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乇爻丕賱丞 賲賳胤賯賷丞 賮賱爻賮賷丞
Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme brilliance, it captured the imagination of a generation of philosophers. For Wittgenstein, logic was something we use to conquer a reality which is in itself both elusive and unobtainable. He famously summarized the book in the following words: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly; and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.' David Pears and Brian McGuinness received the highest praise for their meticulous translation. The work is prefaced by Bertrand Russell's original introduction to the first English edition.
235 pages, Unknown Binding
First published January 1, 1921
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About the author
Ludwig Wittgenstein
196听books2,781听followersLudwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (Ph.D., Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1929) was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 1,159 reviews
June 7, 2016
Wittgenstein was deathly afraid of uttering nonsense; whereas I, clearly, am not鈥攈ow else could I stomach writing so many book reviews?
This book is a work of high art鈥攂eautiful, austere, and sweeping. Wittgenstein is self-consciously attempting to speak the unspeakable鈥攊n his opinion, at least鈥攚hich is why the language is so succinct and severe. He has no use for literary niceties, flowing prose, or extended exposition. One gets the feeling that, for Wittgenstein, writing philosophy is repugnant, akin to unclogging a toilet, something he would like to get over with as soon as possible.
Come to think of it, the toilet metaphor is especially apt. Wittgenstein honestly thinks that the whole of Western philosophy has been literally nonsense, and wishes to free the pipes of thought from all the years of accumulated filth. And the coup de gr芒ce is that, after condemning the philosophical tradition, he condemns his own work. The Tractatus is almost meant to be like a purgative鈥攜ou swallow it just to spit everything back up.
Wittgenstein has fully mastered the precept that the more time one spends arguing a point, the less likely that point seems. His conclusions are so sweeping, his sentences so forceful, that one is tempted to unthinkingly agree with him. Nevertheless, after some consideration, I doubt that many people accept his conclusions. I don鈥檛. In fact, Wittgenstein鈥檚 aforementioned fear of saying something nonsensical may be have limited him. It鈥檚 almost as if he had a superstitious fear of transgressing the bounds of sense鈥攁 superstition all the more perplexing because he places its object outside the realm of thought.
But, like most good books of philosophy, the Tractatus is rewarding to read even if one doesn't accept its conclusions. So, read it, I say! Spend time on every sentence, and savor every word, and maybe Wittgenstein will unclog the toilet of your mind.
This book is a work of high art鈥攂eautiful, austere, and sweeping. Wittgenstein is self-consciously attempting to speak the unspeakable鈥攊n his opinion, at least鈥攚hich is why the language is so succinct and severe. He has no use for literary niceties, flowing prose, or extended exposition. One gets the feeling that, for Wittgenstein, writing philosophy is repugnant, akin to unclogging a toilet, something he would like to get over with as soon as possible.
Come to think of it, the toilet metaphor is especially apt. Wittgenstein honestly thinks that the whole of Western philosophy has been literally nonsense, and wishes to free the pipes of thought from all the years of accumulated filth. And the coup de gr芒ce is that, after condemning the philosophical tradition, he condemns his own work. The Tractatus is almost meant to be like a purgative鈥攜ou swallow it just to spit everything back up.
Wittgenstein has fully mastered the precept that the more time one spends arguing a point, the less likely that point seems. His conclusions are so sweeping, his sentences so forceful, that one is tempted to unthinkingly agree with him. Nevertheless, after some consideration, I doubt that many people accept his conclusions. I don鈥檛. In fact, Wittgenstein鈥檚 aforementioned fear of saying something nonsensical may be have limited him. It鈥檚 almost as if he had a superstitious fear of transgressing the bounds of sense鈥攁 superstition all the more perplexing because he places its object outside the realm of thought.
But, like most good books of philosophy, the Tractatus is rewarding to read even if one doesn't accept its conclusions. So, read it, I say! Spend time on every sentence, and savor every word, and maybe Wittgenstein will unclog the toilet of your mind.
August 15, 2016
Donald Trump's latest protestations about having to fight the "crooked media" remind me of a famous passage from 搂5.62 of the Tractatus:
Was der Solipsismus n盲mlich m e i n t, ist ganz richtig, nur l盲sst es sich nicht s a g e n, sondern es zeigt sich. Dass die Welt m e i n e Welt ist, das zeigt sich darin, dass die Grenzen d e r Sprache (der Sprache, die allein ich verstehe) die Grenzen m e i n e r Welt bedeuten.Donald, I believe I understand what you wish to say. Everyone else is crooked; everyone else is a loser; only you are exempt. But somehow you are unable to express these self-evident truths except in your internal language. Frustrating, isn't it?
In fact what solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it shows itself. That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world.
May 5, 2011
What can I say about Tractatus that hasn't been said a million times before? Crystalline... gnomic... dense... wrong. Well, I don't disagree with any of that, but it would be nice to have an image. I ask my subconscious if it can come up with anything, and while I'm in the shower it shows me the sequence from Terry Gilliam's 1988 movie The Adventures of Baron Munchausen, where John Neville and Eric Idle build a hot air balloon made entirely from women's lingerie.
I am about to smack my subconscious upside the head for its appalling presumption, but suddenly I see that it could have a point. Hm, yes, you are first struck by the amazing chutzpah of the idea, and then you are convinced that it can't possibly fly, but somehow it does. It's obviously crazy, but also quite unforgettable. And they use it to escape from an apparently life-threatening predicament which, it turns out, was only ever in their imagination.
OK, subconscious, now I see what you mean. But don't push your luck too far!
I am about to smack my subconscious upside the head for its appalling presumption, but suddenly I see that it could have a point. Hm, yes, you are first struck by the amazing chutzpah of the idea, and then you are convinced that it can't possibly fly, but somehow it does. It's obviously crazy, but also quite unforgettable. And they use it to escape from an apparently life-threatening predicament which, it turns out, was only ever in their imagination.
OK, subconscious, now I see what you mean. But don't push your luck too far!
September 2, 2011
Hmmm...how to rate a book you didn't understand at all--that is the question. Maybe like this: (?)
1. Here the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is everything that is the case.
1.1 It is the case because it is the subject of this review.
1.11 This review is determined by facts. In this case, all the facts that I came up with while reading the case.
1.12. The subject cannot include facts that are not the case because the totality of existent facts determines what is the case, and whatever is not the case.
1.121. What is not the case cannot be named because it did not occur and cannot be a state of affairs.
1.2 What is the case--a fact--is the existence of states of affairs.
2. An interpretation of facts is a thought.
2.1 Only logical thoughts can exist.
2.11 What is logical can be thought.
2.112 What can be thought is logical.
2.2 What can be thought is the totality of states of affairs.
2.3 While reading the case many of the states of affairs were caused by interpretations--thoughts--that were not logical.
2.4 Because the thoughts were not logical, the case cannot be said to exist.
3. Therefore, this truth-function proves that Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus does not exist.
4. P'x= ~p'X (d)//N,:Q!
5. "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must pass over in silence."
1. Here the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is everything that is the case.
1.1 It is the case because it is the subject of this review.
1.11 This review is determined by facts. In this case, all the facts that I came up with while reading the case.
1.12. The subject cannot include facts that are not the case because the totality of existent facts determines what is the case, and whatever is not the case.
1.121. What is not the case cannot be named because it did not occur and cannot be a state of affairs.
1.2 What is the case--a fact--is the existence of states of affairs.
2. An interpretation of facts is a thought.
2.1 Only logical thoughts can exist.
2.11 What is logical can be thought.
2.112 What can be thought is logical.
2.2 What can be thought is the totality of states of affairs.
2.3 While reading the case many of the states of affairs were caused by interpretations--thoughts--that were not logical.
2.4 Because the thoughts were not logical, the case cannot be said to exist.
3. Therefore, this truth-function proves that Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus does not exist.
4. P'x= ~p'X (d)//N,:Q!
5. "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must pass over in silence."
September 3, 2020
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus = Logical Philosophical Treatise = Treatise on Logic and Philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (abbreviated and cited as TLP) is the only book-length philosophical work by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein that was published during his lifetime (1921).
The project had a broad goal: to identify the relationship between language and reality and to define the limits of science. It is recognized by philosophers as a significant philosophical work of the twentieth century. G. E. Moore originally suggested the work's Latin title as homage to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus by Baruch Spinoza.
鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 爻丕賱 2009 賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳: 乇爻丕賱賴 賲賳胤賯蹖 - 賮賱爻賮蹖貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賱賵丿賵蹖诏 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 賲丨賲賵丿 毓亘丕丿蹖丕賳貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 噩賴丕丿 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴蹖 (丿丕賳卮诏丕賴 鬲賴乇丕賳)貨 1369貨 丿乇 94氐貨 賲賵囟賵毓 賲賳胤賯 乇蹖丕囟蹖 - 夭亘丕賳 賮賱爻賮赖 丕夭 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 丕鬲乇蹖卮蹖 - 爻丿賴 20賲
毓賳賵丕賳: 乇爻丕賱賴 賲賳胤賯蹖 - 賮賱爻賮蹖 (賵蹖乇丕爻鬲 丿賵 夭亘丕賳賴)貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賱賵丿賵蹖诏 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 賲蹖乇 卮賲爻 丕賱丿蹖賳 丕丿蹖亘 爻賱胤丕賳蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 丕賲蹖乇讴亘蹖乇貙 1388貙 丿乇 324氐貨 卮丕亘讴 9789640012468貨 趩丕倬 丿賵賲 1392貨
毓賳賵丕賳: 乇爻丕賱賴 賲賳胤賯蹖 - 賮賱爻賮蹖貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賱賵丿賵蹖诏 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 爻乇賵卮 丿亘丕睾貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 賴乇賲爻貙 1393貨 丿乇 305氐貨 趩丕倬 丿賵賲 1394貨
讴鬲丕亘 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄 鬲賳賴丕 讴鬲丕亘蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 芦賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳禄 丿乇 夭賲丕賳 丨蹖丕鬲 禺賵蹖卮 賲賳鬲卮乇 讴乇丿賳丿貨 丿乇 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄 賳丕賲 賴蹖趩 賲賳亘毓蹖 亘賴 趩卮賲 賳賲蹖鈥屫堌必� 賵 讴鬲丕亘 鬲賳賴丕 蹖讴 倬丕賳賵卮鬲 丿丕乇丿貨 诏賵蹖蹖 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 蹖 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄貙 讴賴 倬蹖丕賲亘乇诏賵賳賴 丕爻乇丕乇 賳賴丕賳 乇丕 亘乇 丌賮鬲丕亘 丕賮讴賳丿賴貙 亘賴 丕蹖賳 丿賯蹖賯賴 亘丕賵乇賲賳丿 亘賵丿賴貙 讴賴 乇丕賴 賳賵蹖賳蹖 倬蹖卮 倬丕蹖 讴丕乇賵丕賳 賮賱爻賮赖 蹖 亘卮乇蹖 亘丕夭 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲貨 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄 丌蹖蹖賳賴 蹖 鬲賲丕賲鈥� 賳賲丕蹖蹖 丕爻鬲貙 丕夭 噩丿 賵 噩賴丿 賳丕亘睾賴鈥� 丕蹖貙 讴賴 賴賲 賲鬲丕孬乇 丕夭 爻賳鬲 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖貙 賵 賮蹖賱爻賵賮丕賳 賳爻賱 丕賵賱蹖 丌賳 (芦诏賵鬲賱賵亘 賮乇诏賴禄貙 芦亘乇鬲乇丕賳丿 乇丕爻賱禄 賵 芦噩蹖.丕蹖 賲賵乇禄) 丕爻鬲貙 賴賲 賲蹖乇丕孬鈥屫ж� 爻賳鬲 丌賱賲丕賳蹖 丕爻鬲毓賱丕蹖蹖 (丕夭 賲賮丕賴蹖賲 讴賱蹖丿蹖 鬲賮讴賾乇 讴丕賳鬲) 丕爻鬲貙 賵 賴賲 丿賱蹖 丿乇 诏乇賵 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 芦丿丕爻鬲丕賳鈥屬囏й� 丕賳噩蹖賱禄貙 賵 芦亘乇丕丿乇丕賳 讴丕乇丕賲丕夭賵賮禄貙 賵 丨讴賲鬲貙 賵 賲毓賳賵蹖鬲 賲賳丿乇噩 丿乇 丌孬丕乇 丕蹖卮丕賳 丿丕乇丿貨 卮丕蹖丿 亘丕 賳诏乇蹖爻鬲賳 亘乇 賴賲诏蹖 丕蹖賳 乇爻丕賱賴 賴丕爻鬲貙 讴賴 芦丕蹖丕賳 賴讴蹖賳诏禄貙 賮蹖賱爻賵賮 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖 賲卮賴賵乇 賲毓丕氐乇貙 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄 乇丕貙 丕賵噩 禺賱丕賯蹖鬲貙 賵 賳亘賵睾 亘卮乇 睾乇亘蹖 賲蹖鈥屫з嗂ж必� 賵 亘乇 丕蹖賳 亘丕賵乇 丕爻鬲 讴賴 鬲丕 鬲賲丿賳 睾乇亘蹖 亘乇倬丕爻鬲貙 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 丕爻鬲孬賳丕蹖蹖貙 禺賵丕賳丿賴 賵 賳賯丿 賵 亘乇乇爻蹖 賲蹖鈥屫促堌�
鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴賳诏丕賲 乇爻丕賳蹖 12/09/1399賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (abbreviated and cited as TLP) is the only book-length philosophical work by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein that was published during his lifetime (1921).
The project had a broad goal: to identify the relationship between language and reality and to define the limits of science. It is recognized by philosophers as a significant philosophical work of the twentieth century. G. E. Moore originally suggested the work's Latin title as homage to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus by Baruch Spinoza.
鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 爻丕賱 2009 賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳: 乇爻丕賱賴 賲賳胤賯蹖 - 賮賱爻賮蹖貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賱賵丿賵蹖诏 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 賲丨賲賵丿 毓亘丕丿蹖丕賳貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 噩賴丕丿 丿丕賳卮诏丕賴蹖 (丿丕賳卮诏丕賴 鬲賴乇丕賳)貨 1369貨 丿乇 94氐貨 賲賵囟賵毓 賲賳胤賯 乇蹖丕囟蹖 - 夭亘丕賳 賮賱爻賮赖 丕夭 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 丕鬲乇蹖卮蹖 - 爻丿賴 20賲
毓賳賵丕賳: 乇爻丕賱賴 賲賳胤賯蹖 - 賮賱爻賮蹖 (賵蹖乇丕爻鬲 丿賵 夭亘丕賳賴)貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賱賵丿賵蹖诏 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 賲蹖乇 卮賲爻 丕賱丿蹖賳 丕丿蹖亘 爻賱胤丕賳蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 丕賲蹖乇讴亘蹖乇貙 1388貙 丿乇 324氐貨 卮丕亘讴 9789640012468貨 趩丕倬 丿賵賲 1392貨
毓賳賵丕賳: 乇爻丕賱賴 賲賳胤賯蹖 - 賮賱爻賮蹖貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 賱賵丿賵蹖诏 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 爻乇賵卮 丿亘丕睾貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 賴乇賲爻貙 1393貨 丿乇 305氐貨 趩丕倬 丿賵賲 1394貨
讴鬲丕亘 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄 鬲賳賴丕 讴鬲丕亘蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 芦賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳禄 丿乇 夭賲丕賳 丨蹖丕鬲 禺賵蹖卮 賲賳鬲卮乇 讴乇丿賳丿貨 丿乇 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄 賳丕賲 賴蹖趩 賲賳亘毓蹖 亘賴 趩卮賲 賳賲蹖鈥屫堌必� 賵 讴鬲丕亘 鬲賳賴丕 蹖讴 倬丕賳賵卮鬲 丿丕乇丿貨 诏賵蹖蹖 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 蹖 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄貙 讴賴 倬蹖丕賲亘乇诏賵賳賴 丕爻乇丕乇 賳賴丕賳 乇丕 亘乇 丌賮鬲丕亘 丕賮讴賳丿賴貙 亘賴 丕蹖賳 丿賯蹖賯賴 亘丕賵乇賲賳丿 亘賵丿賴貙 讴賴 乇丕賴 賳賵蹖賳蹖 倬蹖卮 倬丕蹖 讴丕乇賵丕賳 賮賱爻賮赖 蹖 亘卮乇蹖 亘丕夭 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲貨 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄 丌蹖蹖賳賴 蹖 鬲賲丕賲鈥� 賳賲丕蹖蹖 丕爻鬲貙 丕夭 噩丿 賵 噩賴丿 賳丕亘睾賴鈥� 丕蹖貙 讴賴 賴賲 賲鬲丕孬乇 丕夭 爻賳鬲 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖貙 賵 賮蹖賱爻賵賮丕賳 賳爻賱 丕賵賱蹖 丌賳 (芦诏賵鬲賱賵亘 賮乇诏賴禄貙 芦亘乇鬲乇丕賳丿 乇丕爻賱禄 賵 芦噩蹖.丕蹖 賲賵乇禄) 丕爻鬲貙 賴賲 賲蹖乇丕孬鈥屫ж� 爻賳鬲 丌賱賲丕賳蹖 丕爻鬲毓賱丕蹖蹖 (丕夭 賲賮丕賴蹖賲 讴賱蹖丿蹖 鬲賮讴賾乇 讴丕賳鬲) 丕爻鬲貙 賵 賴賲 丿賱蹖 丿乇 诏乇賵 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 芦丿丕爻鬲丕賳鈥屬囏й� 丕賳噩蹖賱禄貙 賵 芦亘乇丕丿乇丕賳 讴丕乇丕賲丕夭賵賮禄貙 賵 丨讴賲鬲貙 賵 賲毓賳賵蹖鬲 賲賳丿乇噩 丿乇 丌孬丕乇 丕蹖卮丕賳 丿丕乇丿貨 卮丕蹖丿 亘丕 賳诏乇蹖爻鬲賳 亘乇 賴賲诏蹖 丕蹖賳 乇爻丕賱賴 賴丕爻鬲貙 讴賴 芦丕蹖丕賳 賴讴蹖賳诏禄貙 賮蹖賱爻賵賮 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖 賲卮賴賵乇 賲毓丕氐乇貙 芦乇爻丕賱賴禄 乇丕貙 丕賵噩 禺賱丕賯蹖鬲貙 賵 賳亘賵睾 亘卮乇 睾乇亘蹖 賲蹖鈥屫з嗂ж必� 賵 亘乇 丕蹖賳 亘丕賵乇 丕爻鬲 讴賴 鬲丕 鬲賲丿賳 睾乇亘蹖 亘乇倬丕爻鬲貙 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 丕爻鬲孬賳丕蹖蹖貙 禺賵丕賳丿賴 賵 賳賯丿 賵 亘乇乇爻蹖 賲蹖鈥屫促堌�
鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴賳诏丕賲 乇爻丕賳蹖 12/09/1399賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
August 15, 2008
Like many young American readers, I made the mistake of reading the bulk of this text in an In-N-Out, and now it is difficult for me to think about elementary propositions without thinking about someone ordering a cheeseburger, and, subsequently, thinking about the relationship between the sign of "cheeseburger" and the atomic fact of the cheeseburger it refers to. Wittgenstein orders his cheeseburger with the totality of everything that is the case. And he eats the whole thing in under 100 pages.
