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丕賱賵噩賵丿 賵丕賱毓丿賲: 亘丨孬 賮賷 丕賱兀賳胤賵賱賵噩賷丕 丕賱馗丕賴乇丕鬲賷丞
Being & Nothingness is without doubt one of the most significant philosophical books of the 20th century. The central work by one of the century's most influential thinkers, it altered the course of western philosophy. Its revolutionary approach challenged all previous assumptions about the individual's relationship with the world. Known as 'the Bible of existentialism', its impact on culture & literature was immediate & was felt worldwide, from the absurdist drama of Samuel Beckett to the soul-searching cries of the Beat poets.
Being & Nothingness is one of those rare books whose influence has affected the mindset of subsequent generations. Seventy years after its 1st publication, its message remains as potent as ever--challenging readers to confront the fundamental dilemmas of human freedom, choice, responsibility & action.
Being & Nothingness is one of those rare books whose influence has affected the mindset of subsequent generations. Seventy years after its 1st publication, its message remains as potent as ever--challenging readers to confront the fundamental dilemmas of human freedom, choice, responsibility & action.
994 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1943
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138k people want to read
About the author
Jean-Paul Sartre
894听books12.3k听followersJean-Paul Charles Aymard Sartre was a French philosopher, playwright, novelist, screenwriter, political activist, biographer, and literary critic, considered a leading figure in 20th-century French philosophy and Marxism. Sartre was one of the key figures in the philosophy of existentialism (and phenomenology). His work has influenced sociology, critical theory, post-colonial theory, and literary studies. He was awarded the 1964 Nobel Prize in Literature despite attempting to refuse it, saying that he always declined official honors and that "a writer should not allow himself to be turned into an institution."
Sartre held an open relationship with prominent feminist and fellow existentialist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir. Together, Sartre and de Beauvoir challenged the cultural and social assumptions and expectations of their upbringings, which they considered bourgeois, in both lifestyles and thought. The conflict between oppressive, spiritually destructive conformity (mauvaise foi, literally, 'bad faith') and an "authentic" way of "being" became the dominant theme of Sartre's early work, a theme embodied in his principal philosophical work Being and Nothingness (L'脢tre et le N茅ant, 1943). Sartre's introduction to his philosophy is his work Existentialism Is a Humanism (L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946), originally presented as a lecture.
Sartre held an open relationship with prominent feminist and fellow existentialist philosopher Simone de Beauvoir. Together, Sartre and de Beauvoir challenged the cultural and social assumptions and expectations of their upbringings, which they considered bourgeois, in both lifestyles and thought. The conflict between oppressive, spiritually destructive conformity (mauvaise foi, literally, 'bad faith') and an "authentic" way of "being" became the dominant theme of Sartre's early work, a theme embodied in his principal philosophical work Being and Nothingness (L'脢tre et le N茅ant, 1943). Sartre's introduction to his philosophy is his work Existentialism Is a Humanism (L'existentialisme est un humanisme, 1946), originally presented as a lecture.
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October 22, 2021
鈥璍'etre et le neant, essai d'ontologie phenomenologique鈥� = Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre
Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, sometimes subtitled A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, is a 1943 book by the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, in which the author asserts the individual's existence as prior to the individual's essence and seeks to demonstrate that free will exists.
While a prisoner of war in 1940 and 1941, Sartre read Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (1927).
Heidegger's work, an ontological investigation through the lens and method of Husserlian phenomenology (Edmund Husserl was Heidegger's teacher), initiated Sartre's own philosophical inquiry. ...
鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 乇賵夭 賳禺爻鬲 賲丕賴 賮賵乇蹖賴 爻丕賱 2010賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
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丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘貙 芦跇丕賳 倬賱 爻丕乇鬲乇禄 亘賴 亘乇乇爻蹖 賮賱爻賮赖 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖貙 亘丕 毓賳賵丕賳 芦賮賱爻賮赖 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖禄貙 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴 丕爻鬲貨 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘貙 囟賲賳 蹖讴 亘蹖丕賳 讴丕賲賱貙 丕夭 丕孬亘丕鬲 芦賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖禄貙 賵 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖 讴賴 賲蹖丕賳 丌賳丕賳 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿貙 亘賴 匕讴乇 鬲賲丕賲 賲賯賵賱丕鬲 毓丕賱賲 賴爻鬲蹖 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴貙 賵 毓賵丕胤賮 丕賳爻丕賳蹖 賳馗乇蹖 賴賲趩賵賳 芦賵噩丿丕賳禄貙 芦毓卮賯禄貙 芦賳賮乇鬲禄貙 芦賴賵爻禄 賵 爻丕蹖乇 芦鬲囟丕丿賴丕蹖 丿乇賵賳蹖禄貙 賵 芦鬲毓丕乇囟 賳賮爻丕賳蹖禄 乇丕貙 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 丌卮讴丕乇 賵 賲爻鬲丿賱貙 卮乇丨 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 讴賴 丿乇 賮賱爻賮赖 蹖 丕賵 乇賵丨 芦讴丕賳鬲禄 賵 芦賴诏賱禄貙 鬲賵丕賲丕賳 賲卮丕賴丿賴 賲蹖卮賵丿貨 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 亘乇丕蹖 丕賳爻丕賳貙 丿賵 賴爻鬲蹖 賯丕卅賱 卮丿賴貙 蹖讴蹖 賴爻鬲蹖 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丿貙 賵 丌賳 蹖讴蹖 丿蹖诏乇貙 賴爻鬲蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇蹖. 丕蹖卮丕賳 丕蹖賳 賴爻鬲蹖 丿賵賲 乇丕貙 噩夭亍 噩丿丕 賳卮丿賳蹖 賴爻鬲蹖貙 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丿 賲蹖丿丕賳賳丿貙 賵 亘丕賵乇 丿丕乇賳丿 讴賴 賴乇 丕賳爻丕賳 夭賳丿賴貙 亘丕 賴爻鬲蹖 丿蹖诏乇蹖 讴賴 丿乇 賵噩賵丿 丕賵 賮毓丕賱蹖鬲 丿丕乇丿貙 夭賳丿诏蹖 賲蹖讴賳丿貙 賵 乇丕亘胤賴 蹖 賲蹖丕賳 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賴爻鬲蹖貙 蹖讴 賴爻鬲蹖 丿蹖诏乇貙 亘賴 賳丕賲 芦賴爻鬲蹖 丿乇 丿乇賵賳禄 乇丕 丕乇丕卅賴 賲蹖讴賳賳丿貨 趩乇丕 讴賴 丕蹖卮丕賳 亘丕賵乇 丿丕乇賳丿 毓賵丕胤賮 丕賳爻丕賳蹖 匕讴乇 卮丿賴貙 亘賴 賴賲 倬蹖賵爻鬲賴 賳蹖爻鬲賳丿貙 賵 禺賵丕賳卮诏乇 亘丕蹖丿 賲賮賴賵賲 賴乇 讴丿丕賲 乇丕 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 噩丿丕诏丕賳賴貙 丿乇讴 讴賳丿貨 賴賲趩賳蹖賳 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丌乇丕亍 賵 亘丕賵乇賴丕蹖 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄貙 丿乇亘丕乇賴 蹖 賲讴鬲亘 芦丕诏夭蹖爻鬲丕賳爻蹖丕賱蹖爻賲 (丕氐丕賱鬲 丕賳爻丕賳)禄 亘賴 丕禺鬲氐丕乇 丌賵乇丿賴 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲
鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴賳诏丕賲 乇爻丕賳蹖 23/09/1399賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 29/07/1400賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, sometimes subtitled A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, is a 1943 book by the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre, in which the author asserts the individual's existence as prior to the individual's essence and seeks to demonstrate that free will exists.
