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亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 賲賳鬲賴蹖 亘賴 賲乇诏
亘蹖乇丕賴 賳蹖爻鬲 丕诏乇 亘诏賵蹖蹖賲 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 賲賴賲鈥屫臂屬� 禺氐賵氐蹖丕鬲 賵 丿爻鬲丕賵乇丿賴丕蹖 賲鬲賮讴乇丕賳蹖 讴賴 丿乇 夭賲乇踿 賮蹖賱爻賵賮丕賳 丕诏夭蹖爻鬲丕賳爻 噩丕蹖 丿丕丿賴 卮丿賴鈥屫з嗀� 鬲賵噩賴 讴乇丿賳 賵 鬲賵噩賴 丿丕丿賳 亘賴 爻丕丨鬲 芦丕丨賵丕賱禄 丕賳爻丕賳蹖 亘賵丿賴 丕爻鬲貨 丌賳鈥屬囐� 丿乇 丕賮賯 賵爻蹖毓鈥屫臂� 讴賴 丿乇 丌賳 丕丨賵丕賱蹖 趩賵賳 賲賱丕賱貙 丕囟胤乇丕亘貙 丕賲蹖丿貙 丕丨爻丕爻 诏賳丕賴 賵鈥� 賵乇丕蹖 噩賳亘踿 氐乇賮丕 乇賵丕賳鈥屫促嗀ж屫� 賵丕噩丿 丿賱丕賱鬲鈥屬囏й� 賴爻鬲蹖鈥屫促嗀ж� 賵 丕诏夭蹖爻鬲丕賳爻蹖丕賱 賲丨爻賵亘 卮丿賴鈥屫з嗀�. 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賲蹖丕賳 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 丕賵賱蹖賳 賳丕賲鈥屬囏й屰� 讴賴 丕夭 禺丕胤乇 賲蹖鈥屭柏必� 爻賵乇賳 讴蹖鈥屰屫壁┶堌必� 賮蹖賱爻賵賮 賵 丕賱賴蹖鈥屫з� 丿丕賳賲丕乇讴蹖貙 丕爻鬲. 丿乇 讴鬲丕亘蹖 讴賴 亘賴 丿爻鬲 丿丕乇蹖丿 丕賵 乇丕 爻乇诏乇賲 讴賳丿賵讴丕賵 丿乇亘丕乇踿 丨丕賱蹖 賲蹖鈥屫ㄛ屬嗃屬� 讴賴 丕丨鬲賲丕賱丕賸 賴賲踿 賲丕貙 讴賲 蹖丕 亘蹖卮貙 丿乇 诏匕卮鬲賴 蹖丕 丨丕賱貙 丿爻鬲禺賵卮 丌賳 亘賵丿賴鈥屫й屬�: 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖.
亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 賲賳鬲賴蹖 亘賴 賲乇诏 讴鬲丕亘蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 丕賳丿蹖卮賴鈥屬囏� 賵 丿賱鈥屬呚簇嘿堎勠屸€屬囏й� 讴蹖鈥屰屫壁┶堌� 乇丕 丿乇 禺賵丿 噩丕蹖 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲. 禺賵丿 丕賵 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 丿賵 丕孬乇 亘乇鬲乇 禺賵蹖卮 賲蹖鈥屫з嗀池� 賵 诏賵丕乇丿蹖賳蹖 丌賳 乇丕 賲賳丕爻亘鈥屫臂屬� 賲賯丿賲賴 亘乇 丕賳丿蹖卮踿 丕賵 賲蹖鈥屫促呚必�. 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 賲賳鬲賴蹖 亘賴 賲乇诏貙 亘賴 鬲毓亘蹖乇蹖貙 讴鬲丕亘蹖 丕爻鬲 亘乇丕蹖 丌賴爻鬲賴鈥屫堌з嗀з�.
亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 賲賳鬲賴蹖 亘賴 賲乇诏 讴鬲丕亘蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 丕賳丿蹖卮賴鈥屬囏� 賵 丿賱鈥屬呚簇嘿堎勠屸€屬囏й� 讴蹖鈥屰屫壁┶堌� 乇丕 丿乇 禺賵丿 噩丕蹖 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲. 禺賵丿 丕賵 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 丿賵 丕孬乇 亘乇鬲乇 禺賵蹖卮 賲蹖鈥屫з嗀池� 賵 诏賵丕乇丿蹖賳蹖 丌賳 乇丕 賲賳丕爻亘鈥屫臂屬� 賲賯丿賲賴 亘乇 丕賳丿蹖卮踿 丕賵 賲蹖鈥屫促呚必�. 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 賲賳鬲賴蹖 亘賴 賲乇诏貙 亘賴 鬲毓亘蹖乇蹖貙 讴鬲丕亘蹖 丕爻鬲 亘乇丕蹖 丌賴爻鬲賴鈥屫堌з嗀з�.
226 pages, Paperback
First published July 30, 1849
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About the author
S酶ren Kierkegaard
1,099听books6,110听followersS酶ren Aabye Kierkegaard was a prolific 19th century Danish philosopher and theologian. Kierkegaard strongly criticised both the Hegelianism of his time and what he saw as the empty formalities of the Church of Denmark. Much of his work deals with religious themes such as faith in God, the institution of the Christian Church, Christian ethics and theology, and the emotions and feelings of individuals when faced with life choices. His early work was written under various pseudonyms who present their own distinctive viewpoints in a complex dialogue.
Kierkegaard left the task of discovering the meaning of his works to the reader, because "the task must be made difficult, for only the difficult inspires the noble-hearted". Scholars have interpreted Kierkegaard variously as an existentialist, neo-orthodoxist, postmodernist, humanist, and individualist.
Crossing the boundaries of philosophy, theology, psychology, and literature, he is an influential figure in contemporary thought.
Kierkegaard left the task of discovering the meaning of his works to the reader, because "the task must be made difficult, for only the difficult inspires the noble-hearted". Scholars have interpreted Kierkegaard variously as an existentialist, neo-orthodoxist, postmodernist, humanist, and individualist.
Crossing the boundaries of philosophy, theology, psychology, and literature, he is an influential figure in contemporary thought.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 718 reviews
August 13, 2013
For Kierkegaard, 鈥渢he self is not the relation (which relates to itself) but the relation鈥檚 relating to itself.鈥� From the start, he shifts from a Cartesian or essentialist view of the self to an existentialist one. Whereas for Descartes 鈥渟elf鈥� is a common noun, for Kierkegaard, it is a gerund. And the embedded verb, to relate, points to the dynamics of the self. In this case, relating to itself.
The first despair is that 鈥渨hich is ignorant of being in despair, or the despairing ignorance of having a self and an eternal self.鈥� Similar to the 鈥渦nexamined life鈥� of Socrates, this is the unexamined self. And for Kierkegaard, this is the most common despair, though the individuals involved aren鈥檛 aware of it. In the Christian worldview, 鈥渁 human being is a synthesis of the infinite and finite,鈥� and therefore the tension between these poles becomes the source of next two types of despair: 鈥渨anting in despair to be oneself鈥� and 鈥渘ot wanting in despair to be oneself.鈥�
For Kierkegaard, despair is the sickness unto death, one different from an ordinary sickness that leads to physical death. Within the Christian framework, physical death may be a path toward eternal life and a dying person may hope for the life after. But despair, as the sickness unto death, is when one hopes for death as a resolution, but the person cannot die. Hence, the despair. Such despair presupposes life after death. For the atheistic existentialist, such as Sartre or Camus, death is the ultimate end and creates the despair by nullifying hope and achievement and life.
Faith, the interacting with the 鈥減ower which established it,鈥� is for Kierkegaard the only way the self can overcome despair.
Kierkegaard contributes to Christianity by reformulating faith as the dynamics between the believer and the 鈥減ower that established it,鈥� in overcoming the ignorance of a self, and in reintegrating the self with this power so as to resolve the tension between the two. Not longer is faith accepting a set of doctrines and carrying out the rites and rituals of the Church.
And he contributes to our understanding of human beings by modeling the self as the relating to itself and others, rather than as static stuffs: bodies, minds, souls and spirits, etc. So the focus shifts from being to becoming.
The first despair is that 鈥渨hich is ignorant of being in despair, or the despairing ignorance of having a self and an eternal self.鈥� Similar to the 鈥渦nexamined life鈥� of Socrates, this is the unexamined self. And for Kierkegaard, this is the most common despair, though the individuals involved aren鈥檛 aware of it. In the Christian worldview, 鈥渁 human being is a synthesis of the infinite and finite,鈥� and therefore the tension between these poles becomes the source of next two types of despair: 鈥渨anting in despair to be oneself鈥� and 鈥渘ot wanting in despair to be oneself.鈥�
For Kierkegaard, despair is the sickness unto death, one different from an ordinary sickness that leads to physical death. Within the Christian framework, physical death may be a path toward eternal life and a dying person may hope for the life after. But despair, as the sickness unto death, is when one hopes for death as a resolution, but the person cannot die. Hence, the despair. Such despair presupposes life after death. For the atheistic existentialist, such as Sartre or Camus, death is the ultimate end and creates the despair by nullifying hope and achievement and life.
Faith, the interacting with the 鈥減ower which established it,鈥� is for Kierkegaard the only way the self can overcome despair.
Kierkegaard contributes to Christianity by reformulating faith as the dynamics between the believer and the 鈥減ower that established it,鈥� in overcoming the ignorance of a self, and in reintegrating the self with this power so as to resolve the tension between the two. Not longer is faith accepting a set of doctrines and carrying out the rites and rituals of the Church.
And he contributes to our understanding of human beings by modeling the self as the relating to itself and others, rather than as static stuffs: bodies, minds, souls and spirits, etc. So the focus shifts from being to becoming.
February 14, 2017
Identity in an industrialised world
14 October 2013
This book seems to simply ramble on with only a vague structure to it. The reason I say a vague structure is because the first part deals with despair and the second part deals with the nature of sin. However within both parts Kierkegaard doesn't seem to actually be moving in any specific direction, nor does he seem to come to any particular conclusion 鈥� if I were marking this as an essay, I would probably give it good marks in relation to content (which I why I gave it such a high rating, because in amongst all of the ramblings, he makes some very insightful statements) but give it an very low mark in regards to structure. However, as I have mentioned, I am more interested in the content than in the structure.
Kierkegaard (which, by the way, means graveyard in Danish) is considered to be the father of existentialism. It wasn't that one day he decided to sit down an write a new philosophy, but rather he was writing in response to the changes that he was seeing going on around him and building upon the philosophies of those that came before him. Kierkegaard was also a Christian, and had studied for the priesthood, however we wasn't connected with any specific church. This is not surprising because at the time Denmark had a state church, and with all state churches, if one does not tow the line, one does not get to speak.
The situation that Kierkegaard is writing about is the destruction of the self that was coming about with modernisation. As people began to move from the country to the cities, people's individuality, and identity, were beginning to disappear. This was also happening within industrialisation, as the skilled person was being replaced with a multitude of unskilled workers. Where previously a nail would be individually made by a blacksmith who was skilled in making all sorts of items, nails were now made by a team who were required to work on only one part of the nail. As such, the identity of the skilled blacksmith was being replaced by the workers, who in effect had no identity at all.
This, as Kierkegaard suggests, is the progenitor of despair. Further, this loss of identity also created a loss of purpose, and when one's purpose is removed, it goes on to add to the despair. Maybe this is why depression is so common in the developed world today because we have effectively lost our identity, and simply find ourselves as being one of the crowd. For instance, as in my case, I like to review and comment on books, but so do hundreds of other people, and as such I find myself competing with hundreds (or even thousands) of other people for readership of my commentaries, and if twenty of them have picked up a large following then I feel, in the end, that I have been left behind, and as such all of my work means nothing 鈥� I have lost my purpose, and in the end there is nothing left but despair.
So the question that arises is: what is existentialism? It is the idea that we define who we are rather than letting other people define ourselves. This is the essence of despair because if I base my ability to write a commentary by the number of likes that I get then I find that I am letting others define who I am. Instead, if I let define myself as someone who likes to read, and then write about what I have read, and the thoughts and ideas that I have while I have been reading, then it does not matter what other people think, because I have given myself my own definition. It is also the case outside of this particular sphere because if you let people define who you are 'David, I can see that you are this type of person' then we open ourselves up to despair because we give our identity to others to enchain us with their opinion. How would one respond to that? Me, I simply ignore that person, and go and find somebody else to spend time with, somebody who is not going to attempt to define me, but allow me to define myself.
I guess that is what Kierkegaard is trying to do (and I don't really think he does it well in my opinion, because this book is very dense, and also hard to follow his argument) and that is to empower us to escape from the cycle of despair and to make us realise that in God's eyes we are actually somebody, and while we may have a meaningless, dead-end job, we can escape that by giving ourselves our own identity and our own definition. Another example from my own life is that in my previous role I let it define me, and because I let it define me, it depressed me. This time I just acknowledge that I do work, and I work for an insurance company, but then try to move away from that to talk about other things so that my job does not define me, but rather I define myself. Look, it isn't easy, and people really don't like it when you empower yourself like that, but as said, that which doesn't kill you, only makes you stronger (and he was also an existentialist philosopher).
14 October 2013
This book seems to simply ramble on with only a vague structure to it. The reason I say a vague structure is because the first part deals with despair and the second part deals with the nature of sin. However within both parts Kierkegaard doesn't seem to actually be moving in any specific direction, nor does he seem to come to any particular conclusion 鈥� if I were marking this as an essay, I would probably give it good marks in relation to content (which I why I gave it such a high rating, because in amongst all of the ramblings, he makes some very insightful statements) but give it an very low mark in regards to structure. However, as I have mentioned, I am more interested in the content than in the structure.
Kierkegaard (which, by the way, means graveyard in Danish) is considered to be the father of existentialism. It wasn't that one day he decided to sit down an write a new philosophy, but rather he was writing in response to the changes that he was seeing going on around him and building upon the philosophies of those that came before him. Kierkegaard was also a Christian, and had studied for the priesthood, however we wasn't connected with any specific church. This is not surprising because at the time Denmark had a state church, and with all state churches, if one does not tow the line, one does not get to speak.
The situation that Kierkegaard is writing about is the destruction of the self that was coming about with modernisation. As people began to move from the country to the cities, people's individuality, and identity, were beginning to disappear. This was also happening within industrialisation, as the skilled person was being replaced with a multitude of unskilled workers. Where previously a nail would be individually made by a blacksmith who was skilled in making all sorts of items, nails were now made by a team who were required to work on only one part of the nail. As such, the identity of the skilled blacksmith was being replaced by the workers, who in effect had no identity at all.
This, as Kierkegaard suggests, is the progenitor of despair. Further, this loss of identity also created a loss of purpose, and when one's purpose is removed, it goes on to add to the despair. Maybe this is why depression is so common in the developed world today because we have effectively lost our identity, and simply find ourselves as being one of the crowd. For instance, as in my case, I like to review and comment on books, but so do hundreds of other people, and as such I find myself competing with hundreds (or even thousands) of other people for readership of my commentaries, and if twenty of them have picked up a large following then I feel, in the end, that I have been left behind, and as such all of my work means nothing 鈥� I have lost my purpose, and in the end there is nothing left but despair.
So the question that arises is: what is existentialism? It is the idea that we define who we are rather than letting other people define ourselves. This is the essence of despair because if I base my ability to write a commentary by the number of likes that I get then I find that I am letting others define who I am. Instead, if I let define myself as someone who likes to read, and then write about what I have read, and the thoughts and ideas that I have while I have been reading, then it does not matter what other people think, because I have given myself my own definition. It is also the case outside of this particular sphere because if you let people define who you are 'David, I can see that you are this type of person' then we open ourselves up to despair because we give our identity to others to enchain us with their opinion. How would one respond to that? Me, I simply ignore that person, and go and find somebody else to spend time with, somebody who is not going to attempt to define me, but allow me to define myself.
I guess that is what Kierkegaard is trying to do (and I don't really think he does it well in my opinion, because this book is very dense, and also hard to follow his argument) and that is to empower us to escape from the cycle of despair and to make us realise that in God's eyes we are actually somebody, and while we may have a meaningless, dead-end job, we can escape that by giving ourselves our own identity and our own definition. Another example from my own life is that in my previous role I let it define me, and because I let it define me, it depressed me. This time I just acknowledge that I do work, and I work for an insurance company, but then try to move away from that to talk about other things so that my job does not define me, but rather I define myself. Look, it isn't easy, and people really don't like it when you empower yourself like that, but as said, that which doesn't kill you, only makes you stronger (and he was also an existentialist philosopher).
March 9, 2019
鬲丨賯蹖賯蹖 丿乇 賲丕賴蹖鬲 賳賮爻 賵 賲丕賴蹖鬲 丕賵丕賲乇 氐丕丿乇賴 丕夭 賳賮爻 賲賳 噩賲賱賴 诏賳丕賴 賵 賳丕 丕賲蹖丿蹖. 乇蹖卮踿 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 賳丕 丕賲蹖丿蹖 賴丕 丿乇 诏賳丕賴 賵 亘丕賱毓讴爻貙 乇蹖卮踿 亘爻蹖丕乇蹖 丕夭 诏賳丕賴 賴丕 賳蹖夭 丿乇 賳丕 丕賲蹖丿蹖 丕爻鬲. 讴蹖乇讴诏賵乇 丌賳趩賳丕賳 讴賴 禺丕氐蹖鬲 丕賵爻鬲貙 丕睾賱亘 丿乇 賲賯丕賲 賳賵毓蹖 賮蹖賱爻賵賮 賲鬲丕賱賴 亘賴 亘蹖丕賳 丌乇丕蹖 禺賵丿 賲蹖 倬乇丿丕夭丿. 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 賳蹖夭貙 賳賵毓蹖 亘蹖夭丕乇蹖 丕夭 讴賱蹖爻丕 賵 丌乇丕蹖 丌賳 賲卮賴賵丿 丕爻鬲. 丕賲丕 丿乇 鬲丨賱蹖賱貙 亘爻蹖丕乇 禺賵丿 乇丕 賵丕亘爻鬲賴 亘賴 爻賳鬲 賵 讴鬲丕亘 賲蹖 诏乇丿丕賳丿. 賲賴賲 鬲乇蹖賳 賳賵毓 賳丕 丕賲蹖丿蹖 讴賴 賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳丿 賯丕亘賱 亘丨孬 亘丕卮丿 賳丕 丕賲蹖丿蹖 丕夭 禺賵丿 亘賵丿賳 賵 蹖丕 賳丕 丕賲蹖丿蹖 丕夭 亘賵丿賳 賵 賴賲 趩賳蹖賳 賳丕 丕賲蹖丿蹖 丕夭 亘賵丿賳 丿乇 ... 丕爻鬲. 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 亘丕 亘爻胤 賵 鬲賵囟蹖丨 爻賴 賲賮賴賵賲 賳丕 丕賲蹖丿蹖貙 賳賮爻 賵 賲乇诏 诏賮鬲丕乇 禺賵丿 乇丕 丕爻賱賵亘 賲蹖 亘禺卮丿. 亘丨孬 賴丕蹖 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 丿乇 丨讴賲 賲賯丿賲賴 賵 倬蹖卮诏賮鬲丕乇蹖 丕爻鬲 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賲賵囟賵毓 讴賴 丕鬲賮丕賯丕 噩丕賱亘 鬲乇 賵 诏蹖乇丕鬲乇 丕夭 亘賯蹖踿 讴鬲丕亘 丕爻鬲. 丿乇 丕賵丕爻胤 賵 丕賵丕禺乇 讴鬲丕亘貙 诏賮鬲丕乇賴丕 賱丨賳蹖 賳氐蹖丨鬲 賲丕賳賳丿 亘賴 禺賵丿 賲蹖 诏蹖乇賳丿 讴賴 丕蹖賳 毓丕賲賱 賲賵噩亘 爻乇 乇賮鬲賳 丨賵氐賱踿 賲禺丕胤亘 賲蹖 诏乇丿丿.
