Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell, OM, FRS, was a Welsh philosopher, historian, logician, mathematician, advocate for social reform, pacifist, and prominent rationalist. Although he was usually regarded as English, as he spent the majority of his life in England, he was born in Wales, where he also died.
He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1950 "in recognition of his varied and significant writings in which he champions humanitarian ideals and freedom of thought."
La obra "Autoridad e Individuo" de Bertrand Russell es una joya intelectual que aborda con maestr铆a la compleja relaci贸n entre la autoridad y la libertad individual. A lo largo de sus p谩ginas, Russell desentra帽a las diferentes formas en que la autoridad se manifiesta en la sociedad, ya sea a trav茅s del gobierno, la religi贸n o las instituciones sociales, y examina c贸mo estas estructuras afectan la autonom铆a y el desarrollo del individuo a lo largo de diversos contextos culturales.
Lo que hace que este libro sea tan excepcional es la claridad y la profundidad con la que Russell analiza estos temas. Su estilo de escritura es accesible para el lector promedio, pero no por eso menos riguroso en su argumentaci贸n. A trav茅s de ejemplos hist贸ricos y filos贸ficos, Russell ilustra c贸mo la autoridad puede ser tanto una fuerza necesaria para el orden social como una restricci贸n para el crecimiento personal y la creatividad.
Adem谩s, el libro es relevante en cualquier 茅poca debido a su capacidad para provocar reflexi贸n y debate sobre cuestiones pacifistas. Las ideas de Russell sobre la importancia de la libertad de pensamiento y la resistencia a la opresi贸n resuenan tan fuerte hoy como lo hicieron cuando el libro fue publicado por primera vez.
En definitiva, 茅sta es una obra imprescindible para cualquier persona interesada en el estudio de la pol铆tica, la filosof铆a o la psicolog铆a social desde un punto de vista racionalista y positivista. Su an谩lisis perspicaz y su mensaje atemporal lo convierten en un cl谩sico que merece un lugar destacado en cualquier biblioteca. Sin duda, otorgo a este libro una calificaci贸n de cinco estrellas, ya que no solo informa e inspira, sino que tambi茅n desaf铆a y enriquece la mente del lector.
Human natural state Is barbarism , we have gave up or freedom for safety and easier life but we still has this stat of barbarism under our skin we can just get rid of it but we can get rid of civilization, civilization to me is a very weak home but looks beautiful like the first home in the three pigs story, but the civilization story we are not the pigs we are the wolf and the pigs at the same time, civilization needs intelligent people to be built and more intelligent people to continue, but the opposite happen look at the Middle East not in the state of barbarism nor civilization a state that will destroy the human kind if we didn't face it, it's a matter of time for every civilized nation to reach this state I am afraid that Italy and Greece are closer to it than civilization. ''CIVILIZATION NEVER CAME BACK TO ANY OF THE PLACES THAT IT ONCE EXISTED, IT'S LIKE A PERSON YOU MEET ONE TIME THEN HE DIES AFTER THE MEETING''. BACK to the book how can we balance between our old nature and civilization the unnatural thing, I think It differ from one to one an action move is enough for me but other need more than that. And he spoke about other things like that art is not important as it was before the mechanic world that is now. a great reading of the history you will find in this book you can find the book with Bertrand Russell voice on YouTube.
From the little I've known of Russell, he always struck me as both incredibly intelligent and wise. I was excited to discover this book, which is relatively short, would allow me to do some primary reading of his work without a lot of investment.
While his main work was logic and mathematics, he engaged deeply with social and political criticism. This book is a collection of 6 lectures, originally broadcasted by the BBC. It's core theme is the balance between individual freedom and the role of the state and overall authority and large-scale organization.
Russell argues that politics should be done at the smallest level possible. The chain of authority and bureaucracy should be minimized. This isn't only about efficiency or corruption, as a libertarian may argue, but rather to empower the individual with enough power to make a change within his immediate circle. The political landscape always has the character of being "outside" of everyday life, Russell often calls this "They". The ones at the bottom feel like no change is possible, and the people at the top are too distant from the problems they aim to solve. Something I liked in his argument is that Russell realized that this is inherent to large-scale organizations. While this culminates with the state, it's not required. It happens with private companies as well, which are completely separated from the government, and it also happens with communist states, which do not run on a capitalist system, but nevertheless positions of power have to be created to ensure organization.
