplomats hostage for more than fourteen months."
The hostage-takers were enraged against Americans and their support for the deposed Shah who had been allowed into the United States. The US regarded this crime not only as barbaric but also inexplicable. But was it so inexplicable? Many Iranians feared that Americans would help the Shah return to power as they once did in 1953. What stood behind the fears of many Iranians that the US could help the Shah return to Tehran and to power?
In August 1953 the CIA with the help of some influential figures in Iran orchestrated a coup against Mossadegh. They encouraged and organized the mass protests against Mossadegh that resulted in chaos in the capital city of Tehran.
鈥�The great mob that surged through the streets of Tehran on August 18 was partly mercenary and partly a genuine expression of people鈥檚 loss of faith in Mossadegh.鈥�
Mossadegh was overthrown and, later, arrested. The Shah, who had been forced to flee Iran, returned and embarked on consolidating dictatorial power. That was the path that led to the Islamic revolution in 1979.
Mossadegh is remembered as a politician who nationalized Iranian oil and defied the British who had been exploiting Iranian national resources for decades. The British represented by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were not ready to relinquish what they saw as their legal right. The Iranian government led by Mossadegh was determined to defend their national interests and not step back from the brink of confrontation.
Mossadegh cut an enigmatic figure. TIME magazine chose him as its Man of the Year for 1951.
As the author notes, Mossadegh was not a pragmatist. He was more of a visionary and utopian. Had he been a pragmatic leader, he could have made different decisions and avoided a crises that eventually led to his downfall. He could have agreed to mediation offered by President Truman who wanted to avoid a stalemate.
This well-researched non-fiction book at times reads like a novel. The author did a good job documenting the coup of 1953 and the events, public and clandestine, that preceded it. First, the British tried to dismiss Mossadegh but failed. The Iranian government expelled many of the British agents from the country. Then the British decided to pass the baton to the Americans. Churchill aimed to convince the White House to take action. President Truman was against intervention in Iranian internal affairs.
Only after Eisenhower took office, the Americans were persuaded that the action was needed. Discussing those events we cannot overlook the time period in which they happened. The beginning of the second half of the twentieth century saw the war in Korea which for the US was the proof of a "relentless communist advance." The fear of the expansion of communist power was the factor that to a large extent shaped American policies back then. They could not allow Iran to be drawn into the orbit of the Soviets. While those apprehensions may be partly justified, Kinzer notes that there is no proof that the Soviets were indeed scheming to defend Mossadegh.
Meanwhile, it is difficult to predict how the events could have unfolded without the American intervention. The British blockade of Iranian ports had been suffocating the Iranian economy heavily dependent on exports of oil. Mossadegh had influential opponents. However, the role the US played in those events dealt a blow to the hopes for democracy and liberal ideas and paved the way for fierce anti-Western sentiments in Iran.
It seems that at that time few could have known that this coup would have such an impact both within and beyond Iranian borders. Stephen Kinzer highlights the negative impact that came out of this coup. The author points to a series of rather unintended consequences of the 1953 coup. Some of the short-term and long-term effects are the oppressive rule of the Shah, the Islamic Revolution, the rise of radicalism and fundamentalism, and terror attacks across the world.
Also, Kinzer briefly outlines Iran's history before Mohammad Reza, the last Shah. His father Reza, the first monarch of the Pahlavi dynasty with the reputation of a strongman, came to power in a country that was torn between foreign powers, mainly the British and the Russians at the time. He worked upon the internal contradictions and hatred against the discredited Qajar dynasty and proclaimed himself Shah. Reza Shah insisted his country be referred to as Iran. Persia was considered the name used mainly by foreigners.
February 9, 2017
賱丕 噩丿賷丿 賮賷 賴匕丕 丕賱毓丕賱賲 廿賱丕 賲丕 賳噩賴賱賴 賲賳 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺
賱爻鬲 賲賳 賯乇丕亍 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺 乇亘賲丕 賱兀賳 賯乇丕亍丞 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺 鬲亘丿賵 賱賷賾 爻賷丕爻賷丞 廿賱賶 丨丿 賰亘賷乇 丨鬲賶 賮賷 匕賱賰 丕賱賵賯鬲 丕賱匕賷 鬲賯乇兀 亘賴 毓賳 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺 丕賱孬賯丕賮賷 賵丕賱賮賰乇賷 賱兀丨丿 丕賱亘賱丿丕賳 賱丕 賷賲賰賳 丕賱賯乇丕亍丞 毓賳賴 亘賲毓夭賱 毓賳 鬲丕乇賷禺賴丕 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷 賱匕丕 兀噩丿賳賷 賱丕 兀賮囟賱 匕賱賰 丕賱賳賵毓 賲賳 丕賱賰購鬲亘 賱毓丿賲 鬲賮囟賷賱賷 亘賱 賵賳賮賵乇賷 兀丨賷丕賳賸丕 賲賳 丕賱爻噩丕賱丕鬲 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷貙 賮賱賷爻 賴賳丕賰 丨賯亘丞 賲丕 兀賵 亘賱丿 賲丕 鬲噩匕亘賳賷 賱賱賯乇丕亍丞 賮賷 鬲丕乇賷禺賴丕貙 賱賰賳賳賷 賲賳 賵賯鬲 賱丌禺乇 丕禺鬲胤賮 賰鬲丕亘 賷鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 賮鬲乇丞 賴丕賲丞 賲丕 亘鬲乇賰賷夭 賵鬲賰孬賷賮 兀卮毓乇 賲毓賴 兀賳賳賷 丨賯賸丕 毓乇賮鬲 賰賱 卮賷亍 賷禺氐 鬲賱賰 丕賱丨賯亘丞 賵賰兀賳賳賷 毓丕賷卮鬲賴丕 賲毓 賲毓丕氐乇賷賴丕 賵賯丿 賰丕賳 賲賳 兀賴賲 丕賱賰購鬲亘 丕賱鬲賷 丨丕賱賮賳賷 丨馗賷 賲毓賴丕 賴賵 賰鬲丕亘 丕賱丿賷賳 賵丕賱丿賲 廿亘丕丿丞 卮毓亘 丕賱兀賳丿賱爻 丕賱匕賷 鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 兀夭賲丞 丕賱賲賵乇爻賰賷賷賳 亘毓丿 兀賳 鬲丨賵賱鬲 丕賱兀賳丿賱爻 廿賱賶 兀爻亘丕賳賷丕貙 賵賴丕 賴賵 賰鬲丕亘 丌禺乇 毓賳 丨賯亘丞 卮丕卅賰丞 兀禺乇賶 賷毓賷丿 廿賱賷賾 卮睾賮 丕賱賯乇丕亍丞 亘毓丿 丕賳賯胤丕毓 卮賴乇賷賳 賱兀賳賴賷賴 乇睾賲 賰亘乇 丨噩賲賴 賮賷 兀賷丕賲 賯賱賷賱丞.
丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賷鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丕賳賯賱丕亘 廿賷乇丕賳 1953 丕賱匕賷 賳馗賲鬲賴 賰賱 賲賳 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賵兀賲乇賷賰丕 賱賱廿胤丕丨丞 亘丨賰賵賲丞 賲丨賲丿 賲氐丿賯 丕賱乇噩賱 丕賱丿賷賲賯乇丕胤賷 匕賵 丕賱賲亘丕丿卅 丕賱賱賷亘乇丕賱賷丞 丕賱匕賷 賰丕賳 丿賮丕毓賴 毓賳 丕賱丨乇賷丞 賵廿賷賲丕賳賴 亘丨賯 丕賱孬賵丕乇 丕賱賲毓丕乇囟賷賳 賱賴 (賵丕賱匕賷賳 賰丕賳 兀賰孬乇 賲賳 賳氐賮賴賲 廿賳 賱賲 賳賯賱 噩賲賷毓賴賲 賲賳 兀賵賱卅賰 丕賱匕賷賳 丕爻鬲兀噩乇鬲賴賲 丕賱賲禺丕亘乇丕鬲 丕賱賲乇賰夭賷丞 丕賱兀賲乇賷賰賷丞 賰賷 賷爻丕毓丿賵賴丕 賮賷 毓賲賱賷丞 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘) 兀賯賵賱 廿賳 廿賷賲丕賳賴 亘丨賯賴賲 賮賷 兀賳 賷孬賵乇賵丕 賵乇賮囟賴 鬲丿禺賱 賯賵丕鬲 丕賱卮乇胤丞 賱賯賲毓賴賲 丨鬲賶 丨賷賳 鬲丨賵賱鬲 孬賵乇鬲賴賲 賲賳 丕賱爻賱賲賷丞 廿賱賶 丕賱賵丨卮賷丞 賵丕賱鬲禺乇賷亘貙 賵丕賱賴噩賵賲 丨鬲賶 毓賱賷賴 賵毓賱賶 賲賳夭賱賴 丕賱禺丕氐 賴賵 賲丕 賰丕賳 兀賰亘乇 丕賱兀爻亘丕亘 賮賷 賳噩丕丨 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 賵爻賯賵胤 賲氐丿賯貙 賮亘兀禺胤丕丐賴 丕賱鬲賷 賱賲 鬲賰賳 爻賵賶 賳賷丞 丨爻賳丞 賱丕 鬲購爻賲賳 賵賱丕 鬲睾賳賷 賲賳 噩賵毓 賵賯鬲 丕賱兀夭賲丕鬲 賲賴丿 賲氐丿賯 丕賱胤乇賷賯 賱爻賯賵胤賴
賲丕 丕賱匕賷 丿賮毓 賲丨賲丿 賲氐丿賯 廿賱賶 匕賱賰 丕賱賲氐賷乇責 賱賲 鬲賰賳 卮毓亘賷鬲賴 賵賵胤賳賷鬲賴 賵丿賮丕毓賴 毓賳 賲氐丕賱丨 卮毓亘賴 賴賲 賮賯胤 丕賱爻亘亘貙 賱賰賳 禺胤丐賴 丕賱兀賰亘乇 賵兀賳噩丕夭賴 丕賱兀賰亘乇 賮賷 丌賳 賵丕丨丿 賴賵 鬲兀賲賷賲賴 丕賱氐賳丕毓丞 丕賱賳賮胤 丕賱廿賷乇丕賳賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 賰丕賳 賷丨鬲賰乇賴丕 丕賱丕爻鬲毓賲丕乇 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷 賵賷鬲乇賰 賱廿賷乇丕賳 氐丕丨亘丞 丕賱禺賷乇 賳賮爻賴丕 丕賱賮鬲丕鬲 亘賱 兀賳 丕賱兀賲乇 賱賲 賷賯賮 毓賳丿 匕賱賰 丕賱丨丿 賮賯丿 賰丕賳 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷賷賳 賷爻鬲睾賱賵賳 丕賱毓賲丕賱丞 丕賱廿賷乇丕賳賷丞 亘兀爻賵兀 丕賱胤乇賯 丕賱賲賲賰賳丞 丿賵賳 丨鬲賶 鬲賵賮賷乇 賲丕 賷賲賰賳 賱賴丐賱丕亍 兀賳 賷毓賷卮賵賳 亘賴 丨賷丕丞 卮亘賴 丌丿賲賷丞.
爻鬲賷賮賳 賰賷賳夭乇 賮賷 兀丨丿賶 丕賱賲賵丕囟毓 亘丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賰丕賳 賷鬲丨丿孬 兀賳賴 賵賮賷 賲乇丨賱丞 賲丕 賰丕賳 賷賲賰賳 賱賲氐丿賯 賯亘賵賱 丕賱賲賮丕賵囟丕鬲 賵丕賱賵氐賵賱 廿賱賶 丨賱 賵爻胤 賷禺乇噩 賲賳 禺賱丕賱賴 賰賱丕 丕賱胤乇賮賷賳 乇丕亘丨賷賳 賱賰賳 賵賲賳 賵噩賴丞 賳馗乇 賰賷賳夭乇 兀賷囟賸丕 賮廿賳 賲氐丿賯 賰丕賳 賷毓鬲亘乇 兀賳 賲丕 賷丨丿孬 賴賵 賯囟賷丞 賵胤賳賷丞 賮賷 丕賱兀爻丕爻 睾賷乇 丕賱賲爻賲賵丨 亘丕賱鬲賮丕賵囟 毓賱賷賴丕 賵賱賲 賷賰賳 賷賳馗乇 賱丕 賱賱賲賰丕爻亘 丕賱鬲賷 賷賲賰賳 鬲丨賯賷賯賴丕 賵賱丕 丨鬲賶 賱賱毓賵丕賯亘 丕賱鬲賷 賷賲賰賳 賱賴丕 兀賳 鬲丨丿孬 賱賰賳 兀噩丿賳賷 賴丕 賴賳丕 兀禺鬲賱賮 賲毓 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 丕賱匕賷 匕賰乇 賴賵 賳賮爻賴 賮賷 賰孬賷乇 賲賳 丕賱賲賵丕囟毓 賰賷賮 賰丕賳鬲 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 鬲賯賵賲 亘丕賱賲賮丕賵囟丕鬲 亘氐賱賮 賵睾乇賵乇 賵氐賱丕亘丞 賲賳 賷賳鬲夭毓 卮賷卅賸丕 丨賯賴 亘丕賱兀爻丕爻 賵賱賷爻 賰兀賳賴丕 鬲賯賵賲 亘丕睾鬲氐丕亘 賲丕 賱賷爻 賱賴丕貙 丨鬲賶 兀賳賴丕 乇賮囟鬲 鬲毓丿賷賱 亘賳賵丿 毓乇賵囟賴丕 賵丕賱鬲賳丕夭賱 兀賰孬乇 賯賱賷賱丕賸 賮賯丿 賰丕賳鬲 賰賱 賲丕 鬲賯賵賲 亘賮毓賱賴 丨賷賳賴丕 賴賵 鬲毓丿賷賱 "氐賷丕睾丞" 丕賱亘賳賵丿 賱鬲亘丿賵 兀賱胤賮 賵賰兀賳 丕賱卮毓亘 賵乇丐爻丕丐賴 爻購匕噩 爻賷禺囟毓賵賳 賮賷 賰賱 丕賱兀丨賵丕賱.
兀丨賷丕賳賸丕 亘毓囟 丕賱賯賵賶 丕賱廿爻鬲毓賲丕乇賷丞 鬲購爻賰乇賴丕 賯賵鬲賴丕 丨丿 丕賱毓賲賶 毓賲丕 賷賲賰賳 兀賳 鬲卮賰賱賴 孬賵乇丞 卮毓亘 賲賯賴賵乇 匕賷 賯囟賷丞 賲賳 賯賵丞 鬲賮賵賯 賯賵鬲賴丕 兀囟毓丕賮賸丕 賲囟丕毓賮丞!
廿匕丕 賰丕賳 丕賱禺賱丕賮 廿賷乇丕賳賷/亘乇賷胤丕賳賷 賮賯胤 賲丕 丕賱匕賷 丿賮毓 亘丕賱賵賱丕賷丕鬲 丕賱賲鬲丨丿丞 丕賱兀賲乇賷賰賷丞 賮賷 禺囟賲 匕賱賰 丕賱氐乇丕毓責 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賵兀賲乇賷賰丕 賵賵賮賯賸丕 賱丿賵乇 賰賱 賲賳賴賲丕 賰賯賵丞 毓馗賲賶 賮賷 丕賱毓丕賱賲 賷賲賱賰丕賳 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賲賳 丕賱賲氐丕賱丨 丕賱賲卮鬲乇賰丞 亘賷賳 亘毓囟賴賲 丕賱亘毓囟 毓賱賶 胤乇賷賯丞 "賴丕鬲 賵禺丿" 賱匕丕 賵亘毓丿 兀賳 馗賱鬲 兀賲乇賷賰丕 胤賵丕賱 賮鬲乇丞 丨賰賲 丕賱乇卅賷爻 鬲乇賵賲丕賳 鬲賱毓亘 丿賵乇 丕賱氐丿賷賯 賱廿賷乇丕賳 賵丕賱賵爻賷胤 賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賵鬲丨丕賵賱 噩丕賴丿丞 乇睾賲 賰賱 賲丕 鬲賳鬲馗乇賴 丕賱亘賱丿丕賳 賲賳賴丕 兀賳 鬲賯賮 毓賱賶 丕賱丨賷丕丿貙 鬲睾賷乇 賲賵賯賮 兀賲乇賷賰丕 賲毓 丕賳鬲賯丕賱 丕賱爻賱胤丞 賲賳 鬲乇賵賲丕賳 廿賱賶 兀賷夭賳賴丕賵乇 丕賱匕賷 賰丕賳鬲 爻賷丕爻鬲賴 賮賷賲丕 賷鬲毓賱賯 亘賴匕丕 丕賱賲賱賮 賴賵 丕賱賲賵丕賮賯丞 毓賱賶 丕賱鬲丿禺賱 賱賰賳 丿毓賵賳賷 賵卮兀賳賷! 賮賱賲 賷賰賳 賷乇賷丿 亘毓丿賴丕 丕賱廿胤賱丕毓 毓賱賶 兀賷丞 鬲賮丕氐賷賱 賮賷賲丕 賷禺氐 毓賲賱賷丞 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 丕賱鬲賷 鬲爻賲賶 "兀賷丕賰爻" 賱匕丕 賵亘毓丿 賴匕賴 丕賱賲賵丕賮賯丞 丕噩鬲賲毓鬲 丕賱毓丿賷丿 賲賳 丕賱賯賷丕丿丕鬲 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞 賵丕賱兀賲乇賷賰賷丞 賱鬲賲賵賷賱 賵賲鬲丕亘毓丞 毓賲賱賷丞 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 丕賱鬲賷 爻賷賯賵賲 亘鬲賳賮賷匕賴丕 孬賷賵丿賵乇 乇賵夭賮賱鬲 亘丕賱丕爻鬲毓丕賳丞 亘丕賱兀賲賵丕賱 丕賱胤丕卅賱丞 丕賱鬲賷 亘丨丨賵夭鬲賴 賵亘賲爻丕毓丿丞 毓賲賱丕丐賴 丕賱廿賷乇丕賳賷賷賳 丕賱賲噩賳丿賷賳 賲賳 丕賱丨賰賵賲丞 毓賱賶 乇兀爻賴賲 丕賱卮丕賴 賳賮爻賴 賵禺丕乇噩賴丕 賵亘卮乇丕亍 賵丨卮丿 丕賱睾賵睾丕亍 丕賱匕賷賳 賯丕賲賵丕 亘丿賵乇 丕賱孬賵丕乇 丕賱賲毓丕乇囟賷賳 賱賲氐丿賯 賵丕賱賲丐賷丿賷賳 賱乇噩賵毓 丕賱卮丕賴 丕爻鬲胤丕毓 乇賵夭賮賱鬲 鬲丨賯賷賯 賲丕 鬲賲賳賶 亘毓丿 賲丨丕賵賱丞 兀賵賱賶 賮丕卮賱丞 賵兀禺乇賶 賳丕噩丨丞 賮兀賳 賷賯賵賲 亘丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 毓賱賶 賲氐丿賯 賵鬲賯丿賷賲賴 賱賱賲丨丕賰賲丞 賵賳賮賷賴 賮賷 兀丨丿賶 丕賱賯乇賶 廿賱賶 兀賳 鬲賵賮丕賴 丕賱賱賴 賵廿毓丕丿丞 丕賱卮丕賴 賱毓乇卮賴 賱丨賰賲 丿丕賲 亘毓丿賴丕 禺賲爻丞 賵毓卮乇賷賳 毓丕賲貙 禺賲爻丞 賵毓卮乇賷賳 毓丕賲 賮賷 禺丿賲丞 丕賱廿賳噩賱賷夭!!
賴賳丕賰 毓賱丕賯丞 胤乇丿賷丞 亘賷賳 賮爻丕丿 丕賱丨丕賰賲 賵賲丿丞 亘賯丕丐賴 賮賷 丕賱丨賰賲貙 賮賰賱賲丕 賰丕賳 胤丕睾賷丞 賷賲賱賰 賲賳 丕賱亘胤卮 賲丕 賷賲賱賰 賷爻鬲胤賷毓 丨賷賳賴丕 鬲賰賲賷賲 兀賮賵丕賴 賲毓丕乇囟賷賴 賵卮毓亘賴 賵賰賱 賲賳 鬲爻賵賾賱 賱賴 賳賮爻賴 丕賱孬賵乇丞 兀賵 丨鬲賶 兀賳 賷購馗賴乇 亘毓囟 丕賱丕賲鬲毓丕囟 毓賱賶 丨賰賲 賲賵賱丕賴貙 賵賰賱賲丕 賰丕賳 匕賱賷賱 丕賱賳賮爻 賲購賳亘胤丨 兀賲丕賲 兀爻賷丕丿賴 賮賷 丕賱禺丕乇噩 賰賱賲丕 乇囟賵丕 毓賳賴 賵毓賳 丨賰賲賴 賵鬲乇賰賵賴 毓賱賶 毓乇卮賴 廿賱賶 兀賳 賷乇孬 丕賱賱賴 丕賱兀乇囟 賵賲賳 毓賱賷賴丕 賵廿賱賶 兀賳 賷賯賵賲 亘鬲賳賮賷匕 賰賱 兀賵丕賲乇賴賲 賵賲氐丕賱丨賴賲 毓賱賶 丨爻丕亘 丿賵賱鬲賴 賵乇毓丕賷丕賴 賱賰賳賴 丨賷賳 賷賯賮 毓孬乇丞 兀賲丕賲賴賲 爻賷氐亘丨 賴賵 賰亘卮 丕賱賮丿丕亍 丕賱兀賵賱 賰賷 賷賳噩賵賳 亘兀賳賮爻賴賲!
丕賱丌賳 賵亘毓丿 丕賱孬賵乇丞 丕賱廿爻賱丕賲賷丞 賮賷 廿賷乇丕賳 賷亘丿賵 兀賳 兀賲乇賷賰丕 鬲毓囟 兀氐丕亘毓賴丕 賲賳 丕賱賳丿賲 毓賱賶 鬲丿禺賱賴丕 丕賱兀賵賱 賮賯丿 鬲禺賱氐鬲 賲賳 禺胤乇 氐睾賷乇 賱鬲兀鬲賷 賱賳賮爻賴丕 鈥撡堌堎� 兀賳 鬲丿乇賷- 亘禺胤乇 兀賰亘乇 亘賰孬賷乇
賴匕丕 賰鬲丕亘 氐丕丿賲 毓賳 賰賷賮 賱賱賲丐丕賲乇丕鬲 兀賳 鬲賰賵賳貙 賰賷賮 鬲購丨丕賰貙 賵賰賷賮 賷氐亘丨 賵乇丕亍賴丕 毓卮乇丕鬲 丕賱賲賳丕氐亘 丕賱賴丕賲丞 賵毓卮乇丕鬲 丕賱兀賮賰丕乇 丕賱卮賷胤丕賳賷丞貙 賵賲賱丕賷賷賳 丕賱賲賱丕賷賷賳 賲賳 丕賱丿賵賱丕乇丕鬲.
兀賳丕 賰賳鬲 賲賳 兀卮丿 丕賱爻丕禺乇賷賳 賲賳 兀賵賱卅賰 丕賱賲丐賲賳賷賳 亘賳馗乇賷丞 丕賱賲丐丕賲乇丞貙 丕賱匕賷賳 賷賯賵賲賵賳 亘鬲毓賱賷賯 賰賱 賮卮賱/鬲毓孬乇 丿丕禺賱賶 毓賱賶 卮賲丕毓丞 丕賱賰賷丿 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷 賵丕賱匕賷賳 賷毓鬲賯丿賵賳 兀賳賴賲 賲丨賵乇 丕賱賰賵賳 鬲鬲乇賰 丕賱賯賵賶 丕賱毓馗賲賷 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷丞 賲氐丕賱丨賴丕 丕賱禺丕氐丞 賱兀噩賱 丕賱丕賷賯丕毓 亘丿賵賱丞 兀賵 兀賲丞 兀禺乇賶 賴賷 爻丕賯胤丞 賲賳 丕賱兀爻丕爻 丿賵賳 丕賱丨丕噩丞 賱鬲丿禺賱.
賱賰賳賳賷 丕賱丌賳 亘鬲購 兀毓賷賾 兀賳 賳毓賲 賴賳丕賰 賲丕 賷購爻賲賶 亘賳馗乇賷丞 丕賱賲丐丕賲乇丞 亘卮賰賱 賷賲孬賱 兀囟毓丕賮 賲丕 賷賲賰賳 賱毓賯賱賷 丕賱氐睾賷乇 賴匕丕 鬲禺賷賱賴貙 賴賱 賴匕丕 賷毓賳賷 兀賳賳賷 鬲乇賰鬲 噩丕賳亘 丕賱爻丕禺乇賷賳 賲賳 賳馗乇賷丞 丕賱賲丐丕賲乇丞 賱兀賯賮 賮賷 丕賱胤乇賮 丕賱丌禺乇 賵兀賯賮 賲賵賯賮 丕賱丿丕賮毓 毓賳賴丕責 亘丕賱胤亘毓 賱丕 賮賰賱丕賴賲丕 鬲胤乇賮貨 賰賱 賲丕 鬲睾賷乇 賮賷 賵噩賴丞 賳馗乇賷 賴賷 兀賳賴丕 兀氐亘丨鬲 兀賰孬乇 廿鬲夭丕賳賸丕貙 賴賳丕賰 賲丐丕賲乇丞 賲賳 丕賱禺丕乇噩 亘丕賱胤亘毓 賱賰賳賴丕 賱丕 鬲賳賮賷 丕賱賲爻卅賵賱賷丞 毓賳 丕賱丿丕禺賱 賵賱丕 鬲氐賱丨 賰卮賲丕毓丞 賱賴 賱鬲毓賱賷賯 賮卮賱賴 賮賱賲 鬲賰賳 賱鬲賳噩丨 丕賱賲丐丕賲乇丞 丕賱禺丕乇噩賷丞 賱賵 賱賲 賷賰賳 丕賱丿丕禺賱 兀噩賵賮貙 賴卮貙 囟毓賷賮 丕賱兀爻丕爻.
