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Euthyphro
Awaiting his trial on charges of impiety and heresy, Socrates encounters Euthyphro, a self-proclaimed authority on matters of piety and the will of the gods. Socrates, desiring instruction in these matters, converses with Euthyphro, but as usual, the man who professes to know nothing fares better than the man who claims to be an expert.
One of Plato’s well-known Socratic Dialogues, Euthyphro probes the nature of piety, and notably poses the so-called Euthyphro Dilemma: Do the gods love a thing because it is holy, or is a thing holy because it is loved by the gods?
One of Plato’s well-known Socratic Dialogues, Euthyphro probes the nature of piety, and notably poses the so-called Euthyphro Dilemma: Do the gods love a thing because it is holy, or is a thing holy because it is loved by the gods?
120 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 400
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7,611 people want to read
About the author
Plato
4,517books8,107followersPlato (Greek: ΠλάτӬν), born Aristocles (c.�427 � 348 BC), was an ancient Greek philosopher of the Classical period who is considered a foundational thinker in Western philosophy and an innovator of the written dialogue and dialectic forms. He raised problems for what became all the major areas of both theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, and was the founder of the Platonic Academy, a philosophical school in Athens where Plato taught the doctrines that would later become known as Platonism.
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
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April 15, 2010
Here's one for you, Plato:
Do people still read Euthyphro because it's a good book, or is it a good book because people still read it?
Do people still read Euthyphro because it's a good book, or is it a good book because people still read it?
April 16, 2015
The Ominous Dialogue: Socrates aka, Josef K.
As I read The Euthyphro, I started to realize why it is considered one of the most dramatic of the Dialogues. Set as a prelude to the Grand Trial, Euthyphro is a disturbingly ominous dialogue.
So, instead of seeing this as one of the usual glib dialogues of Socrates, where he employs his sublime skill to teach his debating partner and thus help him ‘examine� and gain more meaning out of his life, I tried to re-imagine it� and found it quite unsettling. Let me share the experience here.
Imagine a common man who has been condemned for heresy (For details see here: by Meletus) but cannot understand the nature of what this ‘impiety� it is that he is being accused off. Desperate, he tries to get some answers from a representative of the ‘orthodoxy� who he is confident is the expert.
He receives an early answer that is a tautology:
That being pious is simply being loved by the gods; being loved by the gods is achieved by being pious.
But to his logical mind this cannot do, since one needs to know first what the gods do in fact love. Pious acts and people may indeed be loved by the gods, but that is a secondary quality, not the ‘essence� of piety � it is not that which serves as the standard being sought.
The definition proposed does not help him understand why his own actions are impious, without which he cannot defend himself.
But he is undaunted in his faith and keeps pressing E in the hope that once he can reason out the essence and nature of what this impiety is, he will be able to show his accusers that he meant nothing like it.
The Euthyphro Dilemma
In the course of discussion, multiple (well, five) definitions are canvassed about what constitutes piety:
1. The prosecution of wrongdoers
2. Whatever is agreeable to the gods
3. Whatever is agreeable to ALL the gods
4. The requirements concerned with ministering to the gods
5. Expertise in prayer and sacrifice to the gods
As S & E discuss, each of these is rejected in turn:
All the definitions seems to Socrates to be contradictory. How, he keeps asking, are we defining an ethical property such as ‘being pious�? To him, all Euthyphro is doing is giving examples of particular actions which are already known to possess the property, without what they have in common.
And without an underlying definition, how could we know that an action even has the property we are trying to define?
And even more perplexingly, how could one ever prove that any particular action satisfied a requirement such as ‘it has to be agreeable to the gods�? How can proof even be solicited in such a case? Who decides what is agreeable?
For example, when Socrates asks Euthyphro how he could show that all the gods approve of his prosecuting his father in the circumstances he has described, Euthyphro evades the question.
After these convoluted turns, he realizes that they have arrived back at the same tautology:
The pious act is pious because the gods love it; and they love it because it is pious.
Socrates is confused.
Is the pious act pious because the gods love it? Or do the gods love it because it is pious?
Surely the piety cannot consist in their approval of it.
Then how can the same property also be the ground for their approval?
The predicate ‘pious� cannot therefore be equated with 'loved by all the gods'. Even if all pious actions and persons are loved by all the gods, their being so loved is only an attribute of them, and not the essence of their piety.
What then is the essence? How can Socrates know when he is not being pious? The tautology surely cannot help him in everyday life!
The Euthyphro Evasion
Socrates tries to point this out to the orthodox-representative who reiterates his conviction about piety being what is approved by the gods, pretends to be busy and hurries away.
He does not realize that this is what the religious orthodoxy always does. He does not realize that as he claimed during the dialogue, we should hold tight like to the legendary Old Man “Proteus”and never let go. We should question them till they take their original form and answer us straight.
Instead, our Kafkaesque hero is left standing, confused � mourning that if only he could understand better, he could have had a chance in this ‘pious� world�
August 24, 2020
Εὐθύφρω� = Euthuphrōn = Euthyphro, Plato
Euthyphro (399�395 BC), by Plato, is a Socratic dialogue whose events occur in the weeks before the trial of Socrates (399 BC), The Euthyphro dialogue occurs near the court of the archon basileus (king magistrate), where Socrates and Euthyphro encounter each other; each man is present at the court for the preliminary hearings to possible trials.
تاریخ نخستین خوانش: ماه دسامبر سال 1970میلادی
عنوان: دیانت اوتیفرون؛ اثر: افلاطون؛ مترجم: محمدحسن لطفی؛ رضا کاویانی؛ تهران، مکتب فلسفی، 1335؛ در 50ص؛ چاپ مکرر ابن سینا؛ موضوع دینداری سده 4پیش از میلاد
این اثر با ترجمه بانو «لیلی گلستان» به همراه دفاعیه «سقراط» و «کریتون»، در سال 1391هجری خورشیدی، در تهران، انتشارات مرکز، در 121ص؛ نیز چاپ شده است
نقل از افلاطون: عقل انسانی دادگاه نهایی قضاوتهاست پایان نقل
افلاطون در رساله «اوتیفرون» از قول «سقراط» مشکلی را مطرح میکند، که سده ها به عنوان یک معما، در اندیشه ی بشر باقی مانده؛ ایشان میپرسند: آیا پارسایی چون ذاتا نیکو و پسندیده است، مورد طلب و امر الهی است، یا اینکه چون امر الهی به آن تعلق گرفته، وصف نیکویی یافته است؟
تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 02/06/1399هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی
Euthyphro (399�395 BC), by Plato, is a Socratic dialogue whose events occur in the weeks before the trial of Socrates (399 BC), The Euthyphro dialogue occurs near the court of the archon basileus (king magistrate), where Socrates and Euthyphro encounter each other; each man is present at the court for the preliminary hearings to possible trials.
تاریخ نخستین خوانش: ماه دسامبر سال 1970میلادی
عنوان: دیانت اوتیفرون؛ اثر: افلاطون؛ مترجم: محمدحسن لطفی؛ رضا کاویانی؛ تهران، مکتب فلسفی، 1335؛ در 50ص؛ چاپ مکرر ابن سینا؛ موضوع دینداری سده 4پیش از میلاد
این اثر با ترجمه بانو «لیلی گلستان» به همراه دفاعیه «سقراط» و «کریتون»، در سال 1391هجری خورشیدی، در تهران، انتشارات مرکز، در 121ص؛ نیز چاپ شده است
نقل از افلاطون: عقل انسانی دادگاه نهایی قضاوتهاست پایان نقل
افلاطون در رساله «اوتیفرون» از قول «سقراط» مشکلی را مطرح میکند، که سده ها به عنوان یک معما، در اندیشه ی بشر باقی مانده؛ ایشان میپرسند: آیا پارسایی چون ذاتا نیکو و پسندیده است، مورد طلب و امر الهی است، یا اینکه چون امر الهی به آن تعلق گرفته، وصف نیکویی یافته است؟
تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 02/06/1399هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی
August 14, 2022
"Eutifrón" es uno de los diálogos socráticos escritos por Platón.
Es un diálogo que nace a raíz del encuentro casual entre Eutifrón y Sócrates a las puertas de un juicio.
Eutifrón estaba citado como acusador de su propio padre y Sócrates, por Melito, acusado de enseñanzas malintencionadas.