There is a play between authority and freedom that has to be balanced. For example, in early Greek city-states, they had incredible freedom within each state, but they were at constant war with each other due to lack of social cohesion. On the other hand, the Roman Empire with its constant expansion and taxation (mostly after Augustus) led to its own ruin. Societies have a tendency to swing in this pendulum of anarchy and too much authority, often trying to compensate for the downsides of the previous opposite state.
Other topics are also touched upon, like human nature and the balance between individual and social ethics, although always connected with its main theme of authority and the individual. His writing is very enjoyable to read. Everything is laid out very carefully, yet it never seems to drag unnecessarily. What impresses me the most is how nuanced his views are. He is the epitome of anti-black and white thinking, always ready to acknowledge both sides of the issues. While I disagree with some of his ideas, his insight into social and political organization are incredibly well thought out, and many of the problems that Russell faced in his time we are also facing today. Perhaps if he was listened to, some of it could have been minimized.
A worthwhile read for anyone interested in political philosophy and for me it ignited a desire to dive more into Russell's work.
Even though it is a post WW2 book, the themes that Bertrand Russell so vividly presents are still actual situations in modern society. I'd say the lenght of each chapter is ideal to get a brief understanding of the content, without tiring the reader with too much detail. The chapters entail an overview of the relations between Social Cohesion, Human Nature, Governments, The role of inidividuality and the evolution of technology.
The book starts with Bertrand beautifully describing the distinciton between evolutionary instincts found in human beings, which require a certain liberty for spontanety and creativity, then morals, which have been created in time, through religion, reforms, revolutions etc. This duality of human nature is presented in the most clear way I've encountered in philosophical works. And from here, the author is helpful in creating a certain awareness about the roles of governments, while contrasting socialism/communism or ancient civilisation/modern society.
He talks about personal initiative, which he thinks as essential for an ever growing culture and then talks of how governments opress or boost this personal initiative that is also crucial for the happiness of individuals. But because organisations and governments grew so large nowadays, one single individual finds in hard to feel like he can make a change and therefore misses a sense of purpose, which is helpful in guiding our life and living it vigorously. That is why, Bertrand shows how decentralisation could work in making invidivuals enjoy their life more, even though it gets harder and harder in this mechanical society in which arts and creativity lack immediate importance and are isolated from society in a way or another. The main thing I like about Bertrand Russell is that he creates for the reader such an objective view over crucial matters, withouth taking pride in finding solutions for them, but presenting some realist alternatives which might be for the better. What is also admirable is that this book, as far as I've read, is made together with his wife's impressions and ideas. Living in a West European country I can certainly relate to the monotony of the society they describe, however things have changed a little and one would think that politicians got inspired by this book.Of course, would be ideal if more of them would read Russells essays.
Bertrand Russell realiza un breve disertaci贸n acerca de un tema ambicioso: 驴c贸mo se pueden conjugar en un Estado moderno la regularizaci贸n y la acotaci贸n a la que somete el gobierno a sus ciudadanos, mientras por otro lado se deja lugar al individuo para desarrollar su propia iniciativa? Iniciativa que a veces es revolucionaria o aparentemente contraria a los intereses del Estado, pero que puede redundar en un avance cient铆fico, moral o civil poderoso, como ya ha ocurrido con muchos grandes nombres a lo largo de la Historia.
Abre el debate un an谩lisis hist贸rico de c贸mo se construye una civilizaci贸n y de qu茅 roles van adoptando los individuos en relaci贸n con el resto del grupo, hasta llegar a nuestros d铆as. Analiza las motivaciones de la iniciativa del individuo, a la vez que establece el dominio de un Estado que tiene inter茅s para sus ciudadanos, y propone formas de llegar a un equilibrio beneficioso. De tono ameno y f谩cil de seguir, con ejemplos diversos y sin entrar en muchos tecnicismos, resulta muy sencillo seguir al genio de Russell.