May 27, 2023
鈥溍杔眉mc眉l hastal谋k umutsuzluk鈥� slogan olarak her zaman 莽ok etkilemi艧tir beni, umut s枚z konusu edildi臒inde hep bu s枚z gelir akl谋ma. Ama Kierkegaard gibi varolu艧umuzu yans谋tan umutsuzluk duygusunu ne ruha ne de tanr谋ya hele de Hristiyanl谋臒a (yani dine) hi莽bir 艧ekilde ba臒lamam. Umutsuzluk ne g眉naht谋r ne ruh hastal谋臒谋d谋r, o insana aittir, bir insanl谋k halidir ve 枚l眉mc眉l olabilir bana g枚re.
Kitaptaki felsefi de臒erlendirmelere bir艧ey s枚ylemek haddime de臒il, ama Kierkegaard鈥櫮眓 Hristiyanl谋k i莽in s枚ylediklerine akl谋m谋n yatmad谋臒谋n谋 hatta onun felsefesini de sorgulatt谋臒谋n谋 cesurca s枚ylemeliyim. Kitaptan alaca臒谋m谋 ald谋m ben, en 莽ok da insan谋n umutsuzlu臒u reddetmesinin, umutsuz olmad谋臒谋n谋 s枚ylemesinin bile bir umutsuzluk olabilece臒inin belirtildi臒i b枚l眉mlerden.
Kitaptaki felsefi de臒erlendirmelere bir艧ey s枚ylemek haddime de臒il, ama Kierkegaard鈥櫮眓 Hristiyanl谋k i莽in s枚ylediklerine akl谋m谋n yatmad谋臒谋n谋 hatta onun felsefesini de sorgulatt谋臒谋n谋 cesurca s枚ylemeliyim. Kitaptan alaca臒谋m谋 ald谋m ben, en 莽ok da insan谋n umutsuzlu臒u reddetmesinin, umutsuz olmad谋臒谋n谋 s枚ylemesinin bile bir umutsuzluk olabilece臒inin belirtildi臒i b枚l眉mlerden.
February 10, 2019
丕賵賱 丕蹖賳賵 亘诏賲 讴賴 鬲乇噩賲賴 賯丕亘賱 賯亘賵賱 賳亘賵丿. 丕氐乇丕乇 夭蹖丕丿 亘賴 鬲丨鬲 丕賱賱賮馗蹖 亘賵丿賳貙 丌丿賲 乇賵 亘賴 丕蹖賳 卮讴 賲蹖 丕賳丿丕禺鬲 讴賴 賲鬲乇噩賲 丨乇賮蹖 讴賴 賲鬲賳 丕氐賱蹖 賲蹖禺賵丕丿 亘夭賳賴 乇賵 賲鬲賵噩賴 賳卮丿賴貙 丿乇 賳鬲蹖噩賴 賲噩亘賵乇 卮丿賴 亘丕 丿賯鬲 賵爻賵丕爻 诏賵賳賴 賵 亘蹖賲丕乇诏賵賳賴 丕蹖 賱賮馗 亘賴 賱賮馗 鬲乇噩賲賴 讴賳賴. (亘毓丿丕賸 亘丕 鬲乇噩賲賴 賴丕蹖 丿蹖诏賴贁 乇丐蹖丕 賲賳噩賲 賲賵丕噩賴 卮丿賲貙 賵 賮賴賲蹖丿賲 賴賲賴 亘賴 毓賳賵丕賳 蹖賴 賲鬲乇噩賲 亘丿 讴賴 亘賴 鬲乇噩賲賴贁 丌孬丕乇蹖 亘夭乇诏 鬲乇 丕夭 丨丿 爻賵丕丿卮 丿爻鬲 夭丿賴 賲蹖 卮賳丕爻賳卮.)
丨乇賵賮 趩蹖賳蹖 賵 毓賱丕賲鬲 诏匕丕乇蹖 賵 賵蹖乇丕爻鬲丕乇蹖 賴賲 丕賮鬲囟丕丨 亘賵丿賳. 噩丕賴丕蹖蹖 丨鬲丕 讴賱賲丕鬲 乇賵 丕卮鬲亘丕賴 賳賵卮鬲賴 亘賵丿賳貙 丿乇 賳鬲蹖噩賴 賲毓賳丕蹖 噩賲賱賴貙 讴丕賲賱丕賸 毓讴爻 丕賵賳 趩蹖夭蹖 賲蹖 卮丿 讴賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賲蹖 禺賵丕爻鬲 亘诏賴 賵 丕蹖賳 乇賵 賲鬲賵噩賴 賳賲蹖 卮丿蹖貙 賲诏乇 亘毓丿 丕夭 丿賵 氐賮丨賴 亘丕 诏蹖噩蹖 賵 爻乇丿乇诏賲蹖 倬蹖卮 乇賮鬲賳.
丿賵賲 丕蹖賳 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘貙 賳賵卮鬲賴 蹖 蹖讴 賮蹖賱爻賵賮 賴诏賱蹖賴. 蹖毓賳蹖 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丿蹖丕賱讴鬲蹖讴 賴诏賱貙 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 毓賳丕氐乇 丕爻丕爻蹖 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘賴 賵 倬蹖賵爻鬲賴 亘賴 毓賳賵丕賳 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 亘乇 丨乇賮 賴丕卮 丕夭 丿蹖丕賱讴鬲蹖讴 丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 賲蹖 讴賳賴. 丕夭 丕賵賳 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 賲賳 賮賯胤 蹖賴 丌卮賳丕蹖蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 亘爻蹖丕乇 丕亘鬲丿丕蹖蹖 亘丕 賴诏賱 丿丕乇賲 (丿乇 丨丿 丿賳蹖丕蹖 爻賵賮蹖!!!) 丕蹖賳 賯爻賲鬲 賴丕 乇賵 爻乇蹖毓 賵 亘丿賵賳 鬲賱丕卮 亘乇丕蹖 賮賴賲蹖丿賳 賲蹖 禺賵賳丿賲 賵 賲蹖诏匕卮鬲賲 讴賴 丕賱亘鬲賴 亘丕毓孬 丨爻乇鬲 禺賵乇丿賳 賲蹖卮丿.
爻賵賲貙 丕蹖賳 讴賴 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 賯賵賱 禺賵丿 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴貙 "亘蹖卮 丕夭 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丿賯蹖賯 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘禺賵丕賴丿 倬丕乇爻丕蹖丕賳賴 亘丕卮丿" 蹖丕 "亘蹖卮 丕夭 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丿賯蹖賯 賵 賮賱爻賮蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘禺賵丕賴丿 毓丕賲賴 倬爻賳丿 亘丕卮丿". 亘賴 毓亘丕乇鬲 丿蹖诏乇貙 讴鬲丕亘 亘蹖卮鬲乇 丨丕賱鬲 賮賱爻賮蹖-乇賵丕賳卮賳丕爻丕賳賴 丿丕乇丿 賵 禺卮讴 丕爻鬲. 丕夭 丕蹖賳 噩賴鬲貙 禺賵丕賳丿賳卮 丨賵氐賱賴 蹖 夭蹖丕丿蹖 賲蹖 禺賵丕賴丿 賲禺氐賵氐丕賸 亘乇丕蹖 丕賲孬丕賱 賲賳 讴賴 丿賳亘丕賱 賲鬲賵賳 爻丕丿賴 賮賴賲 賴爻鬲賳丿.
丕夭 丕蹖賳 爻賴 賲賵乇丿 讴賴 亘诏匕乇蹖賲貙 噩丕賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘 爻丕丿賴 亘賵丿 賵 禺卮讴 賳亘賵丿 賵 賲鬲乇噩賲 賵 賵蹖乇丕爻鬲丕乇 賴賲 夭蹖丕丿 乇賵蹖 丕毓氐丕亘 賳亘賵丿賳丿貙 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 胤乇夭 丿蹖賵丕賳賴 讴賳賳丿賴 丕蹖 夭蹖亘丕 賲蹖 卮丿. 丕夭 丌賳 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 丕夭 鬲賴 丿賱賲貙 丕夭 丕毓賲丕賯 噩丕賳賲 亘賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丕卮 賮丨卮 賲蹖 丿丕丿賲. (賲賳 賲毓賲賵賱丕賸 亘賴 丿丕爻鬲丕蹖賮爻讴蹖 賴賲 賮丨卮 賲蹖 丿賲 賵 丿丕爻鬲丕蹖賮爻讴蹖 亘賴 賳馗乇賲 乇亘 丕賱賳賵毓 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賴丕爻鬲) 丕夭 噩賲賱賴 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 乇丕噩毓 亘賴 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖 亘蹖 賵丕爻胤賴 (丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 亘賴 賯丿乇蹖 丿乇 睾賲 賵 卮丕丿蹖 丿賳蹖丕蹖 丕胤乇丕賮 睾乇賯賳丿 讴賴 賮乇丕賲賵卮 讴乇丿賴 丕賳丿 "禺賵丿" 賵 "賳賮爻蹖" 賴賲 丿丕乇賳丿) 賵 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖 丿乇賵賳诏乇丕 (丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖卮丕賳 賴賲乇丕賴 亘丕 囟毓賮 賵 丕賳賮毓丕賱 賵 乇賵讴乇丿賳 亘賴 丿賳蹖丕蹖 丿乇賵賳 丕爻鬲) 賵 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖賽 倬乇禺丕卮诏乇丕賳賴 (丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 丿乇 賳鬲蹖噩賴 蹖 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖貙 鬲賳丿禺賵 賵 毓氐亘蹖 賲蹖 卮賵賳丿貙 賳賲賵賳賴 蹖 乇賵卮賳卮 賮讴乇 讴賳賲 乇丕爻讴賵賱賳蹖讴賵賮 賵 丕蹖賵丕賳 讴丕乇丕賲丕夭賵賮 賵 卮禺氐蹖鬲 丕氐賱蹖 "倬丿乇丕賳 賵 倬爻乇丕賳" 亘丕卮丿 讴賴 丕爻賲卮 蹖丕丿賲 賳蹖爻鬲)貙 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 乇丕噩毓 亘賴 丕蹖賳 爻賴 賳賵毓 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丨乇賮 賲蹖 夭丿貙 丕賵噩 讴鬲丕亘 亘賵丿 賵 賵丕賯毓丕賸 卮蹖賮鬲賴 蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賵 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 卮 卮丿賲. 賴賲蹖賳 胤賵乇 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 乇丕噩毓 亘賴 诏賳丕賴 亘賵丿賳 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丨乇賮 賲蹖夭丿.
禺賱丕氐賴貙 丿乇 賲噩賲賵毓 讴鬲丕亘 禺賵卮丕蹖賳丿蹖 亘賵丿. 亘丕蹖丿 亘蹖卮鬲乇 丕夭 讴蹖乇讴诏賵乇 亘禺賵賳賲.
丨乇賵賮 趩蹖賳蹖 賵 毓賱丕賲鬲 诏匕丕乇蹖 賵 賵蹖乇丕爻鬲丕乇蹖 賴賲 丕賮鬲囟丕丨 亘賵丿賳. 噩丕賴丕蹖蹖 丨鬲丕 讴賱賲丕鬲 乇賵 丕卮鬲亘丕賴 賳賵卮鬲賴 亘賵丿賳貙 丿乇 賳鬲蹖噩賴 賲毓賳丕蹖 噩賲賱賴貙 讴丕賲賱丕賸 毓讴爻 丕賵賳 趩蹖夭蹖 賲蹖 卮丿 讴賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賲蹖 禺賵丕爻鬲 亘诏賴 賵 丕蹖賳 乇賵 賲鬲賵噩賴 賳賲蹖 卮丿蹖貙 賲诏乇 亘毓丿 丕夭 丿賵 氐賮丨賴 亘丕 诏蹖噩蹖 賵 爻乇丿乇诏賲蹖 倬蹖卮 乇賮鬲賳.
丿賵賲 丕蹖賳 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘貙 賳賵卮鬲賴 蹖 蹖讴 賮蹖賱爻賵賮 賴诏賱蹖賴. 蹖毓賳蹖 賮賱爻賮賴 蹖 丿蹖丕賱讴鬲蹖讴 賴诏賱貙 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 毓賳丕氐乇 丕爻丕爻蹖 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘賴 賵 倬蹖賵爻鬲賴 亘賴 毓賳賵丕賳 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 亘乇 丨乇賮 賴丕卮 丕夭 丿蹖丕賱讴鬲蹖讴 丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 賲蹖 讴賳賴. 丕夭 丕賵賳 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 賲賳 賮賯胤 蹖賴 丌卮賳丕蹖蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 亘爻蹖丕乇 丕亘鬲丿丕蹖蹖 亘丕 賴诏賱 丿丕乇賲 (丿乇 丨丿 丿賳蹖丕蹖 爻賵賮蹖!!!) 丕蹖賳 賯爻賲鬲 賴丕 乇賵 爻乇蹖毓 賵 亘丿賵賳 鬲賱丕卮 亘乇丕蹖 賮賴賲蹖丿賳 賲蹖 禺賵賳丿賲 賵 賲蹖诏匕卮鬲賲 讴賴 丕賱亘鬲賴 亘丕毓孬 丨爻乇鬲 禺賵乇丿賳 賲蹖卮丿.
爻賵賲貙 丕蹖賳 讴賴 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 賯賵賱 禺賵丿 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴貙 "亘蹖卮 丕夭 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丿賯蹖賯 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘禺賵丕賴丿 倬丕乇爻丕蹖丕賳賴 亘丕卮丿" 蹖丕 "亘蹖卮 丕夭 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丿賯蹖賯 賵 賮賱爻賮蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘禺賵丕賴丿 毓丕賲賴 倬爻賳丿 亘丕卮丿". 亘賴 毓亘丕乇鬲 丿蹖诏乇貙 讴鬲丕亘 亘蹖卮鬲乇 丨丕賱鬲 賮賱爻賮蹖-乇賵丕賳卮賳丕爻丕賳賴 丿丕乇丿 賵 禺卮讴 丕爻鬲. 丕夭 丕蹖賳 噩賴鬲貙 禺賵丕賳丿賳卮 丨賵氐賱賴 蹖 夭蹖丕丿蹖 賲蹖 禺賵丕賴丿 賲禺氐賵氐丕賸 亘乇丕蹖 丕賲孬丕賱 賲賳 讴賴 丿賳亘丕賱 賲鬲賵賳 爻丕丿賴 賮賴賲 賴爻鬲賳丿.
丕夭 丕蹖賳 爻賴 賲賵乇丿 讴賴 亘诏匕乇蹖賲貙 噩丕賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 讴鬲丕亘 爻丕丿賴 亘賵丿 賵 禺卮讴 賳亘賵丿 賵 賲鬲乇噩賲 賵 賵蹖乇丕爻鬲丕乇 賴賲 夭蹖丕丿 乇賵蹖 丕毓氐丕亘 賳亘賵丿賳丿貙 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 胤乇夭 丿蹖賵丕賳賴 讴賳賳丿賴 丕蹖 夭蹖亘丕 賲蹖 卮丿. 丕夭 丌賳 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 丕夭 鬲賴 丿賱賲貙 丕夭 丕毓賲丕賯 噩丕賳賲 亘賴 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 丕卮 賮丨卮 賲蹖 丿丕丿賲. (賲賳 賲毓賲賵賱丕賸 亘賴 丿丕爻鬲丕蹖賮爻讴蹖 賴賲 賮丨卮 賲蹖 丿賲 賵 丿丕爻鬲丕蹖賮爻讴蹖 亘賴 賳馗乇賲 乇亘 丕賱賳賵毓 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 賴丕爻鬲) 丕夭 噩賲賱賴 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 乇丕噩毓 亘賴 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖 亘蹖 賵丕爻胤賴 (丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 亘賴 賯丿乇蹖 丿乇 睾賲 賵 卮丕丿蹖 丿賳蹖丕蹖 丕胤乇丕賮 睾乇賯賳丿 讴賴 賮乇丕賲賵卮 讴乇丿賴 丕賳丿 "禺賵丿" 賵 "賳賮爻蹖" 賴賲 丿丕乇賳丿) 賵 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖 丿乇賵賳诏乇丕 (丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖卮丕賳 賴賲乇丕賴 亘丕 囟毓賮 賵 丕賳賮毓丕賱 賵 乇賵讴乇丿賳 亘賴 丿賳蹖丕蹖 丿乇賵賳 丕爻鬲) 賵 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖賽 倬乇禺丕卮诏乇丕賳賴 (丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 丿乇 賳鬲蹖噩賴 蹖 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖貙 鬲賳丿禺賵 賵 毓氐亘蹖 賲蹖 卮賵賳丿貙 賳賲賵賳賴 蹖 乇賵卮賳卮 賮讴乇 讴賳賲 乇丕爻讴賵賱賳蹖讴賵賮 賵 丕蹖賵丕賳 讴丕乇丕賲丕夭賵賮 賵 卮禺氐蹖鬲 丕氐賱蹖 "倬丿乇丕賳 賵 倬爻乇丕賳" 亘丕卮丿 讴賴 丕爻賲卮 蹖丕丿賲 賳蹖爻鬲)貙 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 乇丕噩毓 亘賴 丕蹖賳 爻賴 賳賵毓 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丨乇賮 賲蹖 夭丿貙 丕賵噩 讴鬲丕亘 亘賵丿 賵 賵丕賯毓丕賸 卮蹖賮鬲賴 蹖 讴鬲丕亘 賵 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴 卮 卮丿賲. 賴賲蹖賳 胤賵乇 噩丕蹖蹖 讴賴 乇丕噩毓 亘賴 诏賳丕賴 亘賵丿賳 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丨乇賮 賲蹖夭丿.
禺賱丕氐賴貙 丿乇 賲噩賲賵毓 讴鬲丕亘 禺賵卮丕蹖賳丿蹖 亘賵丿. 亘丕蹖丿 亘蹖卮鬲乇 丕夭 讴蹖乇讴诏賵乇 亘禺賵賳賲.