December 24, 2024
Probably the single most influential philosophical treatise of the twentieth century. Wittgenstein addresses the relationship between language and the world. In his view, any proposition with a sense must depict some empirical state of affairs in the world. The propositions of logic, though they don't depict anything, are nonetheless a legitimate part of language insofar as they manifest its structural features. In contrast, propositions that express neither an empirical observation nor a logical truth鈥攊ncluding the entirety of metaphysics and ethics鈥攁re strictly nonsensical. I used to be much more enthralled with Wittgenstein than I am now. My patience for his oracular style and his willful obscurantism has really worn thin. For all its many frustrations, though, there's no denying that the Tractatus is a work of great genius.
March 10, 2019
Get your P's and Q's ready, folks, because we're in for the ride of our lives.
Or not.
Wittgenstein was living proof that androids were around and functioning during WWI. That at least this single android had a sense of humor dry enough to turn the Mariana Trench into the Mojave Desert, too.
Or was this a joke at all? Let's see.
Most of the numbered propositions were imminently clear and devoted to a single purpose: describing reality.
Language is the big limiter, which should never be a big surprise, but he insists that all reality that is, can be explained clearly.
Unfortunately, Wittgenstein, the big brilliant man that he is, was fundamentally incapable of describing or CLEARLY STATING his philosophy. Or using any object in his philosophy for the purposes of further elucidation.
The resulting numbered tracts and use of Formal Logic were used to numb the biological minds reading it... but there is good news! It did help out with the translation problems for future AIs reviewing this work!
Difficult to read? You have no idea. Really. Or perhaps you do if you use chalkboards. But THIS work of philosophy is the target for that old joke:
"What's the difference between a mathematician and a philosopher?
Mathematicians know how to use an eraser."
The logical problem of describing only physics in any positive way while never coming down hard on absolute statements -- like the way we only hypothesize that the sun will come up tomorrow -- eventually curled around itself in very strange ways, like the problem of including your own description in with the description itself.
It keeps adding to the problem of description, mathematically, until the recursion explodes your head or makes you divide by zero. (Same difference, really.)
It presages, at least in part, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem. Also, P=NP. As in, is it possible to include the index to your library in with the library itself, or do you need to make a brand new card catalog system every time to include the original index? The time it takes to prove a thing is disproportionately large (or impossible) compared to the FACT OF THE SOLUTION.
This goes beyond logical fallacy. It's a real thing we still deal with. And yet, Wittgenstein throws out the baby with the bathwater at the very end. He makes a beautiful house of cards and claps his hands, making us wake up after the long novel with a classic, "and it was only a dream."
Am I kinda pissed? First by having been bored to tears and misunderstanding a handful of DENSE and OBLIQUE propositions that refer to undefined and objectless other works, unlike the careful analysis he made at the start? Yeah. I am.
And like his reference to covering your right hand with your left while also covering your left with your right, this text attempts to disprove everything -- firmly.
It makes me believe, once again, that formal logic, while glorious in one way, is an absolute horseradish in another.
I recommend this for anyone in love with highly complicated logical mazes and other computer science majors. YOU MUST HAVE A SENSE OF HUMOR OR YOU WILL DIE. Or kill someone. One, or the other.
Or not.
Wittgenstein was living proof that androids were around and functioning during WWI. That at least this single android had a sense of humor dry enough to turn the Mariana Trench into the Mojave Desert, too.
Or was this a joke at all? Let's see.
Most of the numbered propositions were imminently clear and devoted to a single purpose: describing reality.
Language is the big limiter, which should never be a big surprise, but he insists that all reality that is, can be explained clearly.
Unfortunately, Wittgenstein, the big brilliant man that he is, was fundamentally incapable of describing or CLEARLY STATING his philosophy. Or using any object in his philosophy for the purposes of further elucidation.
The resulting numbered tracts and use of Formal Logic were used to numb the biological minds reading it... but there is good news! It did help out with the translation problems for future AIs reviewing this work!
Difficult to read? You have no idea. Really. Or perhaps you do if you use chalkboards. But THIS work of philosophy is the target for that old joke:
"What's the difference between a mathematician and a philosopher?
Mathematicians know how to use an eraser."
The logical problem of describing only physics in any positive way while never coming down hard on absolute statements -- like the way we only hypothesize that the sun will come up tomorrow -- eventually curled around itself in very strange ways, like the problem of including your own description in with the description itself.
It keeps adding to the problem of description, mathematically, until the recursion explodes your head or makes you divide by zero. (Same difference, really.)
It presages, at least in part, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem. Also, P=NP. As in, is it possible to include the index to your library in with the library itself, or do you need to make a brand new card catalog system every time to include the original index? The time it takes to prove a thing is disproportionately large (or impossible) compared to the FACT OF THE SOLUTION.
This goes beyond logical fallacy. It's a real thing we still deal with. And yet, Wittgenstein throws out the baby with the bathwater at the very end. He makes a beautiful house of cards and claps his hands, making us wake up after the long novel with a classic, "and it was only a dream."
Am I kinda pissed? First by having been bored to tears and misunderstanding a handful of DENSE and OBLIQUE propositions that refer to undefined and objectless other works, unlike the careful analysis he made at the start? Yeah. I am.
And like his reference to covering your right hand with your left while also covering your left with your right, this text attempts to disprove everything -- firmly.
It makes me believe, once again, that formal logic, while glorious in one way, is an absolute horseradish in another.
I recommend this for anyone in love with highly complicated logical mazes and other computer science majors. YOU MUST HAVE A SENSE OF HUMOR OR YOU WILL DIE. Or kill someone. One, or the other.
September 23, 2020
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) by Ludwig Wittgenstein breathes a very intriguing air, which draws you in and encapsulates you as you work your way through the collection of short statements towards the final conclusion. Along this path one is utterly aware of the fact that one is treading continuously on very unfamiliar ground 鈥� ground that offers much resistance to the understanding.
Wittgenstein鈥檚 project is twofold: first, he wants to develop his logical theory and, second, he wants to explain how this conception of logic relates to the world of facts. That is, the work deals with two theories, one logical the other epistemological. And the conclusions Wittgenstein draws from them are extraordinary.
As he states in his opening sentence, the world is the totality of facts 鈥� each fact is divided from each other fact. Whether this division is finite and infinite isn鈥檛 clear to me (I guess it doesn鈥檛 really matter for Wittgenstein鈥檚 theory anyway). We perceive these facts in the sense that we picture them in our thoughts, where the logical-pictorial form of each picture corresponds to the fact it represents. That is, the logical structure of our thoughts corresponds with the logical structure of the facts in the world. In short: at its foundation the world consists of indivisible, independent facts and each corresponds to a single indivisible, independent logical element.
When we think, our thoughts are translated (so to speak) in propositions. Or rather: our propositions are expressions of our thoughts, which are themselves, ultimately, pictures of facts. These propositions are either elemental (i.e. they are the most simple, undividable units of thoughts) or they are composites of elemental propositions (i.e. they are complexes). Wittgenstein applies the (then) new method of symbolic logic to unearth the fundamental logical structure underneath (and common to) all these linguistic expressions of our thoughts. He digs up the general form of a proposition 鈥� or rather truth function 鈥� which collects different elemental propositions containing variables into one complex and generates a truth value for the whole depending on the specific value of the variables.
But here there arises a fundamental issue. Logical propositions are either true or false, depending on the particular input (the values of the variables). The particular input of a variable isn鈥檛 really all that interesting to the logician 鈥� what he or she discovers is a general, lawlike structure which is tautological in the sense that, through the propositional relations, the input rigidly determines the output. These logical propositions are thus necessary, while the particular input in the formulae, since it consists of variables, is accidental. That is, all particular facts (the facts of the world) are accidental. This leads Wittgenstein to conclude that logic is the exploration of all that鈥檚 lawlike, while everything outside logic 鈥� the world of facts 鈥� is accidental.
After developing his logical theory, he applies his apparatus to physic and psychology (i.e. scientific propositions):
鈥淸Physics] is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true propositions that we need for a description of the world.鈥� (pp. 82-83)
鈥淭he laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still speak, however indirectly, about the objects of the world.鈥� (p. 83)
This is a radical stance: causality manifests itself in the world but isn鈥檛 part of physics. All laws are logical necessities and are about the relations between facts, not about the particular facts (their descriptions) themselves. The key point is that we can experience and talk about the particular facts in the world but can never transcend them. The world has no sense, or rather: it cannot be discovered within the world. According to Wittgenstein all propositions (and thus our thoughts about the world) are of equal value. That is, of no value. There is no value in the world 鈥� all questions about religion, ethics, aesthetics, etc. are transcendental. Since words apply only to the phenomenal world of experience, we cannot talk about the subjects of religion, ethics, aesthetics, etc. That is, we cannot ask any questions about them in the first place.
Wittgenstein concludes in one of his final paragraphs:
鈥淲e feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the questions of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.鈥� (p. 88)
鈥淭he solution of the problems of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.鈥� (pp. 88-89)
鈥淭here are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is called mystical.鈥� (p. 89)
And he ends his work with the infamous words:
鈥淲hat we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence.鈥� (p. 89)
It is very easy to read these final pages and accept his claims at face value. But there is more depth to these words than a superficial reader notices. In fact, Wittgenstein has ended up in a very eccentric position: along the way he has built a self-contained and tautological logical apparatus which is entirely separated from the world, the totality of facts, which we experience in life. This apparatus is subsequently used to destroy all claims of logical necessity in physics and psychology and reduce these sciences to the status of collections of statements about particular facts in the world. Finally the apparatus is used to show how only facts in the world can be put into words and everything else transcends this world and thus the possibility of speaking about them. That is, all things outside the world (including the world itself) lack sense, are nonsense. And since the logical apparatus itself is cut off from the world of facts, the final act of Wittgenstein is to throw away his tool and end up with the only thing real: the mystical. He says:
鈥淢y propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them 鈥� as steps 鈥� to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright.鈥� (p. 89)
As he himself points out in the preface, after solving all the philosophical questions 鈥� by pointing out they are (literally) nonsense 鈥� there is not much achieved. He has cleared up all the human, all too human, pretence of thinking ourselves able to talk about the world in scientific and logical terms 鈥� all that rests is our living in the world. It is not surprising that after writing his Tractatus, Wittgenstein decided he had solved (or dissolved?) philosophy once and for all: all that remained was living a life that was in accord with the mystical. He was a man who was throughout his life obsessed with religion and ethics, and so he decided to work as a gardener in a monastery (he was rejected), as a school teacher (he was dismissed due to his loose hands), as a proletarian in Soviet Russia (he was rejected and offered a position as professor of philosopher in Kiev 鈥� which he rejected). Basically all his attempts at living like a saint failed miserable, and in 1929 he decided to return to Britain to return as a professor of philosophy in Cambridge. There he radically altered his views on his former philosophy and developed a whole new philosophy which was as radical and influential as the first one.
Wittgenstein was a very remarkable man, but also a very problematic character. This shows in the Tractatus: it is as unconventional, extreme and original as no philosopher since Plato. Perhaps it helped that he wasn鈥檛 trained as a philosopher but as an engineer in aeronautics 鈥� coming from a mathematical background and stepping into philosophy at a very late point in his education he was free from all the common prejudices and restrictions which education tends to foster. For example, some academic colleagues remarked that he never read Aristotle, which perhaps is rather a compliment than a dismissal. Being intellectually free he was able to invent two highly original philosophies which are more spectacular and ground-breaking than the works of most other twentieth century philosophers.
(Please feel free to add any additional info or correct any mistakes I've made in this review!)
Wittgenstein鈥檚 project is twofold: first, he wants to develop his logical theory and, second, he wants to explain how this conception of logic relates to the world of facts. That is, the work deals with two theories, one logical the other epistemological. And the conclusions Wittgenstein draws from them are extraordinary.
As he states in his opening sentence, the world is the totality of facts 鈥� each fact is divided from each other fact. Whether this division is finite and infinite isn鈥檛 clear to me (I guess it doesn鈥檛 really matter for Wittgenstein鈥檚 theory anyway). We perceive these facts in the sense that we picture them in our thoughts, where the logical-pictorial form of each picture corresponds to the fact it represents. That is, the logical structure of our thoughts corresponds with the logical structure of the facts in the world. In short: at its foundation the world consists of indivisible, independent facts and each corresponds to a single indivisible, independent logical element.
When we think, our thoughts are translated (so to speak) in propositions. Or rather: our propositions are expressions of our thoughts, which are themselves, ultimately, pictures of facts. These propositions are either elemental (i.e. they are the most simple, undividable units of thoughts) or they are composites of elemental propositions (i.e. they are complexes). Wittgenstein applies the (then) new method of symbolic logic to unearth the fundamental logical structure underneath (and common to) all these linguistic expressions of our thoughts. He digs up the general form of a proposition 鈥� or rather truth function 鈥� which collects different elemental propositions containing variables into one complex and generates a truth value for the whole depending on the specific value of the variables.
But here there arises a fundamental issue. Logical propositions are either true or false, depending on the particular input (the values of the variables). The particular input of a variable isn鈥檛 really all that interesting to the logician 鈥� what he or she discovers is a general, lawlike structure which is tautological in the sense that, through the propositional relations, the input rigidly determines the output. These logical propositions are thus necessary, while the particular input in the formulae, since it consists of variables, is accidental. That is, all particular facts (the facts of the world) are accidental. This leads Wittgenstein to conclude that logic is the exploration of all that鈥檚 lawlike, while everything outside logic 鈥� the world of facts 鈥� is accidental.
After developing his logical theory, he applies his apparatus to physic and psychology (i.e. scientific propositions):
鈥淸Physics] is an attempt to construct according to a single plan all the true propositions that we need for a description of the world.鈥� (pp. 82-83)
鈥淭he laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still speak, however indirectly, about the objects of the world.鈥� (p. 83)
This is a radical stance: causality manifests itself in the world but isn鈥檛 part of physics. All laws are logical necessities and are about the relations between facts, not about the particular facts (their descriptions) themselves. The key point is that we can experience and talk about the particular facts in the world but can never transcend them. The world has no sense, or rather: it cannot be discovered within the world. According to Wittgenstein all propositions (and thus our thoughts about the world) are of equal value. That is, of no value. There is no value in the world 鈥� all questions about religion, ethics, aesthetics, etc. are transcendental. Since words apply only to the phenomenal world of experience, we cannot talk about the subjects of religion, ethics, aesthetics, etc. That is, we cannot ask any questions about them in the first place.