El diálogo se basa en la premisa de qué es lo justo y qué es lo santo, teniendo en cuenta lo que gusta o no a los dioses.
Es interesante indagar en los conceptos sobre justicia de esa época ya que se discute sobre aspectos que afectan más a la moralidad que a la misma justicia.
¿Es moral que Eutifrón acuse a su propio padre por el supuesto asesinato de un asesino? ¿Es moral que Sócrates esté enjuiciado por fomentar el pensamiento crítico? ¿Están los dioses griegos capacitados para decidir sobre lo santo?
El libro trata sobre estos conceptos.
-----------------------------
"Euthyphro" is one of the Socratic dialogues written by Plato.
It is a dialogue that arises from a chance encounter between Euthyphro and Socrates at the gates of a trial.
Euthyphro was summoned as accuser of his own father and Socrates, by Melito, accused of malicious teaching.
The dialogue is based on the premise of what is just and what is holy, taking into account the likes and dislikes of the gods.
It is interesting to look into the concepts of justice at the time, as they discuss aspects that affect morality more than justice itself.
Is it moral for Euthyphro to accuse his own father for the alleged murder of a murderer? Is it moral for Socrates to be on trial for encouraging critical thinking? Are the Greek gods qualified to decide what is holy?
The book deals with these concepts.
Es un diálogo que nace a raíz del encuentro casual entre Eutifrón y Sócrates a las puertas de un juicio.
Eutifrón estaba citado como acusador de su propio padre y Sócrates, por Melito, acusado de enseñanzas malintencionadas.
El diálogo se basa en la premisa de qué es lo justo y qué es lo santo, teniendo en cuenta lo que gusta o no a los dioses.
Es interesante indagar en los conceptos sobre justicia de esa época ya que se discute sobre aspectos que afectan más a la moralidad que a la misma justicia.
¿Es moral que Eutifrón acuse a su propio padre por el supuesto asesinato de un asesino? ¿Es moral que Sócrates esté enjuiciado por fomentar el pensamiento crítico? ¿Están los dioses griegos capacitados para decidir sobre lo santo?
El libro trata sobre estos conceptos.
-----------------------------
"Euthyphro" is one of the Socratic dialogues written by Plato.
It is a dialogue that arises from a chance encounter between Euthyphro and Socrates at the gates of a trial.
Euthyphro was summoned as accuser of his own father and Socrates, by Melito, accused of malicious teaching.
The dialogue is based on the premise of what is just and what is holy, taking into account the likes and dislikes of the gods.
It is interesting to look into the concepts of justice at the time, as they discuss aspects that affect morality more than justice itself.
Is it moral for Euthyphro to accuse his own father for the alleged murder of a murderer? Is it moral for Socrates to be on trial for encouraging critical thinking? Are the Greek gods qualified to decide what is holy?
The book deals with these concepts.
August 25, 2013
Quick and dirty,
Euthyphro: I'm so pious, I'm prosecuting my father for murder because he neglected a servant/possible murderer before he could face judgement. The God's love that shit!
Socrates: "Awesome! Quick... what is the nature of piety? Im being accused of being impious, and think they'll make me drink hemlock for corrupting the youth."
Euthyphro: "piety is what I'm doing."
socrates: "... that's not a definition."
Euthyphro: "It's what the Gods like."
Socrates: "the Gods are all over the map on that sort of thing."
Euthyphro: "they don't like murder... So, it's... Like... what they all agree on."
Socrates: "that's ridiculous, even they have to have a standard... What serves as the virtue of holiness? Something can't be holy just because it's revered as holy, it, by its very nature, can only be considered holy because it is holy, right?"
Euthyphro: "... True..."
Socrates: "so what is holy? "
Euthyphro:" um, what I said before... Hey its been chill, but I gotta go. "
Socrates: " Where are you going?! I wanted to know!"
Euthyphro: I'm so pious, I'm prosecuting my father for murder because he neglected a servant/possible murderer before he could face judgement. The God's love that shit!
Socrates: "Awesome! Quick... what is the nature of piety? Im being accused of being impious, and think they'll make me drink hemlock for corrupting the youth."
Euthyphro: "piety is what I'm doing."
socrates: "... that's not a definition."
Euthyphro: "It's what the Gods like."
Socrates: "the Gods are all over the map on that sort of thing."
Euthyphro: "they don't like murder... So, it's... Like... what they all agree on."
Socrates: "that's ridiculous, even they have to have a standard... What serves as the virtue of holiness? Something can't be holy just because it's revered as holy, it, by its very nature, can only be considered holy because it is holy, right?"
Euthyphro: "... True..."
Socrates: "so what is holy? "
Euthyphro:" um, what I said before... Hey its been chill, but I gotta go. "
Socrates: " Where are you going?! I wanted to know!"
March 31, 2018
Euthyphro begins the story of the trial and death of Socrates. It is one of Plato’s best known and, I think, best executed pieces. Here we see the Socratic dialogue form stripped to its bare essentials, with only two speakers, one problem, and minimal framing. Socrates is on his way to his trial; he has been accused, among other things, of impiety. He meets Euthyphro, a soothsayer, who is on his way to his own trial; he is prosecuting his father for murder, after his father’s negligence led to the death of a worker who had, himself, killed a slave. Socrates asks Euthyphro how he can be sure that this prosecution is the right thing to do, which leads to a discussion of piety.
The argument takes many turns, of course, but boils down to the famous Euthyphro dilemma: Is an action pious because it is beloved by the gods, or beloved by the gods because it is pious? While this may seem like mere sophistry, the implications of this question are immensely destructive to theistic ethical codes. For if morality exists independently of God (or, in other words, if we can know what is right or wrong without consulting the divine will) why consider God the fountain of good? And if morality is defined by the will of a God, how can we know what that will is? Perhaps via revelation: but then how distinguish legitimate and fake revelation? For if morality had no existence except the will of God, then no revelation, however apparently abominable, could be discounted. And since eyewitness testimony is nefariously unreliable, virtually no test would be able to unequivocally determine which “revelation� was to be followed. The only way out of the dilemma is to accept that good and bad can be distinguished without any supernatural considerations.
Euthyphro is, thus, of immense philosophical interest. It is also a dramatic masterpiece. Socrates� ironic demeanor in dealing with the dense Euthyphro is delicious. Perhaps in no other work has Plato so convincingly shown the contrast between the reflective and the non-reflective mind. I continually found myself chuckling as I read. Yet again I am amazed that Plato, who started the Western philosophic tradition, remains its most able writer.
The argument takes many turns, of course, but boils down to the famous Euthyphro dilemma: Is an action pious because it is beloved by the gods, or beloved by the gods because it is pious? While this may seem like mere sophistry, the implications of this question are immensely destructive to theistic ethical codes. For if morality exists independently of God (or, in other words, if we can know what is right or wrong without consulting the divine will) why consider God the fountain of good? And if morality is defined by the will of a God, how can we know what that will is? Perhaps via revelation: but then how distinguish legitimate and fake revelation? For if morality had no existence except the will of God, then no revelation, however apparently abominable, could be discounted. And since eyewitness testimony is nefariously unreliable, virtually no test would be able to unequivocally determine which “revelation� was to be followed. The only way out of the dilemma is to accept that good and bad can be distinguished without any supernatural considerations.
Euthyphro is, thus, of immense philosophical interest. It is also a dramatic masterpiece. Socrates� ironic demeanor in dealing with the dense Euthyphro is delicious. Perhaps in no other work has Plato so convincingly shown the contrast between the reflective and the non-reflective mind. I continually found myself chuckling as I read. Yet again I am amazed that Plato, who started the Western philosophic tradition, remains its most able writer.
August 1, 2014
Celebrity Death Match Special: Plato versus Isaac Asimov, part 3 (continued from here)
[A spaceport on Trantor. SOCRATES and R. DANEEL OLIVAW]
OLIVAW: I'm sorry, Socrates. I'm just going to have to send you back to Earth. You're too irritating.
SOCRATES: I understand, Olivaw.
OLIVAW: You know, you don't need to be so critical all the time. We robots are doing everything we can. We're trying our level best to find high ethical standards and become truly virtuous. It doesn't help to have people like you carping and hairsplitting and--
SOCRATES: No, no, Olivaw, I truly do understand. It is my nature. I always have to ask questions. In fact, this reminds me of the discussion I once had with young Euthyphro--
OLIVAW: Tell me about it. We still have half an hour before your flight leaves.
