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Noor's Reviews > ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror
ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror
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by
A common misconception amongst many who discuss ISIL - be it the press, politicians, or otherwise - is the idea that the organisation sprung out of no where; or at least, that it is fairly nascent. This is a direct result of the western media eschewing the consequences of military intervention in the Iraq war, and the subsequent marginalisation of Iraqi Sunni Muslims.
We begin with events that even precede the second gulf war. The first chapter introduces us to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the now-deceased Jordanian al-Qaida agent who was too extreme for even Bin Laden. For the first 100 pages, we are taken through the evolution of Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the patronage of Zarqawi. We come to understand that the group flourished when the post-Saddam Iraqi government sidelined the Sunni community and espoused sectarian tensions, all with the knowledge of the U.S.A.
What is interesting is that the elite of AQI (and indeed ISIL today) comprise mainly of erstwhile secular Ba'athists who had benefited under the despotic Saddam regime. More interestingly perhaps are the links between the Iranian government and Al-Qaida, who, on the face of things, are sworn enemies. Nonetheless, the book tells us that Iran owes a lot to Al Qaida, and the former has been a place to where insurgents from AQ have fled.
The rest of the book takes us further to the organisation's involvement in Syria, whence it became known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (and eventually just 'The Islamic State'). Its involvement in Syria is shown to be as a result of the group opportunistically filling in the vacuum left by the world's inaction in Syria, coupled with the corruption of some of the rebel groups.
That ISIL has been met with little resistance in some areas of Iraq is shown to be as a result of the former treatment of the Sunni tribes who carried out the Sahwa/awakening. When the tribes previously attacked AQI, the Iraqi government marginalised them, refused to pay them and in some cases even arrested those who had fought the extremists.
ISIL and Assad have a symbiotic relationship with one another; neither are each other's primary targets, with them both focusing their attentions on the rebels. For example, Abu Qaqa, an extremist and hateful preacher, was given free reign to recruit in Aleppo. Although not revealed in the book, he was assassinated shortly after alluding in an interview with Al Arabiya that he worked for the Syrian intelligence services. Even when the Assad government did eventually shell ISIL in Raqqah, it focused its munitions on civilians, and only shelled ISIL targets once the building had been evacuated. This was done to create a ruse and convince the world that Assad was engaging in efforts against ISIL, while the reality was to detract away from the regime's barrel bombing and other atrocities. Even fighters loyal to Assad have despaired at the regime's lack of action towards IS.
Other opposition groups, aside from Jabhet Al-Nusra, get little mention. While the authors do not mention the success of some current liberated areas in Syria that are ruled over by rebel factions, such as in Idleb, they do point to the successful self-governing of certain communities in Al-Bab and Minbej prior to ISIL's occupation, redolent of the days when FSA fighters would engage with their communities and help pick rubbish off the streets.
The book also exposes the guileful tactics of the Assad regime in helping to further their claims. By avoiding ISIL targets, they essentially helped to "[tar] all insurgents as extremists." Moreover, intelligence has shown that there are more foreign fighters assisting Assad than there are of other groups, including reinforcements from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Quds force, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias, among others. The manpower of the Solaimani's Quds force in Syria alone is quoted as being as many as 100,000, owing to the exhaustion of the Syrian Arab Army.
Furthermore, not only do the upper ranks of ISIL consist of former Iraqi Ba'athists, but also of the very same 'political prisoners' released under Assad's general amnesty in 2011, in order to radicalise the opposition. Many of these were given cross-border access during the Iraq war, with evidences listed indicting the Assad regime in destabilising the region next door and actually helping with training/supplying these very same terrorists with munitions.
If you approach this book with little background on the topic, you might find yourself flabbergasted by the depth of the content. Particularly during the earlier chapters on Iraq, I found myself constantly referring back to persons/groups previously mentioned. Further to this, the writers use an esoteric style of writing; there were quite a few references that I had to look up, and although it did not disrupt the flow of information, it did slow my reading.
Among the issues I had with the book include its portrayal of what does or does not constitute an extremist Muslim. On more than one occasion, the writers allude to extremists by whether or not they pray or grow a beard, and non extremists are described in terms of drinking alcohol and having girlfriends. They also fail to recognise Syria's religious make-up, most of which is Sufi-leaning and generally repudiates the creed espoused by ISIL, in addition to the role local imams have had in refuting the legitimacy of the Islamic state.
Another issue I had was that the USA's role in Iraq is glossed over; while the authors do acknowledge that they failed in the role of being a non-partisan arbiter following Saddam's ousting, they do not put the bulk of the culpability of Iraq's destabilisation as being directly linked to their actions in the country, and that they were responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. They alienated Sunnis through supporting a replacement despotic regime and failing to support/engage with those who carried out the Sahwa. Iran is rightfully exposed for its imperialistic ambitions in the region on a sectarian level, but the USA is not afforded the same level of criticism.
