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ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror
A revelatory look inside the world's most dangerous terrorist group.
Initially dismissed by US President Barack Obama, along with other fledgling terrorist groups, as a "jayvee squad" compared to al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has shocked the world by conquering massive territories in both countries and promising to create a vast new Muslim caliphate that observes the strict dictates of Sharia law.
In " Inside the Army of Terror," American journalist Michael Weiss and Syrian analyst Hassan Hassan explain how these violent extremists evolved from a nearly defeated Iraqi insurgent group into a jihadi army of international volunteers who behead Western hostages in slickly produced videos and have conquered territory equal to the size of Great Britain. Beginning with the early days of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS's first incarnation as "al-Qaeda in Iraq," Weiss and Hassan explain who the key players are--from their elusive leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to the former Saddam Baathists in their ranks--where they come from, how the movement has attracted both local and global support, and where their financing comes from.
Political and military maneuvering by the United States, Iraq, Iran, and Syria have all fueled ISIS's astonishing and explosive expansion. Drawing on original interviews with former US military officials and current ISIS fighters, the authors also reveal the internecine struggles within the movement itself, as well as ISIS's bloody hatred of Shiite Muslims, which is generating another sectarian war in the region. Just like the one the US thought it had stopped in 2011 in Iraq. Past is prologue and America's legacy in the Middle East is sowing a new generation of terror.
Initially dismissed by US President Barack Obama, along with other fledgling terrorist groups, as a "jayvee squad" compared to al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has shocked the world by conquering massive territories in both countries and promising to create a vast new Muslim caliphate that observes the strict dictates of Sharia law.
In " Inside the Army of Terror," American journalist Michael Weiss and Syrian analyst Hassan Hassan explain how these violent extremists evolved from a nearly defeated Iraqi insurgent group into a jihadi army of international volunteers who behead Western hostages in slickly produced videos and have conquered territory equal to the size of Great Britain. Beginning with the early days of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS's first incarnation as "al-Qaeda in Iraq," Weiss and Hassan explain who the key players are--from their elusive leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to the former Saddam Baathists in their ranks--where they come from, how the movement has attracted both local and global support, and where their financing comes from.
Political and military maneuvering by the United States, Iraq, Iran, and Syria have all fueled ISIS's astonishing and explosive expansion. Drawing on original interviews with former US military officials and current ISIS fighters, the authors also reveal the internecine struggles within the movement itself, as well as ISIS's bloody hatred of Shiite Muslims, which is generating another sectarian war in the region. Just like the one the US thought it had stopped in 2011 in Iraq. Past is prologue and America's legacy in the Middle East is sowing a new generation of terror.
279 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2015
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February 4, 2016
My grandmother hated the Germans until the day she died. Nothing I could say about the greatness of Bach or German regret over the war would make any difference. I could sympathize with her view, though, given she had lived through the Blitz in East Ham and been bombed by the Germans on a daily basis for weeks on end.
So maybe it was my Grandmother who made me think that the plans of US neo-conservatives to bomb the Iraqis into a state of western democracy would never work. Surely such bombing would do no more than create a new generation of terrorists, just like my grandmother would have been if Germany had won the war? (She was a very strong minded woman). Except that this next generation of terrorists would, quite understandably, be even more radical and hate-filled than the last.
But was I really clever enough to work all this out on my own? Or is my subconscious just tricking me into believing a certain expertise in international relations? Most of the western media supported Gulf War II, but might there have been dissenting voices that I now remember as my own? Let’s take a look:
Bernie Sanders seems to have got it about right in this speech made the day after bombing commenced in Gulf War I:
Bernie goes to prove what we all knew already, that he is the only US presidential candidate with any foresight or independent powers of analysis. But can we find a more accurate prediction of the outcome of Gulf War II?
We can. The . Here is what they had to say about Gulf War II a few days after military hostilities commenced:
For the sake of balance The Onion included an opposing viewpoint in their article, which was also the view promulgated by most of the mainstream media at the time, namely:
Seriously though, it’s a sad day for US journalism when an article in The Onion is a more reliable source of analysis than .
The Onion was spot on and as an occasional reader I may have subconsciously adopted their view. However it is still worth looking at the details of how the current disaster in the Syria and Iraq developed to help assess how things may go in the future . This work is an excellent starting point to understanding how events moved on from the days of Bush’s pathetic “Mission Accomplished� to the fulfillment of The Onion’s well thought out and tragically correct prediction.
Despite the somewhat lurid title, “ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror� is not sensationalist but rather a serious journalist work with a great deal of information about the early history of ISIS and its precursor groups in Syria and Iraq. The main actors in this story are the governments of Syria, Iraq and Iran, Al Qaeda, Sunni and Shi’ite communities across those countries and the various individuals opposing or acting in their name.
The main thesis of the book is illustrated by this diagram which recently appeared in The New York Times. It is a diagram showing the distribution of Sunni, Shi’ite and mixed areas of Baghdad in 2005 and 2007.
You will notice that in 2007 there are far fewer mixed areas and far more areas that are purely Sunni or Shi’ite. This diagram is evidence of the increasing sectarian split between Sunni and Shi’ite that was first broken open by the coalition invasion and US attempts at regime change. This split - which is fundamentally a political rather than a religious divide; religion plays a very secondary role here - was fed by the favoritism and patronage of al-Maliki, the first post invasion Prime Minister of Iraq, and by the meddling of other Shi’ite sponsors - Assad in Syria and Iran - all made possible by the invasion. Based on this book I would tag al-Maliki as a rarely recognised villain in this story for his Shi’ite partisanship and for his betrayal of the Sunni moslems who did try and stand up to extremism.
The Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian split started to show signs of widening to a dangerous level with the first round of democratic elections in Iraq which were boycotted by most of the Sunni population amid concerns that the majority Shi’ite government, once elected, would be biased against the Sunni. This concern seem to have been borne out in practice.
In this early post invasion period the main activity of the founders of ISIS was shit-stirring. Al Qaeda in Iraq at that time behaved like the younger kids in a playground looking for attention while the bigger boys are having a fight. Tragically their shit-stirring was very successful, promoting the sectarian split through the bombing of important Shi’ite shrines and Iraqi government targets and helping raise their profile as a possible Sunni opposition.
The heroic but ultimately tragic people who emerged in this period were the Sunni individuals who responded to requests from the US occupiers to oppose the al Qaeda style terrorist groups and help enforce law and order in the Sunni areas, mainly in the provinces to the west of Baghdad extending to the Syrian and Jordanian borders. Governments of countries that participated in Gulf War II have betrayed these people and for that we should truly feel shame and regret.
By this time much of the Sunni population in Iraq was sick and tired of al Qaeda and other assorted jihadis, who were often foreign, running around setting bombs or dictating to them in their homes. The Sunni groups that stood up to the extremists were the main reason for the success of the US “surge�; extra US troops had far less to do with it. However these people were let down by al-Maliki’s government as soon as the US forces departed. They received no support so were exposed to revenge from the terrorist groups; their wages were unpaid; they were abandoned. In due course they would be victims of ISIS or, if they were lucky, end up joining them.
Iran played and must continue to play a key role in the crisis, mainly through supporting Shi’ite groups including the Iraqi government under al-Maliki and the Shi’ite Syrian state under Assad. This support comes from mainly from Iran sponsored proxy groups such as Hizbollah or Hamas.
My reading of Assad from the book is that he is one part ruthless dictator to nine parts fool. His main error in relation to ISIS was encouraging them in the earlier years of their development in order, pretty much, to make his regime look good in comparison. After all, how can he show his importance in the world fight against terrorism if there aren’t any terrorists around to fight? Assad assisted ISIS by letting its members train in Syria, travel freely through the Syria/Iraq border and sometimes by coordinating military attacks with ISIS while their movement was still growing.
Assad adopted his policy towards ISIS despite his being a Shi’ite and hence their natural enemy, given ISIS’s belief that Shi’ites are heretics whose killing can be justified on religious grounds In doing so, as the books says, Assad may now be suffering from the worst case of ever seen.
The book puts forward a good case that ISIS is, in many senses, a replay of Saddam Hussein with extra religious baggage to help distinguish themselves from his secular Baathist regime. Most of the senior leadership of ISIS is comprised of ex-Baathists, which is one reason they are so successful raising money and organising among the Sunni tribes. The Baathists who now head up ISIS were responsible for oil smuggling routes and similar covert action when the worked for Hussein. Also, like Hussein, ISIS powerbase is in the Sunni tribes; like Hussein ISIS, are uncompromising totalitarians. What more sensationalist reporting ignores but the book makes clear is that - along with the more insane aspects of their rule - ISIS had, at least to begin with, brought some order to the region by establishing a modicum of civil infrastructure, relief from fighting and sharia courts and similar. Almost a return to the good old, pre-invasion days of Hussein.
What are we to make of the neo-conservatives who orchestrated this mess?
I am still left speechless at the utter stupidity of the idiots who believed that - as a result of bombing, invading and occupying Iraq - US troops would somehow be welcomed as friends. What were they thinking? Had they never read a book? Could they not have ordered any history of the Middle East from amazon.com and spent a few evenings reading it so inevitably coming to the conclusion that their ideas were utterly insane? I am always prepared to credit a lot of what goes on to the raw power of human stupidity rather than malice, greed or other evil intentions. But could the neo-conservatives really be this stupid? It’s difficult to tell.
So where are we now?
- Fighting on the Shi’ite side: Assad, Russia, Iran, Iraqi government (more or less), various rebel groups fighting Assad.
- Fighting on the Sunni side: ISIS, Turkey, Saudi Arabia; various rebel groups fighting Assad.
- Fighting, but not sure whose side they are on: US, UK, France.
- Fighting for their lives: the Kurds; the populations of Iraq and Syria who want to be left to carry on their lives in peace.
And what of the future? We now have a small region of the earth’s surface filled with bombs being dropped, guns being shot and and missiles being launched by a whole range of trigger happy gun-slingers (including more than one Hitler admirer) who bear a whole of grudges against each other. The targets these bombs, bullets or missiles are going to hit are increasingly a matter of random chance, as Turkey and Russia have already demonstrated. This situation does not bode well for the future, even before we think of the utter devastation of the homes and lives of the people trying to live under all this.
My guess would be that the ISIS controlled areas will remain a battleground for years to come. The ISIS genie is out of the bottle and will be very difficult to bomb back in, especially given there is little appetite to put neutral troops on the ground who might be able to at least slow down the madness. Look at Afghanistan and ask yourself, why should it be any different?
To my mind the real risk is that the dispute expands into a larger Sunni-Shi’ite conflict destabilizing the rest of the Middle East. My biggest worry here would be Saudi Arabia descending into chaos as a result of escalating social and economic problems and increasing belligerence in the rest of the Middle East. That would also not end well.
There is little doubt about it. In decades to come historians will look on Gulf War II as the biggest error in the history of US foreign policy by a large margin. And let’s not forget the culpability of fools like Blair who, in his case apparently on advice from God, were stupid enough to go along with it.
So maybe it was my Grandmother who made me think that the plans of US neo-conservatives to bomb the Iraqis into a state of western democracy would never work. Surely such bombing would do no more than create a new generation of terrorists, just like my grandmother would have been if Germany had won the war? (She was a very strong minded woman). Except that this next generation of terrorists would, quite understandably, be even more radical and hate-filled than the last.
But was I really clever enough to work all this out on my own? Or is my subconscious just tricking me into believing a certain expertise in international relations? Most of the western media supported Gulf War II, but might there have been dissenting voices that I now remember as my own? Let’s take a look:
Bernie Sanders seems to have got it about right in this speech made the day after bombing commenced in Gulf War I:
“Despite the fact that we are now aligned with such Middle Eastern dictatorships such as Syria, a terrorist dictatorship, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, feudalistic dictatorships, and Egypt, a one-party state that receives seven billion dollars in debt forgiveness to wage this war with us, I believe that in the long run, the action unleashed last night will go strongly against our interests in the Middle East. Clearly the United States and allies will win this war, but the death and destruction caused, will in my opinion, not be forgotten by the poor people of the Third World and the people of the Middle East in particular. ...
I fear that one day we will regret that decision and that we are in fact laying the ground-work for more and more wars for years to come�.�
Bernie goes to prove what we all knew already, that he is the only US presidential candidate with any foresight or independent powers of analysis. But can we find a more accurate prediction of the outcome of Gulf War II?
We can. The . Here is what they had to say about Gulf War II a few days after military hostilities commenced:
�...This war will not put an end to anti-Americanism; it will fan the flames of hatred even higher... And it will not lay the groundwork for the flourishing of democracy throughout the Mideast; it will harden the resolve of Arab states to drive out all Western (i.e. U.S.) influence.
If you thought Osama bin Laden was bad, just wait until the countless children who become orphaned by U.S. bombs in the coming weeks are all grown up. Do you think they will forget what country dropped the bombs that killed their parents? In 10 or 15 years, we will look back fondly on the days when there were only a few thousand Middle Easterners dedicated to destroying the U.S. and willing to die for the fundamentalist cause. From this war, a million bin Ladens will bloom.
