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賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賳賮爻
'The soul is, so to speak, the first principle of living things. We seek to contemplate and know its nature and substance'
For the Pre-Socratic philosophers the soul was the source of movement and sensation, while for Plato it was the seat of being, metaphysically distinct from the body that it was forced temporarily to inhabit. Plato's student Aristotle was determined to test the truth of both these beliefs against the emerging sciences of logic and biology. His examination of the huge variety of living organisms - the enormous range of their behaviour, their powers and their perceptual sophistication - convinced him of the inadequacy both of a materialist reduction and of a Platonic sublimation of the soul. In De Anima, he sought to set out his theory of the soul as the ultimate reality of embodied form and produced both a masterpiece of philosophical insight and a psychology of perennially fascinating subtlety.
Hugh Lawson-Tancred's masterly translation makes De Anima fully accessible to modern readers. In his introduction, he places Aristotle's theories at the heart of contemporary debates on the philosophy of life and being.
For the Pre-Socratic philosophers the soul was the source of movement and sensation, while for Plato it was the seat of being, metaphysically distinct from the body that it was forced temporarily to inhabit. Plato's student Aristotle was determined to test the truth of both these beliefs against the emerging sciences of logic and biology. His examination of the huge variety of living organisms - the enormous range of their behaviour, their powers and their perceptual sophistication - convinced him of the inadequacy both of a materialist reduction and of a Platonic sublimation of the soul. In De Anima, he sought to set out his theory of the soul as the ultimate reality of embodied form and produced both a masterpiece of philosophical insight and a psychology of perennially fascinating subtlety.
Hugh Lawson-Tancred's masterly translation makes De Anima fully accessible to modern readers. In his introduction, he places Aristotle's theories at the heart of contemporary debates on the philosophy of life and being.
183 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 351
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About the author
Aristotle
3,301听books5,293听followersAristotle (Greek: 螒蚁喂蟽蟿慰蟿苇位畏蟼; 384鈥�322 BC) was an Ancient Greek philosopher and polymath. His writings cover a broad range of subjects spanning the natural sciences, philosophy, linguistics, economics, politics, psychology, and the arts. As the founder of the Peripatetic school of philosophy in the Lyceum in Athens, he began the wider Aristotelian tradition that followed, which set the groundwork for the development of modern science.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c.鈥�347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Ab茅lard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c.鈥�347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Ab茅lard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
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March 12, 2017
As I have lately been making my way through Aristotle鈥檚 physical treatises, I have often observed that many of Aristotle鈥檚 errors stem from his tendency to see the physical world as analogous to a biological organism. So it is a pleasure to finally see Aristotle back on his home territory鈥攍iving things. While Aristotle鈥檚 work in proto-physics and proto-chemistry is interesting mainly from a historical perspective, this work is interesting in its own right; in just a hundred pages, Aristotle manages to assemble a treatise on the fundamentals of life.
The first thing the modern student will notice is that Aristotle means something quite different by 鈥榮oul鈥� than how we normally understand the word. The word 鈥榮oul鈥� has come to mean an immaterial, specter-like wraith, the spiritual core of one鈥檚 personality鈥攖rapped, only temporarily, in a body; and this view has, over the years, caused problems for philosophers and theologians alike, for it remains to be explained how an immaterial spirit could move a material body, or how a material body could trap an immaterial spirit. Aristotle avoids these awkward questions. What he means is quite different.
Aristotle begins by observing that all forms of behavior, human or animal, require a body. Even supposedly 鈥榤ental鈥� states, such as anger, love, and desire, all have concomitant physical manifestations: an angry man gets red in the face, a man in love stares at his beloved, and a man who desires alcohol tries to get it. From this, Aristotle quickly concludes that all the Pythagorean and Platonic talk of the transmigration of souls is silly; a soul needs a body, just as a body needs a soul. Furthermore, a specific soul doesn鈥檛 need just any body, but it needs its specific body. Soul and body are, in other words, codependent and inseparable. In Aristotle鈥檚 words, 鈥渆ach art must use its tools, each soul its body.鈥�
This still leaves the question unanswered, what is a soul? Aristotle answers that the soul is the form of the body. Alright, what does that mean? Keep this in mind: when Aristotle says 鈥榝orm鈥�, he is not merely talking about the geometrical shape of the object, but means something far more general: the form, or essence, of something is that by which it is what it is. Here鈥檚 an example: the form of a bowl is that which makes a bowl a bowl, as opposed to something else like, say, a plate or a cup. In this particular case, the form would seem to be the mere shape of the object; isn't the thing that makes a bowl a bowl its shape? But consider that there is no such thing as a disembodied bowl; for a bowl to be a bowl, it must have a certain shape, be within a certain size range, and be embodied in a suitable material. All of these qualifications, the shape, size, and material, Aristotle would include in the 鈥榝orm鈥� of an object.
So the soul of living things is the quality (or qualities) that differentiate them from nonliving things. Now, the main difference between animate and inanimate objects is that animate objects possess capacities; therefore, the more capacities a living thing has, the more souls we must posit. This sounds funny, but it鈥檚 just a way of speaking. Plants, for Aristotle, are the simplest forms of living beings; they only possess the 鈥榲egetative soul鈥�, which is what makes them grow and develop. Animals possess additional souls, such as that which allows them to sense, to desire, to imagine, and鈥攊n the case of humans鈥攖o think. The 鈥榮oul鈥�, then, is a particular type of form; it is a form which gives its recipient a certain type of capability. Plants are only capable of growth; animals are capable of growing, of moving, and of many other things.
Aristotle sums up his view in a memorable phrase: 鈥淔rom all this it is obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered formulable essences.鈥� These capacities cannot be 鈥榚nmattered鈥� in just anything, but must be embodied in suitable materials; plants are not made of just anything, but their capacities for growth always manifest themselves in the same types of material. Aristotle sums up this point with another memorable phrase: 鈥渟oul is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses the potentiality of being besouled.鈥�
So an oak tree is made of material with the potentiality of being 鈥榖esouled鈥�, i.e., turned into a living, growing oak tree. Conversely, a life-sized statue of an oak tree made of bronze would still not be an oak tree, even if it shared several aspects of its form with a real oak tree. It isn鈥檛 made of the right material, and thus cannot possess the vegetative soul.
I have given a somewhat laborious summary of this because I think it is a very attractive way of looking at living things. It avoids all talk of 鈥榞hosts in the machine鈥�, and concentrates on what is observable. (I should note, however, that Aristotle thought that 鈥榤ind鈥�, which is the faculty of reason, is immaterial and immortal. Nobody's perfect.)
I also find Aristotle metaphysical views attractive. True to his doctrine of the golden mean, he places equal emphasis on matter and form. He occupies an interesting middle-ground between the idealism of Plato and the materialism of Democritus. In order for a particular thing to be what it is, it must both have a certain form鈥攚hich is embodied in, but not reducible to, its matter鈥攁nd be made of the 鈥榬ight鈥� types of matter. Unlike Plato鈥檚 ideals, which reside in a different sphere of reality, existing as perfect essences devoid of matter, Aristotle鈥檚 forms are inherent in their objects, and thus are neither immaterial nor simply the matter itself.
The treatise ceases to be as interesting as it progresses, but there are a few gems along the way. He moves on to an investigation of the five senses, and, while discussing sight, has a few things to say about light. Aristotle defines light as the quality by which something transparent is transparent; in other words, light is the thing that can be seen through transparent things. I suppose that鈥檚 a respectable operational definition. Aristotle also considers the idea that light travels absurd; nothing could go that fast:
Aristotle also has a few interesting things to say about sense:
So we don鈥檛 take in the matter of a bowl through our eyes, but only its form. All of our senses, then, are adapted for observing different aspects of the forms of objects. Thus, Aristotle concludes, all knowledge consists of forms; when we learn about the world, we are mentally reproducing the form of the world in our minds. As he says: 鈥淚t follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools [i.e. the tool by which we use tools], so the mind is the form of forms [i.e. the form by which we apprehend forms]." (Notice how deftly Aristotle wields his division of everything into matter and form; he uses it to define souls, to define senses, and then to define knowledge. It is characteristic of him to make so much headway with such seemingly simple divisions.)
For a long time, I was perplexed that Aristotle was so influential. I was originally repulsed by his way of thinking, put off by his manner of viewing the world. His works struck me as alternately pedantic, wrongheaded, or obvious. How could he have exerted such a tremendous influence over the Western mind? Now, after reading through much more Aristotle, this is no longer perplexing to me; in fact, I often find myself thinking along his lines, viewing the world through his eyes. It takes, I believe, a lot of exposure in order to really develop a sympathy for Aristotle鈥檚 thought; but with its emphasis on balance, on growth, on potentiality, it succeeds in being a very aesthetically compelling (if often incorrect) way of viewing things.
This piece represents, to me, Aristotle at his best. It is a grand synthesis of philosophy and biology, probably not matched until William James鈥檚 psychological work. Unlike many gentlemanly philosophers who shut themselves in their studies, trying to explain human behavior purely through introspection, Aristotle鈥檚 biologically rooted way of seeing things combines careful observation鈥攐f humans and nonhumans alike鈥攚ith philosophical speculation. It is a shame that only the logic-chopping side of Aristotle was embraced by the medievals, and not his empirical outlook.
The first thing the modern student will notice is that Aristotle means something quite different by 鈥榮oul鈥� than how we normally understand the word. The word 鈥榮oul鈥� has come to mean an immaterial, specter-like wraith, the spiritual core of one鈥檚 personality鈥攖rapped, only temporarily, in a body; and this view has, over the years, caused problems for philosophers and theologians alike, for it remains to be explained how an immaterial spirit could move a material body, or how a material body could trap an immaterial spirit. Aristotle avoids these awkward questions. What he means is quite different.
Aristotle begins by observing that all forms of behavior, human or animal, require a body. Even supposedly 鈥榤ental鈥� states, such as anger, love, and desire, all have concomitant physical manifestations: an angry man gets red in the face, a man in love stares at his beloved, and a man who desires alcohol tries to get it. From this, Aristotle quickly concludes that all the Pythagorean and Platonic talk of the transmigration of souls is silly; a soul needs a body, just as a body needs a soul. Furthermore, a specific soul doesn鈥檛 need just any body, but it needs its specific body. Soul and body are, in other words, codependent and inseparable. In Aristotle鈥檚 words, 鈥渆ach art must use its tools, each soul its body.鈥�
This still leaves the question unanswered, what is a soul? Aristotle answers that the soul is the form of the body. Alright, what does that mean? Keep this in mind: when Aristotle says 鈥榝orm鈥�, he is not merely talking about the geometrical shape of the object, but means something far more general: the form, or essence, of something is that by which it is what it is. Here鈥檚 an example: the form of a bowl is that which makes a bowl a bowl, as opposed to something else like, say, a plate or a cup. In this particular case, the form would seem to be the mere shape of the object; isn't the thing that makes a bowl a bowl its shape? But consider that there is no such thing as a disembodied bowl; for a bowl to be a bowl, it must have a certain shape, be within a certain size range, and be embodied in a suitable material. All of these qualifications, the shape, size, and material, Aristotle would include in the 鈥榝orm鈥� of an object.
So the soul of living things is the quality (or qualities) that differentiate them from nonliving things. Now, the main difference between animate and inanimate objects is that animate objects possess capacities; therefore, the more capacities a living thing has, the more souls we must posit. This sounds funny, but it鈥檚 just a way of speaking. Plants, for Aristotle, are the simplest forms of living beings; they only possess the 鈥榲egetative soul鈥�, which is what makes them grow and develop. Animals possess additional souls, such as that which allows them to sense, to desire, to imagine, and鈥攊n the case of humans鈥攖o think. The 鈥榮oul鈥�, then, is a particular type of form; it is a form which gives its recipient a certain type of capability. Plants are only capable of growth; animals are capable of growing, of moving, and of many other things.
Aristotle sums up his view in a memorable phrase: 鈥淔rom all this it is obvious that the affections of soul are enmattered formulable essences.鈥� These capacities cannot be 鈥榚nmattered鈥� in just anything, but must be embodied in suitable materials; plants are not made of just anything, but their capacities for growth always manifest themselves in the same types of material. Aristotle sums up this point with another memorable phrase: 鈥渟oul is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses the potentiality of being besouled.鈥�
So an oak tree is made of material with the potentiality of being 鈥榖esouled鈥�, i.e., turned into a living, growing oak tree. Conversely, a life-sized statue of an oak tree made of bronze would still not be an oak tree, even if it shared several aspects of its form with a real oak tree. It isn鈥檛 made of the right material, and thus cannot possess the vegetative soul.
I have given a somewhat laborious summary of this because I think it is a very attractive way of looking at living things. It avoids all talk of 鈥榞hosts in the machine鈥�, and concentrates on what is observable. (I should note, however, that Aristotle thought that 鈥榤ind鈥�, which is the faculty of reason, is immaterial and immortal. Nobody's perfect.)
I also find Aristotle metaphysical views attractive. True to his doctrine of the golden mean, he places equal emphasis on matter and form. He occupies an interesting middle-ground between the idealism of Plato and the materialism of Democritus. In order for a particular thing to be what it is, it must both have a certain form鈥攚hich is embodied in, but not reducible to, its matter鈥攁nd be made of the 鈥榬ight鈥� types of matter. Unlike Plato鈥檚 ideals, which reside in a different sphere of reality, existing as perfect essences devoid of matter, Aristotle鈥檚 forms are inherent in their objects, and thus are neither immaterial nor simply the matter itself.
The treatise ceases to be as interesting as it progresses, but there are a few gems along the way. He moves on to an investigation of the five senses, and, while discussing sight, has a few things to say about light. Aristotle defines light as the quality by which something transparent is transparent; in other words, light is the thing that can be seen through transparent things. I suppose that鈥檚 a respectable operational definition. Aristotle also considers the idea that light travels absurd; nothing could go that fast:
Empedocles (and with him all others who used the same forms of expression) was wrong in speaking of light as 鈥榯raveling鈥� or being at a given moment between the earth and its envelope, its movement being unobservable by us; that view is contrary both to the clear evidence of argument and to the observed facts; if the distance traversed were short, the movement might have been unobservable, but where the distance is from extreme East to extreme West, the draught upon our powers of belief is too great.
Aristotle also has a few interesting things to say about sense:
By a 鈥榮ense鈥� is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter. This must be conceived of as taking place in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; we say that what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but its particular metallic constitution makes no difference: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is colored or flavored or sounding, but it is indifferent what in each case the substance is; what alone matters is what quality is has, i.e. in what ratio its constituents are combined.
So we don鈥檛 take in the matter of a bowl through our eyes, but only its form. All of our senses, then, are adapted for observing different aspects of the forms of objects. Thus, Aristotle concludes, all knowledge consists of forms; when we learn about the world, we are mentally reproducing the form of the world in our minds. As he says: 鈥淚t follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools [i.e. the tool by which we use tools], so the mind is the form of forms [i.e. the form by which we apprehend forms]." (Notice how deftly Aristotle wields his division of everything into matter and form; he uses it to define souls, to define senses, and then to define knowledge. It is characteristic of him to make so much headway with such seemingly simple divisions.)
For a long time, I was perplexed that Aristotle was so influential. I was originally repulsed by his way of thinking, put off by his manner of viewing the world. His works struck me as alternately pedantic, wrongheaded, or obvious. How could he have exerted such a tremendous influence over the Western mind? Now, after reading through much more Aristotle, this is no longer perplexing to me; in fact, I often find myself thinking along his lines, viewing the world through his eyes. It takes, I believe, a lot of exposure in order to really develop a sympathy for Aristotle鈥檚 thought; but with its emphasis on balance, on growth, on potentiality, it succeeds in being a very aesthetically compelling (if often incorrect) way of viewing things.
This piece represents, to me, Aristotle at his best. It is a grand synthesis of philosophy and biology, probably not matched until William James鈥檚 psychological work. Unlike many gentlemanly philosophers who shut themselves in their studies, trying to explain human behavior purely through introspection, Aristotle鈥檚 biologically rooted way of seeing things combines careful observation鈥攐f humans and nonhumans alike鈥攚ith philosophical speculation. It is a shame that only the logic-chopping side of Aristotle was embraced by the medievals, and not his empirical outlook.
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January 23, 2017
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November 2, 2023
Dealing with the concept of the soul, particularly the human soul, is never an easy thing. We often speak of the soul in a rather facile manner: we talk about how Doctor Faustus or Dorian Grey 鈥渟old his soul鈥� to the devil; we say that when R.M.S. Titanic sank on 15 April 1912, 鈥�1500 souls were lost.鈥� But what is "the soul" 鈥� that term we use to refer to a sort of intangible quality, an undefinable thing of which we are nonetheless acutely conscious; that thing that gives each of us an individual identity, an individual participation in life, while we are alive? Aristotle took on such questions with his customary rigor in one of his best-known philosophical texts. Fellow Greeks of his time would have called it 螤蔚蟻峤� 唯蠀蠂峥喯�, Peri Psych膿s; but it is generally known to people of the modern world by a Latin title, De Anima. Either way, the reader is getting Aristotle鈥檚 reflections On the Soul.
In a helpful foreword (and an extensive one 鈥� 116 pages, compared with 96 pages of De Anima proper), Hugh Lawson-Tancred of the University of London explains that the Greeks of Aristotle鈥檚 time were not at all sure whether the soul was best discussed in physical terms, as a matter of biology, or in metaphysical terms that would defy biological classification. Aristotle tends to look at all of existence in materialist terms 鈥� remember that in Raphael鈥檚 painting The School of Athens (1511), young Aristotle is pointing down towards the earth and material reality, while an elderly Plato is pointing up towards the heavens and a higher World of Forms 鈥� but as Lawson-Tancred points out, 鈥渢he expression psyche is hardly less vague in Greek than the expression 鈥榮oul鈥� in English, and it would by no means be obvious to a thinking Greek of Aristotle鈥檚 time that the discussion of what the soul is belongs quite so firmly in the area of the foundations of Biology.鈥� Indeed, 鈥淎ristotle seems himself at one stage in his life to have held a distinctively non-biological view of the soul鈥� (p. 50).
If Aristotle seems at times uncertain about how to define the soul 鈥� if On the Soul never seems to arrive at a unified field theory of the soul 鈥� that may be a mark of Aristotle鈥檚 intellectual honesty, his willingness to acknowledge when he has come up against a problem that he cannot yet solve.
Aristotle sets forth his sense that 鈥渢he soul is, so to speak, the first principle of living things鈥�, along with the manner in which he plans to 鈥渟eek to contemplate and know its nature and substance and then the things that are accidental to it鈥� 鈥� even though, 鈥淚n general, and in all ways, it is one of the hardest of things to gain any conviction of the soul鈥� (p. 126).
Aristotle is interested in the idea of the soul as a motivating faculty common to all creatures 鈥� something that brings together a living thing鈥檚 capacity for knowledge, perception, and movement. In the course of analyzing these three functions of the soul, he takes issue with earlier philosophers like Empedocles who posited that the soul must be in some way material, composed of elements: "All those鈥ho say that the soul is composed from the elements on the grounds of its having knowledge and perception of the things that exist, as well as all who say that it is the thing most productive of movement, are not offering an account to cover every type of soul.鈥� When looking at animals, after all, 鈥渢here seem to be some animals incapable of locomotion, which is thought to be the one type of motion in which the soul moves the animal.鈥� Similarly, 鈥減lants seem to live without partaking of perception鈥� (p. 151).