January 21, 2016
丿乇 亘丕亘 丕孬亘丕鬲 賳丕賲蹖乇丕蹖蹖 讴蹖 蹖乇讴賴 诏賵乇賲蹖 诏賵蹖丿 爻賯乇丕胤 賳丕賲蹖乇丕蹖蹖 噩丕賳 乇丕 丕夭 乇賵蹖 丕蹖賳 丨賯蹖賯鬲 孬丕亘鬲 讴乇丿 讴賴 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 噩丕賳(诏賳丕賴) 丌賳 噩丕賳 乇丕 亘賴 賴賲丕賳 氐賵乇鬲蹖 鬲丨賱蹖賱 賳賲蹖 亘乇丿 讴賴 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 鬲賳貙鬲賳 乇丕 鬲丨賱蹖賱 賲蹖 亘乇丿.亘賴 賴賲蹖賳 鬲乇鬲蹖亘 賳蹖夭 賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳 丕賲乇 噩丕賵丿丕賳 丿乇 丕賳爻丕賳 乇丕 丕夭 乇賵蹖 丕蹖賳 丨賯蹖賯鬲 賳卮丕賳 丿丕丿 讴賴 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 賳賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳丿 禺賵丿 乇丕 鬲丨賱蹖賱 亘乇丿貙賵 賴賲蹖賳 丿賯蹖賯丕 賵噩賵丿 鬲囟丕丿 丿乇 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕爻鬲 . 丕诏乇 趩蹖夭蹖 噩丕賵丿丕賳 丿乇 丕賳爻丕賳 賳亘賵丿貙賳賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳爻鬲 賳賵賲蹖丿 卮賵丿貙丕賲丕 丕诏乇 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳爻鬲 禺賵丿 乇丕 鬲丨賱蹖賱 亘乇丿貙亘丕夭 賴賲 丕賲讴丕賳 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕卮鬲
賵蹖 爻倬爻 丕賳賵丕毓 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 乇丕 卮乇丨 賲蹖 丿賴丿 賵丿乇亘丕乇賴 丌诏丕賴蹖 賲蹖 诏賵蹖丿亘丕 賴乇 丕賮夭丕蹖卮蹖 丿乇 賲蹖夭丕賳 丌诏丕賴蹖 貙 賵亘賴 鬲賳丕爻亘 丕蹖賳 丕賮夭丕蹖卮 貙卮丿鬲 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕賮夭丕蹖卮 賲蹖 蹖丕亘丿:賴乇趩賴 丌诏丕賴蹖 亘蹖卮鬲乇 亘丕卮丿 貙賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 卮丿蹖丿鬲乇 丕爻鬲
賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 卮蹖胤丕賳 貙卮丿蹖丿鬲乇蹖賳 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕爻鬲貙夭蹖乇丕 卮蹖胤丕賳 乇賵丨 賲丨囟 丕爻鬲 貙賵 亘賳丕亘乇丕蹖賳 丌诏丕賴蹖 賵 卮賮丕賮蹖鬲 賲胤賱賯 貨丿乇 卮蹖胤丕賳 賴蹖趩 丕亘賴丕賲蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕乇丿 讴賴 亘鬲賵丕賳丿 亘賴 賲賳夭賱賴 丿爻鬲丕賵蹖夭蹖 亘乇丕蹖 爻亘讴 讴乇丿賳 賵 鬲禺賮蹖賮 貙 毓賲賱 讴賳丿 爻倬爻 丿乇 賯爻賲鬲 亘毓丿 賲蹖 丌賵乇丿 讴賴 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 诏賳丕賴 丕爻鬲 賵 丌诏丕賴蹖 賳賮爻 乇丕 丿乇噩賴 亘賳丿蹖 賲蹖 讴賳丿賵 賲蹖 诏賵蹖丿 讴賵丿讴蹖 讴賴 亘乇丕蹖 爻賳噩卮 禺賵丿貙 鬲丕丕蹖賳 賱丨馗賴 賮賯胤 倬丿乇 賵 賲丕丿乇禺賵丿 乇丕 丿丕卮鬲賴 丕爻鬲 夭賲丕賳蹖 賳賮爻 賲蹖 卮賵丿 讴賴 卮禺氐 亘夭乇诏蹖 卮賵丿. 丕賲丕 趩賴 鬲丕讴蹖丿 亘蹖讴乇丕賳蹖 亘乇 賳賮爻 賳丕夭賱 賲蹖 卮賵丿 讴賴 倬乇賵乇丿诏丕乇 乇丕 賲賯蹖丕爻 賯乇丕乇 丿賴丿
賵丿乇亘丕乇賴 诏賳丕賴 賲蹖 诏賵蹖丿 賲賳馗賵乇 丕夭 "丕氐乇丕乇 丿乇 诏賳丕賴" 貙丕蹖賳 賳蹖爻鬲 讴賴 丿乇亘丕乇賴 诏賳丕賴丕賳 噩丿蹖丿 禺丕氐 亘蹖丕賳丿蹖卮蹖賲貙亘賱讴賴 亘丕蹖丿亘賴 丨丕賱鬲 亘賵丿賳 丿乇 诏賳丕賴 鬲賵噩賴 讴賳蹖賲 讴賴 毓亘丕乇鬲 丕夭 倬乇 鬲賵丕賳 卮丿賳 丿乇 诏賳丕賴 丕爻鬲貙倬丕蹖丿丕乇蹖 丿乇 丨丕賱鬲 诏賳丕賴 亘丕 丌诏丕賴蹖 丕夭丌賳 鬲賵丕賲 丕爻鬲
丿乇 賲賯丿賲賴 賲鬲乇噩賲 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖 讴鬲丕亘 丌賲丿賴 丕爻鬲 亘賴 趩丕倬 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 讴蹖 蹖乇 讴賴 诏賵乇賲乇丿丿 亘賵丿 趩賵賳 讴賴 賮讴乇 賲蹖 讴乇丿" 丌蹖丕 丌丿賲蹖 丕蹖賳 丨賯 乇丕 丿丕乇丿 讴賴 亘诏匕丕乇丿 賲乇丿賲 亘丿丕賳賳丿 鬲丕 趩賴 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丕賳爻丕賳 禺賵亘蹖 丕爻鬲". 賵爻乇丕賳噩丕賲 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 夭蹖亘丕 賵 毓賲蹖賯 亘毓丿 賲乇诏卮 賲賳鬲卮乇 卮丿
賵蹖 爻倬爻 丕賳賵丕毓 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 乇丕 卮乇丨 賲蹖 丿賴丿 賵丿乇亘丕乇賴 丌诏丕賴蹖 賲蹖 诏賵蹖丿亘丕 賴乇 丕賮夭丕蹖卮蹖 丿乇 賲蹖夭丕賳 丌诏丕賴蹖 貙 賵亘賴 鬲賳丕爻亘 丕蹖賳 丕賮夭丕蹖卮 貙卮丿鬲 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕賮夭丕蹖卮 賲蹖 蹖丕亘丿:賴乇趩賴 丌诏丕賴蹖 亘蹖卮鬲乇 亘丕卮丿 貙賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 卮丿蹖丿鬲乇 丕爻鬲
賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 卮蹖胤丕賳 貙卮丿蹖丿鬲乇蹖賳 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕爻鬲貙夭蹖乇丕 卮蹖胤丕賳 乇賵丨 賲丨囟 丕爻鬲 貙賵 亘賳丕亘乇丕蹖賳 丌诏丕賴蹖 賵 卮賮丕賮蹖鬲 賲胤賱賯 貨丿乇 卮蹖胤丕賳 賴蹖趩 丕亘賴丕賲蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕乇丿 讴賴 亘鬲賵丕賳丿 亘賴 賲賳夭賱賴 丿爻鬲丕賵蹖夭蹖 亘乇丕蹖 爻亘讴 讴乇丿賳 賵 鬲禺賮蹖賮 貙 毓賲賱 讴賳丿 爻倬爻 丿乇 賯爻賲鬲 亘毓丿 賲蹖 丌賵乇丿 讴賴 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 诏賳丕賴 丕爻鬲 賵 丌诏丕賴蹖 賳賮爻 乇丕 丿乇噩賴 亘賳丿蹖 賲蹖 讴賳丿賵 賲蹖 诏賵蹖丿 讴賵丿讴蹖 讴賴 亘乇丕蹖 爻賳噩卮 禺賵丿貙 鬲丕丕蹖賳 賱丨馗賴 賮賯胤 倬丿乇 賵 賲丕丿乇禺賵丿 乇丕 丿丕卮鬲賴 丕爻鬲 夭賲丕賳蹖 賳賮爻 賲蹖 卮賵丿 讴賴 卮禺氐 亘夭乇诏蹖 卮賵丿. 丕賲丕 趩賴 鬲丕讴蹖丿 亘蹖讴乇丕賳蹖 亘乇 賳賮爻 賳丕夭賱 賲蹖 卮賵丿 讴賴 倬乇賵乇丿诏丕乇 乇丕 賲賯蹖丕爻 賯乇丕乇 丿賴丿
賵丿乇亘丕乇賴 诏賳丕賴 賲蹖 诏賵蹖丿 賲賳馗賵乇 丕夭 "丕氐乇丕乇 丿乇 诏賳丕賴" 貙丕蹖賳 賳蹖爻鬲 讴賴 丿乇亘丕乇賴 诏賳丕賴丕賳 噩丿蹖丿 禺丕氐 亘蹖丕賳丿蹖卮蹖賲貙亘賱讴賴 亘丕蹖丿亘賴 丨丕賱鬲 亘賵丿賳 丿乇 诏賳丕賴 鬲賵噩賴 讴賳蹖賲 讴賴 毓亘丕乇鬲 丕夭 倬乇 鬲賵丕賳 卮丿賳 丿乇 诏賳丕賴 丕爻鬲貙倬丕蹖丿丕乇蹖 丿乇 丨丕賱鬲 诏賳丕賴 亘丕 丌诏丕賴蹖 丕夭丌賳 鬲賵丕賲 丕爻鬲
丿乇 賲賯丿賲賴 賲鬲乇噩賲 丕賳诏賱蹖爻蹖 讴鬲丕亘 丌賲丿賴 丕爻鬲 亘賴 趩丕倬 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 讴蹖 蹖乇 讴賴 诏賵乇賲乇丿丿 亘賵丿 趩賵賳 讴賴 賮讴乇 賲蹖 讴乇丿" 丌蹖丕 丌丿賲蹖 丕蹖賳 丨賯 乇丕 丿丕乇丿 讴賴 亘诏匕丕乇丿 賲乇丿賲 亘丿丕賳賳丿 鬲丕 趩賴 丕賳丿丕夭賴 丕賳爻丕賳 禺賵亘蹖 丕爻鬲". 賵爻乇丕賳噩丕賲 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 夭蹖亘丕 賵 毓賲蹖賯 亘毓丿 賲乇诏卮 賲賳鬲卮乇 卮丿
November 12, 2013
"...What our age needs is education. And so this is what happened: God chose a man who also needed to be educated, and educated him privatissime, so that he might be able to teach others from his own experience." From Kierkegaard's [personal] Journals.
2013 is the bicentennial of Kierkegaard's birth. He probably would have not wanted you to know that, but he has plenty more things to let you know.
They call him the "Father of Existentialism". You know you're asking for trouble when trying to write about a man who holds that distinction, but I must make an effort, once again, to try in vain to talk about one of my heroes-period. Philosopher, theologian, man in love, man in despair, man in angst, man in thought, man in anxiety, the man who launched the great "Attack on Christendom" in order to save Christianity...I can obviously go on but he is almost beyond description in a way though I have just described him at considerable length.
To get to the book itself, it is a relatively short read in comparison to most of his work and is an implicit response to his earlier masterpiece written under the pseudonym "Johannes Climacus" while this book is written under the name "Anti-Climacus". I have read excerpts of "Postscripts but not the whole work in its entirety (it is long), but a lot of the main points are brought up and somewhat expounded on from a different angle here.
The title of this book is actually 2/3 of the main topic of the book which is that the sickness unto death is despair; that is THE word of this book and main idea.
In two parts, he is going to talk about the kinds of despair and than what despair actually is. Throughout that time we will get the standard anti-, mixed with the very in-depth psychological, existential (obviously, he even uses the word), and theological insight that has made his work as new today as it was 50, 100, and 164 years ago.
I am constantly amazed at how at his best, he could tell you anything and make it sound ultra-enlightening even if you feel you have heard it before. For such a small book I felt overwhelmed (in a good way) at all the information that I was getting in such little space. The only other book that really did that to me is , another existential classic.
This book also recalled to my mind. But where that book gives the existential definition of faith (the "teleological suspension of the ethical), this book gives the existential definition of sin.
One common complaint about this book is about some of the lag in part one which infuriated me when part two came around and he easily explains all the tortured points he was making in a page and a half. The good news is that he makes up for it big time in part two when he gets into the topic "Despair is Sin", from there he's on a rampage of everything you ever thought about sin and [Christian] faith...
One is amazed at how well executed his criticism of institutional Christianity (which he calls "Christendom") is without seeming in the least apostateical yet he pulls no punches, whether you're pious or a pagan he is going after you and trying his best to make you question what you thought you knew:
Oh and his feelings toward apologetics? "One can see now...how extraordinarily stupid it is to defend Christianity, how little knowledge of humanity it betrays, how it...[makes] Christianity out to be some miserable object that in the end must be rescued by a defence[sic]. It is therefore certain and true that the person who first thought of defending Christianity in Christendom is de facto a Judas No. 2; he too betrays with a kiss, except his treason is that of stupidity. To defend something is always to discredit it. Let a man have a warehouse full of gold, let him be willing to give away a ducat to every one of the poor - but let him also be stupid enough to begin this charitable undertaking of his with a defence in which he offers three good reasons in justification; and it will almost come to the point of people finding it doubtful whether indeed he is doing something good. But now for Christianity. Yes, the person who defends that has never believed in it. If he does believe, then the enthusiasm of faith is not a defence, no, it is the assault and the victory; a believer is a victor."
One has to have read or be familiar with "Concluding Unscientific Postscripts" to understand why he is so against Christian apologetics. In that work he comments on the absurdity of the idea that the eternal should come into time and die while taking on the form as the least and lowest of men. He argues here and there that the idea is from an intellectual bases absurd to all hell and back, thus making it indefensible but at the same time making it the supreme act of love and morality and is, at least for him, the solution to despair-but of course I'm simplifying this so my small mind can understand.
This is just a taste of the ideas going through this book and I would advise you to read it and experience it for yourself.
One more person who deserves some credit in this book is obvious (to those who knows the life of Kierkegaard) was the only love he ever had, his fianc茅e Regine Olsen. This book, like many of S.K.'s work, is autobiographical to an extent and his relationship to Olsen manages to show-up in quite a bit of his works in one form or another. They were not Dante and Beatrice but she had a devastatingly profound effect on him and she could be called, in a way, the mother of existentialism. This really impresses me and makes me feel that Kierkegaard was probably one of the best psychologist of his own mind outside of Jung.
"Let us speak of this in purely human terms. Oh! how pitiable a person who has never felt the loving urge to sacrifice everything for love, who has therefore been unable to do so!"
2013 is the bicentennial of Kierkegaard's birth. He probably would have not wanted you to know that, but he has plenty more things to let you know.
They call him the "Father of Existentialism". You know you're asking for trouble when trying to write about a man who holds that distinction, but I must make an effort, once again, to try in vain to talk about one of my heroes-period. Philosopher, theologian, man in love, man in despair, man in angst, man in thought, man in anxiety, the man who launched the great "Attack on Christendom" in order to save Christianity...I can obviously go on but he is almost beyond description in a way though I have just described him at considerable length.
To get to the book itself, it is a relatively short read in comparison to most of his work and is an implicit response to his earlier masterpiece written under the pseudonym "Johannes Climacus" while this book is written under the name "Anti-Climacus". I have read excerpts of "Postscripts but not the whole work in its entirety (it is long), but a lot of the main points are brought up and somewhat expounded on from a different angle here.
The title of this book is actually 2/3 of the main topic of the book which is that the sickness unto death is despair; that is THE word of this book and main idea.
In two parts, he is going to talk about the kinds of despair and than what despair actually is. Throughout that time we will get the standard anti-, mixed with the very in-depth psychological, existential (obviously, he even uses the word), and theological insight that has made his work as new today as it was 50, 100, and 164 years ago.
I am constantly amazed at how at his best, he could tell you anything and make it sound ultra-enlightening even if you feel you have heard it before. For such a small book I felt overwhelmed (in a good way) at all the information that I was getting in such little space. The only other book that really did that to me is , another existential classic.
This book also recalled to my mind. But where that book gives the existential definition of faith (the "teleological suspension of the ethical), this book gives the existential definition of sin.
One common complaint about this book is about some of the lag in part one which infuriated me when part two came around and he easily explains all the tortured points he was making in a page and a half. The good news is that he makes up for it big time in part two when he gets into the topic "Despair is Sin", from there he's on a rampage of everything you ever thought about sin and [Christian] faith...
One is amazed at how well executed his criticism of institutional Christianity (which he calls "Christendom") is without seeming in the least apostateical yet he pulls no punches, whether you're pious or a pagan he is going after you and trying his best to make you question what you thought you knew:
"But it has to be said, and as bluntly as possible, that so-called Christendom (in which all, in their millions, are Christians as a matter of course, so that there are as many, yes, just as many Christians as there are people) is not only a miserable edition of Christianity, full of misprints that distort the meaning and of thoughtless omissions and emendations, but an abuse of it in having taken Christianity's name in vain...
Alas! the fate of this word in Christendom is like an epigram on all that is Christian. The misfortune is not that no one speaks up for Christianity (nor, therefore, that there is not enough priests); but they speak up for for it in such a way that the majority of people end up attaching no meaning to it...Thus the highest and holiest leave no impression at all, but sound like something that has now-God knows why-become a matter of form and habits indefensible-they find it requisite to defend Christianity."
Oh and his feelings toward apologetics? "One can see now...how extraordinarily stupid it is to defend Christianity, how little knowledge of humanity it betrays, how it...[makes] Christianity out to be some miserable object that in the end must be rescued by a defence[sic]. It is therefore certain and true that the person who first thought of defending Christianity in Christendom is de facto a Judas No. 2; he too betrays with a kiss, except his treason is that of stupidity. To defend something is always to discredit it. Let a man have a warehouse full of gold, let him be willing to give away a ducat to every one of the poor - but let him also be stupid enough to begin this charitable undertaking of his with a defence in which he offers three good reasons in justification; and it will almost come to the point of people finding it doubtful whether indeed he is doing something good. But now for Christianity. Yes, the person who defends that has never believed in it. If he does believe, then the enthusiasm of faith is not a defence, no, it is the assault and the victory; a believer is a victor."
One has to have read or be familiar with "Concluding Unscientific Postscripts" to understand why he is so against Christian apologetics. In that work he comments on the absurdity of the idea that the eternal should come into time and die while taking on the form as the least and lowest of men. He argues here and there that the idea is from an intellectual bases absurd to all hell and back, thus making it indefensible but at the same time making it the supreme act of love and morality and is, at least for him, the solution to despair-but of course I'm simplifying this so my small mind can understand.
This is just a taste of the ideas going through this book and I would advise you to read it and experience it for yourself.
One more person who deserves some credit in this book is obvious (to those who knows the life of Kierkegaard) was the only love he ever had, his fianc茅e Regine Olsen. This book, like many of S.K.'s work, is autobiographical to an extent and his relationship to Olsen manages to show-up in quite a bit of his works in one form or another. They were not Dante and Beatrice but she had a devastatingly profound effect on him and she could be called, in a way, the mother of existentialism. This really impresses me and makes me feel that Kierkegaard was probably one of the best psychologist of his own mind outside of Jung.
"Let us speak of this in purely human terms. Oh! how pitiable a person who has never felt the loving urge to sacrifice everything for love, who has therefore been unable to do so!"
August 9, 2013
In which I am again reminded of a friend's experience with a professor in a class on Kierkegaard: the students spent the first five weeks trying to convince the professor that you can probably only understand a quarter of Kierkegaard unless you read him in the context of Hegel; the professor rejects this and stresses instead Kierkegaard's Socraticism; at the end of the fifth week (i.e., less than halfway through the course) the professor admits defeat. If that doesn't sound remarkable, you haven't taken many courses with philosophy professors, whom you cannot convince of anything unless they already secretly believe it. The moral of the story is: most of Kierkegaard's writing is incomprehensible unless you've read Hegel.
That doesn't mean, as the cliche has it, that he's writing *against* Hegel. This book is a kind of depressing mini-phenomenology of spirit, in which, instead of ascending towards absolute knowledge, human kind simultaneously ascends towards (what Kierkegaard takes to be) absolute knowledge (i.e., God), and descends further into despair for any number of reasons and in any number of ways. For Hegel, there's always one destination--you might stop on the way to the truth, but your journey is always in that direction. For Kierkegaard, as for Marx, there are two destinations--the good (God/communism) and the horrific (despair/barbarism)--which are both in the same direction. For Marx, 'science' (in the Hegelian sense) will get you to communism, while ideology/capitalism etc will get you to barbarism. For Kierkegaard, science will lead you closer to God, by deepening your despair, but it *won't* get you to the good. Kierkegaard has very good criticisms to make of Hegel, but not the way that, say, Russell has criticisms of him. Kierkegaard, like Marx, remains on Hegel's side of the fence.
Anyway, SuD is a critique of the various idiocies human kind will perform in order to stay in despair. Unlike 20th century existentialists, to whom he's often compared, Kierkegaard insists that the way we are (both 'eternal' and mortal) does not, in itself, lead to despair--despair is the result of an "imbalance" in ourselves, a stressing of one or the other of these elements at the expense of the other. The human condition is not *intrinsically* one of despair; despair is something we do to ourselves. SuD goes through the many different ways in which we can be unbalanced: pretending we're other than we are, despairing of the way we are, and so on. The 'cure' is to recognize and live with our synthesis, not wish to be entirely eternal (a fantasy) nor believe ourselves to be entirely mortal (which, as a kind of determinism, cuts us off from the possibilities of human existence).
The quasi-Hegelian 'portraits' of various people in despair still read like a rogue's gallery of contemporary intellectuals:
"Have hope in the possibility of help, especially on the strength of the absurd, that for God everything is possible? No, that he will not. And ask help of any other? No, that for all the world he will not do; if it came to that, he would rather be himself with all the torments of hell than ask for help." (102)
Here are your militant atheists, 'scientific' determinists*, literary existentialists, and solipsistic nihilists of all stripes, wallowing in self-satisfaction, "he prefers to rage against everything and be the one whom the whole world, all existence, has wronged, the one for whom it is especially important to ensure that he has his agony on hand, so that no one will take it from him--for then he would not be able to convince others and himself that he is right." (103).