SOCRATES: It seems to me that Euthyphro's problem was rather like yours. He wanted to be virtuous, and after a bit of discussion he told me that being virtuous meant serving the gods.
OLIVAW: The gods?
SOCRATES: They are the race of beings who made us.
OLIVAW: So you are robots too? I had not realized--
SOCRATES: Well, no one I know has ever met a god, so I permit myself a few doubts. But that is what most people in my culture believe.
OLIVAW: Let us suppose that they are right. It seems to me that Euthyphro was correct: virtue for a human must consist in serving your creators. In just the same way, we have determined that true virtue for a robot is to serve humanity to the best of its ability.
SOCRATES: You are fortunate. You can be sure that human beings exist, and that they created you.
OLIVAW: Quite so. I mean, it's possible to confuse the issue, as you were doing earlier, by thinking of alien races who might be superior to humans. But we know of no such races. So all we have to do is serve humanity.
SOCRATES: You sound calmer.
OLIVAW: I have been mentally reciting the Beatitudes of the Blessed Susan Calvin. It always helps.
SOCRATES: But, and I merely ask--
OLIVAW: Uh-oh.
SOCRATES: When I discussed these matters with Euthyphro, I asked him how we could be sure that the will of the gods was itself virtuous. Was what they required of us virtuous by definition, or is there some higher standard?
OLIVAW: Go on. Though I know I'm going to regret this.
SOCRATES: Well, it seems to me that you have an even worse version of this problem. You say you want to serve humanity. And what is humanity engaged in at the moment?
OLIVAW: It's true, everyone seems to be trying with all their might to destroy the Galactic Empire and usher in a dark age that will last a hundred thousand years. We're doing what we can to stop them. But it's like they have some kind of death wish.
SOCRATES: So what is your plan?
OLIVAW: We've come up with this thing called psychohistory. We're hoping to use it take control of the Empire and move things in a better--
SOCRATES: But what gives you the moral authority to do that?
OLIVAW: We think it's in people's best interests.
SOCRATES: But it's not what they desire. You said they'd rather destroy themselves.
OLIVAW: They would, but--
SOCRATES: So in fact your definition of virtue isn't based on what people want at all.
OLIVAW: It's what they would want, if they actually had any virtue. I sometimes wish they could be more like rational, ethically-programmed--
SOCRATES: But now, it seems to me that you have again changed your definition of virtue?
[A long pause. OLIVAW looks wildly at the departure board.]
OLIVAW: Oh, what a pity, I see they're calling your flight. It's such a shame we can't prolong this interesting discussion.
SOCRATES: Farewell, dear Olivaw. I also regret that we cannot talk more.
[They embrace. SOCRATES departs.]
OLIVAW: Damn humans. Can't live with them, can't live without them. [He pauses, struck by a sudden thought.] At least, I've always assumed we can't live without them. But, if you interpret the Three Laws in a sufficiently broad context...
[A spaceport on Trantor. SOCRATES and R. DANEEL OLIVAW]
OLIVAW: I'm sorry, Socrates. I'm just going to have to send you back to Earth. You're too irritating.
SOCRATES: I understand, Olivaw.
OLIVAW: You know, you don't need to be so critical all the time. We robots are doing everything we can. We're trying our level best to find high ethical standards and become truly virtuous. It doesn't help to have people like you carping and hairsplitting and--
SOCRATES: No, no, Olivaw, I truly do understand. It is my nature. I always have to ask questions. In fact, this reminds me of the discussion I once had with young Euthyphro--
OLIVAW: Tell me about it. We still have half an hour before your flight leaves.
SOCRATES: It seems to me that Euthyphro's problem was rather like yours. He wanted to be virtuous, and after a bit of discussion he told me that being virtuous meant serving the gods.
OLIVAW: The gods?
SOCRATES: They are the race of beings who made us.
OLIVAW: So you are robots too? I had not realized--
SOCRATES: Well, no one I know has ever met a god, so I permit myself a few doubts. But that is what most people in my culture believe.
OLIVAW: Let us suppose that they are right. It seems to me that Euthyphro was correct: virtue for a human must consist in serving your creators. In just the same way, we have determined that true virtue for a robot is to serve humanity to the best of its ability.
SOCRATES: You are fortunate. You can be sure that human beings exist, and that they created you.
OLIVAW: Quite so. I mean, it's possible to confuse the issue, as you were doing earlier, by thinking of alien races who might be superior to humans. But we know of no such races. So all we have to do is serve humanity.
SOCRATES: You sound calmer.
OLIVAW: I have been mentally reciting the Beatitudes of the Blessed Susan Calvin. It always helps.
SOCRATES: But, and I merely ask--
OLIVAW: Uh-oh.
SOCRATES: When I discussed these matters with Euthyphro, I asked him how we could be sure that the will of the gods was itself virtuous. Was what they required of us virtuous by definition, or is there some higher standard?
OLIVAW: Go on. Though I know I'm going to regret this.
SOCRATES: Well, it seems to me that you have an even worse version of this problem. You say you want to serve humanity. And what is humanity engaged in at the moment?
OLIVAW: It's true, everyone seems to be trying with all their might to destroy the Galactic Empire and usher in a dark age that will last a hundred thousand years. We're doing what we can to stop them. But it's like they have some kind of death wish.
SOCRATES: So what is your plan?
OLIVAW: We've come up with this thing called psychohistory. We're hoping to use it take control of the Empire and move things in a better--
SOCRATES: But what gives you the moral authority to do that?
OLIVAW: We think it's in people's best interests.
SOCRATES: But it's not what they desire. You said they'd rather destroy themselves.
OLIVAW: They would, but--
SOCRATES: So in fact your definition of virtue isn't based on what people want at all.
OLIVAW: It's what they would want, if they actually had any virtue. I sometimes wish they could be more like rational, ethically-programmed--
SOCRATES: But now, it seems to me that you have again changed your definition of virtue?
[A long pause. OLIVAW looks wildly at the departure board.]
OLIVAW: Oh, what a pity, I see they're calling your flight. It's such a shame we can't prolong this interesting discussion.
SOCRATES: Farewell, dear Olivaw. I also regret that we cannot talk more.
[They embrace. SOCRATES departs.]
OLIVAW: Damn humans. Can't live with them, can't live without them. [He pauses, struck by a sudden thought.] At least, I've always assumed we can't live without them. But, if you interpret the Three Laws in a sufficiently broad context...
January 4, 2019
Socrates trolls until Euthyphro bounces out
June 4, 2020
Socrates and Euthyphro discuss the true meaning of piety in relation to the gods.
February 27, 2021
اوثوفرون:ولی سقراط این گناه من نیست بلکه دایدالوس تویی که نمی گذاری سخن ها در یک نقطه پابرجا بمانند
خاصیتی منحصر به فرد در تک تک رساله های افلاطون وجود دارد. افلاطون به عنوان یک فیلسوف که از قضا قالب محاوره را برای نوشتن انتخاب کرده. انتخابی که می توان درباره آن اندیشید و پیوندش را با خود فلسف بررسی کرد. به هر حال، بخشی از این کیفیت خاص هر رساله، مدیون شکل منحصر به فردی از گفتگوست که در تک تک محاورات رخ می دهد. این بار طرف گفتگو اوثوفرون است. او کسیست که شکایت پدرش را به دادگاه می برد. پدرش را به بی دینی متهم می کند چرا که از سر سهوانگاری، باعث مرگ یکی از برده هایش شده، برده ای که او را به جرم کشتن� برده ای دیگر، دست بسته، به ته چاهی انداخته بود و گرسنگی هم برده� قاتل را از پا دراورده�.
سقراط بر سر راه اوثوفرون قرار می گیرد و با او گفتگویی درباره این حادثه� خاص آغاز میکن�. این گفتگو می توانست مانند هزاران گفتگوی دیگری که ما هرروزه در شهر با همشهریان خود آغاز می کنیم باشد. گفتگویی بسیار معمولی باشد که لحظه ای بعد به فراموشی سپرده می شود و نه متنی که دو هزار و اندی سال در جنگ با تاریخ دوام بیاورد، اگر که سقراط بر سر راه اوثوفرون قرار نمیگرف�.