While a prisoner of war in 1940 and 1941, Sartre read Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (1927).
Heidegger's work, an ontological investigation through the lens and method of Husserlian phenomenology (Edmund Husserl was Heidegger's teacher), initiated Sartre's own philosophical inquiry. ...
鬲丕乇蹖禺 賳禺爻鬲蹖賳 禺賵丕賳卮: 乇賵夭 賳禺爻鬲 賲丕賴 賮賵乇蹖賴 爻丕賱 2010賲蹖賱丕丿蹖
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖: 倬丿蹖丿賴 卮賳丕爻蹖 毓丕賱賲 賴爻鬲蹖貨 丕孬乇: 跇丕賳 倬賱 爻丕乇鬲乇貨 賲鬲乇噩賲: 毓賳丕蹖鬲 丕賱賱賴 卮讴蹖亘丕倬賵乇貨 賲卮禺氐丕鬲 賳卮乇 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 丿賳蹖丕蹖 讴鬲丕亘貙 趩丕倬 賳禺爻鬲 責責責 鬲噩丿蹖丿 趩丕倬 倬爻 丕夭 爻蹖 賵 趩賳丿 爻丕賱 丿乇 爻丕賱1389貙 丿乇432氐貙 卮丕亘讴9789643460532貨 賲賵囟賵毓 丕诏夭蹖爻鬲丕賳爻蹖丕賱蹖爻賲 丕夭 賳賵蹖爻賳丿诏丕賳 賮乇丕賳爻賴 - 爻丿賴 20賲
毓賳賵丕賳: 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖: 噩爻鬲丕乇蹖 丿乇 賴爻鬲蹖 卮賳丕爻蹖 倬丿蹖丿丕乇 卮賳丕禺鬲蹖貨 賳賵蹖爻賳丿賴: 跇丕賳 倬賱 爻丕乇鬲乇貨 亘乇诏乇丿丕賳: 賲賴爻鬲蹖 亘丨乇蹖賳蹖貨 鬲賴乇丕賳貙 賳蹖賱賵賮乇貙 爻丕賱1394貨 丿乇856氐貨 卮丕亘讴9789644486456貨
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鈥囏池� 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 蹖讴 倬蹖卮 诏賮鬲丕乇 丕爻鬲 賵 趩賴丕乇 亘禺卮貙 蹖讴 丕孬乇 賮賱爻賮蹖 鬲賲丕賲 毓蹖丕乇 丕夭 爻丿賴 亘蹖爻鬲賲 賲蹖賱丕丿蹖 ...貨 賳賯卮 亘丕夭蹖 讴乇丿賳 倬蹖卮禺丿賲鬲 讴丕賮賴貙 賵 蹖丕 芦鬲氐丕丿賮 賲賵鬲賵乇爻蹖讴賱鬲禄貙 夭賳蹖 讴賴 賵丕賳賲賵丿 賲蹖鈥屭┵嗀� 賲鬲賵噩賴 賳蹖爻鬲 讴賴 賲乇丿蹖 丿爻鬲卮 乇丕 诏乇賮鬲賴貙 賴賲賴 丕賳诏丕乇 賲孬丕賱賴丕蹖蹖 丕夭 賴賲蹖賳 夭賳丿诏蹖 乇賵夭貙 乇賯氐蹖 賲蹖丕賳賴 蹖 賲蹖丿丕賳貙 亘蹖賳 賴爻鬲賳 賵 賳蹖爻鬲賳...貨
丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘貙 芦跇丕賳 倬賱 爻丕乇鬲乇禄 亘賴 亘乇乇爻蹖 賮賱爻賮赖 亘賳蹖丕丿蹖貙 亘丕 毓賳賵丕賳 芦賮賱爻賮赖 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖禄貙 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴 丕爻鬲貨 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘貙 囟賲賳 蹖讴 亘蹖丕賳 讴丕賲賱貙 丕夭 丕孬亘丕鬲 芦賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖禄貙 賵 乇丕亘胤賴 丕蹖 讴賴 賲蹖丕賳 丌賳丕賳 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿貙 亘賴 匕讴乇 鬲賲丕賲 賲賯賵賱丕鬲 毓丕賱賲 賴爻鬲蹖 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴貙 賵 毓賵丕胤賮 丕賳爻丕賳蹖 賳馗乇蹖 賴賲趩賵賳 芦賵噩丿丕賳禄貙 芦毓卮賯禄貙 芦賳賮乇鬲禄貙 芦賴賵爻禄 賵 爻丕蹖乇 芦鬲囟丕丿賴丕蹖 丿乇賵賳蹖禄貙 賵 芦鬲毓丕乇囟 賳賮爻丕賳蹖禄 乇丕貙 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 丌卮讴丕乇 賵 賲爻鬲丿賱貙 卮乇丨 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 讴賴 丿乇 賮賱爻賮赖 蹖 丕賵 乇賵丨 芦讴丕賳鬲禄 賵 芦賴诏賱禄貙 鬲賵丕賲丕賳 賲卮丕賴丿賴 賲蹖卮賵丿貨 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 亘乇丕蹖 丕賳爻丕賳貙 丿賵 賴爻鬲蹖 賯丕卅賱 卮丿賴貙 蹖讴蹖 賴爻鬲蹖 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丿貙 賵 丌賳 蹖讴蹖 丿蹖诏乇貙 賴爻鬲蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇蹖. 丕蹖卮丕賳 丕蹖賳 賴爻鬲蹖 丿賵賲 乇丕貙 噩夭亍 噩丿丕 賳卮丿賳蹖 賴爻鬲蹖貙 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丿 賲蹖丿丕賳賳丿貙 賵 亘丕賵乇 丿丕乇賳丿 讴賴 賴乇 丕賳爻丕賳 夭賳丿賴貙 亘丕 賴爻鬲蹖 丿蹖诏乇蹖 讴賴 丿乇 賵噩賵丿 丕賵 賮毓丕賱蹖鬲 丿丕乇丿貙 夭賳丿诏蹖 賲蹖讴賳丿貙 賵 乇丕亘胤賴 蹖 賲蹖丕賳 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賴爻鬲蹖貙 蹖讴 賴爻鬲蹖 丿蹖诏乇貙 亘賴 賳丕賲 芦賴爻鬲蹖 丿乇 丿乇賵賳禄 乇丕 丕乇丕卅賴 賲蹖讴賳賳丿貨 趩乇丕 讴賴 丕蹖卮丕賳 亘丕賵乇 丿丕乇賳丿 毓賵丕胤賮 丕賳爻丕賳蹖 匕讴乇 卮丿賴貙 亘賴 賴賲 倬蹖賵爻鬲賴 賳蹖爻鬲賳丿貙 賵 禺賵丕賳卮诏乇 亘丕蹖丿 賲賮賴賵賲 賴乇 讴丿丕賲 乇丕 亘賴 氐賵乇鬲 噩丿丕诏丕賳賴貙 丿乇讴 讴賳丿貨 賴賲趩賳蹖賳 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丌乇丕亍 賵 亘丕賵乇賴丕蹖 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄貙 丿乇亘丕乇賴 蹖 賲讴鬲亘 芦丕诏夭蹖爻鬲丕賳爻蹖丕賱蹖爻賲 (丕氐丕賱鬲 丕賳爻丕賳)禄 亘賴 丕禺鬲氐丕乇 丌賵乇丿賴 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲
鬲丕乇蹖禺 亘賴賳诏丕賲 乇爻丕賳蹖 23/09/1399賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 29/07/1400賴噩乇蹖 禺賵乇卮蹖丿蹖貨 丕. 卮乇亘蹖丕賳蹖
March 13, 2025
Q: Why do we elderly folks SLEEP so much?