Wittgenstein concludes in one of his final paragraphs:
鈥淲e feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the questions of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.鈥� (p. 88)
鈥淭he solution of the problems of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem.鈥� (pp. 88-89)
鈥淭here are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is called mystical.鈥� (p. 89)
And he ends his work with the infamous words:
鈥淲hat we cannot speak about, we must pass over in silence.鈥� (p. 89)
It is very easy to read these final pages and accept his claims at face value. But there is more depth to these words than a superficial reader notices. In fact, Wittgenstein has ended up in a very eccentric position: along the way he has built a self-contained and tautological logical apparatus which is entirely separated from the world, the totality of facts, which we experience in life. This apparatus is subsequently used to destroy all claims of logical necessity in physics and psychology and reduce these sciences to the status of collections of statements about particular facts in the world. Finally the apparatus is used to show how only facts in the world can be put into words and everything else transcends this world and thus the possibility of speaking about them. That is, all things outside the world (including the world itself) lack sense, are nonsense. And since the logical apparatus itself is cut off from the world of facts, the final act of Wittgenstein is to throw away his tool and end up with the only thing real: the mystical. He says:
鈥淢y propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them 鈥� as steps 鈥� to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright.鈥� (p. 89)
As he himself points out in the preface, after solving all the philosophical questions 鈥� by pointing out they are (literally) nonsense 鈥� there is not much achieved. He has cleared up all the human, all too human, pretence of thinking ourselves able to talk about the world in scientific and logical terms 鈥� all that rests is our living in the world. It is not surprising that after writing his Tractatus, Wittgenstein decided he had solved (or dissolved?) philosophy once and for all: all that remained was living a life that was in accord with the mystical. He was a man who was throughout his life obsessed with religion and ethics, and so he decided to work as a gardener in a monastery (he was rejected), as a school teacher (he was dismissed due to his loose hands), as a proletarian in Soviet Russia (he was rejected and offered a position as professor of philosopher in Kiev 鈥� which he rejected). Basically all his attempts at living like a saint failed miserable, and in 1929 he decided to return to Britain to return as a professor of philosophy in Cambridge. There he radically altered his views on his former philosophy and developed a whole new philosophy which was as radical and influential as the first one.
Wittgenstein was a very remarkable man, but also a very problematic character. This shows in the Tractatus: it is as unconventional, extreme and original as no philosopher since Plato. Perhaps it helped that he wasn鈥檛 trained as a philosopher but as an engineer in aeronautics 鈥� coming from a mathematical background and stepping into philosophy at a very late point in his education he was free from all the common prejudices and restrictions which education tends to foster. For example, some academic colleagues remarked that he never read Aristotle, which perhaps is rather a compliment than a dismissal. Being intellectually free he was able to invent two highly original philosophies which are more spectacular and ground-breaking than the works of most other twentieth century philosophers.
(Please feel free to add any additional info or correct any mistakes I've made in this review!)
July 8, 2017
讴丕賳鬲 賵 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳
鬲丨賯蹖賯丕鬲 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳貙 賴賲趩賵賳 賳馗乇蹖丕鬲 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 賮賱丕爻賮賴 亘毓丿 丕夭 讴丕賳鬲貙 亘賴 賳賵毓蹖 乇丕噩毓 丕爻鬲 亘賴 賲毓乇賮鬲 卮賳丕爻蹖 讴丕賳鬲. 讴丕賳鬲 亘丕 賲卮禺氐 讴乇丿賳 賲乇夭賴丕蹖 賲毓乇賮鬲 丕賳爻丕賳蹖貙 賳卮丕賳 丿丕丿 讴賴 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 丕賲賵乇 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖賳 賯丕亘賱蹖鬲 丕丿乇丕讴 鬲賵爻胤 丿爻鬲诏丕賴 丕丿乇丕讴蹖 丌丿賲蹖 乇丕 賳丿丕乇賳丿貙 丿乇 賳鬲蹖噩賴 賴賲蹖卮賴 丿乇 丌賳 爻賵蹖 賲乇夭賴丕 賵 丿乇 丨蹖胤賴 丕賲賵乇 乇丕夭丌賲蹖夭 亘丕賯蹖 禺賵丕賴賳丿 賲丕賳丿. 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳 丿乇 丕丿丕賲賴 賴賲蹖賳 爻賳鬲貙 亘丕 乇蹖夭亘蹖賳蹖 丿乇 丿爻鬲诏丕賴 丕丿乇丕讴蹖 丌丿賲蹖貙 蹖毓賳蹖 賲賳胤賯貙 爻毓蹖 讴乇丿 爻丕夭 賵 讴丕乇 丌賳 乇丕 賲卮禺氐 讴賳丿 賵 賲乇夭賴丕蹖 丌賳 乇丕 亘丕 丿賯鬲 亘蹖卮鬲乇蹖 賲毓蹖賳 讴賳丿. 亘賴 賴賲蹖賳 噩賴鬲 丕夭 賳賲賵丿 亘蹖乇賵賳蹖 賲賳胤賯貙 蹖毓賳蹖 "夭亘丕賳" 丌睾丕夭 讴乇丿 賵 亘賴 鬲丨賱蹖賱 丌賳 倬乇丿丕禺鬲.
賳馗乇蹖賴 鬲氐賵蹖乇蹖 賲毓賳丕
丕爻丕爻 讴丕乇 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳 丿乇 乇爻丕賱賴貙 鬲丨賱蹖賱 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 夭亘丕賳 賵 賳卮丕賳 丿丕丿賳 鬲賳丕馗乇 賴乇 爻胤丨 丕夭 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 夭亘丕賳 亘丕 爻胤丨蹖 丕夭 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 噩賴丕賳 丕爻鬲.
倬爻 賳禺爻鬲 亘賴 鬲丨賱蹖賱 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 賲賳胤賯蹖 噩賴丕賳 賲蹖 倬乇丿丕夭丿 賵 賲蹖 诏賵蹖丿 噩賴丕賳貙 爻賴 爻胤丨 丿丕乇丿:
爻胤丨 賳禺爻鬲. 噩賴丕賳 丕夭 丕卮賷丕亍 鬲卮讴蹖賱 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲.
丕卮蹖丕亍 亘爻蹖胤 鬲乇蹖賳 丨丕賱鬲 丕賲賵乇 倬蹖乇丕賲賵賳 賲丕 賴爻鬲賳丿貙 賴乇 趩賳丿 賲賲讴賳 丕爻鬲 丕蹖賳 亘爻丕胤鬲 鬲丕 丨丿蹖 賳爻亘蹖 亘丕卮丿. 賲孬賱丕賸 蹖讴 賲蹖夭 丕夭 蹖讴 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 賲賲讴賳 丕爻鬲 卮蹖卅蹖 亘爻蹖胤 丿乇 賳馗乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 卮賵丿貙 賵 丕夭 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 丿蹖诏乇 鬲乇讴蹖亘 卮丿賴 丕夭 趩賴丕乇 倬丕蹖賴 賵 蹖讴 乇賵蹖賴.
爻胤丨 丿賵賲. 丕卮賷丕亍 亘丕 賴賲 鬲乇賰賷亘 賲蹖 卮賵賳丿貙 賵 賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳賳丿 鬲乇賰賷亘 賴丕賶 賲禺鬲賱賮賶 亘诏賷乇賳丿.
賲孬賱丕賸 "賲賷夭" 賲賶 鬲賵丕賳丿 亘丕 "賯賴賵賴 丕賶" 鬲乇賰賷亘 卮賵丿貙 賷丕 亘丕 "爻賮賷丿". 賴乇 丿賵蹖 丕蹖賳 鬲乇讴蹖亘 賴丕貙 賲丨鬲賲賱賳丿. 亘賴 鬲乇賰賷亘 賴丕賶 賲丨鬲賲賱 丕卮賷丕亍 亘丕 賴賲 賲賶 诏賵蹖蹖賲 "賵囟毓賷鬲 賴丕賶 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇".
爻胤丨 爻賵賲. 賷賰賶 丕夭 鬲乇賰賷亘 賴丕賶 賲禺鬲賱賮貙 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿.
賲孬賱丕賸 "賲賷夭" 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 亘丕賱丕禺乇賴 賷丕 "賯賴賵賴 丕蹖" 丕爻鬲 賷丕 "爻賮賷丿". 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 丕賲乇 賮賯胤 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 鬲乇讴蹖亘 賴丕蹖 賲丨鬲賲賱 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿. 亘賴 鬲乇賰賷亘賶 賰賴 丿乇 賳賴丕賷鬲 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賲丨賯賯 卮丿賴 賲賶 诏賵蹖蹖賲 "丕賲賵乇 賵丕賯毓" 賷丕 "賵丕賯毓賷鬲".
丕賷賳 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 噩賴丕賳 丕爻鬲.
賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳 爻倬爻 亘賴 鬲丨賱蹖賱 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 賲賳胤賯蹖 夭亘丕賳 賲蹖 倬乇丿丕夭丿 賵 賳卮丕賳 賲蹖 丿賴丿 讴賴 夭亘丕賳 賳蹖夭 爻賴 爻胤丨 丿丕乇丿貙 賴賲趩賵賳 噩賴丕賳:.
爻胤丨 賳禺爻鬲. "丕爻賲" 賴丕貙 賰賴 亘乇 "丕卮賷丕亍" 丿賱丕賱鬲 賲賶 賰賳賳丿.
丕賲丕 丿賱丕賱鬲 趩蹖爻鬲責 丿賱丕賱鬲 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖爻鬲 賯乇丕乇丿丕丿蹖 賵 噩毓賱蹖 亘蹖賳 丕爻賲 賵 卮蹖亍 賲鬲賳丕馗乇 亘丕 丌賳. 亘賷賳 賰賱賲賴 賶 "賲-蹖-夭" 賵 賲賷夭 賵丕賯毓賶 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕乇丿. 亘賱讴賴 丕蹖賳 賲丕蹖蹖賲 讴賴 亘丕 賯乇丕乇丿丕丿 鬲氐賲賷賲 诏乇賮鬲賷賲 賰賱賲賴 賶 "賲-賶-夭" 乇丕 亘乇 賲蹖夭 賵丕賯毓蹖 丕胤賱丕賯 讴賳蹖賲. 乇丕亘胤賴 賶 丕爻賲 賴丕 賵 丕卮賷丕亍 丕賷賳 诏賵賳賴 丕爻鬲.
爻胤丨 丿賵賲. "诏夭丕乇賴" 賴丕貙 "賵囟毓賷鬲 賴丕賶 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇" 乇丕 "鬲氐賵賷乇" 賲賶 賰賳賳丿.
丕賲丕 鬲氐賵蹖乇 趩蹖爻鬲責 鬲氐賵蹖乇 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖爻鬲 丨賯蹖賯蹖 亘蹖賳 诏夭丕乇賴 賵 賵囟毓蹖鬲 丕賲賵乇 賲鬲賳丕馗乇 亘丕 丌賳. 亘賴 丕蹖賳 卮讴賱 讴賴 亘賷賳 丕爻賲 賴丕 (讴賴 亘丕 鬲乇讴蹖亘 禺賵丿 诏夭丕乇賴 乇丕 賲蹖 爻丕夭賳丿) 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿貙 賰賴 卮亘賷賴 賴賲丕賳 乇丕亘胤賴 賶 亘賷賳 丕卮賷丕亍 丕爻鬲 (讴賴 亘丕 鬲乇讴蹖亘 禺賵丿 賵囟毓蹖鬲 丕賲賵乇 賲賲讴賳 乇丕 賲蹖 爻丕夭賳丿). 亘乇 毓賰爻 "丿賱丕賱鬲" 賰賴 诏賮鬲賷賲 丕爻賲 賵 卮賶亍 亘丕 賴賲 丕乇鬲亘丕胤賶 賳丿丕乇賳丿 賵 乇丕亘胤賴 亘賴 讴賱蹖 賯乇丕乇丿丕丿蹖 丕爻鬲貙 丿乇 "鬲氐賵賷乇" 诏夭丕乇賴 亘丕 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇 丕乇鬲亘丕胤 賵丕賯毓賶 丿丕乇丿 賵 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賵丕賯毓丕賸 卮亘蹖賴 亘賴 賴賲 賴爻鬲賳丿. 乇丕亘胤賴 賶 诏夭丕乇賴 賵 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇 丕賷賳 诏賵賳賴 丕爻鬲.
爻胤丨 爻賵賲. 诏賮鬲賷賲 亘賴 丌賳 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇 賰賴 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賲丨賯賯 卮丿賴 亘丕卮丿貙 賲賶 诏賵蹖蹖賲 "賵丕賯毓賷鬲". 丨丕賱 丕诏乇 诏夭丕乇賴 (賰賴 鬲氐賵賷乇 賷讴 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 丕爻鬲) 賲胤丕亘賯 賵丕賯毓賷鬲 亘丕卮丿貙 "氐丕丿賯" 丕爻鬲貙 賵 丕诏乇 賲胤丕亘賯 賵丕賯毓賷鬲 賳亘丕卮丿貙 "賰丕匕亘".
賲孬賱丕賸 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賲賷夭 爻賮賷丿 丕爻鬲. 賲丕 丿賵 诏夭丕乇賴 丿丕乇賷賲:
丕賱賮: 賲賷夭 賯賴賵賴 丕賶 丕爻鬲. (賷賰 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 賲賷夭)
亘: 賲賷夭 爻賮賷丿 丕爻鬲. (賷賰 賵囟毓賷鬲 丿賷诏乇 賲賲賰賳 賲賷夭)
丕夭 丕賷賳 丿賵 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賷夭貙 賲賷夭 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賮賯胤 賷賰 賵囟毓賷鬲 乇丕 丿丕乇丿: 爻賮賷丿. 诏夭丕乇賴 丕蹖 賰賴 賲鬲賳丕爻亘 丕蹖賳 賵囟毓賷鬲 丕爻鬲貙 氐丕丿賯 丕爻鬲 賵 丌賳 讴賴 賲鬲賳丕爻亘 賳蹖爻鬲貙 讴丕匕亘.
鬲丨賯蹖賯丕鬲 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳貙 賴賲趩賵賳 賳馗乇蹖丕鬲 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 賮賱丕爻賮賴 亘毓丿 丕夭 讴丕賳鬲貙 亘賴 賳賵毓蹖 乇丕噩毓 丕爻鬲 亘賴 賲毓乇賮鬲 卮賳丕爻蹖 讴丕賳鬲. 讴丕賳鬲 亘丕 賲卮禺氐 讴乇丿賳 賲乇夭賴丕蹖 賲毓乇賮鬲 丕賳爻丕賳蹖貙 賳卮丕賳 丿丕丿 讴賴 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 丕賲賵乇 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖賳 賯丕亘賱蹖鬲 丕丿乇丕讴 鬲賵爻胤 丿爻鬲诏丕賴 丕丿乇丕讴蹖 丌丿賲蹖 乇丕 賳丿丕乇賳丿貙 丿乇 賳鬲蹖噩賴 賴賲蹖卮賴 丿乇 丌賳 爻賵蹖 賲乇夭賴丕 賵 丿乇 丨蹖胤賴 丕賲賵乇 乇丕夭丌賲蹖夭 亘丕賯蹖 禺賵丕賴賳丿 賲丕賳丿. 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳 丿乇 丕丿丕賲賴 賴賲蹖賳 爻賳鬲貙 亘丕 乇蹖夭亘蹖賳蹖 丿乇 丿爻鬲诏丕賴 丕丿乇丕讴蹖 丌丿賲蹖貙 蹖毓賳蹖 賲賳胤賯貙 爻毓蹖 讴乇丿 爻丕夭 賵 讴丕乇 丌賳 乇丕 賲卮禺氐 讴賳丿 賵 賲乇夭賴丕蹖 丌賳 乇丕 亘丕 丿賯鬲 亘蹖卮鬲乇蹖 賲毓蹖賳 讴賳丿. 亘賴 賴賲蹖賳 噩賴鬲 丕夭 賳賲賵丿 亘蹖乇賵賳蹖 賲賳胤賯貙 蹖毓賳蹖 "夭亘丕賳" 丌睾丕夭 讴乇丿 賵 亘賴 鬲丨賱蹖賱 丌賳 倬乇丿丕禺鬲.
賳馗乇蹖賴 鬲氐賵蹖乇蹖 賲毓賳丕
丕爻丕爻 讴丕乇 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳 丿乇 乇爻丕賱賴貙 鬲丨賱蹖賱 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 夭亘丕賳 賵 賳卮丕賳 丿丕丿賳 鬲賳丕馗乇 賴乇 爻胤丨 丕夭 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 夭亘丕賳 亘丕 爻胤丨蹖 丕夭 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 噩賴丕賳 丕爻鬲.
倬爻 賳禺爻鬲 亘賴 鬲丨賱蹖賱 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 賲賳胤賯蹖 噩賴丕賳 賲蹖 倬乇丿丕夭丿 賵 賲蹖 诏賵蹖丿 噩賴丕賳貙 爻賴 爻胤丨 丿丕乇丿:
爻胤丨 賳禺爻鬲. 噩賴丕賳 丕夭 丕卮賷丕亍 鬲卮讴蹖賱 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲.
丕卮蹖丕亍 亘爻蹖胤 鬲乇蹖賳 丨丕賱鬲 丕賲賵乇 倬蹖乇丕賲賵賳 賲丕 賴爻鬲賳丿貙 賴乇 趩賳丿 賲賲讴賳 丕爻鬲 丕蹖賳 亘爻丕胤鬲 鬲丕 丨丿蹖 賳爻亘蹖 亘丕卮丿. 賲孬賱丕賸 蹖讴 賲蹖夭 丕夭 蹖讴 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 賲賲讴賳 丕爻鬲 卮蹖卅蹖 亘爻蹖胤 丿乇 賳馗乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 卮賵丿貙 賵 丕夭 丿蹖丿诏丕賴 丿蹖诏乇 鬲乇讴蹖亘 卮丿賴 丕夭 趩賴丕乇 倬丕蹖賴 賵 蹖讴 乇賵蹖賴.