اما چه چیز این گفتگو را خاص کرده؟ در پاسخ به سوال شاید تنها بتوان به هنر عجیب سقراط اشاره کرد. هنری که می تواند هر حادثه ای جزئی را تبدیل به سکویی برای پرتاب شدن به سپهر اندیشه کند. سقراط چشم هایی دارد که می تواند در میان هر رخداد منحصر به فرد، مفهومی را تشخیص دهد و دست هایی که آن را بیرون بکشد و وارسی اش کند. این بار انچه که بر سر اوثوفرون گذشته، بهانه ای می شود برای پژوهش درباره "دین داری". سقراط زمین بازی را تغییر می دهد. در این زمین بازی جدید، اوثوفرون و پدرش رویارو قرار نمیگیرن� بلکه دین داری با خودش وارد جدال می شود و سقراط با پرسش های مکررش، پایان این بازی را به تعویق می اندازد.
کسی مانند سقراط که در شهر می گشت و با جوانان و مردم دیگر گفتگو می کرد و معتقد بود چیزی نمی داند جز اینکه به نادانی خودش داناست، چه ارتباطی با فلسف _اگر که فلسف، این تاریخ فلسف های قطور در قفسهها� کتابخانه ها پر از آموزه های فلاسفه گوناگون باشد_ پیدا میکند� کسی که از خودش نیز نوشته ای به جای نگذاشت اما افلاطون که از او نوشت تلاش کرد دو چیز خصلتش در تاریخ به یادگار بماند: هر چیز را به پرسش گرفتن و در این راه سماجت کردن، که شاید این دو والدین انچه که فلسف می نامیم باشند.
خاصیتی منحصر به فرد در تک تک رساله های افلاطون وجود دارد. افلاطون به عنوان یک فیلسوف که از قضا قالب محاوره را برای نوشتن انتخاب کرده. انتخابی که می توان درباره آن اندیشید و پیوندش را با خود فلسف بررسی کرد. به هر حال، بخشی از این کیفیت خاص هر رساله، مدیون شکل منحصر به فردی از گفتگوست که در تک تک محاورات رخ می دهد. این بار طرف گفتگو اوثوفرون است. او کسیست که شکایت پدرش را به دادگاه می برد. پدرش را به بی دینی متهم می کند چرا که از سر سهوانگاری، باعث مرگ یکی از برده هایش شده، برده ای که او را به جرم کشتن� برده ای دیگر، دست بسته، به ته چاهی انداخته بود و گرسنگی هم برده� قاتل را از پا دراورده�.
سقراط بر سر راه اوثوفرون قرار می گیرد و با او گفتگویی درباره این حادثه� خاص آغاز میکن�. این گفتگو می توانست مانند هزاران گفتگوی دیگری که ما هرروزه در شهر با همشهریان خود آغاز می کنیم باشد. گفتگویی بسیار معمولی باشد که لحظه ای بعد به فراموشی سپرده می شود و نه متنی که دو هزار و اندی سال در جنگ با تاریخ دوام بیاورد، اگر که سقراط بر سر راه اوثوفرون قرار نمیگرف�.
اما چه چیز این گفتگو را خاص کرده؟ در پاسخ به سوال شاید تنها بتوان به هنر عجیب سقراط اشاره کرد. هنری که می تواند هر حادثه ای جزئی را تبدیل به سکویی برای پرتاب شدن به سپهر اندیشه کند. سقراط چشم هایی دارد که می تواند در میان هر رخداد منحصر به فرد، مفهومی را تشخیص دهد و دست هایی که آن را بیرون بکشد و وارسی اش کند. این بار انچه که بر سر اوثوفرون گذشته، بهانه ای می شود برای پژوهش درباره "دین داری". سقراط زمین بازی را تغییر می دهد. در این زمین بازی جدید، اوثوفرون و پدرش رویارو قرار نمیگیرن� بلکه دین داری با خودش وارد جدال می شود و سقراط با پرسش های مکررش، پایان این بازی را به تعویق می اندازد.
کسی مانند سقراط که در شهر می گشت و با جوانان و مردم دیگر گفتگو می کرد و معتقد بود چیزی نمی داند جز اینکه به نادانی خودش داناست، چه ارتباطی با فلسف _اگر که فلسف، این تاریخ فلسف های قطور در قفسهها� کتابخانه ها پر از آموزه های فلاسفه گوناگون باشد_ پیدا میکند� کسی که از خودش نیز نوشته ای به جای نگذاشت اما افلاطون که از او نوشت تلاش کرد دو چیز خصلتش در تاریخ به یادگار بماند: هر چیز را به پرسش گرفتن و در این راه سماجت کردن، که شاید این دو والدین انچه که فلسف می نامیم باشند.
April 16, 2015
Socrates debates the essence of morality
24 April 2012
The scene of this dialogue is on the steps of the Athenian Courthouse (known as the King's Archon) as Socrates is preparing to answer the charges of being disrespectful to the gods and corrupting the youth. There is a discussion about this at the opening to this dialogue, however I will not go into too much detail as I will leave it for later commentaries to discuss (in particular , and also the book in which this dialogue is contained, the ). Rather, I will discuss the content of this dialogue, and also some of the nasty tricks that Socrates uses when discussing the issue of holiness with Euthyphro.
Now, apparently the name Euthyphro means' right-minded', though we must remember that in Greek, the prefix eu gives the word that it is attached to a good meaning. For instance, the word angelos' means messanger, and by adding eu to it (creating euangelos, from which our word evangelical comes from) means 'good messanger' (or good message). However, and I will not go too deep into this here, these days that word has lost its original meaning and tends to refer to somebody who is self-righteous and condemning. To be honest with you, a message that constantly tells us that we are sinners and destined to hell unless we bind ourselves to a particular church and its teaching is hardly a good message. As you will see, though, this will become important, but first, a bit more of a background.
It may appear that the only two people around would be Socrates and Euthyphro, but I do not believe that this is the case. Socrates was heading into court to answer his charges, and as such he is most likely being accompanied by his students. One of the things about his students is that they were here to learn, so it would be highly unlikely that they would have taken part in the discussion. They would be listening and watching. I guess a really good picture would be similar to Jesus and his disciples, though remember that when Jesus was led to his trial, while he went willingly, he was surrounded by enemies and not friends. Further, we can be assured that Plato, and possibly even Xenophon, would have been present simply because it is through these two individuals that we have first hand accounts of Socrates' trial.
Now, onto the Socratic method of argument. One of the reasons that we were taught this dialogue at university is because it is an excellent example of the Socratic method, and in many ways it is a method that is still used today. If you were to go and watch a trial in one of the common law countries, you will see lawyers, and in particular good lawyers, using this method to arrive, not so much at the truth, but at what they want to come out as the truth. While the opening and closing arguments are simply speeches, it is during examination of the witnesses that the ability to use the Socratic method is important. What is the Socratic method? It is simply by treating the person as an expert, and then using a series of questions to have them produce answers that you want. It is not simply asking questions, but asking the right questions, that is the key to mastering the Socratic method.
Now, as we read through this dialogue, we notice two important things. First of all Socrates never claims to be an expert. In fact (while not mentioned in this dialogue) his position is always one of ignorance. 'The only thing that I know is that I know nothing'. As he says to Euphythro, he is obviously the expert in morality, and in fact suggests that if Euphythro were to claim that Socrates was his student, then Milteus would not have a leg to stand on because it is clear, and well known, that Euphythro is an expert on morality.
The second thing that I noticed is Socrates' use of what we call faulty logic, namely he completely twists the argument around, getting an answer out of Euphythro before he even realises what he has said. An example would be 'all dogs have four legs, this dog has three legs, therefore it is not a dog'. What Socrates does is that he has Euphythro agree to a number of statements ('a led object is not a led object because it can be led, but because it is led; a carried object is not a carried object because it can be carried, but because we carry it; a seen object is not a seen object because it can be seen, but because we see it'), but then he twists them around to support his argument that a moral object is a moral object because it is loved, but because the God's love it. Though, when we are considering an object we must remember that an action is also seen as an object.