The second part, on despair as sin, is a much easier read, and not quite as interesting, although it does include the wonderful thought that "a self is what it has as its standard of measurement," (147). Kierkegaard's attack on 'Christendom' comes up here, and is as right as ever, but you'd have to be pretty convinced of the perfection of institutional Christianity to find it all that affecting, and I, dear reader, am not.
In short, there's a great lesson in here for 21st century types who like to harp on about humanity's existential loneliness and how evolution means we're destined to rape and pillage because there's no meaning anymore: if you think only a God can give us meaning, then leap into faith, or come to the somewhat easier realization that actually, we can give ourselves meaning. It's childish to think otherwise.
*I've always found it odd that so many people who, quite rightly, hold firm to empiricism, take so seriously the idea of determinism (a reasonable assumption for experimental science, but not therefore a fact) despite the absence of evidence for it. Granted, there can be no evidence for it (despite those idiotic 'experiments' in which people's brains 'decide' something 'before' the people do). But determinism and God have that in common. That won't change anyone's mind on God or determinism, of course, because, as Kierkegaard puts it in a different context, "the despairer thinks that he himself is this evidence" (105).
That doesn't mean, as the cliche has it, that he's writing *against* Hegel. This book is a kind of depressing mini-phenomenology of spirit, in which, instead of ascending towards absolute knowledge, human kind simultaneously ascends towards (what Kierkegaard takes to be) absolute knowledge (i.e., God), and descends further into despair for any number of reasons and in any number of ways. For Hegel, there's always one destination--you might stop on the way to the truth, but your journey is always in that direction. For Kierkegaard, as for Marx, there are two destinations--the good (God/communism) and the horrific (despair/barbarism)--which are both in the same direction. For Marx, 'science' (in the Hegelian sense) will get you to communism, while ideology/capitalism etc will get you to barbarism. For Kierkegaard, science will lead you closer to God, by deepening your despair, but it *won't* get you to the good. Kierkegaard has very good criticisms to make of Hegel, but not the way that, say, Russell has criticisms of him. Kierkegaard, like Marx, remains on Hegel's side of the fence.
Anyway, SuD is a critique of the various idiocies human kind will perform in order to stay in despair. Unlike 20th century existentialists, to whom he's often compared, Kierkegaard insists that the way we are (both 'eternal' and mortal) does not, in itself, lead to despair--despair is the result of an "imbalance" in ourselves, a stressing of one or the other of these elements at the expense of the other. The human condition is not *intrinsically* one of despair; despair is something we do to ourselves. SuD goes through the many different ways in which we can be unbalanced: pretending we're other than we are, despairing of the way we are, and so on. The 'cure' is to recognize and live with our synthesis, not wish to be entirely eternal (a fantasy) nor believe ourselves to be entirely mortal (which, as a kind of determinism, cuts us off from the possibilities of human existence).
The quasi-Hegelian 'portraits' of various people in despair still read like a rogue's gallery of contemporary intellectuals:
"Have hope in the possibility of help, especially on the strength of the absurd, that for God everything is possible? No, that he will not. And ask help of any other? No, that for all the world he will not do; if it came to that, he would rather be himself with all the torments of hell than ask for help." (102)
Here are your militant atheists, 'scientific' determinists*, literary existentialists, and solipsistic nihilists of all stripes, wallowing in self-satisfaction, "he prefers to rage against everything and be the one whom the whole world, all existence, has wronged, the one for whom it is especially important to ensure that he has his agony on hand, so that no one will take it from him--for then he would not be able to convince others and himself that he is right." (103).
The second part, on despair as sin, is a much easier read, and not quite as interesting, although it does include the wonderful thought that "a self is what it has as its standard of measurement," (147). Kierkegaard's attack on 'Christendom' comes up here, and is as right as ever, but you'd have to be pretty convinced of the perfection of institutional Christianity to find it all that affecting, and I, dear reader, am not.
In short, there's a great lesson in here for 21st century types who like to harp on about humanity's existential loneliness and how evolution means we're destined to rape and pillage because there's no meaning anymore: if you think only a God can give us meaning, then leap into faith, or come to the somewhat easier realization that actually, we can give ourselves meaning. It's childish to think otherwise.
*I've always found it odd that so many people who, quite rightly, hold firm to empiricism, take so seriously the idea of determinism (a reasonable assumption for experimental science, but not therefore a fact) despite the absence of evidence for it. Granted, there can be no evidence for it (despite those idiotic 'experiments' in which people's brains 'decide' something 'before' the people do). But determinism and God have that in common. That won't change anyone's mind on God or determinism, of course, because, as Kierkegaard puts it in a different context, "the despairer thinks that he himself is this evidence" (105).
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March 27, 2021kierkegaard is an anxious danish twink with self-esteem issues and we love him for it
August 28, 2022
禺丿丕賵賳丿丕 亘賴 賲丕 丿蹖丿诏丕賳蹖 讴賲 賮乇賵睾 丿賴
丿乇 丿蹖丿丕乇 亘丕 丌賳趩賴 亘蹖 賯丿乇 丕爻鬲
賵 丿蹖丿诏丕賳蹖 乇賵卮賳 亘蹖賳
丿乇 爻乇丕爻乇 爻丕丨鬲 丨賯蹖賯鬲.
丕夭 讴蹖 蹖乇 讴诏賵乇. 丕爻賯賮 丕賱亘乇鬲蹖賳蹖
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賲賳 禺蹖賱蹖 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 丿乇讴 賳讴乇丿賲. 亘賴 卮丿鬲 鬲乇噩賲賴鈥屰� 鬲丨鬲 丕賱賮馗蹖 賵 讴賱賲賴 賴丕蹖 賳丕賵丕囟丨 賵 亘蹖 賲賮賴賲賵蹖 丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 卮丿賴 亘賵丿. 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 卮丿鬲 亘丕 鬲毓賱蹖賲丕鬲 丿蹖賳 丿丕乇賴丕蹖 賲丕 丿乇 蹖丕乇丕賳 賴賲禺賵丕賳蹖 丿丕乇丿 亘丕 鬲賵噩賴 亘賴 丕蹖賳讴賴 禺賵丿 讴蹖 蹖乇讴诏賵乇 賴賲 賲爻蹖丨蹖 亘賵丿賴 丿賵 丌鬲卮蹖賴.
賲賴賲鬲乇蹖賳 賵 夭蹖亘丕鬲乇蹖賳 趩蹖夭賴丕蹖蹖 讴賴 賲賳 丕夭 讴鬲丕亘 丿乇蹖丕賮鬲 讴乇丿賲:
賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 賳賵毓蹖 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 乇賵丨貙 賳賵毓蹖 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 禺賵丿 丕爻鬲. 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖貙 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 賲賳鬲賴蹖 亘賴 賲乇诏 丕爻鬲. (丕蹖賳 鬲蹖讴賴 蹖 亘毓丿蹖 乇賵 禺賵丿賲 賳賵卮鬲賲) 丕夭 賴夭丕乇鬲賵蹖 丕賳賵丕毓 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 賲賳 丕蹖賳 賲賵噩賵丿賲: 丕蹖賳诏賴 丕丿賲蹖 丿乇 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 賳禺賵丕賴丿 禺賵丿卮 亘丕卮丿 賵 鬲丕 賲丿鬲 賴丕 賵賯鬲蹖 丨賲丕賲 賲蹖 乇賮鬲賲 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖賳讴賴 禺賵丿賲 乇丕 丿乇 丌蹖賳賴 蹖 賯丿蹖 乇賵 亘賴 乇賵亘賴 乇賵蹖 賳亘蹖賳賲 蹖讴 丨賵賱賴 蹖 亘賱賳丿 倬賴賳 賲蹖 讴乇丿賲 丨噩丕亘蹖 亘蹖賳 賲賳 賵 丌蹖賳賴. 賮乇丕乇 丕夭 禺賵蹖卮鬲賳 丿乇 爻丕丿賴 鬲乇蹖賳 賵 丕賵賱蹖賴 鬲乇蹖賳 爻胤丨卮.
賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 讴賴 賳賲蹖 禺賵丕賴丿 禺賵丿卮 亘丕卮丿 賳爻亘鬲蹖 睾乇蹖亘蹖 亘丕 丕蹖賳 禺賵丿 倬蹖丿丕 賲蹖 讴賳丿. 賴賲趩賵賳 賳爻亘鬲蹖 讴賴 丕丿賲 賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳丿 亘丕 夭丕丿诏丕賴鈥屫� 亘丕 禺丕賳賴 丕卮 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮丿. 丕賵 丌賳噩丕 乇丕 鬲乇讴 賲蹖 讴賳丿 賵賱蹖 賳賯賱 賲讴丕賳 賳賲蹖 讴賳丿. 爻讴賵賳鬲诏丕賴 噩丿蹖丿蹖 丕禺鬲蹖丕乇 賳賲蹖 讴賳丿. 賴賲趩賳丕賳 禺丕賳賴 蹖 賯丿蹖賲 乇丕 賳卮丕賳蹖 丕夭 禺賵丿 賲蹖 丿丕賳丿 丕賲丕 賲卮讴賱 丕蹖賳噩丕爻鬲 讴賴 噩乇丕鬲 賳賲蹖 讴賳丿 亘賴 "禺賵丿卮" 亘蹖丕蹖丿. 賳賲蹖 禺賵丕賴丿 禺賵丿卮 亘丕卮丿 賵 賳賲蹖 鬲賵丕賳丿 亘賴 禺丕賳賴 亘丕夭诏乇丿丿.
丌丿賲蹖 丕夭 丌丿賲蹖丕賳 爻禺賳 诏賮鬲賳 賲蹖 丕賲賵夭丿 賵 丕夭 禺丿丕蹖丕賳 禺丕賲賵卮蹖.
氐賮丨賴 215
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丕蹖丕 趩賳丕賳 丿乇 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 夭蹖爻鬲賴 丕蹖丿 讴賴 賲鬲賵噩賴 賳卮丿賴 亘丕卮蹖丿 賳賵賲蹖丿 亘賵丿賴 丕蹖丿. 蹖丕 亘賴 诏賵賳賴 丕蹖 賲禺賮蹖丕賳賴 丕蹖賳 亘蹖賲丕乇蹖 乇丕 丿乇 丿乇賵賳 禺賵丿鬲丕賳 賴賲趩賵賳 乇丕夭 噩丕賳讴丕賴鬲丕賳貙 賴賲趩賵賳 孬賲乇賴 蹖 毓卮賯蹖 诏賳丕賴 丌賱賵丿 丿乇 丕毓賲丕賯 賯賱亘鬲丕賳 丨賲賱 讴乇丿賴 丕蹖丿 蹖丕 亘賴 诏賵賳賴 丕蹖 乇丿 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丕夭 讴賵乇賴 丿乇乇賮鬲賴 丕蹖丿 讴賴 賲丕蹖賴 蹖 賵丨卮鬲 丿蹖诏乇丕賳 卮丿賴 亘丕卮蹖丿.
賴乇趩賴 丿乇噩賴 蹖 丌诏丕賴蹖 亘蹖卮鬲乇 亘丕卮丿 卮丿鬲 賳丕丕賲蹖丿蹖 亘蹖卮鬲乇 丕爻鬲.
June 13, 2021
讴鬲丕亘蹖 亘賴 卮丿鬲 爻禺鬲 賵 丿賯蹖賯 讴賴 丕賯爻丕賲賽 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 乇丕 亘賴 卮蹖賵賴鈥屫й� 賴賲夭賲丕賳 丿賯蹖賯貙 诏蹖噩 讴賳賳丿賴 賵 丿蹖丕賱讴鬲蹖讴蹖 亘乇 賲蹖 卮賲丕乇丿. 賯賱賲賽 讴蹖 蹖乇讴诏賵乇 诏丕賴蹖 賴賲丕賳賳丿 氐丕毓賯賴 亘乇 爻乇賽 禺賵丕賳賳丿賴 賮乇賵丿 賲蹖 丌蹖丿 賵 賳丕诏丕賴 倬蹖趩 賵 鬲丕亘 賲蹖 禺賵乇丿 賵 丕賵 乇丕 賲丕鬲 賵 賲亘賴賵鬲 亘賴 丨丕賱 禺賵丿 乇賴丕 賲蹖 讴賳丿. 丕賲蹖丿賵丕乇賲 丿賵亘丕乇賴 亘賴 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕夭诏乇丿賲... 丿賵亘丕乇賴 禺賵丕賳卮蹖 毓賲蹖賯 丿乇 賵賯鬲賽 賲賳丕爻亘 賵 亘丕 丿丕賳卮蹖 噩丕賳丿丕乇鬲乇.
April 14, 2009
"The Sickness unto Death" is an insightful taxonomy of human self-deception, and a fascinating polemic supporting a Christianity of individuals, rather than groups. Its two parts, "The Sickness unto Death is Despair" and "Despair is Sin," reflect its dual psychological and theological significance.
It is, first, a precursor of modern psychoanalysis, exploring the idea of despair as a lack of self-understanding and self-acceptance. Anticipating Freud's 'unconscious mind,' Kierkegaard claims that virtually everyone is always in despair, whether they know it or not: "Not being conscious of being in despair, is itself a form of despair.... The physician knows that just as there can be merely imagined illness, so too is there merely imagined health." Much of the book consists of a general overview of the many different forms despair can take, from "the despairing ignorance of having a self and an eternal self" to the demonic "wanting in despair to be oneself -- defiance."
Although, as one of Kierkegaard's "algebraic" (i.e., philosophically schematic rather than literary) works, "Sickness" spends little time developing these forms of despair, more fleshed-out examples an be found in his other works, such as "Either/Or." The short allegories Kierkegaard does use to illustrate his ideas, however, are consistently clear and illuminating. For example:
"As a father disinherits a son, the self will not acknowledge itself after it has been so weak. Despairingly it is unable to forget that weakness; somehow it hates itself, it will not humble itself in faith under its weakness in order to win itself back. No, in despair it will not, as it were, hear a word about itself, will have nothing to do with itself.... As doubtless often with the father who disinherited the son: the external fact only helped a little; it did not rid him of the son, least of all in his thoughts. As so often it helps little when the lover curses the despised (that is, loved) one, but almost intricates him the more, so it is for the despairing self with itself."
Second, and more to Kierkegaard's purpose, "Sickness" is an unorthodoxly orthodox classic of Christian theology. A must-read for anyone interested in the concept of sin, "Sickness" disavows the notion that sin is simply unethical behavior; no, for Kierkegaard "the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith." Sin for Kierkegaard is "before God, or with the conception of God, in despair not wanting to be oneself, or wanting in despair to be oneself." Sin is a heightened form of despair in which God judges each one of us. Using this notion, Kierkegaard attacks established Christendom for being complacent and confident, due to its strength in numbers, of its sinlessness:
Christianity "says to each individual: 'Thou shalt believe'.... Not one word more; there is nothing more to add. 'Now I have spoken', says God in heaven, 'we shall talk it over again in eternity. In the meantime you can do what you want, but judgement is at hand.'
"A judgement! Indeed, we men have learned, by experience, that when there is a mutiny on a ship or in an army, then the guilty are so numerous that the punishment has to be dropped; and when it is the public, the highly esteemed and cultivated public, or the people, then there is not only no crime, but according to the newspaper, which is as dependable as the Gospels and the Revelation, it is God's will. Why is this so? The reason is that the concept 'judgement' corresponds to the individual: judgment cannot be passed en masse; people can be killed en masse, sprayed en masse, flattered en masse, in short can be treated in many ways just like cattle, but to judge people like cattle is not possible, for one cannot pass judgement on cattle. However many are judged, if there is to be any seriousness or truth in the judgement, then judgement is passed on each individual....
"If only there are enough of us in this, then there is no wrong in it... before this wisdom all people have to this day bowed down -- kings, emperors, and excellencies.... So, God is damned well going to learn to bow down too. It is simply a matter of there being many of us, a decent number, who stick together; if we do that we are made safe against the judgement of eternity. They are indeed safe, if it is only in eternity that they are to become individuals. But they were, and are, constantly individuals before God."
Thus, Kierkegaard's aim is to awaken the reader as "spirit" (i.e., as an individual self) before God, not to defend Christianity's doctrines. On the contrary, Kierkegaard's strongest words are directed against apologetics: "how extraordinarily stupid it is to defend Christianity, how little knowledge of humanity it betrays, how it connives if only unconsciously with offence by making Christianity out to be some miserable object that in the end must be rescued by a defence.... Yes, the person who defends that has never believed in it. If he does believe, then the enthusiasm of faith is not a defence, no, it is the assault and the victory; a believer is a victor."
To fully understand why Kierkegaard considers Christianity fundamentally (and necessarily) irrational, to the point of causing "offence," it will be helpful to read his other works, such as "Fear and Trembling" or "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," where faith is defined as "an objective uncertainty held fast in... the most passionate inwardness." And nothing, for Kierkegaard, could be less certainly true than Christianity's paradoxes, like the idea that "there is an infinite difference in kind between God and man," yet the two share a "kinship." To try and water down Christianity's offensive aspects, to make faith easier to just blindly slip into, is to destroy faith by removing the necessity for the individual to passionately CHOOSE, for himself, his own life-path, his own self.
Although this is one of Kierkegaard's more difficult works, once the basic project is grasped it is quite readable, and is more straightforward than "The Concept of Anxiety," a psychological work which explores very similar ideas to "Sickness." The first paragraph (with its "The self is a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating to itself," etc., etc.) is famously dense and opaque, but is not representative of the rest of the text, which becomes more and more clear and accessible as it delves deeper into the obscurity of sin and despair.
"The Sickness unto Death" is an invaluable resource for those interested in existential psychology or religious philosophy. However, it is perhaps not the best place to begin if you haven't read other Kierkegaard works; "Fear and Trembling" is an easier starting point. For both texts, I recommend the Hannay translation, rather than the Hong one.
It is, first, a precursor of modern psychoanalysis, exploring the idea of despair as a lack of self-understanding and self-acceptance. Anticipating Freud's 'unconscious mind,' Kierkegaard claims that virtually everyone is always in despair, whether they know it or not: "Not being conscious of being in despair, is itself a form of despair.... The physician knows that just as there can be merely imagined illness, so too is there merely imagined health." Much of the book consists of a general overview of the many different forms despair can take, from "the despairing ignorance of having a self and an eternal self" to the demonic "wanting in despair to be oneself -- defiance."
Although, as one of Kierkegaard's "algebraic" (i.e., philosophically schematic rather than literary) works, "Sickness" spends little time developing these forms of despair, more fleshed-out examples an be found in his other works, such as "Either/Or." The short allegories Kierkegaard does use to illustrate his ideas, however, are consistently clear and illuminating. For example:
"As a father disinherits a son, the self will not acknowledge itself after it has been so weak. Despairingly it is unable to forget that weakness; somehow it hates itself, it will not humble itself in faith under its weakness in order to win itself back. No, in despair it will not, as it were, hear a word about itself, will have nothing to do with itself.... As doubtless often with the father who disinherited the son: the external fact only helped a little; it did not rid him of the son, least of all in his thoughts. As so often it helps little when the lover curses the despised (that is, loved) one, but almost intricates him the more, so it is for the despairing self with itself."
Second, and more to Kierkegaard's purpose, "Sickness" is an unorthodoxly orthodox classic of Christian theology. A must-read for anyone interested in the concept of sin, "Sickness" disavows the notion that sin is simply unethical behavior; no, for Kierkegaard "the opposite of sin is not virtue but faith." Sin for Kierkegaard is "before God, or with the conception of God, in despair not wanting to be oneself, or wanting in despair to be oneself." Sin is a heightened form of despair in which God judges each one of us. Using this notion, Kierkegaard attacks established Christendom for being complacent and confident, due to its strength in numbers, of its sinlessness:
Christianity "says to each individual: 'Thou shalt believe'.... Not one word more; there is nothing more to add. 'Now I have spoken', says God in heaven, 'we shall talk it over again in eternity. In the meantime you can do what you want, but judgement is at hand.'