爻胤丨 丿賵賲. 丕卮賷丕亍 亘丕 賴賲 鬲乇賰賷亘 賲蹖 卮賵賳丿貙 賵 賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳賳丿 鬲乇賰賷亘 賴丕賶 賲禺鬲賱賮賶 亘诏賷乇賳丿.
賲孬賱丕賸 "賲賷夭" 賲賶 鬲賵丕賳丿 亘丕 "賯賴賵賴 丕賶" 鬲乇賰賷亘 卮賵丿貙 賷丕 亘丕 "爻賮賷丿". 賴乇 丿賵蹖 丕蹖賳 鬲乇讴蹖亘 賴丕貙 賲丨鬲賲賱賳丿. 亘賴 鬲乇賰賷亘 賴丕賶 賲丨鬲賲賱 丕卮賷丕亍 亘丕 賴賲 賲賶 诏賵蹖蹖賲 "賵囟毓賷鬲 賴丕賶 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇".
爻胤丨 爻賵賲. 賷賰賶 丕夭 鬲乇賰賷亘 賴丕賶 賲禺鬲賱賮貙 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿.
賲孬賱丕賸 "賲賷夭" 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 亘丕賱丕禺乇賴 賷丕 "賯賴賵賴 丕蹖" 丕爻鬲 賷丕 "爻賮賷丿". 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 丕賲乇 賮賯胤 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 鬲乇讴蹖亘 賴丕蹖 賲丨鬲賲賱 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿. 亘賴 鬲乇賰賷亘賶 賰賴 丿乇 賳賴丕賷鬲 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賲丨賯賯 卮丿賴 賲賶 诏賵蹖蹖賲 "丕賲賵乇 賵丕賯毓" 賷丕 "賵丕賯毓賷鬲".
丕賷賳 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 噩賴丕賳 丕爻鬲.
賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳 爻倬爻 亘賴 鬲丨賱蹖賱 爻丕禺鬲丕乇 賲賳胤賯蹖 夭亘丕賳 賲蹖 倬乇丿丕夭丿 賵 賳卮丕賳 賲蹖 丿賴丿 讴賴 夭亘丕賳 賳蹖夭 爻賴 爻胤丨 丿丕乇丿貙 賴賲趩賵賳 噩賴丕賳:.
爻胤丨 賳禺爻鬲. "丕爻賲" 賴丕貙 賰賴 亘乇 "丕卮賷丕亍" 丿賱丕賱鬲 賲賶 賰賳賳丿.
丕賲丕 丿賱丕賱鬲 趩蹖爻鬲責 丿賱丕賱鬲 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖爻鬲 賯乇丕乇丿丕丿蹖 賵 噩毓賱蹖 亘蹖賳 丕爻賲 賵 卮蹖亍 賲鬲賳丕馗乇 亘丕 丌賳. 亘賷賳 賰賱賲賴 賶 "賲-蹖-夭" 賵 賲賷夭 賵丕賯毓賶 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕乇丿. 亘賱讴賴 丕蹖賳 賲丕蹖蹖賲 讴賴 亘丕 賯乇丕乇丿丕丿 鬲氐賲賷賲 诏乇賮鬲賷賲 賰賱賲賴 賶 "賲-賶-夭" 乇丕 亘乇 賲蹖夭 賵丕賯毓蹖 丕胤賱丕賯 讴賳蹖賲. 乇丕亘胤賴 賶 丕爻賲 賴丕 賵 丕卮賷丕亍 丕賷賳 诏賵賳賴 丕爻鬲.
爻胤丨 丿賵賲. "诏夭丕乇賴" 賴丕貙 "賵囟毓賷鬲 賴丕賶 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇" 乇丕 "鬲氐賵賷乇" 賲賶 賰賳賳丿.
丕賲丕 鬲氐賵蹖乇 趩蹖爻鬲責 鬲氐賵蹖乇 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖爻鬲 丨賯蹖賯蹖 亘蹖賳 诏夭丕乇賴 賵 賵囟毓蹖鬲 丕賲賵乇 賲鬲賳丕馗乇 亘丕 丌賳. 亘賴 丕蹖賳 卮讴賱 讴賴 亘賷賳 丕爻賲 賴丕 (讴賴 亘丕 鬲乇讴蹖亘 禺賵丿 诏夭丕乇賴 乇丕 賲蹖 爻丕夭賳丿) 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿貙 賰賴 卮亘賷賴 賴賲丕賳 乇丕亘胤賴 賶 亘賷賳 丕卮賷丕亍 丕爻鬲 (讴賴 亘丕 鬲乇讴蹖亘 禺賵丿 賵囟毓蹖鬲 丕賲賵乇 賲賲讴賳 乇丕 賲蹖 爻丕夭賳丿). 亘乇 毓賰爻 "丿賱丕賱鬲" 賰賴 诏賮鬲賷賲 丕爻賲 賵 卮賶亍 亘丕 賴賲 丕乇鬲亘丕胤賶 賳丿丕乇賳丿 賵 乇丕亘胤賴 亘賴 讴賱蹖 賯乇丕乇丿丕丿蹖 丕爻鬲貙 丿乇 "鬲氐賵賷乇" 诏夭丕乇賴 亘丕 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇 丕乇鬲亘丕胤 賵丕賯毓賶 丿丕乇丿 賵 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賵丕賯毓丕賸 卮亘蹖賴 亘賴 賴賲 賴爻鬲賳丿. 乇丕亘胤賴 賶 诏夭丕乇賴 賵 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇 丕賷賳 诏賵賳賴 丕爻鬲.
爻胤丨 爻賵賲. 诏賮鬲賷賲 亘賴 丌賳 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 丕賲賵乇 賰賴 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賲丨賯賯 卮丿賴 亘丕卮丿貙 賲賶 诏賵蹖蹖賲 "賵丕賯毓賷鬲". 丨丕賱 丕诏乇 诏夭丕乇賴 (賰賴 鬲氐賵賷乇 賷讴 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 丕爻鬲) 賲胤丕亘賯 賵丕賯毓賷鬲 亘丕卮丿貙 "氐丕丿賯" 丕爻鬲貙 賵 丕诏乇 賲胤丕亘賯 賵丕賯毓賷鬲 賳亘丕卮丿貙 "賰丕匕亘".
賲孬賱丕賸 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賲賷夭 爻賮賷丿 丕爻鬲. 賲丕 丿賵 诏夭丕乇賴 丿丕乇賷賲:
丕賱賮: 賲賷夭 賯賴賵賴 丕賶 丕爻鬲. (賷賰 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賲賰賳 賲賷夭)
亘: 賲賷夭 爻賮賷丿 丕爻鬲. (賷賰 賵囟毓賷鬲 丿賷诏乇 賲賲賰賳 賲賷夭)
丕夭 丕賷賳 丿賵 賵囟毓賷鬲 賲賷夭貙 賲賷夭 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 賮賯胤 賷賰 賵囟毓賷鬲 乇丕 丿丕乇丿: 爻賮賷丿. 诏夭丕乇賴 丕蹖 賰賴 賲鬲賳丕爻亘 丕蹖賳 賵囟毓賷鬲 丕爻鬲貙 氐丕丿賯 丕爻鬲 賵 丌賳 讴賴 賲鬲賳丕爻亘 賳蹖爻鬲貙 讴丕匕亘.
December 29, 2024
Thoughts are almost always either misinterpreted, disguised, or limited when we use language to express them.
The contemporary shapes of letters and the sounds of words are a poor and innumerable derivation of the original pictures and symbols they once resembled that then more clearly and meaningfully depicted the object's appearance or representation of ideas.
Language lacks the capacity to accurately express one's internal emotions or expressed feelings of grief or joy, pain or pleasure, and hate or love. When this limited capacity of language is reached, then art, music, poetry or human behavior can step in to express the feeling beyond the narrow boundaries of language.
Therefore, if you really must speak, speak about the findings of the natural sciences, but don't use this pale and rudimentary interpretation called language to express beauty, emotions, or ideas. Hence, Wittgenstein's famous quote with which he ends his short but dense book: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.鈥�
The contemporary shapes of letters and the sounds of words are a poor and innumerable derivation of the original pictures and symbols they once resembled that then more clearly and meaningfully depicted the object's appearance or representation of ideas.
Language lacks the capacity to accurately express one's internal emotions or expressed feelings of grief or joy, pain or pleasure, and hate or love. When this limited capacity of language is reached, then art, music, poetry or human behavior can step in to express the feeling beyond the narrow boundaries of language.
Therefore, if you really must speak, speak about the findings of the natural sciences, but don't use this pale and rudimentary interpretation called language to express beauty, emotions, or ideas. Hence, Wittgenstein's famous quote with which he ends his short but dense book: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.鈥�
Read
August 31, 2008I was just going to write, 鈥淥f what we cannot speak we must remain silent,鈥� as my review. The book ends with this rather affected proposition, which actually would make a perfect book review for me as well. However, it鈥檚 an abomination to read (or pretend to have done so) a book of this stature (supposedly the most important philosophical book of the 20th century, no less) and not write a paragraph or two about it.
Wittgenstein wrote this book in the trenches and P.O.W. camps of World War I. At the beginning of the book he says: 鈥淧erhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it.鈥� That was bad news for me right from the beginning. I don鈥檛 think I鈥檝e ever had such lofty thoughts 鈥� not even close.
I would have given this book one star and declared it a heap of pompous and pretentious intellectual chicanery, but Wittgenstein is not to be slighted. You see, someone like Bertrand Russell, whose genius I recognize, was so impressed by this Wittgenstein dude that he gave up mathematical logic just because Wittgenstein told him so. This was after Russell had spent years on writing Principia Mathematica and trying to defend logic and set theory against the sort of paradoxes of which Russell鈥檚 paradox is the most famous one. Russell said that he couldn't quite understand what Wittgenstein was saying, but he felt in his bones that he must be right. That鈥檚 the kind of guy we鈥檙e talking about here. I鈥檓 therefore left with no choice but humbly admit that this book was way over my head. Respect, Mr. Wittgenstein!
The book has seven main propositions, each expanded by other propositions (except for the seventh proposition that ends the book). I think I understood quite a few of them, but I couldn鈥檛 tell you what the book as whole is trying to achieve or prove. Some proposition sound just so arcane that I didn鈥檛 even bother to try to understand them. Some propositions peaked my interest, like Proposition 3.333. I read it, and then it ended with: 鈥淭hat disposes of Russell鈥檚 paradox.鈥� I was like: Say what? How did you dispose of Russell鈥檚 paradox in one paragraph? I stared at that proposition long and hard, but I didn鈥檛 get it. Some propositions looked just weird to me, like Proposition 6.1203 where he proposes an 鈥渋ntuitive method鈥� to recognize an expression as a tautology.
I leave it to another genius like Kurt G枚del to say that he wasn鈥檛 very impressed with Wittgenstein. You see, when G枚del published his Incompleteness Theorem (some 10 years after Tractatus) both Wittgenstein and Russell tripped over it. G枚del was a Platonist who believed that mathematics describes an abstract reality, not the empirical reality of logical positivists like Russell and Wittgenstein. G枚del proved that there are true but unprovable propositions in mathematics. That comes very close to saying that mathematical truths are independent of any human activity. Wittgenstein didn鈥檛 accept G枚del鈥檚 results, and the Dark Prince of Mathematics duly told him to 鈥渂e fruitful and multiply, but not in those words.鈥� (Sorry, I just had to mix Woody Allen into all this.)
Wittgenstein wrote this book in the trenches and P.O.W. camps of World War I. At the beginning of the book he says: 鈥淧erhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it.鈥� That was bad news for me right from the beginning. I don鈥檛 think I鈥檝e ever had such lofty thoughts 鈥� not even close.
I would have given this book one star and declared it a heap of pompous and pretentious intellectual chicanery, but Wittgenstein is not to be slighted. You see, someone like Bertrand Russell, whose genius I recognize, was so impressed by this Wittgenstein dude that he gave up mathematical logic just because Wittgenstein told him so. This was after Russell had spent years on writing Principia Mathematica and trying to defend logic and set theory against the sort of paradoxes of which Russell鈥檚 paradox is the most famous one. Russell said that he couldn't quite understand what Wittgenstein was saying, but he felt in his bones that he must be right. That鈥檚 the kind of guy we鈥檙e talking about here. I鈥檓 therefore left with no choice but humbly admit that this book was way over my head. Respect, Mr. Wittgenstein!
The book has seven main propositions, each expanded by other propositions (except for the seventh proposition that ends the book). I think I understood quite a few of them, but I couldn鈥檛 tell you what the book as whole is trying to achieve or prove. Some proposition sound just so arcane that I didn鈥檛 even bother to try to understand them. Some propositions peaked my interest, like Proposition 3.333. I read it, and then it ended with: 鈥淭hat disposes of Russell鈥檚 paradox.鈥� I was like: Say what? How did you dispose of Russell鈥檚 paradox in one paragraph? I stared at that proposition long and hard, but I didn鈥檛 get it. Some propositions looked just weird to me, like Proposition 6.1203 where he proposes an 鈥渋ntuitive method鈥� to recognize an expression as a tautology.
I leave it to another genius like Kurt G枚del to say that he wasn鈥檛 very impressed with Wittgenstein. You see, when G枚del published his Incompleteness Theorem (some 10 years after Tractatus) both Wittgenstein and Russell tripped over it. G枚del was a Platonist who believed that mathematics describes an abstract reality, not the empirical reality of logical positivists like Russell and Wittgenstein. G枚del proved that there are true but unprovable propositions in mathematics. That comes very close to saying that mathematical truths are independent of any human activity. Wittgenstein didn鈥檛 accept G枚del鈥檚 results, and the Dark Prince of Mathematics duly told him to 鈥渂e fruitful and multiply, but not in those words.鈥� (Sorry, I just had to mix Woody Allen into all this.)
February 20, 2014
What the hell am I supposed to say about this?
The parts I understood were hugely inspirational to my own thoughts, if I did indeed understand those parts, which I suspect I did not.
What a shame that someone so clever who had decided that this book was the be-all and end-all to problems in philosophy could only communicate them in a form that often eludes human comprehension.
It's like the saying that if the human brain were simple enough for us to understand it then we would be too stupid to do so, that the brain was not something we were ever going to understand.
Perhaps if someone were indeed smart enough to resolve all problems in philosophy then they could only communicate it in an incomprehensible language.
Then they would decide later that they were wrong anyway.
WTF.
The parts I understood were hugely inspirational to my own thoughts, if I did indeed understand those parts, which I suspect I did not.
What a shame that someone so clever who had decided that this book was the be-all and end-all to problems in philosophy could only communicate them in a form that often eludes human comprehension.
It's like the saying that if the human brain were simple enough for us to understand it then we would be too stupid to do so, that the brain was not something we were ever going to understand.
Perhaps if someone were indeed smart enough to resolve all problems in philosophy then they could only communicate it in an incomprehensible language.
Then they would decide later that they were wrong anyway.
WTF.
September 19, 2007
The ingenious work which, had it been true, would have provided a firm foundation for Positivism and provided justification for Philosophy's existence. It also would have pretty much been the last word on the nature of and philosophical limits of language. Instead Wittgenstein repudiated this view and put a nail in the coffin with P.I.
Elegant, minimal, logically crystalline. And mostly wrong.
Elegant, minimal, logically crystalline. And mostly wrong.
September 8, 2012
In 1992, the SF writer William Gibson published in floppy-disk form, a poem about his late father and the Memento-ish evanescence of memory, which encrypted itself after reading (i.e. you could only read it once). A rarer, analog edition was even printed with photosensitive chemicals that would degrade the ink upon exposure to light. (Two copies had to be sent to the Library of Congress, one to read so it could be catalogued, the other to be archived, forever unread.)
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as appetizing a read as frozen porridge on a stick (or those "Nutra Loaf" food-bricks served to SuperMax inmates as punishment for weaponizing their fecal matter), self-immolates in a like fashion. It is a tautology-threaded suicide-vest smuggled into the Agora of philosophy, a "friendly fire" apostasy in the heart of Cambridge -- reminiscent of that daft scene in Independence Day where Jeff Goldblum sends a trojan virus back to the mothership -- a death meme, a killshot.
For after 90 pages of eyelid-twitching mental strain we are told, with barely a smirk, that everything we've just read is nonsense, because guess what dipshits, all is nonsense. The Tractatus is a scaffold which, once ascended, can be junked like the Erector Set of our epistemic childhood.
"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them鈥攁s steps鈥攖o climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)" (6.54)
Wittgenstein is like some Zen asshat who makes us hold a stress position for 72 hours on a tree stump in the pouring rain to instill chastened humility before an ungraspable cosmic order. Led through the inspection-tunnels and antechambers of a vast self-annihilating hall of mirrors, we arrive at the shattered terminus of epistemological overthrow that punked Bertrand Russell so hard his pipe whirligigged in his mouth like Popeye's.
Those who've dragged the lake of metaphysics know how exasperating this type of writing can be: the rectilinear sight-lines of definition, thesis, and axiom springing the trap of an illusory cyborg's-eye view of atomic reality, the circuitous maze of tautology and self-reference which seems to lead everywhere and nowhere. Maddeningly, Wittgenstein never provides a clear definition of "object," and so the elucidatory nucleus of the Tractatus itself becomes a sucking vortex of fathomless unknowing, pulling everything into thin air like John Lithgow shooting through the glass at that goblin tearing up the wing.