And what exactly is our endgame here? Do we really believe that we can install Gen. Tommy Franks as the ruler of Iraq? Is our arrogance and hubris so great that we actually believe that a U.S. provisional military regime will be welcomed with open arms by the Iraqi people? Democracy cannot possibly thrive under coercion. To take over a country and impose one's own system of government without regard for the people of that country is the very antithesis of democracy. And it is doomed to fail.
A war against Iraq is not only morally wrong, it will be an unmitigated disaster…�
For the sake of balance The Onion included an opposing viewpoint in their article, which was also the view promulgated by most of the mainstream media at the time, namely:
�...You're getting worked up over nothing. Everything is going to be fine. So just relax, okay? You're really overreacting..�.
Seriously though, it’s a sad day for US journalism when an article in The Onion is a more reliable source of analysis than .
The Onion was spot on and as an occasional reader I may have subconsciously adopted their view. However it is still worth looking at the details of how the current disaster in the Syria and Iraq developed to help assess how things may go in the future . This work is an excellent starting point to understanding how events moved on from the days of Bush’s pathetic “Mission Accomplished� to the fulfillment of The Onion’s well thought out and tragically correct prediction.
Despite the somewhat lurid title, “ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror� is not sensationalist but rather a serious journalist work with a great deal of information about the early history of ISIS and its precursor groups in Syria and Iraq. The main actors in this story are the governments of Syria, Iraq and Iran, Al Qaeda, Sunni and Shi’ite communities across those countries and the various individuals opposing or acting in their name.
The main thesis of the book is illustrated by this diagram which recently appeared in The New York Times. It is a diagram showing the distribution of Sunni, Shi’ite and mixed areas of Baghdad in 2005 and 2007.
You will notice that in 2007 there are far fewer mixed areas and far more areas that are purely Sunni or Shi’ite. This diagram is evidence of the increasing sectarian split between Sunni and Shi’ite that was first broken open by the coalition invasion and US attempts at regime change. This split - which is fundamentally a political rather than a religious divide; religion plays a very secondary role here - was fed by the favoritism and patronage of al-Maliki, the first post invasion Prime Minister of Iraq, and by the meddling of other Shi’ite sponsors - Assad in Syria and Iran - all made possible by the invasion. Based on this book I would tag al-Maliki as a rarely recognised villain in this story for his Shi’ite partisanship and for his betrayal of the Sunni moslems who did try and stand up to extremism.
The Sunni-Shi’ite sectarian split started to show signs of widening to a dangerous level with the first round of democratic elections in Iraq which were boycotted by most of the Sunni population amid concerns that the majority Shi’ite government, once elected, would be biased against the Sunni. This concern seem to have been borne out in practice.
In this early post invasion period the main activity of the founders of ISIS was shit-stirring. Al Qaeda in Iraq at that time behaved like the younger kids in a playground looking for attention while the bigger boys are having a fight. Tragically their shit-stirring was very successful, promoting the sectarian split through the bombing of important Shi’ite shrines and Iraqi government targets and helping raise their profile as a possible Sunni opposition.
The heroic but ultimately tragic people who emerged in this period were the Sunni individuals who responded to requests from the US occupiers to oppose the al Qaeda style terrorist groups and help enforce law and order in the Sunni areas, mainly in the provinces to the west of Baghdad extending to the Syrian and Jordanian borders. Governments of countries that participated in Gulf War II have betrayed these people and for that we should truly feel shame and regret.
By this time much of the Sunni population in Iraq was sick and tired of al Qaeda and other assorted jihadis, who were often foreign, running around setting bombs or dictating to them in their homes. The Sunni groups that stood up to the extremists were the main reason for the success of the US “surge�; extra US troops had far less to do with it. However these people were let down by al-Maliki’s government as soon as the US forces departed. They received no support so were exposed to revenge from the terrorist groups; their wages were unpaid; they were abandoned. In due course they would be victims of ISIS or, if they were lucky, end up joining them.
Iran played and must continue to play a key role in the crisis, mainly through supporting Shi’ite groups including the Iraqi government under al-Maliki and the Shi’ite Syrian state under Assad. This support comes from mainly from Iran sponsored proxy groups such as Hizbollah or Hamas.
My reading of Assad from the book is that he is one part ruthless dictator to nine parts fool. His main error in relation to ISIS was encouraging them in the earlier years of their development in order, pretty much, to make his regime look good in comparison. After all, how can he show his importance in the world fight against terrorism if there aren’t any terrorists around to fight? Assad assisted ISIS by letting its members train in Syria, travel freely through the Syria/Iraq border and sometimes by coordinating military attacks with ISIS while their movement was still growing.
Assad adopted his policy towards ISIS despite his being a Shi’ite and hence their natural enemy, given ISIS’s belief that Shi’ites are heretics whose killing can be justified on religious grounds In doing so, as the books says, Assad may now be suffering from the worst case of ever seen.
The book puts forward a good case that ISIS is, in many senses, a replay of Saddam Hussein with extra religious baggage to help distinguish themselves from his secular Baathist regime. Most of the senior leadership of ISIS is comprised of ex-Baathists, which is one reason they are so successful raising money and organising among the Sunni tribes. The Baathists who now head up ISIS were responsible for oil smuggling routes and similar covert action when the worked for Hussein. Also, like Hussein, ISIS powerbase is in the Sunni tribes; like Hussein ISIS, are uncompromising totalitarians. What more sensationalist reporting ignores but the book makes clear is that - along with the more insane aspects of their rule - ISIS had, at least to begin with, brought some order to the region by establishing a modicum of civil infrastructure, relief from fighting and sharia courts and similar. Almost a return to the good old, pre-invasion days of Hussein.
What are we to make of the neo-conservatives who orchestrated this mess?
I am still left speechless at the utter stupidity of the idiots who believed that - as a result of bombing, invading and occupying Iraq - US troops would somehow be welcomed as friends. What were they thinking? Had they never read a book? Could they not have ordered any history of the Middle East from amazon.com and spent a few evenings reading it so inevitably coming to the conclusion that their ideas were utterly insane? I am always prepared to credit a lot of what goes on to the raw power of human stupidity rather than malice, greed or other evil intentions. But could the neo-conservatives really be this stupid? It’s difficult to tell.
So where are we now?
- Fighting on the Shi’ite side: Assad, Russia, Iran, Iraqi government (more or less), various rebel groups fighting Assad.
- Fighting on the Sunni side: ISIS, Turkey, Saudi Arabia; various rebel groups fighting Assad.
- Fighting, but not sure whose side they are on: US, UK, France.
- Fighting for their lives: the Kurds; the populations of Iraq and Syria who want to be left to carry on their lives in peace.
And what of the future? We now have a small region of the earth’s surface filled with bombs being dropped, guns being shot and and missiles being launched by a whole range of trigger happy gun-slingers (including more than one Hitler admirer) who bear a whole of grudges against each other. The targets these bombs, bullets or missiles are going to hit are increasingly a matter of random chance, as Turkey and Russia have already demonstrated. This situation does not bode well for the future, even before we think of the utter devastation of the homes and lives of the people trying to live under all this.
My guess would be that the ISIS controlled areas will remain a battleground for years to come. The ISIS genie is out of the bottle and will be very difficult to bomb back in, especially given there is little appetite to put neutral troops on the ground who might be able to at least slow down the madness. Look at Afghanistan and ask yourself, why should it be any different?
To my mind the real risk is that the dispute expands into a larger Sunni-Shi’ite conflict destabilizing the rest of the Middle East. My biggest worry here would be Saudi Arabia descending into chaos as a result of escalating social and economic problems and increasing belligerence in the rest of the Middle East. That would also not end well.
There is little doubt about it. In decades to come historians will look on Gulf War II as the biggest error in the history of US foreign policy by a large margin. And let’s not forget the culpability of fools like Blair who, in his case apparently on advice from God, were stupid enough to go along with it.
June 14, 2015
This is a tale of two halves, really. It's a complicated book, for starters. I don't suggest jumping right into it without any pre-existing knowledge on the question. I suggest watching Frontline's documentary LOSING IRAQ first, in order to help you gain an understanding on the key point of why ISIS came to exist. The first half of ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR is a treasure of information on how the convergence of Salafism and Baathism, and the opportunism of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi creates this well-organized movement that spread like wildfire. The problem about this book is more centered around the insights surrounding the inner workings of ISIS.
There is only a couple pages about their inner economy and close to zilch about their advanced logistic, which are some of the most fascinating/terrifying aspects of the group. The insight about recruiting is also vague and anecdotal. I mean, we all know ISIS is using social media to reach out to people, but what people want to know is how and what exactly their are saying to young people to convince them to embark on such a ghastly journey. The historical perspective of ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR is captivating, but it spends a lot of time discussing something nobody fully understands as of today.
There is only a couple pages about their inner economy and close to zilch about their advanced logistic, which are some of the most fascinating/terrifying aspects of the group. The insight about recruiting is also vague and anecdotal. I mean, we all know ISIS is using social media to reach out to people, but what people want to know is how and what exactly their are saying to young people to convince them to embark on such a ghastly journey. The historical perspective of ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR is captivating, but it spends a lot of time discussing something nobody fully understands as of today.
March 19, 2015
Each evening the nightly news seems to zero in on another story that relates to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). We are bombarded with border crossings into Syria from Turkey, the state of the effort by Iraqi forces to retake Tikrit, fears concerning Iran’s role in Iraq should ISIS finally be defeated, the capture of a former American Air Force veteran seized at the Turkish border and extradited to the United States, and yesterday’s brutal attack in Tunisia. This nightly visual obsession has produced a number of new books on the rise of ISIS and suggestions on how we should deal with them. One of the better or perhaps the best of this new genre, explaining ISIS, is Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan’s ISIS: INSIDE THE ARMY OF TERROR. The book is written in a very straight forward historical narrative that tries to explain how we have arrived where we are today in trying to understand current events and how they relate to the last decade of American foreign policy in the Middle East.
The narrative traces the evolution of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) into the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) under the leadership of Abu Musa al-Zarqawi until his death in 2006 by an American air strike. It continues its discussion by zeroing in on the schism that develops between al-Qaeda and the emergence of ISI over strategy in the sectarian civil war in Iraq, and integrates events in Syria that will culminate in the movement to overthrow Bashir al-Assad. What stands out in Weiss and Hassan’s effort is their analysis of how the current situations in Iraq and Syria came to be, and what role the United States and Iran played. The rise of ISI is directly linked to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and American support for the Shi’a politician, Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister. The authors repeatedly point out that Iraqi Sunnis hoped to be treated fairly by the government in Baghdad. After the United States invaded Iraq, American decision makers fired Sunni bureaucrats, dismissed the Sunni dominated Ba’athist Party, and disbanded the Iraqi military, leaving Sunnis unemployed, and when Shi’a politicians, like Maliki did not deliver on their promises, very bitter. As Iran’s influence in Baghdad increased many Sunnis, particularly former policeman and military officers under Saddam Hussein turned to ISI. The authors provide details how Maliki became Prime Minister and his negative impact on creating a unified Iraq. The authors also delve into the rise of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the supreme leader of ISIS and his split with al-Qaeda, a major schism for the jihadi universe.
The authors provide an depth analysis of the civil war that broke out in Syria in February, 2011. Weiss and Hassan make a number of important points that allows the reader to understand the complex political situation that exists and how it came about. Once the revolution gained a foothold it seems Assad’s strategy was to terrorize Syrian Sunnis so they would become radicalized and join the forces that sought to overthrow him. He wanted to create a situation where Alawites (Shi’a sect that Assad belongs to that made up 8-15% of the country’s population) and Christians felt endangered. By so doing he hoped to show the world that he was a victim of terrorists who wanted to overthrow his government. The groups that opposed Assad believed that his blatant use of chemical weapons, rape, and bombing of civilians would be enough to gain substantial support from the west, but this was not to be. The result was that the only means of support came from Iran. In fact, the authors argue that “Syria is occupied by the Iranian regime.� Assad doesn’t run the country, Qassem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds force is in charge. (140) It is Iran that is opposing ISIS (ISI became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in 2011 once the Syrian civil war began) in Iraq and Syria and policy makers in Washington must wonder what will happen once ISIS is defeated with the Quds Force in Syria, and Iranian Shi’a militias in Iraq. It seems that the Iran-Iraq of the 1980s is now being refought.