A: It's because Being and Nothingness, those constantly bickering Gemini Contenders, are constantly at our heels!
Sartre felt their presence young, and drank and smoked too much, leading to an early demise.
I too, felt the proximity of their jarring conflict when I was young, so was given pills for it. So In my elderly years - for which I'm grateful - SLEEP is my constant remedy!
You know, because of my empathy for him, in my more jejune years back in the seventies and eighties, Jean-Paul Sartre played Pied Piper to my bemused Flower Child of Hamelin.
It was that bad.
I clearly saw the Establishment smoothing things over, and didn't like it. But others in their perpetual gloom despise our Others. So I avoided that attitude, and have borne these Others. Unlike Sartre.
Because I know the law is the Law - as Plato did.
You see, I was of two minds on this ill-advised book - the first part of it was well spoken - but the second was distinctly dangerous for the ing茅nu I was.
But it鈥檚 mere gibberish, I鈥檓 afraid, to most of the rest of us. So harmless.
So why did I have two minds?
Because Sartre had two minds on it himself: on one side, his more cerebral braininess hated it, and the other, his fallen body-mind - the way of all flesh - LOVED it.
He had fallen into what he would call factitious habits in the post-war years and in consequence buried his hopes and dreams. All that remained of them was his desire to write greatly. Ego.
And thus fittingly, he divides the book into two main parts, one dealing with the constricted moral freedom of pure being, and the other, with the bondage of amoral facticity.
But guess what? Each is mutually exclusive in the real world. Hence for him it was all endless slough because he sided with the world.
The better to gain a wider readership. And propagate his embittered dissidence.
But as Chogyam Trungoa says in his little bestseller Shambhala, one of our worlds is the hopeful world of sunrise, Shambhala - and the other is the samsaric world of sunset, with all its outr茅 accoutrements and subsequent shame.
You pays your money and you takes your chances!
Says it all, don鈥檛 it? If you fall and remain between the cracks without joining the human race again you live in that perpetual sunset. As it was for Sartre after his series of strokes.
You see, the world is still run by Night-Dwellers, as it was in Ancient Palestine. Folks are still mocked for infinitely less than Jesus accomplished.
That's why I'm on His side now. You鈥檝e got to pick up every stitch!
For black night invariably falls if you lose your joy...
Yes, friends, if you go out on life鈥檚 limb, make darned sure you鈥檙e close enough to the trunk to clamber right back down again.
But staying in line is hard when the Night-Dwelling world screams foul at you, I know.
Martin Luther points out that the Way of Faith is murder when, like Paul to the Galatians, you assert the Primacy of Love over the Law.
You attract attacks by the same kinda Trolls as Pope Francis daily faces in the Curia. Wimps need not apply to become a Christian. It鈥檒l make you - or break you. So it'll probably break me. So what? - I've lived a good long life.