These essays are so good鈥� a human philosophy of government
鈥淢en in control of vast organizations have tended to be too abstract in their outlook, to forget what actual human beings are like, and to try to fit men to systems rather than systems to men.鈥� (Russel, 75)
The fundamental problem I propose to consider in these lectures is this: how can we combine that degree of individual initiative which is necessary for progress with the degree of social cohesion that is necessary for survival?
In all social animals, including man, co-operation and the unity of a group have some foundation in instinct.
This is most complete in ants and bees, which apparently are never tempted to anti-social actions and never deviate from devotion to the nest or the hive. Up to a point we may admire this unswerving devotion to public duty, but it has its drawbacks; ants and bees do not produce great works of art, or make scientific discoveries, or found religions teaching that all ants are sisters. Their social life, in fact, is mechanical, precise and static. We are willing that human life shall have an element of turbulence if thereby we can escape such evolutionary stagnation.
The strongest and most instinctively compelling of social groups was, and still is, the family.
The transition from the family to the small tribe was presumably biologically connected with the fact that hunting could be more efficient if it was cooperative, and from a very early time the cohesion of the tribe must have been increased and developed by conflicts with other tribes.
One of the things that cause stress and strain in human social life is that it is possible, up to a point, to become aware of rational grounds for a behaviour not prompted by natural instinct. But when such behaviour strains natural instinct too severely nature takes her revenge by producing either listlessness or destructiveness, either of which may cause a structure imposed by reason to break down.
From those early days down to modem times war has been the chief engine in enlarging the size of communities, and fear has increasingly replaced tribal solidarity as a source of social cohesion.
Always when we pass beyond the limits of the family it is the external enemy which supplies the cohesive force. In times of safety we can afford to hate our neighbour, but in times of danger - we must love him.
If the unification of mankind is ever to be realised, it will be necessary to find ways of circumventing our largely unconscious primitive ferocity, partly by establishing a reign of law, and partly by finding innocent outlets for our competitive instincts.
This is not an easy problem, and it is one which cannot be solved by morality alone.
People who live a life which is unnatural beyond a point are likely to be filled with envy, malice and all uncharitableness. They may develop strains of cruelty, or, on the other hand, they may so completely lose all joy of life that they have no longer any capacity for effort.
Anyone who hopes that in time it may be possible to abolish war should give serious thought to the problem of satisfying harmlessly the instincts that we inherit from long generations of savages.
I do not think that ordinary human beings can be happy without competition, for competition has been, ever since the origin of man, the spur to most serious activities. We should not, therefore, attempt to abolish competition, but only to see to it that it takes forms which are not too injurious.
Many people are happier during a war than they are in peace time, provided the direct suffering entailed by the fighting does not fall too heavily upon them personally.
The problem of making peace with our anarchic impulses is one which has been too little studied, but one which becomes more and more imperative as scientific technique advances.
I think perhaps the essence of the matter was given by the Red Indian whom I quoted a moment ago, who regretted the old life because 鈥榯here was glory in it鈥�. Every energetic person wants something that can count as 鈥榞lory 鈥�. There are those who get it-film stars, famous athletes, military commanders, and even some few politicians but they are a small minority, and the rest are left to day-dreams: day-dreams of the cinema, day-dreams of wild west adventure stories, purely private day-dreams of imaginary power.
Greek cities differed greatly as regards the degree of individual liberty permitted to citizens; in most of them there was a great deal, but n Sparta an absolute minimum.
The problem, like all those with which we are concerned, is one of balance; too little liberty brings stagnation and too much brings chaos.
I cannot think of anything that mankind has gained by the existence of Jenghis Khan. I do not know what good came of Robespierre, and, for my part, I see no reason to be grateful to Lenin.
Individual Initiative Reduced to a Minimum And this applies not only to men of rare and exceptional greatness, but to a wide range of talent. In the ages in which there were great poets, there were also large numbers of little poets, and when there were great painters there were large numbers of little painters.
A healthy and progressive society requires both central control and individual and group initiative: without control there is anarchy, and without initiative there is stagnation.
In our complex world there cannot be fruitful initiative without government, but unfortunately there can be government without initiative.
Material goods are more a matter of possession than goods that are mental. A man who eats a piece of food prevents everyone else from eating it, but a man who writes or enjoys a poem does not prevent another man from writing or enjoying one just as good or better. That is why, in regard to material goods, justice is important, but in regard so mental goods the thing that is needed is opportunity and an environment that makes hope of achievement seem rational.