What separates Weiss and Hassan’s work from ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR by Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger another useful monograph that has also been recently published is that within its narrative it analyzes the role of the tribal networks in Iraq and Syria. They compare how Saddam and Assad dealt with Iraqi and Syrian tribal structure and organization, and how ISIS manipulated tribal influence in order to gain support. Stern and Berger take a different approach as they provide a narrative history of ISIS� terrorist methods, and the organization of civil society. Further, they devote a great deal of space to ISIS� use of technology in order to gain support and attract foreign fighters, but spend much less time on the rise of key personalities, jihadi organizations, and the interests of nation states. Weiss and Hassan touch on the role of psychology and technology, but not in as much detail as they concentrate on the political paradigm that has brought together the common interests of Iran and the United States in opposing ISIS, and at the same time an alliance between Assad and Teheran also exists. Weiss and Hassan offer useful explanations for how this obtuse situation was created. One of which seems somewhat convoluted but accurate. According to Weiss and Hassan the closer ISIS gets to conquer an area, the less religion plays a part in gaining public confidence. For most people joining ISIS is a political decision as Sunni Muslims feel they have nowhere else to turn. They see the world as one between a Sunni and Iranian coalition. They believe that extreme violence is needed to counter the coming Shi’a hegemony. They feel under assault from Assad, Khamenei (Supreme leader of Iran), and Maliki (who was finally ousted six months ago) and are left with few options other than supporting al-Baghdadi’s new Caliphate. In their epilogue Weiss and Hassan paint a sobering picture of what the future holds. They examine the massive US bombing campaign that seems to have offered mixed results, and Sunni anger over what appears to be an American administration that is indirectly supporting Assad’s reign of terror from Damascus. They conclude that more than eleven years after the United States invaded Iraq, a deadly insurgency adept at multiple forms of warfare has proved resilient, adaptable, and resolved to carry on fighting.� (242) ISIS appears to have tremendous staying power and the sources of revenue to maintain their quest, not a very optimistic picture.
If you enjoy well written narrative history based on numerous interviews including Iraqi, Syrian, American, and Iranian politicians; as well as military observers, foreign fighters and other jihadis then you cannot go wrong with Weiss and Hassan’s new book. If you want less of a historical narrative and are interested in more of a socio-psychological study you might find Stern and Berger’s work be more satisfying. The bottom line is that you cannot go wrong with either work.
The narrative traces the evolution of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) into the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) under the leadership of Abu Musa al-Zarqawi until his death in 2006 by an American air strike. It continues its discussion by zeroing in on the schism that develops between al-Qaeda and the emergence of ISI over strategy in the sectarian civil war in Iraq, and integrates events in Syria that will culminate in the movement to overthrow Bashir al-Assad. What stands out in Weiss and Hassan’s effort is their analysis of how the current situations in Iraq and Syria came to be, and what role the United States and Iran played. The rise of ISI is directly linked to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and American support for the Shi’a politician, Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister. The authors repeatedly point out that Iraqi Sunnis hoped to be treated fairly by the government in Baghdad. After the United States invaded Iraq, American decision makers fired Sunni bureaucrats, dismissed the Sunni dominated Ba’athist Party, and disbanded the Iraqi military, leaving Sunnis unemployed, and when Shi’a politicians, like Maliki did not deliver on their promises, very bitter. As Iran’s influence in Baghdad increased many Sunnis, particularly former policeman and military officers under Saddam Hussein turned to ISI. The authors provide details how Maliki became Prime Minister and his negative impact on creating a unified Iraq. The authors also delve into the rise of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the supreme leader of ISIS and his split with al-Qaeda, a major schism for the jihadi universe.
The authors provide an depth analysis of the civil war that broke out in Syria in February, 2011. Weiss and Hassan make a number of important points that allows the reader to understand the complex political situation that exists and how it came about. Once the revolution gained a foothold it seems Assad’s strategy was to terrorize Syrian Sunnis so they would become radicalized and join the forces that sought to overthrow him. He wanted to create a situation where Alawites (Shi’a sect that Assad belongs to that made up 8-15% of the country’s population) and Christians felt endangered. By so doing he hoped to show the world that he was a victim of terrorists who wanted to overthrow his government. The groups that opposed Assad believed that his blatant use of chemical weapons, rape, and bombing of civilians would be enough to gain substantial support from the west, but this was not to be. The result was that the only means of support came from Iran. In fact, the authors argue that “Syria is occupied by the Iranian regime.� Assad doesn’t run the country, Qassem Soleimani, head of Iran’s Quds force is in charge. (140) It is Iran that is opposing ISIS (ISI became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in 2011 once the Syrian civil war began) in Iraq and Syria and policy makers in Washington must wonder what will happen once ISIS is defeated with the Quds Force in Syria, and Iranian Shi’a militias in Iraq. It seems that the Iran-Iraq of the 1980s is now being refought.
What separates Weiss and Hassan’s work from ISIS: THE STATE OF TERROR by Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger another useful monograph that has also been recently published is that within its narrative it analyzes the role of the tribal networks in Iraq and Syria. They compare how Saddam and Assad dealt with Iraqi and Syrian tribal structure and organization, and how ISIS manipulated tribal influence in order to gain support. Stern and Berger take a different approach as they provide a narrative history of ISIS� terrorist methods, and the organization of civil society. Further, they devote a great deal of space to ISIS� use of technology in order to gain support and attract foreign fighters, but spend much less time on the rise of key personalities, jihadi organizations, and the interests of nation states. Weiss and Hassan touch on the role of psychology and technology, but not in as much detail as they concentrate on the political paradigm that has brought together the common interests of Iran and the United States in opposing ISIS, and at the same time an alliance between Assad and Teheran also exists. Weiss and Hassan offer useful explanations for how this obtuse situation was created. One of which seems somewhat convoluted but accurate. According to Weiss and Hassan the closer ISIS gets to conquer an area, the less religion plays a part in gaining public confidence. For most people joining ISIS is a political decision as Sunni Muslims feel they have nowhere else to turn. They see the world as one between a Sunni and Iranian coalition. They believe that extreme violence is needed to counter the coming Shi’a hegemony. They feel under assault from Assad, Khamenei (Supreme leader of Iran), and Maliki (who was finally ousted six months ago) and are left with few options other than supporting al-Baghdadi’s new Caliphate. In their epilogue Weiss and Hassan paint a sobering picture of what the future holds. They examine the massive US bombing campaign that seems to have offered mixed results, and Sunni anger over what appears to be an American administration that is indirectly supporting Assad’s reign of terror from Damascus. They conclude that more than eleven years after the United States invaded Iraq, a deadly insurgency adept at multiple forms of warfare has proved resilient, adaptable, and resolved to carry on fighting.� (242) ISIS appears to have tremendous staying power and the sources of revenue to maintain their quest, not a very optimistic picture.
If you enjoy well written narrative history based on numerous interviews including Iraqi, Syrian, American, and Iranian politicians; as well as military observers, foreign fighters and other jihadis then you cannot go wrong with Weiss and Hassan’s new book. If you want less of a historical narrative and are interested in more of a socio-psychological study you might find Stern and Berger’s work be more satisfying. The bottom line is that you cannot go wrong with either work.
April 13, 2015
Good book if someone is looking for history of ISIS and how it runs it's caliphate project. The first half contains a lot of good information on why USA failed in Iraq and how ISIS used that for their gain. There's a long one sided section on Syria and how it's Assad fault that ISIS reigns there. I'm by no means an Assad fan, but every suicide bomber against Assad is an Inside Job, or that he secretly runs ISIS? The western part, and by that i mean USA part, in this whole mess gets very little page time.
Authors actually interviewed ISIS members, but the results didn't add much to an insight why someone joins a group that cuts little girls heads or throws gays from high towers, and so on. And in the end, i still wasn't sure about the goals and what's really driving ISIS. A much better book on this subject: .
Authors actually interviewed ISIS members, but the results didn't add much to an insight why someone joins a group that cuts little girls heads or throws gays from high towers, and so on. And in the end, i still wasn't sure about the goals and what's really driving ISIS. A much better book on this subject: .
March 17, 2015
This book offers some useful insights into the operation of ISIS, as well as its origins. Particularly of interest were a few interviews the authors were able to conduct with current and former ISIS members, or people who lived in ISIS territory. Given the necessarily rushed nature of the book its not exactly a stunning literary achievement or particularly enjoyable to read, but it serves a utilitarian purpose of describing the mechanics of the group in a way which is somewhat useful. ISIS is opaque in a lot of ways so whatever pierces the veil a little bit is good. One thing of note was the conspicuously benign way in which American influence in Iraq is portrayed, contrasted with the singularly malevolent role of Iran - you almost get the sense the authors are saying all America's good intentions and actions were simply sullied by outside intervention, which is an ironic characterization. I recommend reading this book but doing so with a critical eye to sources and perspectives.
November 28, 2015
One of the problems with writing about ISIS is how quickly things change. This book certainly doesn't fall into the “hastily cobbled together to cash inâ€� category: but reading about the Charlie Hebdo killings in a book that was released only a few weeks afterwards is still rather odd. And the ability to do so belies the main problem I had with the book —Ìýit's mostly just plain factual reporting. I'm very far from expert in this area, so there was a lot of new information to me, but I was constantly struggling to piece it all together into anything coherent.
In that regard, I found The Atlantic's feature much better. I came away from that thinking I understood the issue better, rather than simply having more facts. Yes, it oversimplifies at times, and gets a few things wrong (Think Progress, for example, have ), but I'd recommend reading that article first, and then following it with a book like this only if you want a deeper factual background.
In that regard, I found The Atlantic's feature much better. I came away from that thinking I understood the issue better, rather than simply having more facts. Yes, it oversimplifies at times, and gets a few things wrong (Think Progress, for example, have ), but I'd recommend reading that article first, and then following it with a book like this only if you want a deeper factual background.
April 5, 2016
A common misconception amongst many who discuss ISIL - be it the press, politicians, or otherwise - is the idea that the organisation sprung out of no where; or at least, that it is fairly nascent. This is a direct result of the western media eschewing the consequences of military intervention in the Iraq war, and the subsequent marginalisation of Iraqi Sunni Muslims.
We begin with events that even precede the second gulf war. The first chapter introduces us to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the now-deceased Jordanian al-Qaida agent who was too extreme for even Bin Laden. For the first 100 pages, we are taken through the evolution of Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the patronage of Zarqawi. We come to understand that the group flourished when the post-Saddam Iraqi government sidelined the Sunni community and espoused sectarian tensions, all with the knowledge of the U.S.A.
What is interesting is that the elite of AQI (and indeed ISIL today) comprise mainly of erstwhile secular Ba'athists who had benefited under the despotic Saddam regime. More interestingly perhaps are the links between the Iranian government and Al-Qaida, who, on the face of things, are sworn enemies. Nonetheless, the book tells us that Iran owes a lot to Al Qaida, and the former has been a place to where insurgents from AQ have fled.
The rest of the book takes us further to the organisation's involvement in Syria, whence it became known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (and eventually just 'The Islamic State'). Its involvement in Syria is shown to be as a result of the group opportunistically filling in the vacuum left by the world's inaction in Syria, coupled with the corruption of some of the rebel groups.
That ISIL has been met with little resistance in some areas of Iraq is shown to be as a result of the former treatment of the Sunni tribes who carried out the Sahwa/awakening. When the tribes previously attacked AQI, the Iraqi government marginalised them, refused to pay them and in some cases even arrested those who had fought the extremists.
ISIL and Assad have a symbiotic relationship with one another; neither are each other's primary targets, with them both focusing their attentions on the rebels. For example, Abu Qaqa, an extremist and hateful preacher, was given free reign to recruit in Aleppo. Although not revealed in the book, he was assassinated shortly after alluding in an interview with Al Arabiya that he worked for the Syrian intelligence services. Even when the Assad government did eventually shell ISIL in Raqqah, it focused its munitions on civilians, and only shelled ISIL targets once the building had been evacuated. This was done to create a ruse and convince the world that Assad was engaging in efforts against ISIL, while the reality was to detract away from the regime's barrel bombing and other atrocities. Even fighters loyal to Assad have despaired at the regime's lack of action towards IS.
Other opposition groups, aside from Jabhet Al-Nusra, get little mention. While the authors do not mention the success of some current liberated areas in Syria that are ruled over by rebel factions, such as in Idleb, they do point to the successful self-governing of certain communities in Al-Bab and Minbej prior to ISIL's occupation, redolent of the days when FSA fighters would engage with their communities and help pick rubbish off the streets.
The book also exposes the guileful tactics of the Assad regime in helping to further their claims. By avoiding ISIL targets, they essentially helped to "[tar] all insurgents as extremists." Moreover, intelligence has shown that there are more foreign fighters assisting Assad than there are of other groups, including reinforcements from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Quds force, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias, among others. The manpower of the Solaimani's Quds force in Syria alone is quoted as being as many as 100,000, owing to the exhaustion of the Syrian Arab Army.
Furthermore, not only do the upper ranks of ISIL consist of former Iraqi Ba'athists, but also of the very same 'political prisoners' released under Assad's general amnesty in 2011, in order to radicalise the opposition. Many of these were given cross-border access during the Iraq war, with evidences listed indicting the Assad regime in destabilising the region next door and actually helping with training/supplying these very same terrorists with munitions.
If you approach this book with little background on the topic, you might find yourself flabbergasted by the depth of the content. Particularly during the earlier chapters on Iraq, I found myself constantly referring back to persons/groups previously mentioned. Further to this, the writers use an esoteric style of writing; there were quite a few references that I had to look up, and although it did not disrupt the flow of information, it did slow my reading.
Among the issues I had with the book include its portrayal of what does or does not constitute an extremist Muslim. On more than one occasion, the writers allude to extremists by whether or not they pray or grow a beard, and non extremists are described in terms of drinking alcohol and having girlfriends. They also fail to recognise Syria's religious make-up, most of which is Sufi-leaning and generally repudiates the creed espoused by ISIL, in addition to the role local imams have had in refuting the legitimacy of the Islamic state.