賰賲丕 兀賳 兀爻賱賵亘 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 乇卮賷賯貙 賲賲鬲毓貙 卮丕賲賱 賮丕爻鬲胤丕毓 乇亘胤 賲丕 丨丿孬 亘丕賱賲丕囟賷 亘賲丕 賷丨丿孬 丕賱丌賳 賵鬲丨賱賷賱賴 亘丿賯丞 賵丕爻鬲禺賱丕氐 賳鬲丕卅噩 亘賱 賵丨賱賵賱 賲亘賴乇丞 賲賳賴 賰賲丕 兀賳賴 睾夭賷乇 賮賱賲 賷鬲乇賰 卮禺氐賷丞 賲丕 廿賱丕 賵鬲丨丿孬 毓賳賴丕 亘賲丕 賷毓胤賷賰 禺賱賮賷丞 亘爻賷胤丞 毓賳賴丕 賯亘賱 兀賳 賷鬲丨丿孬 毓賳 丿賵乇賴丕 賮賷 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 賮賱賲 鬲賰賳 丕賱卮禺氐賷丕鬲 賮賷 丨賰丕賷鬲賴 鬲亘夭睾 鬲賱賯丕卅賷賸丕 賲賳 丕賱賮乇丕睾 亘賲丕 賷購卮毓乇賰 亘丕賱丕乇鬲亘丕賰 賵丕賱鬲賷賴.
丨賰丕賷鬲賴責 賳毓賲 賮丕賱賰鬲丕亘 兀卮亘賴 亘丨賰丕賷丞 亘賵賱賷爻賷丞 賲賳 丨賰丕賷丕鬲 賳亘賷賱 賮丕乇賵賯貙 兀賵 賮賷賱賲 兀賰卮賳/噩丕爻賵爻賷丞 賲毓 賰孬賷乇 賲賳 丕賱禺賷丕賱.
賮賲毓 賰賱 賲丕 鬲賯乇兀 爻鬲鬲毓噩亘 賰賷賮 賰賱 賴匕丕 賷丨丿孬 亘賰賱 鬲賱賰 丕賱丿賯丞 賵丕賱禺亘孬 賲賳 禺賱賮 馗賴賵乇賳丕 賳購賲丕乇爻 賲賴賳鬲賳丕 丕賱賵丨賷丿丞 兀賱丕 賵賴賷貨 兀賳 賳賰賵賳 賳賷丕賲!
鬲賲賾鬲
September 9, 2024
鈥淪oon after the Shah was overthrown, President Jimmy Carter allowed him to enter the United States. That sent Iranian radicals into a frenzy of rage. With the blessing of their new leaders, they stormed the American embassy in Tehran and held fifty-two American diplomats hostage for more than fourteen months. Westerners, and especially Americans, found this crime not only barbaric but inexplicable. That was because almost none of them had any idea of the responsibility the United States bore for imposing the royalist regime that Iranians came to hate so passionately. The hostage-takers remembered that when the Shah fled into exile in 1953, CIA agents working at the American embassy had returned him to his throne. Iranians feared that history was about to repeat itself.鈥�
鈥� All the Shah鈥檚 Men: An American Coup and the Roots of the Middle East Terror
This is the story of the oil-nationalization episode in Iran and the rise and fall of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the leader who embodied his people鈥檚 hopes for taking control of their destiny. This book however, is mainly concerned with depicting how the United States and the British governments tried to influence the event through gunboat diplomacy.
Stephen Kinzer doesn鈥檛 tell anything new and the almost care-free way by which he draws conclusions about the legacy of the coup diminishes the value of the book. To be fair, this is not a historical work and Kinzer has mostly relied on the works of other historians like Elm and Gasiorowski for creating his narrative. The problematic part is his handling of the events surrounding the coup and its aftermath. His depiction of the coup is basically a banal rehashing of the account offered by Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA field-operative who reputedly masterminded the coup and brought it to success, almost single-handedly.
Kinzer cares about Iran and his trip to Tehran for visiting the house that Mosaddeq stayed and lived his final years (which he chronicles in the epilogue of this book), shows that he is passionate about Iran and its fate. His passion is palpable in the account that he offers.
(His critical stance towards U.S. foreign policy throughout the past decades shows that he sees the hand of the United States in almost any development throughout the world and this book is not an exception. While it might have a certain charm for some that Kinzer takes an almost activist-like stance against U.S policies, it does no good for objective historical writing. His recent remarks about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and blaming it on NATO expansion further reveals his penchant for isolating the effects of U.S. policies and criticizing them out of context.)
In this book, Kinzer heavily overplays the role of the CIA in the ousting of Mosaddeq and by relying on Kermit Roosevelt鈥檚 account, this book suffers a lot from ignoring lots of important personalities and their actions which were significant in shaping the final outcome. He hasn鈥檛 even tried to corroborate the version offered by Roosevelt by cross-checking it with other sources. He ignores the role of internal opposition to Mosaddeq to the point of absurdity and apparently doesn鈥檛 have any problem with that: it fits into his narrative that the United States was the major cause of the 1979 revolution and its disastrous consequences. In the final chapter, he warns: 鈥�...[D]rawing conclusions about causes and effects is always dangerous.鈥� But he has evidently ignored his own warning in writing his narrative.
He only devotes two chapters to the actual unfolding of the coup, the rest he uses to build the background and provide context and a summary of events leading up to 1953.
In the first chapter he tells what happened on 15th August during the first coup attempt. The most glaring problem here is a lack of details. I thought maybe he would describe the CIA planning in more depth later on, but he doesn鈥檛 delve any deeper and jumps right into describing the second stage of the coup in the penultimate chapter.
Then he goes back in time and spends two chapters giving a summary of Iran鈥檚 ancient history up until the point that Reza Khan became Shah and established the Pahlavi dynasty. His summary of Iran鈥檚 antiquity is filled with mythological romanticization of the Achaemenid Empire and basically gives a slapdash account of how great they were and how they ruled that monstrously big empire without too much oppression and without brutalizing their subjects. I am not well-versed in Iran鈥檚 ancient history, but I refuse to believe such generalized statements based on fragmentary evidence and archaeological findings. He then retells the oft-repeated tale of how the barbarian Arabs invaded Iran and destroyed its civilization by introducing and enforcing their Islam on the population; again he clings to a one-sided narrative.
Why did Kinzer feel the need to include these sections, I don鈥檛 know but I think he should鈥檝e avoided that which would鈥檝e made his book more coherent and less rambling. I understand that he included these chapters to make the book more accessible but it鈥檚 not like he had many pages to dedicate to this background-building. Partly because of that, this book is misleading at numerous points. A case in point is his description of the reign of Reza Shah, reducing him to a few botched and generalized paragraphs:
Starting with chapter 4, the book improves a lot. He starts by telling the story of George Reynolds who managed to strike oil in Masjed-Suleiman for the first time in Iran and then he gives a good account of how the British Empire managed to gain oil-concessions from the Qajar dynasty and establish the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which owned the oil-fields of Iran and managed to remain a dominant force with the blessing of the British government. These sections are among the best in the book. Kinzer manages to give you a good outline of the British Imperial policies with regards to Iran and how their obstinacy to fairly share their profits with Iranians and the ugly way they treated the workers of Abadan refinery, begot widespread resentment in the population. These grievances ultimately led to the nationalization movement which brought Mosaddeq to the pinnacle of power for the express purpose of nationalizing the oil. I really enjoyed that Kinzer doesn鈥檛 try to justify British policies at all and he manages to show them for what they were: naked exploitation of Iran鈥檚 oil. The fact that Iran probably wouldn鈥檛 have managed to extract its oil without their help doesn鈥檛 excuse their never-ending greed and their oblivious attitude to the suffering of Iranians.
After Mosaddeq nationalized the oil and the oil company, things came to a head. The British government didn鈥檛 want a deal without retaining (de facto if not de jure) control of the oil company and even though their position softened a bit overtime, their persistence was more than matched by that of Mosaddeq鈥檚. Kinzer doesn鈥檛 criticize Mosaddeq openly but from early-on, he devotes paragraphs on his peculiar character that made him a great orator and a firebrand opposition leader but not a great statesman: 鈥�...[A] visionary rather than a pragmatist, preferring defeat in an honorable cause to what he considered shameful compromise.鈥� This is actually a point of contention between historians: some believe that Mosaddeq made numerous mistakes in failing to make a compromise; others holding that the offers made by AIOC and the British government were not made in good faith and were not real attempts at a workable compromise. Kinzer doesn鈥檛 dwell on this and he settles for giving a broad summary of the proposals and then moves ahead.
There are not many faults that I can find in these middle chapters. There are some baseless claims that there are no end-notes to be found for but for the most part they are not earth-shattering. When Kinzer tries to describe the internal situation in Iran however, he is badly out of his depth. When he writes from the British and U.S. perspective, he does a commendable job; his sources are more diverse and he has a good command of the political line-up and policy making. His coverage of Mosaddeq鈥檚 speech in the Security Council and his meeting with Truman and Acheson are also remarkable.
Finally all efforts to find a compromise failed and the Eisenhower administration gradually relented to British pressure for ousting Mosaddeq. To some extent it can be said that the Eisenhower administration did so in the interest of safeguarding its alliance with Britain; not because of a real threat of communist takeover but because the United States needed British support in the international scene and knew that a failure to support them in this case will undoubtedly alienate the British government and will weaken their unified stance against the Soviet Union and China. Roger Goiran, the CIA chief in Tehran, vehemently opposed the coup and given the fact that he was responsible for dealing with the communist threat, it only strengthens the argument that the danger of a communist takeover was mostly a fabrication.
The situation became chaotic in 1953 and this is where Kinzer鈥檚 narrative goes off balance. The National Front started to split and numerous powerful groups (like the industrialists and the clergy) distanced themselves from Mosaddeq. This division, which had numerous causes, is mostly viewed as a result of foreign influence and the work of CIA and MI6 agents. By only relying on reports and correspondents of British and Americans, Kinzer fails to realize that this split most probably would鈥檝e still happened as a result of the unstable political quagmire caused by the unresolved oil issues. He gives the impression that this shift in power dynamics was mostly the result of subversive activities which is far from the truth. Economic and diplomatic pressures from Britain and the United States had already taken their toll on the National Front, much more so than subversive activities.
Kashani鈥檚 split from the National Front 鈥� and his dissent against Mosaddeq 鈥� for example is solely attributed to the work of Rashidian Brothers and no ulterior motive is considered. The fact that Kashani was a power-hungry politician with some ties to Fada'iyan-e Islam terrorist cells (who had assassinated General Razmara in 1951), is not given that much weight. Kinzer doesn鈥檛 openly claim that the situation developed under the tight control of CIA and MI6, but by recounting the events through the prism of those agencies, he takes the power away from Iranian political actors. By doing so, he reduces the internal forces to mere pawns, trapped in a great game arranged by intelligence agencies, destined to play their designated roles. The element of chaos and confusion 鈥� inherent in any political upheaval 鈥� is almost nonexistent in his tale.
(Kashani was not the leader of Fada'iyan, a fundamentalist malcontent named Navvab Safavi was the man at the helm. Navvab saw himself big enough to condemn 鈥渁postates鈥� to death and authorized assassinations in the hope of purging the land of corruption. The clerical establishment didn鈥檛 endorse him and even banned him and his fanatics from Qom.)
In the penultimate chapter, we finally get to the second stage of the coup. This section, like the first chapter, is again drawn from the memoirs of Kermit Roosevelt. Like the first chapter, the absence of detail cripples this chapter and I鈥檓 not convinced that the coup succeeded because of Roosevelt and CIA agents.
In short it goes on like this:
After the failed attempt on August 15, 1953 to remove Mosaddeq from power, top-level CIA officials and even Beedle Smith (the undersecretary of state) had assumed that Operation Ajax had failed. They urged the evacuation of key personnel. How the first attempt was supposed to succeed and what the actual plan to remove Mosaddeq was, is not elaborated. But Kermit Roosevelt decided to give it another try in defiance of his superiors. Roosevelt however had already managed to get Mohammad Reza Shah to sign two farmans (decrees): one for dismissing Mosaddeq, the other for appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. (In reality, the Shah and his court prepared the farmans but in Roosevelt鈥檚 tale, it was the CIA-agents who wrote them and Roosevelt who got the Shah to sign them.) After the first attempt failed, Shah fled Iran first to Iraq and then to Rome and was unhinged and unaware of the situation in Iran. In the meantime, Roosevelt had hidden Zahedi away in a house and Zahedi was biding his time, waiting to see what would happen. Then Roosevelt decided to organize a pro-Mosaddeq demonstration by using his agents and his vast network, which included members of the clergy and merchants of the bazaar and hooligans. The pro-Mosaddeq crowds marched the streets the next day and set fire to buildings and generally caused mayhem. Mosaddeq didn't use his forces to suppress the protesters. Then Roosevelt convinced Loy Henderson (U.S ambassador in Iran) to visit Mosaddeq. Loy Henderson told Mosaddeq that American citizens were being harassed by the disorderly mob and their lives were in danger. Mosaddeq became worried and ordered his troops to finally put an end to the demonstrations. He also ordered his supporters to stay home in the coming days. Now Roosevelt held the winning card; he would just need to organize a pro-Shah demonstration! The day after, pro-Shah demonstrators emerged on the streets. The officers and their troops however, who had clamped down on previous days protests, didn鈥檛 interfere with the crowds this time. The troops actually started to march alongside the crowd and seized key installations across the city one by one, silencing pro-Mosaddeq forces as they went. This sudden about-face of officers, was the result of the work of generals and officers involved in the coup who held pro-Shah sympathies and decided to end the Mosaddeq鈥檚 reign once and for all. The combined pro-Shah forces finally descended on Mosaddeq鈥檚 house and after fierce fighting, forces loyal to Mosaddeq surrendered and Mosaddeq took flight, until he surrendered himself a few days later. Meanwhile, Zahedi came out of hiding and rode to the radio station and announced that he was now prime minister and Mosaddeq was no longer in power, by the force of loyal decree.
Kinzer鈥檚 tale doesn鈥檛 offer much more detail than this. And by ignoring crucial information like the involvement of key generals in rallying the troops and the importance of the clergy in organizing the protests, his account gets distorted and is attributed mostly to the work of CIA agents. I don鈥檛 know if we can say Mosaddeq's government would have fallen even without Ajax. But I think we can say that the CIA didn鈥檛 play that big a part. For that I recommend Darioush Bayandor鈥檚 account of the coup.
Finally we get to the legacy of the coup. As for the claim that by removing Mosaddeq from power, the Iranian people came to resent the United States for meddling in Iran鈥檚 affairs, Bayandor points out in his book that Iranians couldn鈥檛 have known about the Ajax operation until it was publicized around 1980 (and further in 2000 by the Wilbur Document). The clerics' violent anti-American rhetoric however, started much sooner than that. Bayandor aptly points out that Iranians had a predilection to see the hand of foreigners in almost all major developments in their country. So if Mosaddeq鈥檚 government had collapsed through other means, the people probably would鈥檝e still seen it as the work of Britain and the United States. It is true that the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah was weakened because he built his power on the ashes of Mosaddeq's government. But it is far-fetched to say that the Mullahs' rhetoric would鈥檝e been less anti-American if Ajax hadn't happened. Actually, the future leader of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini (who was close in his thinking to Kashani) didn鈥檛 approve of Mosaddeq and his secular nationalism. Since 1979, the Islamic Regime has never paid any real tribute to Mosaddeq and has denounced him in different ways. In their version of events, Kashani is the real liberator who led the struggle for oil-nationalization; the very personality who worked to remove Mosaddeq from power. In this light, Madeleine Albright鈥檚 apology in 2000 seems to have given more ammunition to the Islamic Regime for portraying the United States as the Great Satan. If anything, by removing Mosaddeq from power (assuming that Ajax was responsible for that), the United States government worked in tandem with the revolutionary clerics.
鈥� All the Shah鈥檚 Men: An American Coup and the Roots of the Middle East Terror
This is the story of the oil-nationalization episode in Iran and the rise and fall of Mohammad Mosaddeq, the leader who embodied his people鈥檚 hopes for taking control of their destiny. This book however, is mainly concerned with depicting how the United States and the British governments tried to influence the event through gunboat diplomacy.
Stephen Kinzer doesn鈥檛 tell anything new and the almost care-free way by which he draws conclusions about the legacy of the coup diminishes the value of the book. To be fair, this is not a historical work and Kinzer has mostly relied on the works of other historians like Elm and Gasiorowski for creating his narrative. The problematic part is his handling of the events surrounding the coup and its aftermath. His depiction of the coup is basically a banal rehashing of the account offered by Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA field-operative who reputedly masterminded the coup and brought it to success, almost single-handedly.
Kinzer cares about Iran and his trip to Tehran for visiting the house that Mosaddeq stayed and lived his final years (which he chronicles in the epilogue of this book), shows that he is passionate about Iran and its fate. His passion is palpable in the account that he offers.
(His critical stance towards U.S. foreign policy throughout the past decades shows that he sees the hand of the United States in almost any development throughout the world and this book is not an exception. While it might have a certain charm for some that Kinzer takes an almost activist-like stance against U.S policies, it does no good for objective historical writing. His recent remarks about the Russian invasion of Ukraine and blaming it on NATO expansion further reveals his penchant for isolating the effects of U.S. policies and criticizing them out of context.)
In this book, Kinzer heavily overplays the role of the CIA in the ousting of Mosaddeq and by relying on Kermit Roosevelt鈥檚 account, this book suffers a lot from ignoring lots of important personalities and their actions which were significant in shaping the final outcome. He hasn鈥檛 even tried to corroborate the version offered by Roosevelt by cross-checking it with other sources. He ignores the role of internal opposition to Mosaddeq to the point of absurdity and apparently doesn鈥檛 have any problem with that: it fits into his narrative that the United States was the major cause of the 1979 revolution and its disastrous consequences. In the final chapter, he warns: 鈥�...[D]rawing conclusions about causes and effects is always dangerous.鈥� But he has evidently ignored his own warning in writing his narrative.
He only devotes two chapters to the actual unfolding of the coup, the rest he uses to build the background and provide context and a summary of events leading up to 1953.
In the first chapter he tells what happened on 15th August during the first coup attempt. The most glaring problem here is a lack of details. I thought maybe he would describe the CIA planning in more depth later on, but he doesn鈥檛 delve any deeper and jumps right into describing the second stage of the coup in the penultimate chapter.
Then he goes back in time and spends two chapters giving a summary of Iran鈥檚 ancient history up until the point that Reza Khan became Shah and established the Pahlavi dynasty. His summary of Iran鈥檚 antiquity is filled with mythological romanticization of the Achaemenid Empire and basically gives a slapdash account of how great they were and how they ruled that monstrously big empire without too much oppression and without brutalizing their subjects. I am not well-versed in Iran鈥檚 ancient history, but I refuse to believe such generalized statements based on fragmentary evidence and archaeological findings. He then retells the oft-repeated tale of how the barbarian Arabs invaded Iran and destroyed its civilization by introducing and enforcing their Islam on the population; again he clings to a one-sided narrative.
Why did Kinzer feel the need to include these sections, I don鈥檛 know but I think he should鈥檝e avoided that which would鈥檝e made his book more coherent and less rambling. I understand that he included these chapters to make the book more accessible but it鈥檚 not like he had many pages to dedicate to this background-building. Partly because of that, this book is misleading at numerous points. A case in point is his description of the reign of Reza Shah, reducing him to a few botched and generalized paragraphs:
If he had not alienated himself from almost every segment of Iranian society, and if he had kept a cadre of wise advisers around him instead of systematically exiling or murdering them, he might have been able to resist. Instead he found himself alone, his dreams shattered by his own narrow-mindedness, corruption, and boundless egotism.
Starting with chapter 4, the book improves a lot. He starts by telling the story of George Reynolds who managed to strike oil in Masjed-Suleiman for the first time in Iran and then he gives a good account of how the British Empire managed to gain oil-concessions from the Qajar dynasty and establish the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which owned the oil-fields of Iran and managed to remain a dominant force with the blessing of the British government. These sections are among the best in the book. Kinzer manages to give you a good outline of the British Imperial policies with regards to Iran and how their obstinacy to fairly share their profits with Iranians and the ugly way they treated the workers of Abadan refinery, begot widespread resentment in the population. These grievances ultimately led to the nationalization movement which brought Mosaddeq to the pinnacle of power for the express purpose of nationalizing the oil. I really enjoyed that Kinzer doesn鈥檛 try to justify British policies at all and he manages to show them for what they were: naked exploitation of Iran鈥檚 oil. The fact that Iran probably wouldn鈥檛 have managed to extract its oil without their help doesn鈥檛 excuse their never-ending greed and their oblivious attitude to the suffering of Iranians.
After Mosaddeq nationalized the oil and the oil company, things came to a head. The British government didn鈥檛 want a deal without retaining (de facto if not de jure) control of the oil company and even though their position softened a bit overtime, their persistence was more than matched by that of Mosaddeq鈥檚. Kinzer doesn鈥檛 criticize Mosaddeq openly but from early-on, he devotes paragraphs on his peculiar character that made him a great orator and a firebrand opposition leader but not a great statesman: 鈥�...[A] visionary rather than a pragmatist, preferring defeat in an honorable cause to what he considered shameful compromise.鈥� This is actually a point of contention between historians: some believe that Mosaddeq made numerous mistakes in failing to make a compromise; others holding that the offers made by AIOC and the British government were not made in good faith and were not real attempts at a workable compromise. Kinzer doesn鈥檛 dwell on this and he settles for giving a broad summary of the proposals and then moves ahead.
There are not many faults that I can find in these middle chapters. There are some baseless claims that there are no end-notes to be found for but for the most part they are not earth-shattering. When Kinzer tries to describe the internal situation in Iran however, he is badly out of his depth. When he writes from the British and U.S. perspective, he does a commendable job; his sources are more diverse and he has a good command of the political line-up and policy making. His coverage of Mosaddeq鈥檚 speech in the Security Council and his meeting with Truman and Acheson are also remarkable.
Finally all efforts to find a compromise failed and the Eisenhower administration gradually relented to British pressure for ousting Mosaddeq. To some extent it can be said that the Eisenhower administration did so in the interest of safeguarding its alliance with Britain; not because of a real threat of communist takeover but because the United States needed British support in the international scene and knew that a failure to support them in this case will undoubtedly alienate the British government and will weaken their unified stance against the Soviet Union and China. Roger Goiran, the CIA chief in Tehran, vehemently opposed the coup and given the fact that he was responsible for dealing with the communist threat, it only strengthens the argument that the danger of a communist takeover was mostly a fabrication.
The situation became chaotic in 1953 and this is where Kinzer鈥檚 narrative goes off balance. The National Front started to split and numerous powerful groups (like the industrialists and the clergy) distanced themselves from Mosaddeq. This division, which had numerous causes, is mostly viewed as a result of foreign influence and the work of CIA and MI6 agents. By only relying on reports and correspondents of British and Americans, Kinzer fails to realize that this split most probably would鈥檝e still happened as a result of the unstable political quagmire caused by the unresolved oil issues. He gives the impression that this shift in power dynamics was mostly the result of subversive activities which is far from the truth. Economic and diplomatic pressures from Britain and the United States had already taken their toll on the National Front, much more so than subversive activities.
Kashani鈥檚 split from the National Front 鈥� and his dissent against Mosaddeq 鈥� for example is solely attributed to the work of Rashidian Brothers and no ulterior motive is considered. The fact that Kashani was a power-hungry politician with some ties to Fada'iyan-e Islam terrorist cells (who had assassinated General Razmara in 1951), is not given that much weight. Kinzer doesn鈥檛 openly claim that the situation developed under the tight control of CIA and MI6, but by recounting the events through the prism of those agencies, he takes the power away from Iranian political actors. By doing so, he reduces the internal forces to mere pawns, trapped in a great game arranged by intelligence agencies, destined to play their designated roles. The element of chaos and confusion 鈥� inherent in any political upheaval 鈥� is almost nonexistent in his tale.
(Kashani was not the leader of Fada'iyan, a fundamentalist malcontent named Navvab Safavi was the man at the helm. Navvab saw himself big enough to condemn 鈥渁postates鈥� to death and authorized assassinations in the hope of purging the land of corruption. The clerical establishment didn鈥檛 endorse him and even banned him and his fanatics from Qom.)
In the penultimate chapter, we finally get to the second stage of the coup. This section, like the first chapter, is again drawn from the memoirs of Kermit Roosevelt. Like the first chapter, the absence of detail cripples this chapter and I鈥檓 not convinced that the coup succeeded because of Roosevelt and CIA agents.
In short it goes on like this:
After the failed attempt on August 15, 1953 to remove Mosaddeq from power, top-level CIA officials and even Beedle Smith (the undersecretary of state) had assumed that Operation Ajax had failed. They urged the evacuation of key personnel. How the first attempt was supposed to succeed and what the actual plan to remove Mosaddeq was, is not elaborated. But Kermit Roosevelt decided to give it another try in defiance of his superiors. Roosevelt however had already managed to get Mohammad Reza Shah to sign two farmans (decrees): one for dismissing Mosaddeq, the other for appointing General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. (In reality, the Shah and his court prepared the farmans but in Roosevelt鈥檚 tale, it was the CIA-agents who wrote them and Roosevelt who got the Shah to sign them.) After the first attempt failed, Shah fled Iran first to Iraq and then to Rome and was unhinged and unaware of the situation in Iran. In the meantime, Roosevelt had hidden Zahedi away in a house and Zahedi was biding his time, waiting to see what would happen. Then Roosevelt decided to organize a pro-Mosaddeq demonstration by using his agents and his vast network, which included members of the clergy and merchants of the bazaar and hooligans. The pro-Mosaddeq crowds marched the streets the next day and set fire to buildings and generally caused mayhem. Mosaddeq didn't use his forces to suppress the protesters. Then Roosevelt convinced Loy Henderson (U.S ambassador in Iran) to visit Mosaddeq. Loy Henderson told Mosaddeq that American citizens were being harassed by the disorderly mob and their lives were in danger. Mosaddeq became worried and ordered his troops to finally put an end to the demonstrations. He also ordered his supporters to stay home in the coming days. Now Roosevelt held the winning card; he would just need to organize a pro-Shah demonstration! The day after, pro-Shah demonstrators emerged on the streets. The officers and their troops however, who had clamped down on previous days protests, didn鈥檛 interfere with the crowds this time. The troops actually started to march alongside the crowd and seized key installations across the city one by one, silencing pro-Mosaddeq forces as they went. This sudden about-face of officers, was the result of the work of generals and officers involved in the coup who held pro-Shah sympathies and decided to end the Mosaddeq鈥檚 reign once and for all. The combined pro-Shah forces finally descended on Mosaddeq鈥檚 house and after fierce fighting, forces loyal to Mosaddeq surrendered and Mosaddeq took flight, until he surrendered himself a few days later. Meanwhile, Zahedi came out of hiding and rode to the radio station and announced that he was now prime minister and Mosaddeq was no longer in power, by the force of loyal decree.