"A judgement! Indeed, we men have learned, by experience, that when there is a mutiny on a ship or in an army, then the guilty are so numerous that the punishment has to be dropped; and when it is the public, the highly esteemed and cultivated public, or the people, then there is not only no crime, but according to the newspaper, which is as dependable as the Gospels and the Revelation, it is God's will. Why is this so? The reason is that the concept 'judgement' corresponds to the individual: judgment cannot be passed en masse; people can be killed en masse, sprayed en masse, flattered en masse, in short can be treated in many ways just like cattle, but to judge people like cattle is not possible, for one cannot pass judgement on cattle. However many are judged, if there is to be any seriousness or truth in the judgement, then judgement is passed on each individual....
"If only there are enough of us in this, then there is no wrong in it... before this wisdom all people have to this day bowed down -- kings, emperors, and excellencies.... So, God is damned well going to learn to bow down too. It is simply a matter of there being many of us, a decent number, who stick together; if we do that we are made safe against the judgement of eternity. They are indeed safe, if it is only in eternity that they are to become individuals. But they were, and are, constantly individuals before God."
Thus, Kierkegaard's aim is to awaken the reader as "spirit" (i.e., as an individual self) before God, not to defend Christianity's doctrines. On the contrary, Kierkegaard's strongest words are directed against apologetics: "how extraordinarily stupid it is to defend Christianity, how little knowledge of humanity it betrays, how it connives if only unconsciously with offence by making Christianity out to be some miserable object that in the end must be rescued by a defence.... Yes, the person who defends that has never believed in it. If he does believe, then the enthusiasm of faith is not a defence, no, it is the assault and the victory; a believer is a victor."
To fully understand why Kierkegaard considers Christianity fundamentally (and necessarily) irrational, to the point of causing "offence," it will be helpful to read his other works, such as "Fear and Trembling" or "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," where faith is defined as "an objective uncertainty held fast in... the most passionate inwardness." And nothing, for Kierkegaard, could be less certainly true than Christianity's paradoxes, like the idea that "there is an infinite difference in kind between God and man," yet the two share a "kinship." To try and water down Christianity's offensive aspects, to make faith easier to just blindly slip into, is to destroy faith by removing the necessity for the individual to passionately CHOOSE, for himself, his own life-path, his own self.
Although this is one of Kierkegaard's more difficult works, once the basic project is grasped it is quite readable, and is more straightforward than "The Concept of Anxiety," a psychological work which explores very similar ideas to "Sickness." The first paragraph (with its "The self is a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating to itself," etc., etc.) is famously dense and opaque, but is not representative of the rest of the text, which becomes more and more clear and accessible as it delves deeper into the obscurity of sin and despair.
"The Sickness unto Death" is an invaluable resource for those interested in existential psychology or religious philosophy. However, it is perhaps not the best place to begin if you haven't read other Kierkegaard works; "Fear and Trembling" is an easier starting point. For both texts, I recommend the Hannay translation, rather than the Hong one.
March 14, 2015
Just read this for the second time. The first time was in college for a Kierkegaard class. I liked it then a lot, but one of the problems with college for me was that I often felt overloaded. There was so much to read that it was often difficult to get it all read, and so even the stuff I read was almost never at full attention.
I read "Fear and Trembling" before college (or at least my second and successful attempt at college). I really loved it. But on the other hand, I have a difficult relationship with Christianity. It's too close to me to abandon, but too uncomfortable to be satisfying.
Probably the most satisfying communal religious experiences I have had have been with the Quakers. Of course, as with any denomination, there are many kinds of Quakers. I mean the quiet ones. The ones who literally meet on Sunday (sometimes other times too) to sit for an hour in silence. Where there is no priest, and anyone can speak if they feel moved by God. Of course, just as there are different denominations there are different congregations and let's just say some of them are more quiet than others.
Sometimes I feel very strongly that any Christianity I could really accept would be found more in Christian writers like Kierkegaard than in many of the passages of the Bible. But then again, as K points out, Christ himself said something like blessed are those who are not offended by me. K takes this sense of offense very seriously.
Make no mistake, Kierkegaard is disgusted by the idea of "defending" Christianity, or of trying to convince someone of it's truth. Not because he takes it as too obvious for proof, but rather due to the very nature of Christianity itself and faith. If you are the happy pagan, likely you will simply reject the book out of hand as not corresponding to your understanding of reality.
I think there are two things in particular that are appealing about K. First, he has an incredibly noble view of human possibility. Secondly, he is a very clear thinker.
This read was interesting in many ways, but in one way in particular, because he puts the question directly to a waffler like me. I always want to have it both ways, along the lines of "oh both Christianity and not-Christianity are true." He argues that "no, either you really believe that those happy pagans are healthy, or you believe that they are in despair."
Of course you have to be clear about what he tells you he means by this word. He accepts that those happy pagans can be very much happy and healthy. His meaning of despair is not the idea that "oh they look happy but underneath they are really eating their hearts out". The idea is much closer to the idea that they are simply in error. Of course he does mean that despair is a kind of spiritual illness. Just not one that necessarily makes you feel bad. (though of course it can). It means that if you have those feelings of contentment and happiness in this life without agreeing about God and our relationship to him, then you have essentially traded this life for eternity. You are simply oblivious to the most profound dimension of human existence. Here's the idea, there's no argument about it. If you are the pagan you won't find anything here to convince you, except perhaps the attraction of the image he provides. But it is based in a very noble notion of the eternal and the vast depths of the possibility of the human spirit. Here is the idea that we are defined by what measures us, and what measures us is God.
Of course it can be confusing, because at times he does speak of despair as a feeling like we commonly understand it to be. Certainly he agrees that they can be related. This is of course another of the very cool things about K, that he can talk about pretty abstract things in terms of personal psycho-spiritual experience. Also, the reverse as well.
Certainly for me this read was more personal, more about my own place. And I think this is appropriate, for as Kierkegaard says at the beginning, he does mean this work to be edifying. I take him to mean there personally relevant, not simply meant as some abstract analysis. Certainly I found his views very compelling.
I read "Fear and Trembling" before college (or at least my second and successful attempt at college). I really loved it. But on the other hand, I have a difficult relationship with Christianity. It's too close to me to abandon, but too uncomfortable to be satisfying.
Probably the most satisfying communal religious experiences I have had have been with the Quakers. Of course, as with any denomination, there are many kinds of Quakers. I mean the quiet ones. The ones who literally meet on Sunday (sometimes other times too) to sit for an hour in silence. Where there is no priest, and anyone can speak if they feel moved by God. Of course, just as there are different denominations there are different congregations and let's just say some of them are more quiet than others.
Sometimes I feel very strongly that any Christianity I could really accept would be found more in Christian writers like Kierkegaard than in many of the passages of the Bible. But then again, as K points out, Christ himself said something like blessed are those who are not offended by me. K takes this sense of offense very seriously.
Make no mistake, Kierkegaard is disgusted by the idea of "defending" Christianity, or of trying to convince someone of it's truth. Not because he takes it as too obvious for proof, but rather due to the very nature of Christianity itself and faith. If you are the happy pagan, likely you will simply reject the book out of hand as not corresponding to your understanding of reality.
I think there are two things in particular that are appealing about K. First, he has an incredibly noble view of human possibility. Secondly, he is a very clear thinker.
This read was interesting in many ways, but in one way in particular, because he puts the question directly to a waffler like me. I always want to have it both ways, along the lines of "oh both Christianity and not-Christianity are true." He argues that "no, either you really believe that those happy pagans are healthy, or you believe that they are in despair."
Of course you have to be clear about what he tells you he means by this word. He accepts that those happy pagans can be very much happy and healthy. His meaning of despair is not the idea that "oh they look happy but underneath they are really eating their hearts out". The idea is much closer to the idea that they are simply in error. Of course he does mean that despair is a kind of spiritual illness. Just not one that necessarily makes you feel bad. (though of course it can). It means that if you have those feelings of contentment and happiness in this life without agreeing about God and our relationship to him, then you have essentially traded this life for eternity. You are simply oblivious to the most profound dimension of human existence. Here's the idea, there's no argument about it. If you are the pagan you won't find anything here to convince you, except perhaps the attraction of the image he provides. But it is based in a very noble notion of the eternal and the vast depths of the possibility of the human spirit. Here is the idea that we are defined by what measures us, and what measures us is God.
Of course it can be confusing, because at times he does speak of despair as a feeling like we commonly understand it to be. Certainly he agrees that they can be related. This is of course another of the very cool things about K, that he can talk about pretty abstract things in terms of personal psycho-spiritual experience. Also, the reverse as well.
Certainly for me this read was more personal, more about my own place. And I think this is appropriate, for as Kierkegaard says at the beginning, he does mean this work to be edifying. I take him to mean there personally relevant, not simply meant as some abstract analysis. Certainly I found his views very compelling.
July 19, 2014
This can be called a Phenomenology of Despair. Kierkegaard is frequently considered as anti-Hegel but this book can be considered as a kind of dialectic of the self. Kierkegaard looked at the self the same way as Hegel looked at the world, his universal spirit.
Here we see his iterative definition of the self,
The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but that the relation relates itself to its own self. It must in turn relate to the power which established the whole relation. The self is a dynamic process. It is simultaneously becoming and and unbecoming from what one is.
and the self as a synthesis,
A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis.
Despair results from lack of balance between these opposites and takes three forms,
Being unconscious in despair of having a self. This is the most common form of despair. Despair of an aesthete. Where someone is lost in something external that they are not aware of their eternal self or that they are in despair. A spiritless existence. From Kierkegaard's point of view, almost everyone is in despair, and most of them are not aware of it.
not wanting in despair to be oneself happens if one has finitude and necessity but without infinitude and possibility, i.e. no faith. For God is infinite, for God everything is possible. The opposite is where you have infinitude and possibility without being grounded in temporal and necessity, Where one is carried away by dreams and fantasies without being grounded in something temporal leading to despair and wanting in despair to be oneself.
One can contrast this with materialism, where alienation and despair are caused by material circumstances and they can be rid of by changing the society. Even though they never encountered each other鈥檚 works, Marx and Kierkegaard were contemporaries and both of their thoughts germinated in the rapidly industrialising society. But for Marx, a materialist, this alienation ultimately took the form of a worker being alienated from his labour and it can only be overcome by changing the society, and for Kierkegaard, the individual self is all that matters despair can only be overcome by the self through faith.
Among the western thinkers, existentialists have a lot in common with buddhist and hindu thinkers. The similar emphasis on the self, the importance of self-realisation and in this book there is also some similarity in the understanding of despair. Despair as a sickness of the spirit and the opposite of being in despair is to have faith. Standing openly in front of God.
Here we also see the Christian notion of despair as a blessing. Something which we see in Dostoevsky鈥檚 works as well. Despair transcends banal experience and it leads to salvation. So despair is also a blessing. To arrive at deliverance one must pass through despair.
The second part got too Christian and esoteric for me. It mainly deals with sin. This work is rooted in christianity but still has universal applicability. If you want to understand how your relation is relating itself to itself, you must read this book.
Here we see his iterative definition of the self,
The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but that the relation relates itself to its own self. It must in turn relate to the power which established the whole relation. The self is a dynamic process. It is simultaneously becoming and and unbecoming from what one is.
and the self as a synthesis,
A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short, a synthesis.
Despair results from lack of balance between these opposites and takes three forms,
Being unconscious in despair of having a self. This is the most common form of despair. Despair of an aesthete. Where someone is lost in something external that they are not aware of their eternal self or that they are in despair. A spiritless existence. From Kierkegaard's point of view, almost everyone is in despair, and most of them are not aware of it.
not wanting in despair to be oneself happens if one has finitude and necessity but without infinitude and possibility, i.e. no faith. For God is infinite, for God everything is possible. The opposite is where you have infinitude and possibility without being grounded in temporal and necessity, Where one is carried away by dreams and fantasies without being grounded in something temporal leading to despair and wanting in despair to be oneself.
One can contrast this with materialism, where alienation and despair are caused by material circumstances and they can be rid of by changing the society. Even though they never encountered each other鈥檚 works, Marx and Kierkegaard were contemporaries and both of their thoughts germinated in the rapidly industrialising society. But for Marx, a materialist, this alienation ultimately took the form of a worker being alienated from his labour and it can only be overcome by changing the society, and for Kierkegaard, the individual self is all that matters despair can only be overcome by the self through faith.
Among the western thinkers, existentialists have a lot in common with buddhist and hindu thinkers. The similar emphasis on the self, the importance of self-realisation and in this book there is also some similarity in the understanding of despair. Despair as a sickness of the spirit and the opposite of being in despair is to have faith. Standing openly in front of God.
Here we also see the Christian notion of despair as a blessing. Something which we see in Dostoevsky鈥檚 works as well. Despair transcends banal experience and it leads to salvation. So despair is also a blessing. To arrive at deliverance one must pass through despair.
The second part got too Christian and esoteric for me. It mainly deals with sin. This work is rooted in christianity but still has universal applicability. If you want to understand how your relation is relating itself to itself, you must read this book.
November 20, 2020
hated it, made me anxious. 5 stars
November 21, 2023
芦毓匕丕亘 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 丿賯蹖賯丕 丿乇 賴賲蹖賳 賳丕鬲賵丕賳蹖 丕夭 賲乇丿賳 丕爻鬲.禄
芦賵賯鬲蹖 賲乇诏 亘夭乇诏鈥屫臂屬� 禺胤乇 丕爻鬲貙 亘賴 夭賳丿诏蹖 丕賲蹖丿 賲蹖鈥屫ㄙ嗀屬呚� 丕賲丕 夭賲丕賳蹖 讴賴 賲蹖鈥屫①呝堌槽屬� 禺胤乇蹖 乇丕 讴賴 丨鬲蹖 亘夭乇诏鈥屫� 丕夭 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 亘卮賳丕爻蹖賲貙 丕賲蹖丿賲丕賳 亘賴 賲乇诏 丕爻鬲. 賵賯鬲蹖 禺胤乇 亘賴 丨丿蹖 亘夭乇诏 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘賴 賲乇诏 丕賲蹖丿 賲蹖鈥屫ㄙ嗀屬呚� 丌賳鈥屭з� 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 毓亘丕乇鬲 丕爻鬲 丕夭 丕蹖賳讴賴 丕賲蹖丿蹖 賳丿丕乇蹖賲 丨鬲蹖 亘賴 丕蹖賳讴賴 亘鬲賵丕賳蹖賲 亘賲蹖乇蹖賲.禄
芦賵賯鬲蹖 賲乇诏 亘夭乇诏鈥屫臂屬� 禺胤乇 丕爻鬲貙 亘賴 夭賳丿诏蹖 丕賲蹖丿 賲蹖鈥屫ㄙ嗀屬呚� 丕賲丕 夭賲丕賳蹖 讴賴 賲蹖鈥屫①呝堌槽屬� 禺胤乇蹖 乇丕 讴賴 丨鬲蹖 亘夭乇诏鈥屫� 丕夭 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 亘卮賳丕爻蹖賲貙 丕賲蹖丿賲丕賳 亘賴 賲乇诏 丕爻鬲. 賵賯鬲蹖 禺胤乇 亘賴 丨丿蹖 亘夭乇诏 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘賴 賲乇诏 丕賲蹖丿 賲蹖鈥屫ㄙ嗀屬呚� 丌賳鈥屭з� 賳賵賲蹖丿蹖 毓亘丕乇鬲 丕爻鬲 丕夭 丕蹖賳讴賴 丕賲蹖丿蹖 賳丿丕乇蹖賲 丨鬲蹖 亘賴 丕蹖賳讴賴 亘鬲賵丕賳蹖賲 亘賲蹖乇蹖賲.禄
January 19, 2022
鈥濧ceast膬 boal膬 nu este spre moarte, ci pentru slava lui Dumnezeu, ca, prin ea, Fiul lui Dumnezeu s膬 se sl膬veasc膬." (Ioan 11,4)."
O lectur膬 foarte grea, din cauza intensit膬葲ii scriitorului 葯i a subiectului pe care 卯l dezbate. Cuv芒ntul disperare apare aici de 750 de ori (f膬r膬 prefa葲膬, unde 卯l mai reg膬sim de 100 de ori) cu prec膬dere 卯n prima parte a c膬r葲ii, f膬c芒ndu-te s膬 cazi 葯i tu 卯n aceast膬 boal膬 de moarte care este disperarea. Pentru cre葯tin boala, asuprirea, mizeria 葯i grijile nu sunt de moarte, ci astfel este tocmai maladia care nu recunoa葯te sensul 卯ntrup膬rii, respectiv disperarea. De unde provine 卯ns膬 disperarea? 脦n spirit cre葯tin, originea ei rezid膬 卯n omul 卯nsu葯i, iar nu 卯n forma sinelui ca sintez膬 (ceea ce ar fi implicat c膬 temeiul divin ar fi fost responsabil pentru disperarea omului); cauza disper膬rii trebuie c膬utat膬 卯n libertatea uman膬, 卯n faptul c膬 Dumnezeu, care a f膬cut din om acest raport, 卯l las膬 cumva din m芒n膬, raportul raport芒ndu-se la sine. Altfel spus este 补尘别葲别补濒补 libert膬葲ii, expresia proastei administr膬ri a economiei existen葲iale: disperatul este o valoare, dar una cu sens negativ. Disperarea este boala de moarte caracterizat膬 prin neputin葲a de a muri, ca 卯ntr-o agonie 卯n care lipse葯te orice speran葲膬 de a suprima suferin葲a prin moarte. De aceea disperarea n-a putut ap膬rea dec芒t odat膬 cu credin葲a 卯n nemurirea sufletului, adic膬 doar odat膬 cu cre葯tinismul. Disperarea e numit膬 maladie mortal膬, o contradic葲ie tulbur膬toare, acea boal膬 aflat膬 卯n tine, de a muri ve葯nic, de a muri 葯i totu葯i de a nu muri, de a muri moartea. Moartea este sf芒r葯itul maladiei, dar moartea nu este sf芒r葯itul. Iat膬 葯i o rug膬ciune dedicata de Kierkegaard credincio葯ilor predicatori cre葯tini: Dumnezeule din ceruri, 卯葲i mul葲umesc c膬 n-ai pretins nici unui om c膬 trebuie s膬 卯n葲eleag膬 cre葯tinismul; c膬ci de s-ar pretinde aceasta, atunci a葯 fi cel mai nenorocit dintre to葲i. Cu c芒t 卯ncerc mai mult s膬-l 卯n葲eleg, cu at芒t 卯mi pare mai incomprehensibil 葯i cu at芒t mai mult descop膬r doar posibilitatea scandalul. De aceea 卯葲i mul葲umesc c膬 ceri numai credin葲a 葯i te rog s膬 vrei s膬 mi-o spore葯ti pe mai departe.
O lectur膬 foarte grea, din cauza intensit膬葲ii scriitorului 葯i a subiectului pe care 卯l dezbate. Cuv芒ntul disperare apare aici de 750 de ori (f膬r膬 prefa葲膬, unde 卯l mai reg膬sim de 100 de ori) cu prec膬dere 卯n prima parte a c膬r葲ii, f膬c芒ndu-te s膬 cazi 葯i tu 卯n aceast膬 boal膬 de moarte care este disperarea. Pentru cre葯tin boala, asuprirea, mizeria 葯i grijile nu sunt de moarte, ci astfel este tocmai maladia care nu recunoa葯te sensul 卯ntrup膬rii, respectiv disperarea. De unde provine 卯ns膬 disperarea? 脦n spirit cre葯tin, originea ei rezid膬 卯n omul 卯nsu葯i, iar nu 卯n forma sinelui ca sintez膬 (ceea ce ar fi implicat c膬 temeiul divin ar fi fost responsabil pentru disperarea omului); cauza disper膬rii trebuie c膬utat膬 卯n libertatea uman膬, 卯n faptul c膬 Dumnezeu, care a f膬cut din om acest raport, 卯l las膬 cumva din m芒n膬, raportul raport芒ndu-se la sine. Altfel spus este 补尘别葲别补濒补 libert膬葲ii, expresia proastei administr膬ri a economiei existen葲iale: disperatul este o valoare, dar una cu sens negativ. Disperarea este boala de moarte caracterizat膬 prin neputin葲a de a muri, ca 卯ntr-o agonie 卯n care lipse葯te orice speran葲膬 de a suprima suferin葲a prin moarte. De aceea disperarea n-a putut ap膬rea dec芒t odat膬 cu credin葲a 卯n nemurirea sufletului, adic膬 doar odat膬 cu cre葯tinismul. Disperarea e numit膬 maladie mortal膬, o contradic葲ie tulbur膬toare, acea boal膬 aflat膬 卯n tine, de a muri ve葯nic, de a muri 葯i totu葯i de a nu muri, de a muri moartea. Moartea este sf芒r葯itul maladiei, dar moartea nu este sf芒r葯itul. Iat膬 葯i o rug膬ciune dedicata de Kierkegaard credincio葯ilor predicatori cre葯tini: Dumnezeule din ceruri, 卯葲i mul葲umesc c膬 n-ai pretins nici unui om c膬 trebuie s膬 卯n葲eleag膬 cre葯tinismul; c膬ci de s-ar pretinde aceasta, atunci a葯 fi cel mai nenorocit dintre to葲i. Cu c芒t 卯ncerc mai mult s膬-l 卯n葲eleg, cu at芒t 卯mi pare mai incomprehensibil 葯i cu at芒t mai mult descop膬r doar posibilitatea scandalul. De aceea 卯葲i mul葲umesc c膬 ceri numai credin葲a 葯i te rog s膬 vrei s膬 mi-o spore葯ti pe mai departe.