If a man seriously desires to live the best life that is open to him, he must learn to be critical of the tribal customs and tribal beliefs that are generally accepted among his neighbours.
But a society does not, or at least should not, exist to satisfy an external survey, but to bring a good life to the individuals who compose it. It is in the individuals, not in the whole, that ultimate value is to be sought. A good society is a means to a good life for those who compose it, not something having a separate kind of excellence on its own account.
There is another ethical theory, which to my mind is also inadequate; it is that which might be called the 鈥榖iological鈥� theory, though I should not wish to assert that it is held by most biologists. This view is derived from a contemplation of evolution. The struggle for existence is supposed to have led gradually to more and more complex organisms, culminating (so far) in man. In this view, survival is the supreme end, or rather, survival of one鈥檚 own species. Whatever increases the human population of the globe, if this theory is right, is to count as 鈥榞ood鈥�, and whatever, diminishes the population is to count as 鈥� bad鈥�. I cannot see any justification for such a mechanical and arithmetical outlook. It would be easy to find a single acre containing more ants than there arc human beings in the whole world, but we do not on that account acknowledge the superior excellence of ants. And what humane person would prefer a large population living in poverty and squalor to a smaller population living happily with a sufficiency of comfort?
Men in control of vast organisations have tended to be too abstract in their outlook, to forget what actual human beings are like, and to try to fit men to systems rather than systems to men. The lack of spontaneity from which our highly organised societies tend to suffer is connected with excessive control over large areas by remote authorities.
I wish to repeat, with all possible emphasis, that I disagree completely with those who infer from our combative impulses that human nature demands war and other destructive forms of conflict. I firmly believe the very opposite of this. I maintain that combative impulses have an essential part to play, and Ic their harmful forms can be enormously lessened. Greed of possession will grow less when there is no fear of destitution. Love of power can be satisfied in many ways that involve no injury to others: by the power over nature that results from discovery and invention, by the production of admired books or works of art, and by successful persuasion. Energy and the wish to be effective are beneficent if they can find the right outlet, and harmful if not鈥攍ike steam, which can either drive the train or burst the boiler.
We shall not create a good world by trying to make men tame and timid, but by encouraging them to be bold and adventurous and fearless, except in inflicting injuries upon their fellowmen.
Our present predicament is due more than anything else to the fact that we have learnt to understand and control to a terrifying extent the forces of nature outside us, but not those that are embodied in ourselves.
Self-control has always been a watchword of the moralist, but in the past it has been a control without understanding.
"Energy and the wish to be effective are beneficent if they can find the right outlet, and harmful if not - like steam, which can either drive the train or burst the boiler."
Fantastic book, written by a fantastic man. The ideas outlined by Russell are thought with a level of commonsense which might make you think "oh wow, it really is that obvious". However, based on the nature of current government and the individual's role in society, I believe it is actually Russell's brilliance which makes it come across this way.
For such a short book, Authority and the Individual pounds home some extremely optimistic messages about self-cultivation, and how happiness can still be found in the comparatively strange times that we live in. The structure of the book outlines Russell's main ideas about human nature and the tribalistic impulses which we still have rooted within us; how both our individual efforts and functioning within a society are key to being content. This gives rise to discussion about the role of government in the preservation of humanity, morals and their derivation from the group and the individual, human creativity, and how the individual can adjust their outlook to cope with grave prospects.
The final chapter rounds up all of the fleshed out arguments in the previous chapters, and uses them collectively for a climax which gives a refined amalgamation of Russell's ideas. It is easily my favourite chapter, and well worth the read on its own, let alone the whole book.
Overall, I cannot fault this book. Every point which Russell makes is backed up with contemporary affairs and ideologies which continue to exist to this day. If you want a refreshing take on how you live your day-to-day life as an individual who is also part of a society (which I assume is a vast majority of you) then pick this up.