You know, I had a wise mentor back in those same 1980鈥檚 when I read Sartre - old Bob Mitchell. Bob always use to say, 鈥淎 man鈥檚 got to do what a man鈥檚 got to do!鈥�
Life stinks, but we鈥檝e got our marching orders! The mere prerequisites for being a Christian are an insurmountable wall in our worst moments.
It鈥檚 just too bad Jean-Paul Sartre thought he could make the obduracy of life easier by bucking the system.
By all means, let the half-in/ half-out night dwellers like Sartre and me refuse to go with the flow, friends.
But bear your own Cross with Fortitude. Pay no mind to the bollocks.
Full speed ahead.
A: It's because Being and Nothingness, those constantly bickering Gemini Contenders, are constantly at our heels!
Sartre felt their presence young, and drank and smoked too much, leading to an early demise.
I too, felt the proximity of their jarring conflict when I was young, so was given pills for it. So In my elderly years - for which I'm grateful - SLEEP is my constant remedy!
You know, because of my empathy for him, in my more jejune years back in the seventies and eighties, Jean-Paul Sartre played Pied Piper to my bemused Flower Child of Hamelin.
It was that bad.
I clearly saw the Establishment smoothing things over, and didn't like it. But others in their perpetual gloom despise our Others. So I avoided that attitude, and have borne these Others. Unlike Sartre.
Because I know the law is the Law - as Plato did.
You see, I was of two minds on this ill-advised book - the first part of it was well spoken - but the second was distinctly dangerous for the ing茅nu I was.
But it鈥檚 mere gibberish, I鈥檓 afraid, to most of the rest of us. So harmless.
So why did I have two minds?
Because Sartre had two minds on it himself: on one side, his more cerebral braininess hated it, and the other, his fallen body-mind - the way of all flesh - LOVED it.
He had fallen into what he would call factitious habits in the post-war years and in consequence buried his hopes and dreams. All that remained of them was his desire to write greatly. Ego.
And thus fittingly, he divides the book into two main parts, one dealing with the constricted moral freedom of pure being, and the other, with the bondage of amoral facticity.
But guess what? Each is mutually exclusive in the real world. Hence for him it was all endless slough because he sided with the world.
The better to gain a wider readership. And propagate his embittered dissidence.
But as Chogyam Trungoa says in his little bestseller Shambhala, one of our worlds is the hopeful world of sunrise, Shambhala - and the other is the samsaric world of sunset, with all its outr茅 accoutrements and subsequent shame.
You pays your money and you takes your chances!
Says it all, don鈥檛 it? If you fall and remain between the cracks without joining the human race again you live in that perpetual sunset. As it was for Sartre after his series of strokes.
You see, the world is still run by Night-Dwellers, as it was in Ancient Palestine. Folks are still mocked for infinitely less than Jesus accomplished.
That's why I'm on His side now. You鈥檝e got to pick up every stitch!
For black night invariably falls if you lose your joy...
Yes, friends, if you go out on life鈥檚 limb, make darned sure you鈥檙e close enough to the trunk to clamber right back down again.
But staying in line is hard when the Night-Dwelling world screams foul at you, I know.
Martin Luther points out that the Way of Faith is murder when, like Paul to the Galatians, you assert the Primacy of Love over the Law.
You attract attacks by the same kinda Trolls as Pope Francis daily faces in the Curia. Wimps need not apply to become a Christian. It鈥檒l make you - or break you. So it'll probably break me. So what? - I've lived a good long life.
You know, I had a wise mentor back in those same 1980鈥檚 when I read Sartre - old Bob Mitchell. Bob always use to say, 鈥淎 man鈥檚 got to do what a man鈥檚 got to do!鈥�
Life stinks, but we鈥檝e got our marching orders! The mere prerequisites for being a Christian are an insurmountable wall in our worst moments.
It鈥檚 just too bad Jean-Paul Sartre thought he could make the obduracy of life easier by bucking the system.
By all means, let the half-in/ half-out night dwellers like Sartre and me refuse to go with the flow, friends.
But bear your own Cross with Fortitude. Pay no mind to the bollocks.
Full speed ahead.
April 28, 2020
One of the more cold-serious works I've read, this treatise exerts a strange power that forces readers onward despite the dense subject matter and clunky English translation.
The subject is man's experience of reality. Here you have a rigorous scouring of the subject resulting in a proof of human freedom so thorough you'll never fool with hard determinism again. Every aspect of consciousness is traced in all its implications. After reading this there seems little more to be said about the basis in reality of human thought. The unique effect of reading the book, for me, came from exploring my own mind and thoughts for insight as I followed what Sartre said.
The scope of the book treats conscious thought in isolation. You need a fairly good philosophical vocabulary to read it, as well as a highlighter. Even then, some of the points are so abstruse you have to pause and think, often on each paragraph. Joseph Catalano's is a valuable companion. Those considering reading this book may want to read Catalano alongside it.
As with many existential works, this study tends to ignore external influences on thought. Sartre does pose the problem of the "situation limit" to human freedom, but without exploring it in any detail. As a result, the outward, natural necessity that provides the context for human freedom receives scant attention. Thence comes the sense of a human consciousness unbounded in its freedom.
Sartre's characterization of the human mind possessing "absolute freedom and absolute responsibility" takes on a metaphysical aura; this, as much as anything, accounts for the book's ability to engage one's feelings. The reading of this work is actually more rewarding than what one might learn from it. What an intriguing effect for such an academic work.
The subject is man's experience of reality. Here you have a rigorous scouring of the subject resulting in a proof of human freedom so thorough you'll never fool with hard determinism again. Every aspect of consciousness is traced in all its implications. After reading this there seems little more to be said about the basis in reality of human thought. The unique effect of reading the book, for me, came from exploring my own mind and thoughts for insight as I followed what Sartre said.
The scope of the book treats conscious thought in isolation. You need a fairly good philosophical vocabulary to read it, as well as a highlighter. Even then, some of the points are so abstruse you have to pause and think, often on each paragraph. Joseph Catalano's is a valuable companion. Those considering reading this book may want to read Catalano alongside it.