Perhaps it is for this reason that Aristotle takes issue so strongly with the ways in which prior philosophers have sought to divide the soul into parts 鈥� 鈥渄istinguishing the reasoning, spirited, and desiderative parts, or with others, the rational and irrational.鈥� These attempts to dissect the soul, for Aristotle, quickly fall apart in logical terms, presenting the student with a maze of irreconcilable contradictions: 鈥渁 patent absurdity, as there is then wishing in the rational part, and appetite and passion in the irrational, and, on a tripartite division, desire in all three parts of the soul鈥� (p. 212). Clearly, Aristotle will settle for nothing less than an internally consistent working model of the soul, one that will be free of contradictions.
In his pursuit of that goal, Aristotle somewhat sidesteps the question of whether the soul has materiality or not, stating that 鈥渟oul is substance as the form of a natural body which potentially has life, and since this substance is actuality, soul will be the actuality of such a body鈥� (p. 157). The philosopher goes on to set forth this idea at somewhat greater length, adding that 鈥渟oul is the first actuality of a natural body which potentially has life鈥�, and that the soul 鈥渨ould be the first actuality of a natural body with organs鈥� (p. 157). 鈥淎ctuality,鈥� as Lawson-Tancred explains, is a translation of the Greek term 蔚谓苇蟻纬蔚喂伪, energeia -- 鈥淭his literally means a 鈥榩utting into use,鈥� an 鈥榚mployment鈥欌€� (p. 117). The soul, accordingly, is that which employs the body of a living thing, or puts it into use.
Throughout De Anima, Aristotle explores that idea that the soul forms a sort of life principle in and of itself, something that is distinct from the mind, something whose departure from the body of a living thing marks the moment of death. Yet Aristotle, with humility equal to his philosophical brilliance, acknowledges the limitations on his ability to seek further into the heart of these mysteries, stating forthrightly that 鈥渋t remains unclear whether the soul is the actuality of a body in this way or rather is as the sailor of a boat鈥� (p. 158).
For Aristotle, the possession of a soul is fundamental to being alive, saying that 鈥渢he ensouled is distinguished from the unsouled by its being alive鈥�, and adding a helpful definition of life itself, declaring that 鈥渨e say that the thing is alive if, for instance, there is intellect or perception or spatial movement and rest or indeed movement connected with nourishment and growth and decay鈥� (p. 159). In Aristotle鈥檚 reading, 鈥渟oul is that by which primarily we live and perceive and think鈥� (p. 161).
The ensouled. The unsouled. While modern science cannot locate the soul, there is that sense of its existence that is pervasive if not quantifiable. A person lives and interacts with our life, and we have a sense of a life force, a spirit, a soul, within that person. Then that person dies, and we have a sense that all that is left is the body, is clay 鈥� that some indefinable, non-physical quality that made the person who he or she was is gone forever. Is that quality, that soul, easy to define? No, not at all. Is the effort worthwhile? Absolutely.
The influence of De Anima, since its first appearance around 350 B.C., would be difficult to overstate. Centuries after Aristotle鈥檚 death on the island of Euboea in the year 322 B.C., Christian theologians were looking to this work to inform their ideas regarding the soul, and it has informed discussions about the soul by philosophers and metaphysicians of every belief system ever since. It is one of Aristotle鈥檚 most challenging works 鈥� and, for those readers who have the soul for it, it is one of the most rewarding.
In a helpful foreword (and an extensive one 鈥� 116 pages, compared with 96 pages of De Anima proper), Hugh Lawson-Tancred of the University of London explains that the Greeks of Aristotle鈥檚 time were not at all sure whether the soul was best discussed in physical terms, as a matter of biology, or in metaphysical terms that would defy biological classification. Aristotle tends to look at all of existence in materialist terms 鈥� remember that in Raphael鈥檚 painting The School of Athens (1511), young Aristotle is pointing down towards the earth and material reality, while an elderly Plato is pointing up towards the heavens and a higher World of Forms 鈥� but as Lawson-Tancred points out, 鈥渢he expression psyche is hardly less vague in Greek than the expression 鈥榮oul鈥� in English, and it would by no means be obvious to a thinking Greek of Aristotle鈥檚 time that the discussion of what the soul is belongs quite so firmly in the area of the foundations of Biology.鈥� Indeed, 鈥淎ristotle seems himself at one stage in his life to have held a distinctively non-biological view of the soul鈥� (p. 50).
If Aristotle seems at times uncertain about how to define the soul 鈥� if On the Soul never seems to arrive at a unified field theory of the soul 鈥� that may be a mark of Aristotle鈥檚 intellectual honesty, his willingness to acknowledge when he has come up against a problem that he cannot yet solve.
Aristotle sets forth his sense that 鈥渢he soul is, so to speak, the first principle of living things鈥�, along with the manner in which he plans to 鈥渟eek to contemplate and know its nature and substance and then the things that are accidental to it鈥� 鈥� even though, 鈥淚n general, and in all ways, it is one of the hardest of things to gain any conviction of the soul鈥� (p. 126).
Aristotle is interested in the idea of the soul as a motivating faculty common to all creatures 鈥� something that brings together a living thing鈥檚 capacity for knowledge, perception, and movement. In the course of analyzing these three functions of the soul, he takes issue with earlier philosophers like Empedocles who posited that the soul must be in some way material, composed of elements: "All those鈥ho say that the soul is composed from the elements on the grounds of its having knowledge and perception of the things that exist, as well as all who say that it is the thing most productive of movement, are not offering an account to cover every type of soul.鈥� When looking at animals, after all, 鈥渢here seem to be some animals incapable of locomotion, which is thought to be the one type of motion in which the soul moves the animal.鈥� Similarly, 鈥減lants seem to live without partaking of perception鈥� (p. 151).
Perhaps it is for this reason that Aristotle takes issue so strongly with the ways in which prior philosophers have sought to divide the soul into parts 鈥� 鈥渄istinguishing the reasoning, spirited, and desiderative parts, or with others, the rational and irrational.鈥� These attempts to dissect the soul, for Aristotle, quickly fall apart in logical terms, presenting the student with a maze of irreconcilable contradictions: 鈥渁 patent absurdity, as there is then wishing in the rational part, and appetite and passion in the irrational, and, on a tripartite division, desire in all three parts of the soul鈥� (p. 212). Clearly, Aristotle will settle for nothing less than an internally consistent working model of the soul, one that will be free of contradictions.
In his pursuit of that goal, Aristotle somewhat sidesteps the question of whether the soul has materiality or not, stating that 鈥渟oul is substance as the form of a natural body which potentially has life, and since this substance is actuality, soul will be the actuality of such a body鈥� (p. 157). The philosopher goes on to set forth this idea at somewhat greater length, adding that 鈥渟oul is the first actuality of a natural body which potentially has life鈥�, and that the soul 鈥渨ould be the first actuality of a natural body with organs鈥� (p. 157). 鈥淎ctuality,鈥� as Lawson-Tancred explains, is a translation of the Greek term 蔚谓苇蟻纬蔚喂伪, energeia -- 鈥淭his literally means a 鈥榩utting into use,鈥� an 鈥榚mployment鈥欌€� (p. 117). The soul, accordingly, is that which employs the body of a living thing, or puts it into use.
Throughout De Anima, Aristotle explores that idea that the soul forms a sort of life principle in and of itself, something that is distinct from the mind, something whose departure from the body of a living thing marks the moment of death. Yet Aristotle, with humility equal to his philosophical brilliance, acknowledges the limitations on his ability to seek further into the heart of these mysteries, stating forthrightly that 鈥渋t remains unclear whether the soul is the actuality of a body in this way or rather is as the sailor of a boat鈥� (p. 158).
For Aristotle, the possession of a soul is fundamental to being alive, saying that 鈥渢he ensouled is distinguished from the unsouled by its being alive鈥�, and adding a helpful definition of life itself, declaring that 鈥渨e say that the thing is alive if, for instance, there is intellect or perception or spatial movement and rest or indeed movement connected with nourishment and growth and decay鈥� (p. 159). In Aristotle鈥檚 reading, 鈥渟oul is that by which primarily we live and perceive and think鈥� (p. 161).
The ensouled. The unsouled. While modern science cannot locate the soul, there is that sense of its existence that is pervasive if not quantifiable. A person lives and interacts with our life, and we have a sense of a life force, a spirit, a soul, within that person. Then that person dies, and we have a sense that all that is left is the body, is clay 鈥� that some indefinable, non-physical quality that made the person who he or she was is gone forever. Is that quality, that soul, easy to define? No, not at all. Is the effort worthwhile? Absolutely.
The influence of De Anima, since its first appearance around 350 B.C., would be difficult to overstate. Centuries after Aristotle鈥檚 death on the island of Euboea in the year 322 B.C., Christian theologians were looking to this work to inform their ideas regarding the soul, and it has informed discussions about the soul by philosophers and metaphysicians of every belief system ever since. It is one of Aristotle鈥檚 most challenging works 鈥� and, for those readers who have the soul for it, it is one of the most rewarding.
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November 8, 2017賲爻賱賲丕賸 賳賲蹖鈥屫堌з� 乇丕噩毓 亘賴 丿乇亘丕乇賴 賳賮爻 丕乇爻胤賵 亘賳賵蹖爻賲. 賲蹖鈥屫堌з� 亘賳賵蹖爻賲 趩賴 賯丿乇 鬲賯氐蹖乇 亘乇 诏乇丿賳賲賵賳賴 讴賴 毓賱蹖賲乇丕丿 丿丕賵丿蹖 乇賵 丕賵賳鈥屫焚堌� 讴賴 亘賴鈥屫� 亘丕卮賴貙 賳卮賳丕禺鬲賴鈥屰屬�. 亘丕 丕禺鬲賱丕賮 丕夭 鬲乇噩賲賴鈥屬囏й� 賲乇丨賵賲 賱胤賮蹖 丕夭 丌孬丕乇 丕乇爻胤賵 亘賴鬲乇賴. 賮丕乇爻蹖 禺蹖賱蹖 禺賵亘貙 賲賯丿賾賲賴 讴鬲丕亘貙 丿賯賾鬲 亘丕賱丕蹖 賮賱爻賮蹖 鬲賵蹖 鬲乇噩賲賴貙 倬丕賳賵蹖爻鈥屬囏� 賵 丕乇噩丕毓丕鬲蹖 讴賴 賳卮賵賳 賲蹖鈥屫� 亘賴 丌孬丕乇 卮丕乇丨鈥屬囏й� 亘夭乇诏 丕乇爻胤賵 賴賲 賳馗乇 丿丕卮鬲賴貙 鬲丕 丨丿蹖 賲賳 乇賵 丕夭 賲乇丕噩毓賴 亘賴 賲鬲賳 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖 亘蹖鈥屬嗃屫ж� 讴乇丿賴貙 蹖賴 噩丕賴丕蹖蹖 賴賲 鬲賵囟蹖丨丕鬲 禺賵丿卮 鬲賵 賮賴賲 賲鬲賳 讴賲讴賲 讴乇丿賴. 丌丿賲 丕丨爻丕爻 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗁� 丕賳诏丕乇 倬卮鬲讴丕乇 賵 鬲毓賴丿 毓賱賲蹖 丌丿賲丕 鬲賵 诏乇賵賴 賮賱爻賮賴 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴 鬲賴乇丕賳 賮賯胤 丕禺鬲氐丕氐 亘賴 賴賲賵賳 丿賵乇賴鈥屫й� 丿丕乇賴 讴賴 丕賲孬丕賱 毓賱蹖賲乇丕丿 丿丕賵丿蹖 賵 蹖丨蹖蹖 賲賴丿賵蹖 亘蹖鈥屸€屫池辟堌地� 丕爻鬲丕丿 賮賱爻賮賴 亘賵丿賳. 鬲賲賵賲 卮丿. 丿蹖诏賴 讴爻蹖 禺丕胤乇賴鈥屫й� 賴賲 賳丿丕乇賴 讴賴 賵賯鬲 讴賱丕爻 乇賵 亘賴 鬲毓乇蹖賮鈥屭┴必嗀促堎� 亘诏匕乇賵賳賴.
July 14, 2015
"If then we must say something in general about all types of soul, it would be the first actuality of a natural body with organs. We should not then inquire whether the soul and body are one thing, any more than whether the wax and its imprint are, or in general whether the matter of each thing is one with that of which it is the matter. For although unity and being are spoken of in a number of ways, it is of the actuality that they are most properly said."
Here is Aristotle's biological treatment of the soul. Before approaching this treatise, the reader must suspend the popular conception of the soul as a type of ethereal, ghostlike figure that inhabits a body but is also distinguishable from it. The soul, for Aristotle and most of his contemporaries, is the form of the living body, that by virtue of which things have their life. To have a particular soul is what makes a human being a human being, or a tree a tree. The soul is inseparable from the physical body, and indeed the actualities of the soul--emotions, actions, sensations, intuitions, and so on--have their physical, bodily manifestations. Each body has its peculiar soul.
Interestingly enough, alone of all the "types" of soul, the intellectual part of the soul is taken to be immortal, separated from corruptible matter. The mind, as Aristotle saw it, was not attached to any physical organ. One might chalk this up to ignorance of the brain and its functions, but perhaps "mind" for Aristotle had a more fundamental, conceptual meaning than it typically does for us.
More of an intellectual curiosity for the twenty-first century reader, De Anima was profoundly influential for medieval scholastic philosophy.
Here is Aristotle's biological treatment of the soul. Before approaching this treatise, the reader must suspend the popular conception of the soul as a type of ethereal, ghostlike figure that inhabits a body but is also distinguishable from it. The soul, for Aristotle and most of his contemporaries, is the form of the living body, that by virtue of which things have their life. To have a particular soul is what makes a human being a human being, or a tree a tree. The soul is inseparable from the physical body, and indeed the actualities of the soul--emotions, actions, sensations, intuitions, and so on--have their physical, bodily manifestations. Each body has its peculiar soul.
Interestingly enough, alone of all the "types" of soul, the intellectual part of the soul is taken to be immortal, separated from corruptible matter. The mind, as Aristotle saw it, was not attached to any physical organ. One might chalk this up to ignorance of the brain and its functions, but perhaps "mind" for Aristotle had a more fundamental, conceptual meaning than it typically does for us.
More of an intellectual curiosity for the twenty-first century reader, De Anima was profoundly influential for medieval scholastic philosophy.
December 23, 2016
螒魏慰位慰蠀胃慰蠉谓 魏维蟺慰喂伪 伪蟺慰蟽蟺维蟽渭伪蟿伪 蟺慰蠀 蔚委谓伪喂 蠂伪蟻伪魏蟿畏蟻喂蟽蟿喂魏维 蟿慰蠀 蟿喂 蟽蠀谓伪谓蟿维渭蔚 蟽蟿慰 螤蔚蟻委 唯蠀蠂萎蟼, 蟿慰蠀 螒蟻喂蟽蟿慰蟿苇位畏, 魏伪胃蠋蟼 魏伪喂 蟿畏蟼 苇魏蠁蟻伪蟽畏蟼 蟿慰蠀, 蠈蟺蠅蟼 魏伪喂 蟿蠅谓 未喂伪位蔚魏蟿喂魏蠋谓 蟿慰蠀 蔚蟻纬伪位蔚委蠅谓, 蟺慰蠀 魏伪蟿维 尾维蟽畏 蔚委谓伪喂 维位位慰蟿蔚 畏 蠀蟺蔚蟻尾慰位萎, 维位位慰蟿蔚 畏 蠂蟻萎蟽畏 蟿慰蠀 伪谓蟿喂胃苇蟿慰蠀 魏伪喂 伪蟺伪纬蠅纬萎 蔚喂蟼 维蟿慰蟺慰 魏喂 维位位慰蟿蔚 畏 纬蔚谓委魏蔚蠀蟽畏 蟿慰蠀 蔚喂未喂魏慰蠉, 萎 畏 蔚喂未委魏蔚蠀蟽畏 蟿慰蠀 纬蔚谓喂魏慰蠉. 螘蟺委蟽畏蟼 纬委谓蔚蟿伪喂 喂未喂伪委蟿蔚蟻伪 未喂伪魏蟻喂蟿萎 畏 渭蔚 蔚蠀胃蠉蟿畏蟿伪 蔚喂蟻蠅谓蔚委伪 蟺慰蠀 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟺伪蟻伪渭苇谓蔚喂 魏伪位慰蟺蟻慰伪委蟻蔚蟿畏, 蠅蟽蟿蠈蟽慰 蠈渭蠅蟼 伪渭蔚委位喂魏蟿畏. 螘蟺委蟽畏蟼 纬委谓蔚蟿伪喂 蠁伪谓蔚蟻萎 畏 蔚蠀蟻蠉蟿伪蟿畏 纬谓蠋蟽畏 蠈位蠅谓 蟿蠅谓 蔚蟺喂蟽蟿畏渭蠋谓 蟿畏蟼 蔚蟺慰蠂萎蟼 蟿慰蠀, 蟿慰蠀位维蠂喂蟽蟿慰谓 蟽蟿慰 蔚蟺委蟺蔚未慰 蟿畏蟼 蟺蟻伪魏蟿喂魏萎蟼 纬谓蠋蟽畏蟼 伪谓 蠈蠂喂 魏伪喂 蟿蠅谓 委未喂蠅谓 蟿蠅谓 胃蔚蠅蟻喂蠋谓, 螔喂慰位慰纬委伪, 螠伪胃畏渭伪蟿喂魏维, 螙蠅慰位慰纬委伪, 螒谓胃蟻蠅蟺慰位慰纬委伪, 桅蠀蟽喂魏萎, 螜伪蟿蟻喂魏萎. 螆蠂蔚喂 蔚谓未喂伪蠁苇蟻慰谓 蟺喂蟽蟿蔚蠉蠅 谓伪 未喂伪尾维蟽蔚蟿蔚 伪蠀蟿维 蟿伪 伪蟺慰蟽蟺维蟽渭伪蟿伪:
鈥樷€櫸懴佅囄� 纬喂伪 魏维胃蔚 伪蟺蠈未蔚喂尉畏 蔚委谓伪喂 畏 慰蠀蟽委伪, 苇蟿蟽喂 蟺慰蠀 蠈蟽慰喂 慰蟻喂蟽渭慰委 未蔚 蟽蠀渭尾伪委谓蔚喂 谓伪 渭伪蟼 魏维谓慰蠀谓 纬谓蠅蟽蟿苇蟼 蟿喂蟼 喂未喂蠈蟿畏蟿蔚蟼, 伪位位维 魏伪喂 慰蠉蟿蔚 渭伪蟼 未喂蔚蠀魏慰位蠉谓慰蠀谓 谓伪 蠀蟺慰胃苇蟽慰蠀渭蔚 魏维蟿喂 纬喂鈥� 伪蠀蟿苇蟼, 蔚委谓伪喂 蠁伪谓蔚蟻蠈 蠈蟿喂 蠈位慰喂 未喂伪蟿蠀蟺蠋谓慰谓蟿伪喂 纬喂伪 蠂维蟻畏 蟿慰蠀 蟽蠀位位慰纬喂蟽渭慰蠉 魏伪喂 蔚委谓伪喂 魏蔚谓慰委 蟺蔚蟻喂蔚蠂慰渭苇谓慰蠀鈥欌€�.