A gnomic breviary for androids, prequel to the immeasurably richer Philosophical Investigations (1929-1951), it exemplifies the positivist mania Wittgenstein largely discarded like a cicada moulting its exoskeleton. As enchanting as a circuitboard schematic (for hardware that doesn't function), the Tractatus is a victim of its own tense certitudes. For the "picture theory" of realism, presuming to mirror the deep structure of the logical universe through recourse to atomic "simples," is no mere coding error, but rather the grand boffo Mega Blooper at the perplexed heart of 3000 years of philosophic tail-chasing. The burning bridge to the post-Tractatus Wittgenstein -- cognitive-therapist of language-games high and low -- appears in proposition 4.112: "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity." We inoculate against disease by introducing antigens into our bio-chem to produce antibodies. We study the history of philosophy to keep from contaminating ourselves with the well-meaning-but-poo-brained fallacies of our noble precursors. (Fallacies most of us would embrace on faith sans the contingency of being wised-up latecomers to the game. Which is another way of saying that contemporary fallacies, which no doubt exist, are largely invisible to us. Fish cannot grasp the concept of water. Fallacious cognition fuels our motivational self-esteem just as caloric intake fuels our body systems.)
And so, like Gottlob Frege postscripting Vol. II of his Foundations of Arithmetic to the effect that had undermined his entire project, Wittgenstein sweeps a resigned hand across the Tibetan sand-painting of his Cambridge apprenticeship, downsizing "the Philosopher" to mere critic, therapist, dilettante, revisionist, and pedagogue.
Which is, I think, an eminently sane place to be.
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as appetizing a read as frozen porridge on a stick (or those "Nutra Loaf" food-bricks served to SuperMax inmates as punishment for weaponizing their fecal matter), self-immolates in a like fashion. It is a tautology-threaded suicide-vest smuggled into the Agora of philosophy, a "friendly fire" apostasy in the heart of Cambridge -- reminiscent of that daft scene in Independence Day where Jeff Goldblum sends a trojan virus back to the mothership -- a death meme, a killshot.
For after 90 pages of eyelid-twitching mental strain we are told, with barely a smirk, that everything we've just read is nonsense, because guess what dipshits, all is nonsense. The Tractatus is a scaffold which, once ascended, can be junked like the Erector Set of our epistemic childhood.
"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them鈥攁s steps鈥攖o climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)" (6.54)
Wittgenstein is like some Zen asshat who makes us hold a stress position for 72 hours on a tree stump in the pouring rain to instill chastened humility before an ungraspable cosmic order. Led through the inspection-tunnels and antechambers of a vast self-annihilating hall of mirrors, we arrive at the shattered terminus of epistemological overthrow that punked Bertrand Russell so hard his pipe whirligigged in his mouth like Popeye's.
Those who've dragged the lake of metaphysics know how exasperating this type of writing can be: the rectilinear sight-lines of definition, thesis, and axiom springing the trap of an illusory cyborg's-eye view of atomic reality, the circuitous maze of tautology and self-reference which seems to lead everywhere and nowhere. Maddeningly, Wittgenstein never provides a clear definition of "object," and so the elucidatory nucleus of the Tractatus itself becomes a sucking vortex of fathomless unknowing, pulling everything into thin air like John Lithgow shooting through the glass at that goblin tearing up the wing.
A gnomic breviary for androids, prequel to the immeasurably richer Philosophical Investigations (1929-1951), it exemplifies the positivist mania Wittgenstein largely discarded like a cicada moulting its exoskeleton. As enchanting as a circuitboard schematic (for hardware that doesn't function), the Tractatus is a victim of its own tense certitudes. For the "picture theory" of realism, presuming to mirror the deep structure of the logical universe through recourse to atomic "simples," is no mere coding error, but rather the grand boffo Mega Blooper at the perplexed heart of 3000 years of philosophic tail-chasing. The burning bridge to the post-Tractatus Wittgenstein -- cognitive-therapist of language-games high and low -- appears in proposition 4.112: "Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity." We inoculate against disease by introducing antigens into our bio-chem to produce antibodies. We study the history of philosophy to keep from contaminating ourselves with the well-meaning-but-poo-brained fallacies of our noble precursors. (Fallacies most of us would embrace on faith sans the contingency of being wised-up latecomers to the game. Which is another way of saying that contemporary fallacies, which no doubt exist, are largely invisible to us. Fish cannot grasp the concept of water. Fallacious cognition fuels our motivational self-esteem just as caloric intake fuels our body systems.)
And so, like Gottlob Frege postscripting Vol. II of his Foundations of Arithmetic to the effect that had undermined his entire project, Wittgenstein sweeps a resigned hand across the Tibetan sand-painting of his Cambridge apprenticeship, downsizing "the Philosopher" to mere critic, therapist, dilettante, revisionist, and pedagogue.
Which is, I think, an eminently sane place to be.
August 6, 2018
"螕喂伪 蟿伪 蟺蟻维纬渭伪蟿伪 蟺慰蠀 未蔚谓 渭蟺慰蟻蔚委蟼 谓伪 渭喂位萎蟽蔚喂蟼, 蟺蟻苇蟺蔚喂 谓伪 蟽蠅蟺伪委谓蔚喂蟼."
螌蟺蠅蟼 慰 委未喂慰蟼 慰 Wittgenstein 蟺蟻慰位慰纬蔚委 蟽蟿慰 苇蟻纬慰 蟿慰蠀, 伪谓 未蔚谓 苇蠂蔚蟿蔚 蟽魏蔚蠁蟿蔚委 伪蟺蠈 渭蠈谓慰喂 蟽伪蟼 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 胃苇位蔚喂 谓伪 蟺蔚喂 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰, 蟿蠈蟿蔚 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 伪蠀蟿蠈 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 纬喂伪 蔚蟽维蟼. 螕喂伪 伪蠀蟿蠈 蠄维尉蟿蔚 蟺蟻蠋蟿伪 蟽蟿慰 YouTube 萎 纬蔚谓喂魏维 蟽蟿慰 螖喂伪未委魏蟿蠀慰 纬喂伪 蟿慰谓 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁苇伪 魏伪喂 蟿畏谓 蠁喂位慰蟽慰蠁委伪 蟿慰蠀 蟺蟻喂谓 伪纬慰蟻维蟽蔚蟿蔚 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰.
螤蟻蠈魏蔚喂蟿伪喂 渭蔚 未喂伪蠁慰蟻维 纬喂伪 蟿慰 未蠀蟽魏慰位蠈蟿蔚蟻慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟺慰蠀 苇蠂蠅 蟽蠀谓伪谓蟿萎蟽蔚喂. 螌蠂喂, 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 魏伪魏慰纬蟻伪渭渭苇谓慰. 螘委谓伪喂 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟿慰 蟺喂慰 渭伪胃畏渭伪蟿喂魏维 纬蟻伪渭渭苇谓慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟺慰蠀 未喂维尾伪蟽伪. 螤蟻喂谓 蟿慰 蟺蟻慰渭畏胃蔚蠀蟿蠋 蔚委蠂伪 未蔚喂 伪蟻魏蔚蟿维 尾委谓蟿蔚慰 渭蔚 蟺伪蟻慰蠀蟽喂维蟽蔚喂蟼 魏伪喂 未喂伪位苇尉蔚喂蟼 渭蔚 魏蠉蟻喂慰 胃苇渭伪 蟿畏谓 蠁喂位慰蟽慰蠁委伪 蟿慰蠀 Wittgenstein (蠈蟺慰蠀 渭蔚 尾蟻委蟽魏蔚喂 蟽蠂蔚未蠈谓 蟽蔚 蠈位伪 蟽蠉渭蠁蠅谓慰) 魏伪喂 蔚委蠂伪 伪魏慰蠉蟽蔚喂 伪蟻魏蔚蟿维 Podcasts 蠈蟺慰蠀 伪谓苇位蠀伪谓 蟿畏谓 蟽魏苇蠄畏 蟿慰蠀(蟽蠀谓慰位喂魏维 蟺维谓蠅 伪蟺蠈 6 蠋蟻蔚蟼). 危蠂蔚未蠈谓 未蔚谓 萎胃蔚位伪 谓伪 蟿慰 伪纬慰蟻维蟽蠅 纬喂伪蟿委 蟺委蟽蟿蔚蠀伪 蠈蟿喂 蔚委蠂伪 "蟿蔚位蔚喂蠋蟽蔚喂" 渭蔚 蟿慰谓 Wittgenstein 魏伪喂 蠈蟿喂 蔚委蠂伪 伪谓伪魏伪位蠉蠄蔚喂 蟺位苇慰谓 蟿伪 蟺维谓蟿伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿慰 苇蟻纬慰 蟿慰蠀.
螝伪喂 蠈渭蠅蟼... 蔚谓蠋 蔚委蠂伪 蟺伪蟻伪魏慰位慰蠀胃萎蟽蔚喂 蠀位喂魏蠈 伪蟻魏蔚蟿蠋谓 蠅蟻蠋谓 伪谓维位蠀蟽畏蟼 蟿畏蟼 蟽魏苇蠄畏蟼 蟿慰蠀 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁苇伪 魏伪喂 蔚谓蠋 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 蟺维谓蠅 伪蟺蠈 100 蟽蔚位委未蔚蟼, 螝螒韦螁桅螘巍螘 魏伪喂 纬慰谓维蟿喂蟽蔚 蟿慰 渭蠀伪位蠈 渭慰蠀. 违蟺萎蟻蠂伪谓 蟺慰位位维 蟽畏渭蔚委伪 蟽蟿伪 慰蟺慰委伪 苇蟺蟻蔚蟺蔚 谓伪 伪位位维尉蠅 蟿慰谓 蟿蟻蠈蟺慰 蟺慰蠀 苇蠂蠅 渭维胃蔚喂 谓伪 蠂蟻畏蟽喂渭慰蟺慰喂蠋 蟿畏谓 纬位蠋蟽蟽伪 蟺蟻慰魏蔚喂渭苇谓慰蠀 谓伪 伪谓蟿位萎蟽蠅 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 萎胃蔚位蔚 谓伪 蟺蔚喂 慰 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁苇伪蟼.
螝伪喂 伪蠀蟿蠈蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 慰 位蠈纬慰蟼 蟺慰蠀 纬蟻维蠁畏魏蔚 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 魏伪喂 蟺蟻苇蟺蔚喂 谓伪 未喂伪尾伪蟽蟿蔚委 蟽伪谓 魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰. 螒蠀蟿蠈 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿慰 Point 蟿慰蠀 Wittgenstein. 螌蟿喂 蠂蟻畏蟽喂渭慰蟺慰喂慰蠉渭蔚 位维胃慰蟼 蟿畏谓 纬位蠋蟽蟽伪 蟽蠀谓蔚蠂蠋蟼 魏伪喂 未蔚谓 蟿慰 魏伪蟿伪位伪尾伪委谓慰蠀渭蔚. 螌蟿喂 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿蟻慰渭蔚蟻维 未蠉蟽魏慰位慰 谓伪 蠁蟿维蟽慰蠀渭蔚 蟽蔚 苇谓伪 蟽畏渭蔚委慰 蠈蟺慰蠀 畏 纬位蠋蟽蟽伪 胃伪 位蔚喂蟿慰蠀蟻纬蔚委 渭蔚 蟿苇位蔚喂伪 渭伪胃畏渭伪蟿喂魏萎 伪魏蟻委尾蔚喂伪. 螝伪喂 伪蟺蠈 蟿畏谓 蟽蟿喂纬渭萎 蟺慰蠀 畏 纬位蠋蟽蟽伪 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿苇位蔚喂伪, 未蔚谓 纬委谓蔚蟿伪喂 谓伪 蠁喂位慰蟽慰蠁萎蟽慰蠀渭蔚. 螖蔚谓 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 伪魏蠈渭伪 蟿慰 蟿苇位蔚喂慰 蔚蟻纬伪位蔚委慰 渭蔚 蟿慰 慰蟺慰委慰 胃伪 魏伪蟿伪蠁苇蟻慰蠀渭蔚 谓伪 蟺蔚蟻喂纬蟻维蠄慰蠀渭蔚 蟿畏谓 蟺蟻伪纬渭伪蟿喂魏蠈蟿畏蟿伪. 螤蟻苇蟺蔚喂 谓伪 蟽蠅蟺维蟽慰蠀渭蔚.
螣 委未喂慰蟼 慰 Wittgenstein 蟺委蟽蟿蔚蠀蔚 蠈蟿喂 渭蔚 蟿慰 蟺伪蟻蠈谓 尾喂尾位委慰 蟿蔚蚁渭维蟿喂蟽蔚 蟿畏谓 桅喂位慰蟽慰蠁委伪 魏伪喂 蠈蟿喂 未蔚谓 蠂蟻蔚喂伪味蠈蟿伪谓 谓伪 纬蟻伪蠁蔚委 维位位慰 蠁喂位慰蟽慰蠁喂魏蠈 魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰. 螛伪 蠂蟻蔚喂伪蟽蟿蔚委 谓伪 蟺蔚蟻维蟽慰蠀谓 伪蟻魏蔚蟿维 蠂蟻蠈谓喂伪 渭苇蠂蟻喂 谓伪 纬蟻维蠄蔚喂 蟿慰 蔚蟺蠈渭蔚谓慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟿慰蠀 蠈蟺慰蠀 伪蟺慰蟿蔚位蔚委 渭喂伪 蟽蠀渭蟺位萎蟻蠅蟽畏/未喂蠈蟻胃蠅蟽畏 伪蠀蟿慰蠉...
螘谓 魏伪蟿伪魏位蔚委未喂,委蟽蠅蟼 蟿慰 蟺喂慰 螠螘螕螒螞螘螜惟螖螘危 魏伪喂 螠螘螕螒螞螣桅违螘危 尾喂尾位委慰 蟺慰蠀 纬蟻维蠁畏魏蔚 蟺慰蟿苇 蟺蔚蟻委 桅喂位慰蟽慰蠁委伪蟼 (蟿慰 蔚蟺喂尾蔚尾伪喂蠋谓蔚喂 魏伪喂 慰 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁苇伪蟼 蟿慰蠀 维位位蠅蟽蟿蔚) 伪位位维 未蠀蟽蟿蠀蠂蠋蟼 蟿蟻慰渭蔚蟻维 未蠉蟽魏慰位慰 纬喂伪 蟿慰谓 渭苇蟽慰 伪谓伪纬谓蠋蟽蟿畏. 螒蟺伪喂蟿蔚委 伪蟻魏蔚蟿萎 蠀蟺慰渭慰谓萎 魏伪喂 渭伪胃畏渭伪蟿喂魏萎 蟽魏苇蠄畏 纬喂伪 谓伪 伪谓蟿喂位畏蠁胃蔚委蟼 蟿慰 渭蔚纬伪位蔚委慰 蟿畏蟼 位慰纬喂魏萎蟼 蟿慰蠀 Wittgenstein 魏伪喂 委蟽蠅蟼 未蔚谓 蟿畏谓 未喂伪胃苇蟿慰蠀谓 蠈位慰喂...
螌蟺蠅蟼 慰 委未喂慰蟼 慰 Wittgenstein 蟺蟻慰位慰纬蔚委 蟽蟿慰 苇蟻纬慰 蟿慰蠀, 伪谓 未蔚谓 苇蠂蔚蟿蔚 蟽魏蔚蠁蟿蔚委 伪蟺蠈 渭蠈谓慰喂 蟽伪蟼 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 胃苇位蔚喂 谓伪 蟺蔚喂 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰, 蟿蠈蟿蔚 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 伪蠀蟿蠈 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 纬喂伪 蔚蟽维蟼. 螕喂伪 伪蠀蟿蠈 蠄维尉蟿蔚 蟺蟻蠋蟿伪 蟽蟿慰 YouTube 萎 纬蔚谓喂魏维 蟽蟿慰 螖喂伪未委魏蟿蠀慰 纬喂伪 蟿慰谓 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁苇伪 魏伪喂 蟿畏谓 蠁喂位慰蟽慰蠁委伪 蟿慰蠀 蟺蟻喂谓 伪纬慰蟻维蟽蔚蟿蔚 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰.