Another issue I had was that the USA's role in Iraq is glossed over; while the authors do acknowledge that they failed in the role of being a non-partisan arbiter following Saddam's ousting, they do not put the bulk of the culpability of Iraq's destabilisation as being directly linked to their actions in the country, and that they were responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. They alienated Sunnis through supporting a replacement despotic regime and failing to support/engage with those who carried out the Sahwa. Iran is rightfully exposed for its imperialistic ambitions in the region on a sectarian level, but the USA is not afforded the same level of criticism.
While I have given this book only 3 stars, I would still recommend it as a great reference source for the discourse on ISIL, particularly as there is a massive void of credible information relating to the dubious origins of this hateful organisation.
We begin with events that even precede the second gulf war. The first chapter introduces us to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the now-deceased Jordanian al-Qaida agent who was too extreme for even Bin Laden. For the first 100 pages, we are taken through the evolution of Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the patronage of Zarqawi. We come to understand that the group flourished when the post-Saddam Iraqi government sidelined the Sunni community and espoused sectarian tensions, all with the knowledge of the U.S.A.
What is interesting is that the elite of AQI (and indeed ISIL today) comprise mainly of erstwhile secular Ba'athists who had benefited under the despotic Saddam regime. More interestingly perhaps are the links between the Iranian government and Al-Qaida, who, on the face of things, are sworn enemies. Nonetheless, the book tells us that Iran owes a lot to Al Qaida, and the former has been a place to where insurgents from AQ have fled.
The rest of the book takes us further to the organisation's involvement in Syria, whence it became known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (and eventually just 'The Islamic State'). Its involvement in Syria is shown to be as a result of the group opportunistically filling in the vacuum left by the world's inaction in Syria, coupled with the corruption of some of the rebel groups.
That ISIL has been met with little resistance in some areas of Iraq is shown to be as a result of the former treatment of the Sunni tribes who carried out the Sahwa/awakening. When the tribes previously attacked AQI, the Iraqi government marginalised them, refused to pay them and in some cases even arrested those who had fought the extremists.
ISIL and Assad have a symbiotic relationship with one another; neither are each other's primary targets, with them both focusing their attentions on the rebels. For example, Abu Qaqa, an extremist and hateful preacher, was given free reign to recruit in Aleppo. Although not revealed in the book, he was assassinated shortly after alluding in an interview with Al Arabiya that he worked for the Syrian intelligence services. Even when the Assad government did eventually shell ISIL in Raqqah, it focused its munitions on civilians, and only shelled ISIL targets once the building had been evacuated. This was done to create a ruse and convince the world that Assad was engaging in efforts against ISIL, while the reality was to detract away from the regime's barrel bombing and other atrocities. Even fighters loyal to Assad have despaired at the regime's lack of action towards IS.
Other opposition groups, aside from Jabhet Al-Nusra, get little mention. While the authors do not mention the success of some current liberated areas in Syria that are ruled over by rebel factions, such as in Idleb, they do point to the successful self-governing of certain communities in Al-Bab and Minbej prior to ISIL's occupation, redolent of the days when FSA fighters would engage with their communities and help pick rubbish off the streets.
The book also exposes the guileful tactics of the Assad regime in helping to further their claims. By avoiding ISIL targets, they essentially helped to "[tar] all insurgents as extremists." Moreover, intelligence has shown that there are more foreign fighters assisting Assad than there are of other groups, including reinforcements from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Quds force, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias, among others. The manpower of the Solaimani's Quds force in Syria alone is quoted as being as many as 100,000, owing to the exhaustion of the Syrian Arab Army.
Furthermore, not only do the upper ranks of ISIL consist of former Iraqi Ba'athists, but also of the very same 'political prisoners' released under Assad's general amnesty in 2011, in order to radicalise the opposition. Many of these were given cross-border access during the Iraq war, with evidences listed indicting the Assad regime in destabilising the region next door and actually helping with training/supplying these very same terrorists with munitions.
If you approach this book with little background on the topic, you might find yourself flabbergasted by the depth of the content. Particularly during the earlier chapters on Iraq, I found myself constantly referring back to persons/groups previously mentioned. Further to this, the writers use an esoteric style of writing; there were quite a few references that I had to look up, and although it did not disrupt the flow of information, it did slow my reading.
Among the issues I had with the book include its portrayal of what does or does not constitute an extremist Muslim. On more than one occasion, the writers allude to extremists by whether or not they pray or grow a beard, and non extremists are described in terms of drinking alcohol and having girlfriends. They also fail to recognise Syria's religious make-up, most of which is Sufi-leaning and generally repudiates the creed espoused by ISIL, in addition to the role local imams have had in refuting the legitimacy of the Islamic state.
Another issue I had was that the USA's role in Iraq is glossed over; while the authors do acknowledge that they failed in the role of being a non-partisan arbiter following Saddam's ousting, they do not put the bulk of the culpability of Iraq's destabilisation as being directly linked to their actions in the country, and that they were responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. They alienated Sunnis through supporting a replacement despotic regime and failing to support/engage with those who carried out the Sahwa. Iran is rightfully exposed for its imperialistic ambitions in the region on a sectarian level, but the USA is not afforded the same level of criticism.
While I have given this book only 3 stars, I would still recommend it as a great reference source for the discourse on ISIL, particularly as there is a massive void of credible information relating to the dubious origins of this hateful organisation.
May 26, 2016
This very recent (February 2015) book about the development and scope of ISIS really made me realize how little I actually know not only about what is going on now with ISIS, but about the history of the US's involvement in the Middle East. Very well researched and filled with detail - the authors even interviewed current members of ISIS as well as people living in ISIS controlled areas - I was left desperate for a map and a glossary to help me keep everything and everyone straight.
Some of the conclusions of the book were not surprising - most of what the US has done has just strengthened ISIS resolve and helped recruit not only Sunni to the cause but an amazing number of people from around the world. "tactical victory for the US was rendered strategically negligible because of the enormous propaganda boon it delivered to the insurgency" Also not surprising, economic and political disenfranchisement makes people much more susceptible to follow extremists - unemployment in Mosul was 75% when ISIS invaded in June 2014 and quickly took control.
Some things were surprising - the extent to which US prisons were used as training grounds and recruitment centers for ISIS. Makes me think about the extent to which prisons in the US function the same way for the mafia and gangs. I was surprised by how organized and extensive ISIS is - how effectively they train recruits, how successful their propaganda is.
In the end it is terrifying to realize "ISIS has destroyed the boundaries of contemporary nation-states and proclaimed itself the restorer of a lost Islamic state." That they see an "end of days" battle between good and evil, and an end of that nation-state. Certainly political systems have evolved throughout history and pre-history - it is not crazy to think the nation-state will be replaced by other systems. But scary to think of it happening in this manner. A friend I am reading this with (:-) told me of an article in the Washington Post that intriguingly explored the idea of redrawing the boundaries along ethno-religious lines instead of the post WW1 boundaries drawn by Western European colonial interests. How much of the strife in the Middle East and in the continent of Africa might have been avoided (or could be avoided) without the crazy colonial land grabs and nation-state building without regard to existing peoples and tribes. This seems like a most reasonable suggestion, and perhaps the only solution to what otherwise looks like an endless and devastating war.
Some of the conclusions of the book were not surprising - most of what the US has done has just strengthened ISIS resolve and helped recruit not only Sunni to the cause but an amazing number of people from around the world. "tactical victory for the US was rendered strategically negligible because of the enormous propaganda boon it delivered to the insurgency" Also not surprising, economic and political disenfranchisement makes people much more susceptible to follow extremists - unemployment in Mosul was 75% when ISIS invaded in June 2014 and quickly took control.
Some things were surprising - the extent to which US prisons were used as training grounds and recruitment centers for ISIS. Makes me think about the extent to which prisons in the US function the same way for the mafia and gangs. I was surprised by how organized and extensive ISIS is - how effectively they train recruits, how successful their propaganda is.
In the end it is terrifying to realize "ISIS has destroyed the boundaries of contemporary nation-states and proclaimed itself the restorer of a lost Islamic state." That they see an "end of days" battle between good and evil, and an end of that nation-state. Certainly political systems have evolved throughout history and pre-history - it is not crazy to think the nation-state will be replaced by other systems. But scary to think of it happening in this manner. A friend I am reading this with (:-) told me of an article in the Washington Post that intriguingly explored the idea of redrawing the boundaries along ethno-religious lines instead of the post WW1 boundaries drawn by Western European colonial interests. How much of the strife in the Middle East and in the continent of Africa might have been avoided (or could be avoided) without the crazy colonial land grabs and nation-state building without regard to existing peoples and tribes. This seems like a most reasonable suggestion, and perhaps the only solution to what otherwise looks like an endless and devastating war.
November 5, 2018
A well-researched and timely book (published in February, 2015) about the so-called "Islamic State", its history, economics and expansion... In particular, the chapters abıut the Baathists of Iraq inside the structure and its controversial relations with Bashar al-Assad are significant. However, focuses on the history of Syria-Iraq in post-Saddam period and reflects nearly nothing on historical, religious and eoconomic root-causes of the rise of Islamic radicalism in the region...
March 20, 2016
ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror is a very well researched history combined with first-hand accounts of the rise ISIS, its relationships with other states and groups in the region and throughout the world, along with insights into its motives, actions, and agendas.
If you're like me and not already particularly knowledgeable of Middle Eastern news and geography of the past 10+ years, you'll probably have some of the same struggles I did to keep up with all the names and places. If you can allow for some ambiguity though, the second half and final third of the book in particular are very well worth it. If you don't want the history, get the book just for the epilogue. The conclusions are harrowing.
Weiss concludes in part, that despite losing ground in places like Ramadi, ISIS is gaining ground elsewhere, even if it is not completely controlling the cities in a more traditional sense:
"ISIS continues to rule more or less uncontested in al-Bab, Minbij, Jarablous, Raqqa, southern Hasaka, Tal Afar, Qa’im, and outside the city center of Ramadi." ... "ISIS has compensated for its 10 percent territorial losses in Iraq by gaining 4 percent in Syria, though you wouldn’t know it to listen to US officials."
It's easy to think of ISIS as just a bunch of extreme Islamist fundamentalists, because on the surface that's pretty accurate. The more nuanced view is that ISIS members arrive with diverse motives and backgrounds. Some were displaced Ba'athist Iraqi's, others prison converts brought in by fellow charismatic Syrian inmates, and there are many who seem to have joined ISIS out of some type of expediency, hopelessness, or hopefulness. The resulting diversity has strengthened ISIS by bringing expert statesmen (of sorts), computer and weapons experts, PR and media manipulators, and not a few people with proper military backgrounds. Because of this diversity, ISIS often acts more as a state than a typical terrorist organization.
Despite this facade of legitimacy, ISIS is reprehensible in every way. It's an organization led by heartless murderers, torturers, and rapists as they so brazenly exhibit in their own propaganda. They are well-organized manipulators and terrorists in every sense of the word. They should be stopped. How to do this is unclear, but pacifism isn't an option. Understanding ISIS is not pleasant or rewarding but it is necessary, especially for those with political or military influence. This book should not be missed.
If you're like me and not already particularly knowledgeable of Middle Eastern news and geography of the past 10+ years, you'll probably have some of the same struggles I did to keep up with all the names and places. If you can allow for some ambiguity though, the second half and final third of the book in particular are very well worth it. If you don't want the history, get the book just for the epilogue. The conclusions are harrowing.
Weiss concludes in part, that despite losing ground in places like Ramadi, ISIS is gaining ground elsewhere, even if it is not completely controlling the cities in a more traditional sense:
"ISIS continues to rule more or less uncontested in al-Bab, Minbij, Jarablous, Raqqa, southern Hasaka, Tal Afar, Qa’im, and outside the city center of Ramadi." ... "ISIS has compensated for its 10 percent territorial losses in Iraq by gaining 4 percent in Syria, though you wouldn’t know it to listen to US officials."
“What’s amazing is how we keep making the same mistakes over and over again, in Iraq but also in the broader Middle East,� Ali Khedery told us. “I’ve seen senior American officials waste time tweeting about the number of air strikes. Who cares about these tactical developments? Sunnis are being radicalized at record proportions. A counterterrorism approach isn’t going to work with ISIS. We saw that in Iraq, and we’ll see it in Syria.�
It's easy to think of ISIS as just a bunch of extreme Islamist fundamentalists, because on the surface that's pretty accurate. The more nuanced view is that ISIS members arrive with diverse motives and backgrounds. Some were displaced Ba'athist Iraqi's, others prison converts brought in by fellow charismatic Syrian inmates, and there are many who seem to have joined ISIS out of some type of expediency, hopelessness, or hopefulness. The resulting diversity has strengthened ISIS by bringing expert statesmen (of sorts), computer and weapons experts, PR and media manipulators, and not a few people with proper military backgrounds. Because of this diversity, ISIS often acts more as a state than a typical terrorist organization.