While I have given this book only 3 stars, I would still recommend it as a great reference source for the discourse on ISIL, particularly as there is a massive void of credible information relating to the dubious origins of this hateful organisation.
We begin with events that even precede the second gulf war. The first chapter introduces us to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, the now-deceased Jordanian al-Qaida agent who was too extreme for even Bin Laden. For the first 100 pages, we are taken through the evolution of Al Qaida in Iraq (AQI) to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) under the patronage of Zarqawi. We come to understand that the group flourished when the post-Saddam Iraqi government sidelined the Sunni community and espoused sectarian tensions, all with the knowledge of the U.S.A.
What is interesting is that the elite of AQI (and indeed ISIL today) comprise mainly of erstwhile secular Ba'athists who had benefited under the despotic Saddam regime. More interestingly perhaps are the links between the Iranian government and Al-Qaida, who, on the face of things, are sworn enemies. Nonetheless, the book tells us that Iran owes a lot to Al Qaida, and the former has been a place to where insurgents from AQ have fled.
The rest of the book takes us further to the organisation's involvement in Syria, whence it became known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (and eventually just 'The Islamic State'). Its involvement in Syria is shown to be as a result of the group opportunistically filling in the vacuum left by the world's inaction in Syria, coupled with the corruption of some of the rebel groups.
That ISIL has been met with little resistance in some areas of Iraq is shown to be as a result of the former treatment of the Sunni tribes who carried out the Sahwa/awakening. When the tribes previously attacked AQI, the Iraqi government marginalised them, refused to pay them and in some cases even arrested those who had fought the extremists.
ISIL and Assad have a symbiotic relationship with one another; neither are each other's primary targets, with them both focusing their attentions on the rebels. For example, Abu Qaqa, an extremist and hateful preacher, was given free reign to recruit in Aleppo. Although not revealed in the book, he was assassinated shortly after alluding in an interview with Al Arabiya that he worked for the Syrian intelligence services. Even when the Assad government did eventually shell ISIL in Raqqah, it focused its munitions on civilians, and only shelled ISIL targets once the building had been evacuated. This was done to create a ruse and convince the world that Assad was engaging in efforts against ISIL, while the reality was to detract away from the regime's barrel bombing and other atrocities. Even fighters loyal to Assad have despaired at the regime's lack of action towards IS.
Other opposition groups, aside from Jabhet Al-Nusra, get little mention. While the authors do not mention the success of some current liberated areas in Syria that are ruled over by rebel factions, such as in Idleb, they do point to the successful self-governing of certain communities in Al-Bab and Minbej prior to ISIL's occupation, redolent of the days when FSA fighters would engage with their communities and help pick rubbish off the streets.
The book also exposes the guileful tactics of the Assad regime in helping to further their claims. By avoiding ISIL targets, they essentially helped to "[tar] all insurgents as extremists." Moreover, intelligence has shown that there are more foreign fighters assisting Assad than there are of other groups, including reinforcements from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Quds force, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias, among others. The manpower of the Solaimani's Quds force in Syria alone is quoted as being as many as 100,000, owing to the exhaustion of the Syrian Arab Army.
Furthermore, not only do the upper ranks of ISIL consist of former Iraqi Ba'athists, but also of the very same 'political prisoners' released under Assad's general amnesty in 2011, in order to radicalise the opposition. Many of these were given cross-border access during the Iraq war, with evidences listed indicting the Assad regime in destabilising the region next door and actually helping with training/supplying these very same terrorists with munitions.
If you approach this book with little background on the topic, you might find yourself flabbergasted by the depth of the content. Particularly during the earlier chapters on Iraq, I found myself constantly referring back to persons/groups previously mentioned. Further to this, the writers use an esoteric style of writing; there were quite a few references that I had to look up, and although it did not disrupt the flow of information, it did slow my reading.
Among the issues I had with the book include its portrayal of what does or does not constitute an extremist Muslim. On more than one occasion, the writers allude to extremists by whether or not they pray or grow a beard, and non extremists are described in terms of drinking alcohol and having girlfriends. They also fail to recognise Syria's religious make-up, most of which is Sufi-leaning and generally repudiates the creed espoused by ISIL, in addition to the role local imams have had in refuting the legitimacy of the Islamic state.
Another issue I had was that the USA's role in Iraq is glossed over; while the authors do acknowledge that they failed in the role of being a non-partisan arbiter following Saddam's ousting, they do not put the bulk of the culpability of Iraq's destabilisation as being directly linked to their actions in the country, and that they were responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians. They alienated Sunnis through supporting a replacement despotic regime and failing to support/engage with those who carried out the Sahwa. Iran is rightfully exposed for its imperialistic ambitions in the region on a sectarian level, but the USA is not afforded the same level of criticism.
While I have given this book only 3 stars, I would still recommend it as a great reference source for the discourse on ISIL, particularly as there is a massive void of credible information relating to the dubious origins of this hateful organisation.
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