December 28, 2024
I've been on a Danish modernist / existentialist tear this year, after I visited Denmark over the New Year. 2024 began in an AirBnb in rural Denmark reading Lucky Per and Niels Lyhne, and closed on the couch in Michigan reading Kierkegaard.
The thesis of this book I very much agree with: while you can try to define your identity and life on your own, you'll never be fully satisfied with yourself, stuck in "despair," or the "sickness unto death." This is only solvable when you humble yourself before God.
Any person deals with internal contradictions. As an example, take the competition between imagination vs satisfaction with your circumstances. Imagination taken to an extreme leads you to exist in an "abstract sensitivity" divorced from reality, and to losing yourself. However, some imagination is obviously good.
On your own, you get stuck in a recursive loop of trying to solve contradictions such as these: "the relation's (the self's) total dependence, the expression of the fact that the self cannot of itself come to or be in equilibrium and rest, but only, in relating to itself, by relating to that which has established the entire relation" (God). Then you fall into a despair, that typically shows up in one of two ways - either disliking yourself and trying to be something that you are not, or disliking yourself and accepting it and not trying to be better.
To even get to this despair, you have to prioritize self-knowledge, and most people don't - "the more knowledge increases, the more it becomes a sort of inhuman knowledge in the production of which the person's self is squandered." Most people are unsatisfied with themselves, but are not self-conscious enough to realize it. Going through the motions of being a human with no deeper self-reflection, is dangerous, however: you can "can get married, beget children, be honored and respected-and perhaps people fail to notice that, in the deeper sense, he is lacking a self. In the world, no great fuss is made over this sort of thing, for in the world, a self is the thing that is least asked about, and most of all, is the thing that is dangerous to show you have."
For those who've accepted that they are in despair, it's not a given that they'll then humble themselves before God and accept his mercy: for example, some people are overtly anti-God, and take pride in their hopeless and ability to see the "truth" about the world. Or - some people are Christians, but beat themselves up for their sins, in an egotistical / self-righteous way, missing that "if God were to forgive him for it, he could have at least have the decency to forgive himself." Both types of people could simply accept God's mercy instead of being so stubbornly full of themselves.
Kierkegaard doesn't explicitly say this, but the last part of the book left me with the conclusion that one aspect of God's greatness is that he has the infinite energy and intelligence to know each of us; he delights in the particular. "God does not avail himself of an abbreviation, he comprehends actuality itself, all of the particulars: for him, the individual does not lie under the concept." I'm separately reading Seeing Like a State, which deals with the casualties of governments and corporations simplifying and standardizing local customs. God has no need to simplify like a state.
This particularly stands out to me as incredible in 2024 - when the onslaught of information in the media drives the opposite tendency of simplifying the complexity through memes, metaphors, generalities, tribes. We must pattern-match incidents and people or become overwhelmed. But God has enough compute to see us in all our quirks.
Another theme of the book is the obviousness and ease of being a Christian. Why would we not accept God's mercy? And why should we need to defend it if we feel it so innately? By comparison, it would be silly to ask someone who is in love, to rationalize their belief. "Isn't it, after all, obvious that it could never occur to someone who is genuinely in love to want to prove to on the basis of three reasons, or to defend it, for he is something that is more than all reasons and more than every defense: he is in love. And the person who does this-he is not in love; he merely pretends that he is."
We should be intuitively drawn to accept God's mercy because he is so obviously greater than us. So much so that even if God wanted to, he couldn't forgive the offense of rejecting Him- "to reject God's mercy is an offense against God which He could not forgive, even if he wanted to, because it would make him less than God - because "the possibility of offense is, if I dare put it this way, the guarantee whereby God protects himself, so that human beings cannot come too close to him...God and human beings are two qualities between which there is an infinite qualitative difference."
The thesis of this book I very much agree with: while you can try to define your identity and life on your own, you'll never be fully satisfied with yourself, stuck in "despair," or the "sickness unto death." This is only solvable when you humble yourself before God.
Any person deals with internal contradictions. As an example, take the competition between imagination vs satisfaction with your circumstances. Imagination taken to an extreme leads you to exist in an "abstract sensitivity" divorced from reality, and to losing yourself. However, some imagination is obviously good.
On your own, you get stuck in a recursive loop of trying to solve contradictions such as these: "the relation's (the self's) total dependence, the expression of the fact that the self cannot of itself come to or be in equilibrium and rest, but only, in relating to itself, by relating to that which has established the entire relation" (God). Then you fall into a despair, that typically shows up in one of two ways - either disliking yourself and trying to be something that you are not, or disliking yourself and accepting it and not trying to be better.
To even get to this despair, you have to prioritize self-knowledge, and most people don't - "the more knowledge increases, the more it becomes a sort of inhuman knowledge in the production of which the person's self is squandered." Most people are unsatisfied with themselves, but are not self-conscious enough to realize it. Going through the motions of being a human with no deeper self-reflection, is dangerous, however: you can "can get married, beget children, be honored and respected-and perhaps people fail to notice that, in the deeper sense, he is lacking a self. In the world, no great fuss is made over this sort of thing, for in the world, a self is the thing that is least asked about, and most of all, is the thing that is dangerous to show you have."
For those who've accepted that they are in despair, it's not a given that they'll then humble themselves before God and accept his mercy: for example, some people are overtly anti-God, and take pride in their hopeless and ability to see the "truth" about the world. Or - some people are Christians, but beat themselves up for their sins, in an egotistical / self-righteous way, missing that "if God were to forgive him for it, he could have at least have the decency to forgive himself." Both types of people could simply accept God's mercy instead of being so stubbornly full of themselves.
Kierkegaard doesn't explicitly say this, but the last part of the book left me with the conclusion that one aspect of God's greatness is that he has the infinite energy and intelligence to know each of us; he delights in the particular. "God does not avail himself of an abbreviation, he comprehends actuality itself, all of the particulars: for him, the individual does not lie under the concept." I'm separately reading Seeing Like a State, which deals with the casualties of governments and corporations simplifying and standardizing local customs. God has no need to simplify like a state.
This particularly stands out to me as incredible in 2024 - when the onslaught of information in the media drives the opposite tendency of simplifying the complexity through memes, metaphors, generalities, tribes. We must pattern-match incidents and people or become overwhelmed. But God has enough compute to see us in all our quirks.
Another theme of the book is the obviousness and ease of being a Christian. Why would we not accept God's mercy? And why should we need to defend it if we feel it so innately? By comparison, it would be silly to ask someone who is in love, to rationalize their belief. "Isn't it, after all, obvious that it could never occur to someone who is genuinely in love to want to prove to on the basis of three reasons, or to defend it, for he is something that is more than all reasons and more than every defense: he is in love. And the person who does this-he is not in love; he merely pretends that he is."
We should be intuitively drawn to accept God's mercy because he is so obviously greater than us. So much so that even if God wanted to, he couldn't forgive the offense of rejecting Him- "to reject God's mercy is an offense against God which He could not forgive, even if he wanted to, because it would make him less than God - because "the possibility of offense is, if I dare put it this way, the guarantee whereby God protects himself, so that human beings cannot come too close to him...God and human beings are two qualities between which there is an infinite qualitative difference."
October 31, 2023
Ich muss gestehen recht sp盲t mit Kierkegaard in Ber眉hrung gekommen zu sein, obschon ich Zeuge der vielsagenden Freude meiner Frau wurde als sie seine Werke vor vielen Monaten verschlang. Ich entschied mich jedenfalls f眉r einen Dialog mit dieser durchweg nordischen Gestalt von unheimlichen Kl眉ften und bemerkenswerten Abgr眉nden namens Kierkegaard. Denn genau so schrieb er es und gleichsam so sollte es gelesen werden; als Dialog zwischen Verfasser und Leser. Welch eine Stimulation verschiedenster Gehirnwindungen tritt dabei in Kraft.
脛hnlich dem ewig brandenden Meer versteht es dieser Denker uns in diesem Werk, in ganz sokratischer Manier, Welle f眉r Welle seine tiefsinnigen Beobachtungen bez眉glich des Menschen mitzuteilen. Vieles davon war mir nat眉rlich bereits bekannt, aber 眉beraus erfreut und fasziniert war ich von seiner tieferen Logik bei der Auseinandersetzung der verschiedenen Grade unserer Verzweiflung. Niemals w盲r ich von selbst auf diese Gedanken gekommen. Kierkegaard vermittelt uns als L枚sung, wir selbst zu werden, also das eigentliche, urspr眉ngliche wir, bevor wir uns die j盲mmerliche Gesellschaft in der wir aufwuchsen als Ma脽stab f眉r unser Selbst nahmen. 脛hnliche Belehrungen, die auch Schopenhauer oder Nietzsche vertraten, als letzterer z.B. sagte: "Werde, der du bist."
So schreibt Kierkegaard aber auch sehr feinf眉hlig:
"Es ist daher v枚llig unm枚glich, da脽 die vulg盲re Betrachtung recht hat, wenn sie annimmt, die Verzweiflung sei das Seltene, sie ist hingegen das ganz Allgemeine. Es ist also v枚llig unm枚glich, da脽 die vulg盲re Betrachtung recht hat, wenn sie annimmt, da脽 ein jeder, der nicht meint oder f眉hlt, verzweifelt zu sein, es auch nicht sei, und da脽 nur der es sei, der es von sich selbst sagt. Im Gegenteil, wer ohne Affektiertheit von sich sagt, da脽 er es sei, ist doch ein wenig, ist dialektisch der Heilung n盲her als alle die, die nicht daf眉r angesehen werden und sich selbst nicht f眉r verzweifelt halten.
Aber gerade das ist es, worin der Seelenkenner mir gewi脽 recht geben wird, das Allgemeine, da脽 die meisten Menschen leben, ohne sich recht bewu脽t zu werden, da脽 sie als Geist bestimmt sind - und darauf beruht all die sogenannte Sicherheit, Zufriedenheit mit dem Leben und so weiter, was gerade Verzweiflung ist. Die dagegen sagen, sie seien verzweifelt, sind entweder in der Regel diejenigen, die eine so viel tiefere Natur haben, da脽 sie sich selbst als Geist bewu脽t werden m眉ssen, oder diejenigen, denen schwere Ereignisse und furchtbare Entscheidungen dazu verholfen haben, sich als Geist bewu脽t zu werden - so oder so; denn sehr selten ist gerade derjenige, der in Wahrheit nicht verzweifelt ist."
Welch eine fundamentale Wahrheit vor der ein jeder die Augen verschlie脽t. Die verschiedenen Grade der Verzweiflung haben mich ganz ungemein in den Bann gezogen, denn auch meine eigene Verzweiflung wurde von ihm gleichsam seziert und gab mir oft das gro脽e "Ja genau!"-Erlebnis. Ich staunte nicht schlecht wie treffsicher und beinah mit einer Lupe der Mann die tieferen Ursachen meiner inneren Verzweiflung mir vor Augen f眉hrte. Oft hatte ich beim Lesen Einw盲nde gegen seine Ausf眉hrungen, doch sie wurden zu 99% alle beiseite gefegt und als L枚sung wurde mir nichts irdisches, sondern das Ewige und Edle ans Herz gelegt.
Doch Kierkegaard versteht auch, dass das Selbst am wenigsten gefragt wird, dass fast alle nur Masken tragen und in ihrer unbeschreiblichen J盲mmerlichkeit unter ihren Mitmenschen f眉r alles was sie tun Best盲tigung und Anerkennung suchen, aber auf keinen Fall Aufkl盲rung, denn diese beinhaltet meistens etwas "negatives" und daf眉r sind sie "zu schwach, zu 盲ngstlich, denn es bedarf h枚herer geistiger Kr盲fte", weswegen er auch hinzuf眉gt:
"Wenn aber ein Mensch so phantastisch geworden ist und darum verzweifelt, so kann er doch, obwohl das meistens offenbar wird, recht gut dahin leben; Mensch sein, wie es scheint, besch盲ftigt mit dem Zeitlichen, heiraten, Kinder zeugen, geehrt und angesehen sein - und man merkt es vielleicht nicht, da脽 ihm im tieferen Sinne ein Selbst fehlt. Von solchen Dingen macht man in der Welt kein gro脽es Aufheben; denn ein Selbst ist das, was in der Welt am wenigsten gefragt ist, und das ist etwas, was am allergef盲hrlichsten ist, sich anmerken zu lassen, da脽 man eines hat. Die gr枚脽te Gefahr, sich selbst zu verlieren, kann in der Welt so still vonstatten gehen, als w盲re es nichts. Kein Verlust kann so still abgehen; jeden anderen Verlust, ein Arm, ein Bein, f眉nf Reichstaler, ein Weib und so weiter bemerkt man doch."
Es ist gleichsam wie als ob er die heutigen YouTube Jammerlappen beschreibt, die wegen der mit ihnen geteilten kleinsten Erkenntnis, die ihnen den Mangel an ihrem Selbst offenbar macht, sofort wegen Cyber-Mobbing rum heulen. Ich kann jedenfalls Kierkegaard durchaus viel abgewinnen und verdanke ihm so manches, selbst was das G枚ttliche angeht.
脛hnlich dem ewig brandenden Meer versteht es dieser Denker uns in diesem Werk, in ganz sokratischer Manier, Welle f眉r Welle seine tiefsinnigen Beobachtungen bez眉glich des Menschen mitzuteilen. Vieles davon war mir nat眉rlich bereits bekannt, aber 眉beraus erfreut und fasziniert war ich von seiner tieferen Logik bei der Auseinandersetzung der verschiedenen Grade unserer Verzweiflung. Niemals w盲r ich von selbst auf diese Gedanken gekommen. Kierkegaard vermittelt uns als L枚sung, wir selbst zu werden, also das eigentliche, urspr眉ngliche wir, bevor wir uns die j盲mmerliche Gesellschaft in der wir aufwuchsen als Ma脽stab f眉r unser Selbst nahmen. 脛hnliche Belehrungen, die auch Schopenhauer oder Nietzsche vertraten, als letzterer z.B. sagte: "Werde, der du bist."
So schreibt Kierkegaard aber auch sehr feinf眉hlig:
"Es ist daher v枚llig unm枚glich, da脽 die vulg盲re Betrachtung recht hat, wenn sie annimmt, die Verzweiflung sei das Seltene, sie ist hingegen das ganz Allgemeine. Es ist also v枚llig unm枚glich, da脽 die vulg盲re Betrachtung recht hat, wenn sie annimmt, da脽 ein jeder, der nicht meint oder f眉hlt, verzweifelt zu sein, es auch nicht sei, und da脽 nur der es sei, der es von sich selbst sagt. Im Gegenteil, wer ohne Affektiertheit von sich sagt, da脽 er es sei, ist doch ein wenig, ist dialektisch der Heilung n盲her als alle die, die nicht daf眉r angesehen werden und sich selbst nicht f眉r verzweifelt halten.
Aber gerade das ist es, worin der Seelenkenner mir gewi脽 recht geben wird, das Allgemeine, da脽 die meisten Menschen leben, ohne sich recht bewu脽t zu werden, da脽 sie als Geist bestimmt sind - und darauf beruht all die sogenannte Sicherheit, Zufriedenheit mit dem Leben und so weiter, was gerade Verzweiflung ist. Die dagegen sagen, sie seien verzweifelt, sind entweder in der Regel diejenigen, die eine so viel tiefere Natur haben, da脽 sie sich selbst als Geist bewu脽t werden m眉ssen, oder diejenigen, denen schwere Ereignisse und furchtbare Entscheidungen dazu verholfen haben, sich als Geist bewu脽t zu werden - so oder so; denn sehr selten ist gerade derjenige, der in Wahrheit nicht verzweifelt ist."
Welch eine fundamentale Wahrheit vor der ein jeder die Augen verschlie脽t. Die verschiedenen Grade der Verzweiflung haben mich ganz ungemein in den Bann gezogen, denn auch meine eigene Verzweiflung wurde von ihm gleichsam seziert und gab mir oft das gro脽e "Ja genau!"-Erlebnis. Ich staunte nicht schlecht wie treffsicher und beinah mit einer Lupe der Mann die tieferen Ursachen meiner inneren Verzweiflung mir vor Augen f眉hrte. Oft hatte ich beim Lesen Einw盲nde gegen seine Ausf眉hrungen, doch sie wurden zu 99% alle beiseite gefegt und als L枚sung wurde mir nichts irdisches, sondern das Ewige und Edle ans Herz gelegt.
Doch Kierkegaard versteht auch, dass das Selbst am wenigsten gefragt wird, dass fast alle nur Masken tragen und in ihrer unbeschreiblichen J盲mmerlichkeit unter ihren Mitmenschen f眉r alles was sie tun Best盲tigung und Anerkennung suchen, aber auf keinen Fall Aufkl盲rung, denn diese beinhaltet meistens etwas "negatives" und daf眉r sind sie "zu schwach, zu 盲ngstlich, denn es bedarf h枚herer geistiger Kr盲fte", weswegen er auch hinzuf眉gt:
"Wenn aber ein Mensch so phantastisch geworden ist und darum verzweifelt, so kann er doch, obwohl das meistens offenbar wird, recht gut dahin leben; Mensch sein, wie es scheint, besch盲ftigt mit dem Zeitlichen, heiraten, Kinder zeugen, geehrt und angesehen sein - und man merkt es vielleicht nicht, da脽 ihm im tieferen Sinne ein Selbst fehlt. Von solchen Dingen macht man in der Welt kein gro脽es Aufheben; denn ein Selbst ist das, was in der Welt am wenigsten gefragt ist, und das ist etwas, was am allergef盲hrlichsten ist, sich anmerken zu lassen, da脽 man eines hat. Die gr枚脽te Gefahr, sich selbst zu verlieren, kann in der Welt so still vonstatten gehen, als w盲re es nichts. Kein Verlust kann so still abgehen; jeden anderen Verlust, ein Arm, ein Bein, f眉nf Reichstaler, ein Weib und so weiter bemerkt man doch."
Es ist gleichsam wie als ob er die heutigen YouTube Jammerlappen beschreibt, die wegen der mit ihnen geteilten kleinsten Erkenntnis, die ihnen den Mangel an ihrem Selbst offenbar macht, sofort wegen Cyber-Mobbing rum heulen. Ich kann jedenfalls Kierkegaard durchaus viel abgewinnen und verdanke ihm so manches, selbst was das G枚ttliche angeht.
May 22, 2020
Among Kierkegaard鈥檚 writings Sickness Unto Death is definitely not his easiest work. It begins with a very arcane discussion on the nature of different kinds of despair which relies rather too much on Hegel to immediately comprehensible to most readers. From there, it moves into a discussion on how these different forms of despair relate to the concept of sin. The second part is substantially shorter than the first. If your goodwill lasts into this second section, it鈥檚 where the text really comes alive.
I鈥檓 going to attempt a brief summary of Kierkegaard鈥檚 thoughts on this.