Despite this facade of legitimacy, ISIS is reprehensible in every way. It's an organization led by heartless murderers, torturers, and rapists as they so brazenly exhibit in their own propaganda. They are well-organized manipulators and terrorists in every sense of the word. They should be stopped. How to do this is unclear, but pacifism isn't an option. Understanding ISIS is not pleasant or rewarding but it is necessary, especially for those with political or military influence. This book should not be missed.
December 6, 2015
This was NOT an easy read. This book, while VERY interesting, is not accessible to the layman or the politically ignorant. I found it difficult to grasp a lot of the geopolitical aspects of rival factions etc, being unfamiliar with the geographical and political structures of the middle east. This book is more for a person familiar with the territory, rival groups etc and politics as a means of overview of a complex subject: ISIS.
I could hardly tolerate the first half.BUT that was largely in part to my own ignorance on the subject I later realized. As I became slightly familiar with the groups, cities, political allegiences etc it became a much more interesting read, albeit still one with which I srruggled to comprehend. I resorted to university style underlining, circling, and such forth, as a means of analysing while reading. during the first half i simply tried reading it.
This book has still left me with a lot of confusion. BUT I feel I have a better undersranding of the conflicts than I did. Although... on the other hand.. this book gives the impression that THERE IS NO GROUP or governing entity that is good.. basically portrays just about everyone as bad... Assad, the many rebels, Turkey, Iraq. America, Iran... gives a sense of "there is no hope, the middle east is f%-$ed... oddly there is basically NO mention of Russia in this... hmm
One SERIOUS FAULT with the book is not including a glossary, as many political analysis books tend to do. Thus, as I read, it was difficult to retain in memory who was who, who was allied to who, and what all the acronyms stood for and whose side thw groups stood for under said acronyms. You really MUST have a list of acronyms.
Also, I have always hated end notes. If something is worth noting, put footnotes at the bottom of pages. No one wants to flip to the back of the book every few sentenced. As a university graduate, I have experienced this many times, and to this day I have no idea why publishers/authors do this so often. i suppose for aesthetics most likely.
This is worth a read, but only for someone looking for a complex academic account, not so much for the lay-person. The length of the book helps. had it been twice as long I may have given up, due to the laborious nature of reading and comprehending it. But... sometimes I like a challenge.
I could hardly tolerate the first half.BUT that was largely in part to my own ignorance on the subject I later realized. As I became slightly familiar with the groups, cities, political allegiences etc it became a much more interesting read, albeit still one with which I srruggled to comprehend. I resorted to university style underlining, circling, and such forth, as a means of analysing while reading. during the first half i simply tried reading it.
This book has still left me with a lot of confusion. BUT I feel I have a better undersranding of the conflicts than I did. Although... on the other hand.. this book gives the impression that THERE IS NO GROUP or governing entity that is good.. basically portrays just about everyone as bad... Assad, the many rebels, Turkey, Iraq. America, Iran... gives a sense of "there is no hope, the middle east is f%-$ed... oddly there is basically NO mention of Russia in this... hmm
One SERIOUS FAULT with the book is not including a glossary, as many political analysis books tend to do. Thus, as I read, it was difficult to retain in memory who was who, who was allied to who, and what all the acronyms stood for and whose side thw groups stood for under said acronyms. You really MUST have a list of acronyms.
Also, I have always hated end notes. If something is worth noting, put footnotes at the bottom of pages. No one wants to flip to the back of the book every few sentenced. As a university graduate, I have experienced this many times, and to this day I have no idea why publishers/authors do this so often. i suppose for aesthetics most likely.
This is worth a read, but only for someone looking for a complex academic account, not so much for the lay-person. The length of the book helps. had it been twice as long I may have given up, due to the laborious nature of reading and comprehending it. But... sometimes I like a challenge.
December 28, 2015
Weiss and Hassan have produced a detailed and highly readable book on the history of ISIS. They have done extensive research on the subject not only delving into the archives but conducting lots of interviews with a variety of people such as NATO and regional military officials, intelligence operatives and diplomats. They also state they interviewed defecting Syrian spies and officials and well as Syrians who work for ISIS. Hassan is an expert on tribal and jihadist dynamics and is a researcher at the Delma Institute in Abu Dhabi. Weiss is a journalist who was stationed in Iraq.
According to the authors Aba Baker al-Baghdadi created his monotheism and Holy War movement based on his own radical jihadist ideas. The authors report that he had created the basics of his ideology from Saudi Arabia’s Wahabi ideology and its Sharia law. The authors show how ISIS feeds on state dysfunction and Sunni outrage to feed his organization. I wished the authors had provided more in-depth information as to the basic structure and organization chart of ISIS. The authors outline the serious danger ISIS poses to Western civilization and for the average Muslim and other religions of the world in this war of ideology. I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. This is the first time I had listen to Qarie Marshall narrate and he did a good job.
According to the authors Aba Baker al-Baghdadi created his monotheism and Holy War movement based on his own radical jihadist ideas. The authors report that he had created the basics of his ideology from Saudi Arabia’s Wahabi ideology and its Sharia law. The authors show how ISIS feeds on state dysfunction and Sunni outrage to feed his organization. I wished the authors had provided more in-depth information as to the basic structure and organization chart of ISIS. The authors outline the serious danger ISIS poses to Western civilization and for the average Muslim and other religions of the world in this war of ideology. I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. This is the first time I had listen to Qarie Marshall narrate and he did a good job.
July 1, 2015
With the mainstream media so politically canted, the book was refreshing in that it did not seem to have a political agenda. However, it is not an easy read. Most importantly, it sufficiently covers a topic that affects our nation every day, both overseas and domestically. The two biggest take-aways for me were � the definitive links of the current militants to the Iraqi insurgency, which was in response to the U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003 � giving us the “long war;� and secondly, how much longer the conflict is likely going to be with us � sadly, there is no end in sight.
On the down side, I would have liked to see the authors jump around in time less, as trying to sort out who was who, and figuring out the various different organizations was difficult enough already. The best part of the book was where the authors gave us a glimpse into the insurgents themselves through firsthand interviews.
On the down side, I would have liked to see the authors jump around in time less, as trying to sort out who was who, and figuring out the various different organizations was difficult enough already. The best part of the book was where the authors gave us a glimpse into the insurgents themselves through firsthand interviews.
March 20, 2015
Excellent analysis of how ISIS rose to power. Current and up-to-date. A glossary and a few maps would have been helpful though.
February 22, 2015
A very refreshing and accessible analysis and assessment of ISIS by two authors who are clearly very familiar with the region. The book--which is lucidly written and straightforward--presents the rise of ISIS within the broader context of the rise of jihadist networks across Iraq (since 2003) and Syria (since 2011). The authors provide important insight into the institutional and organizational links between ISIS and its earlier incarnations, al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State of Iraq while also focusing on the Saddamist/Baathist background of many of its operatives. Special attention is devoted to the sectarian strife in Iraq and the brutal repression by the Baathist regime in Syria as important factors in facilitating the rise of Salafist-jihadism as a major movement in the region. Nearly half the book is devoted to an exposition of these broader developments.
The analysis gives the reader a concrete idea of the various geo-political, social, tribal, and local factors that led to the rise of ISIS, its conquest of large swathes of Iraq and Syria, and its ability to continue to govern such a vast and difficult terrain despite major attempts by an international coalition to dislodge it. Weiss and Hassan are also quite familiar with the various ideological underpinnings of ISIS, but caution that it is futile to seek to understand ISIS' brutality, its success on the battlefield, and the complex web of alliances that it has established solely (or even primarily) by reference to their religious ideology. The central argument of this book is that ISIS is a distinctly modern phenomenon and one that owes its existence and success largely to the various developments that have engulfed the region since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War (2011-present). The authors demonstrate that ISIS' rise to power needs to be firmly placed within the context of the disintegration of state institutions and control and the emergence of a new reality dominated by warlordism and mass violence (often directed by sectarian death squads) which has come to dominate Syria and Iraq.
The authors contend that, in order for ISIS to be completely and totally defeated, their primary constituency--the Sunnis of Syria and Iraq--need to be convinced that there exist viable alternatives to ISIS. The authors emphasize that the absence of any Sahwa/tribal insurgency (similar to what existed in Iraq in 2008), the massacres and excesses committed by the sectarian Shi'i militias in Iraq and the atrocities of the Assad regime (and its allies) against civilians across Syria all undercut the effort to weaken ISIS and, in fact, do far more to serve the cause of the terrorist organization by presenting it as the only logical, feasible alternative to many of the embattled Sunnis of Iraq and Syria. The strongest parts of the book are those describing specific examples of ISIS control in various locales, where the reader can begin to appreciate the various socio-political and administrative realities of the so-called Islamic State. The book also provides important insight into the logistical and military capabilities of ISIS. By pointing to the versatility and adaptability of ISIS, the Hassan and Weiss show that it is a far more dangerous enemy than al-Qaeda ever was. The authors greatly contribute to our knowledge of the organization by providing various profiles of the fighters (both local and foreign) that have joined ISIS in order to demonstrate how far-reaching its appeal can be and how it would be mistaken to look solely at its proclaimed theological or religious doctrine in order to make sense of the group.
Although this book represents an important attempt to contextualize ISIS and to provide insight into the various factors that facilitated the rise of the terrorist organization, in many places it feels rushed, inadequately referenced (this weakens the argument at certain points), and incomplete. The complete absence of a serious discussion of the role of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in the rise of Salafist-jihadism in the region since 2003 and the interconnections between these states and ISIS fundamentally weakens much of the analysis. The authors are also notably silent about Turkey and its role. Their assessment of the role played by Iran in the region also seemed to lack the analytical rigor characteristic of the remainder of their book.
Overall, Weiss' and Hassan's assessment of the terror organization will be invaluable for anyone interested in seriously understanding the various ways that ISIS functions in the territories that it currently dominates and for those seeking to understand how and why ISIS has managed to establish a functioning military state (and, as the authors make clear, it is a state) in an area the size of Great Britain.
3.5/5
The analysis gives the reader a concrete idea of the various geo-political, social, tribal, and local factors that led to the rise of ISIS, its conquest of large swathes of Iraq and Syria, and its ability to continue to govern such a vast and difficult terrain despite major attempts by an international coalition to dislodge it. Weiss and Hassan are also quite familiar with the various ideological underpinnings of ISIS, but caution that it is futile to seek to understand ISIS' brutality, its success on the battlefield, and the complex web of alliances that it has established solely (or even primarily) by reference to their religious ideology. The central argument of this book is that ISIS is a distinctly modern phenomenon and one that owes its existence and success largely to the various developments that have engulfed the region since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War (2011-present). The authors demonstrate that ISIS' rise to power needs to be firmly placed within the context of the disintegration of state institutions and control and the emergence of a new reality dominated by warlordism and mass violence (often directed by sectarian death squads) which has come to dominate Syria and Iraq.
The authors contend that, in order for ISIS to be completely and totally defeated, their primary constituency--the Sunnis of Syria and Iraq--need to be convinced that there exist viable alternatives to ISIS. The authors emphasize that the absence of any Sahwa/tribal insurgency (similar to what existed in Iraq in 2008), the massacres and excesses committed by the sectarian Shi'i militias in Iraq and the atrocities of the Assad regime (and its allies) against civilians across Syria all undercut the effort to weaken ISIS and, in fact, do far more to serve the cause of the terrorist organization by presenting it as the only logical, feasible alternative to many of the embattled Sunnis of Iraq and Syria. The strongest parts of the book are those describing specific examples of ISIS control in various locales, where the reader can begin to appreciate the various socio-political and administrative realities of the so-called Islamic State. The book also provides important insight into the logistical and military capabilities of ISIS. By pointing to the versatility and adaptability of ISIS, the Hassan and Weiss show that it is a far more dangerous enemy than al-Qaeda ever was. The authors greatly contribute to our knowledge of the organization by providing various profiles of the fighters (both local and foreign) that have joined ISIS in order to demonstrate how far-reaching its appeal can be and how it would be mistaken to look solely at its proclaimed theological or religious doctrine in order to make sense of the group.
Although this book represents an important attempt to contextualize ISIS and to provide insight into the various factors that facilitated the rise of the terrorist organization, in many places it feels rushed, inadequately referenced (this weakens the argument at certain points), and incomplete. The complete absence of a serious discussion of the role of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in the rise of Salafist-jihadism in the region since 2003 and the interconnections between these states and ISIS fundamentally weakens much of the analysis. The authors are also notably silent about Turkey and its role. Their assessment of the role played by Iran in the region also seemed to lack the analytical rigor characteristic of the remainder of their book.
Overall, Weiss' and Hassan's assessment of the terror organization will be invaluable for anyone interested in seriously understanding the various ways that ISIS functions in the territories that it currently dominates and for those seeking to understand how and why ISIS has managed to establish a functioning military state (and, as the authors make clear, it is a state) in an area the size of Great Britain.
3.5/5
November 18, 2015
This is one of a number of recent books on the rise and current state of ISIS (aka ISIL and Da'esh), which seems particularly relevant given events in Paris this week. This one had some good detail, but there were times I struggled to follow the thread of the authors' arguments.