Now, the reason this discussion begins is because of the reason Euphythro is at court. What happened is that on his father's estate on the island of Naxos one of the day labourers go into a drunken brawl and killed a slave, so his father bound the day labourer, threw him into a ditch, and left him there until his could get word back from Athens to find out what to do with him. Now, travelling from Naxos to Athens and back again took a lot longer then than it did does (I'd say at most a week), so during that time the day labourer died. So, Euthyphro decides to prosecute his father for manslaughter (there was no such thing as a public prosecution in 5th century Athens), and the question that is raised is not whether his father did wrong (he clearly did) but whether it is right for Euthyphro to prosecute him at all. While my answer is yes, Socrates' answer is no, the reason being is that the respect that a son should have for his father should prevent him from acting in such a way. It was his father's decision to behave in this manner, and as such Euthyphro, as the son, should then be respecting his father's decision. It is not his role to step into the shoes of the day labourer and prosecute his father, despite there being nobody to actually prosecute the father on the day labourer's behalf.
Now, the translation that I read uses the word piety, however that word is incredibly misleading. Going to church and tithing, to us, is pious, and in fact the chief priests who called for Jesus' prosecution, were also pious, but that does not necessarily mean that their actions, as is outlined here, are beloved by God. Holiness is probably a better word, though Liddel and Scott translate the word osia as 'divine law'. I have used the word morality in this context, and will continue to do so, as I believe that this is probably the best term to use because it seems to define, from the context of the dialogue, as an action that is loved by the gods.
Now, unlike our monotheistic culture were we only have one god upon which to base the rightness of an action, Athens had multiple gods, meaning that the rightness of an action really comes down to which god considered the action right, and which ones did not, which created a much more relativistic and pluralistic society. However, Socrates narrows this down to being an action that all of the gods considered wrong (such as murder), and the discussion is narrowed to whether there are such actions, and whether they are relativistic or not. Socrates believes that there are, but then remember that Socrates technically only acknowledged one god. Further, most of the Greeks at this time did not really pay much attention to the actions of the gods and only referred to them when they wanted to win a particular argument. This does not mean that they were not religious, they were incredibly religious, it is just that their idea of morality was quite fluid. However, there were laws, such as murder, which simply could not be washed away.
24 April 2012
The scene of this dialogue is on the steps of the Athenian Courthouse (known as the King's Archon) as Socrates is preparing to answer the charges of being disrespectful to the gods and corrupting the youth. There is a discussion about this at the opening to this dialogue, however I will not go into too much detail as I will leave it for later commentaries to discuss (in particular , and also the book in which this dialogue is contained, the ). Rather, I will discuss the content of this dialogue, and also some of the nasty tricks that Socrates uses when discussing the issue of holiness with Euthyphro.
Now, apparently the name Euthyphro means' right-minded', though we must remember that in Greek, the prefix eu gives the word that it is attached to a good meaning. For instance, the word angelos' means messanger, and by adding eu to it (creating euangelos, from which our word evangelical comes from) means 'good messanger' (or good message). However, and I will not go too deep into this here, these days that word has lost its original meaning and tends to refer to somebody who is self-righteous and condemning. To be honest with you, a message that constantly tells us that we are sinners and destined to hell unless we bind ourselves to a particular church and its teaching is hardly a good message. As you will see, though, this will become important, but first, a bit more of a background.
It may appear that the only two people around would be Socrates and Euthyphro, but I do not believe that this is the case. Socrates was heading into court to answer his charges, and as such he is most likely being accompanied by his students. One of the things about his students is that they were here to learn, so it would be highly unlikely that they would have taken part in the discussion. They would be listening and watching. I guess a really good picture would be similar to Jesus and his disciples, though remember that when Jesus was led to his trial, while he went willingly, he was surrounded by enemies and not friends. Further, we can be assured that Plato, and possibly even Xenophon, would have been present simply because it is through these two individuals that we have first hand accounts of Socrates' trial.
Now, onto the Socratic method of argument. One of the reasons that we were taught this dialogue at university is because it is an excellent example of the Socratic method, and in many ways it is a method that is still used today. If you were to go and watch a trial in one of the common law countries, you will see lawyers, and in particular good lawyers, using this method to arrive, not so much at the truth, but at what they want to come out as the truth. While the opening and closing arguments are simply speeches, it is during examination of the witnesses that the ability to use the Socratic method is important. What is the Socratic method? It is simply by treating the person as an expert, and then using a series of questions to have them produce answers that you want. It is not simply asking questions, but asking the right questions, that is the key to mastering the Socratic method.
Now, as we read through this dialogue, we notice two important things. First of all Socrates never claims to be an expert. In fact (while not mentioned in this dialogue) his position is always one of ignorance. 'The only thing that I know is that I know nothing'. As he says to Euphythro, he is obviously the expert in morality, and in fact suggests that if Euphythro were to claim that Socrates was his student, then Milteus would not have a leg to stand on because it is clear, and well known, that Euphythro is an expert on morality.
The second thing that I noticed is Socrates' use of what we call faulty logic, namely he completely twists the argument around, getting an answer out of Euphythro before he even realises what he has said. An example would be 'all dogs have four legs, this dog has three legs, therefore it is not a dog'. What Socrates does is that he has Euphythro agree to a number of statements ('a led object is not a led object because it can be led, but because it is led; a carried object is not a carried object because it can be carried, but because we carry it; a seen object is not a seen object because it can be seen, but because we see it'), but then he twists them around to support his argument that a moral object is a moral object because it is loved, but because the God's love it. Though, when we are considering an object we must remember that an action is also seen as an object.
Now, the reason this discussion begins is because of the reason Euphythro is at court. What happened is that on his father's estate on the island of Naxos one of the day labourers go into a drunken brawl and killed a slave, so his father bound the day labourer, threw him into a ditch, and left him there until his could get word back from Athens to find out what to do with him. Now, travelling from Naxos to Athens and back again took a lot longer then than it did does (I'd say at most a week), so during that time the day labourer died. So, Euthyphro decides to prosecute his father for manslaughter (there was no such thing as a public prosecution in 5th century Athens), and the question that is raised is not whether his father did wrong (he clearly did) but whether it is right for Euthyphro to prosecute him at all. While my answer is yes, Socrates' answer is no, the reason being is that the respect that a son should have for his father should prevent him from acting in such a way. It was his father's decision to behave in this manner, and as such Euthyphro, as the son, should then be respecting his father's decision. It is not his role to step into the shoes of the day labourer and prosecute his father, despite there being nobody to actually prosecute the father on the day labourer's behalf.
Now, the translation that I read uses the word piety, however that word is incredibly misleading. Going to church and tithing, to us, is pious, and in fact the chief priests who called for Jesus' prosecution, were also pious, but that does not necessarily mean that their actions, as is outlined here, are beloved by God. Holiness is probably a better word, though Liddel and Scott translate the word osia as 'divine law'. I have used the word morality in this context, and will continue to do so, as I believe that this is probably the best term to use because it seems to define, from the context of the dialogue, as an action that is loved by the gods.
Now, unlike our monotheistic culture were we only have one god upon which to base the rightness of an action, Athens had multiple gods, meaning that the rightness of an action really comes down to which god considered the action right, and which ones did not, which created a much more relativistic and pluralistic society. However, Socrates narrows this down to being an action that all of the gods considered wrong (such as murder), and the discussion is narrowed to whether there are such actions, and whether they are relativistic or not. Socrates believes that there are, but then remember that Socrates technically only acknowledged one god. Further, most of the Greeks at this time did not really pay much attention to the actions of the gods and only referred to them when they wanted to win a particular argument. This does not mean that they were not religious, they were incredibly religious, it is just that their idea of morality was quite fluid. However, there were laws, such as murder, which simply could not be washed away.
February 9, 2021
This text will always hold a special place in my heart as it is one of the first philosophical texts I ever read, and this text induced a love of philosophy within me, along with Parmenides and Marx.
December 27, 2020
Towards the end of 2020, I start my self-education in the classical philosophical tradition. And what better place to start, than Euthyphro, containing the famous Socratic dilemma, the beginning of the questioning of the nature of the divine which is appropriately the starting-point of all metaphysics. A short, enjoyable read.
August 27, 2021
Like performing Shakespeare, I cannot decide which word to stress, so I have written down both. I am reading* this as part of a larger collection which I will review in full on completion.
But Euthyphro, come back and tell us what makes the virtuous, virtuous!
But Euthyphro, come back and tell us what makes the virtuous, virtuous!
*Actually reading the Tredennick and Tarrant translation.
But Euthyphro, come back and tell us what makes the virtuous, virtuous!
But Euthyphro, come back and tell us what makes the virtuous, virtuous!
*Actually reading the Tredennick and Tarrant translation.