喈掂喈瘝喈瘝喈喈班瘉喈曕瘝喈曕瘉喈瘝 喈ㄠ喁嵿喈班瘝喈曕喁� 喈囙喁嵿喁傕喁執� 喈呧喈氞喈喁� 喈掂喈氞喈む瘝喈む瘉 喈喈┼疅喁堗喁佮畽喁嵿畷喈赤瘝. 喈囙喁嵿 喈ㄠ瘋喈侧瘚喈熰瘉 喈氞瘒喈班瘝喈む瘝喈む瘉 Bertrand russell 喈庎喁佮喈苦 鈥淧olitical Ideals鈥�, 鈥渨hat i believe鈥�, 鈥渨hy i am not a christian鈥�, 喈瘚喈┼瘝喈� 喈瘉喈む瘝喈む畷喈權瘝喈曕喁堗喁佮喁� 喈掂喈氞喈瘉喈權瘝喈曕喁�.听
This book is not a dense philosophical treatise but a collection of accessible lectures, making it an excellent introduction to Russell鈥檚 thought. As with much of his work, the language is deceptively simple, yet the ideas presented require deep reflection. His reasoning is sharp, though some readers may find his conclusions overly idealistic or lacking in practical applicability.
Russell presents a balanced argument, neither outright rejecting authority nor unquestioningly endorsing individualism. Instead, he examines how the two must coexist to promote creativity, progress, and human dignity.
His insights on democracy, capitalism, and the role of science in governance are particularly thought-provoking. However, certain sections inevitably feel somewhat dated.
Six lectures delivered in 1948, later (posthumously?) published in book form; these 85 pages pack a lot of punch. Similar to Burke, Russell makes the case that the state of nature for man is not that state which civilization gives rise to. The further man gets from 鈥渘ature,鈥� whatever that is, the more he will suffer in one way or another. It is thus the role of politics to find a way for man to be able to release his creative outlets, those things which gave rise to civilization as it exists, without stifling them; at the same time, it is the role to somehow provide for a social order that allows for the collective wellbeing. While no fan of the Soviets, at the time of these lectures given by Bertrand in 1948, it was still thought by many (including Bertrand) that central planning was the solution to our economic ails; indeed, that the economic 鈥減roblem鈥� was one which could be 鈥渟olved.鈥� Nonetheless, many of the observations made in these lectures ring true, and it is without a doubt that Bertrand Russell was a far, far smarter man than I. 鈥� 鈥淥ne of things that cause stress and strain in human social life is that it is possible, up to a point, to become aware of rational grounds for a behaviour not prompted by natural instinct. But when such behaviour strains natural instinct too severely nature takes her revenge by producing either listlessness or destructiveness, either of which may cause a structure inspired by reason to break down.鈥� Thus, what is natural, what is our instinct? Does modernity stray too far from what that is? 鈥� 鈥淎lways when we pass beyond the limits of the family it is the external enemy which supplies the cohesive force. In times of safety we can afford to hate our neighbour, but in times of danger we must love him. People do not, at most times, love those whom they find sitting next to them in a bus, but during the blitz they did.鈥� As Matt Taibbi says, now it鈥檚 us against us, 24/7, on every news channel, with no Communists to fight. o 鈥淚n a shipwreck the crew obey orders without the need of reasoning with themselves, because they have a common purpose which is not remote, and the means to its realization are not difficult to understand. But if the captain were obliged, like the government, to explain the principles of currency in order to prove his commands wise, the ship would ink before his lecture was finished.鈥� 鈥� 鈥淚f we are all children of God, then we are all one family. But in practice those who in theory adopted this creed have always felt that those who did not adopt it were not children of God but children of Satan, and the old mechanism of hatred of those outside the tribe has returned鈥� the old instincts that have come down to us from our tribal ancestors rise up in indignation, feeling that life would lose its savour if there were no one to hate鈥� If the unification of mankind if ever to be realized, it will be necessary to find ways of circumventing our largely unconscious primitive ferocity, partly by establishing a reign of law, and partly by finding innocent outlets for our competitive instincts.鈥� Religion binds and blinds, as Nietzsche mocks the 鈥淏rotherly Love鈥� of Christianity. o 鈥淲e have all kinds of aggressive impulses, and also creative impulses, which society forbids us to indulge, and the alternatives that it supplies in the shape of football matches and all-in wrestling are hardly adequate. Anyone who hopes that in time it may be possible to abolish war should give serious thought to the problem of satisfying harmlessly the instincts that we inherit form long generations of savages.鈥� Maybe sports spectating isn鈥檛 as socially un-useful as it might seem, Noam Chomsky鈥檚 lack of affinity for it (and thus really his lack of understanding of the human condition) be damned. 