Kinzer鈥檚 tale doesn鈥檛 offer much more detail than this. And by ignoring crucial information like the involvement of key generals in rallying the troops and the importance of the clergy in organizing the protests, his account gets distorted and is attributed mostly to the work of CIA agents. I don鈥檛 know if we can say Mosaddeq's government would have fallen even without Ajax. But I think we can say that the CIA didn鈥檛 play that big a part. For that I recommend Darioush Bayandor鈥檚 account of the coup.
Finally we get to the legacy of the coup. As for the claim that by removing Mosaddeq from power, the Iranian people came to resent the United States for meddling in Iran鈥檚 affairs, Bayandor points out in his book that Iranians couldn鈥檛 have known about the Ajax operation until it was publicized around 1980 (and further in 2000 by the Wilbur Document). The clerics' violent anti-American rhetoric however, started much sooner than that. Bayandor aptly points out that Iranians had a predilection to see the hand of foreigners in almost all major developments in their country. So if Mosaddeq鈥檚 government had collapsed through other means, the people probably would鈥檝e still seen it as the work of Britain and the United States. It is true that the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah was weakened because he built his power on the ashes of Mosaddeq's government. But it is far-fetched to say that the Mullahs' rhetoric would鈥檝e been less anti-American if Ajax hadn't happened. Actually, the future leader of the revolution Ayatollah Khomeini (who was close in his thinking to Kashani) didn鈥檛 approve of Mosaddeq and his secular nationalism. Since 1979, the Islamic Regime has never paid any real tribute to Mosaddeq and has denounced him in different ways. In their version of events, Kashani is the real liberator who led the struggle for oil-nationalization; the very personality who worked to remove Mosaddeq from power. In this light, Madeleine Albright鈥檚 apology in 2000 seems to have given more ammunition to the Islamic Regime for portraying the United States as the Great Satan. If anything, by removing Mosaddeq from power (assuming that Ajax was responsible for that), the United States government worked in tandem with the revolutionary clerics.
September 24, 2024
"My countrymen lack the bare necessities of existence. Their standard of living is perhaps the lowest in the world. Our greatest natural asset is oil. It should properly be our national industry and the revenue from it should go to improve our conditions of life."
"If the exploitation of our oil industry continues in which the Iranian plays the part of a mere manual worker, and if foreign exploiters continue to appropriate practically all of the income, then our people will remain forever in a state of poverty and misery."
"Wherever the former (Anglo-Persian Oil) company may operate in the future, it will never again operate in Iran. Neither by trusteeship nor by contract will we turn over to foreigners the right to exploit our oil resources."
-Excerpts from Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh's address to the United Nations Security Council in New York City, October 15-17, 1951
**
This book is about the 1953 British and American ouster of the democratic government of Iran and reinstatement of a despotic monarchy. It is also the story of PM Mossadegh, elected in 1951 and deposed in 1953. He was educated in Europe, Iran's first law PhD, a fighter for secular democracy and against foreign domination since 1905. From 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., called by Winston Churchill 'a prize beyond our wildest dreams' had been owned by Britain.
Stephen Kinzer, a NYT journalist and specialist in US plots to overthrow foreign governments published this book in 2003. He begins with a whirlwind tour of Iranian history from Cyrus the Great in 550 BC to Alexander the Great in 334 BC and Parthians to Sasanians. Zoroastrianism taught leaders gained legitimacy by just rule. Following the Arab conquest of 633 AD Islam was divided into Sunni and Shia branches. Shia believed that the Sunni caliphate had been corrupted.
After the Mongol conquest of 1220 the Safavid dynasty in 1501 established Iran as the center of Shia Islam. At the turn of the 17th century Abbas Shah combined modernization with tyranny, creating artistic marvels in Isfahan. In the mid-18th century Nadir Shah looted Delhi and lands around. The dissolute Qajars ascended to power during the 19th century selling off natural resources. Movements toward reform were delayed by a British-Russian partition in 1907.
Reza Shah, a strongman from northern Iran, overthrew the Qajars in 1926 collaborating with Britain as the Bolsheviks renounced claims on Iran. An admirer of Ataturk, Reza built roads, rails and banks, banned foreign property sales and constrained religion by authoritarian fiat. A fan of Mussolini and Hitler he ran afoul of the west in WWII, abdicating in 1941. Postwar profits from the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. soared as protests proliferated, leading to the rise of nationalists.
In 1950 communists advanced across Korea. The prior year the USSR tested a nuclear weapon and Mao won the civil war in China. Countries across eastern Europe had governments imposed by Moscow. Truman thought the developing world would adopt Marxism if the west didn't accept nationalism. Iran was at risk due to British refusal to compromise on oil leases. Churchill was PM again in 1951 and Eisenhower president in 1953. Britain needed oil to pay US war debts.
In 1951 Iran had nationalized oil fields exploited by Britain for over forty years. Ike took the opposite approach from Truman, who feared British intervention would drive Iran to Soviet aid. A CIA planned coup was put into motion within months of his inauguration, executed by Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of Teddy. The goal was to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh and empower the son of Reza Shah. The plot was uncovered and military loyal to the Shah jailed.
Kermit was not daunted by the initial setback to the coup. He was backed by the Dulles brothers, Secretary of State and CIA Director, both cold war icons. Although foreign funded protests and propaganda painted Mossadegh as a Soviet pawn he remained a hero to Iranians for opposition to the British. US involvement wasn't widely known until after his overthrow in 1953. Mossadegh was under arrest to his death in 1967, a sad fate for a man who was a patriot and scholar.
Once Reza Shah Jr was reinstalled on the peacock throne his tenure lasted to the 1979 Islamic revolution. During the time he was a vassal of US and UK oil interests. A pampered and weak ruler he resorted to torture and imprisonment of his perceived enemies. Exiled and sick he was followed by angry mobs shouting "Death to the Shah!". He died in 1980. One of his former antagonists, the Ayatollah Khomeini, returned to lead the state and held fifty US hostages for over a year.
The US and UK were at odds in the early 1950's. Truman did not support prolonging empires, called by Secretary of State Dean Acheson 'whiff of grapeshot diplomacy'. PM Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin delayed invasion, unable to secure US and UN approval. Once Churchill and Eisenhower were in power the tables turned. United under pro-capitalism and anti-communism they defeated Iranian aspirations, later ushering in the Islamic state. Kinzer tells the story well.
Iran's struggle to modernize provokes questions. Should governments lease national resources? Should developed nations lease land from underdeveloped ones? Foreign investment could help develop domestic infrastructure. Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Co., agreed to 50% royalties in 1950 while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was paying 15%. When contracts were canceled the UK chose embargos and considered armed invasion, an avoidable crisis.
After the restoration of the Shah a deal was struck for fifty-fifty sharing of oil revenue between Iran and a consortium of international companies. The UK retained 40% of the foreign half. The US bought a 40% share, the Dutch and France 10% each for $1B total. It was a very favorable arrangement for the west that lasted a quarter century until the revolution of 1979. The Shah presented Kermit a gold cigarette case and Eisenhower a ruby and sapphire encrusted peacock.
"If the exploitation of our oil industry continues in which the Iranian plays the part of a mere manual worker, and if foreign exploiters continue to appropriate practically all of the income, then our people will remain forever in a state of poverty and misery."
"Wherever the former (Anglo-Persian Oil) company may operate in the future, it will never again operate in Iran. Neither by trusteeship nor by contract will we turn over to foreigners the right to exploit our oil resources."
-Excerpts from Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh's address to the United Nations Security Council in New York City, October 15-17, 1951
**
This book is about the 1953 British and American ouster of the democratic government of Iran and reinstatement of a despotic monarchy. It is also the story of PM Mossadegh, elected in 1951 and deposed in 1953. He was educated in Europe, Iran's first law PhD, a fighter for secular democracy and against foreign domination since 1905. From 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., called by Winston Churchill 'a prize beyond our wildest dreams' had been owned by Britain.
Stephen Kinzer, a NYT journalist and specialist in US plots to overthrow foreign governments published this book in 2003. He begins with a whirlwind tour of Iranian history from Cyrus the Great in 550 BC to Alexander the Great in 334 BC and Parthians to Sasanians. Zoroastrianism taught leaders gained legitimacy by just rule. Following the Arab conquest of 633 AD Islam was divided into Sunni and Shia branches. Shia believed that the Sunni caliphate had been corrupted.
After the Mongol conquest of 1220 the Safavid dynasty in 1501 established Iran as the center of Shia Islam. At the turn of the 17th century Abbas Shah combined modernization with tyranny, creating artistic marvels in Isfahan. In the mid-18th century Nadir Shah looted Delhi and lands around. The dissolute Qajars ascended to power during the 19th century selling off natural resources. Movements toward reform were delayed by a British-Russian partition in 1907.
Reza Shah, a strongman from northern Iran, overthrew the Qajars in 1926 collaborating with Britain as the Bolsheviks renounced claims on Iran. An admirer of Ataturk, Reza built roads, rails and banks, banned foreign property sales and constrained religion by authoritarian fiat. A fan of Mussolini and Hitler he ran afoul of the west in WWII, abdicating in 1941. Postwar profits from the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. soared as protests proliferated, leading to the rise of nationalists.
In 1950 communists advanced across Korea. The prior year the USSR tested a nuclear weapon and Mao won the civil war in China. Countries across eastern Europe had governments imposed by Moscow. Truman thought the developing world would adopt Marxism if the west didn't accept nationalism. Iran was at risk due to British refusal to compromise on oil leases. Churchill was PM again in 1951 and Eisenhower president in 1953. Britain needed oil to pay US war debts.
In 1951 Iran had nationalized oil fields exploited by Britain for over forty years. Ike took the opposite approach from Truman, who feared British intervention would drive Iran to Soviet aid. A CIA planned coup was put into motion within months of his inauguration, executed by Kermit Roosevelt Jr., grandson of Teddy. The goal was to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadegh and empower the son of Reza Shah. The plot was uncovered and military loyal to the Shah jailed.
Kermit was not daunted by the initial setback to the coup. He was backed by the Dulles brothers, Secretary of State and CIA Director, both cold war icons. Although foreign funded protests and propaganda painted Mossadegh as a Soviet pawn he remained a hero to Iranians for opposition to the British. US involvement wasn't widely known until after his overthrow in 1953. Mossadegh was under arrest to his death in 1967, a sad fate for a man who was a patriot and scholar.
Once Reza Shah Jr was reinstalled on the peacock throne his tenure lasted to the 1979 Islamic revolution. During the time he was a vassal of US and UK oil interests. A pampered and weak ruler he resorted to torture and imprisonment of his perceived enemies. Exiled and sick he was followed by angry mobs shouting "Death to the Shah!". He died in 1980. One of his former antagonists, the Ayatollah Khomeini, returned to lead the state and held fifty US hostages for over a year.
The US and UK were at odds in the early 1950's. Truman did not support prolonging empires, called by Secretary of State Dean Acheson 'whiff of grapeshot diplomacy'. PM Attlee and Foreign Secretary Bevin delayed invasion, unable to secure US and UN approval. Once Churchill and Eisenhower were in power the tables turned. United under pro-capitalism and anti-communism they defeated Iranian aspirations, later ushering in the Islamic state. Kinzer tells the story well.
Iran's struggle to modernize provokes questions. Should governments lease national resources? Should developed nations lease land from underdeveloped ones? Foreign investment could help develop domestic infrastructure. Aramco, the Arabian-American Oil Co., agreed to 50% royalties in 1950 while the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. was paying 15%. When contracts were canceled the UK chose embargos and considered armed invasion, an avoidable crisis.
After the restoration of the Shah a deal was struck for fifty-fifty sharing of oil revenue between Iran and a consortium of international companies. The UK retained 40% of the foreign half. The US bought a 40% share, the Dutch and France 10% each for $1B total. It was a very favorable arrangement for the west that lasted a quarter century until the revolution of 1979. The Shah presented Kermit a gold cigarette case and Eisenhower a ruby and sapphire encrusted peacock.
October 23, 2022
4 鈽�
During my entire life, I have regarded Iran and Iraq as part of the "troubled Middle East" with its occasional bursts of anger and violence directed at the United States. Even after 9/11, when the US launched military action in this region, I couldn't say that I could unravel the geopolitical complexities that characterize this corner of the world. I have now read a few nonfictions set in Iran in the 20th century, and none of them, including the latest, had been written in a purely objective tone. But at least, offered an explanation for the anti-Western sentiment.
Iran had been ruled by a monarch, the Shah (or "king"), for centuries. In the mid-1800s, the Qajar Dynasty under Nasir al-Din Shah began to sell concessions (ie. access) to Iran's natural resources to support a lavish lifestyle instead of benefitting his people. There were no terms of parity as Iran essentially became a cog in Great Britain's industrial empire. Perpetuating his father's practices, Muzzafir al-Din Shah had sold in 1901 the most pivotal concession in his country's history -- access to Iran's natural gas and petroleum for 60 years.
Political instability arrived with the 20th century as the populace began agitating for a constitution, the nascent seeds of democracy. Three distinct segments within Iran wrestled for power: the Qajar ruling clan, the Constitutional reformers, and the Islamic clerics. Simultaneously, Britain and the Russian Empire tussled to maintain their economic interests in Iran and in 1907, they accordingly signed a treaty, notably without any input from Iran. As Russia became engulfed by its own civil war and revolution, Britain took decisive steps which resulted in its effective sovereignty over Iran. In the 1920s, Reza, an uneducated but ambitious military leader, toppled the Qajar dynasty and ruled until 1941. His successor was his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. Neither dislodged British business interests nor its military presence.
Although it took nearly a decade to find oil, the company's patience had been generously rewarded. The British executives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company possessed extractive colonial attitudes. They also had the solid backing of the British government, which had owned a 51 percent share in the company since 1913. By the mid-1900s, the abused Iranian workers could tolerate no more the management's profit-maximizing ethos. Mohammad Reza Shah was not effective on behalf of the Iranian oil workers.
Mohammad Mossadegh had been rising in popularity since he resumed his political career in the late 1940s. By 1951, he was on the brink of becoming the next Prime Minister of Iran. Mossadegh agreed to do so only if parliament accepted his proposal to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. On May 1, 1951, Anglo-Iranian's concession was revoked and it was replaced by the newly established National Iranian Oil Company.
After a century of involvement in Iran, Britain did not remain idle in the face of this loss. So when Mossadegh's administration expelled the British diplomats, they turned to their American allies for assistance. Author firmly pointed his finger at specific employees of the British and American governments. President Harry Truman opposed any military intervention on behalf of British economic interests. But in 1952, Truman was replaced by Dwight Eisenhower, who heeded the anti-Communist strategies of his Secretary of State John Dulles [the one for whom the Washington DC Airport is named] and brother Allen Dulles [who became the head of the CIA]. With the approval of POTUS Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, a coup d'茅tat (codenamed "Operation Ajax") had been successfully orchestrated against Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in August 1953.
Kinzer argued that the consequences of Operation Ajax have reverberated throughout the ensuing decades in the fraught international relationships. I found Chapter 12, in which he wrapped up his thesis, interesting even though I wasn't completely convinced. The author had cited academic research which concluded that many of the geopolitical tensions of the 21st century are the rotten fruit borne of the 1953 coup. I have no doubt that the 1979 US Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran was directly connected with Operation Ajax but I remain skeptical of the longer term repercussions. Given Ayatollah Khomeini's fervency, who is to say that he wouldn't have gained power without the US-led toppling of Mohammad Mossadegh?
Overall, I found to be quite intriguing. I now have a better grasp of both Iran's modern history and, sadly, interference by the US government. The fact that it took me months to finish it is not a reflection on the writing but of my ability to become distracted by real life.
During my entire life, I have regarded Iran and Iraq as part of the "troubled Middle East" with its occasional bursts of anger and violence directed at the United States. Even after 9/11, when the US launched military action in this region, I couldn't say that I could unravel the geopolitical complexities that characterize this corner of the world. I have now read a few nonfictions set in Iran in the 20th century, and none of them, including the latest, had been written in a purely objective tone. But at least, offered an explanation for the anti-Western sentiment.
It is not far-fetched to draw a line from Operation Ajax through the Shah's repressive regime and the Islamic Revolution to the fireballs the World Trade Center in New York.
Iran had been ruled by a monarch, the Shah (or "king"), for centuries. In the mid-1800s, the Qajar Dynasty under Nasir al-Din Shah began to sell concessions (ie. access) to Iran's natural resources to support a lavish lifestyle instead of benefitting his people. There were no terms of parity as Iran essentially became a cog in Great Britain's industrial empire. Perpetuating his father's practices, Muzzafir al-Din Shah had sold in 1901 the most pivotal concession in his country's history -- access to Iran's natural gas and petroleum for 60 years.
Political instability arrived with the 20th century as the populace began agitating for a constitution, the nascent seeds of democracy. Three distinct segments within Iran wrestled for power: the Qajar ruling clan, the Constitutional reformers, and the Islamic clerics. Simultaneously, Britain and the Russian Empire tussled to maintain their economic interests in Iran and in 1907, they accordingly signed a treaty, notably without any input from Iran. As Russia became engulfed by its own civil war and revolution, Britain took decisive steps which resulted in its effective sovereignty over Iran. In the 1920s, Reza, an uneducated but ambitious military leader, toppled the Qajar dynasty and ruled until 1941. His successor was his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. Neither dislodged British business interests nor its military presence.
Although it took nearly a decade to find oil, the company's patience had been generously rewarded. The British executives of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company possessed extractive colonial attitudes. They also had the solid backing of the British government, which had owned a 51 percent share in the company since 1913. By the mid-1900s, the abused Iranian workers could tolerate no more the management's profit-maximizing ethos. Mohammad Reza Shah was not effective on behalf of the Iranian oil workers.
The riots that shook Abadan led many Iranians to rally to the workers' cause, partly out of instinctive sympathy but also because of the grossly unequal terms under which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company operated. In 1947, for example, the company reported an after-tax profit of 拢40 million-the equivalent of $112 million dollars-and gave Iran just 拢7 million. To make matters worse, it never complied with its commitment under the 1933 agreement with Reza Shah to give laborers better pay and more chance for advancement, nor had it built the schools, hospitals, roads, or telephone system it promised. Manucher Farmanfarmaian, who in 1949 became director of Iran's petroleum institute, was appalled by what he found at Abadan.
Mohammad Mossadegh had been rising in popularity since he resumed his political career in the late 1940s. By 1951, he was on the brink of becoming the next Prime Minister of Iran. Mossadegh agreed to do so only if parliament accepted his proposal to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. On May 1, 1951, Anglo-Iranian's concession was revoked and it was replaced by the newly established National Iranian Oil Company.
After a century of involvement in Iran, Britain did not remain idle in the face of this loss. So when Mossadegh's administration expelled the British diplomats, they turned to their American allies for assistance. Author firmly pointed his finger at specific employees of the British and American governments. President Harry Truman opposed any military intervention on behalf of British economic interests. But in 1952, Truman was replaced by Dwight Eisenhower, who heeded the anti-Communist strategies of his Secretary of State John Dulles [the one for whom the Washington DC Airport is named] and brother Allen Dulles [who became the head of the CIA]. With the approval of POTUS Eisenhower and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, a coup d'茅tat (codenamed "Operation Ajax") had been successfully orchestrated against Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in August 1953.
"My only crime," Mossadegh told his judges, "is that I nationalized the Iranian oil industry and removed from this land the network of colonialism and the political and economic influence of the greatest empire on earth."
Kinzer argued that the consequences of Operation Ajax have reverberated throughout the ensuing decades in the fraught international relationships. I found Chapter 12, in which he wrapped up his thesis, interesting even though I wasn't completely convinced. The author had cited academic research which concluded that many of the geopolitical tensions of the 21st century are the rotten fruit borne of the 1953 coup. I have no doubt that the 1979 US Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran was directly connected with Operation Ajax but I remain skeptical of the longer term repercussions. Given Ayatollah Khomeini's fervency, who is to say that he wouldn't have gained power without the US-led toppling of Mohammad Mossadegh?
Overall, I found to be quite intriguing. I now have a better grasp of both Iran's modern history and, sadly, interference by the US government. The fact that it took me months to finish it is not a reflection on the writing but of my ability to become distracted by real life.
February 6, 2024
The overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh is one of the little known events that lead to Mohammad Reza Shah coming to power in Iran. This book looks at the tragic aftermath - and the continuing strife - that was a direct result of this act. It is very clear that because Mohammad Mossadegh wanted more oil profits for his country the US/UK decided he had to be replaced. A sad commentary on the limits of commitment given to elected officials who advocate for their people over global corporate interests.
March 24, 2017
Eye-opening, sad and infuriating read. Tells how the U.S. destroyed the birth of democracy in the middle east, which began in Iran, and now falsely accuses Iran as a sponsor of Mid-East terrorism, when in truth, it's the Saudis!
Always remember majority of Islamist terrorists are 'Sunni' Muslims, while Iran are Shia Muslims!
Always remember majority of Islamist terrorists are 'Sunni' Muslims, while Iran are Shia Muslims!
February 16, 2016
賷亘丿賵 兀賳 毓賱賷賸丕 (賰乇賲 丕賱賱賴 賵噩賴賴) 賷鬲噩爻丿 亘賷賳 丕賱丨賷賳 賵丕賱丌禺乇 賮賷 兀乇賵丕丨 丕賱賲鬲賲乇丿賷賳 賵丕賱孬賵賾丕乇.
賴匕賴 賯氐丞 毓賱賷 丿賵賳 夭賷丕丿丞 兀賵 賳賯氐丕賳貙 賮賷 丕賱亘丿丕賷丞 賷賵丕噩賴 兀毓丿丕亍賴 賵賮賷 丕賱賳賴丕賷丞 賷賵丕噩賴 兀氐丿賯丕亍賴 丕賱匕賷賳 丕賳賯賱亘賵丕 毓賱賷賴 賵鬲乇賰賵賴 賵丨賷丿賸丕.
賲氐賾丿賯 丕賱匕賷 丨賲賱 乇爻丕賱丞 丕賱丿賷賲賯乇丕胤賷丞 賮賵賯 乇兀爻賴 賵賰丕賳 兀賲賱賸丕 毓馗賷賲賸丕 賵囟賵亍賸丕 爻丕胤毓賸丕 賵爻胤 馗賱賲丕鬲 賲賳 丕賱噩賴賱 賵丕賱鬲毓氐亘 賵丕賱丿賷賰鬲丕鬲賵乇賷丞.
丕賱廿乇賴丕亘 氐賳丕毓丞 睾乇亘賷丞 亘丕賱賰丕賲賱.
賴匕賴 賯氐丞 毓賱賷 丿賵賳 夭賷丕丿丞 兀賵 賳賯氐丕賳貙 賮賷 丕賱亘丿丕賷丞 賷賵丕噩賴 兀毓丿丕亍賴 賵賮賷 丕賱賳賴丕賷丞 賷賵丕噩賴 兀氐丿賯丕亍賴 丕賱匕賷賳 丕賳賯賱亘賵丕 毓賱賷賴 賵鬲乇賰賵賴 賵丨賷丿賸丕.
賲氐賾丿賯 丕賱匕賷 丨賲賱 乇爻丕賱丞 丕賱丿賷賲賯乇丕胤賷丞 賮賵賯 乇兀爻賴 賵賰丕賳 兀賲賱賸丕 毓馗賷賲賸丕 賵囟賵亍賸丕 爻丕胤毓賸丕 賵爻胤 馗賱賲丕鬲 賲賳 丕賱噩賴賱 賵丕賱鬲毓氐亘 賵丕賱丿賷賰鬲丕鬲賵乇賷丞.
丕賱廿乇賴丕亘 氐賳丕毓丞 睾乇亘賷丞 亘丕賱賰丕賲賱.
November 18, 2019
Outstanding -- a must-read for all who want to understand US/Iran relations. Author & audiobook narrator are great.
January 9, 2020
Wow, such a great book. I had read Kinzer鈥檚 鈥淭he brothers鈥� a few years ago, about the Dulles brothers, and found it just as engaging, well-written, and well researched.
Kinzer has a real gift to write history that is deep, accurate and, at the same time, as gripping as a novel.
I鈥檝e often found that many history books that are very engaging lack a certain depth or seriousness. 鈥淎ll the Shah鈥檚 men鈥� does not 鈥� it鈥檚 both a gripping tale, almost a page turner, and a really good history book.
The only slightly negative thing I have to say about 鈥淎ll the Shah鈥檚 men鈥� is the same that I had for 鈥淭he brothers鈥�: Kinzer is a passionate author, which is wonderful, but his political leanings tend to show - especially towards the end.
So when I think about this book I wonder: is it really offering an impartial account of history, by focusing so much on blaming the US for everything?
For example: how did it happen that the history of a country plundered mercilessly by British and Russian colonialists became the history of a country whose future has been 鈥渞uined by the US鈥�?
When Kinzer traces a direct line from the 1953 coup to 9/11, it seems to me that he is drawing over-simplified lines through history. When he says that Islamic terrorism has its roots in 1953, he is visualizing 鈥渞oots鈥� that might be a bit too short.
But again, this is a fabulous read, that I would recommend to anyone who is curious about this fascinating period of history.
Also - since Herodotus鈥� times, history gets much more interesting if you insert a bit of bias and subjective narrative.... without that, it easily becomes a very dry collection of facts and sources.
And what a towering historic figure Mohammad Mossadeq was. Although, to be precise, his 鈥渉istoric persona鈥� is what is towering, since he鈥檚 been romanticized into something like a movie star. However, the real man, as it clearly transpires from even just this book, was an uncompromising, deceitful and obsessive guy who with his rigidity put the people of his country at serious risk various times. That is not what a 鈥済reat politician鈥� does.
Kinzer, however, in his interviews, loves to buy into the 鈥渉ero of the people鈥� narrative.
Personally, I think heroes exist only in popular narratives, which are typically a fictionalization of reality.
If Iranians today have theater plays where Mossadegh is celebrated for being the greatest man of the 20th century, that is very good for their national spirit, but maybe not so good for truth.
(Same goes for Che Guevara, Simon Bolivar and everyone else whom popular history loves to celebrate as demi-gods. They are all human beings. Erm ... actually, worse: they were all men, and extremely self-absorbed and dominating ones).