As with many existential works, this study tends to ignore external influences on thought. Sartre does pose the problem of the "situation limit" to human freedom, but without exploring it in any detail. As a result, the outward, natural necessity that provides the context for human freedom receives scant attention. Thence comes the sense of a human consciousness unbounded in its freedom.
Sartre's characterization of the human mind possessing "absolute freedom and absolute responsibility" takes on a metaphysical aura; this, as much as anything, accounts for the book's ability to engage one's feelings. The reading of this work is actually more rewarding than what one might learn from it. What an intriguing effect for such an academic work.
December 11, 2024
What is essential in the context of the phenomenology of being? Being & Existing, the memorable and subtle space separating being from non-being, and the possibility of non-existence constitute a distinct phenomenon from death. These are some of the countless questions that Sartre addresses uniquely in "Being and Nothingness," in an intellectual exercise that sometimes touches on the absurdity of the denials of the apparent evidence. According to Sartre, the subject-object relationship inevitably passes through the conception of the self and the self's consciousness so that knowledge can assume compelling cognition perspectives. The object is perceptible if the consciousness of the being situates and references itself outside the item, and, in turn, it exists independently of the being. "Before any comparison, before any construction, the thing is what is present in the conscience as not being the conscience" (SARTRE, 1997). When objects exist, they imply an order of things independent of being and knowledge itself. Likewise, the Sartrian exists before self-awareness, and when he refuses, he assumes a negative characteristic that only realizes it as a non-substantial structure. Being is before thinking because it (pre) exists for self-awareness. Although for Sartre, consciousness constitutes the original absolute, insubstantial, and external to all reality, it exists when being and self-awareness meet in thought and prove an ability to integrate and perceive the existence of being. The Sartrian problem of being part of and not being for the other's knowledge is the same phenomenological problem. And between being and non-being, nothing, the non-existence that shapes death, negates the existing and self-conscious being. This fact refers to another order of questions: the value of conscience as a normative reference for perceiving reality and convergence with a world defined according to previously elaborated categories. It will end up assuming conventions and prejudices from proof to proof. In other words, madness and death would, to be so, be equal concerning the ontological question of being and nothingness. The fundamental thing is to mention that through this superior work, it will be possible to raise numerous questions about existential content that will take us further in our knowledge of ourselves and others. And isn't this the primary role of Philosophy?
February 23, 2019
賯賴乇賲丕賳 讴鬲丕亘 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 爻丕乇鬲乇貙 蹖讴 卮禺氐蹖鬲 禺蹖丕賱蹖 亘賳丕賲 倬蹖賽乇 丕爻鬲 讴賴 丿乇 丌孬丕乇 賮賱爻賮蹖 丿賴賴 爻蹖 爻丕乇鬲乇 馗丕賴乇 賲蹖卮丿 賵 丕賱亘鬲賴 丕夭 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘亘毓丿貙 賴蹖趩 丕胤賱丕毓蹖 丕夭 爻乇賳賵卮鬲 丕賵 丿乇 丿爻鬲 賳蹖爻鬲. 讴鬲丕亘 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖貙 乇爻丕賱賴鈥屫й� 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 賴爻鬲蹖鈥屫促嗀ж驰� 倬丿蹖丿丕乇卮賳丕爻丕賳賴貙 賵 亘賴 诏賵丕賴蹖 賲賳鬲賯丿丕賳貙 賲賴賲鈥屫臂屬� 讴丕乇 賮賱爻賮蹖 爻丕乇鬲乇 丕爻鬲 讴賴 卮賴乇鬲卮 乇丕 賵丕賲鈥屫ж� 賳孬乇 丕丿亘蹖 夭蹖亘丕 賵 丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 丕夭 賲孬丕賱鈥屬囏й屰� 丕夭 夭賳丿诏蹖 乇賵夭賲乇賴 丕爻鬲. 賴乇趩賳丿 诏蹖乇丕蹖蹖 賳孬乇貙 丿乇 鬲乇噩賲賴鈥屰� 賮丕乇爻蹖 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇貙 亘賴 丿爻鬲 賵蹖乇丕賳蹖 爻倬乇丿賴 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲. 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖貙 讴賴 賳丕賲卮貙 诏賵蹖蹖 丕丿丕蹖 丿蹖賳蹖 亘賴 丕孬乇 卮讴賵賴賲賳丿 賲丕乇鬲蹖賳 賴丕賷丿诏乇貙 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 夭賲丕賳 丕爻鬲貙 丕夭 賳馗乇 賲丨鬲賵丕蹖蹖 賳蹖夭 賳爻亘鬲 亘蹖賳丕賲鬲賳蹖 賲丨讴賲蹖 亘丕 丕孬乇 賴丕蹖丿诏乇 丕蹖噩丕丿 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲. 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 丕夭 蹖讴 倬蹖卮鈥屭佖ж� 賵 趩賴丕乇 賮氐賱 丕氐賱蹖 鬲卮讴蹖賱 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲. 丿乇 倬蹖卮鈥屭佖ж必� 爻丕乇鬲乇 亘賴 胤乇丨 倬乇爻卮鈥屬囏й屰� 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 賲毓賳丕蹖 賳賴丕蹖蹖 丿賵 賳賵毓 賴爻鬲賳丿賴貙 丕賳爻丕賳 賵 趩蹖夭賴丕 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴 丕爻鬲 賵 賲蹖鈥屭堐屫� 亘禺丕胤乇 倬丕爻禺 丿丕丿賳 亘賴 丕蹖賳 倬乇爻卮鈥屬囏ж池� 讴賴 賲賳 讴鬲丕亘 丨丕囟乇 乇丕 賳賵卮鬲賴鈥屫з�. 毓賳賵丕賳 亘禺卮 丕賵賱貙 賲爻丕賱賴 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 丕爻鬲. 賳诏丕乇賳锟斤拷賴貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 亘禺卮 丿乇 倬蹖 乇賵卮賳 爻丕禺鬲賳 賲毓賳丕蹖 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賲毓賳丕蹖 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 丕爻鬲. 亘禺卮 丿賵賲 讴鬲丕亘 亘丕 毓賳賵丕賳 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丿 亘賵丿賳貙 丿乇 鬲賵囟蹖丨 賵囟毓蹖鬲 賴爻鬲賳丿賴鈥屫й� 禺丕氐 亘賴 賳丕賲 丕賳爻丕賳 丕爻鬲貙 讴賴 丌诏丕賴 賲蹖鈥屫促堌� 賵 亘賴 趩蹖夭賴丕 賲毓賳丕 賲蹖鈥屫囏�. 賮氐賱 爻賵賲貙 亘乇丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇蹖 亘賵丿賳貙 噩爻鬲丕乇蹖 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 賵噩賵丿 丿蹖诏乇蹖鈥屫池�. 賵 丿乇 亘禺卮 倬丕蹖丕賳蹖貙 爻丕乇鬲乇 丿乇亘丕乇賴 丌夭丕丿蹖 賵 賳爻亘鬲 丌賳 亘丕 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 夭賲丕賳 爻禺賳 賲蹖鈥屭堐屫�. 丿乇 倬丕蹖丕賳貙 爻丕乇鬲乇 賵毓丿賴鈥屰� 讴鬲丕亘蹖 丿乇亘丕乇賴鈥屰� 丕爻鬲賱夭丕賲 丕禺賱丕賯蹖 賲毓賳丕賴丕蹖 賲鬲丕賮蹖夭蹖讴蹖 丕賳爻丕賳 賵 趩蹖夭賴丕 乇丕 賲蹖鈥屫囏� 讴丕乇蹖 讴賴 丕賱亘鬲賴 賴乇诏夭 亘賴 倬丕蹖丕賳 賳賲蹖鈥屫必池�.