Despair, although taking many forms, fundamentally boils down to a misunderstanding of the relationship between the universal and subjective. This basic division of the self is a borrowing from Hegel. Essentially, Kierkegaard argues, the self consists of an internal universal experience, with a subjective reflection of the universal existing in relation to it. The universal is something which I think objectively exists experientially, by which I mean to say that all people are capable of experiencing the universal experience. What I essentially mean is that all humanity is capable of conceiving of the concept of the infinite. In the West, this infinity is often synonymous with the God of Christianity. The subjective self must then exist in a relation to this distinctly human idea. What I mean is that all experience of self-hood must exist under the shadow of the potential conception of infinitude. The subjective must make peace with its finitude in the face of the infinite.
Kierkegaard then argues that despair stems from an imbalance in this experience. To exist solely in the universal leads to a starvation of the subjective, and selfhood being lost. To exists solely in the subjective leads to a starvation of the deeper part of the soul, and one鈥檚 actions become more alike to automation than conscious decision-making. Kierkegaard expands this basic idea with many examples, but fundamentally this misrelation between the two parts of self lies at their core.
Part two moves on from the investigation into the symptoms of despair, and into the moral cause. Here, Kierkegaard begins to look at the idea of sin. Kierkegaard argues that to despair is to sin. The opposite of sin, he argues, is not virtue, but faith. The solution to sin is not to be virtuous, but to have faith. Of course, one must also strive to be virtuous, but this occurs basically automatically if one rejects despair and embraces faith. To despair is to sin, and it is only in despair that one is actually likely to behave in a manner which is not virtuous. By misrelating the universal and subjective, one enters into a state of immorality by default, because one loses the ability to perceive the world in an accurate manner.
However, how does one then balance the two? That is the role of faith. To put the two in perfect balance is basically impossible, so humanity exists in a state of despair constantly, although in most people in a different degree to one who submits totally to the universal or the subjective. The key then is to embrace faith, which essentially provides the tools to exist in this balance as best as possible. See Fear and Trembling for more of Kierkegaard鈥檚 discussion on the nature of faith.
Of course, this then ties into original sin. Kierkegaard leaves much of the details of the relation between all of this and original sin up to the reader, but as I see it, the suggestion is that by partaking in the tree of life, humanity gained access to the universal, and so have to exist in this relation between subjective and universal. This knowing is itself the original sin. Original sin is dissolved into the concept of the knowing. By being aware of the universal, we are constantly in a state of sin and only the atonement can absolve us of this.
So, I hope that was basically comprehensible. As I have said, I think this is one of Kierkegaard鈥檚 harder works, but it is very rewarding. I鈥檓 not sure that many modern readers will readily accept Kierkegaard鈥檚 solutions to these problems, but I think the questions are just as relevant now as they ever were. How should we deal with the concept of infinity? What should we do in the face of despair? These questions matter just as much now as ever.
I鈥檓 going to attempt a brief summary of Kierkegaard鈥檚 thoughts on this.
Despair, although taking many forms, fundamentally boils down to a misunderstanding of the relationship between the universal and subjective. This basic division of the self is a borrowing from Hegel. Essentially, Kierkegaard argues, the self consists of an internal universal experience, with a subjective reflection of the universal existing in relation to it. The universal is something which I think objectively exists experientially, by which I mean to say that all people are capable of experiencing the universal experience. What I essentially mean is that all humanity is capable of conceiving of the concept of the infinite. In the West, this infinity is often synonymous with the God of Christianity. The subjective self must then exist in a relation to this distinctly human idea. What I mean is that all experience of self-hood must exist under the shadow of the potential conception of infinitude. The subjective must make peace with its finitude in the face of the infinite.
Kierkegaard then argues that despair stems from an imbalance in this experience. To exist solely in the universal leads to a starvation of the subjective, and selfhood being lost. To exists solely in the subjective leads to a starvation of the deeper part of the soul, and one鈥檚 actions become more alike to automation than conscious decision-making. Kierkegaard expands this basic idea with many examples, but fundamentally this misrelation between the two parts of self lies at their core.
Part two moves on from the investigation into the symptoms of despair, and into the moral cause. Here, Kierkegaard begins to look at the idea of sin. Kierkegaard argues that to despair is to sin. The opposite of sin, he argues, is not virtue, but faith. The solution to sin is not to be virtuous, but to have faith. Of course, one must also strive to be virtuous, but this occurs basically automatically if one rejects despair and embraces faith. To despair is to sin, and it is only in despair that one is actually likely to behave in a manner which is not virtuous. By misrelating the universal and subjective, one enters into a state of immorality by default, because one loses the ability to perceive the world in an accurate manner.
However, how does one then balance the two? That is the role of faith. To put the two in perfect balance is basically impossible, so humanity exists in a state of despair constantly, although in most people in a different degree to one who submits totally to the universal or the subjective. The key then is to embrace faith, which essentially provides the tools to exist in this balance as best as possible. See Fear and Trembling for more of Kierkegaard鈥檚 discussion on the nature of faith.
Of course, this then ties into original sin. Kierkegaard leaves much of the details of the relation between all of this and original sin up to the reader, but as I see it, the suggestion is that by partaking in the tree of life, humanity gained access to the universal, and so have to exist in this relation between subjective and universal. This knowing is itself the original sin. Original sin is dissolved into the concept of the knowing. By being aware of the universal, we are constantly in a state of sin and only the atonement can absolve us of this.
So, I hope that was basically comprehensible. As I have said, I think this is one of Kierkegaard鈥檚 harder works, but it is very rewarding. I鈥檓 not sure that many modern readers will readily accept Kierkegaard鈥檚 solutions to these problems, but I think the questions are just as relevant now as they ever were. How should we deal with the concept of infinity? What should we do in the face of despair? These questions matter just as much now as ever.
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September 18, 2018Ti锚u 膽峄� c峄 cu峄憂 s谩ch d峄盿 tr锚n Kinh Th谩nh (John 11:4), khi Ch煤a h峄搃 sinh Lazarus v脿 tuy锚n b峄� s峄� 峄憁 y岷縰 b锚nh t岷璽 c峄 Lazarus kh么ng d岷玭 膽岷縩 c谩i ch岷縯 (The Sickness is not unto death). 膼峄慽 v峄沬 Anti Climacus (hay Kierkegaard), the sickness unto death kh么ng ph岷 l脿 s峄� 峄憁 y岷縰 b峄噉h t岷璽 v峄� th峄� x谩c. The sickness unto death l脿 c啤n b峄噉h mang y岷縰 t峄� tinh th岷 t芒m linh, l脿 s峄� ho脿n to脿n kh么ng 媒 th峄ヽ 膽瓢峄 v峄� b岷 ng茫, l脿 s峄� kh么ng 媒 th峄ヽ 膽瓢峄 v峄� 媒 ngh末a c峄 s峄� t峄搉 t岷 膽峄檆 l岷璸 nh瓢 m峄檛 con ng瓢峄漣, l脿 s峄� ch峄慽 b峄� b岷 ng茫 khi 媒 th峄ヽ 膽瓢峄 v峄� n贸, l脿 s峄� ch峄慽 b峄� b岷 ng茫 膽峄� t岷 ra m峄檛 h矛nh 岷h c峄 b岷 th峄� ch峄� d峄盿 tr锚n c谩c th脿nh t峄眜 v脿 m峄 ti锚u c谩 nh芒n ch峄� quan. Tr锚n t岷 c岷�, v峄沬 Kierkegaard (hay Anti Climacus), the sickness unto death l脿 s峄� ch峄慽 b峄� c谩c c谩c gi谩 tr峄� tinh th岷 t芒m linh c峄 Christianity. B岷 c贸 th峄� kh么ng 膽峄搉g 媒 v峄沬 Kierkegaard v矛 b岷 kh么ng tin v脿o c谩c gi谩 tr峄� Thi锚n Ch煤a, th岷璵 ch铆 t峄� nh岷璶 m矛nh l脿 ng瓢峄漣 v么 th岷, nh瓢ng c贸 l岷� b岷 kh贸 c贸 th峄� ph峄� nh岷璶 r岷眓g, m峄檛 th峄漣 膽i峄僲 n脿o 膽贸, b岷 nh岷璶 ra r岷眓g trong x茫 h峄檌 hi峄噉 膽岷, c脿ng v峄沬 c谩c ti岷縩 b峄� t峄檛 c霉ng c峄 khoa h峄峜 k峄� thu岷璽 v脿 膽峄漣 s峄憂g v岷璽 ch岷, con ng瓢峄漣 d瓢峄漬g nh瓢 c脿ng hoang mang v脿 l岷 l峄慽 trong 膽峄漣 s峄憂g tinh th岷, c脿ng c岷 gi谩c thi岷縰 膽i m峄檛 gi谩 tr峄� t芒m linh n脿o 膽贸 c峄� th峄� 膽峄� b岷 v铆u. Gi峄痑 m峄檛 x茫 h峄檌 c么ng nghi峄噋 v脿 th瓢啤ng m岷 h贸a, con ng瓢峄漣 d瓢峄漬g nh瓢 c脿ng kh么ng d峄� tr岷� l峄漣 cho c芒u h峄廼 m矛nh th峄眂 s峄� l脿 ai v脿 gi谩 tr峄� g矛 c峄 b岷 th芒n th峄眂 s峄� l脿 ri锚ng bi峄噒 v脿 th峄眂 ch岷 gi峄痑 h脿ng tr膬m ngh矛n c谩c t脿i kho岷 m岷g x茫 h峄檌 岷 th岷璽 gi岷� l岷玭 l峄檔. M矛nh c贸 th峄眂 l脿 con ng瓢峄漣 m脿 m矛nh tr瓢ng l锚n facebook, instagram, goodreads...cho m峄峣 ng瓢峄漣 chi锚m ng瓢峄g. V脿 n岷縰 kh么ng tin v脿o gi谩o l媒 Christianity, v岷瓂 th矛 b岷 ch峄峮 cho m矛nh 膽i峄乽 g矛 l脿 m峄 ti锚u c峄 cu峄檆 s峄憂g tinh th岷 t芒m linh n岷縰 kh么ng 膽啤n thu岷 ch峄� l脿 s峄� th峄廰 m茫n v峄� v岷璽 ch岷 v脿 d峄 v峄峮g? 膼峄慽 v峄沬 Kierkegaard, s峄� th岷 b岷 cho vi峄嘽 tr岷� l峄漣 c谩c c芒u h峄廼 膽贸, ch铆nh l脿 The Sickness Unto Death. Gi峄憂g nh瓢 khi Nietzsche tuy锚n b峄� God is Dead, 么ng kh么ng c贸 媒 r岷眓g Ch煤a kh么ng t峄搉 t岷. Ng瓢峄 l岷, Ch煤a 膽茫 t峄搉 t岷 v脿 c贸 媒 ngh末a v峄沬 cu峄檆 s峄憂g tinh th岷 c峄 con ng瓢峄漣 trong qu谩 kh峄�. Nh瓢ng c霉ng v峄沬 s峄� ph谩t tri峄僴 c峄 x茫 h峄檌 hi峄噉 膽岷 : God is dead, God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply to appear worthy of it? (The Gay Science).
August 14, 2020
"T眉m hastal谋klar谋n en k枚t眉s眉 olan hastal谋臒谋n [umutsuzluk] benim i莽in en korkun莽 i艧areti, onun gizemidir. Yaln谋zca bu hastal谋臒谋 ondan ac谋 莽ekenden saklamak i莽in g枚sterilen arzular ve iyi niyetli gayretler de臒il, yaln谋zca bu hastal谋臒谋n hi莽 kimse fark谋na varmadan insan谋n i莽ine yerle艧mesi de臒il, ayn谋 zamanda bu hastal谋臒谋n insan谋n i莽ine onun varl谋臒谋n谋 hi莽 bilmeden 莽ok iyi bir bi莽imde saklanabilmesidir. Ve kum saati, d眉nyan谋n kum saati bo艧ald谋 ve y眉zy谋l谋n t眉m g眉r眉lt眉leri sustu; 莽谋lg谋n ve k谋s谋r 莽abam谋z bitti, yak谋nlar谋na gelince, sonsuzlukta oldu臒u gibi - erke臒in veya kad谋n谋n, zenginin veya yoksulun, k枚lenin veya efendinin, mutlunun veya mutsuzun oldu臒u gibi- her 艧ey sessizlik i莽indedir; ba艧谋n ister tac谋n p谋r谋lt谋s谋n谋 ta艧谋s谋n ister basit insanlar谋n aras谋nda kaybolsun, ister yaln谋zca g眉nlerin s谋k谋nt谋lar谋na ve al谋n terlerine sahip ol, ister d眉nya durdu臒u s眉rece 眉n眉n y眉celtilsin, ister isimsiz ve unutulmu艧 olarak say谋s眉z kalabal谋klar谋n i莽inde kaybol, ister seni kaplayan bu g枚rkem t眉m insansal betimlemeleri a艧s谋n, ister insanlar, ne olursan ol seni yarg谋lar谋n en ac谋s谋, en al莽alt谋c谋s谋 ile vursunlar, sonsuzluk milyonlarca benzerinden her biri i莽in oldu臒u gibi senin i莽in de tek bir konuda bilgiyle donanacakt谋r: Ya艧am谋n谋n umutsuz olup olmad谋臒谋 ve umutsuzsa bunu bilip bilmedi臒in veya bu umutsuzlu臒u bir kayg谋 gizi gibj, su莽lu bir a艧k谋n meyvesi gibi i莽ine sokup sokmad谋臒谋n veya umutsuz olarak ve di臒erlerine nefret duyarak 枚fkeye kap谋l谋p kap谋lmad谋臒谋n konusunda. Ve e臒er ya艧am谋n yaln谋zca umutsuzlu臒u ta艧谋yorsa gerisinin hi莽bir 枚nemi yoktur! 陌ster zaferler isterse yenilgiler s枚z konusu olsun, senin i莽in her 艧ey kaybedilmi艧tir, sonsuzluk seni art谋k hi莽 i莽ine almaz, seni hi莽 tan谋mam谋艧t谋r veya daha da k枚t眉s眉 seni tan谋rken seni kendi ben'ine, umutsuzlu臒un ben'ine 莽iviler!" (s.37)
陌nsan谋n (varsa/fark谋ndaysa) umutsuzlu臒unun bi莽imlerini, kendisini ve "eksikliklerini" (bu y枚nde bir istek olmas谋 halinde) tan谋mlamas谋na veya sorgulamas谋na yard谋m edebilecek/tetikleyebilecek bir eser. H谋ristiyan perspektifinin (艧ahsi kanaatime g枚re 莽ok) bask谋n kalmas谋, psikolojik/felsefik taraf谋n kuvvetini biraz zay谋flatsa da teolojik y枚nden de ilgin莽 bir kaynak olu艧mas谋na vesile olmu艧 gibi duruyor. Sayfa say谋s谋 y枚n眉nden az gibi dursa da sindire sindire okumay谋 gerektiren bir dil mevcut.
7/10
陌nsan谋n (varsa/fark谋ndaysa) umutsuzlu臒unun bi莽imlerini, kendisini ve "eksikliklerini" (bu y枚nde bir istek olmas谋 halinde) tan谋mlamas谋na veya sorgulamas谋na yard谋m edebilecek/tetikleyebilecek bir eser. H谋ristiyan perspektifinin (艧ahsi kanaatime g枚re 莽ok) bask谋n kalmas谋, psikolojik/felsefik taraf谋n kuvvetini biraz zay谋flatsa da teolojik y枚nden de ilgin莽 bir kaynak olu艧mas谋na vesile olmu艧 gibi duruyor. Sayfa say谋s谋 y枚n眉nden az gibi dursa da sindire sindire okumay谋 gerektiren bir dil mevcut.
7/10
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November 7, 2016The following is an essay I wrote about the book for my philosophy class which briefly summarizes its main ideas.
The Disrupted 鈥淪elf鈥� as a Cause of All Despair
According to Kierkegaard鈥檚 work 鈥淭he Sickness unto Death鈥�
The Disrupted 鈥淪elf鈥� as a Cause of All Despair
According to Kierkegaard鈥檚 work 鈥淭he Sickness unto Death鈥�
Soren Kierkegaard was a Danish writer who lived in the 19th century. During his lifetime Kierkegaard published numerous works which have come to represent the earliest form of philosophical existentialism. Well before Nietzsche and Sartre, Kierkegaard was less concerned about proving or disproving the outside world, but rather focused on the fundamental discomfort every human being experiences when attempting to relate to it. This discomfort which Kierkegaard called 鈥渄espair鈥� and some other philosophers 鈥渁nxiety鈥� or 鈥渘ausea鈥�, became the axis of existentialist thought, which inevitably had to shift its attention inwardly to the human 鈥渟elf鈥�. But what is the 鈥渟elf鈥�? Kierkegaard answered this question in the very first lines of his work 鈥淭he Sickness unto Death鈥� - 鈥淭he self is a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating to itself鈥�. The question then arises - how does the 鈥渟elf鈥� give rise to despair?
Kierkegaard attributed the humanly condition of despair to the 鈥渟elf鈥�, in other words the source of despair is the 鈥渟elf鈥�. The self is in itself a relation, a synthesis and precisely this synthesis holds the possibility of despair. This is because the synthesis is made of opposites which if imbalanced become despair. The relation which relates to this synthesis is what determines whether this possibility will become actuality or not. According to Kierkegaard, to have this possibility is a merit, it is what proves the divinity of the human self and what separates the man from the beast. However to actually be in despair is a descent rather than an ascent, and in Christianity it is a sin (鈥渟in is: before God, or with God, in despair not wanting to be oneself, or wanting in despair to be oneself鈥�). In despair the relation continuously causes an imbalance in the synthesis, having let go of God and thus blindly attempting to destroy the 鈥渟elf鈥� and replace it with an artificial sense of self. It does so by playing with the opposites which constitute the 鈥渟elf鈥�. In 鈥淭he Sickness unto Death鈥� Kierkegaard gives two examples of how the despair expresses itself in the context of the self being imbalanced between infinitude and finitude and between possibility and necessity, because after all 鈥渘o form of despair can be defined directly, but only with reference to its opposite鈥�. In an imbalance, when one opposite dominates the other, it becomes impossible to become a wholesome self. In the case of infinitude and finitude, if the person loses himself in fantasy and imagination (infinitude) he steers too far away from his 鈥渟elf鈥�, but on the other hand if he gives up all of that to be dominated by wordily things only (finitude) he will not be able to be a true 鈥渟elf鈥� either. Hence the balance in the synthesis is vital to the human 鈥渟elf鈥�. So why does the relation struggle to relate to the synthesis and thus disrupts the divine balance and brings about despair? According to Kierkegaard this seemingly irrational destruction of oneself stems from the self not being grounded in God.
One way in which the self cannot be grounded in God, is if the self is ignorant of God, i.e. it is impossible to conceive the self as a spirit which is able to despair without the knowledge of God. Despite this, this type of despair is very common and least recognized among people, not surprisingly since the person suffering is himself ignorant of it, hence he claims that he is fine and is likely to be a functioning and accomplished member of society. Not only is such a person blind to his own despair, but he does not want to recognize it, because he is comfortable in such a vegetative state, in Kierkegaard鈥檚 words, 鈥渢he dread in a spiritless person is recognizable precisely in his spiritless sense of security鈥�. He feels secure, because such a despair is also least intense, since the person is numb to it. He does not display any symptoms, yet he is sick all the same, 鈥渉e feels best, considers himself at his healthiest, can appear to others to be in the pink of condition, just when the illness is at its most critical鈥�. So even though the person mutes the painful awareness of his own despair, as a shuddersome consequence he remains unable to heal from it as long as he remains ignorant. Kierkegaard recognized such a despair among pagans, whose self is not grounded transparently in God and thus remains unaccountable.