Not only the reality of politics has no heroes - it also has no good guys and bad guys. This is the truth.
But this book seems to have its good guys and bad guys: the story goes that the magnificent "reforming" "democratic" leader of Iran Mohammed Mossadegh was overthrown solely by the evil CIA in the 1950s and put in place the "evil" "autocratic" and "unpopular" Shah who was overthrown in 1979 by the masses of Iran yearning to be free.
Yes of course the CIA plotted with the U.K. to support a regime change. But regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, the question is: what would have happened otherwise? There were many serious risks to global stability. Mosaddeq鈥檚 government was already in a deep crisis : he was bound to fall because of his strategic mistakes, and no one knows what could have happened after that - perhaps the shah was going to retain his throne and expand his power, or perhaps communist groups in Iran would have been backed by Russia.
Yet the narrative of exclusive American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes the way in which many Americans study and understand the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. It also influences how American leaders think about Iran. Including Obama.
For example, it is hard to see how Eisenhower could take advantage of Mossadeq鈥檚 mishaps when he was informed by his intelligence services that the 鈥淐IA presently has no group which would be effective in spreading anti-Mossadeq mass propaganda鈥� and the 鈥淐IA has no group in Iran which could effectively promote riots demonstrating against Mossadeq.鈥� (from recently declassified CIA documents)
In the fabled history of the coup, from such incapacity the CIA developed a resilient network that easily toppled a popular leader a few months later.
The truth might be in the middle: the CIA did that, but probably not on the scale that is often reported, and thanks to the help of many other powerful local groups.
For example, the idea of a coup was also strongly promoted by aggrieved Iranian politicians who believed that Mossadeq鈥檚 disastrous course was ill-serving their country. General Fazlullah confirmed the embassy鈥檚 view that a nascent anti-Mossadeq coalition already existed and could gain power with very limited American support.
Also, documentary evidence reveals that, far from acting as puppet masters, CIA operatives and U.S. embassy staffers in Tehran were surprised at the size and diversity of the 1953 crowds. The protesters who took to the streets were not merely thugs hired by the CIA; in fact, they represented a cross section of Iranian society. Mosaddeq鈥檚 defiance of the shah had outraged them and, in the words of one contemporaneous CIA assessment, had 鈥済alvanized the people into an irate pro-Shah force.鈥�
So, many people were on the side of the Shah already.
In addition, Iranian military officers had their own reasons for plotting against Mosaddeq, and they required neither instigation nor instruction from Roosevelt. Under the shah, and during the rule of his father before him, the military and the monarchy were indivisible. The army was an essential pillar of the shah鈥檚 rule. That is why Mosaddeq -- who wanted to weaken the shah -- continuously purged the army鈥檚 officer ranks, cut the military鈥檚 budget, and hollowed out its institutions.
If you want to read a good review to balance off Kinzer鈥檚 book, check out Foreign Affairs鈥� article here:
Also, if you have Amazon prime, I would recommend the documentary 鈥淎n American coup鈥�, where you can see Kinzer himself being interviewed and presenting many chapters of this book.
Kinzer has a real gift to write history that is deep, accurate and, at the same time, as gripping as a novel.
I鈥檝e often found that many history books that are very engaging lack a certain depth or seriousness. 鈥淎ll the Shah鈥檚 men鈥� does not 鈥� it鈥檚 both a gripping tale, almost a page turner, and a really good history book.
The only slightly negative thing I have to say about 鈥淎ll the Shah鈥檚 men鈥� is the same that I had for 鈥淭he brothers鈥�: Kinzer is a passionate author, which is wonderful, but his political leanings tend to show - especially towards the end.
So when I think about this book I wonder: is it really offering an impartial account of history, by focusing so much on blaming the US for everything?
For example: how did it happen that the history of a country plundered mercilessly by British and Russian colonialists became the history of a country whose future has been 鈥渞uined by the US鈥�?
When Kinzer traces a direct line from the 1953 coup to 9/11, it seems to me that he is drawing over-simplified lines through history. When he says that Islamic terrorism has its roots in 1953, he is visualizing 鈥渞oots鈥� that might be a bit too short.
But again, this is a fabulous read, that I would recommend to anyone who is curious about this fascinating period of history.
Also - since Herodotus鈥� times, history gets much more interesting if you insert a bit of bias and subjective narrative.... without that, it easily becomes a very dry collection of facts and sources.
And what a towering historic figure Mohammad Mossadeq was. Although, to be precise, his 鈥渉istoric persona鈥� is what is towering, since he鈥檚 been romanticized into something like a movie star. However, the real man, as it clearly transpires from even just this book, was an uncompromising, deceitful and obsessive guy who with his rigidity put the people of his country at serious risk various times. That is not what a 鈥済reat politician鈥� does.
Kinzer, however, in his interviews, loves to buy into the 鈥渉ero of the people鈥� narrative.
Personally, I think heroes exist only in popular narratives, which are typically a fictionalization of reality.
If Iranians today have theater plays where Mossadegh is celebrated for being the greatest man of the 20th century, that is very good for their national spirit, but maybe not so good for truth.
(Same goes for Che Guevara, Simon Bolivar and everyone else whom popular history loves to celebrate as demi-gods. They are all human beings. Erm ... actually, worse: they were all men, and extremely self-absorbed and dominating ones).
Not only the reality of politics has no heroes - it also has no good guys and bad guys. This is the truth.
But this book seems to have its good guys and bad guys: the story goes that the magnificent "reforming" "democratic" leader of Iran Mohammed Mossadegh was overthrown solely by the evil CIA in the 1950s and put in place the "evil" "autocratic" and "unpopular" Shah who was overthrown in 1979 by the masses of Iran yearning to be free.
Yes of course the CIA plotted with the U.K. to support a regime change. But regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, the question is: what would have happened otherwise? There were many serious risks to global stability. Mosaddeq鈥檚 government was already in a deep crisis : he was bound to fall because of his strategic mistakes, and no one knows what could have happened after that - perhaps the shah was going to retain his throne and expand his power, or perhaps communist groups in Iran would have been backed by Russia.
Yet the narrative of exclusive American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes the way in which many Americans study and understand the history of U.S.-Iranian relations. It also influences how American leaders think about Iran. Including Obama.
For example, it is hard to see how Eisenhower could take advantage of Mossadeq鈥檚 mishaps when he was informed by his intelligence services that the 鈥淐IA presently has no group which would be effective in spreading anti-Mossadeq mass propaganda鈥� and the 鈥淐IA has no group in Iran which could effectively promote riots demonstrating against Mossadeq.鈥� (from recently declassified CIA documents)
In the fabled history of the coup, from such incapacity the CIA developed a resilient network that easily toppled a popular leader a few months later.
The truth might be in the middle: the CIA did that, but probably not on the scale that is often reported, and thanks to the help of many other powerful local groups.
For example, the idea of a coup was also strongly promoted by aggrieved Iranian politicians who believed that Mossadeq鈥檚 disastrous course was ill-serving their country. General Fazlullah confirmed the embassy鈥檚 view that a nascent anti-Mossadeq coalition already existed and could gain power with very limited American support.
Also, documentary evidence reveals that, far from acting as puppet masters, CIA operatives and U.S. embassy staffers in Tehran were surprised at the size and diversity of the 1953 crowds. The protesters who took to the streets were not merely thugs hired by the CIA; in fact, they represented a cross section of Iranian society. Mosaddeq鈥檚 defiance of the shah had outraged them and, in the words of one contemporaneous CIA assessment, had 鈥済alvanized the people into an irate pro-Shah force.鈥�
So, many people were on the side of the Shah already.
In addition, Iranian military officers had their own reasons for plotting against Mosaddeq, and they required neither instigation nor instruction from Roosevelt. Under the shah, and during the rule of his father before him, the military and the monarchy were indivisible. The army was an essential pillar of the shah鈥檚 rule. That is why Mosaddeq -- who wanted to weaken the shah -- continuously purged the army鈥檚 officer ranks, cut the military鈥檚 budget, and hollowed out its institutions.
If you want to read a good review to balance off Kinzer鈥檚 book, check out Foreign Affairs鈥� article here:
Also, if you have Amazon prime, I would recommend the documentary 鈥淎n American coup鈥�, where you can see Kinzer himself being interviewed and presenting many chapters of this book.
October 22, 2015
Iran has a long and distinct history. Beginning in the 6th century BC with Cyrus, followed by Xerxes and Darius and on to the present, Iran鈥檚 people have had a common identity. The adoption of Shiism in the 7th century AD imparted a common set of values. Since then Arabs, Mongols and Turks ruled Iran. In the 19th century the decadent Qajar rulers exploited Iran to support their opulent lifestyle. In 1925 they were overthrown by a British engineered coup conducted to thwart Russia. The British placed Reza Shah on the Peacock Throne. A brutal dictator, he worked to modernize Iran antagonizing the mullahs. Reza declared neutrality in WWII. The British responded by invading in 1941. They forced Reza out and put his 21 year old son Mohammad Reza in as the new Shah.
In 1908 the British discovered a huge oil deposit and founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Henceforth oil would dictate British policy and fuel Iranian nationalism culminating in the ascendancy in 1951 of Mohammad Mossadegh. The Swiss educated Mossadegh spent his life struggling for Iranian democracy and against the British and their puppets, the two Shahs. The British took practically all of the oil profit leaving a small amount to buy off the Shah. This one sided deal brought popular resentment against the British and the Shah as did the Brits condescending attitude towards the Iranians and their abysmal treatment of Iranian workers. Most important in this land proud of its history and religion was that of control. Iranians were furious that the British were running their country through the Shah. They would not accept subservience to this foreign power, particularly with respect to the oil that they felt was theirs. Inept and unrealistic British foreign policy ended in Mossadegh becoming Iranian Prime Minister. He quickly nationalized the oil fields.
The communist takeover of China and the Korean War changed the way America viewed Iran. Foreign policy was now cast in terms of the Cold War. Still President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson remained anti-colonial. They refused to support Britain鈥檚 hardline stand and proposals for direct intervention in Iran. Acheson sent his assistant secretary George McGhee to Iran then followed up with the experienced Averill Harriman to try to negotiate a peaceful resolution. Despite the persistent effort of both men the British and Iranians remained intransigent. Iran took over the oilfields but had no capacity to run them. The British had never trained the Iranian workers who lived in abject poverty. Britain pulled out all its management and technicians and production stopped.
Britain asked the United Nations to support its position and Mossadegh came to New York to respond. He was the first leader of a developing country to plead his case against a colonial power before the Security Council. Afterwards Truman invited him to Washington where Acheson, Harriman and McGhee spent fruitless hours trying to convince Mossadgh to compromise. Mossadegh then traveled to Egypt where nationalism would lead to the Suez crisis in a few years. He received a tumultuous hero鈥檚 welcome. Mossadegh had also achieved popularity in the US and graced the cover of Time Magazine as its 1951 鈥淢an of the Year鈥� beating out Eisenhower, MacArthur and Acheson.
Attempts at compromise stopped when Winston Churchill replaced Clement Attlee as Prime Minister. Churchill chided Attlee for pulling out of Iran when the British military could have easily settled the issue. The British began orchestrating a coup which was discovered and Mossadegh broke relations with Britain expelling all of its diplomats. The British however had a new hope, the election of Eisenhower who was running on a strong anti-communist platform. The British quickly brought CIA chief Allen Dulles and his brother, soon to be Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, into the fold. Foster and Allie immediately began plotting. Two months after Eisenhower鈥檚 inauguration in March of 1953 Ike signed off on their planned coup.
The plan required considerable coordination. Select a new leader to be Prime Minister, get the backing of the Shah, spread bribe money around, buy off the press, legislators, mullahs and the military; enlist street gangs and key army units, create riots and dissonance, blame it on Mossadegh, have him arrested and install their puppet. The CIA鈥檚 lead operative for the Middle East, Kermit Roosevelt, TR鈥檚 grandson, had been selected to craft and execute the plan. It almost worked, but as often happens, a few missteps in timing tipped off Mossadegh鈥檚 allies and he was spirited away to safety. However, Kermit had a lot of TR鈥檚 grittiness in him. Despite orders to leave the country he decided to try again. This time in August 1953 it worked. The Shah, who had fled Iran and checked into the Excelsior Hotel in Rome when the first coup failed, returned. Kermit had it all set up for him. The Shah thanked Roosevelt as did Churchill and Eisenhower who gave him the National Security Medal. Emboldened, the brothers, Foster and Allie, next went after Guatemala to overthrow another elected nationalist leader and replace him with a dictator. Kermit refused the Guatemala job and left the CIA a few years later, but always maintained the Iranian coup was justified.
The Shah became increasingly oppressive and after 26 years Iranians finally had enough, overthrowing him in 1979. The US government was clueless, unaware of how much the Shah and his main benefactor the US were hated. The Iranians never forgot who was behind the coup. The next big mistake was to invite the Shah to the US. This played right into the hands of Iranian extremists. Since the US had engineered one coup to put the Shah in power, the idea that the US was planning the same thing again had compelling logic to the Iranians. The takeover of the US embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis were the immediate result. A regime that supported terrorists and destabilized the entire Middle East was the longer term result.
The 1953 US engineered coup in Iran profoundly changed history. Despite Mossadegh鈥檚 worldwide 1951 fame, few Americans today would likely know who he was or how America took him down. Yet in Iran he is remembered by all as a hero. Thus most Americans cannot understand how Iranians see the US and the world. In 2015 we are still bearing the repercussions of colonialism exacerbated by Cold War tunnel vision. Kinzer offers up an apt quote from Harry Truman,鈥� There is nothing new in the world except the history you don鈥檛 know.鈥�
Eisenhower and the brothers saw the world only in terms of global communism. Unlike Truman and Acheson, they did not believe that befriending nationalist leaders in countries confronting Western imperialism was a viable strategy. They were on the wrong side of history. Ike, Allie and Foster wreaked havoc in Iran, Guatemala, Viet Nam, the Congo and Cuba. For much more on this topic, Kinzer鈥檚 The Brothers is an excellent resource. Both books show how arrogance and superficial understanding led to short sighted interventionist policies that made the world less stable and less safe. Unfortunately this pattern has persisted well beyond Eisenhower and the brothers.
In 1908 the British discovered a huge oil deposit and founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Henceforth oil would dictate British policy and fuel Iranian nationalism culminating in the ascendancy in 1951 of Mohammad Mossadegh. The Swiss educated Mossadegh spent his life struggling for Iranian democracy and against the British and their puppets, the two Shahs. The British took practically all of the oil profit leaving a small amount to buy off the Shah. This one sided deal brought popular resentment against the British and the Shah as did the Brits condescending attitude towards the Iranians and their abysmal treatment of Iranian workers. Most important in this land proud of its history and religion was that of control. Iranians were furious that the British were running their country through the Shah. They would not accept subservience to this foreign power, particularly with respect to the oil that they felt was theirs. Inept and unrealistic British foreign policy ended in Mossadegh becoming Iranian Prime Minister. He quickly nationalized the oil fields.
The communist takeover of China and the Korean War changed the way America viewed Iran. Foreign policy was now cast in terms of the Cold War. Still President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson remained anti-colonial. They refused to support Britain鈥檚 hardline stand and proposals for direct intervention in Iran. Acheson sent his assistant secretary George McGhee to Iran then followed up with the experienced Averill Harriman to try to negotiate a peaceful resolution. Despite the persistent effort of both men the British and Iranians remained intransigent. Iran took over the oilfields but had no capacity to run them. The British had never trained the Iranian workers who lived in abject poverty. Britain pulled out all its management and technicians and production stopped.
Britain asked the United Nations to support its position and Mossadegh came to New York to respond. He was the first leader of a developing country to plead his case against a colonial power before the Security Council. Afterwards Truman invited him to Washington where Acheson, Harriman and McGhee spent fruitless hours trying to convince Mossadgh to compromise. Mossadegh then traveled to Egypt where nationalism would lead to the Suez crisis in a few years. He received a tumultuous hero鈥檚 welcome. Mossadegh had also achieved popularity in the US and graced the cover of Time Magazine as its 1951 鈥淢an of the Year鈥� beating out Eisenhower, MacArthur and Acheson.
Attempts at compromise stopped when Winston Churchill replaced Clement Attlee as Prime Minister. Churchill chided Attlee for pulling out of Iran when the British military could have easily settled the issue. The British began orchestrating a coup which was discovered and Mossadegh broke relations with Britain expelling all of its diplomats. The British however had a new hope, the election of Eisenhower who was running on a strong anti-communist platform. The British quickly brought CIA chief Allen Dulles and his brother, soon to be Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, into the fold. Foster and Allie immediately began plotting. Two months after Eisenhower鈥檚 inauguration in March of 1953 Ike signed off on their planned coup.
The plan required considerable coordination. Select a new leader to be Prime Minister, get the backing of the Shah, spread bribe money around, buy off the press, legislators, mullahs and the military; enlist street gangs and key army units, create riots and dissonance, blame it on Mossadegh, have him arrested and install their puppet. The CIA鈥檚 lead operative for the Middle East, Kermit Roosevelt, TR鈥檚 grandson, had been selected to craft and execute the plan. It almost worked, but as often happens, a few missteps in timing tipped off Mossadegh鈥檚 allies and he was spirited away to safety. However, Kermit had a lot of TR鈥檚 grittiness in him. Despite orders to leave the country he decided to try again. This time in August 1953 it worked. The Shah, who had fled Iran and checked into the Excelsior Hotel in Rome when the first coup failed, returned. Kermit had it all set up for him. The Shah thanked Roosevelt as did Churchill and Eisenhower who gave him the National Security Medal. Emboldened, the brothers, Foster and Allie, next went after Guatemala to overthrow another elected nationalist leader and replace him with a dictator. Kermit refused the Guatemala job and left the CIA a few years later, but always maintained the Iranian coup was justified.
The Shah became increasingly oppressive and after 26 years Iranians finally had enough, overthrowing him in 1979. The US government was clueless, unaware of how much the Shah and his main benefactor the US were hated. The Iranians never forgot who was behind the coup. The next big mistake was to invite the Shah to the US. This played right into the hands of Iranian extremists. Since the US had engineered one coup to put the Shah in power, the idea that the US was planning the same thing again had compelling logic to the Iranians. The takeover of the US embassy in Tehran and the hostage crisis were the immediate result. A regime that supported terrorists and destabilized the entire Middle East was the longer term result.
The 1953 US engineered coup in Iran profoundly changed history. Despite Mossadegh鈥檚 worldwide 1951 fame, few Americans today would likely know who he was or how America took him down. Yet in Iran he is remembered by all as a hero. Thus most Americans cannot understand how Iranians see the US and the world. In 2015 we are still bearing the repercussions of colonialism exacerbated by Cold War tunnel vision. Kinzer offers up an apt quote from Harry Truman,鈥� There is nothing new in the world except the history you don鈥檛 know.鈥�
Eisenhower and the brothers saw the world only in terms of global communism. Unlike Truman and Acheson, they did not believe that befriending nationalist leaders in countries confronting Western imperialism was a viable strategy. They were on the wrong side of history. Ike, Allie and Foster wreaked havoc in Iran, Guatemala, Viet Nam, the Congo and Cuba. For much more on this topic, Kinzer鈥檚 The Brothers is an excellent resource. Both books show how arrogance and superficial understanding led to short sighted interventionist policies that made the world less stable and less safe. Unfortunately this pattern has persisted well beyond Eisenhower and the brothers.
February 21, 2020
Part of what makes All The Shah's Men: An American Coup & the Roots of Middle East Terror so fascinating is Stephen Kinzer's ability to put all of the details into historical context and still formulate his story in a way that causes it to read like a spy novel at times. I initially read this book on the American involvement in Iran when I was awaiting an Iranian visa to visit a country that was officially listed as part of the "Axis of Evil".
While being very curious about the erstwhile Persia, most of the available media-supplied images of Iran were couched in extreme anti-American rhetoric, nary a hint about why the people of that land might be so antagonistic. Kinzer fills in the gaps & does so in an almost politically neutral manner. As the saying has it, "the devil is in the details" and the way the story of the CIA-led overthrow of an elected Iranian government unfolds, seems almost comic at times, with anti-Mossadegh protestors being somewhat randomly hired by the CIA, at times reminding one of an early scene from the recent film Argo. What happened hardly represnts a distinguished moment in American diplomatic history.
The historical backdrop on both Iran and America's dealings with that country, going as far back as President Woodrow Wilson seems to indicate that the U.S. sought to view Iran very differently than did our colonial British friends, so much so that in the mid-1920s an American envoy in Tehran reported that "Persians of all classes have unbounded confidence in America". And with a view to better understanding Iran, Steve Kinzer deftly manages to inform his reader on the rich cultural backdrop within the country, including these words from Rumi:
Obviously, this dose of Sufi metaphysics does not explain the storming of the U.S. embassy in 1979 but it serves to humanize Iran for the outsider perhaps more than any listing of the historical achievements of Cyrus the Great or Darius in ancient Persia. Iran has a very rich & complex history & Kinzer builds on that history so that a casual reader can begin to fathom the happenings in 1979 & what led up to that moment in history.
The author gives high marks to Dean Acheson, President Truman's secretary of state & together they reckoned in 1952 that an elected leader named Mossedegh, while perhaps imperfect, was still a step towards democracy & should be supported. However, that fall represented an election year change in the U.S. and with the installation of President Eisenhower & the Dulles brothers as secretary of state and head of the CIA and with ample prodding by Great Britain, America's stance on Iran took an abrupt shift.
Kinzer paints a very clear picture about some of the reasons for this change, including the situation in Korea in 1953 and as always during this era, the fear of global Communism, making Iran yet again part of the "Great Game" of international diplomacy. These were indeed dangerous times & the issue of "Containment" was a dominant approach to political reality around the globe. Quickly, Dean Acheson was perceived as weak in a situation that demanded American strength, even without a great deal of forethought.
Enter, Kermit Roosevelt as CIA bureau chief in Iran and you have a chapter of history that now seems almost improbable in the recounting of many of its elements but which led to the overthrow of a elected government in Iran and the installation of the Shah, guaranteeing a friendly face & cheap oil but ultimately coming home to haunt the United States some 25 years later. As was later said in justifying the regime's radicalism by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was seen as much more humane following Ayatollah Khomeini, "We are not liberals like Allende & Mossedegh, whom the CIA can snuff out".
All the Shah's Men is a comprehensive, thoughtful & exceedingly enjoyable attempt at rendering a very complicated event in American-Iranian relations and I highly recommend this & other books by Stephen Kinzer. And if you are feeling intrepid, I also recommend a visit to Iran, with the Iranian people among the most hospitable I have ever experienced.
*The 2nd photo image is that of Stephen Kinzer in front of a painting of John Foster Dulles, former secretary-of-state & architect of the American intervention in Iran in 1953.
While being very curious about the erstwhile Persia, most of the available media-supplied images of Iran were couched in extreme anti-American rhetoric, nary a hint about why the people of that land might be so antagonistic. Kinzer fills in the gaps & does so in an almost politically neutral manner. As the saying has it, "the devil is in the details" and the way the story of the CIA-led overthrow of an elected Iranian government unfolds, seems almost comic at times, with anti-Mossadegh protestors being somewhat randomly hired by the CIA, at times reminding one of an early scene from the recent film Argo. What happened hardly represnts a distinguished moment in American diplomatic history.
The historical backdrop on both Iran and America's dealings with that country, going as far back as President Woodrow Wilson seems to indicate that the U.S. sought to view Iran very differently than did our colonial British friends, so much so that in the mid-1920s an American envoy in Tehran reported that "Persians of all classes have unbounded confidence in America". And with a view to better understanding Iran, Steve Kinzer deftly manages to inform his reader on the rich cultural backdrop within the country, including these words from Rumi:
I hold no religion or creed; am neither Eastern nor Western; Muslim or infidel; Zoroastrian, Christian, Jew or Gentile; I come from neither land nor sea; am not related to those above or below; was not born near or far away; do not live either in Paradise or on this Earth; claim descent not from Adam & eve or the Angels above. I transcend body & soul. My home is beyond place & name. It is with the beloved, in a space beyond space. I embrace all & am part of all.
Obviously, this dose of Sufi metaphysics does not explain the storming of the U.S. embassy in 1979 but it serves to humanize Iran for the outsider perhaps more than any listing of the historical achievements of Cyrus the Great or Darius in ancient Persia. Iran has a very rich & complex history & Kinzer builds on that history so that a casual reader can begin to fathom the happenings in 1979 & what led up to that moment in history.
The author gives high marks to Dean Acheson, President Truman's secretary of state & together they reckoned in 1952 that an elected leader named Mossedegh, while perhaps imperfect, was still a step towards democracy & should be supported. However, that fall represented an election year change in the U.S. and with the installation of President Eisenhower & the Dulles brothers as secretary of state and head of the CIA and with ample prodding by Great Britain, America's stance on Iran took an abrupt shift.
Kinzer paints a very clear picture about some of the reasons for this change, including the situation in Korea in 1953 and as always during this era, the fear of global Communism, making Iran yet again part of the "Great Game" of international diplomacy. These were indeed dangerous times & the issue of "Containment" was a dominant approach to political reality around the globe. Quickly, Dean Acheson was perceived as weak in a situation that demanded American strength, even without a great deal of forethought.
Enter, Kermit Roosevelt as CIA bureau chief in Iran and you have a chapter of history that now seems almost improbable in the recounting of many of its elements but which led to the overthrow of a elected government in Iran and the installation of the Shah, guaranteeing a friendly face & cheap oil but ultimately coming home to haunt the United States some 25 years later. As was later said in justifying the regime's radicalism by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was seen as much more humane following Ayatollah Khomeini, "We are not liberals like Allende & Mossedegh, whom the CIA can snuff out".
All the Shah's Men is a comprehensive, thoughtful & exceedingly enjoyable attempt at rendering a very complicated event in American-Iranian relations and I highly recommend this & other books by Stephen Kinzer. And if you are feeling intrepid, I also recommend a visit to Iran, with the Iranian people among the most hospitable I have ever experienced.
*The 2nd photo image is that of Stephen Kinzer in front of a painting of John Foster Dulles, former secretary-of-state & architect of the American intervention in Iran in 1953.