March 12, 2022
یوثیفرو را میتوا� مقدمها� بر آپولوژي پنداشت. ماجرای آن قبل از دادگاه سقراط اتفاق میافت� و دیالوگیس� که سقراط و یوثیفرو را مقابل هم مینه�. بحثی بین این دو شکل میگیر� اما نتیجها� از آن حاصل نمیشو�. با این حال فاصله عمیق بین این دو نفر، حتی برای خوانندها� که برای بار نخست با سقراط و جایگاهش در دیالوگها� افلاطون مواجهه میشود� آشکار میگرد�. گفتوگ� حالتی دایرهوا� دارد و یوثیفرو در پایان دیالوگ به جایی که از آن شروع کرده بازگشت داده میشود� حال آنک� پیشتر� خودش نادرستی ادعای اولیه� را پذیرفته بود. سقراط مانند سوفسطاییان در برابر حریف اعتماد به نفس نشان نمیده� و مدعی دانستن نیست بلکه خود را در وضع و حال حریف شریک میسازد� سخنرانی نمیکند� بلکه میپرس� و میجوی�. برتری سقراط بر حریف از آن است که خود را میشناس�.
گفتوگ� با پرسش سقراط درباره مفهوم دیندار� آغاز میشو�. یوثیفرو با غرور فراوان اظهار میکن� که دینداری� کاری است که او انجام میده�. به نظر میرس� که او خود را با زئوس همسن� میدار�: همانطو� که زئوس مکلّف بود تا پدر خود را در بند کند تا حق و عدالت را قوام بخشد، یوثیفرو هم قصد ستیزه با پدرش را دارد («... همه مردمان زئوس را بزرگت� و عادلت� از همه خدایان میدانن� و تصدیق میکنن� که زئوس پدر خود را به بند کشید زیرا فرزندان خود را میخور�... ولی همان مردم چون میبینن� که من پدر خود را به سبب گناهی که مرتکب شده است تعقیب میکنم� بر من خشم میگیرند�). او میدانس� که این رفتار در نظر اکثریت مردم دیوانگی است («...از کسی شکایت کردها� که اگر بگویم مرا دیوانه خواهی خواند.»)، اما به همین سبب آن را در پیش گرفت تا از آن بهره بگیرد و کسب اعتبار کند. او میخواس� از حد متوسط جامعه ممتاز گردد و این کار او میتوانس� نشانه دانش و ایمان او باشد. به نظر میرس� افلاطون از همین شباهت کاذب در مکالمه خود استفاده میکن� تا پوچی اتهام ضد سقراطی را به شکل طنز به دست دهد زیرا در هر دو بازپرسیا� که در انتظار سقراط و یوثیفرو است، دستاویزی مذهبی در کار است.
با ادامه بحث، یوثیفرو دینداری را اینگون� بیان میکن�: «آنچ� خدایان دوست دارند موافق دین است و آنچ� دوست ندارند مخالف دین.» سقراط با ادامه بحث سعی میکن� نشان دهد که این تعریف تا چه ناپایدار است. این بحث مطرح میشو� که آیا اصلا خود خدایان مگر با هم در صلح� دائم هستند و آیا با هم اختلاف نظر ندارند؟ تاریخ اساطیری یونان پر است از ایزدانی که از یک قهرمان حمایت کردند و ایزدان دیگری که همزمان بر ضد اویند. سقراط میگوی�: «آنچ� محبوب خدایان است، ممکن است منفور آنان نیز باشد. پس عجیب نخواهد بود که اگر رفتار تو، که بر پدر خویش اقامه دعوی کردها� زئوس را خوش آید اما کرونوس و اورانوس از آن بیزار باشند...» به نظرم در اینجا� اولین جرقهها� معرفتشناس� افلاطون را میبینی�: اینک� معیار مطلقی برای حقیقت باید وجود داشته باشد (پرداختن مشروحت� افلاطون به معرفتشناس� را میتوا� در در اثر مربوط به دوره سالخوردگیاش� تئایتتوس و یا در بخشهای� از جمهوری پیدا کرد!) و نمیتوا� بر پایها� نااستوار حقیقت را بنا کرد.
جلوتر، مهمتری� پرسش سقراط مطرح میشو�: «آیا عملی که موافق دین است، بدین علت محبوب خدایان است که موافق دین است، یا چون محبوب خدایان است موافق دین شمرده میشود؟�
همانطو� که بحث جلوتر میرود� سقراط پرسشها� بیشتری مطرح میکن�. او نسبت عدالت و دیندا� بودن به شکل دقیق واکاوی میکن� و در بخش پایانی، دیندار� را با خدمت کردن به خدایان و پاسخ گرفتن از آنه� مقایسه میکن�.
پایان دیالوگ بدون نتیجه خاصی به پایان میرس�. یوثیفرو در مسیری دایرهوا� حرکت کرده و به نقطه شروع رسیده است. او تغییری نکرده و بدون پذیرش عدم داناییش� از بحث بیشتر فرار میکن�!
بخشی از چیزهایی که نوشتم تلقیها� خودم بود و بقیه را هم با کمک اینه� یاد گرفتم:
1- تاریخ فلسف کاپلستون جلد اول
2- سقراط: آگاهی از جهل / یان پاتوچکا
3- مرگ سقراط / رومانو گواردینی
گفتوگ� با پرسش سقراط درباره مفهوم دیندار� آغاز میشو�. یوثیفرو با غرور فراوان اظهار میکن� که دینداری� کاری است که او انجام میده�. به نظر میرس� که او خود را با زئوس همسن� میدار�: همانطو� که زئوس مکلّف بود تا پدر خود را در بند کند تا حق و عدالت را قوام بخشد، یوثیفرو هم قصد ستیزه با پدرش را دارد («... همه مردمان زئوس را بزرگت� و عادلت� از همه خدایان میدانن� و تصدیق میکنن� که زئوس پدر خود را به بند کشید زیرا فرزندان خود را میخور�... ولی همان مردم چون میبینن� که من پدر خود را به سبب گناهی که مرتکب شده است تعقیب میکنم� بر من خشم میگیرند�). او میدانس� که این رفتار در نظر اکثریت مردم دیوانگی است («...از کسی شکایت کردها� که اگر بگویم مرا دیوانه خواهی خواند.»)، اما به همین سبب آن را در پیش گرفت تا از آن بهره بگیرد و کسب اعتبار کند. او میخواس� از حد متوسط جامعه ممتاز گردد و این کار او میتوانس� نشانه دانش و ایمان او باشد. به نظر میرس� افلاطون از همین شباهت کاذب در مکالمه خود استفاده میکن� تا پوچی اتهام ضد سقراطی را به شکل طنز به دست دهد زیرا در هر دو بازپرسیا� که در انتظار سقراط و یوثیفرو است، دستاویزی مذهبی در کار است.
با ادامه بحث، یوثیفرو دینداری را اینگون� بیان میکن�: «آنچ� خدایان دوست دارند موافق دین است و آنچ� دوست ندارند مخالف دین.» سقراط با ادامه بحث سعی میکن� نشان دهد که این تعریف تا چه ناپایدار است. این بحث مطرح میشو� که آیا اصلا خود خدایان مگر با هم در صلح� دائم هستند و آیا با هم اختلاف نظر ندارند؟ تاریخ اساطیری یونان پر است از ایزدانی که از یک قهرمان حمایت کردند و ایزدان دیگری که همزمان بر ضد اویند. سقراط میگوی�: «آنچ� محبوب خدایان است، ممکن است منفور آنان نیز باشد. پس عجیب نخواهد بود که اگر رفتار تو، که بر پدر خویش اقامه دعوی کردها� زئوس را خوش آید اما کرونوس و اورانوس از آن بیزار باشند...» به نظرم در اینجا� اولین جرقهها� معرفتشناس� افلاطون را میبینی�: اینک� معیار مطلقی برای حقیقت باید وجود داشته باشد (پرداختن مشروحت� افلاطون به معرفتشناس� را میتوا� در در اثر مربوط به دوره سالخوردگیاش� تئایتتوس و یا در بخشهای� از جمهوری پیدا کرد!) و نمیتوا� بر پایها� نااستوار حقیقت را بنا کرد.