螤蟻蠈魏蔚喂蟿伪喂 渭蔚 未喂伪蠁慰蟻维 纬喂伪 蟿慰 未蠀蟽魏慰位蠈蟿蔚蟻慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟺慰蠀 苇蠂蠅 蟽蠀谓伪谓蟿萎蟽蔚喂. 螌蠂喂, 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 魏伪魏慰纬蟻伪渭渭苇谓慰. 螘委谓伪喂 蠈渭蠅蟼 蟿慰 蟺喂慰 渭伪胃畏渭伪蟿喂魏维 纬蟻伪渭渭苇谓慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟺慰蠀 未喂维尾伪蟽伪. 螤蟻喂谓 蟿慰 蟺蟻慰渭畏胃蔚蠀蟿蠋 蔚委蠂伪 未蔚喂 伪蟻魏蔚蟿维 尾委谓蟿蔚慰 渭蔚 蟺伪蟻慰蠀蟽喂维蟽蔚喂蟼 魏伪喂 未喂伪位苇尉蔚喂蟼 渭蔚 魏蠉蟻喂慰 胃苇渭伪 蟿畏谓 蠁喂位慰蟽慰蠁委伪 蟿慰蠀 Wittgenstein (蠈蟺慰蠀 渭蔚 尾蟻委蟽魏蔚喂 蟽蠂蔚未蠈谓 蟽蔚 蠈位伪 蟽蠉渭蠁蠅谓慰) 魏伪喂 蔚委蠂伪 伪魏慰蠉蟽蔚喂 伪蟻魏蔚蟿维 Podcasts 蠈蟺慰蠀 伪谓苇位蠀伪谓 蟿畏谓 蟽魏苇蠄畏 蟿慰蠀(蟽蠀谓慰位喂魏维 蟺维谓蠅 伪蟺蠈 6 蠋蟻蔚蟼). 危蠂蔚未蠈谓 未蔚谓 萎胃蔚位伪 谓伪 蟿慰 伪纬慰蟻维蟽蠅 纬喂伪蟿委 蟺委蟽蟿蔚蠀伪 蠈蟿喂 蔚委蠂伪 "蟿蔚位蔚喂蠋蟽蔚喂" 渭蔚 蟿慰谓 Wittgenstein 魏伪喂 蠈蟿喂 蔚委蠂伪 伪谓伪魏伪位蠉蠄蔚喂 蟺位苇慰谓 蟿伪 蟺维谓蟿伪 伪蟺蠈 蟿慰 苇蟻纬慰 蟿慰蠀.
螝伪喂 蠈渭蠅蟼... 蔚谓蠋 蔚委蠂伪 蟺伪蟻伪魏慰位慰蠀胃萎蟽蔚喂 蠀位喂魏蠈 伪蟻魏蔚蟿蠋谓 蠅蟻蠋谓 伪谓维位蠀蟽畏蟼 蟿畏蟼 蟽魏苇蠄畏蟼 蟿慰蠀 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁苇伪 魏伪喂 蔚谓蠋 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 蟺维谓蠅 伪蟺蠈 100 蟽蔚位委未蔚蟼, 螝螒韦螁桅螘巍螘 魏伪喂 纬慰谓维蟿喂蟽蔚 蟿慰 渭蠀伪位蠈 渭慰蠀. 违蟺萎蟻蠂伪谓 蟺慰位位维 蟽畏渭蔚委伪 蟽蟿伪 慰蟺慰委伪 苇蟺蟻蔚蟺蔚 谓伪 伪位位维尉蠅 蟿慰谓 蟿蟻蠈蟺慰 蟺慰蠀 苇蠂蠅 渭维胃蔚喂 谓伪 蠂蟻畏蟽喂渭慰蟺慰喂蠋 蟿畏谓 纬位蠋蟽蟽伪 蟺蟻慰魏蔚喂渭苇谓慰蠀 谓伪 伪谓蟿位萎蟽蠅 伪蠀蟿蠈 蟺慰蠀 萎胃蔚位蔚 谓伪 蟺蔚喂 慰 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁苇伪蟼.
螝伪喂 伪蠀蟿蠈蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 慰 位蠈纬慰蟼 蟺慰蠀 纬蟻维蠁畏魏蔚 蟿慰 尾喂尾位委慰 魏伪喂 蟺蟻苇蟺蔚喂 谓伪 未喂伪尾伪蟽蟿蔚委 蟽伪谓 魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰. 螒蠀蟿蠈 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿慰 Point 蟿慰蠀 Wittgenstein. 螌蟿喂 蠂蟻畏蟽喂渭慰蟺慰喂慰蠉渭蔚 位维胃慰蟼 蟿畏谓 纬位蠋蟽蟽伪 蟽蠀谓蔚蠂蠋蟼 魏伪喂 未蔚谓 蟿慰 魏伪蟿伪位伪尾伪委谓慰蠀渭蔚. 螌蟿喂 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿蟻慰渭蔚蟻维 未蠉蟽魏慰位慰 谓伪 蠁蟿维蟽慰蠀渭蔚 蟽蔚 苇谓伪 蟽畏渭蔚委慰 蠈蟺慰蠀 畏 纬位蠋蟽蟽伪 胃伪 位蔚喂蟿慰蠀蟻纬蔚委 渭蔚 蟿苇位蔚喂伪 渭伪胃畏渭伪蟿喂魏萎 伪魏蟻委尾蔚喂伪. 螝伪喂 伪蟺蠈 蟿畏谓 蟽蟿喂纬渭萎 蟺慰蠀 畏 纬位蠋蟽蟽伪 未蔚谓 蔚委谓伪喂 蟿苇位蔚喂伪, 未蔚谓 纬委谓蔚蟿伪喂 谓伪 蠁喂位慰蟽慰蠁萎蟽慰蠀渭蔚. 螖蔚谓 蠀蟺维蟻蠂蔚喂 伪魏蠈渭伪 蟿慰 蟿苇位蔚喂慰 蔚蟻纬伪位蔚委慰 渭蔚 蟿慰 慰蟺慰委慰 胃伪 魏伪蟿伪蠁苇蟻慰蠀渭蔚 谓伪 蟺蔚蟻喂纬蟻维蠄慰蠀渭蔚 蟿畏谓 蟺蟻伪纬渭伪蟿喂魏蠈蟿畏蟿伪. 螤蟻苇蟺蔚喂 谓伪 蟽蠅蟺维蟽慰蠀渭蔚.
螣 委未喂慰蟼 慰 Wittgenstein 蟺委蟽蟿蔚蠀蔚 蠈蟿喂 渭蔚 蟿慰 蟺伪蟻蠈谓 尾喂尾位委慰 蟿蔚蚁渭维蟿喂蟽蔚 蟿畏谓 桅喂位慰蟽慰蠁委伪 魏伪喂 蠈蟿喂 未蔚谓 蠂蟻蔚喂伪味蠈蟿伪谓 谓伪 纬蟻伪蠁蔚委 维位位慰 蠁喂位慰蟽慰蠁喂魏蠈 魏蔚委渭蔚谓慰. 螛伪 蠂蟻蔚喂伪蟽蟿蔚委 谓伪 蟺蔚蟻维蟽慰蠀谓 伪蟻魏蔚蟿维 蠂蟻蠈谓喂伪 渭苇蠂蟻喂 谓伪 纬蟻维蠄蔚喂 蟿慰 蔚蟺蠈渭蔚谓慰 尾喂尾位委慰 蟿慰蠀 蠈蟺慰蠀 伪蟺慰蟿蔚位蔚委 渭喂伪 蟽蠀渭蟺位萎蟻蠅蟽畏/未喂蠈蟻胃蠅蟽畏 伪蠀蟿慰蠉...
螘谓 魏伪蟿伪魏位蔚委未喂,委蟽蠅蟼 蟿慰 蟺喂慰 螠螘螕螒螞螘螜惟螖螘危 魏伪喂 螠螘螕螒螞螣桅违螘危 尾喂尾位委慰 蟺慰蠀 纬蟻维蠁畏魏蔚 蟺慰蟿苇 蟺蔚蟻委 桅喂位慰蟽慰蠁委伪蟼 (蟿慰 蔚蟺喂尾蔚尾伪喂蠋谓蔚喂 魏伪喂 慰 蟽蠀纬纬蟻伪蠁苇伪蟼 蟿慰蠀 维位位蠅蟽蟿蔚) 伪位位维 未蠀蟽蟿蠀蠂蠋蟼 蟿蟻慰渭蔚蟻维 未蠉蟽魏慰位慰 纬喂伪 蟿慰谓 渭苇蟽慰 伪谓伪纬谓蠋蟽蟿畏. 螒蟺伪喂蟿蔚委 伪蟻魏蔚蟿萎 蠀蟺慰渭慰谓萎 魏伪喂 渭伪胃畏渭伪蟿喂魏萎 蟽魏苇蠄畏 纬喂伪 谓伪 伪谓蟿喂位畏蠁胃蔚委蟼 蟿慰 渭蔚纬伪位蔚委慰 蟿畏蟼 位慰纬喂魏萎蟼 蟿慰蠀 Wittgenstein 魏伪喂 委蟽蠅蟼 未蔚谓 蟿畏谓 未喂伪胃苇蟿慰蠀谓 蠈位慰喂...
February 17, 2016
I really enjoyed this book, my first by Wittgenstein, a book about the essential function of language and a sort of "theory of everything" of meaning. It starts off as a very cool, clear-eyed, incisive look at what language is, what it does, and how we can cull it to its essence to say something meaningful and true, then ends on an oddly metaphysical note that seems to throw everything that preceded it to the wind.
The format is as economical and mathematical as Wittgenstein's arguments. It is arranged like a series of proofs, with an idea or definition asserted and subsequent statements building upon or out from that assertion to go deeper into what that piece of language does or what it means. In the middle chapters he includes symbolic representations of what he says language does best (and how meaning can be found), and it is fascinating to see language reduced to such simple, sterile characters. My comprehension always faded a bit the deeper into a definition or concept he got, but Wittgenstein never lost me completely. (Although, at the end he does call all the writing that preceded to be "senseless," so maybe I should have been lost and actually was lost and only convinced myself I wasn't lost because I was too proud to admit otherwise...)
While the logical positivism reigns supreme here, at the very end Wittgenstein's tone changes and he delves into a bit of metaphysics and philosophy of ethics. He first decries causality ("6.371 The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena"), then says that propositions have no place in ethics (6.42), that "ethics cannot be put into words" (6.421) because ethical propositions require something beyond the proposition itself (6.422) and because a proposition must contain all states of affairs (if I am understanding Wittgenstein). I did not find these of his arguments convincing, and the last few pages as a whole felt slightly "tacked on," like he felt he had to say something about a larger issue than language itself.
Finally, his most referenced idea seems to be the unexpected culmination of his thought and examination: "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer." (6.52) At the end, he almost undermines his entire work by saying that philosophy cannot really say anything, that only propositions of natural science can say anything, that all philosophy rests on a failure to "give meaning to certain signs in ... [metaphysical] propositions." (6.53) It was almost like getting to the last page of a book and having the protagonist wake up and reveal the whole story to have been a dream. Of course I think that philosophy CAN say something meaningful, so I disagree with this conclusion.... but I have to wonder if Wittgenstein really meant that literally, or if there is some other purpose at work. I really have no idea.
Side note: it is amusing how often Wittgenstein makes known that he is refuting an argument of Russell or Frege, like through the Tractatus Wittgenstein was asserting his independence from his teachers and mentors. How fascinating to see philosophy in conversation.
This book is remarkable and fascinating as an argument about the form of language and how it communicates true things about the world. For lovers of symbolic logic, this is a treat. I have to add, though, that I did NOT enjoy the e-book version I purchased (a different version than the one pictured). The text I read from was riddled with typographical errors, and the symbolic logic passages were just a mess -- some not at all helpful or readable. Luckily, I have a little experience with symbolic logic so I was able to "translate" some of the mess, but let my folly be a lesson to you all: if you are going to read Wittgenstein, get a quality, reliable translation. Preferably in print. Wittgenstein's dissection of the form and logic of language is not a place for frugality.
The format is as economical and mathematical as Wittgenstein's arguments. It is arranged like a series of proofs, with an idea or definition asserted and subsequent statements building upon or out from that assertion to go deeper into what that piece of language does or what it means. In the middle chapters he includes symbolic representations of what he says language does best (and how meaning can be found), and it is fascinating to see language reduced to such simple, sterile characters. My comprehension always faded a bit the deeper into a definition or concept he got, but Wittgenstein never lost me completely. (Although, at the end he does call all the writing that preceded to be "senseless," so maybe I should have been lost and actually was lost and only convinced myself I wasn't lost because I was too proud to admit otherwise...)
While the logical positivism reigns supreme here, at the very end Wittgenstein's tone changes and he delves into a bit of metaphysics and philosophy of ethics. He first decries causality ("6.371 The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena"), then says that propositions have no place in ethics (6.42), that "ethics cannot be put into words" (6.421) because ethical propositions require something beyond the proposition itself (6.422) and because a proposition must contain all states of affairs (if I am understanding Wittgenstein). I did not find these of his arguments convincing, and the last few pages as a whole felt slightly "tacked on," like he felt he had to say something about a larger issue than language itself.
Finally, his most referenced idea seems to be the unexpected culmination of his thought and examination: "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer." (6.52) At the end, he almost undermines his entire work by saying that philosophy cannot really say anything, that only propositions of natural science can say anything, that all philosophy rests on a failure to "give meaning to certain signs in ... [metaphysical] propositions." (6.53) It was almost like getting to the last page of a book and having the protagonist wake up and reveal the whole story to have been a dream. Of course I think that philosophy CAN say something meaningful, so I disagree with this conclusion.... but I have to wonder if Wittgenstein really meant that literally, or if there is some other purpose at work. I really have no idea.
Side note: it is amusing how often Wittgenstein makes known that he is refuting an argument of Russell or Frege, like through the Tractatus Wittgenstein was asserting his independence from his teachers and mentors. How fascinating to see philosophy in conversation.
This book is remarkable and fascinating as an argument about the form of language and how it communicates true things about the world. For lovers of symbolic logic, this is a treat. I have to add, though, that I did NOT enjoy the e-book version I purchased (a different version than the one pictured). The text I read from was riddled with typographical errors, and the symbolic logic passages were just a mess -- some not at all helpful or readable. Luckily, I have a little experience with symbolic logic so I was able to "translate" some of the mess, but let my folly be a lesson to you all: if you are going to read Wittgenstein, get a quality, reliable translation. Preferably in print. Wittgenstein's dissection of the form and logic of language is not a place for frugality.
January 29, 2008
Wittgenstein says explicitly in the introduction of the book that no one has not already had these thoughts will be able to understand it, and should therefore not read it. No doubt this had a great affect on the size of The Tractatus' readership.
I, having not fully had many of these thoughts, was nonetheless absolutely THRILLED by the book--it's abstruseness notwithstanding--to the point where I would bring it up in conversation with absolute strangers, which, needless to say, affected the number of friends I made during that time.
An important book for everyone to read, as it shows us how NOT to write prose, what really matters in life (not necessarily what he wrote about), and the value of thought.
I, having not fully had many of these thoughts, was nonetheless absolutely THRILLED by the book--it's abstruseness notwithstanding--to the point where I would bring it up in conversation with absolute strangers, which, needless to say, affected the number of friends I made during that time.
An important book for everyone to read, as it shows us how NOT to write prose, what really matters in life (not necessarily what he wrote about), and the value of thought.
December 1, 2010
Absolutely trite and unconvincing. A bloodless and conceited bore, organized as though by a severe autistic. The assumptions about cognition are laughably archaic, and the popularity of this work is a thorn in my throat.
May 5, 2023
Probablemente haya entendido un 5%... siendo generoso XD
Creo que ahora toca leer alg煤n otro libro donde se explique o preguntarle a ChatGPT.
Creo que ahora toca leer alg煤n otro libro donde se explique o preguntarle a ChatGPT.
October 31, 2024
Likely my third reading but the first time straight through. Foundational and simultaneously destructive. Here鈥檚 to architects being paroled and the fall of divine spheres.
Wonderful day at a sheep farm in Northern Michigan.
Wonderful day at a sheep farm in Northern Michigan.
Read
April 8, 2023I have read through this one three times: once hastily to get a feel for it; and twice carefully with Bertrand Russell's 1922 introductory text in between. During this last reading I kept some notes and constructed a diagram. It was this diagram that began to homogenize my scattered thoughts. At first, I didn't even realize that I applied Wittgenstein's point 2.1: "We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (9).
Looking at my elementary little diagram, I began to see something familiar. This dualistic metaphysics has its root in Kant's transcendental idealism from . For Kant, there are two worlds: the noumenal and the phenomenal. As regards my diagram, Kant's noumenal world is the analog of the box labeled WORLD and the phenomental world has its analog in my box labeled CONCEPTUAL MODEL. These names aren't exactly synonymous, but I don't feel like changing them. The main point is that the noumenal world is reality as it is in itself, and we cannot access it. We cannot access, for example, the substance of objects. The phenomenal world, on the other hand, is the reality we experience through our senses.
For Wittgenstein, the main composite object we construct in order to interact with facts in the noumenal world are pictures. We picture facts, as he says early on. But this picture is the amalgamation of thoughts which make up propositions which make up a language. Yet herein lies one of the main thrusts of the tractatus: how do we assert a logically complete and infallible language with which to deal with phenomena? This was a major sticking point for me during my first two readings, because it seemed to me (especially at the very end of the text) that the whole argument ended with the destruction of metaphysics. This I based chiefly on point 6.54: "...he who understands me finally recognizes [my propositions] as senseless...." (82; and, indeed, many critics feel cheated at this point--the end--of the text).
Perhaps, though, this interpretation was due to my heightened skepticism for the usefulness of philosophy these days. I took a note at some point that says "the purpose of philosophy is to clarify thoughts and nothing more." And, indeed, one of Wittgenstein's goals is to use Occam's razor to excise any bit of symbolism/grammar/syntax/etc. deemed unnecessary. Which then causes my question to resurface: what would be left? Towards the end of the work, it seemed to me that Wittgenstein proposed the area of the mystical being the destination for of Occam's shavings.