February 11, 2018
亘丕賱乇睾賲 賲賳 賲毓乇賮鬲賷 亘賳噩丕丨 毓賲賱賷丞 兀噩丕賰爻 丕賱鬲賷 賯丕賲鬲 亘賴丕 丕賱賲禺丕亘乇丕鬲 丕賱兀賲乇賷賰賷丞 賱賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 毓賱賶 賲氐丿賯 乇卅賷爻 賵夭乇丕亍 丕賷乇丕賳 賵賱賰賳 毓賳丿賲丕 亘丿兀 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 亘匕賰乇 兀賵賱 賲丨丕賵賱丞 賱賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 賵丕賱鬲賷 賮卮賱鬲 丕賳鬲丕亘賳賷 賮乇丨丞 賱兀賳鬲氐丕乇 賲丐賯鬲 賵 丕賱鬲睾賱亘 毓賱賶 兀賲乇賷賰丕 賵亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賵毓賲賱丕卅賴賲 賵丿賷賰鬲丕鬲賵乇賷丞 丕賱卮丕賴
賲賱禺氐 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 毓賱賶 賲氐丿賯 賴賵 賲丕 賷鬲賲 賲賳匕 爻賳賵丕鬲 賮賶 噩賲賷毓 亘賱丕丿賳丕 賵亘賱丕丿 丕禺乇賷 , 賮賲賵丕乇丿 丕賱亘賱丿 賵丨鬲賷 丕賱卮毓亘 賳賮爻賴 賲噩乇丿 賵爻賷賱丞 賱丨氐賵賱 丕賱賯賵賷 丕賱毓馗賲賷 毓賱賶 噩賲賷毓 禺賷乇丕鬲 丕賱亘賱丿 賵賲賳 賷丨丕賵賱 賮賯胤 丕賳 賷賯賵賱 賴匕丕 賲賳 丨賯賳丕 賷賯鬲賱賵賴 丕賵 賷賳賯賱亘賵丕 毓賱賷賴
賲氐丿賯 乇噩賱 賰丕賳 賷丨丕賵賱 賮賯胤 丕賳 賷噩毓賱 賳賮胤 (丕賱亘鬲乇賵賱) 廿賷乇丕賳 賱賱卮毓亘 丕賱廿賷乇丕賳賷 , 亘丿賱 賲賳 爻乇賯鬲賴 爻賳賵賷丕 賲賳 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕
賵賱賰賷 賳賮賴賲 丕賱賯氐丞 賷噩亘 爻乇丿 亘毓囟 丕賱鬲賵乇丕賷禺 賵丕賱丕丨丿丕孬 丕賱賲賴賲丞 :
丕賱亘丿丕賷丞 賲賳 丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丿丕乇爻賷 毓丕賲 1901 丕賱鬲賷 賵丕賮賯 毓賱賷賴丕 丕賱賲賱賰 賲馗賮乇 丕賱丿賷賳 卮丕賴 賱賲賳丨 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷 丿丕乇爻賷 丕賱丨賯 丕賱丨氐乇賷 賮賶 丕賱賳賮胤 賵丕爻鬲睾賱丕賱賴 賵賳賯賱賴 賵亘賷毓賴 賱賲丿丞 60 毓丕賲
丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 毓丕賲 1907 賱鬲賯爻賷賲 丕賷乇丕賳 , 賴賱 鬲毓賱賲賵丕 賲賳 賵賯毓賴丕 乇賵爻賷丕 賵亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賮賴賲 丕鬲賮賯賵丕 毓賱賶 鬲賯爻賷賲 丕賷乇丕賳 亘賷賳賴賲 賵丕亘賯丕亍 賮賯胤 噩夭亍 亘爻賷胤 賲丨丕賷丿 賷丿賷乇賴 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷賷賳 孬賲 亘毓丿 丕賱鬲賵賯賷毓 丕亘賱睾賵丕 丕賷乇丕賳 亘鬲賱賰 丕賱丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞
亘毓丿 孬賵乇丞 丕賱亘賱丕卮賮丞 鬲乇賰鬲 乇賵爻賷丕 賰鬲乇 禺賷乇賴賲 丕賷乇丕賳 賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賮賯胤 賵丕氐亘丨 丕賱賳賮賵匕 賰賱賴 賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕
丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 毓丕賲 1919 丕賱丕賳噩賱賷夭賷丞 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷賴 賮賷 毓賴丿 丕丨賲丿 卮丕賴 賵鬲毓胤賷 丕賱丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 賱賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 丕賱爻賷胤乇丞 毓賱賶 丕賱噩賷卮 賵丕賱禺夭丕賳丞 賵胤乇賯 丕賱賳賯賱 賵丕賱賲賵丕氐賱丕鬲 賵卮亘賰丕鬲 丕賱丕鬲氐丕賱丕鬲 , 賰丕賳 賮丕囟賱 賵夭丕乇丞 丕賱鬲賳賲賷丞 丕賱賲丨賱賷丞 賰丕賳賵丕 賷丕禺丿賵賴丕 亘丕賱賲乇丞
賰丕賳鬲 丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丿丕乇爻賷 鬲毓胤賷 16% 爻賳賵賷丕 賸賮賯胤 賱賱丕賷乇丕賳賷賷賳 賵賰丕賳 丨賵丕賱賶 47 丕賱賮 丕爻鬲乇賱賷賳賷 毓丕賲 1920 賵賰丕賳 賷毓鬲亘乇 賲亘賱睾 囟卅賷賱丕 噩丿丕 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 賱賱丕乇亘丕丨 賵丕賱鬲賷 亘丕賱賲賳丕爻亘丞 賱丕 賷賵噩丿 丨賯 賱丕賷乇丕賳 亘賲乇丕噩毓丞 丕賶 丕賵乇丕賯 賱賱卮乇賰丞 丕賱賮丕乇爻賷丞 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞
毓丕賲 1933 賷爻賯胤 乇囟丕 卮丕賴 丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丿丕乇爻賷 賮鬲匕賴亘 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賱賱鬲賮丕賵囟 賲毓賴 賮賷賵丕賮賯 毓賱賶 丕賳 丕賷乇丕賳 鬲丨氐賱 毓賱賶 丕乇亘丕丨 爻賳賵賷丞 賱丕 鬲賯賱 毓賳 975 丕賱賮 丕爻鬲乇賱賷賳賷 爻賳賵賷丕賸 賵鬲睾賷賷乇 丕爻賲 丕賱卮乇賰丞 賱賱丕賷乇丕賳賷丞 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞 賵賲丿 丕賱丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 賱丕孬賳賷賳 賵孬賱丕孬賷賳 毓丕賲丕 兀禺乇賷
禺賵賮 丕賱睾乇亘 賲賳 鬲禺胤賷胤 丕賱賳丕夭賷丞 賱丕爻鬲睾賱丕賱 丕賷乇丕賳 禺賱丕賱 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱毓丕賱賲賷丞 賰賯丕毓丿丞 賴噩賵賲 , 兀丿賷 丕賱賶 丿禺賵賱 丕賱賯賵丕鬲 丕賱爻賵賮賷鬲賷丞 賵丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞 丕賷乇丕賳 毓丕賲 1941 賮賷 毓賴丿 乇囟丕 卮丕賴
亘毓丿 丕囟乇丕亘 毓賲丕賱 丕賱賳賮胤 毓丕賲 1947 賯乇乇 賲噩賱爻 丕賱賳賵丕亘 毓丿賲 賲賳丨 丕賶 丕賲鬲賷丕夭丕鬲 丕禺乇賷 賱卮乇賰丕鬲 兀噩賳亘賷丞 賵丕毓丕丿丞 丕賱鬲賮丕賵囟 亘卮兀賳 丕賱丕賲鬲賷丕夭 丕賱丨丕賱賶 丕賱賲賲賳賵丨 賱賱卮乇賰丞 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷丞 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞 賵賲賳 賰鬲亘 賲爻賵丿丞 匕賱賰 丕賱賯丕賳賵賳 丕賱賳丕卅亘 賲丨賲丿 賲氐丿賯
賲噩賱爻 丕賱賵夭丕乇亍 亘兀賲乇 賲賳 丕賱卮丕賴 亘賵丕賮賯 毓賱賶 丕賱丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丕賱鬲賰賲賷賱賷丞 賲毓 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 毓丕賲 1949 亘囟賲丕賳 丕乇亘丕丨 賱丕 鬲賯賱 毓賳 4 賲賱賷賵賳 丕爻鬲乇賱賷賳賷 賱丕賷乇丕賳 賵賱賰賳 亘丿賵賳 賲乇丕賯亘丞 丕賵 丕賷 丨賯 賱丕賷乇丕賳 賱丕丿丕乇丞 丕賵 賲乇丕噩毓丞 丕賱卮乇賰丞 , 賵賱賰賳 賲噩賱爻 丕賱賳賵丕亘 賷乇賮囟賴丕 賵賷毓乇囟 賲氐丿賯 賱兀賵賱 賲乇丞 賮賰乇丞 鬲兀賲賷賲 丕賱賳賮胤 賱氐丕賱丨 丕賱卮毓亘 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷
毓丕賲 1951 賷賵丕賮賯 賲噩賱爻 丕賱賳賵丕亘 毓賱賶 賯乇丕乇 鬲兀賲賷賲 丕賱賳賮胤 賵亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 鬲毓乇囟 丕賯鬲乇丕丨 亘賲賳丕氐賮丞 丕賱丕乇亘丕丨 賵賱賰賳 鬲賲 乇賮囟賴
賵丕賱丕賳 賲賱禺氐 亘爻賷胤 噩丿丕 賱賲丕 鬲賲 賲賳 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 兀賵賱丕 孬賲 丕賲乇賷賰丕 賮賶 毓賴丿 丕賷夭賳賴丕賵乇 賱賱廿胤丕丨丞 亘賲氐丿賯 :
賲賳毓 丕賷乇丕賳 賲賳 亘賷毓 丕賶 賰賲賷丞 賳賮胤 賱兀賷 丿賵賱丞 , 賵丕匕丕 丕乇丕丿丕鬲 丕賶 丿賵賱丞 丕賱卮乇丕亍 鬲賲賳毓賴丕 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 丿亘賵賱賲丕爻賷丕 丕賵 亘禺乇賵噩 丕賱丕爻胤賵賱 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷 賱賲賳毓 丕賱賳丕賯賱丕鬲 丕賱賳賮胤
亘賳丕亍 卮亘賰丞 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞 賱鬲賵賱賷 賲氐丕賱丨 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 毓賳 胤乇賷賯 毓賲賱丕卅賴丕 , 賵丕禺乇賷 丕賲乇賷賰賷丞 賵丕賱賴丿賮 賲賳賴丕 鬲禺乇賷亘 丕賱亘賱丿 賮賶 丨丕賱丞 爻賯賵胤 賲氐丿賯 賵賳噩丕丨 丨夭亘 鬲賵丿丕 丕賱卮賷賵毓賷
丿賮毓 乇卮丕賵賷 賵氐賱鬲 丕賱賶 賲賱丕賷賷賳 賱丕毓囟丕亍 賲噩賱爻 丕賱賳賵丕亘 , 氐丨丕賮丞 , 賵夭乇丕亍 , 乇噩丕賱 兀毓賲丕賱 , 卮乇胤丞 賵噩賷卮 , 亘賱胤噩賷丞 賱丕孬丕乇丞 丕毓賲丕賱 卮睾亘 賵賱賳夭賵賱 賲馗丕賴乇丕鬲 囟丿 賲氐丿賯, 賵賲賳 囟賲賳 丕賮毓丕賱賴賲 賱賱丕賷賯丕毓 亘賷賳 丕賱噩亘賴丞 丕賱賵胤賳賷丞 丕賱鬲賶 賷賯賵丿賴丕 賲氐丿賯 賵乇噩丕賱 丕賱丿賷賳 賷賯賵賲 毓賲賱丕卅賴賲 亘鬲賴丿賷丿 賵賲丨丕賵賱丞 丕睾鬲賷丕賱 賵賯氐賮 賵賴賲賷 賱賲賳丕夭賱 乇噩丕賱 丕賱丿賷賳 亘兀爻賲 丨夭亘 鬲賵丿丕 丕賱卮賷賵毓賷 丕賱賲丐賷丿 賱賲氐丿賯 丨鬲賶 賷賯丕賱 賲氐丿賯 卮賷賵毓賷 賲賱丨丿
丕賲乇賷賰丕 鬲賯乇乇 賲賷夭丕賳賷丞 鬲氐賱 賱毓卮乇賷賳 賲賱賷賵賳 丿賵賱丕乇 賱賱丕胤丕丨丞 亘賲氐丿賯 賱兀賳賴丕 賰丕賳鬲 鬲鬲賵賯毓 丕賳 賲賯丕賵賲丞 賲氐丿賯 賲賳 丕賱賲賲賰賳 丕賳 鬲爻亘亘 賮賵囟賷 鬲鬲爻亘亘 賮賶 鬲賲賰賷賳 丨夭亘 鬲賵丿丕 亘賲毓丕賵賳丞 丕賱爻賵賮賷賷鬲 賲賳 丕賱爻賷胤乇丞 毓賱賶 丕賷乇丕賳 , 賵胤亘毓丕 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賴丿賮賴丕 賵丕囟丨 丕賱賳賮胤 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷
賵丕賱賳賴丕賷丞 丕賱丕胤丕丨丞 亘賲氐丿賯 賵乇噩賵毓 丕賱卮丕賴
![](https://i.imgur.com/n4vaWxe.jpg"<br)
毓賳丿 賳賴丕賷丞 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賵賯乇亘 賳噩丕丨 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 :
賰賱 丕賱賱賶 噩賵丕賷丕 丕卮鬲賲 賵兀賱毓賳 丕賲乇賷賰丕 毓賱賶 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賵丨乇賯丞 丕賱丿賲 賵丕賳鬲 亘鬲賯乇兀 賰賱丕賲賴賲 賰兀賳 丕賱賳賮胤 丿賴 丕爻丕爻丕 賲賱賰賴賲 賵丕丨賳丕 丕賱賱賶 丨乇丕賲賷丞 , 賵毓賱賶 丕賱毓賲賱丕亍 丕賱賱賷 毓卮丕賳 賲賳氐亘 丕賵 賮賱賵爻 賷鬲丨丕賱賮賵丕 賲毓 丕賱丕爻鬲毓賲丕乇 賵毓賱賶 丕賱乇賷丕囟賷賷賳 賵丕賱賳噩賵賲 丕賱賱賷 賳夭賱賵丕 賲馗丕賴乇丕鬲 鬲兀賷賷丿 賱賱卮丕賴 賵毓賱賷 丕賱卮毓亘 丕賱噩丕賴賱 丕賱賱賷 亘賷氐丿賯 丕賶 丨丕噩丞 賮賶 丕毓賱丕賲 丕賱卮丕賴 賵賷賳夭賱 賷兀賷賷丿賴 賲毓 丕賳賴 丕賰鬲乇 賵丕丨丿 馗賱賲賴 賵爻乇賯賴 , 賳噩丕丨 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 鬲丕乇賷禺賷丕 賲丨爻賵賲丕 賵賱賰賳 賰兀賳賷 賰賳鬲 亘鬲賲賳賷 兀賳賴 賲賷賳噩丨卮 賵賮賶 丕禺乇 賱丨馗丞 賷賮卮賱 夭賷 兀賵賱 賲丨丕賵賱丞 , 賵毓賱賷 賮賰乇丞 毓賲賱賷丞 兀噩丕賰爻 丕賱鬲賶 賯丕賲鬲 亘賴丕 丕賱賲禺丕亘乇丕鬲 丕賱丕賲乇賷賰賷丞 鬲賲 賳卮乇賴丕 乇爻賲賷 賮賶 丕賲乇賷賰丕
賲賱禺氐 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 毓賱賶 賲氐丿賯 賴賵 賲丕 賷鬲賲 賲賳匕 爻賳賵丕鬲 賮賶 噩賲賷毓 亘賱丕丿賳丕 賵亘賱丕丿 丕禺乇賷 , 賮賲賵丕乇丿 丕賱亘賱丿 賵丨鬲賷 丕賱卮毓亘 賳賮爻賴 賲噩乇丿 賵爻賷賱丞 賱丨氐賵賱 丕賱賯賵賷 丕賱毓馗賲賷 毓賱賶 噩賲賷毓 禺賷乇丕鬲 丕賱亘賱丿 賵賲賳 賷丨丕賵賱 賮賯胤 丕賳 賷賯賵賱 賴匕丕 賲賳 丨賯賳丕 賷賯鬲賱賵賴 丕賵 賷賳賯賱亘賵丕 毓賱賷賴
賲氐丿賯 乇噩賱 賰丕賳 賷丨丕賵賱 賮賯胤 丕賳 賷噩毓賱 賳賮胤 (丕賱亘鬲乇賵賱) 廿賷乇丕賳 賱賱卮毓亘 丕賱廿賷乇丕賳賷 , 亘丿賱 賲賳 爻乇賯鬲賴 爻賳賵賷丕 賲賳 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕
賵賱賰賷 賳賮賴賲 丕賱賯氐丞 賷噩亘 爻乇丿 亘毓囟 丕賱鬲賵乇丕賷禺 賵丕賱丕丨丿丕孬 丕賱賲賴賲丞 :
丕賱亘丿丕賷丞 賲賳 丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丿丕乇爻賷 毓丕賲 1901 丕賱鬲賷 賵丕賮賯 毓賱賷賴丕 丕賱賲賱賰 賲馗賮乇 丕賱丿賷賳 卮丕賴 賱賲賳丨 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷 丿丕乇爻賷 丕賱丨賯 丕賱丨氐乇賷 賮賶 丕賱賳賮胤 賵丕爻鬲睾賱丕賱賴 賵賳賯賱賴 賵亘賷毓賴 賱賲丿丞 60 毓丕賲
丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 毓丕賲 1907 賱鬲賯爻賷賲 丕賷乇丕賳 , 賴賱 鬲毓賱賲賵丕 賲賳 賵賯毓賴丕 乇賵爻賷丕 賵亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賮賴賲 丕鬲賮賯賵丕 毓賱賶 鬲賯爻賷賲 丕賷乇丕賳 亘賷賳賴賲 賵丕亘賯丕亍 賮賯胤 噩夭亍 亘爻賷胤 賲丨丕賷丿 賷丿賷乇賴 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷賷賳 孬賲 亘毓丿 丕賱鬲賵賯賷毓 丕亘賱睾賵丕 丕賷乇丕賳 亘鬲賱賰 丕賱丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞
亘毓丿 孬賵乇丞 丕賱亘賱丕卮賮丞 鬲乇賰鬲 乇賵爻賷丕 賰鬲乇 禺賷乇賴賲 丕賷乇丕賳 賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賮賯胤 賵丕氐亘丨 丕賱賳賮賵匕 賰賱賴 賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕
丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 毓丕賲 1919 丕賱丕賳噩賱賷夭賷丞 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷賴 賮賷 毓賴丿 丕丨賲丿 卮丕賴 賵鬲毓胤賷 丕賱丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 賱賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 丕賱爻賷胤乇丞 毓賱賶 丕賱噩賷卮 賵丕賱禺夭丕賳丞 賵胤乇賯 丕賱賳賯賱 賵丕賱賲賵丕氐賱丕鬲 賵卮亘賰丕鬲 丕賱丕鬲氐丕賱丕鬲 , 賰丕賳 賮丕囟賱 賵夭丕乇丞 丕賱鬲賳賲賷丞 丕賱賲丨賱賷丞 賰丕賳賵丕 賷丕禺丿賵賴丕 亘丕賱賲乇丞
賰丕賳鬲 丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丿丕乇爻賷 鬲毓胤賷 16% 爻賳賵賷丕 賸賮賯胤 賱賱丕賷乇丕賳賷賷賳 賵賰丕賳 丨賵丕賱賶 47 丕賱賮 丕爻鬲乇賱賷賳賷 毓丕賲 1920 賵賰丕賳 賷毓鬲亘乇 賲亘賱睾 囟卅賷賱丕 噩丿丕 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 賱賱丕乇亘丕丨 賵丕賱鬲賷 亘丕賱賲賳丕爻亘丞 賱丕 賷賵噩丿 丨賯 賱丕賷乇丕賳 亘賲乇丕噩毓丞 丕賶 丕賵乇丕賯 賱賱卮乇賰丞 丕賱賮丕乇爻賷丞 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞
毓丕賲 1933 賷爻賯胤 乇囟丕 卮丕賴 丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丿丕乇爻賷 賮鬲匕賴亘 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賱賱鬲賮丕賵囟 賲毓賴 賮賷賵丕賮賯 毓賱賶 丕賳 丕賷乇丕賳 鬲丨氐賱 毓賱賶 丕乇亘丕丨 爻賳賵賷丞 賱丕 鬲賯賱 毓賳 975 丕賱賮 丕爻鬲乇賱賷賳賷 爻賳賵賷丕賸 賵鬲睾賷賷乇 丕爻賲 丕賱卮乇賰丞 賱賱丕賷乇丕賳賷丞 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞 賵賲丿 丕賱丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 賱丕孬賳賷賳 賵孬賱丕孬賷賳 毓丕賲丕 兀禺乇賷
禺賵賮 丕賱睾乇亘 賲賳 鬲禺胤賷胤 丕賱賳丕夭賷丞 賱丕爻鬲睾賱丕賱 丕賷乇丕賳 禺賱丕賱 丕賱丨乇亘 丕賱毓丕賱賲賷丞 賰賯丕毓丿丞 賴噩賵賲 , 兀丿賷 丕賱賶 丿禺賵賱 丕賱賯賵丕鬲 丕賱爻賵賮賷鬲賷丞 賵丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞 丕賷乇丕賳 毓丕賲 1941 賮賷 毓賴丿 乇囟丕 卮丕賴
亘毓丿 丕囟乇丕亘 毓賲丕賱 丕賱賳賮胤 毓丕賲 1947 賯乇乇 賲噩賱爻 丕賱賳賵丕亘 毓丿賲 賲賳丨 丕賶 丕賲鬲賷丕夭丕鬲 丕禺乇賷 賱卮乇賰丕鬲 兀噩賳亘賷丞 賵丕毓丕丿丞 丕賱鬲賮丕賵囟 亘卮兀賳 丕賱丕賲鬲賷丕夭 丕賱丨丕賱賶 丕賱賲賲賳賵丨 賱賱卮乇賰丞 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷丞 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞 賵賲賳 賰鬲亘 賲爻賵丿丞 匕賱賰 丕賱賯丕賳賵賳 丕賱賳丕卅亘 賲丨賲丿 賲氐丿賯
賲噩賱爻 丕賱賵夭丕乇亍 亘兀賲乇 賲賳 丕賱卮丕賴 亘賵丕賮賯 毓賱賶 丕賱丕鬲賮丕賯賷丞 丕賱鬲賰賲賷賱賷丞 賲毓 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 毓丕賲 1949 亘囟賲丕賳 丕乇亘丕丨 賱丕 鬲賯賱 毓賳 4 賲賱賷賵賳 丕爻鬲乇賱賷賳賷 賱丕賷乇丕賳 賵賱賰賳 亘丿賵賳 賲乇丕賯亘丞 丕賵 丕賷 丨賯 賱丕賷乇丕賳 賱丕丿丕乇丞 丕賵 賲乇丕噩毓丞 丕賱卮乇賰丞 , 賵賱賰賳 賲噩賱爻 丕賱賳賵丕亘 賷乇賮囟賴丕 賵賷毓乇囟 賲氐丿賯 賱兀賵賱 賲乇丞 賮賰乇丞 鬲兀賲賷賲 丕賱賳賮胤 賱氐丕賱丨 丕賱卮毓亘 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷
毓丕賲 1951 賷賵丕賮賯 賲噩賱爻 丕賱賳賵丕亘 毓賱賶 賯乇丕乇 鬲兀賲賷賲 丕賱賳賮胤 賵亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 鬲毓乇囟 丕賯鬲乇丕丨 亘賲賳丕氐賮丞 丕賱丕乇亘丕丨 賵賱賰賳 鬲賲 乇賮囟賴
賵丕賱丕賳 賲賱禺氐 亘爻賷胤 噩丿丕 賱賲丕 鬲賲 賲賳 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 兀賵賱丕 孬賲 丕賲乇賷賰丕 賮賶 毓賴丿 丕賷夭賳賴丕賵乇 賱賱廿胤丕丨丞 亘賲氐丿賯 :
賲賳毓 丕賷乇丕賳 賲賳 亘賷毓 丕賶 賰賲賷丞 賳賮胤 賱兀賷 丿賵賱丞 , 賵丕匕丕 丕乇丕丿丕鬲 丕賶 丿賵賱丞 丕賱卮乇丕亍 鬲賲賳毓賴丕 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 丿亘賵賱賲丕爻賷丕 丕賵 亘禺乇賵噩 丕賱丕爻胤賵賱 丕賱亘乇賷胤丕賳賷 賱賲賳毓 丕賱賳丕賯賱丕鬲 丕賱賳賮胤
亘賳丕亍 卮亘賰丞 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丞 賱鬲賵賱賷 賲氐丕賱丨 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 毓賳 胤乇賷賯 毓賲賱丕卅賴丕 , 賵丕禺乇賷 丕賲乇賷賰賷丞 賵丕賱賴丿賮 賲賳賴丕 鬲禺乇賷亘 丕賱亘賱丿 賮賶 丨丕賱丞 爻賯賵胤 賲氐丿賯 賵賳噩丕丨 丨夭亘 鬲賵丿丕 丕賱卮賷賵毓賷
丿賮毓 乇卮丕賵賷 賵氐賱鬲 丕賱賶 賲賱丕賷賷賳 賱丕毓囟丕亍 賲噩賱爻 丕賱賳賵丕亘 , 氐丨丕賮丞 , 賵夭乇丕亍 , 乇噩丕賱 兀毓賲丕賱 , 卮乇胤丞 賵噩賷卮 , 亘賱胤噩賷丞 賱丕孬丕乇丞 丕毓賲丕賱 卮睾亘 賵賱賳夭賵賱 賲馗丕賴乇丕鬲 囟丿 賲氐丿賯, 賵賲賳 囟賲賳 丕賮毓丕賱賴賲 賱賱丕賷賯丕毓 亘賷賳 丕賱噩亘賴丞 丕賱賵胤賳賷丞 丕賱鬲賶 賷賯賵丿賴丕 賲氐丿賯 賵乇噩丕賱 丕賱丿賷賳 賷賯賵賲 毓賲賱丕卅賴賲 亘鬲賴丿賷丿 賵賲丨丕賵賱丞 丕睾鬲賷丕賱 賵賯氐賮 賵賴賲賷 賱賲賳丕夭賱 乇噩丕賱 丕賱丿賷賳 亘兀爻賲 丨夭亘 鬲賵丿丕 丕賱卮賷賵毓賷 丕賱賲丐賷丿 賱賲氐丿賯 丨鬲賶 賷賯丕賱 賲氐丿賯 卮賷賵毓賷 賲賱丨丿
丕賲乇賷賰丕 鬲賯乇乇 賲賷夭丕賳賷丞 鬲氐賱 賱毓卮乇賷賳 賲賱賷賵賳 丿賵賱丕乇 賱賱丕胤丕丨丞 亘賲氐丿賯 賱兀賳賴丕 賰丕賳鬲 鬲鬲賵賯毓 丕賳 賲賯丕賵賲丞 賲氐丿賯 賲賳 丕賱賲賲賰賳 丕賳 鬲爻亘亘 賮賵囟賷 鬲鬲爻亘亘 賮賶 鬲賲賰賷賳 丨夭亘 鬲賵丿丕 亘賲毓丕賵賳丞 丕賱爻賵賮賷賷鬲 賲賳 丕賱爻賷胤乇丞 毓賱賶 丕賷乇丕賳 , 賵胤亘毓丕 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賴丿賮賴丕 賵丕囟丨 丕賱賳賮胤 丕賱丕賷乇丕賳賷
賵丕賱賳賴丕賷丞 丕賱丕胤丕丨丞 亘賲氐丿賯 賵乇噩賵毓 丕賱卮丕賴
毓賳丿 賳賴丕賷丞 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賵賯乇亘 賳噩丕丨 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 :
賰賱 丕賱賱賶 噩賵丕賷丕 丕卮鬲賲 賵兀賱毓賳 丕賲乇賷賰丕 毓賱賶 亘乇賷胤丕賳賷丕 賵丨乇賯丞 丕賱丿賲 賵丕賳鬲 亘鬲賯乇兀 賰賱丕賲賴賲 賰兀賳 丕賱賳賮胤 丿賴 丕爻丕爻丕 賲賱賰賴賲 賵丕丨賳丕 丕賱賱賶 丨乇丕賲賷丞 , 賵毓賱賶 丕賱毓賲賱丕亍 丕賱賱賷 毓卮丕賳 賲賳氐亘 丕賵 賮賱賵爻 賷鬲丨丕賱賮賵丕 賲毓 丕賱丕爻鬲毓賲丕乇 賵毓賱賶 丕賱乇賷丕囟賷賷賳 賵丕賱賳噩賵賲 丕賱賱賷 賳夭賱賵丕 賲馗丕賴乇丕鬲 鬲兀賷賷丿 賱賱卮丕賴 賵毓賱賷 丕賱卮毓亘 丕賱噩丕賴賱 丕賱賱賷 亘賷氐丿賯 丕賶 丨丕噩丞 賮賶 丕毓賱丕賲 丕賱卮丕賴 賵賷賳夭賱 賷兀賷賷丿賴 賲毓 丕賳賴 丕賰鬲乇 賵丕丨丿 馗賱賲賴 賵爻乇賯賴 , 賳噩丕丨 丕賱丕賳賯賱丕亘 鬲丕乇賷禺賷丕 賲丨爻賵賲丕 賵賱賰賳 賰兀賳賷 賰賳鬲 亘鬲賲賳賷 兀賳賴 賲賷賳噩丨卮 賵賮賶 丕禺乇 賱丨馗丞 賷賮卮賱 夭賷 兀賵賱 賲丨丕賵賱丞 , 賵毓賱賷 賮賰乇丞 毓賲賱賷丞 兀噩丕賰爻 丕賱鬲賶 賯丕賲鬲 亘賴丕 丕賱賲禺丕亘乇丕鬲 丕賱丕賲乇賷賰賷丞 鬲賲 賳卮乇賴丕 乇爻賲賷 賮賶 丕賲乇賷賰丕
May 2, 2010
My S.F. Chronicle review from 2003:
Nearly two years after the shock of Sept. 11, 2001, it's fair to start poking through the legacy of U.S. foreign policy and raise troubling questions about the extent to which our own past misdeeds ultimately boomeranged on us. Few readers of "All the Shah's Men," by longtime New York Times foreign correspondent Stephen Kinzer, can come away without grave suspicions that Sept.