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鈥樷€� 蟿喂 蔚委谓伪喂 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 蠂维谓蔚蟿伪喂 蠈蟿伪谓 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 伪蠁萎蟽蔚喂 蟿慰 蟽蠋渭伪鈥欌€�;
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鈥樷€欌€ο兾� 蠈蟽伪 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿伪 尾蟻委蟽魏慰蠀渭蔚 魏伪喂 蟿畏谓 蟺位维谓畏 魏伪喂 蟿畏谓 伪位萎胃蔚喂伪, 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 魏伪喂 魏维蟺慰喂伪 蟽蠉谓胃蔚蟽畏 谓慰畏渭维蟿蠅谓鈥ο€维谓蟿伪, 畏 蟺位维谓畏 尾蟻委蟽魏蔚蟿伪喂 蟽蟿畏 蟽蠉谓胃蔚蟽畏鈥欌€�
鈥樷€欌€ξ澄刮� 蟺伪蟻维未蔚喂纬渭伪 蟺蠅蟼 纬谓蠅蟻委味蔚喂 魏伪谓蔚委蟼 蟿慰 魏伪魏蠈 萎 蟿慰 渭伪蠉蟻慰, 纬喂伪蟿委 魏伪蟿维 魏维蟺慰喂慰谓 蟿蟻蠈蟺慰 蟿慰 纬谓蠅蟻委味蔚喂 渭蔚 蟿慰 伪谓蟿委胃蔚蟿慰 蟿慰蠀蟼. 螤蟻苇蟺蔚喂 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟿慰 蠀蟺慰魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰 蟺慰蠀 蟿伪 纬谓蠅蟻委味蔚喂, 谓伪 蔚委谓伪喂 未蠀谓维渭蔚喂 伪蠀蟿维 蟿伪 伪谓蟿委胃蔚蟿伪 魏伪喂 畏 蔚谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪 谓伪 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 渭苇蟽伪 蟿慰蠀鈥欌€�
鈥樷€櫸毼蔽� 畏 伪蟺慰蟽蟿蟻慰蠁萎 位慰喂蟺蠈谓 魏伪喂 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪, 蔚委谓伪喂 蔚谓苇蟻纬蔚喂蔚蟼 蟿畏蟼 委未喂伪蟼 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪蟼 魏伪喂 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 维位位慰 谓伪 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭蔚委蟼 魏伪喂 维位位慰 谓伪 伪蟺慰蟽蟿蟻苇蠁蔚蟽伪喂, 慰蠉蟿蔚 渭蔚蟿伪尉蠉 蟿慰蠀蟼 未喂伪蠁苇蟻慰蠀谓鈥ξ蔽晃晃� 渭蠈谓慰 畏 慰蠀蟽委伪 蟿慰蠀蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 未喂伪蠁慰蟻蔚蟿喂魏萎鈥ο屜勎蔽� 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 尾蔚尾伪喂蠋蟽蔚喂 萎 伪蟻谓畏胃蔚委 蟿慰 魏伪位蠈 萎 蟿慰 魏伪魏蠈, 伪蟺慰蠁蔚蠉纬蔚喂, 萎 蔚蟺喂未喂蠋魏蔚喂. 螕喂鈥� 伪蠀蟿蠈 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 蟺慰蟿苇 未蔚 蟽魏苇蠁蟿蔚蟿伪喂 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 蔚喂魏蠈谓伪鈥� 螚 谓慰畏蟿喂魏萎 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪 位慰喂蟺蠈谓 蟽魏苇蠁蟿蔚蟿伪喂 蟿喂蟼 渭慰蟻蠁苇蟼 渭苇蟽伪 蟽蟿喂蟼 蔚喂魏蠈谓蔚蟼鈥欌€�
鈥樷€欌€ξ� 伪位萎胃蔚喂伪 魏伪喂 蟿慰 蠄蔚蠉未慰蟼 伪谓萎魏慰蠀谓 蟽蟿慰 委未喂慰 纬苇谓慰蟼 渭蔚 蟿慰 魏伪位蠈 魏伪喂 蟿慰 魏伪魏蠈, 未喂伪蠁苇蟻慰蠀谓 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟽蟿慰 蠈蟿喂 蟿伪 蟺蟻蠋蟿伪 蔚委谓伪喂 伪蟺蠈位蠀蟿伪, 蔚谓蠋 蟿伪 维位位伪 蠀蟺维蟻蠂慰蠀谓 纬喂伪 魏维蟺慰喂慰谓鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€欌€ξ� 谓慰蠀蟼 魏伪喂 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 蔚委谓伪喂 蟺慰蠀 蟺蟻慰魏伪位慰蠉谓 蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏 蟽蟿慰 蠂蠋蟻慰鈥ο幭兿勎� 蔚蠉位慰纬伪 蠁伪委谓蔚蟿伪喂 蟺蠅蟼 伪蠀蟿维 蟿伪 未蠉慰 未委谓慰蠀谓 蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏, 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 魏伪喂 畏 蟺蟻伪魏蟿喂魏萎 蟽魏苇蠄畏, 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿喂 魏喂谓蔚委 蟿慰 伪谓蟿喂魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰 蟿畏蟼 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪蟼鈥ο勎� 委未喂慰 魏伪喂 畏 蠁伪谓蟿伪蟽委伪 蠈蟿伪谓 魏喂谓蔚委 未蔚谓 魏喂谓蔚委 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪, 苇谓伪 蟺蟻维纬渭伪 位慰喂蟺蠈谓 未委谓蔚喂 蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏, 蟿慰 伪谓蟿喂魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰 蟿畏蟼 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪蟼鈥欌€�
鈥樷€�( 慰 谓慰蠀蟼 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿喂 蟺蟻慰蟽蟿维味蔚喂 谓伪 伪谓蟿喂蟽蟿蔚魏蠈渭伪蟽蟿蔚 伪蟺慰尾位苇蟺慰谓蟿伪蟼 蟽蟿慰 渭苇位位慰谓, 蔚谓蠋 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 渭伪蟼 蟽蟺蟻蠋蠂谓蔚喂 蟽蔚 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 蔚委谓伪喂 萎未畏 渭蟺蟻慰蟽蟿维 渭伪蟼, 纬喂伪蟿委 蔚魏蔚委谓慰 蟺慰蠀 伪蠀蟿萎 蟿畏 蟽蟿喂纬渭萎 蔚委谓伪喂 蔚蠀蠂维蟻喂蟽蟿慰 蠁伪委谓蔚蟿伪喂 伪蟺蠈位蠀蟿伪 蔚蠀蠂维蟻喂蟽蟿慰 魏伪喂 伪蟺蠈位蠀蟿伪 魏伪位蠈, 纬喂伪蟿委 未蔚 尾位苇蟺慰蠀渭蔚 蟿慰 渭苇位位慰谓 )鈥欌€�
鈥樷€櫸撐刮毕勎� 蔚委谓伪喂 蠁伪谓蔚蟻蠈 蟺蠅蟼 苇蠂慰蠀谓 渭苇蟽伪 蟿慰蠀蟼 蟺蠈谓慰 魏伪喂 畏未慰谓萎. 螒谓 蠈渭蠅蟼 苇蠂慰蠀谓 伪蠀蟿维, 蔚委谓伪喂 伪谓维纬魏畏 谓伪 苇蠂慰蠀谓 魏喂 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪鈥欌€�
鈥樷€欌€ο�,蟿喂 纬蔚谓谓萎胃畏魏蔚 蔚委谓伪喂 伪谓维纬魏畏 谓伪 伪谓伪蟺蟿蠀蠂胃蔚委 魏伪喂 谓伪 蠅蟻喂渭维蟽蔚喂 魏伪喂 谓伪 蟺伪蟻伪魏渭维蟽蔚喂 魏伪喂 伪蠀蟿维 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 蟿蟻慰蠁萎 蔚委谓伪喂 伪未蠉谓伪蟿慰 谓伪 纬委谓慰蠀谓鈥欌€�
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螞委纬蔚蟼 蟽魏苇蠄蔚喂蟼:
螚 未喂蟿蟿萎 蠁蠉蟽畏, 蠀蟺蠈蟽蟿伪蟽畏, 渭慰蟻蠁萎 蟺维谓蟿慰蟿蔚 渭蔚 纬慰萎蟿蔚蠀蔚, 蔚未蠋 尾位苇蟺慰蠀渭蔚 谓伪 尉蔚未喂蟺位蠋谓蔚蟿伪喂 渭苇蟽伪 蟽蔚 渭喂伪 慰位蠈魏位畏蟻畏 胃蔚蠅蟻委伪 蟺慰蠀 伪纬纬委味蔚喂 蟽蠂蔚未蠈谓 蠈位蔚蟼 蟿喂蟼 蔚蟺喂蟽蟿萎渭蔚蟼 蟺蠅蟼 蠈位伪 尉蔚魏喂谓慰蠉谓 伪蟺蠈 渭伪蟼, 蠁伪谓蟿伪蟽蟿蔚委蟿蔚 渭伪蟼 蟽伪谓 蟿蔚蟿蟻维蔚未蟻伪 蟽蟿慰蠀蟼 蟿蟻蔚喂蟼 维尉慰谓蔚蟼 蠈蟺慰蠀 慰喂 蟺位蔚蠀蟻苇蟼 渭伪蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 蟽蠀谓喂蟽蟿蠋蟽蔚蟼 未喂伪谓蠀蟽渭维蟿蠅谓, 蟿伪 未喂伪谓蠉蟽渭伪蟿伪 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟺慰蠀 蟿喂蟼 伪蟺慰蟿蔚位慰蠉谓 蔚魏蔚委 尾蟻委蟽魏慰谓蟿伪喂鈥�
韦慰 尾喂尾位委慰 伪蠀蟿蠈 蔚委谓伪喂 蟺慰蟿 蟺慰蠀蟻委 蠈位蠅谓 蟿蠅谓 纬谓蠅蟽蟿蠋谓 蟿蠈蟿蔚 蔚蟺喂蟽蟿畏渭蠋谓. 螤蠋蟼 谓伪 魏伪蟿伪谓慰畏胃蔚委 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 蟿慰蠀 伪蟿蠈渭慰蠀, 伪谓 未蔚谓 纬委谓蔚喂 魏伪蟿伪谓慰畏蟿萎 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 蟿畏蟼 味蠅萎蟼; 螘蟺慰渭苇谓蠅蟼 尾位苇蟺蠅 渭蔚 伪蟺蠈位蠀蟿慰 胃伪蠀渭伪蟽渭蠈 蠈蟿喂 慰 螒蚁喂蟽蟿慰蟿苇位畏蟼 蟺伪蟻伪蟿畏蟻蔚委 蟿慰谓 蔚伪蠀蟿蠈 蟿慰蠀, 蟿慰蠀蟼 伪谓胃蟻蠋蟺慰蠀蟼 纬蠉蟻蠅 蟿慰蠀, 蟿畏 纬畏, 蟿畏 胃维位伪蟽蟽伪, 蟿伪 味蠋伪, 蟿伪 蠁蠀蟿维 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 谓伪 蔚魏蠁苇蟻蔚喂 纬谓蠋渭畏. 螤蟻蠋蟿伪 渭蔚位蔚蟿维, 蠂蟻蠅渭伪蟿委味蔚喂 蟿畏 纬谓蠋渭畏 蟿慰蠀 渭蔚蟼 蟽蟿畏 纬谓蠋蟽畏 魏伪喂 蟺蟻慰蠂蠅蟻维. 螒蠀蟿蠈蟼 慰 渭畏蠂伪谓喂蟽渭蠈蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿蠈蟽慰 蠈渭慰蟻蠁慰蟼.
螆谓伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿伪 蟽蠀渭蟺蔚蟻维蟽渭伪蟿伪 蟺慰蠀 渭蔚 伪蟺伪蟽蠂慰位慰蠉谓 蟺慰位蠉 魏伪喂蟻蠈 蔚委谓伪喂 伪蠀蟿蠈: 未蔚 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉渭蔚 谓伪 伪纬纬委尉慰蠀渭蔚 蟿畏谓 蠄蠀蠂萎 蟿慰蠀 维位位慰蠀, 未委蠂蠅蟼 谓伪 伪谓蟿喂魏蟻蠉蟽慰蠀渭蔚, 蔚委蟿蔚 未喂伪蟺蔚蟻维蟽慰蠀渭蔚 魏伪喂 蟿畏 蟽维蟻魏伪 蟿伪蠀蟿蠈蠂蟻慰谓伪. 螚 渭慰蟻蠁萎 魏伪喂 畏 蠀蟺蠈蟽蟿伪蟽畏 蔚委谓伪喂 伪位位畏位苇谓未蔚蟿蔚蟼. 螚 蟿维未蔚 蠄蠀蠂萎 魏伪胃慰蟻委味蔚喂 蟿畏 未蔚委谓伪 渭慰蟻蠁萎, 蟿畏谓 蔚蠀蟺维胃蔚喂伪, 蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏 , 蟿畏谓 慰渭喂位委伪, 蟿畏谓 魏维谓蔚喂 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 蔚委谓伪喂. 螒谓 蔚纬蠋 蠁慰蟻苇蟽蠅 蟿畏谓 蟺蟻慰尾喂维 蟿慰蠀 螕喂蠋蟻纬慰蠀 魏伪喂 蔚谓谓慰蠋 慰喂 蠄蠀蠂苇蟼 渭伪蟼 谓伪 伪谓蟿伪位位伪蠂胃慰蠉谓 蟿慰 蟺喂蟽蟿蔚蠉蠅 蟺蠅蟼 蟽蔚 位委纬慰 魏伪喂蟻蠈 胃伪 尾位苇蟺蔚喂蟼 蟿慰 螕喂蠋蟻纬慰 魏伪喂 胃伪 位蔚蟼 蟺蠅蟼 蟽慰蠀 胃蠀渭委味蔚喂 蔚渭苇谓伪.
螖喂伪蠁蠅谓蠋 魏维蟺蠅蟼 渭蔚 蟿慰谓 螒蟻喂蟽蟿慰蟿苇位畏, 未蔚谓 蟺喂蟽蟿蔚蠉蠅 蟺蠅蟼 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 渭蟺慰蟻蔚委 谓伪 纬蔚谓谓畏胃蔚委 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 蟽魏苇蠄畏, 畏 尾慰蠉位畏蟽畏 委蟽蠅蟼. 螒位位维 蟿慰 胃苇渭伪 蔚委谓伪喂 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉谓 蟺蟻伪纬渭伪蟿喂魏维 谓伪 未喂伪蠂蠅蟻喂蟽蟿慰蠉谓 畏 尾慰蠉位畏蟽畏 伪蟺鈥� 蟿畏谓 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪; 危蔚 伪蠀蟿蠈 未蔚 渭慰蠀 伪蟺维谓蟿畏蟽蔚. 螘委谓伪喂 渭萎蟺蠅蟼 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 渭喂伪 伪蟻蠂萎 蟿畏蟼 慰蟺慰委伪蟼 畏 魏委谓畏蟽畏 纬委谓蔚蟿伪喂 渭蔚 蟿畏 胃苇位畏蟽畏; 螘委谓伪喂 未蠀慰 未喂伪蠁慰蟻蔚蟿喂魏苇蟼 蠁蠉蟽蔚喂蟼; 螖蔚谓 尉苇蟻蠅 伪位位维 未蔚谓 蟿喂蟼 蟿伪蠀蟿委味蠅.
螌蟺蠅蟼 蔚蟺委蟽畏蟼 胃蔚蠅蟻蠋 蔚位位喂蟺萎 蟿畏谓 蔚位维蠂喂蟽蟿畏 蔚尉苇蟿伪蟽畏 蟿畏蟼 伪谓维渭谓畏蟽畏蟼, 苇谓伪 胃苇渭伪 蟺慰蠀 渭蔚 伪蟺伪蟽蠂慰位蔚委 蟺慰位蠉 纬蔚谓喂魏维 魏伪喂 伪魏蠈渭畏 蟺蔚蟻喂蟽蟽蠈蟿蔚蟻慰 伪蠁蠈蟿慰蠀 未喂维尾伪蟽伪 蟿喂蟼 螛维位伪蟽蟽蔚蟼 蟿慰蠀 谓蠈蟿慰蠀, 蟿慰蠀 螠慰谓蟿伪位渭蟺维谓 蟺慰蠀 渭喂伪 伪蟺鈥� 蟿喂蟼 魏蔚谓蟿蟻喂魏苇蟼 喂未苇蔚蟼 蟺蟻慰苇蟻蠂蔚蟿伪喂 伪蟺蠈 苇谓伪 蟽蟿委蠂慰 魏维蟺慰喂慰蠀 蟺慰喂畏蟿萎 慰 慰蟺慰委慰蟼 位苇蔚喂 慰蠀蟽喂伪蟽蟿喂魏维 蟺蠅蟼 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 魏喂 畏 伪谓维渭谓畏蟽畏 未蔚 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉谓 蟿伪蠀蟿蠈蠂蟻慰谓伪 谓伪 尾蟻委蟽魏慰谓蟿伪喂 蟽蟿慰谓 委未喂慰 蠂蠋蟻慰, 畏 渭喂伪 蔚委谓伪喂 未慰位慰蠁蠈谓慰蟼 蟿畏蟼 维位位畏蟼. 螖蔚谓 尉苇蟻蠅 伪谓 喂蟽蠂蠉蔚喂 慰蠉蟿蔚 伪蠀蟿蠈, 未苇蠂慰渭伪喂 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟿慰 位蠈纬慰 蟿慰蠀 蟺蠅蟼 畏 伪谓维渭谓畏蟽畏 尉蔚魏喂谓维蔚喂 伪蟺鈥� 蟿畏谓 蠄蠀蠂萎. 螖蔚 渭慰蠀 伪蟻魏蔚委 蠈渭蠅蟼.
韦苇位慰蟼 渭慰蠀 伪蟻苇蟽蔚喂 畏 喂未苇伪 魏伪喂 蟽蠀渭蠁蠅谓蠋 蟺蠅蟼 慰 谓慰蠀蟼 魏喂 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 渭蔚 蟿喂蟼 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿蔚蟼 蟿畏蟼 未蔚谓 蔚未蟻维味慰谓蟿伪喂 蟽蟿慰谓 委未喂慰 蟿蠈蟺慰.
螝伪喂 蟺维位喂 蠈渭蠅蟼 伪谓苇蟺蟿蠀尉蔚 蟺慰位蠉 蟿慰 胃苇渭伪 蟿慰蠀 蟿喂 位苇纬伪谓蔚 慰喂 蟺伪位伪喂蠈蟿蔚蟻慰喂, 蔚尉鈥� 委蟽慰蠀 蔚魏蟿蔚蟿伪渭苇谓伪 蟿喂蟼 委未喂蔚蟼 蟿喂蟼 伪喂蟽胃萎蟽蔚喂蟼 魏伪喂 蟽蟿畏 蟽魏苇蠄畏, 蟿畏 尾慰蠉位畏蟽畏, 蟿畏谓 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪, 蟿畏谓 伪谓维渭谓畏蟽畏 未蔚谓 苇未蠅蟽蔚 蟿畏谓 苇魏蟿伪蟽畏 蟺慰蠀 胃伪 萎胃蔚位伪.
3.5 伪蟽蟿苇蟻喂伪.