جلوتر، مهمتری� پرسش سقراط مطرح میشو�: «آیا عملی که موافق دین است، بدین علت محبوب خدایان است که موافق دین است، یا چون محبوب خدایان است موافق دین شمرده میشود؟�
همانطو� که بحث جلوتر میرود� سقراط پرسشها� بیشتری مطرح میکن�. او نسبت عدالت و دیندا� بودن به شکل دقیق واکاوی میکن� و در بخش پایانی، دیندار� را با خدمت کردن به خدایان و پاسخ گرفتن از آنه� مقایسه میکن�.
پایان دیالوگ بدون نتیجه خاصی به پایان میرس�. یوثیفرو در مسیری دایرهوا� حرکت کرده و به نقطه شروع رسیده است. او تغییری نکرده و بدون پذیرش عدم داناییش� از بحث بیشتر فرار میکن�!
بخشی از چیزهایی که نوشتم تلقیها� خودم بود و بقیه را هم با کمک اینه� یاد گرفتم:
1- تاریخ فلسف کاپلستون جلد اول
2- سقراط: آگاهی از جهل / یان پاتوچکا
3- مرگ سقراط / رومانو گواردینی
April 24, 2022
I enjoyed the translation by Benjamin Jowett, which I read this past week. In EUTHYPHRO, Socrates explores the meaning of the pious or holy. He poses the famous question: do the Gods love something because it is holy or is it holy because the Gods love it? (Natural right or convention?)
Have fun.
Have fun.
May 31, 2024
very short but very insightful
February 10, 2023
Euthyphro can be simplified as this:
Socrates: What is virtue?
Euthyphro: Virtue is what God loves.
Socrates: Wait a sec, let me get this straight before we go any farther.
1. Is virtue loved by God because it is virtuous,
OR
2. Is virtue virtuous because it is loved by God?
Euthyphro: Number 1. God loves virtue because it is virtuous.
Socrates: That doesn't explain why virtuous acts are virtuous though.
This my friends is called the Euthyphro dilemma. Socrates' question continues to echo in modern minds over 2000 years later.
To better explain it, look at this question:
'Is my wife beautiful because I am attracted to her, or am I attracted to her because she is beautiful.'
It is the latter in this case.
Yet, in Socrates' dilemma above it is not so easily said which is true.
There are many different views that have historically been held, and this dilemma has been particularly important because it lays a foundation to both ethics and metaphysics.
The first camp holds the view, 'that which is right is commanded by God because it is right' and this perspective is identified in moral philosophy by a variety of names, including intellectualism, rationalism, realism, naturalism, and objectivism. This idea is that there are independent moral standards: some actions are right or wrong in and of themselves, independent of God's commands.
The second camp holds the view, 'that which is right is right because it is commanded by God.' This perspective is known as divine command theory or voluntarism. It is the view that there are no moral standards other than God's will: without God's commands, nothing would be right or wrong.
And in third camp (the classical theist perspective) it is claimed to be a false dilemma. That God neither conforms to nor invents the moral order. Rather His very nature is the standard for value. For example Edward Feser, a Thomist philosopher says, "Divine simplicity [entails] that God's will just is God's goodness which just is His immutable and necessary existence. That means that what is objectively good and what God wills for us as morally obligatory are really the same thing considered under different descriptions, and that neither could have been other than they are. There can be no question then, either of God's having arbitrarily commanded something different for us (torturing babies for fun, or whatever) or of there being a standard of goodness apart from Him. Again, the Euthyphro dilemma is a false one; the third option that it fails to consider is that what is morally obligatory is what God commands in accordance with a non-arbitrary and unchanging standard of goodness that is not independent of Him... He is not under the moral law precisely because He is the moral law."
Socrates: What is virtue?
Euthyphro: Virtue is what God loves.
Socrates: Wait a sec, let me get this straight before we go any farther.
1. Is virtue loved by God because it is virtuous,
OR
2. Is virtue virtuous because it is loved by God?
Euthyphro: Number 1. God loves virtue because it is virtuous.
Socrates: That doesn't explain why virtuous acts are virtuous though.
This my friends is called the Euthyphro dilemma. Socrates' question continues to echo in modern minds over 2000 years later.
To better explain it, look at this question:
'Is my wife beautiful because I am attracted to her, or am I attracted to her because she is beautiful.'
It is the latter in this case.
Yet, in Socrates' dilemma above it is not so easily said which is true.
There are many different views that have historically been held, and this dilemma has been particularly important because it lays a foundation to both ethics and metaphysics.
The first camp holds the view, 'that which is right is commanded by God because it is right' and this perspective is identified in moral philosophy by a variety of names, including intellectualism, rationalism, realism, naturalism, and objectivism. This idea is that there are independent moral standards: some actions are right or wrong in and of themselves, independent of God's commands.
The second camp holds the view, 'that which is right is right because it is commanded by God.' This perspective is known as divine command theory or voluntarism. It is the view that there are no moral standards other than God's will: without God's commands, nothing would be right or wrong.
And in third camp (the classical theist perspective) it is claimed to be a false dilemma. That God neither conforms to nor invents the moral order. Rather His very nature is the standard for value. For example Edward Feser, a Thomist philosopher says, "Divine simplicity [entails] that God's will just is God's goodness which just is His immutable and necessary existence. That means that what is objectively good and what God wills for us as morally obligatory are really the same thing considered under different descriptions, and that neither could have been other than they are. There can be no question then, either of God's having arbitrarily commanded something different for us (torturing babies for fun, or whatever) or of there being a standard of goodness apart from Him. Again, the Euthyphro dilemma is a false one; the third option that it fails to consider is that what is morally obligatory is what God commands in accordance with a non-arbitrary and unchanging standard of goodness that is not independent of Him... He is not under the moral law precisely because He is the moral law."
February 7, 2021
This is a frustrating dialogue, because Euthyphro throws in the towel
Before Socrates has properly interrogated him (technically, a foul).
Socrates does not understand the Homeric account of the gods.
That disagreements should arise among them is not particularly odd;
The essential mission of Aryan gods is eternal war against Entropy,
Decreasing which in the cosmos is the true definition of piety.
In this the gods are all as one, and what's loved by them all is pious;
They follow an imperative beyond themselves, in spite of Socrates' bias.
The gods follow the ultimate good (that they love it is one of its attributes,
But not however its essence), else sans meaning would be their attitudes.
There is no 'Euthyphro dilemma', for you see both gods and men
Follow something higher (call it 'good'), whose essence is beyond them.
We help the gods to help the good, not the other way around;
This dialogue will clarify that - frustrating, yet profound.
Before Socrates has properly interrogated him (technically, a foul).
Socrates does not understand the Homeric account of the gods.
That disagreements should arise among them is not particularly odd;
The essential mission of Aryan gods is eternal war against Entropy,
Decreasing which in the cosmos is the true definition of piety.
In this the gods are all as one, and what's loved by them all is pious;
They follow an imperative beyond themselves, in spite of Socrates' bias.
The gods follow the ultimate good (that they love it is one of its attributes,
But not however its essence), else sans meaning would be their attitudes.
There is no 'Euthyphro dilemma', for you see both gods and men
Follow something higher (call it 'good'), whose essence is beyond them.
We help the gods to help the good, not the other way around;
This dialogue will clarify that - frustrating, yet profound.
June 26, 2021
I am reading , as part of a project to read all four Plato's dialogues that address the issue of the trial and death of Socrates. Euthyphron is by far the shortest of the four. Unlike some of Plato's dialogues such as the Symposium/Banquet I cannot see reading Euthyphron on its own. It simply feels incomplete. This is why I am giving it only three stars.
Euthyphron would however merit five stars if it were to be considered simply as the beginning to the set (created after the fact) of dialogues related to the demise of Socrates. Plato makes two points. First, that to live piously is not a question of following rules; it is about living according to the wishes of God. Second, what is pleasing to God is a constant that has nothing to do with how imminent death is.
Euthyphron would however merit five stars if it were to be considered simply as the beginning to the set (created after the fact) of dialogues related to the demise of Socrates. Plato makes two points. First, that to live piously is not a question of following rules; it is about living according to the wishes of God. Second, what is pleasing to God is a constant that has nothing to do with how imminent death is.
August 1, 2016
A rather abrupt end to a rather interesting dialogue. This picks up right where Meno left off with an addition of piety to the ongoing dialogue about virtue.
Socrates off tangential discussion doesn't dissuade Euthyphro as Euthyphro tries to answer Socrates questions as much as possible. With impending trial looming in the horizon, Plato addresses piety, justice in the same sentence which sounds fascinating but like Socrates, we are left in the dust.