June 26, 2019
Here is this review in podcast form:
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I first heard of this book from my dad. 鈥淚 had to read this in college,鈥� he told me. 鈥淲e looked at every type of being. Being-in-myself, being-for-myself, being-of-myself, being-across-myself, being-by-myself. I went crazy trying to read that thing.鈥� Ever since that memorable description, this book has held a special allure for me. It has everything to attract a self-styled intellectual: a reputation for difficulty, a hefty bulk, a pompous title, and the imprimatur of a famous name. Clearly I had to read it.
Jean-Paul Sartre was the defining intellectual of his time, at least on the European continent. He did everything: writing novels and plays, founding and editing a journal, engaging in political activism, and pioneering a philosophical school: existentialism. This book is the defining monument of that school. An eight-hundred-page treatise on ontology which, somehow, became widely read鈥攐r at least widely talked about. Nearly eighty years later, we are still talking about this book. In 2016 Sarah Bakewell released a best-selling book about Sartre鈥檚 movement; and a new translation of Being and Nothingness will be released next year. Interest in existentialism has not abated.
Yet what is existentialism? And how has it weathered the passing years? This is what I set out to determine, and this review will show whether my attempt bore fruit.
One should begin by examining the subtitle of this book: 鈥淎 Phenomenological Essay on Ontology.鈥� Already we have a contradiction. Phenomenology is a philosophical school founded by Edmund Husserl, which attempted to direct philosophers鈥� attention back 鈥渢o the things themselves鈥濃€攖hat is, to their own experience of the world. One of Husserl鈥檚 most insistent commandments was that the philosopher should 鈥渂racket,鈥� or set aside, the old Cartesian question of the reality of these experiences (is the world truly as I perceive it?); rather, the philosopher should simply examine the qualities of the experience itself. Thus, Sartre鈥檚 promise of a phenomenological ontology (ontology being the investigation of the fundamental nature of reality) is a flagrant violation of Husserl鈥檚 principles.
Still, it does have a lot to tell us about Sartre鈥檚 method. This book is an attempt to deduce the fundamental categories of being from everyday experience. And this attempt leads Sartre to the two most basic categories of all: being and nothingness. Being is all around us; it is manifest in every object we experience. Sartre defines existing objects as those which are self-identical鈥攖hat is, objects which simply are what they are鈥攁nd he dubs this type of being the 鈥渋n-itself.鈥� Humans, by contrast, cannot be so defined; they are constantly shifting, projecting themselves into an uncertain future. Rather than simply existing, they observe their own existence. Sartre calls this type of human existence the 鈥渇or-itself.鈥�
Already we see the old Cartesian dualism reappearing in these categories. Are we not confronted, once again, with the paradoxes of matter and mind? Not exactly. For Sartre does not consider the in-itself and the for-itself to be two different types of substances. In fact, the for-itself has no existence at all: it is a nothingness. To use Sartre鈥檚 expressions, human consciousness can be compared to 鈥渓ittle pools of non-being that we encounter in the heart of being,鈥� or elsewhere he says that the for-itself 鈥渋s like a hole in being at the heart of Being.鈥� The for-itself (a consciousness) is a particular privation of a specific in-itself (a human body), which functions as a nihilation that makes the world appear: for there would not be a 鈥渨orld鈥� as we know it without perception, and perception is, for Sartre, a type of nihilation.
Putting aside all of the difficulties with this view, we can examine the consequences which Sartre draws from these two sorts of being. If the for-itself is a nothingness, then it is forever removed from the world around it. That is, it cannot be determined, either by its past or by its environment. In short, it is free鈥攊nescapably free. Human behavior can thus never be adequately explained or even excused, since all explanations or excuses presuppose that humans are not fundamentally self-determining. But of course we explain and excuse all the time. We point to economic class, occupation, culture, gender, race, sexuality, upbringing, genetic background, mood鈥攖o a thousand different factors in order to understand why people act the way they do.
This attempt to treat humans as things rather than free beings Sartre calls 鈥渂ad faith.鈥� This constitutes the fundamental sin of existentialism. He gives the example of a waiter who so embraces his role as a waiter that his motions become calculated and mechanical; the waiter tries to embody himself in his role to the extent that he gives up his individual freedom and becomes a kind of automaton whose every movement is predictable. But of course life is full of examples of bad faith. I excuse my mistake by saying I hadn鈥檛 had my coffee yet; my friend cheats on his girlfriend, but it was because his father cheated on his mother; and so on.