But for the sake of argument, let's say endeavor to list the totality of things that are the case. We would happen upon Russell's paradox, which proves a self-referential error that occurs when trying to assert a set of all possible sets, because said set would have to include itself. This same type of issue arises when Wittgenstein proposes a language that includes everything that is the case--the facts; the pictures; the symbols. And even disregarding the paradox of Wittgenstein's friend, could we achieve this infinite language of symbols?
One thinks of Borges's story of the Aleph, a symbol and object in the story used to represent a point of infinite knowledge. Of its description, the narrator says:
"And here begins my despair as a writer. All language is a set of symbols whose use among its speakers assumes a shared past. How, then, can I translate into words the limitless Aleph, which my floundering mind can scarcely encompass? Mystics, faced with the same problem, fall back on symbols...."
Couple this with Wittgenstein's point 6.45: "The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole. The feeling that the world is a limited whole is the mystical feeling." Indeed a "limited whole" is a paradox, an oxymoron. Yet, in another light, it isn't, for the adjective "limited" really describes our finite cognitive ability, while the "whole" refers to the totality we wish to propose as the complete system.
In conclusion, I propose that the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the endgame for an attempt at a full system of metaphysics. As Kant put forth his as an indispensable beginning for any system of metaphysics, Wittgenstein's 82-page tractatus stakes its claim as perhaps the new launching pad. When we consider the very real limitations of our thinking and our ability to establish a system that encompasses such a transendental whole, the very last point is properly fitting: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (82).
Checkmate.
Looking at my elementary little diagram, I began to see something familiar. This dualistic metaphysics has its root in Kant's transcendental idealism from . For Kant, there are two worlds: the noumenal and the phenomenal. As regards my diagram, Kant's noumenal world is the analog of the box labeled WORLD and the phenomental world has its analog in my box labeled CONCEPTUAL MODEL. These names aren't exactly synonymous, but I don't feel like changing them. The main point is that the noumenal world is reality as it is in itself, and we cannot access it. We cannot access, for example, the substance of objects. The phenomenal world, on the other hand, is the reality we experience through our senses.
For Wittgenstein, the main composite object we construct in order to interact with facts in the noumenal world are pictures. We picture facts, as he says early on. But this picture is the amalgamation of thoughts which make up propositions which make up a language. Yet herein lies one of the main thrusts of the tractatus: how do we assert a logically complete and infallible language with which to deal with phenomena? This was a major sticking point for me during my first two readings, because it seemed to me (especially at the very end of the text) that the whole argument ended with the destruction of metaphysics. This I based chiefly on point 6.54: "...he who understands me finally recognizes [my propositions] as senseless...." (82; and, indeed, many critics feel cheated at this point--the end--of the text).
Perhaps, though, this interpretation was due to my heightened skepticism for the usefulness of philosophy these days. I took a note at some point that says "the purpose of philosophy is to clarify thoughts and nothing more." And, indeed, one of Wittgenstein's goals is to use Occam's razor to excise any bit of symbolism/grammar/syntax/etc. deemed unnecessary. Which then causes my question to resurface: what would be left? Towards the end of the work, it seemed to me that Wittgenstein proposed the area of the mystical being the destination for of Occam's shavings.
But for the sake of argument, let's say endeavor to list the totality of things that are the case. We would happen upon Russell's paradox, which proves a self-referential error that occurs when trying to assert a set of all possible sets, because said set would have to include itself. This same type of issue arises when Wittgenstein proposes a language that includes everything that is the case--the facts; the pictures; the symbols. And even disregarding the paradox of Wittgenstein's friend, could we achieve this infinite language of symbols?
One thinks of Borges's story of the Aleph, a symbol and object in the story used to represent a point of infinite knowledge. Of its description, the narrator says:
"And here begins my despair as a writer. All language is a set of symbols whose use among its speakers assumes a shared past. How, then, can I translate into words the limitless Aleph, which my floundering mind can scarcely encompass? Mystics, faced with the same problem, fall back on symbols...."
Couple this with Wittgenstein's point 6.45: "The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole. The feeling that the world is a limited whole is the mystical feeling." Indeed a "limited whole" is a paradox, an oxymoron. Yet, in another light, it isn't, for the adjective "limited" really describes our finite cognitive ability, while the "whole" refers to the totality we wish to propose as the complete system.
In conclusion, I propose that the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the endgame for an attempt at a full system of metaphysics. As Kant put forth his as an indispensable beginning for any system of metaphysics, Wittgenstein's 82-page tractatus stakes its claim as perhaps the new launching pad. When we consider the very real limitations of our thinking and our ability to establish a system that encompasses such a transendental whole, the very last point is properly fitting: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (82).
Checkmate.
November 26, 2022
Wittgenstein'in dil, d眉nya, etik, mant谋k, felsefe, ve d眉艧眉nce alan谋nda yapt谋臒谋 枚nermelerle bu 枚nermeleri daha a莽an alt 枚nermelerden olu艧an ve hayattayken yazd谋臒谋 bir kitap. Dilin 枚nemini mant谋k yoluyla ve matematiksel form眉llerle a莽谋kl谋yor. Daha derli toplu bir kitap bekliyordum, sanki olgunla艧madan kitap haline getirilmi艧 d眉艧眉nceler gibi bir d眉zeni yok. BFS yay谋nlar谋n谋n 1985 bask谋s谋 oldu臒u i莽in 枚nceden okudu臒umu d眉艧眉n眉yorum, ama akl谋mda hi莽bir iz b谋rakmam谋艧, muhtemelen tekrar okudum, 莽眉nk眉 alt谋n谋 莽izdi臒im c眉mleler var.
August 3, 2017
+5 for writing this (apparently while serving in WW1)
-1 because not enough examples. That would've helped to clear up a ton of confusion (for example, what exactly is the N-operator)
-1 because I CAN
Final grade: 3/5
-1 because not enough examples. That would've helped to clear up a ton of confusion (for example, what exactly is the N-operator)
-1 because I CAN
Final grade: 3/5
May 24, 2015
丕賵賱 卮乇丨 乇賵 禺賵賳丿賲 亘毓丿 禺賵丿 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵.
卮乇丨 丕夭 趩賳丿 噩賳亘賴 禺賵亘賴: 賳孬乇 賮丕乇爻蹖 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 倬禺鬲賴 賵 噩丕賮鬲丕丿賴 丕爻鬲. 噩夭 趩賳丿 丕氐胤賱丕丨 賳丕賲丕賳賵爻貙 亘丕 賳孬乇蹖 乇賵丕賳 賵 丿乇禺賵乇 卮乇丨蹖 賮賱爻賮蹖 乇賵 亘賴 亘乇賵 賴爻鬲蹖賲. 賲賵囟賵毓丕鬲 毓賲丿賴 乇爻丕賱賴 賲賳胤賯蹖 賮賱爻賮蹖 丕夭 賴賲 鬲賮讴蹖讴 卮丿賴 丕賳丿 賵 噩丿丕诏丕賳賴 賲丨賱 亘丨孬 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕賳丿 讴賴 丕蹖賳 賲賵噩亘 丕賳爻噩丕賲 丿乇 賲胤丕賱毓賴 賲蹖 卮賵丿. 丕氐胤賱丕丨 诏夭蹖賳蹖 賴丕 亘賴 丕爻鬲丕丿蹖 丕賳噩丕賲 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕賳丿. 鬲乇噩賲賴 蹖 賲鬲賳 乇爻丕賱賴 亘丕 讴賲 鬲乇蹖賳 丕亘賴丕賲 賵 亘蹖卮鬲乇蹖賳 丿賯鬲 賲賲讴賳 氐賵乇鬲 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕爻鬲. 賲亘丕丨孬蹖 讴賴 賲胤乇丨 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲 亘賴 禺賵亘蹖 賲賵乇丿 亘丨孬 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕賳丿 (賴乇趩賳丿 丿乇 亘乇禺蹖 賲賵丕乇丿 爻賵丕賱 賴丕蹖蹖 丿乇 匕賴賳賲 卮讴賱 诏乇賮鬲 讴賴 卮丕乇丨 丌賳賴丕 乇丕 亘蹖 噩賵丕亘 诏匕丕卮鬲賴 丕爻鬲). 卮丕乇丨 亘賴 丕丿亘蹖丕鬲 賲賵噩賵丿 丿乇 亘丕亘 乇爻丕賱賴 丕卮乇丕賮 讴丕賮蹖 丿丕乇丿 賵 亘毓囟丕 丕乇噩丕毓 賴丕蹖 爻賵丿賲賳丿蹖 亘賴 讴鬲丕亘 賴丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲. 賲賳 亘丕 丕蹖賳讴賴 亘丕 爻賳鬲 賮賱爻賮赖 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖 賴賲賳賵丕蹖蹖 賳丿丕乇賲 (讴賴 丿賱蹖賱卮 亘乇 賲蹖 诏乇丿丿 亘賴 乇賴蹖丕賮鬲 毓賲丿賴 蹖 賮賱爻賮赖 蹖 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖 丿乇 禺氐賵氐 賳丨賵賴 蹖 鬲賯乇亘 亘賴 賲爻丕卅賱 賮賱爻賮蹖)貙 丕夭 禺賵丕賳丿賳 丕蹖賳 卮乇丨 賴賲 趩蹖夭賴丕蹖 夭蹖丕丿蹖 蹖丕丿 诏乇賮鬲賲 賴賲 毓賱丕賯賴 丕蹖 丿乇 賲賳 丕蹖噩丕丿 卮丿 鬲丕 丿爻鬲 讴賲 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳 乇丕 賳丕禺賵丕賳丿賴 亘乇 噩丕蹖 賳诏匕丕乇賲.
賲賳鬲賴丕 禺賵丿 乇爻丕賱賴 讴賲丕讴丕賳 亘乇丕蹖賲 賲亘賴賲 丕爻鬲. 讴鬲丕亘 讴鬲丕亘 丿卮賵丕乇蹖 丕爻鬲 賵 卮丕乇丨 賲丨鬲乇賲 亘賴 亘乇禺蹖 丕夭 賲賮丕賴蹖賲 讴鬲丕亘 蹖丕 丕氐賱丕 賳倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴 蹖丕 丕蹖賳讴賴 賲賳 賳鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賴 丕賲 卮乇丨 丕賵 乇丕 禺賵亘 丿乇讴 讴賳賲. 賵賱蹖 诏賲丕賳 賲蹖 讴賳賲 卮乇丨 噩丕賲毓 賳亘賵丿賴 丕爻鬲.
賲賳 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 亘爻蹖丕乇 倬爻賳丿蹖丿賲 賵 亘蹖卮 丕夭 賴賲賴 丕夭 丕蹖賳 賱匕鬲 亘乇丿賲 讴賴 蹖讴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖 卮乇丨蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮赖 賮蹖賱爻賵賮蹖 睾乇亘蹖 賲蹖 賳賵蹖爻丿 讴賴 賳賴 鬲賳賴丕 亘賴 賲毓賳丕蹖 賵丕賯毓蹖 讴賱賲賴 "鬲丕賱蹖賮" 丕爻鬲貙 亘賱讴賴 鬲丕賱蹖賮蹖 丕爻鬲 毓賲丿鬲丕 賯丕亘賱 賮賴賲 賵 亘賴 丿賵乇 丕夭 禺賵丿賳賲丕蹖蹖 賴丕 賵 馗丕賴乇爻丕夭蹖 賴丕蹖 賲乇爻賵賲 丿乇 讴鬲亘 鬲丕賱蹖賮蹖 賲鬲丿丕賵賱 丿乇 夭賲蹖賳賴 賮賱爻賮赖 丿乇 賲賲賱讴鬲 賲丕.
卮乇丨 丕夭 趩賳丿 噩賳亘賴 禺賵亘賴: 賳孬乇 賮丕乇爻蹖 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 倬禺鬲賴 賵 噩丕賮鬲丕丿賴 丕爻鬲. 噩夭 趩賳丿 丕氐胤賱丕丨 賳丕賲丕賳賵爻貙 亘丕 賳孬乇蹖 乇賵丕賳 賵 丿乇禺賵乇 卮乇丨蹖 賮賱爻賮蹖 乇賵 亘賴 亘乇賵 賴爻鬲蹖賲. 賲賵囟賵毓丕鬲 毓賲丿賴 乇爻丕賱賴 賲賳胤賯蹖 賮賱爻賮蹖 丕夭 賴賲 鬲賮讴蹖讴 卮丿賴 丕賳丿 賵 噩丿丕诏丕賳賴 賲丨賱 亘丨孬 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕賳丿 讴賴 丕蹖賳 賲賵噩亘 丕賳爻噩丕賲 丿乇 賲胤丕賱毓賴 賲蹖 卮賵丿. 丕氐胤賱丕丨 诏夭蹖賳蹖 賴丕 亘賴 丕爻鬲丕丿蹖 丕賳噩丕賲 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕賳丿. 鬲乇噩賲賴 蹖 賲鬲賳 乇爻丕賱賴 亘丕 讴賲 鬲乇蹖賳 丕亘賴丕賲 賵 亘蹖卮鬲乇蹖賳 丿賯鬲 賲賲讴賳 氐賵乇鬲 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕爻鬲. 賲亘丕丨孬蹖 讴賴 賲胤乇丨 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲 亘賴 禺賵亘蹖 賲賵乇丿 亘丨孬 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕賳丿 (賴乇趩賳丿 丿乇 亘乇禺蹖 賲賵丕乇丿 爻賵丕賱 賴丕蹖蹖 丿乇 匕賴賳賲 卮讴賱 诏乇賮鬲 讴賴 卮丕乇丨 丌賳賴丕 乇丕 亘蹖 噩賵丕亘 诏匕丕卮鬲賴 丕爻鬲). 卮丕乇丨 亘賴 丕丿亘蹖丕鬲 賲賵噩賵丿 丿乇 亘丕亘 乇爻丕賱賴 丕卮乇丕賮 讴丕賮蹖 丿丕乇丿 賵 亘毓囟丕 丕乇噩丕毓 賴丕蹖 爻賵丿賲賳丿蹖 亘賴 讴鬲丕亘 賴丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲. 賲賳 亘丕 丕蹖賳讴賴 亘丕 爻賳鬲 賮賱爻賮赖 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖 賴賲賳賵丕蹖蹖 賳丿丕乇賲 (讴賴 丿賱蹖賱卮 亘乇 賲蹖 诏乇丿丿 亘賴 乇賴蹖丕賮鬲 毓賲丿賴 蹖 賮賱爻賮赖 蹖 鬲丨賱蹖賱蹖 丿乇 禺氐賵氐 賳丨賵賴 蹖 鬲賯乇亘 亘賴 賲爻丕卅賱 賮賱爻賮蹖)貙 丕夭 禺賵丕賳丿賳 丕蹖賳 卮乇丨 賴賲 趩蹖夭賴丕蹖 夭蹖丕丿蹖 蹖丕丿 诏乇賮鬲賲 賴賲 毓賱丕賯賴 丕蹖 丿乇 賲賳 丕蹖噩丕丿 卮丿 鬲丕 丿爻鬲 讴賲 賵蹖鬲诏賳卮鬲丕蹖賳 乇丕 賳丕禺賵丕賳丿賴 亘乇 噩丕蹖 賳诏匕丕乇賲.
賲賳鬲賴丕 禺賵丿 乇爻丕賱賴 讴賲丕讴丕賳 亘乇丕蹖賲 賲亘賴賲 丕爻鬲. 讴鬲丕亘 讴鬲丕亘 丿卮賵丕乇蹖 丕爻鬲 賵 卮丕乇丨 賲丨鬲乇賲 亘賴 亘乇禺蹖 丕夭 賲賮丕賴蹖賲 讴鬲丕亘 蹖丕 丕氐賱丕 賳倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴 蹖丕 丕蹖賳讴賴 賲賳 賳鬲賵丕賳爻鬲賴 丕賲 卮乇丨 丕賵 乇丕 禺賵亘 丿乇讴 讴賳賲. 賵賱蹖 诏賲丕賳 賲蹖 讴賳賲 卮乇丨 噩丕賲毓 賳亘賵丿賴 丕爻鬲.
賲賳 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 亘爻蹖丕乇 倬爻賳丿蹖丿賲 賵 亘蹖卮 丕夭 賴賲賴 丕夭 丕蹖賳 賱匕鬲 亘乇丿賲 讴賴 蹖讴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖 卮乇丨蹖 亘乇 賮賱爻賮赖 賮蹖賱爻賵賮蹖 睾乇亘蹖 賲蹖 賳賵蹖爻丿 讴賴 賳賴 鬲賳賴丕 亘賴 賲毓賳丕蹖 賵丕賯毓蹖 讴賱賲賴 "鬲丕賱蹖賮" 丕爻鬲貙 亘賱讴賴 鬲丕賱蹖賮蹖 丕爻鬲 毓賲丿鬲丕 賯丕亘賱 賮賴賲 賵 亘賴 丿賵乇 丕夭 禺賵丿賳賲丕蹖蹖 賴丕 賵 馗丕賴乇爻丕夭蹖 賴丕蹖 賲乇爻賵賲 丿乇 讴鬲亘 鬲丕賱蹖賮蹖 賲鬲丿丕賵賱 丿乇 夭賲蹖賳賴 賮賱爻賮赖 丿乇 賲賲賱讴鬲 賲丕.