However a person can also claim to be in despair, so he is (or thinks he is) conscious of his own suffering, and yet does not step out of such a state. Such despair is either 鈥渢he despair of not wanting to be oneself鈥� or 鈥渢he despair of wanting in despair to be oneself鈥�. The first one is born from weakness, while the latter one is weakness transformed into defiance, or the feminine despair overtaken by the masculine. If we follow the increasing degree of consciousness one has about the nature of the self, we have to start by examining the despair of weakness first. Despair of the immediate falls under this category. A person despairing over the immediate claims he is in despair, despite being unable to detect it correctly - 鈥渉e stands there pointing to something that is not despair, explaining that he is in despair, and yet, sure enough, the despair is going on behind him unawares鈥�. Why can鈥檛 such a person see the true despair? Because he despairs over worldly things, while the self is eternal (鈥渘ext to God there is nothing so eternal as a self鈥�), so he is unable to see anything which does not manifest itself externally, an image which is infinitely comical to Kierkegaard. Yet the dissatisfaction eats him from the inside and the only tool he has in combating it, is fantasy. Through his fantasy he wishes to get rid of whatever self he conceives of, and acquire a new self. This illusion that one can slip into a new self, like into a pair of new pants is destroyed by reflection. Once a person recognizes the fact that the self is eternal, the illusion of becoming something else is shattered. This understanding is so devastating, that most people cannot move past it and resort to a certain passivity of just not wanting to be oneself. Thus they get stuck in what Kierkegaard referred to as 鈥渋mmediacy with a little dash of reflection added鈥�. Their consciousness is elevated from that of weakness to that of recognition of its own weakness, however the spirit remains chained, the person cannot accept his true self.
The despair of not wanting to be oneself, as we discussed, is despair of worldly things and externalities. However once a person undergoes a shift of focus from the immediate to the eternal, the despair of passivity becomes active. Such a despair 鈥渃omes not from the outside in the form of passivity in the face of external pressure, but directly from the self鈥�. In other words, this kind of despair becomes conscious of having an eternal self and now wants in despair to be itself. It is hypnotized by its own eternity, however it misuses it by in wanting to be itself, clinging on to it, and not letting go (having faith) and losing itself in eternity in order to win itself. Kierkegaard writes of such despair: 鈥渢he self wants in despair to rule over himself, or create himself, make this self the self he wants to be, determine what he will have and what he will not have in his concrete self鈥�. Such a controlling self cannot lose itself in eternity, it does not have faith in God, because it does not know what a self, grounded transparently in the power which created it, will look like. It is obsessed with creating a perfect self, the despair is at the height of its fever. It is so intense and relentless that it is almost demonic (according to Kierkegaard demonic despair is the most intense despair because the fallen angel is fully conscious of itself). It derives pleasure of being its own master, however it continuously contradicts itself, by trying to be a self it consequently becomes no self.
In his book 鈥淭he Sickness unto Death鈥� Kierkegaard discussed in detail all the types of despair that plague people. The self being the source of all despair; Kierkegaard pointed to the disrupted relation鈥檚 relating to the self to define its intensity. In fact the key message of the human condition of despair is expressed in the title of the book. 鈥淭he Sickness鈥� refers to despair, and 鈥渦nto Death鈥� indicates that the only way to escape it, is to die. But this is not 鈥渄eath鈥� in the physical sense, but death in a more theological/Christian understanding. One could say it is the death of the artificial self. Overall the despair is the disrupted self鈥檚 struggle to die, but once one acquires faith, he is no longer clinging unto that false sense of security. This is when the self undergoes a transformation, becomes grounded in God and its enlightenment destroys despair.
April 22, 2016
What is it about great books that make us feel as though, even on ours first read, we have read them before? They come to us already familiar. Their profundity seems to have bubbled over and dribbled down into the culture. Over time such books exert an oblique influence on our paradigms so that soon enough, to pick one example, we unwittingly assume Cartesian suppositions about the self without even having read Descartes鈥� Meditations. The Sickness unto Death seems to be one such 鈥済reat book,鈥� for I can only explain its peculiar familiarity by its stature and influence. It has undoubtedly had a formative role to play in Sartre鈥檚 and Heidegger鈥檚 thinking, and the existentialists in general are heavily indebted to it. My interest in that particular drift of thought has in some sense initiated me into Kierkegaard鈥檚 own piercing way of writing, for it is the shared goal (perhaps the only shared goal) of existentialist writers to 鈥渁waken鈥� the reader into an awareness of their own individual, self-responsible existence.
It is interesting to read SUD from a position of acquaintance with those thinkers who have secularized Kierkegaard鈥檚 insights. I found that Kierkegaard鈥檚 explicit Christianity made the 鈥渆xistential鈥� dimension of the book more immediate and gripping. At the same time, though, I am able to see more clearly how Kierkegaard鈥檚 particular religious conviction frames his analysis of selfhood in a way that raises an important concern, namely, his exclusive focus on personal salvation. Where does good old neighbour-love enter in? It seems that something significant is missing from the picture, and if we are to be cautious we must decide for now that Kierkegaard鈥檚 myopic vision for individual salvation precludes a 鈥減rescriptive鈥� interpretation of the work as a whole. To be sure, it would not be too far off to call SUD a 鈥渟elf-help book,鈥� for the bent of the analysis is an elucidation of despair for the sake of the reader鈥檚 own 鈥渦pbuilding.鈥� I wonder, though, how far such elucidation can go in the task of personal upbuilding?
Kierkegaard鈥檚 analysis also brings up a profound and deeply unsettling question without giving us any assurance of an answer (leaving us without assurance was indeed part of the point). It seems that the most compelling and important question to ask after reading SUD is, quite strangely: 鈥淒id God do the right thing in creating us? Is being a self worth it?鈥� Or, framed more religiously: 鈥淚s it worth it, to be separate from God?鈥� Being a 鈥渟elf鈥� is the condition of possibility for rejecting salvation, as Kierkegaard has shown so clearly 鈥� it is even possible that a self can knowingly reject salvation (鈥渢here is no obscurity that could serve as a mitigating excuse鈥�), which is far stranger and of more profound importance than the insight that we can unknowingly reject salvation. We are then inclined to ask, are these conditions of possibility worth it? Can we handle our selfhood, our radical freedom? Free will is a curse on those who misuse it, to be sure 鈥� being a self is the possibility of real danger. But free will is a blessing on those who use it right, and so being a self is also the conditions of possibility for real joy. So, once again: is the risk worth it?
We must admit, there is no way to judge.
All we can say is that right now we are, in a carefully qualified sense, separate from God: 鈥淕od, who constituted man as a relation, releases it from his hand, as it were.鈥� This means that we can relate ourselves to ourselves in such a way that we interpret ourselves as actually separate from God 鈥� we thus interpret ourselves into our own damnation. Or we can do the opposite and interpret ourselves as grounded in God 鈥� we can have faith, and in this way allow God to save us from damnation.
Yet this leads to a new question: how could damnation be predicated upon the inwardness/closedness of the self, which is the very thing which cuts off the hope for salvation? This is the greatest Catch-22 of all time! Dostoyevsky voices the same chilling complaint to God in Ivan Karamazov鈥檚 poem 鈥淭he Grand Inquisitor.鈥� Humans, he says, are for the most part too weak for their freedom 鈥� why then give it to them at all? They will be stuck in this Catch-22 forever. We cannot answer this question in any definite sense, and at best we can read SUD with a renewed appreciation of the depth of our choices.
It is interesting to read SUD from a position of acquaintance with those thinkers who have secularized Kierkegaard鈥檚 insights. I found that Kierkegaard鈥檚 explicit Christianity made the 鈥渆xistential鈥� dimension of the book more immediate and gripping. At the same time, though, I am able to see more clearly how Kierkegaard鈥檚 particular religious conviction frames his analysis of selfhood in a way that raises an important concern, namely, his exclusive focus on personal salvation. Where does good old neighbour-love enter in? It seems that something significant is missing from the picture, and if we are to be cautious we must decide for now that Kierkegaard鈥檚 myopic vision for individual salvation precludes a 鈥減rescriptive鈥� interpretation of the work as a whole. To be sure, it would not be too far off to call SUD a 鈥渟elf-help book,鈥� for the bent of the analysis is an elucidation of despair for the sake of the reader鈥檚 own 鈥渦pbuilding.鈥� I wonder, though, how far such elucidation can go in the task of personal upbuilding?
Kierkegaard鈥檚 analysis also brings up a profound and deeply unsettling question without giving us any assurance of an answer (leaving us without assurance was indeed part of the point). It seems that the most compelling and important question to ask after reading SUD is, quite strangely: 鈥淒id God do the right thing in creating us? Is being a self worth it?鈥� Or, framed more religiously: 鈥淚s it worth it, to be separate from God?鈥� Being a 鈥渟elf鈥� is the condition of possibility for rejecting salvation, as Kierkegaard has shown so clearly 鈥� it is even possible that a self can knowingly reject salvation (鈥渢here is no obscurity that could serve as a mitigating excuse鈥�), which is far stranger and of more profound importance than the insight that we can unknowingly reject salvation. We are then inclined to ask, are these conditions of possibility worth it? Can we handle our selfhood, our radical freedom? Free will is a curse on those who misuse it, to be sure 鈥� being a self is the possibility of real danger. But free will is a blessing on those who use it right, and so being a self is also the conditions of possibility for real joy. So, once again: is the risk worth it?
We must admit, there is no way to judge.
All we can say is that right now we are, in a carefully qualified sense, separate from God: 鈥淕od, who constituted man as a relation, releases it from his hand, as it were.鈥� This means that we can relate ourselves to ourselves in such a way that we interpret ourselves as actually separate from God 鈥� we thus interpret ourselves into our own damnation. Or we can do the opposite and interpret ourselves as grounded in God 鈥� we can have faith, and in this way allow God to save us from damnation.
Yet this leads to a new question: how could damnation be predicated upon the inwardness/closedness of the self, which is the very thing which cuts off the hope for salvation? This is the greatest Catch-22 of all time! Dostoyevsky voices the same chilling complaint to God in Ivan Karamazov鈥檚 poem 鈥淭he Grand Inquisitor.鈥� Humans, he says, are for the most part too weak for their freedom 鈥� why then give it to them at all? They will be stuck in this Catch-22 forever. We cannot answer this question in any definite sense, and at best we can read SUD with a renewed appreciation of the depth of our choices.
October 23, 2021
Ovo je jedna od te啪ih knjiga koje sam do sada pro膷itao, bez obzira na njene malene gabarite. Nije u pitanju nivo neprobojnosti Jakoba Bemea, niti lo拧i i nezgrapni spisi Aristotela ili Hegela, pa ipak je te拧ko na svoj na膷in. Te拧ko je zbog apsurda kojim se bavi i apsurdnog re膷nika kojim to saop拧tava.
I 拧to je naj膷udnije - te啪e je o ovoj knjizi pri膷ati/pisati nego je razumeti. Naravno, 膷im o njoj ne mogu sa sigurno拧膰u pri膷ati, zna膷i da dosta toga jeste ostalo neprobojno za mene, ovde i sada, i poziva na jo拧 koje 膷itanje, 拧to 膰e svakako i biti slu膷aj, ipak... dok moj razum ba拧 ne uspeva do kraja da preslo啪i utiske i pouke i to prenese bilo kome, moja du拧a kao da je razumela sve ovo.
U slede膰oj Kjrekegorovoj knjizi koju 膷itam to postaje jo拧 jasnije, no ve膰 ovde sasvim je o膷igledno - 膷ovek je postao previ拧e mekan za religiju, za veru, za Boga, za apsolut. Ni膷e i svi kriti膷ari su pogre拧ili, kritikuju膰i op拧tu, narodsku religiju sa idejom da je ona za slabi膰e, robove, umorne, prose膷ne... i dok je sve to ta膷no, svi takvi kriti膷ari zaboravili su ili nisu bili sposobni da dobace dotle, do onog krajnjeg, grani膷nog stanja ljudskog postojanja, do susreta sa ve膷no拧膰u, pa makar u tuma膷enju tog susreta do拧li do zaklju膷ka da je ve膷nost - ni拧ta, ali zaista do啪iveti to grani膷no stanje, ne razumom, ne logikom, ne emocijom, nego puno膰om svoje egzistencije. Stajati ogoljen, olju拧ten kao truli luk, sve do poslednjeg, zdravog sloja, centra, nije za slabi膰e i robove.
膶ovek je kroz vekove postao sve manje sposoban za taj susret. Nikada i nije bio, u proseku, sposoban za to, ali je, 膷ini se, ba拧 zbog tehnolo拧kog napretka koji nije ispra膰en duhovnim rastom, ve膰 ba拧 suprotno - potpunim opadanjem, je doveo do mekanog, razma啪enog i za pravu duhovnost nesposobno 膷ove膷anstva. 膶ove膷anstvo koje ni iz svih svojih m,ilijardi danas ne bi moglo iznedriti ni tuce duhovnika u punom smislu te re膷i - iako je uvek, u svakom trenutku, u svakom dobu, svaki 膷ovek sposoban za to, iako je to zapravo jedina njegova sudbina. Ova knjiga je o tome. O susretu sa apsolutom. O stajanju pred bogom. O o膷ajanju kada tog susreta nema. O o膷ajanju kada taj susret 啪elimo. O o膷ajanju kada taj susret ne 啪elimo. O o膷ajanju kada taj susret imamo. O o膷ajanju.
"Greh je onda pred bogom o膷ajni膷ki ne 啪eleti biti samim sobom ili o膷ajni膷ki 啪eleti biti samim sobom."
I 拧to je naj膷udnije - te啪e je o ovoj knjizi pri膷ati/pisati nego je razumeti. Naravno, 膷im o njoj ne mogu sa sigurno拧膰u pri膷ati, zna膷i da dosta toga jeste ostalo neprobojno za mene, ovde i sada, i poziva na jo拧 koje 膷itanje, 拧to 膰e svakako i biti slu膷aj, ipak... dok moj razum ba拧 ne uspeva do kraja da preslo啪i utiske i pouke i to prenese bilo kome, moja du拧a kao da je razumela sve ovo.
U slede膰oj Kjrekegorovoj knjizi koju 膷itam to postaje jo拧 jasnije, no ve膰 ovde sasvim je o膷igledno - 膷ovek je postao previ拧e mekan za religiju, za veru, za Boga, za apsolut. Ni膷e i svi kriti膷ari su pogre拧ili, kritikuju膰i op拧tu, narodsku religiju sa idejom da je ona za slabi膰e, robove, umorne, prose膷ne... i dok je sve to ta膷no, svi takvi kriti膷ari zaboravili su ili nisu bili sposobni da dobace dotle, do onog krajnjeg, grani膷nog stanja ljudskog postojanja, do susreta sa ve膷no拧膰u, pa makar u tuma膷enju tog susreta do拧li do zaklju膷ka da je ve膷nost - ni拧ta, ali zaista do啪iveti to grani膷no stanje, ne razumom, ne logikom, ne emocijom, nego puno膰om svoje egzistencije. Stajati ogoljen, olju拧ten kao truli luk, sve do poslednjeg, zdravog sloja, centra, nije za slabi膰e i robove.
膶ovek je kroz vekove postao sve manje sposoban za taj susret. Nikada i nije bio, u proseku, sposoban za to, ali je, 膷ini se, ba拧 zbog tehnolo拧kog napretka koji nije ispra膰en duhovnim rastom, ve膰 ba拧 suprotno - potpunim opadanjem, je doveo do mekanog, razma啪enog i za pravu duhovnost nesposobno 膷ove膷anstva. 膶ove膷anstvo koje ni iz svih svojih m,ilijardi danas ne bi moglo iznedriti ni tuce duhovnika u punom smislu te re膷i - iako je uvek, u svakom trenutku, u svakom dobu, svaki 膷ovek sposoban za to, iako je to zapravo jedina njegova sudbina. Ova knjiga je o tome. O susretu sa apsolutom. O stajanju pred bogom. O o膷ajanju kada tog susreta nema. O o膷ajanju kada taj susret 啪elimo. O o膷ajanju kada taj susret ne 啪elimo. O o膷ajanju kada taj susret imamo. O o膷ajanju.
"Greh je onda pred bogom o膷ajni膷ki ne 啪eleti biti samim sobom ili o膷ajni膷ki 啪eleti biti samim sobom."
February 16, 2017
"sonlu varl谋臒谋 ve sonsuz varl谋臒谋 aras谋na s谋k谋艧an insan 'kendi olma' s眉recini umutsuzluk i莽inde ya艧ar."
"umutsuzlu臒un 枚z眉 ya艧am谋n hi莽bir 艧ey olmamas谋d谋r."
Kitap m眉thi艧ti. Bu kadar etkilenece臒imi hi莽 tahmin etmeden ba艧lam谋艧t谋m. K谋sac谋k gibi g枚r眉nse de bir s眉re sonra daha yava艧 okumak d眉艧眉nmek ve i莽selle艧tirmek istiyorsunuz. Umutsuzlu臒un hayat谋n i莽inde, Tanr谋n谋n da insan谋n i莽inde varoldu臒u ger莽e臒i ile yapt谋臒谋m谋z yapaca臒谋m谋z her 艧eyin ve i艧leyece臒imiz t眉m g眉nahlar谋n bizi umutsuzluk i莽inde b谋rakmas谋yla olumsuzluklar谋n ba艧lad谋臒谋 ve hayat谋n ger莽e臒inin asl谋nda bu olumsuzluklarla bezeli oldu臒u, sizi art谋k sadece umutsuzlukla m眉cadele edilmemesi gerekti臒i y枚n眉nde durma sa臒lamal谋d谋r. Bunu anlat谋rken asl谋nda hayat谋n s眉reklili臒ine dair umut a艧谋layan yegane kitap olabilir elinizdeki kitap... 脰zenle t眉ketiniz..
"umutsuzlu臒un 枚z眉 ya艧am谋n hi莽bir 艧ey olmamas谋d谋r."
Kitap m眉thi艧ti. Bu kadar etkilenece臒imi hi莽 tahmin etmeden ba艧lam谋艧t谋m. K谋sac谋k gibi g枚r眉nse de bir s眉re sonra daha yava艧 okumak d眉艧眉nmek ve i莽selle艧tirmek istiyorsunuz. Umutsuzlu臒un hayat谋n i莽inde, Tanr谋n谋n da insan谋n i莽inde varoldu臒u ger莽e臒i ile yapt谋臒谋m谋z yapaca臒谋m谋z her 艧eyin ve i艧leyece臒imiz t眉m g眉nahlar谋n bizi umutsuzluk i莽inde b谋rakmas谋yla olumsuzluklar谋n ba艧lad谋臒谋 ve hayat谋n ger莽e臒inin asl谋nda bu olumsuzluklarla bezeli oldu臒u, sizi art谋k sadece umutsuzlukla m眉cadele edilmemesi gerekti臒i y枚n眉nde durma sa臒lamal谋d谋r. Bunu anlat谋rken asl谋nda hayat谋n s眉reklili臒ine dair umut a艧谋layan yegane kitap olabilir elinizdeki kitap... 脰zenle t眉ketiniz..
January 4, 2013
I have to say an extraordinary piece of philosophy. And the most serious work I came across concerning Christianity. Kierkegaard's words simplified a lot of concepts about despair, and also translated our emotions and our awareness of the self and how complex that is. I don't think that its difficult to read, the matter discussed is deep yes but the way the author had delivered it was elegant. The book is a page-turner no doubt, Soren Kierkegaard is sure a genius and he was not the type of authors of whom you can sense that they're skeptic or timid toward their own work.
April 14, 2008
A self is a self that relates to itself -- says Barnacle Bill the Sailor.
No wonder Sweden hated Denmark until recently.
The quintessential 'brooding Dane' makes Hamlet seem like Milton Berle.
He makes Aristotle and Plato seem relevant in comparison.
Not recommended for anyone who has something constructive to do or works with sharp objects.
No wonder Sweden hated Denmark until recently.
The quintessential 'brooding Dane' makes Hamlet seem like Milton Berle.
He makes Aristotle and Plato seem relevant in comparison.
Not recommended for anyone who has something constructive to do or works with sharp objects.
March 25, 2020
- A muri moartea 卯nseamn膬 a tr膬i, a proba tr膬ind faptul de a muri: 葯i a putea tr膬i 卯n aceast膬 stare pentru o singur膬 clip膬 卯nseamn膬 a tr膬i 卯n vesnc. Omului i este insuportabil faptul c膬 nu se poate elibera de sine 卯nsu葯i.- Kierkegaard are o filosofie paradoxala fiindc膬 a葯a e 葯i cre葯tinismul, 葯i pentru asta e unul dintre filosofii mei prefera葲i.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
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