鈥樷€櫸懴佅囄� 纬喂伪 魏维胃蔚 伪蟺蠈未蔚喂尉畏 蔚委谓伪喂 畏 慰蠀蟽委伪, 苇蟿蟽喂 蟺慰蠀 蠈蟽慰喂 慰蟻喂蟽渭慰委 未蔚 蟽蠀渭尾伪委谓蔚喂 谓伪 渭伪蟼 魏维谓慰蠀谓 纬谓蠅蟽蟿苇蟼 蟿喂蟼 喂未喂蠈蟿畏蟿蔚蟼, 伪位位维 魏伪喂 慰蠉蟿蔚 渭伪蟼 未喂蔚蠀魏慰位蠉谓慰蠀谓 谓伪 蠀蟺慰胃苇蟽慰蠀渭蔚 魏维蟿喂 纬喂鈥� 伪蠀蟿苇蟼, 蔚委谓伪喂 蠁伪谓蔚蟻蠈 蠈蟿喂 蠈位慰喂 未喂伪蟿蠀蟺蠋谓慰谓蟿伪喂 纬喂伪 蠂维蟻畏 蟿慰蠀 蟽蠀位位慰纬喂蟽渭慰蠉 魏伪喂 蔚委谓伪喂 魏蔚谓慰委 蟺蔚蟻喂蔚蠂慰渭苇谓慰蠀鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€櫸の� 苇渭蠄蠀蠂慰 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿喂 未蔚委蠂谓蔚喂 谓伪 未喂伪蠁苇蟻蔚喂 伪蟺蠈 蟿慰 维蠄蠀蠂慰, 蟽蔚 未蠉慰 魏蠀蟻委蠅蟼 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿伪, 蟽蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏 魏伪喂 蟿畏谓 伪委蟽胃畏蟽畏鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€櫸斘滴� 伪谓蟿喂渭蔚蟿蠅蟺委味蔚喂 位慰喂蟺蠈谓 蟿慰 谓慰蠀 蠅蟼 渭喂伪 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪 纬喂伪 蟿畏谓 伪位萎胃蔚喂伪, 伪位位维 位苇蔚喂 蠈蟿喂 蠄蠀蠂萎 魏伪喂 谓慰蠀蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿慰 委未喂慰 蟺蟻维纬渭伪鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€欌€ξ� 谓慰蠀蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿慰 苇谓伪 魏伪喂 畏 纬谓蠋蟽畏 蟿慰 未蠉慰 ( 纬喂伪蟿委 蟺蟻慰蠂蠅蟻蔚委 蟺蟻慰蟼 苇谓伪 蟽畏渭蔚委慰 伪蟺蠈 渭喂伪 渭慰谓伪未喂魏萎 魏伪蟿蔚蠉胃蠀谓蟽畏 ), 蔚谓蠋 慰 伪蟻喂胃渭蠈蟼 蟿慰蠀 蔚蟺喂蟺苇未慰蠀 蔚委谓伪喂 畏 纬谓蠋渭畏 魏伪喂 蔚魏蔚委谓慰蟼 蟿慰蠀 蟽蟿蔚蟻蔚慰蠉 畏 伪委蟽胃畏蟽畏鈥� 韦伪 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿伪 蔚尉维位位慰蠀 蟽蠀位位伪渭尾维谓慰谓蟿伪喂 维位位伪 渭蔚 蟿慰 谓慰蠀, 维位位伪 渭蔚 蟿畏 纬谓蠋蟽畏, 维位位伪 渭蔚 蟿畏 纬谓蠋渭畏 魏伪喂 维位位伪 渭蔚 蟿畏谓 伪委蟽胃畏蟽畏, 魏伪喂, 慰喂 伪蟻喂胃渭慰委 伪蠀蟿慰委 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿伪蠀蟿蠈蠂蟻慰谓伪 慰喂 喂未苇蔚蟼 蟿蠅谓 蟺蟻伪纬渭维蟿蠅谓鈥欌€�.( 蟽蠀纬魏蟻喂蟿喂魏萎 胃苇蟽畏 渭蔚 蟿慰蠀 螤位维蟿蠅谓伪, 蠈蟺蠅蟼 慰 委未喂慰蟼 伪谓伪蠁苇蟻蔚喂 )
鈥樷€欌€ο勎兿兾迪佄� 蔚委未畏 魏喂谓萎蟽蔚蠅谓, 畏 蠁慰蟻维, 畏 伪位位慰委蠅蟽畏, 畏 蠁胃委蟽畏 魏伪喂 畏 伪蠉尉畏蟽畏鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€櫸の� 蟽蠋渭伪 蠈渭蠅蟼 魏喂谓蔚委蟿伪喂 伪位位维味慰谓蟿伪蟼 胃苇蟽畏 魏伪喂 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 蔚蟺慰渭苇谓蠅蟼 胃伪 苇蟺蟻蔚蟺蔚 谓伪 渭蔚蟿伪尾位畏胃蔚委 蠈蟺蠅蟼 蟿慰 蟽蠋渭伪, 伪位位维味慰谓蟿伪蟼 胃苇蟽畏 蔚委蟿蔚 慰位蠈魏位畏蟻畏, 蔚委蟿蔚 魏伪蟿维 渭苇蟻畏. 螒谓 蠈渭蠅蟼 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉蟽蔚 谓伪 蟽蠀渭尾蔚委 伪蠀蟿蠈, 胃伪 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉蟽蔚 蔚蟺委蟽畏蟼 谓伪 尾纬蔚喂 伪蟺蠈 蟿慰 蟽蠋渭伪 魏伪喂 蟺维位喂 谓伪 尉伪谓伪渭蟺蔚委 魏伪喂 蟿慰 伪蟺慰蟿苇位蔚蟽渭伪 胃伪 萎蟿伪谓 谓伪 伪谓伪蟽蟿伪委谓慰谓蟿伪喂 蟿伪 味蠋伪 蟺慰蠀 蟺苇胃伪谓伪谓鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€欌€�. 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 未蔚 蠁伪委谓蔚蟿伪喂 谓伪 魏喂谓蔚委 蟿慰 味蠋慰 渭蔚 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟿慰谓 蟿蟻蠈蟺慰, 伪位位维 渭蔚 渭喂伪 慰蟻喂蟽渭苇谓畏 尾慰蠉位畏蟽畏 魏伪喂 魏维蟺慰喂伪 蟽魏苇蠄畏鈥欌€�
鈥樷€櫸� 谓慰蠀蟼 蠈渭蠅蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 苇谓伪蟼 魏伪喂 蟽蠀谓蔚蠂萎蟼, 蠈蟺蠅蟼 伪魏蟻喂尾蠋蟼 畏 谓蠈畏蟽畏 魏伪喂 畏 谓蠈畏蟽畏 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿伪 谓慰萎渭伪蟿伪 魏伪喂 蟿伪 蟿蔚位蔚蠀蟿伪委伪 渭蔚 蟿慰 谓伪 未喂伪未苇蠂慰谓蟿伪喂 蟿慰 苇谓伪 蟿慰 维位位慰, 伪蟺慰蟿蔚位慰蠉谓 蔚谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪 蠈蟺蠅蟼 慰 伪蟻喂胃渭蠈蟼, 伪位位维 蠈蠂喂 蠈蟺蠅蟼 蟿慰 渭苇纬蔚胃慰蟼鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€櫹€蠅蟼 胃伪 蟽魏蔚蠁蟿蔚委 慰 谓慰蠀蟼 蟿慰 未喂伪喂蟻蔚蟿蠈 渭蔚 蟿慰 伪未喂伪委蟻蔚蟿慰, 萎 蟿慰 伪未喂伪委蟻蔚蟿慰 渭蔚 蟿慰 未喂伪喂蟻蔚蟿蠈; 鈥�. 畏 魏委谓畏蟽畏 蟿慰蠀 谓慰蠀 蔚委谓伪喂 畏 谓蠈畏蟽畏鈥欌€�
鈥樷€� 蟿喂 蔚委谓伪喂 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 蠂维谓蔚蟿伪喂 蠈蟿伪谓 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 伪蠁萎蟽蔚喂 蟿慰 蟽蠋渭伪鈥欌€�;
鈥樷€櫸澪� 位苇渭蔚 蠈渭蠅蟼 蠈蟿喂 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 慰蟻纬委味蔚蟿伪喂, 蔚委谓伪喂 蟽伪谓 魏维蟺慰喂慰蟼 谓伪 苇位蔚纬蔚 蠈蟿喂 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 蠀蠁伪委谓蔚喂, 萎 魏蟿委味蔚喂 蟽蟺委蟿喂. 螕喂伪蟿委 蠈蟺蠅蟼 蠁伪委谓蔚蟿伪喂 , 蔚委谓伪喂 魏伪位蠉蟿蔚蟻伪 谓伪 渭畏 位苇渭蔚 蠈蟿喂 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 慰喂魏蟿委蟻蔚喂 萎 渭伪胃伪委谓蔚喂 萎 蟽魏苇蠁蟿蔚蟿伪喂, 伪位位维 慰 维谓胃蟻蠅蟺慰蟼 渭蔚 蟿畏谓 蠄蠀蠂萎鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€欌€ξ� 伪委蟽胃畏蟽畏 尉蔚魏喂谓维 伪蟺蠈 蟽蠀纬魏蔚魏蟻喂渭苇谓慰 伪谓蟿喂魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰, 蔚谓蠋 畏 伪谓维渭谓畏蟽畏 伪蟺蠈 蟿畏谓 蠄蠀蠂萎鈥欌€�
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鈥樷€櫸� 蔚谓蟿蔚位苇蠂蔚喂伪 蠈渭蠅蟼 苇蠂蔚喂 未蠀慰 蟽畏渭伪蟽委蔚蟼: 维位位慰蟿蔚 蔚委谓伪喂 蠈蟺蠅蟼 畏 纬谓蠋蟽畏 魏喂 维位位慰蟿蔚 蠈蟺蠅蟼 畏 维蟽魏畏蟽畏 蟿畏蟼 纬谓蠋蟽畏蟼. 螘委谓伪喂 蠁伪谓蔚蟻蠈 位慰喂蟺蠈谓 蠈蟿喂 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 蔚委谓伪喂 纬谓蠋蟽畏, 纬喂伪蟿委 蠈蟽慰 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎, 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 魏伪喂 蠉蟺谓慰蟼 魏伪喂 蔚纬蟻萎纬慰蟻蟽畏 魏伪喂 畏 蔚纬蟻萎纬慰蟻蟽畏 蔚委谓伪喂 伪谓维位慰纬畏 渭蔚 蟿畏谓 维蟽魏畏蟽畏 蟿畏蟼 纬谓蠋蟽畏蟼, 蔚谓蠋 慰 蠉蟺谓慰蟼 渭蔚 蟿畏谓 魏伪蟿慰蠂萎 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 蟿畏谓 维蟽魏畏蟽畏鈥欌€�
鈥樷€欌€ξ� 蠄蠀蠂萎 蔚委谓伪喂 畏 伪蟻蠂萎 蟿蠅谓 喂魏伪谓慰蟿萎蟿蠅谓 魏伪喂 慰蟻委味蔚蟿伪喂 渭蔚 伪蠀蟿苇蟼, 蟿畏谓 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪 蟿畏蟼 胃蟻苇蠄畏蟼, 蟿畏蟼 伪委蟽胃畏蟽畏蟼, 蟿畏蟼 蟽魏苇蠄畏蟼 魏伪喂 渭蔚 蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏鈥ο屜€慰蠀 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 伪委蟽胃畏蟽畏, 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 魏伪喂 位蠉蟺畏 魏伪喂 畏未慰谓萎 魏伪喂 蠈蟺慰蠀 蠀蟺维蟻蠂慰蠀谓 伪蠀蟿维, 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 伪谓伪纬魏伪蟽蟿喂魏维 魏伪喂 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪. 螌蟽慰 蟿蠋蟻伪 纬喂伪 蟿慰 谓慰蠀 蠁伪委谓蔚蟿伪喂 蟺蠅蟼 蟺蟻蠈魏蔚喂蟿伪喂 纬喂伪 维位位慰 纬苇谓慰蟼 蠄蠀蠂萎蟼 魏伪喂 蟺蠅蟼 渭蠈谓慰 伪蠀蟿蠈 渭蟺慰蟻蔚委 谓伪 蠂蠅蟻委味蔚蟿伪喂. 韦伪 蠀蟺蠈位慰喂蟺伪 渭苇蟻畏 蟿畏蟼 蠄蠀蠂萎蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 蠁伪谓蔚蟻蠈 蟺蠅蟼 未蔚 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉谓 谓伪 蠂蠅蟻喂蟽蟿慰蠉谓鈥ξ迪€委蟽畏蟼 蠈渭蠅蟼 未喂伪蠁苇蟻慰蠀谓, 纬喂伪蟿委 畏 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪 蟿畏蟼 伪委蟽胃畏蟽畏蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 维位位慰 伪蟺蠈 蟿畏谓 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪 蟿畏蟼 纬谓蠋渭畏蟼鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€櫸� 蟺蔚委谓伪 魏伪喂 畏 未委蠄伪 蟿蠋蟻伪 蔚委谓伪喂 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 魏伪喂 畏 渭蔚谓 蟺蔚委谓伪 纬喂伪 蟿慰 尉畏蟻蠈 魏伪喂 蟿慰 胃蔚蟻渭蠈, 蔚谓蠋 畏 未委蠄伪 纬喂伪 蟿慰 蠄蠀蠂蟻蠈 魏伪喂 蟿慰 蠀纬蟻蠈 魏伪喂 畏 纬蔚蠉蟽畏 蔚委谓伪喂 魏维蟿喂 蟽伪谓 蟿慰 魏伪蟻蠉魏蔚蠀渭伪 蟿慰蠀蟼鈥欌€�
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鈥樷€欌€ο兾� 蠈蟽伪 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿伪 尾蟻委蟽魏慰蠀渭蔚 魏伪喂 蟿畏谓 蟺位维谓畏 魏伪喂 蟿畏谓 伪位萎胃蔚喂伪, 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 魏伪喂 魏维蟺慰喂伪 蟽蠉谓胃蔚蟽畏 谓慰畏渭维蟿蠅谓鈥ο€维谓蟿伪, 畏 蟺位维谓畏 尾蟻委蟽魏蔚蟿伪喂 蟽蟿畏 蟽蠉谓胃蔚蟽畏鈥欌€�
鈥樷€欌€ξ澄刮� 蟺伪蟻维未蔚喂纬渭伪 蟺蠅蟼 纬谓蠅蟻委味蔚喂 魏伪谓蔚委蟼 蟿慰 魏伪魏蠈 萎 蟿慰 渭伪蠉蟻慰, 纬喂伪蟿委 魏伪蟿维 魏维蟺慰喂慰谓 蟿蟻蠈蟺慰 蟿慰 纬谓蠅蟻委味蔚喂 渭蔚 蟿慰 伪谓蟿委胃蔚蟿慰 蟿慰蠀蟼. 螤蟻苇蟺蔚喂 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟿慰 蠀蟺慰魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰 蟺慰蠀 蟿伪 纬谓蠅蟻委味蔚喂, 谓伪 蔚委谓伪喂 未蠀谓维渭蔚喂 伪蠀蟿维 蟿伪 伪谓蟿委胃蔚蟿伪 魏伪喂 畏 蔚谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪 谓伪 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 渭苇蟽伪 蟿慰蠀鈥欌€�
鈥樷€櫸毼蔽� 畏 伪蟺慰蟽蟿蟻慰蠁萎 位慰喂蟺蠈谓 魏伪喂 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪, 蔚委谓伪喂 蔚谓苇蟻纬蔚喂蔚蟼 蟿畏蟼 委未喂伪蟼 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪蟼 魏伪喂 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 维位位慰 谓伪 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭蔚委蟼 魏伪喂 维位位慰 谓伪 伪蟺慰蟽蟿蟻苇蠁蔚蟽伪喂, 慰蠉蟿蔚 渭蔚蟿伪尉蠉 蟿慰蠀蟼 未喂伪蠁苇蟻慰蠀谓鈥ξ蔽晃晃� 渭蠈谓慰 畏 慰蠀蟽委伪 蟿慰蠀蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 未喂伪蠁慰蟻蔚蟿喂魏萎鈥ο屜勎蔽� 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 尾蔚尾伪喂蠋蟽蔚喂 萎 伪蟻谓畏胃蔚委 蟿慰 魏伪位蠈 萎 蟿慰 魏伪魏蠈, 伪蟺慰蠁蔚蠉纬蔚喂, 萎 蔚蟺喂未喂蠋魏蔚喂. 螕喂鈥� 伪蠀蟿蠈 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 蟺慰蟿苇 未蔚 蟽魏苇蠁蟿蔚蟿伪喂 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 蔚喂魏蠈谓伪鈥� 螚 谓慰畏蟿喂魏萎 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿伪 位慰喂蟺蠈谓 蟽魏苇蠁蟿蔚蟿伪喂 蟿喂蟼 渭慰蟻蠁苇蟼 渭苇蟽伪 蟽蟿喂蟼 蔚喂魏蠈谓蔚蟼鈥欌€�
鈥樷€欌€ξ� 伪位萎胃蔚喂伪 魏伪喂 蟿慰 蠄蔚蠉未慰蟼 伪谓萎魏慰蠀谓 蟽蟿慰 委未喂慰 纬苇谓慰蟼 渭蔚 蟿慰 魏伪位蠈 魏伪喂 蟿慰 魏伪魏蠈, 未喂伪蠁苇蟻慰蠀谓 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟽蟿慰 蠈蟿喂 蟿伪 蟺蟻蠋蟿伪 蔚委谓伪喂 伪蟺蠈位蠀蟿伪, 蔚谓蠋 蟿伪 维位位伪 蠀蟺维蟻蠂慰蠀谓 纬喂伪 魏维蟺慰喂慰谓鈥欌€�.