January 14, 2010
I love this book, and I am not sure why. I actually pick it up time-to-time and it is really a book that can't be defined by words - I think about it and it's almost abstract. And that is the essence of the book. How do you define something abstract into words - and are words enough to describe something that can't be said, but can be felt?
June 24, 2024
This book is like鈥� really difficult (馃摉馃く).
Wittgenstein is like鈥� really smart (馃馃彮).
This is a foundational text in analytical philosophy.
It鈥檚 LEGENDARY for being:
IMPORTANT/INSCRUTABLE
It鈥檚 FAR BEYOND my ability (or willingness) to DECODE.
And when I say DECODE, I mean that quite literally.
Much of the text is written in (algebraic) logical statements.
Take for example the following:
Proposition 3.318:
f(x) = T
In this context f(x) represents a logical variable (x), that performs a logical function (f), in a larger truth claim (T).
This formula illustrates Wittgenstein's idea that any BIG proposition (r) that can be said to be true (T), is founded upon logical functions f(x), which connect SMALLER elementary statements (p/q) in various ways.
For EXAMPLE:
Let's consider two elementary propositions:
p = the sky is blue.
q = The grass is green.
These SMALL elementary propositions (p/q) can be linked together to make a BIG complex proposition (r).
In this example, the BIG complex proposition is:
r = 鈥渢he sky is blue AND the grass is green.鈥�
In logical notation, this can be written as:
r = p/\q
WHEREBY
f(x) = IF
p = the sky is blue = true (T)
f(x) = AND
q = the grass is green = true (T)
f(x) = THEN
r = 鈥渢he sky is blue AND the grass is green = true (T)
In the example, the EXPLICIT interlocutor AND, as well as the IMPLICIT interlocutors IF/THAN, each function f(x) to link (/\) the element proposition (p) with another element proposition (q), in order to form the complex proposition (r).
If (p) AND (q) are both true (T)
THEN (and only then) can (r) be considered true (T).
In logical notation, this could be written as:
r = p/\q = T = T/\T
In SUM:
Logical interlocutors (such as if/and/or/but/than) function f(x) to link LITTLE elementary propositions (p/q) into BIG complex propositions (r), which can be said to be true (T), or not, based on the accumulative truth value of the constituents.
TRUE THAT!
So anyway.
This book is JUST ONE AFTER ANOTHER ONE OF THESE.
And there are HUNDREDS MORE OF THESE TO DECODE.
And I (personally) am not (at present) willing/able to DEAL.
But I can APPRECIATE THE ENDEAVOR.
And I鈥檓 glad there are serious/masochistic philosophers out there who ARE WILLING/ABLE to do this.
My assumption is:
f(x) = if
p = your are a serious philosopher
f(x) = and
q = you are masochistic
f(x) = than
r = you could/would sit there and DECODE this whole TEXT.
But I am NEITHER (T)
As such.
I鈥檓 going to KEEP IT LIGHT.
And maybe (MAYBE) get ahold of a few of the BIG IDEAS.
And maybe (MAYBE) get a general sense for Wittgenstein.
And from what I can ascertain.
The REALLY BIG idea Wittgenstein seems to be asserting is:
THE WORLD IS MADE OF FACTS (Not OBJECTS).
And BIG FACTS are made of LITTLE FACTS.
What Wittgenstein refers to as ATOMIC FACTS.
Atomic facts are the simplest kinds of facts.
Which cannot be broken down any further.
They are the basic building blocks of reality.
This is OBVIOUSLY inspired by the physics of the day.
Wittgenstein also makes broader conclusions regarding the limits of LANGUAGE to accurately describe REALITY.
Wittgenstein asserts that:
IF language can accurately REFLECT (model) reality.
It must do so through propositions which REPRESENT facts.
And in order to do so in any kind of MEANINGFUL way.
Then the STRUCTURE of a these propositions.
Must accurately REFLECT (model/recapitulate).
The STRUCTURE of the STATE of affairs it DESCRIBES.
In other words:
According to Wittgenstein:
LANGUAGE has to be structured like the REALITY it describes, in order to accurately DESCRIBE REALITY.
Wittgenstein further asserts that PHILOSOPHY should only express what can be stated in this POSITIVISTIC FORM.
And if it can鈥檛.
It needs to REMAIN SILET on that TOPIC.
Wittgenstein is suggests that SUBJECTIVE/QUALITATIVE phenomena, including ETICHS and METAPHYSICS are in essence transcendent ephemera, that can鈥檛 be captured in the LOGICAL PROPOSITIONS OF POSITIVISTIC PHILOSOPHY.
They belong to a realm BEYOND the limits of language.
And are as such OUTSIDE THE PURVIEW of PHILOSOPHY.
The book ends with the famous final quote:
"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dar眉ber muss man schweigen."
English translation:
鈥淲hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
DUDE.
He鈥檚 BASICALLY TELLING everyone EXCEPT for POSITIVISTIC PHILOSOPHERS to SHUT THE FUCK UP.
础狈顿鈥�
THATS SO GERMAN!
But WAIT.
In the END END.
He COMPLETELY RETRACTS ALL OF THAT.
Proposition 6.54:
"My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (We must throw away the ladder, after we have climbed up on it.)"
Here, Wittgenstein is basically saying that the propositions in the Tractatus are meant to serve as a means to an end.
Not as DEFINITIVE TRUTHS.
And once you have understood them.
You can go ahead and IGNORE THEM.
You can BURN THE BOOK.
FUCK IT.
Once you鈥檙e on the ROOF.
You can KICK the LADDER to the ground.
Insinuating that the whole thing is in the end.
Kind of a QUASI MYSTERIOUS EXERCISE.
A strange loop that leaves you where you started.
Only changed.
More precise.
And somehow.
Less certain.
Again.
THATS SO GERMAN!
5/5 猸愶笍
Wittgenstein is like鈥� really smart (馃馃彮).
This is a foundational text in analytical philosophy.
It鈥檚 LEGENDARY for being:
IMPORTANT/INSCRUTABLE
It鈥檚 FAR BEYOND my ability (or willingness) to DECODE.
And when I say DECODE, I mean that quite literally.
Much of the text is written in (algebraic) logical statements.
Take for example the following:
Proposition 3.318:
f(x) = T
In this context f(x) represents a logical variable (x), that performs a logical function (f), in a larger truth claim (T).
This formula illustrates Wittgenstein's idea that any BIG proposition (r) that can be said to be true (T), is founded upon logical functions f(x), which connect SMALLER elementary statements (p/q) in various ways.
For EXAMPLE:
Let's consider two elementary propositions:
p = the sky is blue.
q = The grass is green.
These SMALL elementary propositions (p/q) can be linked together to make a BIG complex proposition (r).
In this example, the BIG complex proposition is:
r = 鈥渢he sky is blue AND the grass is green.鈥�
In logical notation, this can be written as:
r = p/\q
WHEREBY
f(x) = IF
p = the sky is blue = true (T)
f(x) = AND
q = the grass is green = true (T)
f(x) = THEN
r = 鈥渢he sky is blue AND the grass is green = true (T)
In the example, the EXPLICIT interlocutor AND, as well as the IMPLICIT interlocutors IF/THAN, each function f(x) to link (/\) the element proposition (p) with another element proposition (q), in order to form the complex proposition (r).
If (p) AND (q) are both true (T)
THEN (and only then) can (r) be considered true (T).
In logical notation, this could be written as:
r = p/\q = T = T/\T
In SUM:
Logical interlocutors (such as if/and/or/but/than) function f(x) to link LITTLE elementary propositions (p/q) into BIG complex propositions (r), which can be said to be true (T), or not, based on the accumulative truth value of the constituents.
TRUE THAT!
So anyway.
This book is JUST ONE AFTER ANOTHER ONE OF THESE.
And there are HUNDREDS MORE OF THESE TO DECODE.
And I (personally) am not (at present) willing/able to DEAL.
But I can APPRECIATE THE ENDEAVOR.
And I鈥檓 glad there are serious/masochistic philosophers out there who ARE WILLING/ABLE to do this.
My assumption is:
f(x) = if
p = your are a serious philosopher
f(x) = and
q = you are masochistic
f(x) = than
r = you could/would sit there and DECODE this whole TEXT.
But I am NEITHER (T)
As such.
I鈥檓 going to KEEP IT LIGHT.
And maybe (MAYBE) get ahold of a few of the BIG IDEAS.
And maybe (MAYBE) get a general sense for Wittgenstein.
And from what I can ascertain.
The REALLY BIG idea Wittgenstein seems to be asserting is:
THE WORLD IS MADE OF FACTS (Not OBJECTS).
And BIG FACTS are made of LITTLE FACTS.
What Wittgenstein refers to as ATOMIC FACTS.
Atomic facts are the simplest kinds of facts.
Which cannot be broken down any further.
They are the basic building blocks of reality.
This is OBVIOUSLY inspired by the physics of the day.
Wittgenstein also makes broader conclusions regarding the limits of LANGUAGE to accurately describe REALITY.
Wittgenstein asserts that:
IF language can accurately REFLECT (model) reality.
It must do so through propositions which REPRESENT facts.
And in order to do so in any kind of MEANINGFUL way.
Then the STRUCTURE of a these propositions.
Must accurately REFLECT (model/recapitulate).
The STRUCTURE of the STATE of affairs it DESCRIBES.
In other words:
According to Wittgenstein:
LANGUAGE has to be structured like the REALITY it describes, in order to accurately DESCRIBE REALITY.
Wittgenstein further asserts that PHILOSOPHY should only express what can be stated in this POSITIVISTIC FORM.
And if it can鈥檛.
It needs to REMAIN SILET on that TOPIC.
Wittgenstein is suggests that SUBJECTIVE/QUALITATIVE phenomena, including ETICHS and METAPHYSICS are in essence transcendent ephemera, that can鈥檛 be captured in the LOGICAL PROPOSITIONS OF POSITIVISTIC PHILOSOPHY.
They belong to a realm BEYOND the limits of language.
And are as such OUTSIDE THE PURVIEW of PHILOSOPHY.
The book ends with the famous final quote:
"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dar眉ber muss man schweigen."
English translation:
鈥淲hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
DUDE.
He鈥檚 BASICALLY TELLING everyone EXCEPT for POSITIVISTIC PHILOSOPHERS to SHUT THE FUCK UP.
础狈顿鈥�
THATS SO GERMAN!
But WAIT.
In the END END.
He COMPLETELY RETRACTS ALL OF THAT.
Proposition 6.54:
"My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (We must throw away the ladder, after we have climbed up on it.)"
Here, Wittgenstein is basically saying that the propositions in the Tractatus are meant to serve as a means to an end.
Not as DEFINITIVE TRUTHS.
And once you have understood them.
You can go ahead and IGNORE THEM.
You can BURN THE BOOK.
FUCK IT.
Once you鈥檙e on the ROOF.
You can KICK the LADDER to the ground.
Insinuating that the whole thing is in the end.
Kind of a QUASI MYSTERIOUS EXERCISE.
A strange loop that leaves you where you started.
Only changed.
More precise.
And somehow.
Less certain.
Again.
THATS SO GERMAN!
5/5 猸愶笍
July 13, 2013
Boring, Absurd, False. The foundation for the most mindless philosophy to have ever subsisted.
August 20, 2024
There are not many books like this. Its tone is brash, irreverent, and cocksure. Its points are painstakingly enumerated; the words are carefully chosen, and many points are stubbornly but alluringly confusing. And despite being uncertain that I fully understand Wittgenstein at each step in his argument, I am convinced that his critique is right but not one that undermines the possibility of analysis.
Trying to sum up, Wittgenstein is wary of the truth function of analytic language (logic in particular) that is true only in the logic of its form and in the symbolism of its expression. At some point, the aims of analysis go beyond the description of elementary propositions about the world and attempt to posit relationships between objects. It then assigns object status to those conclusions about states of affairs and at each step retreats a little further from making statements that propose anything verifiable by reference to the world and the states of affairs among things in it. Eventually, analytic statements make claims about the world and assert relationships that are true only by definition. The language of analysis starts to refer only to itself and its own products. It becomes 鈥渟enseless鈥� in Wittgenstein鈥檚 terms, meaning that it follows a logic of form but that it is ultimately not verifiable.
Sensible propositions assert falsifiable truths whereby language can be tested against a state of affairs in the world of things. To drive at more certainty requires unpacking more elementary propositions about the world, chasing atomic facts and inventing additional objects and assigning unique signs and symbols to them. It is, however, futile because the world of things is endlessly divisible into more and more atomic facts and objects that need names. It is another form of Zeno鈥檚 paradox. To drive to more complex assertions, analysis needs to build on itself and even if that analysis builds on a firm foundation of elementary propositions, forms of logic used to pull those elementary propositions together then slips into place as the object of analysis and then we are studying things that are not in the world.
These are the limits of analytic language, but I鈥檓 not bothered by Wittgenstein鈥檚 claims about the senselessness of logic and other kinds of interpretive and analytical language. It does seem true that there is a point at which the level of claims that we want to make and support with analytic language escape the bounds of verifiability against a world of atomic facts. However, if we believe Wittgenstein鈥檚 claim that philosophy is an 鈥渁ctivity鈥� for the clarification of thought then it retains its value despite working in the medium of language.
It is also true that philosophy and logic are not the only modes of analysis we have. Consider other modes of analytic expression, ways of saying something about the world, such as through art, music, literature. Then, just like with senseless philosophy that follows the form of its logic, art, music, and literature follows form as well and form expands the limits of the possible, a point that Wittgenstein develops later into proposition 6.
The famous ending: proposition 7: 鈥淲hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent鈥� seems a little less final. The problem may not be that there are things about which nothing can be spoken. Part of the problem may be the limited repertoire of ways we have for speaking. Forms of 鈥渟peaking鈥� like art and literature retain more of the experiential in a way that, to me, seems to allow for the kind of progress toward truth telling that Wittgenstein assigns to living.
Trying to sum up, Wittgenstein is wary of the truth function of analytic language (logic in particular) that is true only in the logic of its form and in the symbolism of its expression. At some point, the aims of analysis go beyond the description of elementary propositions about the world and attempt to posit relationships between objects. It then assigns object status to those conclusions about states of affairs and at each step retreats a little further from making statements that propose anything verifiable by reference to the world and the states of affairs among things in it. Eventually, analytic statements make claims about the world and assert relationships that are true only by definition. The language of analysis starts to refer only to itself and its own products. It becomes 鈥渟enseless鈥� in Wittgenstein鈥檚 terms, meaning that it follows a logic of form but that it is ultimately not verifiable.
Sensible propositions assert falsifiable truths whereby language can be tested against a state of affairs in the world of things. To drive at more certainty requires unpacking more elementary propositions about the world, chasing atomic facts and inventing additional objects and assigning unique signs and symbols to them. It is, however, futile because the world of things is endlessly divisible into more and more atomic facts and objects that need names. It is another form of Zeno鈥檚 paradox. To drive to more complex assertions, analysis needs to build on itself and even if that analysis builds on a firm foundation of elementary propositions, forms of logic used to pull those elementary propositions together then slips into place as the object of analysis and then we are studying things that are not in the world.
These are the limits of analytic language, but I鈥檓 not bothered by Wittgenstein鈥檚 claims about the senselessness of logic and other kinds of interpretive and analytical language. It does seem true that there is a point at which the level of claims that we want to make and support with analytic language escape the bounds of verifiability against a world of atomic facts. However, if we believe Wittgenstein鈥檚 claim that philosophy is an 鈥渁ctivity鈥� for the clarification of thought then it retains its value despite working in the medium of language.
It is also true that philosophy and logic are not the only modes of analysis we have. Consider other modes of analytic expression, ways of saying something about the world, such as through art, music, literature. Then, just like with senseless philosophy that follows the form of its logic, art, music, and literature follows form as well and form expands the limits of the possible, a point that Wittgenstein develops later into proposition 6.
The famous ending: proposition 7: 鈥淲hereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent鈥� seems a little less final. The problem may not be that there are things about which nothing can be spoken. Part of the problem may be the limited repertoire of ways we have for speaking. Forms of 鈥渟peaking鈥� like art and literature retain more of the experiential in a way that, to me, seems to allow for the kind of progress toward truth telling that Wittgenstein assigns to living.
July 6, 2008
A beautiful little book about language and thought, done in by Wittgenstein's lack of mathematical training to this point (it was written in the trenches of the Austro-Hungarian ostfront and the Italian POW camps of Cassino, and published only with the help of Russell and Ogden -- indeed, Ogden gave the book its title). Look to the
for "Wittgenstein II", the much more useful side of Ludwig's career (well after he'd left Logical Positivism behind), but read the Tractatus for some of the most breathtaking, heart-jarring pearls of the early century. It's not quite epigrams, and it neither follows the rules of deduction nor constitutes a valid derivation, but from that magnificent, syntactically-enigmatic first line:
The world is everything that is the case.
to the sweeping, single sentence of the seventh and final chapter:
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
you'll admire Ludwig for his verbal derring-do, if nothing else. An excellent transcription is available freely online , if you'd like.
The world is everything that is the case.
to the sweeping, single sentence of the seventh and final chapter:
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
you'll admire Ludwig for his verbal derring-do, if nothing else. An excellent transcription is available freely online , if you'd like.
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