飩� 鈥淎 quiet life may well be a boring life. The unadventurous existence of a well-behaved citizen, engaged in earning a moderate living in a humble capacity, leaves completely unsatisfied all that part of his nature which, if he had lived 400,000 years ago, would have found ample scope in the search for food, in cutting off the heads of enemies, and in escaping the attention of tigers. When war comes the bank clerk may escape and become a commando, and then at last he feels that he is living as nature intended him to live.鈥� 飩� 鈥淚t is no wonder if the religious innovators were execrated in their own day, for they sought to rob men of the joy of battle and the fierce delights of revenge. Primitive ferocity, which had seemed a virtue, was not said to be a sin, and a deep duality was introduced between morality and the life of impulse 鈥� or rather between the morality taught by those in whom the impulse of humanity was strong, and the traditional morality that was preferred by those who had no sympathies outside their own herd.鈥� 鈥� In a rebuke to socialists and DSA-members who cry that capitalism 鈥渢eaches鈥� hierarchy and competitiveness to humans, 鈥淚 do not think that ordinary human beings can be happy without competition, for competition has been, ever since the origin of Man, the spur to most serious activities. We should not, therefor, attempt to abolish competition, but only see to it that it takes forms which are not too injurious.鈥� 鈥� 鈥淭he problem of the social reformer, therefore, is not merely to seek means of security, for if these means when found provide no deep satisfaction the security will be thrown away for the glory of adventure.鈥� We must find, 鈥溾€� forms of adventure and danger and contest which are compatible with the civilised way of life... our instincts for both good and evil remain very much what they were when our ancestors鈥� brains first grew to their present size.鈥� If there cannot be found 鈥溾€� some real outlet for the impulses鈥� which Russell speaks of, 鈥溾€estructive philosophies will from time to time sweep away the best of human achievements.鈥� One such outlet is the sports competition outlet (Tim Krabbe, 鈥淗ow empty those lives are鈥�, for others it may be a more creative outlet.) 鈥� Formerly stability was provided by the existence of religion, again echoing Burke who says it is a necessary component of social control. 鈥淚t depended for its stability upon religion and the divinity of the king. Disobedience was impiety, and rebellion was liable to call down the anger of the gods.鈥� And for the lower classes and peasants, there was the stick. 鈥� With the advent of modernity, man is, to a certain extent, governed by forces outside his control, just that now it is not Gods, but other individuals. 鈥淎ll of these modern developments increase the control over the lives of individuals possessed by those who govern large organisations鈥︹€� o 鈥淚ndividual initiative is hemmed in either by the State or by powerful corporations, and there is a great danger lest this should produce, as in ancient Rome, a kind of listlessness and fatalism that is disastrous to vigorous life鈥�. As a result of mere size, government becomes increasingly remote from the governed and tends, even in a democracy, to have an independent life of its own.鈥� Through all of this, people lose 鈥渢he power of initiative鈥�, and the 鈥渟ense of individual initiative鈥�, reserved for, in Betrand鈥檚 1948 United Kingdom, the titans of industry and the high and mighty bureaucrats; the rest become cogs, necessary for 鈥渟mooth co-operation.鈥� 飩� Bureaucracy kills initiative; government does not have the necessary incentives for innovation. 鈥溾€hose who have nominal initiative are perpetually controlled by a Civil Service which has only a veto and no duty of inauguration, and thus acquires a negative psychology perpetually prone to prohibitions. Under such a system the energetic are reduced to despair; those who might have become energetic in a more hopeful environment tend to be listless and frivolous; and it is not likely that the positive functions of the State will be performed with vigour and competence鈥︹€� 鈥� He continues with an excellent quip at overprotective parents, 鈥淭his, needless to say, is the opinion of men who have acquired the habit that one sees in unwise parents of always saying 鈥榙on鈥檛 do that,鈥� without stopping to consider whether 鈥榯hat鈥� does any harm.鈥� 鈥� 鈥淣othing is so damping and deadening to initiative as to have a carefully thought out scheme vetoed by a central authority which knows almost nothing about it and has no sympathy with its objects.鈥� 鈥� Regarding too much individualism, 鈥淭he greatness of the Greeks in individual achievement was, I think, intimately bound up with their political incompetence, for the strength of individual passion was the source both of individual achievement and of the failure to secure Greek unity.