11 was in many ways a self-inflicted wound.
What American crime could explain so sensational a charge? Simply that U.S. leaders in the early 1950s lacked the courage of their convictions and did not really believe in democracy. Instead, despite the post-Stalin vacuum of power in the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower held his nose and gave the CIA the OK to overthrow the elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953.
If you've never heard of Mossadegh, don't feel bad. He appeared on the cover of Time magazine as "Man of the Year" for 1951, no small feat for a year when Henry Luce could easily have chosen Winston Churchill, Harry Truman or Ike. But in the years since his illegal ouster, Mossadegh has slipped into a deep obscurity, unless of course you happen to be Iranian. To most Iranians, he remains a potent symbol of freedom and the hope of democracy, and most have long been aware of the millions of dollars the CIA spent to topple his government, a dirty chapter in U.S. history finally owned up to during the Clinton administration.
"Why did you Americans do that terrible thing?" a relative of Mossadegh demands of Kinzer. "We always loved America. To us, America was the great country, the perfect country, the country that helped us while other countries were exploiting us. But after that moment, no one in Iran ever trusted the United States again. I can tell you for sure that if you had not done that thing, you would never have had that problem of hostages being taken in your embassy in Tehran. All your trouble started in 1953. Why, why did you do it?"
Why, why indeed? The short answer is that then as now, U.S. decision-makers based their choices on alarmist, highly ideological interpretations of short- term problems and left the toxic fallout to other administrations (and generations).
But by manipulating the Iranian media, renting thugs and bribing military officers, all to oust Mossadegh, the CIA virtually forced large numbers of Iranians to adopt a strident anti-Americanism. Desire for revenge against "the great Satan," seen in this context, is not nearly the puzzle it seemed to poor Jimmy Carter, hunkered down in the White House during the hostage crisis. The anti-Americanism that thrived in Iran's Muslim community soon spread to influence other radicals in the region, most especially Osama bin Laden.
Kinzer, co-author of "Bitter Fruit," a classic study of the CIA-sponsored coup against Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, emphasizes the importance of British influence in Iran, and in particular, the role of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh nationalized the company only after the British ignored repeated American pleas to compromise and split profits 50-50 with the Iranians.
The smugness of British imperial disdain for the Iranians ought to serve as a bracing reminder to the contemporary reader of how unchecked global power can lead to a deep -- and deeply stupid -- form of arrogance. Before Mossadegh showed up at the U.N. in New York for a dramatic appearance, British delegate Gladwyn Jebb made a speech that showed a complete lack of understanding of the resentment imperialism could inspire.
Despite the appalling living conditions of workers at the company's huge oil refinery in Iran, as British directors lived nearby in luxury, Jebb sputtered on patronizingly about how the company's profiteering in Iran "must arouse the greatest admiration from the social point of view and should be taken as a model of the form of development which would bring benefits to the economically less-developed areas of the world."
The British had in fact discovered the oil in Iran, and had in fact built the refineries and assembled the fleet of tankers to transport it around the world. But the unwillingness of British leaders, including Churchill, to accept even a 50-50 split of the billions derived from Iranian oil was a costly miscalculation.
The truly sad part of the story concerns American willingness to take over as a pawn of the British, once Mossadegh had the good sense to evict all United Kingdom diplomats (and spies) from his country as their scheming to overthrow him reached fever pitch. The Dulles brothers, key aides to Eisenhower, did not argue that Mossadegh himself was a Communist or was likely to turn to the Soviets, only that they needed him removed to install Mohammed Rezah Shah and bolster him as a hedge against Soviet expansionism. As Kinzer notes, the Dulles brothers showed little awareness of what they were getting their country into with the first U.S. action to overthrow a foreign government.
"Their decision to make Iran the first battleground of their crusade may or may not have been wise, but they deserve to be judged harshly for the way they made it," he writes. "Even before taking their oaths of office, both brothers had convinced themselves beyond all doubt that Mossadegh must go. They never even considered the possibility that a coup might be a bad idea or that it might have negative consequences. History might view their action more favorably if it had been the result of serious, open-minded reflection and debate. Instead, it sprang from petulant impatience, from a burning desire to do something, anything, that would seem like a victory over communism. . . . Iran was the place they chose to start showing the world that the United States was no longer part of what Vice President Richard Nixon called 'Dean Acheson's college of cowardly Communist containment.' "
Steve Kettmann, editor of "Game Time," the new Roger Angell collection, lives in New York.
This article appeared on page M - 6 of the San Francisco Chronicle
Nearly two years after the shock of Sept. 11, 2001, it's fair to start poking through the legacy of U.S. foreign policy and raise troubling questions about the extent to which our own past misdeeds ultimately boomeranged on us. Few readers of "All the Shah's Men," by longtime New York Times foreign correspondent Stephen Kinzer, can come away without grave suspicions that Sept.
11 was in many ways a self-inflicted wound.
What American crime could explain so sensational a charge? Simply that U.S. leaders in the early 1950s lacked the courage of their convictions and did not really believe in democracy. Instead, despite the post-Stalin vacuum of power in the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower held his nose and gave the CIA the OK to overthrow the elected government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953.
If you've never heard of Mossadegh, don't feel bad. He appeared on the cover of Time magazine as "Man of the Year" for 1951, no small feat for a year when Henry Luce could easily have chosen Winston Churchill, Harry Truman or Ike. But in the years since his illegal ouster, Mossadegh has slipped into a deep obscurity, unless of course you happen to be Iranian. To most Iranians, he remains a potent symbol of freedom and the hope of democracy, and most have long been aware of the millions of dollars the CIA spent to topple his government, a dirty chapter in U.S. history finally owned up to during the Clinton administration.
"Why did you Americans do that terrible thing?" a relative of Mossadegh demands of Kinzer. "We always loved America. To us, America was the great country, the perfect country, the country that helped us while other countries were exploiting us. But after that moment, no one in Iran ever trusted the United States again. I can tell you for sure that if you had not done that thing, you would never have had that problem of hostages being taken in your embassy in Tehran. All your trouble started in 1953. Why, why did you do it?"
Why, why indeed? The short answer is that then as now, U.S. decision-makers based their choices on alarmist, highly ideological interpretations of short- term problems and left the toxic fallout to other administrations (and generations).
But by manipulating the Iranian media, renting thugs and bribing military officers, all to oust Mossadegh, the CIA virtually forced large numbers of Iranians to adopt a strident anti-Americanism. Desire for revenge against "the great Satan," seen in this context, is not nearly the puzzle it seemed to poor Jimmy Carter, hunkered down in the White House during the hostage crisis. The anti-Americanism that thrived in Iran's Muslim community soon spread to influence other radicals in the region, most especially Osama bin Laden.
Kinzer, co-author of "Bitter Fruit," a classic study of the CIA-sponsored coup against Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, emphasizes the importance of British influence in Iran, and in particular, the role of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh nationalized the company only after the British ignored repeated American pleas to compromise and split profits 50-50 with the Iranians.
The smugness of British imperial disdain for the Iranians ought to serve as a bracing reminder to the contemporary reader of how unchecked global power can lead to a deep -- and deeply stupid -- form of arrogance. Before Mossadegh showed up at the U.N. in New York for a dramatic appearance, British delegate Gladwyn Jebb made a speech that showed a complete lack of understanding of the resentment imperialism could inspire.
Despite the appalling living conditions of workers at the company's huge oil refinery in Iran, as British directors lived nearby in luxury, Jebb sputtered on patronizingly about how the company's profiteering in Iran "must arouse the greatest admiration from the social point of view and should be taken as a model of the form of development which would bring benefits to the economically less-developed areas of the world."
The British had in fact discovered the oil in Iran, and had in fact built the refineries and assembled the fleet of tankers to transport it around the world. But the unwillingness of British leaders, including Churchill, to accept even a 50-50 split of the billions derived from Iranian oil was a costly miscalculation.
The truly sad part of the story concerns American willingness to take over as a pawn of the British, once Mossadegh had the good sense to evict all United Kingdom diplomats (and spies) from his country as their scheming to overthrow him reached fever pitch. The Dulles brothers, key aides to Eisenhower, did not argue that Mossadegh himself was a Communist or was likely to turn to the Soviets, only that they needed him removed to install Mohammed Rezah Shah and bolster him as a hedge against Soviet expansionism. As Kinzer notes, the Dulles brothers showed little awareness of what they were getting their country into with the first U.S. action to overthrow a foreign government.
"Their decision to make Iran the first battleground of their crusade may or may not have been wise, but they deserve to be judged harshly for the way they made it," he writes. "Even before taking their oaths of office, both brothers had convinced themselves beyond all doubt that Mossadegh must go. They never even considered the possibility that a coup might be a bad idea or that it might have negative consequences. History might view their action more favorably if it had been the result of serious, open-minded reflection and debate. Instead, it sprang from petulant impatience, from a burning desire to do something, anything, that would seem like a victory over communism. . . . Iran was the place they chose to start showing the world that the United States was no longer part of what Vice President Richard Nixon called 'Dean Acheson's college of cowardly Communist containment.' "
Steve Kettmann, editor of "Game Time," the new Roger Angell collection, lives in New York.
This article appeared on page M - 6 of the San Francisco Chronicle
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August 20, 2017賴賲賴 賲乇丿丕賳 锟斤拷丕賴 (亘賴 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖: All the Shah's Men)鈥� 毓賳賵丕賳 讴鬲丕亘蹖 丕夭 禺亘乇賳诏丕乇 丕賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 丕爻鬲蹖賵賳 讴蹖賳夭乇 丕爻鬲. 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 讴賵丿鬲丕蹖 鄄鄹 賲乇丿丕丿 乇丕 丿乇 賯丕賱亘 乇賵丕蹖鬲蹖 丿丕爻鬲丕賳蹖 賵 乇賲丕賳鈥屭堎嗁� 賲賵乇丿 亘乇乇爻蹖 賯乇丕乇 賲蹖鈥屫囏�.
賲賯丿賲賴 賳诏丕乇賳丿賴
乇賵夭蹖 亘賴 囟蹖丕賮鬲 賲毓乇賮蹖 讴鬲丕亘 蹖讴 禺丕賳賲 賲爻賳 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖 讴賴 禺丕胤乇丕鬲卮 乇丕 賲賳鬲卮乇 讴乇丿賴 亘賵丿貙 丿毓賵鬲 卮丿賲. 賵蹖 蹖讴 爻丕毓鬲 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 夭賳丿诏蹖 倬乇賲丕噩乇丕蹖卮 氐丨亘鬲 讴乇丿 賵 丕诏乇趩賴 賴蹖趩 爻禺賳蹖 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 爻蹖丕爻鬲 亘賴 賲蹖丕賳 賳蹖丕賵乇丿貙 亘賴 胤賵乇 诏匕乇丕 丕卮丕乇賴 讴乇丿 讴賴 亘丕 賲丨賲賾丿 賲氐丿賯貙 賳禺爻鬲鈥屬堌槽屫� 爻丕賱鈥屬囏й� 郾鄢鄢郯 賭 郾鄢鄢鄄 讴賴 爻丕夭賲丕賳 丕胤賱丕毓丕鬲蹖 賲乇讴夭蹖 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 (爻蹖丕) 爻乇賳诏賵賳卮 讴乇丿貙 賮丕賲蹖賱 丕爻鬲.
倬爻 丕夭 倬丕蹖丕賳 爻禺賳丕賳 賵蹖貙 賳鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賲 丿乇 亘乇丕亘乇 賵爻賵爻賴鈥屰� 蹖讴 倬乇爻卮 賲賯丕賵賲鬲 讴賳賲. 诏賮鬲賲: 芦賳丕賲 賲氐丿賯 乇丕 亘乇丿蹖丿. 趩賴 趩蹖夭蹖 乇丕 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 丕賵 蹖丕 讴賵丿鬲丕蹖蹖 讴賴 毓賱蹖賴 賵蹖 氐賵乇鬲 诏乇賮鬲 亘賴 蹖丕丿 賲蹖鈥屫①堌臂屫� 蹖丕 賲蹖鈥屫堌з嗃屫� 亘賴 賲丕 亘诏賵蹖蹖丿責禄 賵蹖 亘賱丕賮丕氐賱賴 亘賴 賴蹖噩丕賳 賵 噩賳亘鈥屬堌堌� 丕賮鬲丕丿 賵 賮乇蹖丕丿 讴卮蹖丿: 芦趩乇丕 卮賲丕 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖鈥屬囏� 亘賴 丌賳 讴丕乇 賵丨卮鬲賳丕讴 丿爻鬲 夭丿蹖丿責 賲丕 賴賲蹖卮賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 乇丕 丿賵爻鬲 丿丕卮鬲蹖賲. 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 丕夭 賳馗乇 賲丕 讴卮賵乇蹖 亘夭乇诏 賵 亘蹖鈥屫观屫� 賵 賳賯氐 亘賵丿貨 讴卮賵乇蹖 讴賴 丿乇 賴賲丕賳 丨丕賱 讴賴 丿蹖诏乇丕賳 賲丕 乇丕 賲蹖鈥屭嗀з聚屫嗀� 亘賴 賲丕 讴賲讴 賲蹖鈥屭┴必�. 丕賲賾丕 丕夭 丌賳 鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴 亘毓丿貙 賴蹖趩鈥屭┴� 丿乇 丕蹖乇丕賳 丿蹖诏乇 亘賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 丕毓鬲賲丕丿 賳丿丕乇丿.
賲賯丿賲賴 賳诏丕乇賳丿賴
乇賵夭蹖 亘賴 囟蹖丕賮鬲 賲毓乇賮蹖 讴鬲丕亘 蹖讴 禺丕賳賲 賲爻賳 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖 讴賴 禺丕胤乇丕鬲卮 乇丕 賲賳鬲卮乇 讴乇丿賴 亘賵丿貙 丿毓賵鬲 卮丿賲. 賵蹖 蹖讴 爻丕毓鬲 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 夭賳丿诏蹖 倬乇賲丕噩乇丕蹖卮 氐丨亘鬲 讴乇丿 賵 丕诏乇趩賴 賴蹖趩 爻禺賳蹖 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 爻蹖丕爻鬲 亘賴 賲蹖丕賳 賳蹖丕賵乇丿貙 亘賴 胤賵乇 诏匕乇丕 丕卮丕乇賴 讴乇丿 讴賴 亘丕 賲丨賲賾丿 賲氐丿賯貙 賳禺爻鬲鈥屬堌槽屫� 爻丕賱鈥屬囏й� 郾鄢鄢郯 賭 郾鄢鄢鄄 讴賴 爻丕夭賲丕賳 丕胤賱丕毓丕鬲蹖 賲乇讴夭蹖 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 (爻蹖丕) 爻乇賳诏賵賳卮 讴乇丿貙 賮丕賲蹖賱 丕爻鬲.
倬爻 丕夭 倬丕蹖丕賳 爻禺賳丕賳 賵蹖貙 賳鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賲 丿乇 亘乇丕亘乇 賵爻賵爻賴鈥屰� 蹖讴 倬乇爻卮 賲賯丕賵賲鬲 讴賳賲. 诏賮鬲賲: 芦賳丕賲 賲氐丿賯 乇丕 亘乇丿蹖丿. 趩賴 趩蹖夭蹖 乇丕 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 丕賵 蹖丕 讴賵丿鬲丕蹖蹖 讴賴 毓賱蹖賴 賵蹖 氐賵乇鬲 诏乇賮鬲 亘賴 蹖丕丿 賲蹖鈥屫①堌臂屫� 蹖丕 賲蹖鈥屫堌з嗃屫� 亘賴 賲丕 亘诏賵蹖蹖丿責禄 賵蹖 亘賱丕賮丕氐賱賴 亘賴 賴蹖噩丕賳 賵 噩賳亘鈥屬堌堌� 丕賮鬲丕丿 賵 賮乇蹖丕丿 讴卮蹖丿: 芦趩乇丕 卮賲丕 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖鈥屬囏� 亘賴 丌賳 讴丕乇 賵丨卮鬲賳丕讴 丿爻鬲 夭丿蹖丿責 賲丕 賴賲蹖卮賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 乇丕 丿賵爻鬲 丿丕卮鬲蹖賲. 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 丕夭 賳馗乇 賲丕 讴卮賵乇蹖 亘夭乇诏 賵 亘蹖鈥屫观屫� 賵 賳賯氐 亘賵丿貨 讴卮賵乇蹖 讴賴 丿乇 賴賲丕賳 丨丕賱 讴賴 丿蹖诏乇丕賳 賲丕 乇丕 賲蹖鈥屭嗀з聚屫嗀� 亘賴 賲丕 讴賲讴 賲蹖鈥屭┴必�. 丕賲賾丕 丕夭 丌賳 鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴 亘毓丿貙 賴蹖趩鈥屭┴� 丿乇 丕蹖乇丕賳 丿蹖诏乇 亘賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 丕毓鬲賲丕丿 賳丿丕乇丿.
May 15, 2013
Although over ninety, Dad is unusually active. He is a docent at the Dundee Historical Society and, thanks to the influence of his Danish wife, Lene, takes courses as a non-degree-seeking student at the Roosevelt University campus out in dreary Schaumburg, Illinois. He tends towards history and political science, having said at one time that he enjoys ganging up with the liberal teachers against his mostly right-wing, fellow suburban students. (Dad always was a pinkish Democrat.) This book was recommended by him after he'd taken some course which used it. He had asked it I'd read it and, having read Kinzer's other book about the overthrow of the Guatemalan government by the C.I.A. and having enjoyed that one, his recommendation was enough for me to obtain the thing. I wasn't disappointed.
The C.I.A. was set up under the Truman administration as an information collection agency of government responsible to the president. Later, when Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State Foster Dulles, came to head the agency, it became almost as much a disinformation and destruction agency devoted to its own aggrandizement and the supposed interests of the U.S.A. These interests were, then as now, not the long-term interests of people, but the short-term political interests of politicians representing the American ruling class and corporations. We overthrew the popular governments of Guatemala and of Iran in the interests of the United Fruit Corporation (for which one of the Dulles brothers had worked and in which the other was heavily invested) and of big oil, respectively. The consequences were years of dictatorship and, in the case of Iran, serious and well-founded suspicion towards the United States--as well as a shot in the arm boost for the least savory aspects of the C.I.A. from the Eisenhower period until the present day.
The C.I.A. was set up under the Truman administration as an information collection agency of government responsible to the president. Later, when Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State Foster Dulles, came to head the agency, it became almost as much a disinformation and destruction agency devoted to its own aggrandizement and the supposed interests of the U.S.A. These interests were, then as now, not the long-term interests of people, but the short-term political interests of politicians representing the American ruling class and corporations. We overthrew the popular governments of Guatemala and of Iran in the interests of the United Fruit Corporation (for which one of the Dulles brothers had worked and in which the other was heavily invested) and of big oil, respectively. The consequences were years of dictatorship and, in the case of Iran, serious and well-founded suspicion towards the United States--as well as a shot in the arm boost for the least savory aspects of the C.I.A. from the Eisenhower period until the present day.
May 30, 2020
賮讴乇 賳賲蹖讴乇丿賲 亘丕 禺賵丕賳丿賳 蹖讴 讴鬲丕亘 鬲丕乇蹖禺蹖 丕卮讴賲 丿乇 亘蹖丕丿.
賲丕噩乇丕
丕亘鬲丿丕蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賲丕噩乇丕蹖 乇賵夭賴丕蹖 賲賳鬲賴蹖 亘賴 讴賵丿鬲丕 乇丕 丕夭 夭丕賵蹖賴 丿蹖丿 蹖讴 噩丕爻賵爻 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賵 丕夭 賮蹖賱鬲乇 蹖讴 匕乇賴 亘蹖賳 乇賵丕蹖鬲 賲蹖讴賳丿. 爻倬爻 蹖讴 賮賱卮 亘讴 亘爻蹖丕乇 胤賵賱丕賳蹖 亘賴 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賯亘賱 丕夭 丕爻賱丕賲 鬲丕 賲毓丕氐乇 丕蹖乇丕賳 夭丿賴 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 賲禺丕胤亘 乇丕 亘丕 倬蹖卮蹖賳賴 丕蹖乇丕賳 丌卮賳丕 賲蹖讴賳丿. 讴賲蹖 丿乇 禺氐賵氐 鬲賮丕賵鬲 賲賱鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 亘丕 丿蹖诏乇 賲賱賱 賲爻賱賲丕賳 亘丨孬 賲蹖卮賵丿. 卮蹖毓賴 卮丿賳 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 賵 爻丕亘賯賴 鬲賲丿賳 亘賴 賲禺丕胤亘 诏賵卮夭丿 賲蹖卮賵丿.
丿乇 丕丿丕賲賴 賵丕乇丿 丕賳鬲賯丕賱 賯丿乇鬲 丕夭 賯丕噩丕乇 亘賴 倬賴賱賵蹖 賵 賳賯卮 丕賳诏賱蹖爻 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賲蹖丕賳 賲蹖卮賵丿 鬲丕 亘乇爻丿 亘賴 丕鬲賮丕賯丕鬲 丿賴賴 20 卮賲爻蹖. 丌乇丕賲 丌乇丕賲 噩夭蹖蹖丕鬲 亘蹖卮鬲乇蹖 乇賵丕蹖鬲 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 賳賯卮 卮禺氐蹖鬲 賴丕蹖 鬲丕孬蹖乇 诏匕丕乇 丿乇 爻蹖丕爻鬲賴丕蹖 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 睾乇亘 賲毓乇賮蹖 賲蹖卮賵丿.
乇賵丕蹖鬲 讴鬲丕亘 丌賳賯丿乇 丕丿丕賲賴 倬蹖丿丕 賲蹖讴賳丿 鬲丕 亘賴 乇賵夭 讴賵丿鬲丕 賲蹖乇爻丿. 丕蹖賳噩丕 賮賱卮 亘讴 鬲賲丕賲 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 丕丿丕賲賴 賲丕噩乇丕 鬲丕 夭賲丕賳 賲乇诏 賲氐丿賯 賵 亘毓丿 丕夭 丌賳 亘賴 鬲丕孬蹖乇 丕蹖賳 讴賵丿鬲丕 亘乇 爻蹖丕爻鬲賴丕蹖 賲鬲賯丕亘賱 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴- 亘賴 賵蹖跇賴 丕蹖乇丕賳- 亘丕 睾乇亘 -亘賵蹖跇賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕- 賲蹖倬乇丿丕夭丿.