鈥樷€欌€ξ� 谓慰蠀蟼 魏伪喂 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 蔚委谓伪喂 蟺慰蠀 蟺蟻慰魏伪位慰蠉谓 蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏 蟽蟿慰 蠂蠋蟻慰鈥ο幭兿勎� 蔚蠉位慰纬伪 蠁伪委谓蔚蟿伪喂 蟺蠅蟼 伪蠀蟿维 蟿伪 未蠉慰 未委谓慰蠀谓 蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏, 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 魏伪喂 畏 蟺蟻伪魏蟿喂魏萎 蟽魏苇蠄畏, 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿喂 魏喂谓蔚委 蟿慰 伪谓蟿喂魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰 蟿畏蟼 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪蟼鈥ο勎� 委未喂慰 魏伪喂 畏 蠁伪谓蟿伪蟽委伪 蠈蟿伪谓 魏喂谓蔚委 未蔚谓 魏喂谓蔚委 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪, 苇谓伪 蟺蟻维纬渭伪 位慰喂蟺蠈谓 未委谓蔚喂 蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏, 蟿慰 伪谓蟿喂魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰 蟿畏蟼 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪蟼鈥欌€�
鈥樷€�( 慰 谓慰蠀蟼 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿喂 蟺蟻慰蟽蟿维味蔚喂 谓伪 伪谓蟿喂蟽蟿蔚魏蠈渭伪蟽蟿蔚 伪蟺慰尾位苇蟺慰谓蟿伪蟼 蟽蟿慰 渭苇位位慰谓, 蔚谓蠋 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 渭伪蟼 蟽蟺蟻蠋蠂谓蔚喂 蟽蔚 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 蔚委谓伪喂 萎未畏 渭蟺蟻慰蟽蟿维 渭伪蟼, 纬喂伪蟿委 蔚魏蔚委谓慰 蟺慰蠀 伪蠀蟿萎 蟿畏 蟽蟿喂纬渭萎 蔚委谓伪喂 蔚蠀蠂维蟻喂蟽蟿慰 蠁伪委谓蔚蟿伪喂 伪蟺蠈位蠀蟿伪 蔚蠀蠂维蟻喂蟽蟿慰 魏伪喂 伪蟺蠈位蠀蟿伪 魏伪位蠈, 纬喂伪蟿委 未蔚 尾位苇蟺慰蠀渭蔚 蟿慰 渭苇位位慰谓 )鈥欌€�
鈥樷€櫸撐刮毕勎� 蔚委谓伪喂 蠁伪谓蔚蟻蠈 蟺蠅蟼 苇蠂慰蠀谓 渭苇蟽伪 蟿慰蠀蟼 蟺蠈谓慰 魏伪喂 畏未慰谓萎. 螒谓 蠈渭蠅蟼 苇蠂慰蠀谓 伪蠀蟿维, 蔚委谓伪喂 伪谓维纬魏畏 谓伪 苇蠂慰蠀谓 魏喂 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪鈥欌€�
鈥樷€欌€ο�,蟿喂 纬蔚谓谓萎胃畏魏蔚 蔚委谓伪喂 伪谓维纬魏畏 谓伪 伪谓伪蟺蟿蠀蠂胃蔚委 魏伪喂 谓伪 蠅蟻喂渭维蟽蔚喂 魏伪喂 谓伪 蟺伪蟻伪魏渭维蟽蔚喂 魏伪喂 伪蠀蟿维 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 蟿蟻慰蠁萎 蔚委谓伪喂 伪未蠉谓伪蟿慰 谓伪 纬委谓慰蠀谓鈥欌€�
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螞委纬蔚蟼 蟽魏苇蠄蔚喂蟼:
螚 未喂蟿蟿萎 蠁蠉蟽畏, 蠀蟺蠈蟽蟿伪蟽畏, 渭慰蟻蠁萎 蟺维谓蟿慰蟿蔚 渭蔚 纬慰萎蟿蔚蠀蔚, 蔚未蠋 尾位苇蟺慰蠀渭蔚 谓伪 尉蔚未喂蟺位蠋谓蔚蟿伪喂 渭苇蟽伪 蟽蔚 渭喂伪 慰位蠈魏位畏蟻畏 胃蔚蠅蟻委伪 蟺慰蠀 伪纬纬委味蔚喂 蟽蠂蔚未蠈谓 蠈位蔚蟼 蟿喂蟼 蔚蟺喂蟽蟿萎渭蔚蟼 蟺蠅蟼 蠈位伪 尉蔚魏喂谓慰蠉谓 伪蟺蠈 渭伪蟼, 蠁伪谓蟿伪蟽蟿蔚委蟿蔚 渭伪蟼 蟽伪谓 蟿蔚蟿蟻维蔚未蟻伪 蟽蟿慰蠀蟼 蟿蟻蔚喂蟼 维尉慰谓蔚蟼 蠈蟺慰蠀 慰喂 蟺位蔚蠀蟻苇蟼 渭伪蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 蟽蠀谓喂蟽蟿蠋蟽蔚蟼 未喂伪谓蠀蟽渭维蟿蠅谓, 蟿伪 未喂伪谓蠉蟽渭伪蟿伪 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟺慰蠀 蟿喂蟼 伪蟺慰蟿蔚位慰蠉谓 蔚魏蔚委 尾蟻委蟽魏慰谓蟿伪喂鈥�
韦慰 尾喂尾位委慰 伪蠀蟿蠈 蔚委谓伪喂 蟺慰蟿 蟺慰蠀蟻委 蠈位蠅谓 蟿蠅谓 纬谓蠅蟽蟿蠋谓 蟿蠈蟿蔚 蔚蟺喂蟽蟿畏渭蠋谓. 螤蠋蟼 谓伪 魏伪蟿伪谓慰畏胃蔚委 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 蟿慰蠀 伪蟿蠈渭慰蠀, 伪谓 未蔚谓 纬委谓蔚喂 魏伪蟿伪谓慰畏蟿萎 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 蟿畏蟼 味蠅萎蟼; 螘蟺慰渭苇谓蠅蟼 尾位苇蟺蠅 渭蔚 伪蟺蠈位蠀蟿慰 胃伪蠀渭伪蟽渭蠈 蠈蟿喂 慰 螒蚁喂蟽蟿慰蟿苇位畏蟼 蟺伪蟻伪蟿畏蟻蔚委 蟿慰谓 蔚伪蠀蟿蠈 蟿慰蠀, 蟿慰蠀蟼 伪谓胃蟻蠋蟺慰蠀蟼 纬蠉蟻蠅 蟿慰蠀, 蟿畏 纬畏, 蟿畏 胃维位伪蟽蟽伪, 蟿伪 味蠋伪, 蟿伪 蠁蠀蟿维 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 谓伪 蔚魏蠁苇蟻蔚喂 纬谓蠋渭畏. 螤蟻蠋蟿伪 渭蔚位蔚蟿维, 蠂蟻蠅渭伪蟿委味蔚喂 蟿畏 纬谓蠋渭畏 蟿慰蠀 渭蔚蟼 蟽蟿畏 纬谓蠋蟽畏 魏伪喂 蟺蟻慰蠂蠅蟻维. 螒蠀蟿蠈蟼 慰 渭畏蠂伪谓喂蟽渭蠈蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿蠈蟽慰 蠈渭慰蟻蠁慰蟼.
螆谓伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿伪 蟽蠀渭蟺蔚蟻维蟽渭伪蟿伪 蟺慰蠀 渭蔚 伪蟺伪蟽蠂慰位慰蠉谓 蟺慰位蠉 魏伪喂蟻蠈 蔚委谓伪喂 伪蠀蟿蠈: 未蔚 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉渭蔚 谓伪 伪纬纬委尉慰蠀渭蔚 蟿畏谓 蠄蠀蠂萎 蟿慰蠀 维位位慰蠀, 未委蠂蠅蟼 谓伪 伪谓蟿喂魏蟻蠉蟽慰蠀渭蔚, 蔚委蟿蔚 未喂伪蟺蔚蟻维蟽慰蠀渭蔚 魏伪喂 蟿畏 蟽维蟻魏伪 蟿伪蠀蟿蠈蠂蟻慰谓伪. 螚 渭慰蟻蠁萎 魏伪喂 畏 蠀蟺蠈蟽蟿伪蟽畏 蔚委谓伪喂 伪位位畏位苇谓未蔚蟿蔚蟼. 螚 蟿维未蔚 蠄蠀蠂萎 魏伪胃慰蟻委味蔚喂 蟿畏 未蔚委谓伪 渭慰蟻蠁萎, 蟿畏谓 蔚蠀蟺维胃蔚喂伪, 蟿畏谓 魏委谓畏蟽畏 , 蟿畏谓 慰渭喂位委伪, 蟿畏谓 魏维谓蔚喂 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 蔚委谓伪喂. 螒谓 蔚纬蠋 蠁慰蟻苇蟽蠅 蟿畏谓 蟺蟻慰尾喂维 蟿慰蠀 螕喂蠋蟻纬慰蠀 魏伪喂 蔚谓谓慰蠋 慰喂 蠄蠀蠂苇蟼 渭伪蟼 谓伪 伪谓蟿伪位位伪蠂胃慰蠉谓 蟿慰 蟺喂蟽蟿蔚蠉蠅 蟺蠅蟼 蟽蔚 位委纬慰 魏伪喂蟻蠈 胃伪 尾位苇蟺蔚喂蟼 蟿慰 螕喂蠋蟻纬慰 魏伪喂 胃伪 位蔚蟼 蟺蠅蟼 蟽慰蠀 胃蠀渭委味蔚喂 蔚渭苇谓伪.
螖喂伪蠁蠅谓蠋 魏维蟺蠅蟼 渭蔚 蟿慰谓 螒蟻喂蟽蟿慰蟿苇位畏, 未蔚谓 蟺喂蟽蟿蔚蠉蠅 蟺蠅蟼 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 渭蟺慰蟻蔚委 谓伪 纬蔚谓谓畏胃蔚委 蠂蠅蟻委蟼 蟽魏苇蠄畏, 畏 尾慰蠉位畏蟽畏 委蟽蠅蟼. 螒位位维 蟿慰 胃苇渭伪 蔚委谓伪喂 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉谓 蟺蟻伪纬渭伪蟿喂魏维 谓伪 未喂伪蠂蠅蟻喂蟽蟿慰蠉谓 畏 尾慰蠉位畏蟽畏 伪蟺鈥� 蟿畏谓 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪; 危蔚 伪蠀蟿蠈 未蔚 渭慰蠀 伪蟺维谓蟿畏蟽蔚. 螘委谓伪喂 渭萎蟺蠅蟼 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 渭喂伪 伪蟻蠂萎 蟿畏蟼 慰蟺慰委伪蟼 畏 魏委谓畏蟽畏 纬委谓蔚蟿伪喂 渭蔚 蟿畏 胃苇位畏蟽畏; 螘委谓伪喂 未蠀慰 未喂伪蠁慰蟻蔚蟿喂魏苇蟼 蠁蠉蟽蔚喂蟼; 螖蔚谓 尉苇蟻蠅 伪位位维 未蔚谓 蟿喂蟼 蟿伪蠀蟿委味蠅.
螌蟺蠅蟼 蔚蟺委蟽畏蟼 胃蔚蠅蟻蠋 蔚位位喂蟺萎 蟿畏谓 蔚位维蠂喂蟽蟿畏 蔚尉苇蟿伪蟽畏 蟿畏蟼 伪谓维渭谓畏蟽畏蟼, 苇谓伪 胃苇渭伪 蟺慰蠀 渭蔚 伪蟺伪蟽蠂慰位蔚委 蟺慰位蠉 纬蔚谓喂魏维 魏伪喂 伪魏蠈渭畏 蟺蔚蟻喂蟽蟽蠈蟿蔚蟻慰 伪蠁蠈蟿慰蠀 未喂维尾伪蟽伪 蟿喂蟼 螛维位伪蟽蟽蔚蟼 蟿慰蠀 谓蠈蟿慰蠀, 蟿慰蠀 螠慰谓蟿伪位渭蟺维谓 蟺慰蠀 渭喂伪 伪蟺鈥� 蟿喂蟼 魏蔚谓蟿蟻喂魏苇蟼 喂未苇蔚蟼 蟺蟻慰苇蟻蠂蔚蟿伪喂 伪蟺蠈 苇谓伪 蟽蟿委蠂慰 魏维蟺慰喂慰蠀 蟺慰喂畏蟿萎 慰 慰蟺慰委慰蟼 位苇蔚喂 慰蠀蟽喂伪蟽蟿喂魏维 蟺蠅蟼 畏 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪 魏喂 畏 伪谓维渭谓畏蟽畏 未蔚 渭蟺慰蟻慰蠉谓 蟿伪蠀蟿蠈蠂蟻慰谓伪 谓伪 尾蟻委蟽魏慰谓蟿伪喂 蟽蟿慰谓 委未喂慰 蠂蠋蟻慰, 畏 渭喂伪 蔚委谓伪喂 未慰位慰蠁蠈谓慰蟼 蟿畏蟼 维位位畏蟼. 螖蔚谓 尉苇蟻蠅 伪谓 喂蟽蠂蠉蔚喂 慰蠉蟿蔚 伪蠀蟿蠈, 未苇蠂慰渭伪喂 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟿慰 位蠈纬慰 蟿慰蠀 蟺蠅蟼 畏 伪谓维渭谓畏蟽畏 尉蔚魏喂谓维蔚喂 伪蟺鈥� 蟿畏谓 蠄蠀蠂萎. 螖蔚 渭慰蠀 伪蟻魏蔚委 蠈渭蠅蟼.
韦苇位慰蟼 渭慰蠀 伪蟻苇蟽蔚喂 畏 喂未苇伪 魏伪喂 蟽蠀渭蠁蠅谓蠋 蟺蠅蟼 慰 谓慰蠀蟼 魏喂 畏 蠄蠀蠂萎 渭蔚 蟿喂蟼 喂魏伪谓蠈蟿畏蟿蔚蟼 蟿畏蟼 未蔚谓 蔚未蟻维味慰谓蟿伪喂 蟽蟿慰谓 委未喂慰 蟿蠈蟺慰.
螝伪喂 蟺维位喂 蠈渭蠅蟼 伪谓苇蟺蟿蠀尉蔚 蟺慰位蠉 蟿慰 胃苇渭伪 蟿慰蠀 蟿喂 位苇纬伪谓蔚 慰喂 蟺伪位伪喂蠈蟿蔚蟻慰喂, 蔚尉鈥� 委蟽慰蠀 蔚魏蟿蔚蟿伪渭苇谓伪 蟿喂蟼 委未喂蔚蟼 蟿喂蟼 伪喂蟽胃萎蟽蔚喂蟼 魏伪喂 蟽蟿畏 蟽魏苇蠄畏, 蟿畏 尾慰蠉位畏蟽畏, 蟿畏谓 蔚蟺喂胃蠀渭委伪, 蟿畏谓 伪谓维渭谓畏蟽畏 未蔚谓 苇未蠅蟽蔚 蟿畏谓 苇魏蟿伪蟽畏 蟺慰蠀 胃伪 萎胃蔚位伪.
3.5 伪蟽蟿苇蟻喂伪.
June 16, 2014
賰賳鬲 賯丿 賯乇兀鬲 賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賳賮爻 賱丕亘賳 亘丕噩丞 賵賴賵 賲賳 丕賰亘乇 卮乇丕丨 丕乇爻胤丕胤丕賱賷爻 亘毓丿 丕亘賳 爻賷賳丕 賵賯丿 賵囟丨 毓賱賲 丕賱賳賮爻 毓賱賶 賲賳賴噩 丕乇爻胤賵
丕毓噩亘賳賷 賲賲丕 噩丕亍 亘賰鬲丕亘賴 賯賵賱賴
賲賳 賱丕 賷賵孬賯 亘兀賳賴 賷毓乇賮 丨丕賱 賳賮爻賴 賮賴賵 丕禺賱賯 丕賳 賱丕 賷賵孬賯 亘賴 賮賷 賲毓乇賮丞 睾賷乇賴
兀賲丕 賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賳賮爻 賱丕乇爻胤賵 賮賯丿 乇兀賷鬲賴 賲賲鬲毓丕賸 丕賰孬乇 賲賳 賰鬲亘 丕賱卮乇丨 亘賱 賵丕亘爻胤
丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賴賳丕 賲賳 孬賱丕孬丞 丕噩夭丕亍 丕賱丕賵賱 賮賷 賲匕丕賴亘 丕賱賯丿賲丕亍 丕賱乇卅賷爻賷丞 賮賷 丕賱賳賮爻 賵丕賱孬丕賳賷丞 賮賷 鬲毓乇賷賮 丕賱賳賮爻 賵胤亘賷毓鬲賴丕 賵噩賵賴乇賴丕 賵鬲乇賰賷亘賴丕 賵丕賱賱賵丕夭賲 丕賱鬲賷 鬲鬲毓賱賯 亘丕賱丕丨賵丕賱 丕賱鬲賷 鬲禺氐 丕賱賳賮爻 亘丕賱匕丕鬲 賵丕賱丕丨賵丕賱 丕賱鬲賷 鬲禺氐賴丕 賮賷 丕賱丨賷賵丕賳 賵丨乇賰鬲賴丕 賵賷氐賮 丕賱賳賮爻 丕賳賴丕 賲賳賯爻賲丞 賮噩夭亍 賲賳賴丕 賷賮賰乇 賵噩夭亍 丕禺乇 賷卮鬲丕賯 賮賲丕匕丕 賷賵丨丿 丕賱賳賮爻 丕匕丕 賰丕賳鬲 亘胤亘賷毓鬲賴丕 賲賳賯爻賲丞責
賵丕賱孬丕賱孬丞 賮賷 丕賱丨爻 丕賱賲卮鬲乇賰 賵丕賱鬲禺賷賱 賵丕賱鬲賮賰賷乇 賵丕賱賳夭賵毓
丕毓噩亘賳賷 賲賲丕 噩丕亍 亘賰鬲丕亘賴 賯賵賱賴
賲賳 賱丕 賷賵孬賯 亘兀賳賴 賷毓乇賮 丨丕賱 賳賮爻賴 賮賴賵 丕禺賱賯 丕賳 賱丕 賷賵孬賯 亘賴 賮賷 賲毓乇賮丞 睾賷乇賴
兀賲丕 賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賳賮爻 賱丕乇爻胤賵 賮賯丿 乇兀賷鬲賴 賲賲鬲毓丕賸 丕賰孬乇 賲賳 賰鬲亘 丕賱卮乇丨 亘賱 賵丕亘爻胤
丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賴賳丕 賲賳 孬賱丕孬丞 丕噩夭丕亍 丕賱丕賵賱 賮賷 賲匕丕賴亘 丕賱賯丿賲丕亍 丕賱乇卅賷爻賷丞 賮賷 丕賱賳賮爻 賵丕賱孬丕賳賷丞 賮賷 鬲毓乇賷賮 丕賱賳賮爻 賵胤亘賷毓鬲賴丕 賵噩賵賴乇賴丕 賵鬲乇賰賷亘賴丕 賵丕賱賱賵丕夭賲 丕賱鬲賷 鬲鬲毓賱賯 亘丕賱丕丨賵丕賱 丕賱鬲賷 鬲禺氐 丕賱賳賮爻 亘丕賱匕丕鬲 賵丕賱丕丨賵丕賱 丕賱鬲賷 鬲禺氐賴丕 賮賷 丕賱丨賷賵丕賳 賵丨乇賰鬲賴丕 賵賷氐賮 丕賱賳賮爻 丕賳賴丕 賲賳賯爻賲丞 賮噩夭亍 賲賳賴丕 賷賮賰乇 賵噩夭亍 丕禺乇 賷卮鬲丕賯 賮賲丕匕丕 賷賵丨丿 丕賱賳賮爻 丕匕丕 賰丕賳鬲 亘胤亘賷毓鬲賴丕 賲賳賯爻賲丞責
賵丕賱孬丕賱孬丞 賮賷 丕賱丨爻 丕賱賲卮鬲乇賰 賵丕賱鬲禺賷賱 賵丕賱鬲賮賰賷乇 賵丕賱賳夭賵毓
April 8, 2016
Aristotle's De Anima was the primary text for the first part of my course on the history of philosophy: ancient philosophy. It is almost certainly composed of lecture notes by Aristotle and/or some of his more astute students. Its translation as On the Soul in English is likely to mislead, or at least to surprise, modern readers who have in mind the associations belonging to that laden word. For what we generally understand by 'the soul' is not that in which Aristotle is interested. In De Anima, Aristotle seeks to understand 'psyche', or that in virtue of which something is alive 鈥� which, of course, is a much broader investigation than translations of 'psyche' in English, like 'soul' (or 'mind', 'consciousness', etc.) would suggest. As Lawson-Tancred points out in his long and highly informative introduction to this edition, a more accurate translation of 'psyche' would be 'principle of life' or 'principle of animation' 鈥� and it is this principle that Aristotle examines in De Anima.
Aristotle begins from this notion, which runs through much of earlier Greek thought 鈥� namely that the soul is the principle of life, that which makes living things alive, and that which is responsible for the different living fuctions. He further refines the principle, after taking issue with his predecessors in Book I, in order to arrive at his account of the soul as the form of a living body, or more precisely, the 'first actuality (or first entelechy) of a natural body which has organs'. The first actuality is a special sort of potentiality (hexis), which is 'actual' compared to the potentialities of non-living things. Differently put, to speak of the soul is to speak of the potentialities that a living thing has for different forms of life. This account, ultimately, is descriptive/classificatory rather than explanatory: the notion of 'actuality' employed by Aristotle serves to distinguish the potentialities possessed by a living thing from the potentialities (for movement and change, for instance) held by inanimate bodies. As Hamlyn points out, Aristotle, in a relatively simplistic conceptual scheme, tries to distinguish between living things and inanimate things, and to provide a descriptive account of forms of life using a few schematic concepts like 'potentiality', 'activity', 'actuality', and 'being affected'. The manifestations of life are all considered as forms of change, or, more accurately, as the actualizations of various potentialities. These potentialities constitute the 'faculties' on which Aristotle expounds in De Anima, such as those of nutrition and reproduction, perception, and thought, as well as imagination and locomotion 鈥� which are fitted somewhere between perception and thought. These faculties are all things that a living thing can do or has the potential for doing, and Aristotle thinks that they form a hierarchy so that the higher functions are dependent on the lower. As Lawson-Tancred straightforwardly puts it in the introduction, the task of De Anima, for Aristotle, is to show how nutrition occurs in plants, animals, and men, how perception and motivation occur in animals and men but not plants, and how thought occurs in men alone of the species of which we have certain knowledge.