鈥� o 鈥淩ome鈥檚 attempt to unify the civilized world came to grief largely because, perhaps through being both remote and alien, it failed to bring any measure of instinctive happiness even to prosperous citizens. In its last centuries there was universal pessimism and lack of vigour. Men felt that life here on earth had little to offer, and this feeling helped Christianity to centre men鈥檚 thoughts on the world to come.鈥� It seems, for many, these feelings persist to this day. 鈥� 鈥淭he impulse towards liberty, however, seems now to have lost much of its force among reformers; it has been replaced by the love of equality, which has been largely stimulated by the rise to affluence and power of new industrial magnates without any traditional claim to superiority.鈥� Is Progressivism in its many modern manifestations just a big way to try to dunk on the Rich? As Pinker says, 鈥淚ntellectuals who call themselves 鈥榩rogressive鈥� really hate progress.鈥� Echoing Orwell, how dare The Rich outperform intellectuals. 鈥� Regarding non-conformity and social progress, 鈥溾€� a community needs, if it is to prosper, a certain number of individuals who do not wholly conform to the general type. Practically all progress, artistic, moral, and intellectual, has depended upon such individuals, who have been a decisive factor in the transition from barbarism to civilization. If a community is to make progress, it needs exceptional individuals whose activities, though useful, are not of a sort that ought to be general. There is always a tendency in a highly organized society for the activities of such individuals to be unduly hampered, but on the other hand, if the community exercises no control, the same kind of individual initiative which may produce a valuable innovator may also produce a criminal. The problem, like all those with which we are concerned, is one of balance; too little liberty brings stagnation, and too much brings chaos.鈥� o 鈥淏ut all these men [Lenin, Robespierre, Genghis Khan], good and bad alike, had a quality which I should not wish to see disappear from the world 鈥� a quality of energy and personal initiative, of independence of mind, and of imaginative vision. A man who possesses these qualities if capable of doing much good, or of doing great harm, and if mankind is not to sink into dullness such exceptional men must find scope, though one could wish that the scope they find should be for the benefit of mankind.鈥� Are these people simply the product of good, non-alcoholic, non-abusive, non-overly protective parents? 鈥� 鈥溾€pontaneous delight is no longer felt as something which it is important to be able to enjoy. Among comparatively unsophisticated populations folk dances and popular music still flourish鈥� But as men grow more industrialised and regimented, the kind of delight that is common in children becomes impossible to adults, because they are always thinking of the next thing, and cannot let themselves be absorbed in the moment.鈥� People have to eat, but they lose sight of also having fun in life. o 鈥淭he modern man lives a very different life. If he sings in the street he will be thought to be drunk, and if he dances a policeman will reprove him for impeding the traffic.鈥� o 鈥淓verything is organized, nothing is spontaneous. The Nazis organized 鈥淪trength Through Joy鈥�, but joy prescribed by the government is likely to be not very joyful.鈥� 鈥� In an increasingly connected and more populous World, there are many to whom people can compare themselves. 鈥淚f you wish to be a painter you will not be content to pit yourself against the men with similar desires in your own town; you will go to some school of painting in a metropolis where you will probably conclude that you are mediocre鈥� you may be so discouraged that you are tempted to throw away your paint-brushes鈥� for a certain degree of self confidence is essential to achievement鈥�.鈥� o 鈥淲e know too much and feel too little. At least we feel too little of those creative emotions from which a good life springs. In regard to what is important we are passive; where we are active it is over trivialities. If life is to be saved from boredom relieved only by disaster, means must be found of restoring individual initiative, not only in things that are trivial, but in the things that really matter. I do not mean that we should destroy those parts of modern organization upon which the very existence of large populations depends, but I do mean that organization should be much more flexible, more relieved by local autonomy, and less oppressive to the human spirit through its impersonal vastness, than it has become through its unbearably rapid growth and centralization, with which our ways of thought and feeling have been able to keep pace.鈥� We cannot throw out the baby with the bathwater, but people must find ways to pursue goals with things that matter to them, in a World which is impersonal. 