November 2, 2016
I have to admit that, prior to reading this book, I was not particularly well-informed about ISIS, aka ISIL, aka Islamic State, aka Daesh (in a story so convoluted, even names are a source of confusion). The group was making the news, certainly, and so I was aware � albeit rather vaguely � about their ideology, their terrifying methods, and their startling march across whole swathes of the Middle East. What I had gleaned from news bulletins and internet articles, however, did not amount to a great deal, and did little to explain the phenomenon. I decided to read something more in-depth, and chose this book pretty much at random.
This is a good place to start if you're in a similar position and looking for some insight into ISIS's history and the workings of their self-styled caliphate. The group seems, in many ways, to have been the child of an ill-starred confluence of Wahhabism, Baathism, Sunni-Shi'ite sectarianism, tribal politics, and the West's frequently inept interventions in the Middle East. There's a great deal of information about the group's origins in Al-Qaeda and its forefather, the thuggish al-Zarqawi, as well as about the state of Iraq after the second Gulf War, which provided fertile ground for the emergence of such an organisation.
While I appreciated the solid factual grounding of the book, I would have liked to have heard more about some of the (to my mind) more mystifying aspects of ISIS. How, for example, have they managed to plug into so many people's psychology, and so effectively? How have they managed to lure thousands of foreigners � many of them young, well-educated, Western-born, and seemingly with much to lose � to join them in Syria and Iraq, when they appear to offer little except almost-certain death? They certainly don't sugar-coat their brutal methods; indeed, they record and disseminate them worldwide. Does this propaganda draw only psychopaths, or is there a subliminal appeal that others of us simply do not see? How have they managed to not only play the social media game, but play it much better than any of their rivals?
As I type these words, ISIS appears to be losing ground. I say "appears to be" because in this constantly changing and evolving story, nothing can be taken for granted. Even if they are routed militarily, they will still pose a challenge to the West, and provide a model for future jihadist groups. They represent, after all, an ideology � and ideology, especially in these days of the internet, is resilient indeed.
This is a good place to start if you're in a similar position and looking for some insight into ISIS's history and the workings of their self-styled caliphate. The group seems, in many ways, to have been the child of an ill-starred confluence of Wahhabism, Baathism, Sunni-Shi'ite sectarianism, tribal politics, and the West's frequently inept interventions in the Middle East. There's a great deal of information about the group's origins in Al-Qaeda and its forefather, the thuggish al-Zarqawi, as well as about the state of Iraq after the second Gulf War, which provided fertile ground for the emergence of such an organisation.
While I appreciated the solid factual grounding of the book, I would have liked to have heard more about some of the (to my mind) more mystifying aspects of ISIS. How, for example, have they managed to plug into so many people's psychology, and so effectively? How have they managed to lure thousands of foreigners � many of them young, well-educated, Western-born, and seemingly with much to lose � to join them in Syria and Iraq, when they appear to offer little except almost-certain death? They certainly don't sugar-coat their brutal methods; indeed, they record and disseminate them worldwide. Does this propaganda draw only psychopaths, or is there a subliminal appeal that others of us simply do not see? How have they managed to not only play the social media game, but play it much better than any of their rivals?
As I type these words, ISIS appears to be losing ground. I say "appears to be" because in this constantly changing and evolving story, nothing can be taken for granted. Even if they are routed militarily, they will still pose a challenge to the West, and provide a model for future jihadist groups. They represent, after all, an ideology � and ideology, especially in these days of the internet, is resilient indeed.
November 28, 2015
The beginning of this book has a lot of useful information on the formation of ISIS. The authors present a lot of detailed information on Az-Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda in Iraq and how this ultimately led to the formation of ISIS. I think they did a a pretty good job describing how the power vacuum left by the US led invasion allowed Al-Qaeda in Iraq to flourish, which in turn, allowed ISIS to form. They also present a lot of useful information on how the advancement of Shi'a leaders at the cost of Sunnis led to the insurgency and ultimately, ISIS.
However, as the book went on it dragged. The book is pretty dry and I found it difficult to finish. The chapters that actually focus on ISIS as it is now were boring. The authors managed to interview a few ISIS members but what they said about their motivations is nothing new. If you've kept up with the news for the past year, nothing in the second half is enlightening.
However, as the book went on it dragged. The book is pretty dry and I found it difficult to finish. The chapters that actually focus on ISIS as it is now were boring. The authors managed to interview a few ISIS members but what they said about their motivations is nothing new. If you've kept up with the news for the past year, nothing in the second half is enlightening.
June 17, 2015
This book gave me some great insight into ISIS on a historical and organisational level. The author uses a great array of sources to give the reader a well-researched overview.
I found the historical part of this book very engaging and Michael Weiss does a solid job in putting together all the complicated pieces in a manner that is easy to read. Another aspect of this book that I found riveting was the high level of organisation and planning that ISIS use in its campaigns. They appear to be functioning at an extremely high level and this is what is contributing to its ability to punch way above its weight. It is also a very terrifying realisation to come to.
Overall this book gives the reader a good overview of ISIS and the related issues. It is a timely book and as given me a new perspective on the subject.
I found the historical part of this book very engaging and Michael Weiss does a solid job in putting together all the complicated pieces in a manner that is easy to read. Another aspect of this book that I found riveting was the high level of organisation and planning that ISIS use in its campaigns. They appear to be functioning at an extremely high level and this is what is contributing to its ability to punch way above its weight. It is also a very terrifying realisation to come to.
Overall this book gives the reader a good overview of ISIS and the related issues. It is a timely book and as given me a new perspective on the subject.
September 6, 2015
After reading the book for the 2nd time. I would say that the book in short is "multum in parvo" or concise and comprehensive.
The authors did too much effort to gather all aspects of ISIS in about 200 pages, they discussed the history, ideology, strategies, media, propaganda, governance, economy, etc.
If I should recommend a reading about ISIS it will definitely be "ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror."
Note: I still didn't read Stern & Berger's book nor Loretta Napoleoni's new publication but I believe they will be of value too.
The authors did too much effort to gather all aspects of ISIS in about 200 pages, they discussed the history, ideology, strategies, media, propaganda, governance, economy, etc.
If I should recommend a reading about ISIS it will definitely be "ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror."
Note: I still didn't read Stern & Berger's book nor Loretta Napoleoni's new publication but I believe they will be of value too.
November 27, 2016
This is the second book I have read on ISIS/Islamic State. I have previously read Black Flag. I appreciated this present work that details to the readers further insight into the Islamic State. The two authors definitely has done their research and while the future will no doubt have more scholarly books analyzing ISIS with more information this book is quite helpful at the moment given how little book length treatment currently exists on ISIS. I think this work would still be important even in the future among the collection of works that paved the way in terms of analyzing ISIS. Both authors are journalists who among other things contribute to the periodical Foreign Policy. Their background no doubt is helpful. The book essentially traces the history of how Al Qaeda in Iraq evolved into the Islamic state. The main question that the book focuses on is how is an insurgency group that at one time was as a “junior varsity� among terrorist’s organization eventually became its own self-proclaimed state.
The book starts off with the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq name Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and how he founded the group. It is intriguing to see the apocalyptic mindset of al-Zarqawi being described in which he seems to be much more evil than Bin Laden at the height of his terrorist career. The author pointed out that Bin Laden was largely silent about the question of the status of the Shiites orthodoxy whereas al-Zarqawi was adamant in his view that Shiites were the enemies that needed to the targets of suicide bombers. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi even managed to have his own father in law commit himself as a suicide bomber in 2003. I had to google that to see if there were other sources that mentioned that and not just something the book mentioned. Of course with al-Zarqawi’s hardline position against the Shiites and eventually other Sunnis this received the ironic backlash of Al Qaeda’s leadership condemning al-Zarqawi and calling him to practice restraint. It is also interesting to read in this book how al-Zarqawi was at one dismissed by Bin Laden but later with al-Zarqawi’s success in Iraq would later be spoken highly and praised by Bin Laden. Often those in the West think of all members of Al Qaeda as blindly following Bin Laden but here we see that al-Zarqawi was very capable of being his own man and courted the franchise of “Al Qaeda� in order to attract attention of potential recruits, funds and other support. Unlike Bin Laden, al-Zarqawi was also different than the other terrorist celebrity in an important regard: al-Zarqawi believes that he is destined to re-establish the Caliphate which means bringing about an Islamic empire again. This was the genesis of the “Caliphate� ideology that would become a part of the “DNA� of his followers long after al-Zarqawi’s death by the Americans going after him.
I also appreciated how the authors were able to get a wide array of sources for this book ranging from those who fought in insurgency in Syria against ISIS (and of course the Syrian regime) to those whom ISIS have oppressed and even former ISIS members who defected. One thing readers will find in this book that one probably won’t find discussed elsewhere is the different kinds of fighters that make up the rank and files of ISIS fighters. Some are die hard radical Islamists but the book pointed out there’s also degrees of radicalization and also those who have different motivation for fighting. On the one hand you have those who were a part of ISIS merely because of their identity with being Sunni in which the conflict in Iraq has pitted Shiites against Sunni while on the other hand you have those who were former Baathists of the previous regime of Saddam Hussein. I thought the book presents the argument rather persuasively that ISIS is not monolithic and at times bear signature of a coalition of disenfranchised Iraqi Sunni tribesmen, hard core Wahhabis, Sunni opportunists and former Baathists.
Another aspect of the book that I like is the authors exploration of the problem of the Islamic State beyond seeing this as merely as an Iraqi problem and conflict. Readers must not forget that the Islamic State presently occupy Syria as well and wishes to expand elsewhere. The book is wonderful in that explores the Syrian Civil War and how that contributed to the rise of ISIS. The authors argue that Assad’s Syrian regime have actually helped fuel and even created the problem it has today with ISIS: at first the protests and civil war against Assad by the rebels were largely a broad coalition of Syrians of various background despite religious and ethnic background but that changed with deliberate policies by the Assad regime. They intentionally released a lot of Sunni radicals from their prisons in order for them to fight against Assad and therefore in both the home front and the court of public opinion it would look like Assad was fighting a “war on terror.� At the same time according to the authors Assad regime also sent out killing squads from Alawites descent in order to divide the people on religious lines and therefore the minorities can be exploited to side with Assad against the Sunnis since the conflict is now crafted as a way for the survival of these minorities. Simply evil. It is easy to be conspiratorial when it comes to current events about the Middle East but the authors buttressed their views with further evidences such as the fact that the Syrian armed forces focused more resources and energy in attacking non-ISIS insurgents rather than attacking ISIS itself. Classic divide-and-conquer tactic.
There’s so much more in the book than this review can go over. I highly recommend this work if you want to be informed and understand the Islamic State.
The book starts off with the founder of Al Qaeda in Iraq name Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and how he founded the group. It is intriguing to see the apocalyptic mindset of al-Zarqawi being described in which he seems to be much more evil than Bin Laden at the height of his terrorist career. The author pointed out that Bin Laden was largely silent about the question of the status of the Shiites orthodoxy whereas al-Zarqawi was adamant in his view that Shiites were the enemies that needed to the targets of suicide bombers. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi even managed to have his own father in law commit himself as a suicide bomber in 2003. I had to google that to see if there were other sources that mentioned that and not just something the book mentioned. Of course with al-Zarqawi’s hardline position against the Shiites and eventually other Sunnis this received the ironic backlash of Al Qaeda’s leadership condemning al-Zarqawi and calling him to practice restraint. It is also interesting to read in this book how al-Zarqawi was at one dismissed by Bin Laden but later with al-Zarqawi’s success in Iraq would later be spoken highly and praised by Bin Laden. Often those in the West think of all members of Al Qaeda as blindly following Bin Laden but here we see that al-Zarqawi was very capable of being his own man and courted the franchise of “Al Qaeda� in order to attract attention of potential recruits, funds and other support. Unlike Bin Laden, al-Zarqawi was also different than the other terrorist celebrity in an important regard: al-Zarqawi believes that he is destined to re-establish the Caliphate which means bringing about an Islamic empire again. This was the genesis of the “Caliphate� ideology that would become a part of the “DNA� of his followers long after al-Zarqawi’s death by the Americans going after him.
I also appreciated how the authors were able to get a wide array of sources for this book ranging from those who fought in insurgency in Syria against ISIS (and of course the Syrian regime) to those whom ISIS have oppressed and even former ISIS members who defected. One thing readers will find in this book that one probably won’t find discussed elsewhere is the different kinds of fighters that make up the rank and files of ISIS fighters. Some are die hard radical Islamists but the book pointed out there’s also degrees of radicalization and also those who have different motivation for fighting. On the one hand you have those who were a part of ISIS merely because of their identity with being Sunni in which the conflict in Iraq has pitted Shiites against Sunni while on the other hand you have those who were former Baathists of the previous regime of Saddam Hussein. I thought the book presents the argument rather persuasively that ISIS is not monolithic and at times bear signature of a coalition of disenfranchised Iraqi Sunni tribesmen, hard core Wahhabis, Sunni opportunists and former Baathists.