For all of its conceptual simplicity and partially outdated physiology, De Anima remains, as Hamlyn states, the first systematic attempt to account for all the activities of the soul and mind under a single theoretical umbrella. It is also the work that contains, as a consequence of Aristotle's diligent inquiry, the first systematic treatment of the imagination as a distinct faculty of the soul.
The professor for the ancient philosophy part of my course especially recommended this edition. For my essay, which is on Aristotle's treatment of the imagination (and Averro毛s' commentary on it), I am reading 4 different translations of De Anima; so far, I prefer Lawson-Tancred's translation, and his extensive introduction (116 pages!) to the work is excellent.
Aristotle begins from this notion, which runs through much of earlier Greek thought 鈥� namely that the soul is the principle of life, that which makes living things alive, and that which is responsible for the different living fuctions. He further refines the principle, after taking issue with his predecessors in Book I, in order to arrive at his account of the soul as the form of a living body, or more precisely, the 'first actuality (or first entelechy) of a natural body which has organs'. The first actuality is a special sort of potentiality (hexis), which is 'actual' compared to the potentialities of non-living things. Differently put, to speak of the soul is to speak of the potentialities that a living thing has for different forms of life. This account, ultimately, is descriptive/classificatory rather than explanatory: the notion of 'actuality' employed by Aristotle serves to distinguish the potentialities possessed by a living thing from the potentialities (for movement and change, for instance) held by inanimate bodies. As Hamlyn points out, Aristotle, in a relatively simplistic conceptual scheme, tries to distinguish between living things and inanimate things, and to provide a descriptive account of forms of life using a few schematic concepts like 'potentiality', 'activity', 'actuality', and 'being affected'. The manifestations of life are all considered as forms of change, or, more accurately, as the actualizations of various potentialities. These potentialities constitute the 'faculties' on which Aristotle expounds in De Anima, such as those of nutrition and reproduction, perception, and thought, as well as imagination and locomotion 鈥� which are fitted somewhere between perception and thought. These faculties are all things that a living thing can do or has the potential for doing, and Aristotle thinks that they form a hierarchy so that the higher functions are dependent on the lower. As Lawson-Tancred straightforwardly puts it in the introduction, the task of De Anima, for Aristotle, is to show how nutrition occurs in plants, animals, and men, how perception and motivation occur in animals and men but not plants, and how thought occurs in men alone of the species of which we have certain knowledge.
For all of its conceptual simplicity and partially outdated physiology, De Anima remains, as Hamlyn states, the first systematic attempt to account for all the activities of the soul and mind under a single theoretical umbrella. It is also the work that contains, as a consequence of Aristotle's diligent inquiry, the first systematic treatment of the imagination as a distinct faculty of the soul.
The professor for the ancient philosophy part of my course especially recommended this edition. For my essay, which is on Aristotle's treatment of the imagination (and Averro毛s' commentary on it), I am reading 4 different translations of De Anima; so far, I prefer Lawson-Tancred's translation, and his extensive introduction (116 pages!) to the work is excellent.
July 10, 2023
The human being, to Aristotle, is a body soul compound, driven by imagination and appetite, or the calculations of the mind. It is the soul that provide the animation to all animate beings, the pattern of all life to all living things, and the source of formation to all forms.
February 3, 2025
I thought it was a very good Aristotle work. I would have been disappointed if I would not have read it, by absence of solid foundational theological and metaphysical contemplation. Understand, this is a book on the harmony of different neurological, biological, and symbiotic processes into a central idea of efficient behavior. The different components of perception, intuition, sense-perception, and imagination are all tackled here. Each aspect of mental behavior with the combination of your body.
You have always known how the human body works, but did you know why it works? This work would be a good starting point.
You have always known how the human body works, but did you know why it works? This work would be a good starting point.
May 25, 2017
De Anima is filled with striking ideas: that the soul is the form of the body, that it is the body's "potential" or "capacity" and is only actualised in thought or action, that sense-perception receives the "forms" of things and not their "matter", that since everything is potentially an object of thought, and since the intellect is potentially any object of thought, the mind in some sense contains the universe. These ideas are delightful. As are Aristotle's similes. Ancient Greece must truly have been a civilisation of similitudes: Aristotle's lovely images, illustrating his points, remind me of Plato's allegories and Homer's epic comparisons. One of my favourite images, illustrating Aristotle's central thesis:
It is no surprise that Aristotle believes we can only think in images, and that perception and imagination are therefore necessary for the intellect.
I can't give the book a 5/5, despite all this, because it has in some ways seriously dated. It is not just a work of philosophy, but of science, and Aristotle's science has been left behind. There are many pages in here of arguments which are simply irrelevant today. This is in stark contrast to a book like the Poetics, for instance, every one of whose paragraphs continues to inspire actors, directors, playwrights, theatregoers and literary critics.
The apparatus in this Penguin edition is charmingly eccentric and genuinely helpful. Lawson-Tancred is surely right to argue that Aristotle's "third-personal" perspective on mental life and "non-substantialist" theory of the soul are the two most interesting aspects of his account for contemporary readers. His style is generally accessible, as he frequently reminds us, though I'm not sure all readers will be equally prepared for a discussion of monadic vs. diadic predication without prior warning or explanation. The summaries of each chapter help to ease the pain of Aristotle's dense exposition.
We should not then inquire whether the soul and body are one thing, any more than whether the wax and its imprint are, or in general whether the matter of each thing is one with that of which it is the matter.
It is no surprise that Aristotle believes we can only think in images, and that perception and imagination are therefore necessary for the intellect.
I can't give the book a 5/5, despite all this, because it has in some ways seriously dated. It is not just a work of philosophy, but of science, and Aristotle's science has been left behind. There are many pages in here of arguments which are simply irrelevant today. This is in stark contrast to a book like the Poetics, for instance, every one of whose paragraphs continues to inspire actors, directors, playwrights, theatregoers and literary critics.
The apparatus in this Penguin edition is charmingly eccentric and genuinely helpful. Lawson-Tancred is surely right to argue that Aristotle's "third-personal" perspective on mental life and "non-substantialist" theory of the soul are the two most interesting aspects of his account for contemporary readers. His style is generally accessible, as he frequently reminds us, though I'm not sure all readers will be equally prepared for a discussion of monadic vs. diadic predication without prior warning or explanation. The summaries of each chapter help to ease the pain of Aristotle's dense exposition.
January 22, 2024
Aristoteles his in tribus libris, qui "De Anima" appellantur, principium magnifici praecepti sui facit. Idem praeceptum in primis philosophia vivendi est - quid est vivere, quae res sunt viventes, quid sunt condiciones vitae? Igitur animam principium rerum viventium esse putat. Eam tres in partes dividit: Prima est alens, quem stirpes animalia homines habent, secunda percipiens, quem animalia hominesque habent, denique rationalis, quem solum homines habent. Eadem divisione etiam in libro I,13 Ethicae Nicomacheae utitur.
Praeterea multas veterum philosophorum doctrinas primo in libro "De Anima" colligit, explanat, aestimat. Idem magna veteris philosophiae Graecae fons est. Sunt multa testimonia Heracliti, Empedoclis, Platonis et aliorum illustrium philosophorum.
Certum est hanc librum omnibus, qui litteras et philosophiam Graecam ament, legendum esse!
Praeterea multas veterum philosophorum doctrinas primo in libro "De Anima" colligit, explanat, aestimat. Idem magna veteris philosophiae Graecae fons est. Sunt multa testimonia Heracliti, Empedoclis, Platonis et aliorum illustrium philosophorum.
Certum est hanc librum omnibus, qui litteras et philosophiam Graecam ament, legendum esse!
April 14, 2023
O livro "De Anima" (Da Alma), escrito por Arist贸teles, 茅 uma obra filos贸fica que trata da natureza da alma e suas fun莽玫es. Arist贸teles argumenta que a alma 茅 a forma do corpo e que ela 茅 respons谩vel pela vida, movimento e pensamento.
Arist贸teles divide a alma em tr锚s tipos: a alma vegetativa, a alma sensitiva e a alma racional. A alma vegetativa 茅 respons谩vel pelas fun莽玫es vitais dos seres vivos, como a nutri莽茫o, o crescimento e a reprodu莽茫o. A alma sensitiva 茅 respons谩vel pelas fun莽玫es sensoriais e emocionais, como a percep莽茫o, o desejo e a emo莽茫o. Por fim, a alma racional 茅 respons谩vel pelo pensamento e pela raz茫o.
Arist贸teles tamb茅m discute a rela莽茫o entre a alma e o corpo, argumentando que a alma 茅 insepar谩vel do corpo e que as fun莽玫es da alma dependem do corpo. Ele afirma que a alma 茅 mortal e que ela 茅 destru铆da quando o corpo morre.
Ao longo do livro, Arist贸teles explora v谩rias quest玫es filos贸ficas relacionadas 脿 alma, como a rela莽茫o entre a alma e a mente, a natureza da percep莽茫o e da mem贸ria, e a rela莽茫o entre a alma e a moralidade. "De Anima" 茅 uma obra fundamental na hist贸ria da filosofia e influenciou muitos fil贸sofos posteriores.
PS, eu te amo. E pedi ao aplicativo Ask AI para escrever isso para mim. Obtenha gratuitamente -->
Arist贸teles divide a alma em tr锚s tipos: a alma vegetativa, a alma sensitiva e a alma racional. A alma vegetativa 茅 respons谩vel pelas fun莽玫es vitais dos seres vivos, como a nutri莽茫o, o crescimento e a reprodu莽茫o. A alma sensitiva 茅 respons谩vel pelas fun莽玫es sensoriais e emocionais, como a percep莽茫o, o desejo e a emo莽茫o. Por fim, a alma racional 茅 respons谩vel pelo pensamento e pela raz茫o.
Arist贸teles tamb茅m discute a rela莽茫o entre a alma e o corpo, argumentando que a alma 茅 insepar谩vel do corpo e que as fun莽玫es da alma dependem do corpo. Ele afirma que a alma 茅 mortal e que ela 茅 destru铆da quando o corpo morre.
Ao longo do livro, Arist贸teles explora v谩rias quest玫es filos贸ficas relacionadas 脿 alma, como a rela莽茫o entre a alma e a mente, a natureza da percep莽茫o e da mem贸ria, e a rela莽茫o entre a alma e a moralidade. "De Anima" 茅 uma obra fundamental na hist贸ria da filosofia e influenciou muitos fil贸sofos posteriores.
PS, eu te amo. E pedi ao aplicativo Ask AI para escrever isso para mim. Obtenha gratuitamente -->
January 20, 2025
This book definitely well displays Aristotle's abilities. However, is it something that people should continue to read? I think that depends upon the person reading. Most of the time I felt bogged down in too much wordiness that makes it too hard to understand or appreciate, but every so often the words would pop out clearly to me and I could see why people still read him. I think that reading a classic is never a waste of time, but sometimes you have to take them with an understanding that their understanding seems basic to us.
January 5, 2022
Una obra un tanto dif铆cil de entender para el lector no iniciado. Arist贸teles parte de la existencia del alma para preguntarse: 驴qu茅 es el alma? y 驴en qu茅 consiste el alma? A partir de aqu铆, utilizar谩 su sabidur铆a y su conocimiento para tratar de responder a estas dos cuestiones fundamentales.
Entiendo que para poder realizar una lectura comprensiva de este texto es necesario contar con una buena base de conocimiento sobre los griegos cl谩sicos, y si es posible, tambi茅n con la orientaci贸n de alg煤n experto en la materia.
Recomendable.
Entiendo que para poder realizar una lectura comprensiva de este texto es necesario contar con una buena base de conocimiento sobre los griegos cl谩sicos, y si es posible, tambi茅n con la orientaci贸n de alg煤n experto en la materia.
Recomendable.
April 18, 2024
absolute banger
August 26, 2017
毓賳 丨賵丕爻 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳 丕賱禺賲爻 賷鬲丨丿孬 兀乇爻胤賵 賵賱賰賳 賲賳 賲賳馗賵乇 賮賱爻賮賶 賵 賲賮丕賴賷賲 賯丿賷賲丞 賵 賳馗乇賷丕鬲 亘毓賷丿丞 毓賳 丕賱毓賱賲 丕賱丨丿賷孬 .
January 5, 2023
As expected, Aristotle is right about most things.
July 5, 2016
It was very difficult to engage this book (the writing is bad), but there鈥檚 an overall perspective that might be gleaned from it.* Aristotle describes three levels of soul, each with distinctive characteristics (plant鈥搉utritive, animal-movement, and human-movement in thought). But underneath each the mission of life is the same. It鈥檚 to enable the body to survive and reproduce. Seen this way, today鈥檚 evolutionary theory adds a scientific basis to what Aristotle described over two thousand years ago: Replicating DNA as expressed in its plant, animal and human (body) forms, might be seen as the soul. It can be seen as a life force that actively seeks the objects it needs to survive (and replicate) and actively defends itself against threats.
While Aristotle鈥檚 final cause has been criticized, there鈥檚 an certain undeniably about it: Like an acorn growing into a tree, the human body does develop into its pre-determined (assuming favorable conditions) adult form. Looked at from the modern perspective, the final cause is not an external cause that pulls this development process. Rather, there鈥檚 a 鈥渓ife force鈥� (鈥渟oul鈥�) the development of which proceeds logically from within, toward an inevitable result (just like adding two and two ends up, necessarily, as four). It鈥檚 self-assembly and self-organization toward an inherent design of what is meant to be.
Aristotle and many modern-day thinkers focus on the essence of human soul as 鈥渕an鈥檚鈥� (i.e., human) capacity to think, but that鈥檚 only taking the cream from the top. This ability to think is a by-product of a mind that was developed to serve the same elemental goals seen in all of life: nurture, or the importation of energy to counter entropy, and replication. Seen this way, human essence (the soul), is life鈥檚 essence and life鈥檚 soul so that, at our most fundamental level, we are one with all of life, not its exception. In this sense, science is one with, say, Buddhism.
*This is my second time around with this book, but it鈥檚 a different edition and translation. It was interesting to compare this review with my August 2009 review on De Animas (On the Soul). While my reaction to the book is the same, both versions illustrate the potential issues involved with translation. On page one of De Animas, the translator (Hugh Lawson-Tancred) writes: 鈥淔or the soul is, so to speak, the first principle of living things.鈥� In this version I just read, translated by J.P. Smith, that same line is, 鈥淸F]or the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life.鈥� The former version is consistent with the intent of my review. The second version could be read to make a distinction between animal and human soul.
While Aristotle鈥檚 final cause has been criticized, there鈥檚 an certain undeniably about it: Like an acorn growing into a tree, the human body does develop into its pre-determined (assuming favorable conditions) adult form. Looked at from the modern perspective, the final cause is not an external cause that pulls this development process. Rather, there鈥檚 a 鈥渓ife force鈥� (鈥渟oul鈥�) the development of which proceeds logically from within, toward an inevitable result (just like adding two and two ends up, necessarily, as four). It鈥檚 self-assembly and self-organization toward an inherent design of what is meant to be.
Aristotle and many modern-day thinkers focus on the essence of human soul as 鈥渕an鈥檚鈥� (i.e., human) capacity to think, but that鈥檚 only taking the cream from the top. This ability to think is a by-product of a mind that was developed to serve the same elemental goals seen in all of life: nurture, or the importation of energy to counter entropy, and replication. Seen this way, human essence (the soul), is life鈥檚 essence and life鈥檚 soul so that, at our most fundamental level, we are one with all of life, not its exception. In this sense, science is one with, say, Buddhism.
*This is my second time around with this book, but it鈥檚 a different edition and translation. It was interesting to compare this review with my August 2009 review on De Animas (On the Soul). While my reaction to the book is the same, both versions illustrate the potential issues involved with translation. On page one of De Animas, the translator (Hugh Lawson-Tancred) writes: 鈥淔or the soul is, so to speak, the first principle of living things.鈥� In this version I just read, translated by J.P. Smith, that same line is, 鈥淸F]or the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life.鈥� The former version is consistent with the intent of my review. The second version could be read to make a distinction between animal and human soul.
October 6, 2016
En este importante ensayo el genio griego Arist贸teles intenta definir el concepto de alma desde una punto de vista biol贸gico y psicol贸gico de tal manera que se aleja de las corrientes religiosas que sus antepasados tuvieron con este tema.
Evidentemente nos encontramos con una obra puramente especulativa donde lo que es real e imaginario danzan a sus anchas en una obra que perfectamente podr铆a pasar por un libro de fantas铆a contempor谩neo. La falta de descubrimientos cient铆ficos sobre la realidad ha provocado desde siempre que las grandes mentes pensantes hayan intentado justificar las cosas a trav茅s de una manera muy personal pero al fin y al cabo leg铆tima sobre lo que implica la existencia.
Arist贸teles fue un adelantado a su 茅poca porque supo aunar el concepto abstracto del alma con la vida y el universo f铆sicos, algo que hasta entonces a ning煤n fil贸sofo se le hab铆a ocurrido, manteni茅ndose sus ideas vigentes y m谩s o menos aceptadas durante dos milenios.
Desde un punto de vista vigente lo m谩s interesante de este tratado es el estudio y reflexi贸n que el griego hace de los sentidos, su funcionamiento y su finalidad, parte que adem谩s se hace sumamente interesante porque me permiti贸 fijarme en aspectos de mi propia fisiolog铆a en las que nunca me hab铆a parado a reflexionar por resultarme demasiado obvio y natural.
Esta concepci贸n del an谩lisis de la naturaleza desde una perspectiva que mezclaba lo emp铆rico con lo racional fue la base en torno a la cual se construy贸 el m茅todo cient铆fico y que convirti贸 a Arist贸teles en uno de los primeros ejemplos de cient铆ficos tal y como los conocemos hoy d铆a.
As铆 mismo, su visi贸n del cosmos como un todo formado por peque帽as partes que originan una armon铆a superior y perfecta es el origen de gran parte del anhelo de los cient铆ficos modernos por buscar una gran realidad unificadora, en cierto modo propulsora de la teor铆a del todo y del modelo de supercuerdas, salvando las evidentes diferencias entre la cosmovisi贸n de unos y de otros.
Por 煤ltimo destacar las teor铆as de Arist贸teles sobre la imaginaci贸n y el intelecto. La realidad que conocemos de las cosas se llevan a cabo a trav茅s del procesamiento mental de los elementos que captamos sensorialmente, de tal manera que cada pensamiento va a asociado a una imagen, sonido, olor, etc. De esta manera la realidad es esencialmente una construcci贸n sensorial y en cierta manera limitada por estos mismos sentidos, por lo que la especulaci贸n racional, a pesar de tener una base igualmente sensorial, constituye en muchas ocasiones la 煤nica manera de captar y representar lo que est谩 m谩s all谩 de lo estrictamente sensorial, aunque en s铆 mismo, esta realidad, sea al fin y al cabo una construcci贸n sensorial, m谩s abstracta o compleja si se prefiere pero esencialmente terrenal.