鈥� 鈥淢an differs from other animals in many ways. One of these is that he is willing to engage in activities that are unpleasant in themselves, because they are means to ends that he desires鈥� [Animals] do not practise self-control or prudence or foresight or restraint of impulses by the will. Human beings do all these things. When they do more of them than human nature can endure, they suffer a psychological penalty. Part of this penalty is unavoidable in a civilized way of life, but much of it is unnecessary鈥︹€� Some people are more willing than others to drive the garbage truck. o 鈥淎 boy will toil up hill with a toboggan for the sake of the few brief moments of bliss during the descent; no one has to urge him to be industrious, and however he may puff and pant he is still happy. But if instead of the immediate reward you promised him an old-age pension at seventy, his energy would very quickly flag... A man may spend years of hardship, danger, and poverty in attempts to climb Everest or reach the South Pole or make a scientific discovery, and live all the while as much in harmony with his own impulses as the boy with the toboggan, provided he ardently desires the end and puts his pride into overcoming obstacles. As the Red Indian said, 鈥榯here鈥檚 glory in it鈥�.鈥� 飩� 鈥淐ottage gardens in county villages are often lovely, and may have cost much labour, but are not intended to bring any monetary reward鈥� a money economy has replaced an economy in which things were produced for the use of the producer, and this change has caused commodities to be viewed as useful rather than delightful.鈥� Through the (ever necessary) cult of the practical, we lose touch with the things that may brings us joy; the 鈥淛oyless Economy.鈥� o 鈥淔orethought, which involves doing unpleasant things now for the sake of pleasant things in the future, is one of the most essential marks of mental development. Since forethought is difficult and requires control of impulse, moralists stress its necessity, and lay more stress on the virtue of present sacrifice than on the pleasantness of the subsequent reward.鈥� 鈥� On incentives of organizations, similar to Sowell, 鈥淢oreover, it would be unduly optimistic to expect that governments, even if democratic, will always do what is best in the public interest. I have spoken before of some evils connected with bureaucracy; I wish now to consider those involved in the relation of the official to the public. In a highly organised community those who exercise governmental functions, from Ministers down to the most junior employees in local offices, have their own private interests, which by no means coincide with those of the community. Of these love of power and dislike of work are the chief鈥� so he comes to seem, and to a certain extent to be, the enemy of those whom he is supposed to serve.鈥� o 鈥淐ompetition, where it exists, is an immensely powerful incentive. It has been generally decried by socialists as one of the evil things in a capitalist society, but the Soviet Government has restored it to a very important place in the organisation of industry.鈥� Humans are naturally competitive. 飩� 鈥淏ut although competition, in many forms, is gravely objectionable, it has, I think, an essential part to play in the promotion of necessary effort, and in some spheres affords a comparatively harmless outlet for the kind of impulses that might otherwise lead to war鈥� If two hitherto rival football teams, under the influence of brotherly love, decided to cooperate in placing the football first beyond one goal and then beyond the other, no one鈥檚 happiness would be increased鈥� But if competition is not to become ruthless and harmful, the penalty for failure must not be disaster, as in war, or starvation, as in unregulated economic competition, but only loss of glory. Football would not be a desirable sport if defeated teams were put to death or left to starve.鈥� Some might argue that our existing social safety nets ensure the penalty for failure is not starvation, but loss of glory. Markets and competition are the only way to organize complex human societies. o 鈥淸John Spedan Lewis] has arguments against equality of remuneration, not only on the ground that those who difficult work deserve better pay, but, on the converse ground, that better pay is a cause of better work.鈥� The ability as well as the will to use it vary, and are influenced by level of pay. 鈥� Regarding duty and a sense of national duty, Russell makes remarks that pertain to all forms of duty, 鈥淸Duty] involves a sense of strain, and a constant resistance to natural impulses, which, if contained, must be exhausting and productive of a diminution of natural energy. If it is urged, not on the basis of some simple traditional ethic such as the Ten Commandments, but on complicated economic and political grounds, weariness will lead to scepticism as to the arguments involved, and many people will either become simply indifferent or adopt some probably untrue theory suggesting that there is a short cut to prosperity.