Another aspect of the book that I like is the authors exploration of the problem of the Islamic State beyond seeing this as merely as an Iraqi problem and conflict. Readers must not forget that the Islamic State presently occupy Syria as well and wishes to expand elsewhere. The book is wonderful in that explores the Syrian Civil War and how that contributed to the rise of ISIS. The authors argue that Assad’s Syrian regime have actually helped fuel and even created the problem it has today with ISIS: at first the protests and civil war against Assad by the rebels were largely a broad coalition of Syrians of various background despite religious and ethnic background but that changed with deliberate policies by the Assad regime. They intentionally released a lot of Sunni radicals from their prisons in order for them to fight against Assad and therefore in both the home front and the court of public opinion it would look like Assad was fighting a “war on terror.� At the same time according to the authors Assad regime also sent out killing squads from Alawites descent in order to divide the people on religious lines and therefore the minorities can be exploited to side with Assad against the Sunnis since the conflict is now crafted as a way for the survival of these minorities. Simply evil. It is easy to be conspiratorial when it comes to current events about the Middle East but the authors buttressed their views with further evidences such as the fact that the Syrian armed forces focused more resources and energy in attacking non-ISIS insurgents rather than attacking ISIS itself. Classic divide-and-conquer tactic.
There’s so much more in the book than this review can go over. I highly recommend this work if you want to be informed and understand the Islamic State.
March 28, 2019
On March 22nd 2019, Mustafa Bali, a spokesman for the Syrian Democratic Forces, announced the military victory against Da’esh. Baghouz is now free. The proclaimed Caliphate has ended.
Or has it?
Needless to say, this announcement has its own “terms and conditions apply�-like asterisks. The sleeper cells and sympathisers are still active, bidding their time, plotting the deaths of innocent people. Da’esh or Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is nothing but the latest in the line of offsprings of the terrorist groups that have their genesis in the wars that have been fought in the region since World War II (or if extrapolated nicely, World War I and the spree of imperialism and colonialism). It is easy to lose count of how many generations of fighters have laid their lives for the Mujahideen, the jihad, and now, the Khalifa (Anglicised to Caliphate). It will be quite anticlimactic if the region which had been the cradle of human civilisation, will also turn into its graveyard. Poetic!
I had picked up the book by and J. M. Berger while idling my time in a Crossword store three years ago. I was hooked (more to the events described than to the mentioned book). In 2016, when you typed “ISIS�, Google gave out a bunch of links: about 97% regarding the Middle East war and 3% about the beautiful and caring Egyptian Goddess, Isis. In fact, Google had asked me then if I were searching about the Goddess or the bunch of bearded old men plotting treachery. Fast-forward to 2019. Google doesn’t even bother about the Goddess anymore. It directs you straight to the latest news surrounding the political and military Middle East "Ring of Fire".
This book is first in the series of books that I plan to read about the topic. It has been comprehensive and has a great list of bibliography. The hard work, street smartness and intrepidity of the authors shines through as much as the scholarship of the details. This book does not contain fluid, flowery story; instead, it is sharp, straight to the point. It deals with the political and organisational jugglery that has been taking place regarding the region among the various stakeholders: Iraq, Iran, Russia, Syria, Turkey and the United States to name a few. The book provided an excellent idea of the various tribal associations and relations, people organisation and loyalty factors of the groups. In a nutshell, money and tribal loyalties hold the highest currency there.
Nevertheless, the readers get a few key takeaways from the events surrounding the mess:
1. If you want to wage war, understand the demography and fabric of the society of your opponent. It can help save millions of dollars (or whichever is your favourite currency) by allowing you to skip socialising with the wrong sort. Be prepared. Read The Art of War by Sun Tzu.
For TL;DR: Look before you leap.
2. Humans are social animals. In case of disputes and justice, humans prefer social arbitration from neighbours and relatives first. If this does not work out, they might look for whatever means of redressal is available. It is stupidity for outsiders to go and meddle in the divorce settlement of a couple who live almost ten thousand kilometres (~6200 mi) away.
For TL;DR: Mind your own business.
I would recommend this book for anyone who wants to:
a. Understand the tech and business savviness of ISIS (and probably its descendants as well). And,
b. Not underestimate the destructive potential of the nuclear button in wrong hands.
Or has it?
Needless to say, this announcement has its own “terms and conditions apply�-like asterisks. The sleeper cells and sympathisers are still active, bidding their time, plotting the deaths of innocent people. Da’esh or Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is nothing but the latest in the line of offsprings of the terrorist groups that have their genesis in the wars that have been fought in the region since World War II (or if extrapolated nicely, World War I and the spree of imperialism and colonialism). It is easy to lose count of how many generations of fighters have laid their lives for the Mujahideen, the jihad, and now, the Khalifa (Anglicised to Caliphate). It will be quite anticlimactic if the region which had been the cradle of human civilisation, will also turn into its graveyard. Poetic!
I had picked up the book by and J. M. Berger while idling my time in a Crossword store three years ago. I was hooked (more to the events described than to the mentioned book). In 2016, when you typed “ISIS�, Google gave out a bunch of links: about 97% regarding the Middle East war and 3% about the beautiful and caring Egyptian Goddess, Isis. In fact, Google had asked me then if I were searching about the Goddess or the bunch of bearded old men plotting treachery. Fast-forward to 2019. Google doesn’t even bother about the Goddess anymore. It directs you straight to the latest news surrounding the political and military Middle East "Ring of Fire".
This book is first in the series of books that I plan to read about the topic. It has been comprehensive and has a great list of bibliography. The hard work, street smartness and intrepidity of the authors shines through as much as the scholarship of the details. This book does not contain fluid, flowery story; instead, it is sharp, straight to the point. It deals with the political and organisational jugglery that has been taking place regarding the region among the various stakeholders: Iraq, Iran, Russia, Syria, Turkey and the United States to name a few. The book provided an excellent idea of the various tribal associations and relations, people organisation and loyalty factors of the groups. In a nutshell, money and tribal loyalties hold the highest currency there.
Nevertheless, the readers get a few key takeaways from the events surrounding the mess:
1. If you want to wage war, understand the demography and fabric of the society of your opponent. It can help save millions of dollars (or whichever is your favourite currency) by allowing you to skip socialising with the wrong sort. Be prepared. Read The Art of War by Sun Tzu.
For TL;DR: Look before you leap.
2. Humans are social animals. In case of disputes and justice, humans prefer social arbitration from neighbours and relatives first. If this does not work out, they might look for whatever means of redressal is available. It is stupidity for outsiders to go and meddle in the divorce settlement of a couple who live almost ten thousand kilometres (~6200 mi) away.
For TL;DR: Mind your own business.
I would recommend this book for anyone who wants to:
a. Understand the tech and business savviness of ISIS (and probably its descendants as well). And,
b. Not underestimate the destructive potential of the nuclear button in wrong hands.
December 1, 2018
The world awoke to a series of horrifying snuff videos in 2014, in which gory images of people actually being beheaded and burnt alive were uploaded by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) who exploited the unsettled conditions of post-occupation Iraq and rebellion-ravaged Syria. Both these neighbours had a unique feature in common � they were ruled by a strongman belonging to a religious minority who was autocratic and iron-fisted. Saddam Hussein was a Sunni who lorded over Iraq which contained 65 per cent Shia, 20 per cent Arab Sunnis and 15 per cent Kurdish Sunnis. Syria was under Bashar al-Assad, a UK-trained ophthalmologist, who was a Shia Alavite but ruling over a population that contained 75 per cent Sunni and 15 per cent Shia. When these dictators were suddenly unseated � Saddam by American occupation and al-Assad’s authority was challenged in most parts of Syria by popular insurrection � the political landscape was ripe for a competition with naked evolutionary zeal � survival of the fittest. Government forces and numerous private militias controlled by religious sects, tribal groups and terrorist organizations entered the fray in an orgy of civil war. Out of this theatre of extinction and metamorphosis, ISIS was formed on June 28, 2014 when its so-called Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced it from the pulpit of the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul, which was just captured by the group. Michael Weiss is an American journalist, author and a senior editor of the Daily Beast. The co-author, Hassan Hassan is an American journalist of Syrian origin. His work on Islamic groups in the Middle East is widely acclaimed. They look into the origin and growth of ISIS in this book that also delves into the mechanism by which this organization draws its lifeblood from the emaciated body politic of Iraq and Syria.
The origin of jihadism was not exactly in the Middle East. The authors trace its birth to Afghanistan where the mujahidin (fighters of jihad) came together against the communist takeover of that country. This was a pan-Islamic effort freely supported by the West who saw in it a perfect opportunity to embarrass the Soviets for their similar role in Vietnam where the US was at war. Coming as it does at the fag end of communism as a whole, the jihadists were successful in driving out the invaders and hoisting an extremist regime under the Taliban. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian native, founded the Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant) in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda support. The end of war in Afghanistan was followed by American military presence during the Kuwait war and occupation of Iraq. It was in the US-occupied Iraq that the jihadi militias under Zarqawi came of age. The namesake government was partisan and was tottering even with the deadly US firepower at its back. The country was carved into fiefs by the militant organizations, which comprised all hues of ideology � jihadist, nationalist, tribal or secular. It is heartening to note that civil unrest erupted against al-Qaeda when its puritanical fervor was resented by the native populations. Even though Zarqawi was killed in 2006, sahwa (Awakening) movements proliferated in Iraq. The former Baath party cadres and Saddam’s regime officials were singled out for discrimination in the new administration dominated by Shias. Such a huge well of discontent got channeled into a fierce terrorist organization called the ISIS in 2014.
The image painted by ISIS in the minds of most people is that of savage brutality and inhuman hatred. I think I am not exactly correct in writing the last sentence. Well, hatred is a distinctly human emotion which no animal can probably emulate. But the meaning of the epithet ‘inhuman� is somehow required to describe the deeds of this group of zealots. This portrayal was managed by the jihadis who interweaved horrific violence and mass media. It was when the people actually saw those beheadings from the safety of their drawing rooms did the act touched their nerves. Death is macabre enough and Hitler’s gas chambers would have inflicted as painful a death to its victims. ISIS used these videos to shock and awe the world. It also helped many deranged people across the world to convert to Islam and fight in ISIS� favour in Syria and Iraq. The rewards were disgusting to most, but impressive for the devout. These people relished the sadistic pleasure of killing unarmed people and also the carnal pleasures offered by the employment of sexual slaves forcibly taken away from religious minorities as war booty. As per strict interpretation of the Islamic law, followers of other religions must be subservient to the faithful, because they were given the chance to convert to Islam, but chose not to do so. ISIS brutality is evident in their use of even mentally challenged girls of age three and thirteen as suicide bombers to blow up a police-recruitment line in Iraq.
Okay, ISIS is a terror to live with, but what was the plight of those who had the misfortune to live under their rule? This book tells us that for ordinary people who did not have any political inclinations or membership in any rival militias, life was not so bad after all. At first, ISIS treated civilians gently, fixed damaged roads, planted flowers in the streets and cleaned local schools. Then came Sharia law. Men were not allowed to remove their beards and women strictly prohibited to uncover their face and hair. Hair dressing and shaving were banned. Smoking was made a taboo and women were not allowed to go out of their homes without a male escort. Attending prayers became mandatory. Businesses had to close shops during prayer times. Secular schools were closed and religious madarassas sprang up in their place that parceled out jihadist ideology to kids. In short, if people sealed their lips and obeyed orders like cattle do, they could go on living a mechanical existence. Even the slightest sign of free will was sure to invite the organization’s pathological brutality. It sold antiquities like golden statues and coins to make money, thereby obliterating the history of the land. Its income mainly consisted of sale of oil and gas in its territories, confiscation from enemies and renegades and taxation. Its summary execution of opponents by savage means ensured docility of the people over whom they ruled.
A brief, inadequate glimpse on the ideology of ISIS is given. The organization believed that the mainstream Islam practiced by moderate Muslims was only a few decades old. It thrived by using stories and texts that mainstream clerics have preferred to ignore, either because they deemed it to be too marginal or because they are too difficult or embarrassing to square with modern morality (p.220). But the undeniable truth is that the verses which fueled ISIS� carnage are very much a part and parcel of the Islamic religion. In fact, there is nothing abnormal or astonishing in this. All religions have such skeletons in their closet. What the others have done is that they have moved such closets out of everyday life by bringing in reformers and enlightenment. Where Islam should concentrate is the facilitation of new religious teachers who would negotiate with the modern world and reposition its ideology in compatible terms with modernity.
The book is thoroughly American. It follows the state policy without fail. Weiss does not even mention the fact that the Afghan mujahidin were funded by covert CIA operatives. In claiming that Iraqi prisons were the breeding ground of jihadism, the authors seek to downplay and legitimize the brutal torture meted out to political prisoners under the US-led regimes. Weiss and Hassan follow a style of diction that owes more to journalism than the rules of a book. Each piece of information is explicitly credited to the source in the main text itself, as in newspapers. A lot of facts are provided in the lengthy narrative, but these are not integrated into a coherent story. The narrative ends in early 2016 when ISIS was still in power. Future editions are sure to bring the account up to date.
The book is recommended.