Evidentemente nos encontramos con una obra puramente especulativa donde lo que es real e imaginario danzan a sus anchas en una obra que perfectamente podr铆a pasar por un libro de fantas铆a contempor谩neo. La falta de descubrimientos cient铆ficos sobre la realidad ha provocado desde siempre que las grandes mentes pensantes hayan intentado justificar las cosas a trav茅s de una manera muy personal pero al fin y al cabo leg铆tima sobre lo que implica la existencia.
Arist贸teles fue un adelantado a su 茅poca porque supo aunar el concepto abstracto del alma con la vida y el universo f铆sicos, algo que hasta entonces a ning煤n fil贸sofo se le hab铆a ocurrido, manteni茅ndose sus ideas vigentes y m谩s o menos aceptadas durante dos milenios.
Desde un punto de vista vigente lo m谩s interesante de este tratado es el estudio y reflexi贸n que el griego hace de los sentidos, su funcionamiento y su finalidad, parte que adem谩s se hace sumamente interesante porque me permiti贸 fijarme en aspectos de mi propia fisiolog铆a en las que nunca me hab铆a parado a reflexionar por resultarme demasiado obvio y natural.
Esta concepci贸n del an谩lisis de la naturaleza desde una perspectiva que mezclaba lo emp铆rico con lo racional fue la base en torno a la cual se construy贸 el m茅todo cient铆fico y que convirti贸 a Arist贸teles en uno de los primeros ejemplos de cient铆ficos tal y como los conocemos hoy d铆a.
As铆 mismo, su visi贸n del cosmos como un todo formado por peque帽as partes que originan una armon铆a superior y perfecta es el origen de gran parte del anhelo de los cient铆ficos modernos por buscar una gran realidad unificadora, en cierto modo propulsora de la teor铆a del todo y del modelo de supercuerdas, salvando las evidentes diferencias entre la cosmovisi贸n de unos y de otros.
Por 煤ltimo destacar las teor铆as de Arist贸teles sobre la imaginaci贸n y el intelecto. La realidad que conocemos de las cosas se llevan a cabo a trav茅s del procesamiento mental de los elementos que captamos sensorialmente, de tal manera que cada pensamiento va a asociado a una imagen, sonido, olor, etc. De esta manera la realidad es esencialmente una construcci贸n sensorial y en cierta manera limitada por estos mismos sentidos, por lo que la especulaci贸n racional, a pesar de tener una base igualmente sensorial, constituye en muchas ocasiones la 煤nica manera de captar y representar lo que est谩 m谩s all谩 de lo estrictamente sensorial, aunque en s铆 mismo, esta realidad, sea al fin y al cabo una construcci贸n sensorial, m谩s abstracta o compleja si se prefiere pero esencialmente terrenal.
April 14, 2021
This was an interesting read, I was surprised at the degree to which he didn't touch upon the phenomenological side of the mind. In my view, it seemed closer to a form of non-reductive physicalism than any form of dualism.
I'd be interested to read Aquinas' commentary to see how he makes this compatible with the immortality of the soul.
I'd be interested to read Aquinas' commentary to see how he makes this compatible with the immortality of the soul.
April 7, 2013
丕賱鬲賯乇賷乇 賱丕丨賯丕賸 丕賳 卮丕亍 丕賱賱賴
賱賰賳 丕賱鬲丨賯賷賯 噩賲賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賱 賲賳 賳爻禺鬲賷賳 丕賳噩賱賷夭賷鬲賷賳 賲賳 兀噩賵丿 丕賱賳爻禺 賰賲丕 匕賰乇 + 賲賯丕乇賳丞 賲毓 賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賳賮爻 賱丕亘賳 乇卮丿 丕賱賱賷 賴賵 賲賳 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲賱亘 + 賲乇丕噩毓丞 毓賱賶 丕賱賷賵賳丕賳賷丞 賲賳 丕賱兀亘 噩賵乇噩.
兀賯賱 丕賱賮丕卅丿丞 賳胤賱毓 亘亘毓囟 丕賱賲氐胤賱丨丕鬲 亘丿賱丕賱鬲賴丕 丕賱賷賵賳丕賳賷丞
賱賰賳 丕賱鬲丨賯賷賯 噩賲賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賷賱 賲賳 賳爻禺鬲賷賳 丕賳噩賱賷夭賷鬲賷賳 賲賳 兀噩賵丿 丕賱賳爻禺 賰賲丕 匕賰乇 + 賲賯丕乇賳丞 賲毓 賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賳賮爻 賱丕亘賳 乇卮丿 丕賱賱賷 賴賵 賲賳 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲賱亘 + 賲乇丕噩毓丞 毓賱賶 丕賱賷賵賳丕賳賷丞 賲賳 丕賱兀亘 噩賵乇噩.
兀賯賱 丕賱賮丕卅丿丞 賳胤賱毓 亘亘毓囟 丕賱賲氐胤賱丨丕鬲 亘丿賱丕賱鬲賴丕 丕賱賷賵賳丕賳賷丞
March 8, 2021
A soul is what moves a body to action. It turns the potential into kinetic.
Love this work so much that it inspired me to write an entire story about transforming the potential into kinetic within a man's soul.
Highly recommend!
Love this work so much that it inspired me to write an entire story about transforming the potential into kinetic within a man's soul.
Highly recommend!
August 20, 2019
De Anima (On the Soul) is Aristotle's introduction to a series of lectures on biology. Let this remark work on you for a moment. This is a radically different conception of the soul compared to us modern people. We stand firmly in the Cartesian tradition of substance-dualism, which implies there's matter and there's mind/soul. We think in terms of the soul or the mind both a centre of control and the subject of psychology, and this makes it hard for us to grasp the worldview of people who do not see the world in this way.
Aristotle is a case on point. For him the soul was neither a subject of psychology (this science didn't even exist) nor a centre of control in human beings. For Aristotle, the soul was the principle of life, distinguishing dead matter from living matter. Living things have a soul, the rest of nature moves according to his physical notions like 'natural place', 'rest' and 'unnatural movement through imparted force'. Again, let this work on you for a moment.
Aristotle thus claims that plants, animals, humans and all other possibly existing living beings have in common that they have a soul - are ensouled. The soul allows the living being to actualize its potential whether or not this actually happens or not. So a plant is able to feed itself through its roots whether at this particular moment it does so or not, and it is the soul that allows this function to actualize. I am able to perceive an object in potential whether I do so, right now and right here, or not - and it is my soul that allows this function to exist potentially and actualize itself.
It takes a little while to get used to this conception, but luckily Aristotle starts De Anima with an exposition of earlier theories of the soul. In general, all these earlier explanations were substantialist - explaining the soul as a thing. The main difference between particular philosophers was the nature of this thing: Is the soul made of matter or of spirit?
Natural philosophers like Thales or Herakleitos claimed everything, including the soul, was constituted from one element (respectively water and fire), while someone like Empedocles claimed everything was a mixture of multiple elements. The atomists (Leucippus and Democritus) claimed everything was the product of the interaction of indivisible elementary particles, while Anaxoras claimed that Nous (Intelligence) is both the ordering principle of the universe and the moving power of all in it, making his conception of soul (an imperfect Nous) rather undefinable.
According to Aristotle, all these theories seek explanations on the wrong level 鈥� the dig too deep, so to speak. This immediately rings a bell for those who are familiar with the reductionist debate in modern science. A reductionist is someone who claims that any scientific object of study should 鈥� at least in theory 鈥� be explained in terms of more fundamental parts. So a psychologist should explain human cognitive capacities in terms of neurological processes (neural networks, etc.); while the neuroscientist studying this should explain all these processes in terms of biochemical interactions on the molecular level; and the biochemist should, ultimately, explain everything in terms of moving atoms, handing de foundation of his science to the particle physicist, who then exclaims: All atoms are made up more fundamental particles, which are made up of quarks, which are possibly be made up of superstrings 鈥� and where does it end? Whether such a reductionist approach is fruitful (I think it is) I leave unanswered, but Aristotle seems to claim so.
Aristotle looks at the functions that living beings show in their natural habitat, and then explains these functions in terms of biological purposes 鈥� a stance we could call 鈥榖iological functionalism鈥�. All the materialists look at the material living beings are made from, and claim this explains their biological functions 鈥� a stance we could call 鈥榩hysicalistic reductionism鈥�. This is an interesting observation Aristotle makes and we have to grant him his victory (especially since most materialist theories were rather vague, ambiguous or downright mysticism).
What about the alternative to materialist substantialism, psychological substantialism? Couldn鈥檛 the soul be an immaterial thing? This is the view that Pythagoras and his sect took: they claimed Nature is ultimately composed of numbers 鈥� ratios between things. This might sound absurd, but it is actually pretty close to modern day physics which describes nature in purely mathematical terms and claims this explains how Nature works. According to the Pythagoreans, everything stands in a relationship with everything else, and these relations can be expressed in ratios and ultimately are result harmony. This leads to a conception of the soul as an immaterial harmony or ratio.
And then we have Plato鈥檚 theory of Forms, which explains how the soul is an immaterial thing which exists in the realm of Ideas, where it gazes at all these perfect Forms, and only temporarily gets shackled into a corrupted material body, where it longs to break free again at the bodily death.
According to Aristotle, both these immaterial explanations of the soul cannot explain how the bodies of living beings move. This is only a legitimate criticism if one accepts, with Aristotle, that a theory of the soul should explain certain biological functions, like nutrition, movement, sense-perception and intelligence. But I think we can grant him his victory against the immaterialists as well 鈥� if not for the simple fact that any immaterial conception of the soul fails to explain the interaction with matter (this is a stumbling block for all people who believe in souls as immaterial things).
But now, in part 2 of De Anima, Aristotle has to offer his own explanation of the soul 鈥� and this he does superbly. He starts by asking what the soul actually is: Is it a thing? Or is it a part? Or what is it? He answers this tricky question with his own 鈥榟ylemorphism鈥�: matter does not exist formless, all things are composites of both matter and form. The form is what gives the matter its potential to actualize itself, so to speak. So, the soul is the form of living being, which is itself composed of matter. Furthermore, the soul possesses certain faculties, which allow the living being to function properly 鈥� these are the nutritive faculty, sense-perception, imagination, intelligence and the faculty of desire (as intrinsic principle of motivation). It is important to note the distinction with theories that claim the soul consists of multiple parts and Aristotle鈥檚 claim that the soul possesses multiple faculties 鈥� for Aristotle never claims the soul consists of parts (since the soul is not a thing). For example, Plato views the soul as consisting of a Rational, Desirous, and Proud part, which are in constant conflict with each other and its solution lying in the Rational part taking the reins, so to speak. This tripartite division of the soul is something Aristotle will not allow, since he claims the soul to be a form, not a thing.
The rest of book 2 and the first part of book 3 deal with an exposition of all the faculties of the soul. It goes too far to reproduce all these, mostly outdated, visions on how (e.g.) the senses operate and how nutrition is converted into bodily material. The gist of the story is that the soul functions as a formal, efficient and final cause for living beings: it impresses a form on the matter we鈥檙e build from, it works on us to produce changes inside us, and it lets us act in the world through pursuing goals, etc.
An important observation is that Aristotle views nutrition as the most primary faculty of the soul, since all living things possess it. Plants, animals, humans 鈥� all have to eat, grow and then decay. Nutrition prepares the organism for activity.
When dealing with sense-perception, Aristotle distinguishes the fives sense of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. The first three are indirect, and need a medium to transmit the form of the sense-object to our soul. Aristotle, for example, views light as the medium which carries colour from the sense-object into our eyes and from there into our soul. Taste and touch work through direct contact of the organism with the sense-object, and touch is the most primary sense 鈥� Aristotle grants it such a grandiose status that he claims that without touch the animal dies and that excessive touch kills the organism.
He further distinguishes between three types of perception: (1) of a specific object (like colour, sound, smell); (2) integrated/common perception (like movement, rest, number, shape, size); and (3) incidental perception (like seeing the whiteness of some particular person which is itself the sense-object).
The most remarking suggestion by Aristotle in his dealings with the senses and perception, is that our senses are not simple but composite. We not only perceive objects, we also perceive ourselves perceiving the object. This seems to suggest some form of proto-subjectivism 脿 la Descartes, but in Aristotle there are no notions of a perceiving subject (or a subjective experience) 鈥� at all.
With these sense-perceptions we start to climb to the higher faculties of the soul. We use these perceptions to imagine things 鈥� conceived as 鈥榠nner movement鈥� resulting from sensual perception. Once again we see Aristotle offer a purely physical explanation (movements of particles) for a faculty of the soul, once again emphasizing his lack of subjectivism. Besides imagination human beings are alone in possessing intelligence. And it is when dealing with the human intellect that the historical importance of De Anima becomes clear.
Aristotle starts by claiming that our understanding is, on the one hand, potentially the objects of my thoughts (脿 la John Locke鈥檚 鈥榯abula rasa鈥� 鈥� an unwritten tablet) and, on the other hand, our understanding is nothing in reality without/before thinking. So my understanding has the potential of becoming all things (as thought-objects) while at the same time it has the potential to actualize all these things (as thought-objects). This seems to imply that there are two types of intellect 鈥� a passive one which receives all the impressions and an active one which itself sets things in motion.
Later, Christian and Islamic, writers would seize upon this distinction between passive and active intellect in Aristotle to mould his theory of the soul into a theological framework. One has to do this, if one wants to integrate Aristotle into Christianity (or Islam), since Aristotle doesn鈥檛 conceive of the soul as a thing, let alone an immaterial and infinite thing. The Christian conception of the Soul simply doesn鈥檛 fit into Aristotle鈥檚 philosophy. But if you can claim that the active intellect in a sense exists apart from the rest of Aristotle鈥檚 faculties of the soul, you have a foot between the door to infuse all the rest of the theological notions into this one obscure Aristotelean appendix. So, for example, Thomas Aquinas would later claim that the active part of the intellect would survive the bodily death and thus is perfectly commensurable with theological doctrines and Scripture.
Anyway, back to Aristotle. The final faculty of the soul he deals with is desire, which motivates us 鈥� literally moves us. For him, the motivating capacity of the soul houses in desire 鈥� the intellect cannot set us into motion, it can only reason about things. Only when things move us, we start to move 鈥� so desire is a precondition for movement (This sounds rather like David Hume who claimed that 鈥淩eason is a slave of the Passions鈥�). For Aristotle this process of motivation consists of three parts: the object of desire, the desire, and the organism that moves. And this is a problem, since both the desired object and the organism can be explained in terms of physics, but the desire itself seems to elude this fate. How can Aristotle describe our desires in physical terms? He doesn鈥檛 do so 鈥� although he presents it in a physical framework.
Aristotle ends De Anima with a short explanation how the sense of touch is the most fundamental condition of existence for living things. Too much touch will kill them; without touch they don鈥檛 exist at all. Why he thinks this is rather a puzzle to me, but perhaps the statements were simply meant as a transition between the end of De Anima and his lectures on biology?
To summarize, for Aristotle the soul is a life-giving principle that all living things possess; the form it impresses upon the living thing allows that thing to function in various ways in its environment; and to understand these organisms we have to look at the functions they perform and how these are related to the matter and form of which they consist. This means, in ultimo, that all of Nature, including dead matter, serves particular functions or goals, so we can call Aristotle鈥檚 worldview 鈥榯eleological physiology鈥� 鈥� describing all things in physical terms and explain them in relation to their various purposes. Plants, animals and humans possess the nutritive faculty; animals and humans possess sense-perception and movement (albeit in various degrees); and only humans possess intelligence (i.e. imagination and supposition/reasoning).
It is easy to shoot many holes into this conception of the soul and especially into the particular physical descriptions of particular senses and faculties. But this is not the point: Aristotle offers us the soul as a framework with which to look at the living world and I find this a truly inspirational outlook on things. The book itself is rather readable (for Aristotelean standards) and accessible, and I think reading both Fysica and De Anima offers one a very decent conception of Aristotle鈥檚 view of the world, both in terms of moving matter and living beings. And finally, I keep being amazed at how readable this stuff of 2500 years ago is 鈥� this is perhaps the most impressive feat of Aristotle.
Aristotle is a case on point. For him the soul was neither a subject of psychology (this science didn't even exist) nor a centre of control in human beings. For Aristotle, the soul was the principle of life, distinguishing dead matter from living matter. Living things have a soul, the rest of nature moves according to his physical notions like 'natural place', 'rest' and 'unnatural movement through imparted force'. Again, let this work on you for a moment.
Aristotle thus claims that plants, animals, humans and all other possibly existing living beings have in common that they have a soul - are ensouled. The soul allows the living being to actualize its potential whether or not this actually happens or not. So a plant is able to feed itself through its roots whether at this particular moment it does so or not, and it is the soul that allows this function to actualize. I am able to perceive an object in potential whether I do so, right now and right here, or not - and it is my soul that allows this function to exist potentially and actualize itself.
It takes a little while to get used to this conception, but luckily Aristotle starts De Anima with an exposition of earlier theories of the soul. In general, all these earlier explanations were substantialist - explaining the soul as a thing. The main difference between particular philosophers was the nature of this thing: Is the soul made of matter or of spirit?
Natural philosophers like Thales or Herakleitos claimed everything, including the soul, was constituted from one element (respectively water and fire), while someone like Empedocles claimed everything was a mixture of multiple elements. The atomists (Leucippus and Democritus) claimed everything was the product of the interaction of indivisible elementary particles, while Anaxoras claimed that Nous (Intelligence) is both the ordering principle of the universe and the moving power of all in it, making his conception of soul (an imperfect Nous) rather undefinable.
According to Aristotle, all these theories seek explanations on the wrong level 鈥� the dig too deep, so to speak. This immediately rings a bell for those who are familiar with the reductionist debate in modern science. A reductionist is someone who claims that any scientific object of study should 鈥� at least in theory 鈥� be explained in terms of more fundamental parts. So a psychologist should explain human cognitive capacities in terms of neurological processes (neural networks, etc.); while the neuroscientist studying this should explain all these processes in terms of biochemical interactions on the molecular level; and the biochemist should, ultimately, explain everything in terms of moving atoms, handing de foundation of his science to the particle physicist, who then exclaims: All atoms are made up more fundamental particles, which are made up of quarks, which are possibly be made up of superstrings 鈥� and where does it end? Whether such a reductionist approach is fruitful (I think it is) I leave unanswered, but Aristotle seems to claim so.
Aristotle looks at the functions that living beings show in their natural habitat, and then explains these functions in terms of biological purposes 鈥� a stance we could call 鈥榖iological functionalism鈥�. All the materialists look at the material living beings are made from, and claim this explains their biological functions 鈥� a stance we could call 鈥榩hysicalistic reductionism鈥�. This is an interesting observation Aristotle makes and we have to grant him his victory (especially since most materialist theories were rather vague, ambiguous or downright mysticism).
What about the alternative to materialist substantialism, psychological substantialism? Couldn鈥檛 the soul be an immaterial thing? This is the view that Pythagoras and his sect took: they claimed Nature is ultimately composed of numbers 鈥� ratios between things. This might sound absurd, but it is actually pretty close to modern day physics which describes nature in purely mathematical terms and claims this explains how Nature works. According to the Pythagoreans, everything stands in a relationship with everything else, and these relations can be expressed in ratios and ultimately are result harmony. This leads to a conception of the soul as an immaterial harmony or ratio.
And then we have Plato鈥檚 theory of Forms, which explains how the soul is an immaterial thing which exists in the realm of Ideas, where it gazes at all these perfect Forms, and only temporarily gets shackled into a corrupted material body, where it longs to break free again at the bodily death.