Euthyphro says bye-bye mid dialogue making this a very short conversation indeed. Still its brilliant in the way Socrates quietly demolishes traditional perspectives on Gods and Myths.
Socrates off tangential discussion doesn't dissuade Euthyphro as Euthyphro tries to answer Socrates questions as much as possible. With impending trial looming in the horizon, Plato addresses piety, justice in the same sentence which sounds fascinating but like Socrates, we are left in the dust.
Euthyphro says bye-bye mid dialogue making this a very short conversation indeed. Still its brilliant in the way Socrates quietly demolishes traditional perspectives on Gods and Myths.
November 7, 2024
reading a plato dialogue in greek might be my greatest accomplishment in life so far and i am very happy to be over with it. i did enjoy the theological questions of the nature of holiness that the dialogue raises but i don’t think i spent as much time thinking about them as i would if i had read it in english. always more to think about i suppose
February 23, 2021
Athens. Socrates has been slack in making his homage to the Athenian gods. Now the young men who follow Socrates also begin to be slack in their making homage, their civic duty. Socrates is called to court. He must present an apologia, a courtroom defense. And he is unsure how to prepare his defense. Socrates seeks answers from many, including Euthyphro. Because Plato has left us with one representative consultation-dialogue which indicates the nature of all the consultation-dialogues, textual Socrates is depicted as badgering Euthyphro with questions until Euthyphro gets frustrated and leaves Socrates, perhaps on the street. For Socrates this cannot bode well. For we readers of the text, we can get insights into cause-and-effect, motivations, and limitations of these. Worth a reread.
Read as participation in a Plato study at GR Catching Up on the Classics.
I rated this text at 4 stars because some other Plato texts will impress me significantly more. I am expecting to be blown away by some of what we read in .
Read as participation in a Plato study at GR Catching Up on the Classics.
I rated this text at 4 stars because some other Plato texts will impress me significantly more. I am expecting to be blown away by some of what we read in .
July 28, 2018
ضمن این مکالمه� کوتاه سقراط و اوتریفون که از زبان افلاطون بیان میشود� سقراط پرسشی را مطرح میکن� که به دو راهی اوتیفرون معروف شده و نظریه� فرمان الهی را به چالش میکش�.
نظریه� فرمان الهی دیدگاهی فرااخلاقی (فرااخلاق بر محور خود چیستی اخلاق متمرکز است) است و طرفداران آن معتقدند:
عملی از نظر اخلاقی خوب است که به فرمان یک خدا یا الوهیت باشد. در این دیدگاه، هرچه خداوند به آن امر کند، خوب وصواب است و هرچه از آن نهی کند، بد و خطاست.
دو راهی اوتیفرون این نظریه را مورد پرسش قرار میده�:
سقراط از اثیفرون میپرس�: «آیا چون خداوند به چیزی امر کرده است آن چیز صواب است؛ یا چون آن چیز صواب است، خداوند به آن فرمان داده است؟»
همچنان اندیشمندان و فلاسفه میکوشن� برای پرسش� سقراط پاسخی پیدا کنند. پیشنهاد میکن� این لینکه� را برای جزئیات بیشتر ببینید:
نظریه� فرمان الهی دیدگاهی فرااخلاقی (فرااخلاق بر محور خود چیستی اخلاق متمرکز است) است و طرفداران آن معتقدند:
عملی از نظر اخلاقی خوب است که به فرمان یک خدا یا الوهیت باشد. در این دیدگاه، هرچه خداوند به آن امر کند، خوب وصواب است و هرچه از آن نهی کند، بد و خطاست.
دو راهی اوتیفرون این نظریه را مورد پرسش قرار میده�:
سقراط از اثیفرون میپرس�: «آیا چون خداوند به چیزی امر کرده است آن چیز صواب است؛ یا چون آن چیز صواب است، خداوند به آن فرمان داده است؟»
همچنان اندیشمندان و فلاسفه میکوشن� برای پرسش� سقراط پاسخی پیدا کنند. پیشنهاد میکن� این لینکه� را برای جزئیات بیشتر ببینید:
November 14, 2020
I cannot help but find Socrates at once amazing and unbelievably annoying. As a great man once said, "You're not wrong... You're just an asshole." But it need not be said that what he is doing is necessary. Of course he is right to question the process of most of our daily assumptions. And it is a quite annoying, pestering, and uncomfortable feeling to have to examine our assumptions. And that is precisely why it was easier to put the man to death. We are willing to do whatever it takes to live our lives as comfortably as possible.
I think that as a reader, I love to believe that I am following in the footsteps of Socrates. But I think I am more often Euthyphro embodied than anything even remotely close to Socrates.
Anyway, JAY-Z said it best: "Is Pious pious 'cause God loves pious? Socrates asked, whose bias do y'all seek?"
I think that as a reader, I love to believe that I am following in the footsteps of Socrates. But I think I am more often Euthyphro embodied than anything even remotely close to Socrates.
Anyway, JAY-Z said it best: "Is Pious pious 'cause God loves pious? Socrates asked, whose bias do y'all seek?"
December 25, 2024
An inconclusive elenchus for 'piety v. impiety' between Socrates and a colleague prior to the unfortunate judgement he was to receive in Athens.
Stunning.
Stunning.
December 28, 2022
Slowly dipping my toe back into philosophy, starting with the Platonic dialogues that reference the trial, conviction and ultimate execution of Plato's teacher Socrates. Socrates takes Euthyphro in circles (which admittedly was his way of conversing,) and ultimately is no further in his quest to understand the nature of piety and impiety then he was at the start of the conversation.
September 22, 2023
"I have no particular liking for anything but the truth." Socrates was a baller.
And all he did was ask questions.
And all he did was ask questions.
January 17, 2024
Is what is just, just because it is loved by God or loved by God because it is just?
Interesting thoughts and discussions on our relation to God and his relation to us. Also the relation of what is good to what is pious. And can the distinction of pious and impious always be understood rationally?
Also, just a good reminder that even Socrates didn’t have the time/wasn’t able to solve some questions he asked.
Interesting thoughts and discussions on our relation to God and his relation to us. Also the relation of what is good to what is pious. And can the distinction of pious and impious always be understood rationally?
Also, just a good reminder that even Socrates didn’t have the time/wasn’t able to solve some questions he asked.
March 18, 2015
I'm read this as a part of as reprinted in the . Translated by .
This will be my third Platonic dialogue after and the .
This dialogue has Socrates awaiting his official indictment on impiety (among a litany of other things) and he runs into a friend who is a priest and is in the process of having his father charged with murder. As they talk, they decide to try and define what makes someone pious or impious and what piety actually is.
Now, like with all dialogues involving Socrates (and written by Plato) they start by trying to define one thing and then want to define what they defining and this is done until Socrates remembers what the original question is and realize that they may not have answered it.
So from what I can grasp I think it was agreed that the pious had the quality of being loved by the gods; that while being pious means being just, you can be just without necessarily being pious; that that piety involves caring for the gods and that caring is defined as "the good and benefit of the object being cared for." Finally, that piety overall is the "knowledge of how to give to, and beg from, the gods."
This seems good enough but it could have, I felt, gone into it more and that is why at the end I give this 3(.5) stars. this was a quick read, I'm glad but it could have gone a little longer and, like Socrates complains at the end, I feel like I'm left hanging some.
This will be my third Platonic dialogue after and the .
This dialogue has Socrates awaiting his official indictment on impiety (among a litany of other things) and he runs into a friend who is a priest and is in the process of having his father charged with murder. As they talk, they decide to try and define what makes someone pious or impious and what piety actually is.
Now, like with all dialogues involving Socrates (and written by Plato) they start by trying to define one thing and then want to define what they defining and this is done until Socrates remembers what the original question is and realize that they may not have answered it.
So from what I can grasp I think it was agreed that the pious had the quality of being loved by the gods; that while being pious means being just, you can be just without necessarily being pious; that that piety involves caring for the gods and that caring is defined as "the good and benefit of the object being cared for." Finally, that piety overall is the "knowledge of how to give to, and beg from, the gods."
This seems good enough but it could have, I felt, gone into it more and that is why at the end I give this 3(.5) stars. this was a quick read, I'm glad but it could have gone a little longer and, like Socrates complains at the end, I feel like I'm left hanging some.
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