The origin of jihadism was not exactly in the Middle East. The authors trace its birth to Afghanistan where the mujahidin (fighters of jihad) came together against the communist takeover of that country. This was a pan-Islamic effort freely supported by the West who saw in it a perfect opportunity to embarrass the Soviets for their similar role in Vietnam where the US was at war. Coming as it does at the fag end of communism as a whole, the jihadists were successful in driving out the invaders and hoisting an extremist regime under the Taliban. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian native, founded the Jund al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant) in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda support. The end of war in Afghanistan was followed by American military presence during the Kuwait war and occupation of Iraq. It was in the US-occupied Iraq that the jihadi militias under Zarqawi came of age. The namesake government was partisan and was tottering even with the deadly US firepower at its back. The country was carved into fiefs by the militant organizations, which comprised all hues of ideology � jihadist, nationalist, tribal or secular. It is heartening to note that civil unrest erupted against al-Qaeda when its puritanical fervor was resented by the native populations. Even though Zarqawi was killed in 2006, sahwa (Awakening) movements proliferated in Iraq. The former Baath party cadres and Saddam’s regime officials were singled out for discrimination in the new administration dominated by Shias. Such a huge well of discontent got channeled into a fierce terrorist organization called the ISIS in 2014.
The image painted by ISIS in the minds of most people is that of savage brutality and inhuman hatred. I think I am not exactly correct in writing the last sentence. Well, hatred is a distinctly human emotion which no animal can probably emulate. But the meaning of the epithet ‘inhuman� is somehow required to describe the deeds of this group of zealots. This portrayal was managed by the jihadis who interweaved horrific violence and mass media. It was when the people actually saw those beheadings from the safety of their drawing rooms did the act touched their nerves. Death is macabre enough and Hitler’s gas chambers would have inflicted as painful a death to its victims. ISIS used these videos to shock and awe the world. It also helped many deranged people across the world to convert to Islam and fight in ISIS� favour in Syria and Iraq. The rewards were disgusting to most, but impressive for the devout. These people relished the sadistic pleasure of killing unarmed people and also the carnal pleasures offered by the employment of sexual slaves forcibly taken away from religious minorities as war booty. As per strict interpretation of the Islamic law, followers of other religions must be subservient to the faithful, because they were given the chance to convert to Islam, but chose not to do so. ISIS brutality is evident in their use of even mentally challenged girls of age three and thirteen as suicide bombers to blow up a police-recruitment line in Iraq.
Okay, ISIS is a terror to live with, but what was the plight of those who had the misfortune to live under their rule? This book tells us that for ordinary people who did not have any political inclinations or membership in any rival militias, life was not so bad after all. At first, ISIS treated civilians gently, fixed damaged roads, planted flowers in the streets and cleaned local schools. Then came Sharia law. Men were not allowed to remove their beards and women strictly prohibited to uncover their face and hair. Hair dressing and shaving were banned. Smoking was made a taboo and women were not allowed to go out of their homes without a male escort. Attending prayers became mandatory. Businesses had to close shops during prayer times. Secular schools were closed and religious madarassas sprang up in their place that parceled out jihadist ideology to kids. In short, if people sealed their lips and obeyed orders like cattle do, they could go on living a mechanical existence. Even the slightest sign of free will was sure to invite the organization’s pathological brutality. It sold antiquities like golden statues and coins to make money, thereby obliterating the history of the land. Its income mainly consisted of sale of oil and gas in its territories, confiscation from enemies and renegades and taxation. Its summary execution of opponents by savage means ensured docility of the people over whom they ruled.
A brief, inadequate glimpse on the ideology of ISIS is given. The organization believed that the mainstream Islam practiced by moderate Muslims was only a few decades old. It thrived by using stories and texts that mainstream clerics have preferred to ignore, either because they deemed it to be too marginal or because they are too difficult or embarrassing to square with modern morality (p.220). But the undeniable truth is that the verses which fueled ISIS� carnage are very much a part and parcel of the Islamic religion. In fact, there is nothing abnormal or astonishing in this. All religions have such skeletons in their closet. What the others have done is that they have moved such closets out of everyday life by bringing in reformers and enlightenment. Where Islam should concentrate is the facilitation of new religious teachers who would negotiate with the modern world and reposition its ideology in compatible terms with modernity.
The book is thoroughly American. It follows the state policy without fail. Weiss does not even mention the fact that the Afghan mujahidin were funded by covert CIA operatives. In claiming that Iraqi prisons were the breeding ground of jihadism, the authors seek to downplay and legitimize the brutal torture meted out to political prisoners under the US-led regimes. Weiss and Hassan follow a style of diction that owes more to journalism than the rules of a book. Each piece of information is explicitly credited to the source in the main text itself, as in newspapers. A lot of facts are provided in the lengthy narrative, but these are not integrated into a coherent story. The narrative ends in early 2016 when ISIS was still in power. Future editions are sure to bring the account up to date.
The book is recommended.
June 20, 2016
This book took forever to read and I nearly gave up several times, but I really wanted to try to understand how everything came to be. It was really hard to keep track of all the cast of characters - a few of the names I recognized from the news, but there were so many more. On top of that, there were all the nom de guerres; just so challenging to keep all the major players apart. And so many factions to try to keep track of: Shia, Sunni, Baathists, al-Qaeda, Takfiris, Salafists, al-Nusra, al-Dawla, the Brotherhood, the Awakening - and those are the ones coming to me off the top of my head. There are so many more. Additionally, the authors state again and again how geography plays a major role, but I have a very limited understanding of the geography of the area. I could probably find Bagdad and Damascus on a map, but the rest of the locations didn't mean a thing to me, so I think that part went right over my head. And being someone who has only known democracy, however flawed it's practiced, I could not wrap my mind around tribalism, yet knowing how the various tribes will react and how to countermand those actions plays into the success of ISIS in the area where western thought will often find the same situation irrational.
That said, the book is broken down into shorter sections in attempt to clarify and distinguish the identities and motives of each group. The authors spoke to many people including former ISIS members, former Saddam government personnel, US military officers , government officials, etc. I would recommend this book to anyone who truly wants to understand and is willing to make the effort. I hope our leaders have read this or something similar and have a clearer picture than I do. I would say Donald Trump should read it before he ignorantly opens his mouth again on the topic, but I'm afraid it's above his reading comprehension level.
That said, the book is broken down into shorter sections in attempt to clarify and distinguish the identities and motives of each group. The authors spoke to many people including former ISIS members, former Saddam government personnel, US military officers , government officials, etc. I would recommend this book to anyone who truly wants to understand and is willing to make the effort. I hope our leaders have read this or something similar and have a clearer picture than I do. I would say Donald Trump should read it before he ignorantly opens his mouth again on the topic, but I'm afraid it's above his reading comprehension level.
January 1, 2016
Interesting reporting of both the current (as of its release almost in February 2015) conflict under the banner of ISIS and the events that helped birth the organization during the previous decade. The story was little confusing for me but with the help of Google I was able to cobble together many of the pieces to get a much better understanding of the crisis (or maybe I just understand better that I will never fully understand it). To a large extent, but not always, the telling has the unbiased feel of what used to be considered good reporting. Of course, if I had the perspective of an Iraqi or a Syrian it is entirely possible I wouldn't see it that way.
There are limitations to the book brought on both by the choices of the author and by the realities of the subject. The author focuses on political, historical and economic forces in the war and doesn't go into depth into the seemingly subtle (to someone who lacks much knowledge on the history and teachings of Islam) religious aspects of the conflict. Also, all wars develop their narrative once a war is over so a book written in the middle of a conflict has many disparate pieces that fight against a streamlined understanding. There are so many parts to this conflict you could fill a book with a thousand pages and still leave much of the story untold. So the author chooses to focus on Iraq, Syria, Iran and to some extent the US. But Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Western Europe, et al, have roles that are largely left out. Finally, since the book's publication 10 months ago much has happened in the war. I suspect there are probably more up-to-date books in print or soon to be released. But overall this was an excellent primer on this extremely murky conflict.
There are limitations to the book brought on both by the choices of the author and by the realities of the subject. The author focuses on political, historical and economic forces in the war and doesn't go into depth into the seemingly subtle (to someone who lacks much knowledge on the history and teachings of Islam) religious aspects of the conflict. Also, all wars develop their narrative once a war is over so a book written in the middle of a conflict has many disparate pieces that fight against a streamlined understanding. There are so many parts to this conflict you could fill a book with a thousand pages and still leave much of the story untold. So the author chooses to focus on Iraq, Syria, Iran and to some extent the US. But Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Western Europe, et al, have roles that are largely left out. Finally, since the book's publication 10 months ago much has happened in the war. I suspect there are probably more up-to-date books in print or soon to be released. But overall this was an excellent primer on this extremely murky conflict.
April 27, 2015
2.5 stars. Weiss thoroughly outlines ISIS's rise to power in Iraq and Syria by offering an in-depth analysis of the terror group's tactical strategies in recruitment, politics, warfare, and even municipal administration. There's a lot of information to learn from this book, but it is not for the faint of heart. In other words, you need a pretty fundamental base knowledge of Islam and Middle East politics to dive into this book without being completely in the woods. For me (someone who tries their best to have that knowledge but finds all of it super confusing), this book was incredibly dense and I had to stop to google things or just find my bearings several times. This feeling wasn't helped by a number of structural and grammatical errors in the writing. I'm guessing, given the current nature of the content and its fast-paced changes, publication of this book was meant to move fast. The race to the presses seemed to sacrifice something in style, finesse, and narrative that makes "ISIS" less memorably impactful and more textbook tedious to read. At the same time, I definitely learned way more about this issue than cable news has ever provided (though I am no less terrified by the content, especially given the last sentence and conclusion of this book). Not for the casual reader, but informative if you can stick through the facts-laden text.
April 28, 2015
It's become so hard to follow the different factions in the current Middle East situation, and ISIS seemed to come from nowhere, so when I saw this book, I decided to see whether it clarified things for me. It helped a lot, although I'm not going to say I totally understand yet. For one thing, the names, both of the major players and the groups that formed and disbanded and the ones that have survived to compete with each other are often so similar that it's difficult to keep the players straight.
Weiss and Hassan, journalists and analysts in this region of the Middle East, have followed the rise of ISIS from it's early days as the descendant of Al Qaeda in Iraq. I learned that part of his people.
their success is due to the fact that many of Saddam Hussein's trained officers are leading their military efforts - and we're talking mid-level officers who actually did the work, not the generals who were usually political or family appointees. ISIS isn't just a "rabble in arms." I was also appalled by how Syrian leader Assad has played the situation to his own benefit at the expense of
Two things would have earned this book a higher rating from me. Maps would have helped a lot, and occasionally the authors seem to assume that we know more than we do. Still, I believe that with this background, I can now stay up with the news reports and better understand what's happening.
Weiss and Hassan, journalists and analysts in this region of the Middle East, have followed the rise of ISIS from it's early days as the descendant of Al Qaeda in Iraq. I learned that part of his people.
their success is due to the fact that many of Saddam Hussein's trained officers are leading their military efforts - and we're talking mid-level officers who actually did the work, not the generals who were usually political or family appointees. ISIS isn't just a "rabble in arms." I was also appalled by how Syrian leader Assad has played the situation to his own benefit at the expense of
Two things would have earned this book a higher rating from me. Maps would have helped a lot, and occasionally the authors seem to assume that we know more than we do. Still, I believe that with this background, I can now stay up with the news reports and better understand what's happening.
May 13, 2015
This book was written with an agenda, and far from being a objective view of the complicated middle-east situation as it stands today. It is an outright polemic to the Obama administration and a revisionist history tailored for a neocon audience. Full of mis-directions, thinly resourced references, and outright fabrications, it reads more like a youtube commenter having a flame war with himself than serious piece of journalism. Seriously, if this author has a paying gig at Foreign Policy Magazine, then they need to check themselves before they wreck themselves. My guess is you wont find this guys name in a masthead anywhere soon. On a positive note, I'm sure Michael Weiss has a long career ahead in 40 words or less at Twitter.
My advice, save your money and wait for a better author to tackle this subject. If you have any better book suggestions for me about this topic I would love to have them. Thank you.
My advice, save your money and wait for a better author to tackle this subject. If you have any better book suggestions for me about this topic I would love to have them. Thank you.
January 2, 2016
Exceptional book and description of the insurgency problems faced in the middle. This is not just about ISIS it is about other insurgency groups, Iraq and Syria. You come to an understanding that the US does not and has not understood the problems they would face before starting a war with Iraq. The focus is on the atrocities of ISIS but many more groups commit atrocities along with Iran, Syria and Iraq.
The US has no answer to stopping any of thr insurgents. It is a situation where ther no clear ways to bring peace. Any group the US would a line with is no better than ISIS The mentality of the Middle East is almost impossible to understand.
The success of ISIS is it's organization and the help they give different groups of people. Even though the help people they continue to massacre at will.
The US has no answer to stopping any of thr insurgents. It is a situation where ther no clear ways to bring peace. Any group the US would a line with is no better than ISIS The mentality of the Middle East is almost impossible to understand.
The success of ISIS is it's organization and the help they give different groups of people. Even though the help people they continue to massacre at will.
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