According to Aristotle, both these immaterial explanations of the soul cannot explain how the bodies of living beings move. This is only a legitimate criticism if one accepts, with Aristotle, that a theory of the soul should explain certain biological functions, like nutrition, movement, sense-perception and intelligence. But I think we can grant him his victory against the immaterialists as well 鈥� if not for the simple fact that any immaterial conception of the soul fails to explain the interaction with matter (this is a stumbling block for all people who believe in souls as immaterial things).
But now, in part 2 of De Anima, Aristotle has to offer his own explanation of the soul 鈥� and this he does superbly. He starts by asking what the soul actually is: Is it a thing? Or is it a part? Or what is it? He answers this tricky question with his own 鈥榟ylemorphism鈥�: matter does not exist formless, all things are composites of both matter and form. The form is what gives the matter its potential to actualize itself, so to speak. So, the soul is the form of living being, which is itself composed of matter. Furthermore, the soul possesses certain faculties, which allow the living being to function properly 鈥� these are the nutritive faculty, sense-perception, imagination, intelligence and the faculty of desire (as intrinsic principle of motivation). It is important to note the distinction with theories that claim the soul consists of multiple parts and Aristotle鈥檚 claim that the soul possesses multiple faculties 鈥� for Aristotle never claims the soul consists of parts (since the soul is not a thing). For example, Plato views the soul as consisting of a Rational, Desirous, and Proud part, which are in constant conflict with each other and its solution lying in the Rational part taking the reins, so to speak. This tripartite division of the soul is something Aristotle will not allow, since he claims the soul to be a form, not a thing.
The rest of book 2 and the first part of book 3 deal with an exposition of all the faculties of the soul. It goes too far to reproduce all these, mostly outdated, visions on how (e.g.) the senses operate and how nutrition is converted into bodily material. The gist of the story is that the soul functions as a formal, efficient and final cause for living beings: it impresses a form on the matter we鈥檙e build from, it works on us to produce changes inside us, and it lets us act in the world through pursuing goals, etc.
An important observation is that Aristotle views nutrition as the most primary faculty of the soul, since all living things possess it. Plants, animals, humans 鈥� all have to eat, grow and then decay. Nutrition prepares the organism for activity.
When dealing with sense-perception, Aristotle distinguishes the fives sense of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and touching. The first three are indirect, and need a medium to transmit the form of the sense-object to our soul. Aristotle, for example, views light as the medium which carries colour from the sense-object into our eyes and from there into our soul. Taste and touch work through direct contact of the organism with the sense-object, and touch is the most primary sense 鈥� Aristotle grants it such a grandiose status that he claims that without touch the animal dies and that excessive touch kills the organism.
He further distinguishes between three types of perception: (1) of a specific object (like colour, sound, smell); (2) integrated/common perception (like movement, rest, number, shape, size); and (3) incidental perception (like seeing the whiteness of some particular person which is itself the sense-object).
The most remarking suggestion by Aristotle in his dealings with the senses and perception, is that our senses are not simple but composite. We not only perceive objects, we also perceive ourselves perceiving the object. This seems to suggest some form of proto-subjectivism 脿 la Descartes, but in Aristotle there are no notions of a perceiving subject (or a subjective experience) 鈥� at all.
With these sense-perceptions we start to climb to the higher faculties of the soul. We use these perceptions to imagine things 鈥� conceived as 鈥榠nner movement鈥� resulting from sensual perception. Once again we see Aristotle offer a purely physical explanation (movements of particles) for a faculty of the soul, once again emphasizing his lack of subjectivism. Besides imagination human beings are alone in possessing intelligence. And it is when dealing with the human intellect that the historical importance of De Anima becomes clear.
Aristotle starts by claiming that our understanding is, on the one hand, potentially the objects of my thoughts (脿 la John Locke鈥檚 鈥榯abula rasa鈥� 鈥� an unwritten tablet) and, on the other hand, our understanding is nothing in reality without/before thinking. So my understanding has the potential of becoming all things (as thought-objects) while at the same time it has the potential to actualize all these things (as thought-objects). This seems to imply that there are two types of intellect 鈥� a passive one which receives all the impressions and an active one which itself sets things in motion.
Later, Christian and Islamic, writers would seize upon this distinction between passive and active intellect in Aristotle to mould his theory of the soul into a theological framework. One has to do this, if one wants to integrate Aristotle into Christianity (or Islam), since Aristotle doesn鈥檛 conceive of the soul as a thing, let alone an immaterial and infinite thing. The Christian conception of the Soul simply doesn鈥檛 fit into Aristotle鈥檚 philosophy. But if you can claim that the active intellect in a sense exists apart from the rest of Aristotle鈥檚 faculties of the soul, you have a foot between the door to infuse all the rest of the theological notions into this one obscure Aristotelean appendix. So, for example, Thomas Aquinas would later claim that the active part of the intellect would survive the bodily death and thus is perfectly commensurable with theological doctrines and Scripture.
Anyway, back to Aristotle. The final faculty of the soul he deals with is desire, which motivates us 鈥� literally moves us. For him, the motivating capacity of the soul houses in desire 鈥� the intellect cannot set us into motion, it can only reason about things. Only when things move us, we start to move 鈥� so desire is a precondition for movement (This sounds rather like David Hume who claimed that 鈥淩eason is a slave of the Passions鈥�). For Aristotle this process of motivation consists of three parts: the object of desire, the desire, and the organism that moves. And this is a problem, since both the desired object and the organism can be explained in terms of physics, but the desire itself seems to elude this fate. How can Aristotle describe our desires in physical terms? He doesn鈥檛 do so 鈥� although he presents it in a physical framework.
Aristotle ends De Anima with a short explanation how the sense of touch is the most fundamental condition of existence for living things. Too much touch will kill them; without touch they don鈥檛 exist at all. Why he thinks this is rather a puzzle to me, but perhaps the statements were simply meant as a transition between the end of De Anima and his lectures on biology?
To summarize, for Aristotle the soul is a life-giving principle that all living things possess; the form it impresses upon the living thing allows that thing to function in various ways in its environment; and to understand these organisms we have to look at the functions they perform and how these are related to the matter and form of which they consist. This means, in ultimo, that all of Nature, including dead matter, serves particular functions or goals, so we can call Aristotle鈥檚 worldview 鈥榯eleological physiology鈥� 鈥� describing all things in physical terms and explain them in relation to their various purposes. Plants, animals and humans possess the nutritive faculty; animals and humans possess sense-perception and movement (albeit in various degrees); and only humans possess intelligence (i.e. imagination and supposition/reasoning).
It is easy to shoot many holes into this conception of the soul and especially into the particular physical descriptions of particular senses and faculties. But this is not the point: Aristotle offers us the soul as a framework with which to look at the living world and I find this a truly inspirational outlook on things. The book itself is rather readable (for Aristotelean standards) and accessible, and I think reading both Fysica and De Anima offers one a very decent conception of Aristotle鈥檚 view of the world, both in terms of moving matter and living beings. And finally, I keep being amazed at how readable this stuff of 2500 years ago is 鈥� this is perhaps the most impressive feat of Aristotle.
November 3, 2024
Aristoteles'in "Peri Psykhes" adl谋 felsefi metninde ruh kavram谋 derinlemesine ele al谋n谋r. Ruh, do臒al bir bedenin ilk yetkinli臒idir. Aristoteles'e g枚re, t眉m d眉艧眉n眉rler ruhu 眉莽 temel 枚zellikle tan谋mlar: devinim, duyumsama ve cisimden ba臒谋ms谋z olma. Bu 枚zellikler temel ilkelere indirgenir. Aristoteles, Platon'un beden-ruh ikili臒i g枚r眉艧眉n眉 reddederek bunlar谋n ayr谋lmaz bir b眉t眉n oldu臒unu savunur.
Aristoteles, ruh kavram谋n谋 眉莽 temel yeti 眉zerinden a莽谋klar: t眉m canl谋larda bulunan besleyici yeti (b眉y眉me, beslenme, 眉reme), hayvanlarda ve insanlarda bulunan duyumsay谋c谋 yeti (alg谋 ve hareket) ve yaln谋zca insana 枚zg眉 olan akledici yeti (d眉艧眉nme ve ak谋l y眉r眉tme). Eserin birinci kitab谋nda ruhu ve devinimi inceleyen Aristoteles, kitab谋n sonunda 艧u soruyu sorar: Ruh bir b眉t眉n m眉d眉r, yoksa par莽alar谋n谋n i艧levlerini mi yerine getirir? Ruhun par莽alar谋 hem birbiriyle hem de b眉t眉n眉yle t眉rde艧tir. Aristoteles bu yakla艧谋m谋yla canl谋 varl谋臒谋n 枚z眉n眉 olu艧turan ruhun, bedenden ayr谋 d眉艧眉n眉lemeyece臒ini vurgular. Ona g枚re ruh, canl谋 varl谋臒谋n formu (eidos), beden ise maddesidir (hyle). Organizman谋n b眉t眉nsel yap谋s谋 bu 艧ekilde varl谋臒谋n谋 s眉rd眉r眉r. Ruh, canl谋l谋臒谋n temel ilkesi ve hareketin kayna臒谋 olarak varolanlar谋n bir bi莽imde t眉m眉n眉 kapsar.
陌nsan zihninin i艧leyi艧i ve bilgi edinme s眉reci hakk谋nda Aristoteles tekrar yetilere ba艧vurur. Bilgi edinme s眉reci duyumla ba艧lay谋p ak谋l y眉r眉tmeyle tamamlan谋r. Duyumsay谋c谋 yetinin alg谋lad谋klar谋, akledici yeti sayesinde kavramlara d枚n眉艧眉r. Edilgin ak谋l duyumlardan gelen bilgiyi i艧leyen zihinsel yap谋y谋, etkin ak谋l ise soyut d眉艧眉nce ve evrensel bilgiye ula艧mam谋z谋 sa臒layan yetiyi temsil eder. Bu noktada d眉艧眉nme ve duyumsama birbirinden ayr谋l谋r, ancak zihin-beden b眉t眉nl眉臒眉 korunur. Ruh; zihinsel s眉re莽lerin temeli, hareket ve duyum yetilerininin bedendeki kar艧谋l谋臒谋d谋r. Ayr谋ca Ruh 脺zerine metni; canl谋l谋k, bilin莽, alg谋 ve d眉艧眉nme gibi temel felsefi problemlere de 谋艧谋k tutar.
Aristoteles, ruh kavram谋n谋 眉莽 temel yeti 眉zerinden a莽谋klar: t眉m canl谋larda bulunan besleyici yeti (b眉y眉me, beslenme, 眉reme), hayvanlarda ve insanlarda bulunan duyumsay谋c谋 yeti (alg谋 ve hareket) ve yaln谋zca insana 枚zg眉 olan akledici yeti (d眉艧眉nme ve ak谋l y眉r眉tme). Eserin birinci kitab谋nda ruhu ve devinimi inceleyen Aristoteles, kitab谋n sonunda 艧u soruyu sorar: Ruh bir b眉t眉n m眉d眉r, yoksa par莽alar谋n谋n i艧levlerini mi yerine getirir? Ruhun par莽alar谋 hem birbiriyle hem de b眉t眉n眉yle t眉rde艧tir. Aristoteles bu yakla艧谋m谋yla canl谋 varl谋臒谋n 枚z眉n眉 olu艧turan ruhun, bedenden ayr谋 d眉艧眉n眉lemeyece臒ini vurgular. Ona g枚re ruh, canl谋 varl谋臒谋n formu (eidos), beden ise maddesidir (hyle). Organizman谋n b眉t眉nsel yap谋s谋 bu 艧ekilde varl谋臒谋n谋 s眉rd眉r眉r. Ruh, canl谋l谋臒谋n temel ilkesi ve hareketin kayna臒谋 olarak varolanlar谋n bir bi莽imde t眉m眉n眉 kapsar.
陌nsan zihninin i艧leyi艧i ve bilgi edinme s眉reci hakk谋nda Aristoteles tekrar yetilere ba艧vurur. Bilgi edinme s眉reci duyumla ba艧lay谋p ak谋l y眉r眉tmeyle tamamlan谋r. Duyumsay谋c谋 yetinin alg谋lad谋klar谋, akledici yeti sayesinde kavramlara d枚n眉艧眉r. Edilgin ak谋l duyumlardan gelen bilgiyi i艧leyen zihinsel yap谋y谋, etkin ak谋l ise soyut d眉艧眉nce ve evrensel bilgiye ula艧mam谋z谋 sa臒layan yetiyi temsil eder. Bu noktada d眉艧眉nme ve duyumsama birbirinden ayr谋l谋r, ancak zihin-beden b眉t眉nl眉臒眉 korunur. Ruh; zihinsel s眉re莽lerin temeli, hareket ve duyum yetilerininin bedendeki kar艧谋l谋臒谋d谋r. Ayr谋ca Ruh 脺zerine metni; canl谋l谋k, bilin莽, alg谋 ve d眉艧眉nme gibi temel felsefi problemlere de 谋艧谋k tutar.
August 15, 2024
5/5 u啪 logikos prad啪i膮 tamstai Aristoteliui;
2/5 u啪 parodym膮, kaip toli mokslas pa啪eng臋s, v臈lgi tamstai Aristoteliui;
-1/5 u啪 komunistin臈s ideologijos skleidim膮 60 psl. 寞啪angoje ir 40 psl. komentaruose (50% knygos!) jau nebe Aristoteliui, o gerbiamiems Leninui, Marksui ir vert臈jui Sezemanui.
2/5 u啪 parodym膮, kaip toli mokslas pa啪eng臋s, v臈lgi tamstai Aristoteliui;
-1/5 u啪 komunistin臈s ideologijos skleidim膮 60 psl. 寞啪angoje ir 40 psl. komentaruose (50% knygos!) jau nebe Aristoteliui, o gerbiamiems Leninui, Marksui ir vert臈jui Sezemanui.
February 14, 2021
"Ruh ya艧ama g眉c眉ne sahip do臒al bir cismin bi莽imi anlam谋nda bir varl谋kt谋r. Varl谋k ise bir yetkinliktir [entelekheia]. O halde ruh b枚yle bir cismin yetkinli臒idir."
"Yetkinlik g眉c眉l olan谋n [dinamis] bi莽imidir [logos]."
"Duyular olmadan hayal g眉c眉 ortaya 莽谋kmaz, hayal g眉c眉 olmadan da yarg谋 olmaz."
"Ruh asla hayalsiz akletmez."
"Ruh bir anlamda b眉t眉n varolanlard谋r. 脟眉nk眉 varolanlar ya duyulurlardand谋r ya da akledilirlerdendir; i艧te ruhtaki bilgi de, bir anlamda, bilinebilir olanlard谋r, gene ruhta ger莽ekle艧en duyum da duyulur olanlard谋r."
"Hi莽bir 艧ey duyumsamayan birisi ne bir艧ey 枚臒renebilir ne de anlayabilir."
"Kendine hakim olabilen insanlar bir arzu ve i艧tah duymalar谋na ra臒men arzulad谋klar谋 艧eyi yapmay谋p akl谋 takip ederler."
"Ruhta hareket ettiren g眉莽 arzu denen g眉莽t眉r."
"Ak谋l gelece臒i g枚zeterek direnmeyi emreder, i艧tah ise hemen halihaz谋rda varolan谋 g枚zetir; 莽眉nk眉 gelece臒i g枚rmedi臒imiz i莽in halihaz谋rdaki haz bize basbaya臒谋 haz verici ve basbaya臒谋 iyi olarak g枚r眉n眉r."
"Ruh sahibi beden b眉t眉n olarak dokunma g眉c眉 ta艧谋r."
"Hayvanlar i莽in ya艧amak dokunma duyusuyla tan谋mlan谋r."
Duyular谋n ruhla ili艧kilendirilmesinden anla艧谋laca臒谋 眉zere bedenle i莽i莽e olan, ondan ayr谋 olmayan bir ruhtan bahsediyor Aristoteles...
"Yetkinlik g眉c眉l olan谋n [dinamis] bi莽imidir [logos]."
"Duyular olmadan hayal g眉c眉 ortaya 莽谋kmaz, hayal g眉c眉 olmadan da yarg谋 olmaz."
"Ruh asla hayalsiz akletmez."
"Ruh bir anlamda b眉t眉n varolanlard谋r. 脟眉nk眉 varolanlar ya duyulurlardand谋r ya da akledilirlerdendir; i艧te ruhtaki bilgi de, bir anlamda, bilinebilir olanlard谋r, gene ruhta ger莽ekle艧en duyum da duyulur olanlard谋r."
"Hi莽bir 艧ey duyumsamayan birisi ne bir艧ey 枚臒renebilir ne de anlayabilir."
"Kendine hakim olabilen insanlar bir arzu ve i艧tah duymalar谋na ra臒men arzulad谋klar谋 艧eyi yapmay谋p akl谋 takip ederler."
"Ruhta hareket ettiren g眉莽 arzu denen g眉莽t眉r."
"Ak谋l gelece臒i g枚zeterek direnmeyi emreder, i艧tah ise hemen halihaz谋rda varolan谋 g枚zetir; 莽眉nk眉 gelece臒i g枚rmedi臒imiz i莽in halihaz谋rdaki haz bize basbaya臒谋 haz verici ve basbaya臒谋 iyi olarak g枚r眉n眉r."
"Ruh sahibi beden b眉t眉n olarak dokunma g眉c眉 ta艧谋r."
"Hayvanlar i莽in ya艧amak dokunma duyusuyla tan谋mlan谋r."
Duyular谋n ruhla ili艧kilendirilmesinden anla艧谋laca臒谋 眉zere bedenle i莽i莽e olan, ondan ayr谋 olmayan bir ruhtan bahsediyor Aristoteles...
April 2, 2025
I have found myself not really caring about Aristotle鈥檚 thoughts on the soul
October 9, 2022
Es una lectura necesaria para psic贸logos, pues aborda los procesos sensoriales y superiores, desde la filosof铆a, tal como se estudiaba de modo te贸rico antes de la era cient铆fica y sigue siendo v谩lido con los hallazgos de neuro辫蝉颈肠辞濒辞驳铆补.
October 20, 2020
I find this quote from early on De Anima to be central to all Aristotelian thought:
"So that definitions which do not enable us to discover the derived properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously, one and all, be dialectical and futile."
He's not so interested in opinions or propositions for their own sake and instead focuses in analytical process, dissecting and then explaining in toto any one topic.
I know now why he was recognized as 'The Philosopher' and quite obviously a forebearer of Scientific method.
How I can only wish that Aristotle was alive today so he could see how much progress has been made in neuroscience, biology and logic 鈥攈e'd be enthralled and astonished by how much of his questioning has had an answer found and how different the reality is from what he could deduct. And at the same time, I can only wonder how much farther away a fruitful mind like his been born today could have taken us to.
"So that definitions which do not enable us to discover the derived properties, or which fail to facilitate even a conjecture about them, must obviously, one and all, be dialectical and futile."
He's not so interested in opinions or propositions for their own sake and instead focuses in analytical process, dissecting and then explaining in toto any one topic.
I know now why he was recognized as 'The Philosopher' and quite obviously a forebearer of Scientific method.
How I can only wish that Aristotle was alive today so he could see how much progress has been made in neuroscience, biology and logic 鈥攈e'd be enthralled and astonished by how much of his questioning has had an answer found and how different the reality is from what he could deduct. And at the same time, I can only wonder how much farther away a fruitful mind like his been born today could have taken us to.
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