This is the basic situation of the for-itself. Yet there is another type of being which Sartre later introduces us to: the for-others. Sartre introduces this category with a characteristically vivid example: Imagine a peeping Tom is looking through a keyhole into a room. His attention is completely fixed on what he sees. Then, suddenly, he hears footsteps coming down the hall; and he immediately becomes aware of himself as a body, as a thing. Sartre considers experiences like this to prove that we cannot doubt the existence of others, since being perceived by others totally changes how we experience ourselves.
This allows Sartre to launch into an analysis of human interaction, and particularly into love and sexuality. This analysis bears the obvious influence of Hegel鈥檚 famous Master-Slave dialectic, and it centers on the same sorts of paradoxes: the contradictory urges to subjugate and be subjugated, to be embodied and desired, to be free and to be freely chosen, and so on. However, Sartre鈥檚 best writing in this vein is not to be found here, but in his great play No Exit, where each character exhibits a particular type of bad faith. All three of the characters wish to be looked at in a particular way, yet each of them is stuck with others whose own particular sort of bad faith renders them unable to look in the 鈥渞ight鈥� way.
Sartre concludes from all this that our most fervent desire, and the reason we so often slip into bad faith, is that we wish to be an impossible combination of the in-itself and the for-itself. We want to be the foundation of our own being, a perfect self-identical creature, and yet absolutely free. We want to become gods. But, for Sartre, this is self-contradictory: the in-itself and the for-itself can never coexist. Thus, the idea of God arises as a sort of wish-fulfillment; but God is impossible by definition. As a result, human life 鈥渋s a useless passion鈥濃€攁 relentless striving to be something which cannot exist.
All this may be clearer if we avoid Sartre鈥檚 terminology and, instead, compare his philosophy to that of Buddhism (at least, the type of Western Buddhism I鈥檓 acquainted with). The mind is constantly searching for a sense of permanent identity. Though the mind is, by nature, groundless, we are uncomfortable with this; we want put ground under our feet. So we seek to identify ourselves with our jobs, our families, our marriages, our hobbies, our success, our money鈥攚ith any external good that lets us forget that our consciousness is constantly shifting and flowing, and that our identities can never be absolutely determined. So far, Buddhism and Sartrean existentialism have similar diagnoses of our problems. But Buddhism prescribes detachment, while Sartre prescribes the embrace of absolute freedom and the adoption of complete responsibility of our actions.
No summary of the book would be complete without Sartre鈥檚 critique of Freud. Sartre was clearly intrigued by Freud鈥檚 theories and wanted to use them in some way. However, Freud鈥檚 unconscious motivations and superconscious censorship is clearly incompatible with Sartre鈥檚 philosophy of freedom. In particular, Sartre found it self-contradictory to say that there could be a part of the mind which 鈥渨ants鈥� without us knowing it, or a part that is able to hide information from our awareness. For Sartre, all consciousness is self-consciousness, and it therefore does not make sense to 鈥渨ant鈥� or 鈥渒now鈥� something unconsciously.
In place of Freud鈥檚 psychoanalysis, then, Sartre proposes an existential psychoanalysis. For Sartre, every person is defined by a sort of fundamental choice that determines their stance towards the world (though, strangely, it seems that most people are not aware of having made this choice). It is the task of the existential psychoanalyst is to uncover this fundamental choice by a close examination of everyday actions. Indeed, Sartre believes that everything from one鈥檚 preference for onions to one鈥檚 aversion to cold water is a consequence of this fundamental choice. Sartre even goes so far as to insist that some things, by virtue of being so clearly suggestive of metaphor, have a universal meaning for the for-itself. As an example of this, he gives 鈥渟lime鈥濃€攙iscous liquid which Sartre thinks inspires a universal horror of the weight of existence.
This fairly well rounds out a summary of the book. So what are we to make of this?
The comparison with Heidegger is unavoidable. Sartre himself seems to have encouraged the comparison by giving his metaphysical tome a title redolent of the German professor鈥檚 magnum opus. The influence is clear: Sartre wrote Being and Nothingness after reading Being and Time during his brief imprisonment in a prisoner-of-war camp; and Heidegger is referenced throughout the book. Nevertheless, I think it would be inaccurate to describe Sartre as a follower of Heidegger, or his philosophy merely as an interpretation of Heidegger鈥檚. Indeed, I think that the superficial similarities between the two thinkers (stylistic obscurity, disregard of religion and ethics, a focus on human experience, a concern with 鈥渂eing鈥�) mask far more important differences.
Heidegger鈥檚 project, insofar as I understand it, is radically anti-Cartesian. He sought to replace the thinking and observing ego with the Dasein, a being thrown into the world, a being fundamentally ensconced in a community and surrounded by tools ready-to-hand. For Heidegger, the Cartesian perspective鈥攐f withdrawing from the world and deliberately reflecting and reasoning鈥攊s derivative of, and inferior to, this far more fundamental relationship to being. Sartre could not be further from this. Sartre鈥檚 perspective, to the contrary, is insistently Cartesian and subjectivist; it is the philosophy of a single mind urgently investigating its experience. Further, the concept of 鈥渇reedom鈥� plays almost no role in Heidegger鈥檚 philosophy; indeed, I believe he would criticize the very idea of free choice as enmeshed in the Cartesian framework he hoped to destroy.
In method, then, Sartre is far closer to Husserl鈥攁nother professed Cartesian鈥攖han to Heidegger. However, as we observed above, Sartre breaks Husserl鈥檚 most fundamental tenet by using subjective experiences to investigate being; and this was done clearly under the influence of Heidegger. These two, along with Freud, and Hegel, constitute the major intellectual influences on Sartre.
It should be no surprise, then, that Sartre鈥檚 style often verges on the obscure. Many passages in this book are comparable in ugliness and density to those German masters of opacity (Freud excluded). Heidegger is the most obvious influence here: for Sartre, like Heidegger, enjoys using clunky hyphenated terms and repurposing quotidian words in order to give them a special meaning. There is an important difference, however. When I did decipher Sartre鈥檚 more difficult passages, I usually found that the inky murkiness was rather unnecessary.