賲賱蹖 卮丿賳 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲責
亘丕 禺賵丕賳丿賳 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 賲鬲賵噩賴 賲蹖卮賵蹖賲 賲賱蹖 卮丿賳 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲 丿乇賵睾蹖 亘蹖卮 賳亘賵丿賴 賵 賳蹖爻鬲. 丿乇 鬲賵噩蹖賴 囟賱賲 賵 爻鬲賲蹖 讴賴 卮乇讴鬲 賳賮鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 丕賳诏賱蹖爻 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲 鬲氐丕賵蹖乇蹖 丕夭 讴丕睾匕鈥屫⒇ㄘж� 賵 趩丕丿乇 丌亘丕丿 丌亘丕丿丕賳 亘賴 賲禺丕胤亘 亘蹖賳 丕賱賲賱賱蹖 賳卮丕賳 丿丕丿賴 賲蹖鈥屫促堌�. 丕賳诏賱蹖爻賴丕 丿乇 胤賵賱 30 爻丕賱 讴乇賵乇 讴乇賵乇 賳賮鬲 亘賴 噩蹖亘 夭丿賳丿 賵 亘乇丿賳丿 賵賱蹖 趩蹖夭蹖 噩夭 讴丕乇 亘蹖卮鬲乇 賵 賮賯乇 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 賳賲丕賳丿賴 亘賵丿. 賲丨賱賴鈥屬囏й屰� 讴賴 丕睾賱亘 讴丕乇诏乇丕賳 賵 禺丕賳賵丕丿賴鈥屬囏й� 卮丕賳 讴賴 賴賲賴 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖 亘賵丿賳丿 丿乇 丌賳 夭賳丿诏蹖 賲蹖鈥屭┴必嗀� 禺丕賳賴 賴丕蹖蹖 丕夭 讴丕睾匕 賵 賲賯賵丕 賵 倬丕乇趩賴 丿乇 亘丿鬲乇蹖賳 卮乇丕蹖胤 夭賳丿诏蹖. 丌賳胤乇賮 鬲乇 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖鈥屬囏� 丿乇 賲丨賱賴鈥屬囏й� 亘乇蹖賲 賵 亘丕賵丕乇丿賴鈥� 丌亘丕丿丕賳 夭賳丿诏蹖 賲蹖鈥屭┴必嗀� 讴賴 賴賳賵夭 亘毓丿 丕夭 诏匕卮鬲 亘蹖卮 丕夭 70-80 爻丕賱 丕爻鬲丕賳丿丕乇賴丕蹖 亘蹖 賳馗蹖乇蹖 丿丕乇丿. 賲噩鬲賲毓 賴丕蹖蹖 亘丕 亘賴鬲乇蹖賳 丕賲讴丕賳丕鬲 夭賳丿诏蹖.
亘毓丿 丕夭 讴賵鬲丕賴 卮丿賳 丿爻鬲 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖賴丕 丕夭 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 賳賵亘鬲 讴賳爻乇爻蹖賵賲 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖-睾乇亘蹖 卮丿. 鬲賳賴丕 趩蹖夭蹖 讴賴 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 讴乇丿 賳丕賲 卮乇讴鬲 亘賵丿 讴賴 賲賱蹖 卮丿.
丿乇 丨丕賱 丨丕囟乇 賴賲 賲賳丕胤賯 賳賮鬲 禺蹖夭 丕夭 丌亘 丌卮丕賲蹖丿賳蹖 丕爻鬲丕賳丿丕乇丿 亘乇禺賵乇丿丕乇 賳蹖爻鬲賳丿. 卮乇丕蹖胤 賵 讴蹖賮蹖鬲 夭賳丿诏蹖 倬丕蹖蹖賳 丕爻鬲. 爻蹖賱 賵 乇蹖夭 诏乇丿 賵 賳丕 丕賲賳蹖 丨丕氐賱 賲賱蹖 卮丿賳 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲 卮丿賴. 丿乇丌賲丿賴丕蹖 賴賳诏賮鬲 賳賮鬲 亘賴 噩蹖亘 賲丿蹖乇丕賳 丿賵賱鬲蹖 賵 賲毓丿賵丿 讴丕乇賮乇賲丕蹖丕賳 賲蹖鈥屫辟堌� 賵 讴丕乇诏乇 丕夭 丌賳 亘蹖 賳氐蹖亘 丕爻鬲. 诏賵蹖蹖 賳賮鬲 胤賱爻賲 賲賳丨賵爻 丕蹖乇丕賳 丕爻鬲.
卮丕蹖丿 "賲賳 賵 鬲賵" 賴賲 亘丕蹖丿 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 亘禺賵丕賳丿
亘賴 賳馗乇賲 賮丕乇睾 丕夭 賳馗乇 賲賳 蹖丕 丿蹖诏乇蹖 丿乇 禺氐賵氐 賳賵毓 丨讴賵賲鬲貙 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕蹖丿 鬲賵爻胤 讴爻丕賳蹖 讴賴 乇囟丕 卮丕賴 蹖丕 賲丨賲丿 乇囟丕 卮丕賴 倬賴賱賵蹖 乇丕 胤丕賴乇 賵 賲胤賴乇 賲蹖丿丕賳賳丿 禺賵丕賳丿賴 卮賵丿.
乇賮鬲丕乇 卮丕賴 亘丕 賲氐丿賯 蹖丕 亘丕 卮乇讴鬲 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖 賵 蹖丕 亘丕 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賴丕 禺賵丿卮 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳丿 丿蹖丿 亘賴鬲乇蹖 丕夭 丕賵囟丕毓 丌賳 夭賲丕賳 亘丿賴丿. 丿賵乇丕賳 倬賴賱賵蹖 丿賵賲 賮賯胤 禺蹖丕亘丕賳 賴丕蹖 亘丕賱丕 卮賴乇 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 爻賵丕丨賱 乇丕賲爻乇 賵 賳賵卮賴乇 賳蹖爻鬲. 讴丕亘丕乇賴 賴丕蹖 卮蹖讴 賵 亘丕卮诏丕賴 賴丕蹖 禺丕乇噩蹖 賴丕 丿乇 丌亘丕丿丕賳 蹖讴 亘禺卮 丕夭 賲丕噩乇丕爻鬲 讴賴 夭乇賯 賵 亘乇賯 夭蹖丕丿蹖 丿丕乇賳丿. 丕賲丕 賴丕蹖蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賳丿 讴賴 亘毓賳賵丕賳 蹖讴 卮丕賴丿 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賲蹖亘丕蹖爻鬲 賴賲賴 乇丕 賲丿 賳馗乇 賯乇丕乇 丿賴蹖賲.
丕氐賱丕 賵 丕亘丿丕 賯氐丿 賳丿丕乇賲 蹖讴 丨讴賵賲鬲 乇丕 鬲禺乇蹖亘 蹖丕 鬲賲噩蹖丿 讴賳賲. 賯氐丿賲 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 讴賴 爻蹖丕賴蹖賽 丕毓賲丕賱 蹖讴 丨讴賵賲鬲 賳亘丕蹖丿 亘丕毓孬 卮賵丿 丨讴賵賲鬲 賴丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇 乇丕 爻賮蹖丿 倬賳丿丕乇蹖賲.
賲賯丕蹖爻賴 亘蹖賳 爻蹖丕爻鬲鈥屬囏й� 噩賲賴賵乇蹖 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 賵 丨讴賵賲鬲 倬賴賱賵蹖 鬲賮丕賵鬲 賴丕蹖 讴賲蹖 乇丕 亘賴 丿爻鬲 賲蹖鈥屫囏�. 丨亘爻 禺丕賳诏蹖 賲禺丕賱賮丕賳貙 賲賲賳賵毓蹖鬲 丕丨夭丕亘貙 夭賳丿丕賳 賵 卮讴賳噩賴貙 賯鬲賱 賲禺丕賱賮貙 賮囟丕蹖 亘爻鬲賴 噩乇丕蹖丿 賵 爻蹖丕爻蹖貙 亘蹖诏丕賳賴 賴乇丕爻蹖(卮賵乇賵蹖). 禺乇貙 賴賲丕賳 禺乇 丕爻鬲 賲賳鬲賴丕 倬丕賱丕賳卮 毓賵囟 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲.
鬲丕孬蹖乇 丿乇 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 賲乇丿賲 丌賲乇蹖讴丕
賳馗乇丕鬲蹖 讴賴 匕蹖賱 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 鬲賵爻胤 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賴丕 賳賵卮鬲賴 卮丿賴 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳丿 鬲丕孬蹖乇 丌賳 乇丕 賲卮禺氐 讴賳丿. 賯乇蹖亘 亘賴 丕鬲賮丕賯 噩賲毓蹖鬲 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 丕夭 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賲毓丕氐乇 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 賳賯卮 讴卮賵乇卮丕賳 丿乇 丌賳 趩蹖夭蹖 賳賲蹖丿丕賳賳丿. 鬲賳賴丕 趩蹖夭蹖 讴賴 賲蹖丿丕賳賳丿 蹖讴 丿卮賲賳蹖 亘蹖賳 丿賵 讴卮賵乇 丕爻鬲. 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘禺卮蹖 丕夭 倬乇丿賴 賴丕 乇丕 亘乇丿丕卮鬲賴.
賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 鬲賮爻蹖乇 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 丕蹖賳 讴賵丿鬲丕 賲爻蹖乇 丿賲賵讴乇丕爻蹖 丿乇 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴貙 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖 噩賳賵亘蹖 乇丕 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 丿丕丿. 丿乇 讴賵鬲丕賴 賲丿鬲 亘賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 丕蹖賳 丕蹖丿賴 乇丕 丿丕丿 讴賴 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳丿 亘賴 乇丕丨鬲蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲 賴丕 乇丕 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 丿丕丿 賵 丕夭 賲賵賴亘鬲賴丕蹖 鬲噩丕乇蹖 亘毓丿 丕夭 丌賳 丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 讴乇丿. 讴丕乇蹖 讴賴 亘丕 丕蹖賳 丕蹖乇丕賳 丕賳噩丕賲 卮丿 蹖讴 賳賲賵賳賴 賲賵賮賯 噩賱賵賴 讴乇丿.
丕賲丕 丿乇 胤賵賱丕賳蹖 賲丿鬲 鬲丕孬蹖乇 丌賳 趩蹖夭蹖 卮丿 亘賴 賳丕賲 亘賳蹖丕丿 诏乇丕蹖蹖 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 丿乇 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 爻丕蹖乇 讴卮賵乇賴丕蹖 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴. 胤丕賱亘丕賳貙 丕賱賯丕毓丿賴貙 丨夭亘 丕賱賱賴貙 丨賲丕爻貙 丿丕毓卮. 丕蹖賳賴丕 乇丕 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賳鬲蹖噩賴 讴賵鬲賴 亘蹖賳蹖 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 賲蹖丿丕賳丿 讴賴 亘毓丿賴丕 丌鬲卮 丌賳 丿丕賲賳 禺賵丿 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 乇丕 賴賲 诏乇賮鬲.
诏丕賳丿蹖賽 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴
丿乇 丕賳鬲賴丕蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 爻丕賱賴丕蹖 亘毓丿 丕夭 丕賳賯賱丕亘 亘賴 丕蹖乇丕賳 爻賮乇 賲蹖讴賳丿 鬲丕 賲丨賱 丨亘爻 禺丕賳诏蹖 賲氐丿賯 丿乇 乇賵爻鬲丕蹖 丕丨賲丿 丌亘丕丿 乇丕 丕夭 賳夭丿蹖讴 亘亘蹖賳丿. 賲賲丕賳毓鬲賴丕蹖蹖 亘乇丕蹖卮 丕夭 胤乇賮 丨讴賵賲鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 丕蹖噩丕丿 賲蹖卮賵丿. 丿乇 丕賳鬲賴丕 丕蹖賳 賳蹖鬲 亘賴 丕噩乇丕 丿乇 賲蹖 丌蹖丿. 丿乇 賲爻蹖乇 賵乇賵丿 亘賴 乇賵爻鬲丕 賵 丨丿賵丿 50 爻丕賱 亘毓丿 丕夭 賲乇诏 賲氐丿賯貙 亘賴 丿賵 倬爻乇 亘趩賴 13-14 爻丕賱賴 亘乇禺賵乇丿 賲蹖讴賳丿 賵 賲蹖倬乇爻丿 卮賲丕 賲氐丿賯 乇丕 賲蹖卮賳丕爻蹖丿責
亘趩賴 賴丕 賲蹖禺賳丿賳丿 賵 賲蹖诏賵蹖賳丿 賲氐丿賯 讴爻蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲 乇丕 賲賱蹖 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲.
鬲亘賱蹖睾丕鬲 賵 賲丨丿賵丿蹖鬲 賴丕 鬲丕 趩賴 丕賳丿丕夭賴 鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賴 蹖丕丿 賵 禺丕胤乇賴 丕蹖賳 賲乇丿 亘蹖 賳馗蹖乇 賵 賳爻鬲賵賴 乇丕 賲禺賮蹖 讴賳丿責
賴賳賵夭 亘蹖賳 "賲乇丿賲" 賲氐丿賯 賳賲丕丿 賲賯丕賵賲鬲 丕爻鬲.
亘蹖 禺賵丿 賳蹖爻鬲 讴賴 丕夭 丕賵 亘賴 賳丕賲 "夭毓蹖賲 丕賱卮乇賯" 蹖丕丿 賲蹖卮賵丿. 讴爻蹖 讴賴 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴 亘丕蹖丿 亘蹖丿丕乇蹖 丕卮 乇丕 賲丿蹖賵賳 丕賵 亘丕卮丿.
賲賳 亘賴 賳馗乇賲 賱賯亘 賲賳丕爻亘 亘乇丕蹖卮 "诏丕賳丿蹖 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴" 丕爻鬲.
賳爻禺賴 氐賵鬲蹖
賲賳 乇丕 讴賴 亘賴 賳馗乇 丕夭 鬲蹖睾 爻丕賳爻賵乇 噩賲賴賵乇蹖 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 賳诏匕卮鬲賴 亘賵丿 卮賳蹖丿賲. 诏賵蹖賳丿賴 亘賴 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丕蹖 鬲賱賮馗 賴丕蹖 丕卮鬲亘丕賴 丿丕卮鬲 讴賴 賳蹖賲蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 賳賲蹖丿丕賳爻鬲賲 丕夭 亘賱丕蹖蹖 讴賴 亘賴 爻乇 賲賱鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 賲蹖鈥屫③屫� 诏乇蹖賴 讴賳賲 賵 蹖丕 丕夭 亘蹖 爻賵丕丿蹖 诏賵蹖賳丿賴 亘禺賳丿賲.
禺賱丕氐
賲丕噩乇丕
丕亘鬲丿丕蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賲丕噩乇丕蹖 乇賵夭賴丕蹖 賲賳鬲賴蹖 亘賴 讴賵丿鬲丕 乇丕 丕夭 夭丕賵蹖賴 丿蹖丿 蹖讴 噩丕爻賵爻 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賵 丕夭 賮蹖賱鬲乇 蹖讴 匕乇賴 亘蹖賳 乇賵丕蹖鬲 賲蹖讴賳丿. 爻倬爻 蹖讴 賮賱卮 亘讴 亘爻蹖丕乇 胤賵賱丕賳蹖 亘賴 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賯亘賱 丕夭 丕爻賱丕賲 鬲丕 賲毓丕氐乇 丕蹖乇丕賳 夭丿賴 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 賲禺丕胤亘 乇丕 亘丕 倬蹖卮蹖賳賴 丕蹖乇丕賳 丌卮賳丕 賲蹖讴賳丿. 讴賲蹖 丿乇 禺氐賵氐 鬲賮丕賵鬲 賲賱鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 亘丕 丿蹖诏乇 賲賱賱 賲爻賱賲丕賳 亘丨孬 賲蹖卮賵丿. 卮蹖毓賴 卮丿賳 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 賵 爻丕亘賯賴 鬲賲丿賳 亘賴 賲禺丕胤亘 诏賵卮夭丿 賲蹖卮賵丿.
丿乇 丕丿丕賲賴 賵丕乇丿 丕賳鬲賯丕賱 賯丿乇鬲 丕夭 賯丕噩丕乇 亘賴 倬賴賱賵蹖 賵 賳賯卮 丕賳诏賱蹖爻 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賲蹖丕賳 賲蹖卮賵丿 鬲丕 亘乇爻丿 亘賴 丕鬲賮丕賯丕鬲 丿賴賴 20 卮賲爻蹖. 丌乇丕賲 丌乇丕賲 噩夭蹖蹖丕鬲 亘蹖卮鬲乇蹖 乇賵丕蹖鬲 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 賳賯卮 卮禺氐蹖鬲 賴丕蹖 鬲丕孬蹖乇 诏匕丕乇 丿乇 爻蹖丕爻鬲賴丕蹖 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 睾乇亘 賲毓乇賮蹖 賲蹖卮賵丿.
乇賵丕蹖鬲 讴鬲丕亘 丌賳賯丿乇 丕丿丕賲賴 倬蹖丿丕 賲蹖讴賳丿 鬲丕 亘賴 乇賵夭 讴賵丿鬲丕 賲蹖乇爻丿. 丕蹖賳噩丕 賮賱卮 亘讴 鬲賲丕賲 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 丕丿丕賲賴 賲丕噩乇丕 鬲丕 夭賲丕賳 賲乇诏 賲氐丿賯 賵 亘毓丿 丕夭 丌賳 亘賴 鬲丕孬蹖乇 丕蹖賳 讴賵丿鬲丕 亘乇 爻蹖丕爻鬲賴丕蹖 賲鬲賯丕亘賱 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴- 亘賴 賵蹖跇賴 丕蹖乇丕賳- 亘丕 睾乇亘 -亘賵蹖跇賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕- 賲蹖倬乇丿丕夭丿.
賲賱蹖 卮丿賳 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲責
亘丕 禺賵丕賳丿賳 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 賲鬲賵噩賴 賲蹖卮賵蹖賲 賲賱蹖 卮丿賳 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲 丿乇賵睾蹖 亘蹖卮 賳亘賵丿賴 賵 賳蹖爻鬲. 丿乇 鬲賵噩蹖賴 囟賱賲 賵 爻鬲賲蹖 讴賴 卮乇讴鬲 賳賮鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 丕賳诏賱蹖爻 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲 鬲氐丕賵蹖乇蹖 丕夭 讴丕睾匕鈥屫⒇ㄘж� 賵 趩丕丿乇 丌亘丕丿 丌亘丕丿丕賳 亘賴 賲禺丕胤亘 亘蹖賳 丕賱賲賱賱蹖 賳卮丕賳 丿丕丿賴 賲蹖鈥屫促堌�. 丕賳诏賱蹖爻賴丕 丿乇 胤賵賱 30 爻丕賱 讴乇賵乇 讴乇賵乇 賳賮鬲 亘賴 噩蹖亘 夭丿賳丿 賵 亘乇丿賳丿 賵賱蹖 趩蹖夭蹖 噩夭 讴丕乇 亘蹖卮鬲乇 賵 賮賯乇 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 賳賲丕賳丿賴 亘賵丿. 賲丨賱賴鈥屬囏й屰� 讴賴 丕睾賱亘 讴丕乇诏乇丕賳 賵 禺丕賳賵丕丿賴鈥屬囏й� 卮丕賳 讴賴 賴賲賴 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖 亘賵丿賳丿 丿乇 丌賳 夭賳丿诏蹖 賲蹖鈥屭┴必嗀� 禺丕賳賴 賴丕蹖蹖 丕夭 讴丕睾匕 賵 賲賯賵丕 賵 倬丕乇趩賴 丿乇 亘丿鬲乇蹖賳 卮乇丕蹖胤 夭賳丿诏蹖. 丌賳胤乇賮 鬲乇 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖鈥屬囏� 丿乇 賲丨賱賴鈥屬囏й� 亘乇蹖賲 賵 亘丕賵丕乇丿賴鈥� 丌亘丕丿丕賳 夭賳丿诏蹖 賲蹖鈥屭┴必嗀� 讴賴 賴賳賵夭 亘毓丿 丕夭 诏匕卮鬲 亘蹖卮 丕夭 70-80 爻丕賱 丕爻鬲丕賳丿丕乇賴丕蹖 亘蹖 賳馗蹖乇蹖 丿丕乇丿. 賲噩鬲賲毓 賴丕蹖蹖 亘丕 亘賴鬲乇蹖賳 丕賲讴丕賳丕鬲 夭賳丿诏蹖.
亘毓丿 丕夭 讴賵鬲丕賴 卮丿賳 丿爻鬲 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖賴丕 丕夭 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 賳賵亘鬲 讴賳爻乇爻蹖賵賲 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖-睾乇亘蹖 卮丿. 鬲賳賴丕 趩蹖夭蹖 讴賴 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 讴乇丿 賳丕賲 卮乇讴鬲 亘賵丿 讴賴 賲賱蹖 卮丿.
丿乇 丨丕賱 丨丕囟乇 賴賲 賲賳丕胤賯 賳賮鬲 禺蹖夭 丕夭 丌亘 丌卮丕賲蹖丿賳蹖 丕爻鬲丕賳丿丕乇丿 亘乇禺賵乇丿丕乇 賳蹖爻鬲賳丿. 卮乇丕蹖胤 賵 讴蹖賮蹖鬲 夭賳丿诏蹖 倬丕蹖蹖賳 丕爻鬲. 爻蹖賱 賵 乇蹖夭 诏乇丿 賵 賳丕 丕賲賳蹖 丨丕氐賱 賲賱蹖 卮丿賳 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲 卮丿賴. 丿乇丌賲丿賴丕蹖 賴賳诏賮鬲 賳賮鬲 亘賴 噩蹖亘 賲丿蹖乇丕賳 丿賵賱鬲蹖 賵 賲毓丿賵丿 讴丕乇賮乇賲丕蹖丕賳 賲蹖鈥屫辟堌� 賵 讴丕乇诏乇 丕夭 丌賳 亘蹖 賳氐蹖亘 丕爻鬲. 诏賵蹖蹖 賳賮鬲 胤賱爻賲 賲賳丨賵爻 丕蹖乇丕賳 丕爻鬲.
卮丕蹖丿 "賲賳 賵 鬲賵" 賴賲 亘丕蹖丿 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 亘禺賵丕賳丿
亘賴 賳馗乇賲 賮丕乇睾 丕夭 賳馗乇 賲賳 蹖丕 丿蹖诏乇蹖 丿乇 禺氐賵氐 賳賵毓 丨讴賵賲鬲貙 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕蹖丿 鬲賵爻胤 讴爻丕賳蹖 讴賴 乇囟丕 卮丕賴 蹖丕 賲丨賲丿 乇囟丕 卮丕賴 倬賴賱賵蹖 乇丕 胤丕賴乇 賵 賲胤賴乇 賲蹖丿丕賳賳丿 禺賵丕賳丿賴 卮賵丿.
乇賮鬲丕乇 卮丕賴 亘丕 賲氐丿賯 蹖丕 亘丕 卮乇讴鬲 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖 賵 蹖丕 亘丕 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賴丕 禺賵丿卮 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳丿 丿蹖丿 亘賴鬲乇蹖 丕夭 丕賵囟丕毓 丌賳 夭賲丕賳 亘丿賴丿. 丿賵乇丕賳 倬賴賱賵蹖 丿賵賲 賮賯胤 禺蹖丕亘丕賳 賴丕蹖 亘丕賱丕 卮賴乇 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 爻賵丕丨賱 乇丕賲爻乇 賵 賳賵卮賴乇 賳蹖爻鬲. 讴丕亘丕乇賴 賴丕蹖 卮蹖讴 賵 亘丕卮诏丕賴 賴丕蹖 禺丕乇噩蹖 賴丕 丿乇 丌亘丕丿丕賳 蹖讴 亘禺卮 丕夭 賲丕噩乇丕爻鬲 讴賴 夭乇賯 賵 亘乇賯 夭蹖丕丿蹖 丿丕乇賳丿. 丕賲丕 賴丕蹖蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賳丿 讴賴 亘毓賳賵丕賳 蹖讴 卮丕賴丿 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賲蹖亘丕蹖爻鬲 賴賲賴 乇丕 賲丿 賳馗乇 賯乇丕乇 丿賴蹖賲.
丕氐賱丕 賵 丕亘丿丕 賯氐丿 賳丿丕乇賲 蹖讴 丨讴賵賲鬲 乇丕 鬲禺乇蹖亘 蹖丕 鬲賲噩蹖丿 讴賳賲. 賯氐丿賲 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 讴賴 爻蹖丕賴蹖賽 丕毓賲丕賱 蹖讴 丨讴賵賲鬲 賳亘丕蹖丿 亘丕毓孬 卮賵丿 丨讴賵賲鬲 賴丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇 乇丕 爻賮蹖丿 倬賳丿丕乇蹖賲.
賲賯丕蹖爻賴 亘蹖賳 爻蹖丕爻鬲鈥屬囏й� 噩賲賴賵乇蹖 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 賵 丨讴賵賲鬲 倬賴賱賵蹖 鬲賮丕賵鬲 賴丕蹖 讴賲蹖 乇丕 亘賴 丿爻鬲 賲蹖鈥屫囏�. 丨亘爻 禺丕賳诏蹖 賲禺丕賱賮丕賳貙 賲賲賳賵毓蹖鬲 丕丨夭丕亘貙 夭賳丿丕賳 賵 卮讴賳噩賴貙 賯鬲賱 賲禺丕賱賮貙 賮囟丕蹖 亘爻鬲賴 噩乇丕蹖丿 賵 爻蹖丕爻蹖貙 亘蹖诏丕賳賴 賴乇丕爻蹖(卮賵乇賵蹖). 禺乇貙 賴賲丕賳 禺乇 丕爻鬲 賲賳鬲賴丕 倬丕賱丕賳卮 毓賵囟 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲.
鬲丕孬蹖乇 丿乇 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 賲乇丿賲 丌賲乇蹖讴丕
賳馗乇丕鬲蹖 讴賴 匕蹖賱 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 鬲賵爻胤 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賴丕 賳賵卮鬲賴 卮丿賴 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳丿 鬲丕孬蹖乇 丌賳 乇丕 賲卮禺氐 讴賳丿. 賯乇蹖亘 亘賴 丕鬲賮丕賯 噩賲毓蹖鬲 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 丕夭 鬲丕乇蹖禺 賲毓丕氐乇 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 賳賯卮 讴卮賵乇卮丕賳 丿乇 丌賳 趩蹖夭蹖 賳賲蹖丿丕賳賳丿. 鬲賳賴丕 趩蹖夭蹖 讴賴 賲蹖丿丕賳賳丿 蹖讴 丿卮賲賳蹖 亘蹖賳 丿賵 讴卮賵乇 丕爻鬲. 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘禺卮蹖 丕夭 倬乇丿賴 賴丕 乇丕 亘乇丿丕卮鬲賴.
賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 鬲賮爻蹖乇 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 丕蹖賳 讴賵丿鬲丕 賲爻蹖乇 丿賲賵讴乇丕爻蹖 丿乇 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴貙 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖 噩賳賵亘蹖 乇丕 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 丿丕丿. 丿乇 讴賵鬲丕賴 賲丿鬲 亘賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 丕蹖賳 丕蹖丿賴 乇丕 丿丕丿 讴賴 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳丿 亘賴 乇丕丨鬲蹖 丨讴賵賲鬲 賴丕 乇丕 鬲睾蹖蹖乇 丿丕丿 賵 丕夭 賲賵賴亘鬲賴丕蹖 鬲噩丕乇蹖 亘毓丿 丕夭 丌賳 丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 讴乇丿. 讴丕乇蹖 讴賴 亘丕 丕蹖賳 丕蹖乇丕賳 丕賳噩丕賲 卮丿 蹖讴 賳賲賵賳賴 賲賵賮賯 噩賱賵賴 讴乇丿.
丕賲丕 丿乇 胤賵賱丕賳蹖 賲丿鬲 鬲丕孬蹖乇 丌賳 趩蹖夭蹖 卮丿 亘賴 賳丕賲 亘賳蹖丕丿 诏乇丕蹖蹖 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 丿乇 丕蹖乇丕賳 賵 爻丕蹖乇 讴卮賵乇賴丕蹖 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴. 胤丕賱亘丕賳貙 丕賱賯丕毓丿賴貙 丨夭亘 丕賱賱賴貙 丨賲丕爻貙 丿丕毓卮. 丕蹖賳賴丕 乇丕 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賳鬲蹖噩賴 讴賵鬲賴 亘蹖賳蹖 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 賲蹖丿丕賳丿 讴賴 亘毓丿賴丕 丌鬲卮 丌賳 丿丕賲賳 禺賵丿 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 乇丕 賴賲 诏乇賮鬲.
诏丕賳丿蹖賽 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴
丿乇 丕賳鬲賴丕蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 爻丕賱賴丕蹖 亘毓丿 丕夭 丕賳賯賱丕亘 亘賴 丕蹖乇丕賳 爻賮乇 賲蹖讴賳丿 鬲丕 賲丨賱 丨亘爻 禺丕賳诏蹖 賲氐丿賯 丿乇 乇賵爻鬲丕蹖 丕丨賲丿 丌亘丕丿 乇丕 丕夭 賳夭丿蹖讴 亘亘蹖賳丿. 賲賲丕賳毓鬲賴丕蹖蹖 亘乇丕蹖卮 丕夭 胤乇賮 丨讴賵賲鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 丕蹖噩丕丿 賲蹖卮賵丿. 丿乇 丕賳鬲賴丕 丕蹖賳 賳蹖鬲 亘賴 丕噩乇丕 丿乇 賲蹖 丌蹖丿. 丿乇 賲爻蹖乇 賵乇賵丿 亘賴 乇賵爻鬲丕 賵 丨丿賵丿 50 爻丕賱 亘毓丿 丕夭 賲乇诏 賲氐丿賯貙 亘賴 丿賵 倬爻乇 亘趩賴 13-14 爻丕賱賴 亘乇禺賵乇丿 賲蹖讴賳丿 賵 賲蹖倬乇爻丿 卮賲丕 賲氐丿賯 乇丕 賲蹖卮賳丕爻蹖丿責
亘趩賴 賴丕 賲蹖禺賳丿賳丿 賵 賲蹖诏賵蹖賳丿 賲氐丿賯 讴爻蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 氐賳毓鬲 賳賮鬲 乇丕 賲賱蹖 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲.
鬲亘賱蹖睾丕鬲 賵 賲丨丿賵丿蹖鬲 賴丕 鬲丕 趩賴 丕賳丿丕夭賴 鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賴 蹖丕丿 賵 禺丕胤乇賴 丕蹖賳 賲乇丿 亘蹖 賳馗蹖乇 賵 賳爻鬲賵賴 乇丕 賲禺賮蹖 讴賳丿責
賴賳賵夭 亘蹖賳 "賲乇丿賲" 賲氐丿賯 賳賲丕丿 賲賯丕賵賲鬲 丕爻鬲.
亘蹖 禺賵丿 賳蹖爻鬲 讴賴 丕夭 丕賵 亘賴 賳丕賲 "夭毓蹖賲 丕賱卮乇賯" 蹖丕丿 賲蹖卮賵丿. 讴爻蹖 讴賴 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴 亘丕蹖丿 亘蹖丿丕乇蹖 丕卮 乇丕 賲丿蹖賵賳 丕賵 亘丕卮丿.
賲賳 亘賴 賳馗乇賲 賱賯亘 賲賳丕爻亘 亘乇丕蹖卮 "诏丕賳丿蹖 禺丕賵乇 賲蹖丕賳賴" 丕爻鬲.
賳爻禺賴 氐賵鬲蹖
賲賳 乇丕 讴賴 亘賴 賳馗乇 丕夭 鬲蹖睾 爻丕賳爻賵乇 噩賲賴賵乇蹖 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 賳诏匕卮鬲賴 亘賵丿 卮賳蹖丿賲. 诏賵蹖賳丿賴 亘賴 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丕蹖 鬲賱賮馗 賴丕蹖 丕卮鬲亘丕賴 丿丕卮鬲 讴賴 賳蹖賲蹖 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 賳賲蹖丿丕賳爻鬲賲 丕夭 亘賱丕蹖蹖 讴賴 亘賴 爻乇 賲賱鬲 丕蹖乇丕賳 賲蹖鈥屫③屫� 诏乇蹖賴 讴賳賲 賵 蹖丕 丕夭 亘蹖 爻賵丕丿蹖 诏賵蹖賳丿賴 亘禺賳丿賲.
禺賱丕氐
September 8, 2020
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February 17, 2025
Kinzer convincingly argues that the coup set off a chain reaction leading to the Shah鈥檚 oppressive rule, the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and ultimately, the rise of anti-American sentiment in the region. The book does not shy away from drawing a direct line from Operation Ajax to the events of 9/11, making it a crucial read for anyone seeking to understand the roots of modern Middle Eastern tensions.
馃幎 "Time" 鈥� Hans Zimmer
馃幎 "So What" 鈥� Miles Davis
馃幎 "Time" 鈥� Hans Zimmer
馃幎 "So What" 鈥� Miles Davis
May 25, 2017
鬲賮賵 亘乇 鬲賵 丕蹖 趩乇禺 诏乇丿賵賳 鬲賮賵.
丕夭 賱丨丕馗 賳賵卮鬲丕乇蹖 讴鬲丕亘 亘爻蹖丕乇 禺賵卮 禺賵丕賳蹖 賴爻鬲. 毓賳丕賵蹖賳 賴乇 賮氐賱 丕夭 噩賲賱丕鬲 讴賱蹖丿蹖 丿丕禺賱 賮氐賱 丕賳鬲禺丕亘 卮丿賳丿 讴賴 亘爻蹖丕乇 賴賳乇賲賳丿丕賳賴 賵 夭蹖亘丕 丕賳鬲禺丕亘 卮丿賳丿. 丕蹖丿賴 蹖 丕氐賱蹖 噩賳丕亘 讴蹖賳夭乇 丕蹖賳賴 讴賴 倬丕 诏乇賮鬲賳 丿蹖讴鬲丕鬲賵乇蹖 賲丨賲丿乇囟丕 卮丕賴貙 丕賳賯賱丕亘 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 賵 賳賮乇鬲蹖 讴賴 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 丕夭 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賴丕 賳卮賵賳 丿丕丿賳丿 賴賲诏蹖 丨丕氐賱 讴賵丿鬲丕蹖 28 賲乇丿丕丿 亘賵丿賳丿 讴賴 亘乇丕蹖 賴賲蹖卮賴 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 噩賴丕賳 爻賵賲 乇賵 賳爻亘鬲 亘賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 毓賵囟 讴乇丿. 丕賳賯賱丕亘 丕蹖乇丕賳 丕賱賴丕賲 亘禺卮 亘賳蹖丕丿诏乇丕蹖丕賳 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 卮丿 賵 11 爻倬鬲丕賲亘乇 乇賵 丕蹖噩丕丿 讴乇丿. 丕賵丕蹖賱 禺賵賳丿賳 賮讴乇 賲蹖 讴乇丿賲 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇丕賲 鬲讴乇丕乇 賲讴乇乇丕鬲 亘丕卮賴 趩賵賳 禺蹖賱蹖 丕夭 丕蹖賳 丨賵丕丿孬 乇賵 亘賴 禺丕胤乇 乇卮鬲賴 蹖 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴蹖賲 禺賵賳丿賴 亘賵丿賲 賵賱蹖 賵賯鬲蹖 丕丿丕賲賴 丿丕丿賲 丨爻 讴乇丿賲 噩匕丕亘蹖鬲 賳賵卮鬲丕乇蹖 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 賯丿乇蹖 禺賵亘賴 讴賴 賲孬賱 蹖讴 乇賲丕賳 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 乇賵 噩賱賵 賲蹖 亘乇賴 賵 賲卮鬲丕賯 卮賳蹖丿賳 亘賯蹖賴 丿丕爻鬲丕賳 賲蹖 讴賳賴. 丿乇 讴賱 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 丿賵爻鬲 丿丕卮鬲賲 賵 賮讴乇 賲蹖 讴賳賲 賴賲賵賳胤賵乇 讴賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賴賲 丿乇 賳馗乇 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘賴 胤賵乇 賵蹖跇賴 亘丕蹖丿 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖 賴丕 賵 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賴丕 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 亘禺賵賳賳丿 鬲丕 賲鬲賵噩賴 亘卮賳丿 讴賴 賵囟毓蹖 讴賴 丕賲乇賵夭 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賲賳胤賯賴 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賴 賴賲卮 丕夭 毓賱賱 丿乇賵賳蹖 賳蹖爻鬲 亘賱讴賴 毓賱賱 鬲丕乇蹖禺蹖 禺丕乇噩蹖 賴賲 賳賯卮 鬲兀孬蹖乇诏匕丕乇蹖 丿乇 亘賵噩賵丿 丕賵賲丿賳 丕賵賳 丿丕乇賳丿.
丕夭 賱丨丕馗 賳賵卮鬲丕乇蹖 讴鬲丕亘 亘爻蹖丕乇 禺賵卮 禺賵丕賳蹖 賴爻鬲. 毓賳丕賵蹖賳 賴乇 賮氐賱 丕夭 噩賲賱丕鬲 讴賱蹖丿蹖 丿丕禺賱 賮氐賱 丕賳鬲禺丕亘 卮丿賳丿 讴賴 亘爻蹖丕乇 賴賳乇賲賳丿丕賳賴 賵 夭蹖亘丕 丕賳鬲禺丕亘 卮丿賳丿. 丕蹖丿賴 蹖 丕氐賱蹖 噩賳丕亘 讴蹖賳夭乇 丕蹖賳賴 讴賴 倬丕 诏乇賮鬲賳 丿蹖讴鬲丕鬲賵乇蹖 賲丨賲丿乇囟丕 卮丕賴貙 丕賳賯賱丕亘 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 賵 賳賮乇鬲蹖 讴賴 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 丕夭 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賴丕 賳卮賵賳 丿丕丿賳丿 賴賲诏蹖 丨丕氐賱 讴賵丿鬲丕蹖 28 賲乇丿丕丿 亘賵丿賳丿 讴賴 亘乇丕蹖 賴賲蹖卮賴 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 噩賴丕賳 爻賵賲 乇賵 賳爻亘鬲 亘賴 丌賲乇蹖讴丕 毓賵囟 讴乇丿. 丕賳賯賱丕亘 丕蹖乇丕賳 丕賱賴丕賲 亘禺卮 亘賳蹖丕丿诏乇丕蹖丕賳 丕爻賱丕賲蹖 卮丿 賵 11 爻倬鬲丕賲亘乇 乇賵 丕蹖噩丕丿 讴乇丿. 丕賵丕蹖賱 禺賵賳丿賳 賮讴乇 賲蹖 讴乇丿賲 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇丕賲 鬲讴乇丕乇 賲讴乇乇丕鬲 亘丕卮賴 趩賵賳 禺蹖賱蹖 丕夭 丕蹖賳 丨賵丕丿孬 乇賵 亘賴 禺丕胤乇 乇卮鬲賴 蹖 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴蹖賲 禺賵賳丿賴 亘賵丿賲 賵賱蹖 賵賯鬲蹖 丕丿丕賲賴 丿丕丿賲 丨爻 讴乇丿賲 噩匕丕亘蹖鬲 賳賵卮鬲丕乇蹖 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 賯丿乇蹖 禺賵亘賴 讴賴 賲孬賱 蹖讴 乇賲丕賳 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 乇賵 噩賱賵 賲蹖 亘乇賴 賵 賲卮鬲丕賯 卮賳蹖丿賳 亘賯蹖賴 丿丕爻鬲丕賳 賲蹖 讴賳賴. 丿乇 讴賱 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 丿賵爻鬲 丿丕卮鬲賲 賵 賮讴乇 賲蹖 讴賳賲 賴賲賵賳胤賵乇 讴賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賴賲 丿乇 賳馗乇 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘賴 胤賵乇 賵蹖跇賴 亘丕蹖丿 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖 賴丕 賵 丌賲乇蹖讴丕蹖蹖 賴丕 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 亘禺賵賳賳丿 鬲丕 賲鬲賵噩賴 亘卮賳丿 讴賴 賵囟毓蹖 讴賴 丕賲乇賵夭 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賲賳胤賯賴 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇賴 賴賲卮 丕夭 毓賱賱 丿乇賵賳蹖 賳蹖爻鬲 亘賱讴賴 毓賱賱 鬲丕乇蹖禺蹖 禺丕乇噩蹖 賴賲 賳賯卮 鬲兀孬蹖乇诏匕丕乇蹖 丿乇 亘賵噩賵丿 丕賵賲丿賳 丕賵賳 丿丕乇賳丿.
May 29, 2012
Great Britain via Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) wanted to secure its grip on Iran's oil. The United States wanted to prevent Iran from joining Russia and going communist. Iran wanted freedom, an Iran free of British imperialism.
These three nations, and their conflicting priorities, were on a collision course in the early 1950s, and it culminated in the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the popular Iranian prime minister who nationalized his country's oil industry and fought for an Iranian government that represented the will of the people.
Stephen Kinzer does a decent job of summarizing thousands of years of Persian history to provide the reader with adequate background to understand the actions and motivations of the Iranians he is writing about.
He paints a sympathetic portrait of Mossadegh as an uncompromisingly honest man who wanted nothing more than a free and independent Iran. Not only did he take on APOC, he pressured Iran's monarchy (often in the pocket of APOC) to accept a government that put elected officials above the monarchy.
Less flattering is portrayal of the Iranian monarchy. But it is the British that leave the worst impression in this tale. As for the Americans...perhaps that betrayal was the greatest of all to the Iranians.
Part history/politics, part fast-paced spy thriller, this book gives the reader insight into current Iran-U.S. relations.
These three nations, and their conflicting priorities, were on a collision course in the early 1950s, and it culminated in the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the popular Iranian prime minister who nationalized his country's oil industry and fought for an Iranian government that represented the will of the people.
Stephen Kinzer does a decent job of summarizing thousands of years of Persian history to provide the reader with adequate background to understand the actions and motivations of the Iranians he is writing about.
He paints a sympathetic portrait of Mossadegh as an uncompromisingly honest man who wanted nothing more than a free and independent Iran. Not only did he take on APOC, he pressured Iran's monarchy (often in the pocket of APOC) to accept a government that put elected officials above the monarchy.
Less flattering is portrayal of the Iranian monarchy. But it is the British that leave the worst impression in this tale. As for the Americans...perhaps that betrayal was the greatest of all to the Iranians.
Part history/politics, part fast-paced spy thriller, this book gives the reader insight into current Iran-U.S. relations.
January 10, 2020
We remain unable to recognize the dangers of unintended consequences. Such dangers should breed caution and a reluctance to engage in foreign adventures. Does each generation have to relearn this?
July 27, 2014
An alternate title of this book could be "United States: Strangler of Infant Democracies". It is pretty well known among scholars and international relations experts that anti-American Mideast terrorism has its roots in the US coup that overthrew Iran's first-ever democratically elected prime minister in 1953. This book explains the history of Iran, its governments, its oppression at the hands of colonialists, its exploitation by the British oil industry, and how Britain talked the United States into overthrowing the Iranian prime minister who threatened their oil profits. Yes, it really is that simple: the U.S. killed a democracy and installed a dictator solely so BP's profits would not be impacted.
The following quote by a British diplomat sums it up pretty well:
"The typical Iranian is motivated by an unabashed dishonesty, fatalistic outlook, and indifference to suffering. The ordinary Persian is unprincipled, eager to promise what he knows he is incapable or has no intention of performing, given to procrastination, lacking in perseverance and energy, but amenable to discipline. Above all, he enjoys intrigue and readily turns to prevarication and dishonesty whenever there is a possibility of personal gain. Although an accomplished liar he does not expect to be believed. They easily acquire a superficial knowledge of technical subjects, deluding themselves into the belief that it is profound. To deal with such people on an equal and respectful basis would of course be absurd."
You will read all about how Britons thought socialism and nationalization of industry were fine for their own civilized society, but that their oil fields in Iran required the heavy hand of colonial masters to function, due to the brutish and uncivilized ways of the locals. You will read all about how overthrowing nations is a game for those who do it professionally. You will also hear about the many Iranians whose dreams and hopes for democracy were dashed, and about the decades-long campaign within Iran to stomp out the memory of the brief moment in time when Iranians might have actually controlled their own destiny.
I highly recommend this book for anyone, but especially to those who want to know why "they hate us so much" in the Middle East. Iranians typically loved and respected America, back in the day--until they realized that America loved oil more than democracy. Think America won't overthrow a government just for oil? Think again. I highly recommend it also to those who believe that America is the protector and exporter of democracy to the world. Some myths need to be shattered.
The following quote by a British diplomat sums it up pretty well:
"The typical Iranian is motivated by an unabashed dishonesty, fatalistic outlook, and indifference to suffering. The ordinary Persian is unprincipled, eager to promise what he knows he is incapable or has no intention of performing, given to procrastination, lacking in perseverance and energy, but amenable to discipline. Above all, he enjoys intrigue and readily turns to prevarication and dishonesty whenever there is a possibility of personal gain. Although an accomplished liar he does not expect to be believed. They easily acquire a superficial knowledge of technical subjects, deluding themselves into the belief that it is profound. To deal with such people on an equal and respectful basis would of course be absurd."
You will read all about how Britons thought socialism and nationalization of industry were fine for their own civilized society, but that their oil fields in Iran required the heavy hand of colonial masters to function, due to the brutish and uncivilized ways of the locals. You will read all about how overthrowing nations is a game for those who do it professionally. You will also hear about the many Iranians whose dreams and hopes for democracy were dashed, and about the decades-long campaign within Iran to stomp out the memory of the brief moment in time when Iranians might have actually controlled their own destiny.
I highly recommend this book for anyone, but especially to those who want to know why "they hate us so much" in the Middle East. Iranians typically loved and respected America, back in the day--until they realized that America loved oil more than democracy. Think America won't overthrow a government just for oil? Think again. I highly recommend it also to those who believe that America is the protector and exporter of democracy to the world. Some myths need to be shattered.
March 4, 2024
There is a direct line starting with:
- Post WWII Communist Containment, to
- American support for the post WWII interests of the former colonial powers, to
- American support (in the name of anti-communism) of repressive dictators in the emerging world, who in turn quash nationalists fighting colonialism, to
- The CIA 1953 Coup in Iran, to
- The 1979 Fundamentalist Islamic Revolution in Iran, to
- The 444 day Iranian Hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, to
- The export of Islamic, Extremist Terror Campaigns, thanks to Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, to
- The rise of America-centric actions in the Middle East, at the expense of the Arab nations cooperating with America, which in turn gave traction to the extremism of
- Osama bin Laden, who engineered 9-11, which emboldened the Taliban, and the aspirations of the would-be caliphate of ISIL / ISIS . . .
And this direct line WAS DRAWN BY -- was CAUSED BY -- the very actions of the United States in the first place.
Who is to blame? America, and then, next, blame accrues to the arrogant colonial powers (the British, the French, and the Dutch) for their suppression of the legitimate nationalism in the nations these colonial powers subjugated. . . And don't forget the vast amount of blame earned by the Zionist thugs (and the foolish policy makers who supported them -- in the USA and in the UK) who added fuel to the Middle Eastern fire by looting, marginalizing, and terrorizing the Palestinian people.
When will the West ever learn? No wonder the world is seething.
- Post WWII Communist Containment, to
- American support for the post WWII interests of the former colonial powers, to
- American support (in the name of anti-communism) of repressive dictators in the emerging world, who in turn quash nationalists fighting colonialism, to
- The CIA 1953 Coup in Iran, to
- The 1979 Fundamentalist Islamic Revolution in Iran, to
- The 444 day Iranian Hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, to
- The export of Islamic, Extremist Terror Campaigns, thanks to Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas, to
- The rise of America-centric actions in the Middle East, at the expense of the Arab nations cooperating with America, which in turn gave traction to the extremism of
- Osama bin Laden, who engineered 9-11, which emboldened the Taliban, and the aspirations of the would-be caliphate of ISIL / ISIS . . .
And this direct line WAS DRAWN BY -- was CAUSED BY -- the very actions of the United States in the first place.
Who is to blame? America, and then, next, blame accrues to the arrogant colonial powers (the British, the French, and the Dutch) for their suppression of the legitimate nationalism in the nations these colonial powers subjugated. . . And don't forget the vast amount of blame earned by the Zionist thugs (and the foolish policy makers who supported them -- in the USA and in the UK) who added fuel to the Middle Eastern fire by looting, marginalizing, and terrorizing the Palestinian people.
When will the West ever learn? No wonder the world is seething.
May 6, 2023
Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men takes a hard look at Operation AJAX, the Anglo-American conspiracy to overthrow Iran's democratic government and install the Shah. Kinzer depicts the coup's machinations in detail both engrossing and utterly damning; the British hope to stymie the liberal-minded Mossadegh in defense of their empire, while the Americans frame their intervention in Cold War terms, graphically illustrating how fear of communist could be used to justify the most amoral decisions. (Of course, oil and corporate interests played the bigger part in their decision.) Part of what makes this book so compelling is Kinzer's obvious empathy for Iran, which sets it apart from other books which merely chronicle Western misdeeds: his portrayal of Mossadegh is often critical, pointing up his bizarre, erratic personality, while also showing how he represented the aspirations of a proud, ancient nation too long bullied by colonial powers. Sadly the West didn't take heed, and (Kinzer convincingly argues) sixty years of misery resulted from their decision.
November 24, 2022
Another case of nastiness by our rogue CIA. Kinzer also wrote a JFK Conspiracy book, same nastiness only we killed our own President.
I remember being at a Rock n Roll club in Houston back in the Carter Administration when the hostage crisis in Iran was going on. The band was playing the Beach Boys Barbara Ann but everybody was singing Bomb Bomb Bomb Iran. Most Americans had a lot of hate for the Khomeini regime back then, me included.
I have grown a lot in my thinking. It's books like this one that add to understanding, and less hate.
I disliked JFK for years, was a Reagan Republican. Reading books like John M Newman's JFK and Vietnam give me a totally different view of him. I really think he was going up against an establishment full of war mongers and if reelected in 1964 would have tried his best to get us out.
Instead The Man in the Shadows showed up once again just like he did in Iran, Guatemala, and in Sadaam's Iraq . Why Iraq when all or almost all the plane terrorists on 9/11 were from Saudi Arabia I have never understood.
I remember being at a Rock n Roll club in Houston back in the Carter Administration when the hostage crisis in Iran was going on. The band was playing the Beach Boys Barbara Ann but everybody was singing Bomb Bomb Bomb Iran. Most Americans had a lot of hate for the Khomeini regime back then, me included.
I have grown a lot in my thinking. It's books like this one that add to understanding, and less hate.
I disliked JFK for years, was a Reagan Republican. Reading books like John M Newman's JFK and Vietnam give me a totally different view of him. I really think he was going up against an establishment full of war mongers and if reelected in 1964 would have tried his best to get us out.
Instead The Man in the Shadows showed up once again just like he did in Iran, Guatemala, and in Sadaam's Iraq . Why Iraq when all or almost all the plane terrorists on 9/11 were from Saudi Arabia I have never understood.
May 25, 2019
Why should you read All the Shah's Men?
1. Stephen Kinzer is, in my opinion, the greatest journalist of our age.
2. Also, his expertise in the Middle East is almost nonpareil. (Refer to aforementioned point on his journalistic prowess)
3. If you want to learn about why the US really, actually, does not like Iran.
4. If you, like me, think that Iran could've been a world power under Mohammad Mossadegh.
5. If you don't believe the above statement, and need proof.
6. If you want a short, concise history of Shia Islam, and about Iran in general.
7. If you are a contemporary history aficionado.
8. If you want to know more about exactly how much the US (and Great Britain) has infringed upon other countries' rights.
9. If you want to learn more about how CIA operations work.
10. For any other reason you can think of.
Bottom line is, read the damn book. It's really, really good.
1. Stephen Kinzer is, in my opinion, the greatest journalist of our age.
2. Also, his expertise in the Middle East is almost nonpareil. (Refer to aforementioned point on his journalistic prowess)
3. If you want to learn about why the US really, actually, does not like Iran.
4. If you, like me, think that Iran could've been a world power under Mohammad Mossadegh.
5. If you don't believe the above statement, and need proof.
6. If you want a short, concise history of Shia Islam, and about Iran in general.
7. If you are a contemporary history aficionado.
8. If you want to know more about exactly how much the US (and Great Britain) has infringed upon other countries' rights.
9. If you want to learn more about how CIA operations work.
10. For any other reason you can think of.
Bottom line is, read the damn book. It's really, really good.
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