Believe me when I say that I am no lover of Heidegger鈥檚 writing. Nevertheless, I think Heidegger鈥檚 tortured locutions are more justifiable than Sartre鈥檚, for Heidegger was attempting to express something that is truly counter-intuitive, at least in the Western philosophical tradition; whereas Sartre鈥檚 philosophy, whatever novelties it possesses, is far more clearly in the mainline of Cartesian thinking. As a result, Sartre鈥檚 adventures in jargon come across as mere displays of pomp鈥攁 bejewelled robe he dons in order to appear more weighty鈥攁nd, occasionally, as mere abuses of language, concealing simple points in false paradoxes.
This is a shame, for when Sartre wished he could be quite a powerful writer. And, indeed, the best sections of this book are when Sartre switches from his psuedo-Heideggerian tone to that of the French novelist. The most memorable passages in this book are Sartre鈥檚 illustrations of his theories: the aforementioned waiter, or the Peeping Tom, or the passage on skiing. Whatever merit Sartre had as a philosopher, he was undoubtedly a genius in capturing the intricacies of subjective experience鈥攖he turns of thought and twinges of emotion that rush through the mind in everyday situations.
But what are we to make of his system? To my mind, the most immediately objectionable aspect is his idea of nothingness. Nothing is just that鈥攏othing: a complete lack of qualities, attributes, or activity of any kind. Indeed, if a nothingness can be defined at all, it must be via elimination: by excluding every existing thing. It seems incoherent, then, to say that the human mind is a nothingness, and is therefore condemned to be free. Consciousness has many definite qualities and, besides that, is constantly active and (in Sartre鈥檚 opinion at least) able to choose itself and change the world. How can a nothingness do that? And this is putting to the side the striking question of how the human brain can produce a complete absence of being. Maybe I am taking Sartre鈥檚 point too literally; but it is fair to say that he provides no account of how this nothingness came into being.
Once this idea of nothingness is called into question, the rest of Sartre鈥檚 conclusions are on extremely shaky ground. Sartre鈥檚 idea of freedom is especially suspect. If human consciousness is not separated from the world and from its past by a nothingness, then Sartre鈥檚 grand pronouncements of total freedom and total responsibility become dubious. To me it seems unlikely to the highest degree that, of all the known objects in the universe, including all of the animals (some of which are closely related to us), humans are the only things that are exempt from the chain of causality that binds everything together.
Besides finding it implausible, I also cannot help finding Sartre鈥檚 idea of total freedom and responsibility to be morally dubious. He himself, so far as I know, never managed to make his system compatible with a system of ethics. In any case, an emphasis on total responsibility can easily lead to a punitive mentality. According to Sartre, everyone deserves their fate.
Admittedly I do think his conception of 鈥渂ad faith鈥� is useful. Whether or not we are metaphysically 鈥渇ree,鈥� we often have more power over a situation than we admit. Denying our responsibility can lead to inauthenticity and immorality. And Sartre鈥檚 embrace of freedom can be a healthy antidote to an apathetic despair. Still, I do not think an elaborate ontological system is necessary in order to make this point.
Reading Sartre nowadays, I admit that it is difficult to take his conclusions seriously. For one, the next generation of French intellectuals set to work demonstrating that our freedom is constrained by society (Bourdeiu), psychology (Lacan), language (Derrida), and history (Foucault), among other factors. (Of course, these intellectual projects were not necessarily any more solid than Sartre鈥檚.) More importantly, Sartre鈥檚 system seems to be so completely bound up in both his times and his own psychology鈥攖wo things which he denied could determine human behavior鈥攖hat it ironically belies his conclusions. (As an example of the latter influence, Sartre鈥檚 revulsion and even horror of sex is apparent throughout the book, especially in the strange section on 鈥渟lime.鈥�)
In the end I was somewhat disappointed by this work. And I think my disappointment is ultimately a consequence of Sartre鈥檚 method: phenomenological ontology. It is simply incorrect to believe that we can closely interrogate our own experiences to determine the fundamental categories of being. Admittedly, Sartre is not entirely averse to making logical argument; but too many of his conclusions rest on the shaky ground of these narrations of subjective experience. Sartre is, indeed, a brilliant observer of this experience, and his descriptions are worth reading for their psychological insight alone. Nevertheless, as a system of ontology, I do not think it can stand on its own two feet.
________________________________
Slime is the agony of water.
I first heard of this book from my dad. 鈥淚 had to read this in college,鈥� he told me. 鈥淲e looked at every type of being. Being-in-myself, being-for-myself, being-of-myself, being-across-myself, being-by-myself. I went crazy trying to read that thing.鈥� Ever since that memorable description, this book has held a special allure for me. It has everything to attract a self-styled intellectual: a reputation for difficulty, a hefty bulk, a pompous title, and the imprimatur of a famous name. Clearly I had to read it.
Jean-Paul Sartre was the defining intellectual of his time, at least on the European continent. He did everything: writing novels and plays, founding and editing a journal, engaging in political activism, and pioneering a philosophical school: existentialism. This book is the defining monument of that school. An eight-hundred-page treatise on ontology which, somehow, became widely read鈥攐r at least widely talked about. Nearly eighty years later, we are still talking about this book. In 2016 Sarah Bakewell released a best-selling book about Sartre鈥檚 movement; and a new translation of Being and Nothingness will be released next year. Interest in existentialism has not abated.
Yet what is existentialism? And how has it weathered the passing years? This is what I set out to determine, and this review will show whether my attempt bore fruit.
One should begin by examining the subtitle of this book: 鈥淎 Phenomenological Essay on Ontology.鈥� Already we have a contradiction. Phenomenology is a philosophical school founded by Edmund Husserl, which attempted to direct philosophers鈥� attention back 鈥渢o the things themselves鈥濃€攖hat is, to their own experience of the world. One of Husserl鈥檚 most insistent commandments was that the philosopher should 鈥渂racket,鈥� or set aside, the old Cartesian question of the reality of these experiences (is the world truly as I perceive it?); rather, the philosopher should simply examine the qualities of the experience itself. Thus, Sartre鈥檚 promise of a phenomenological ontology (ontology being the investigation of the fundamental nature of reality) is a flagrant violation of Husserl鈥檚 principles.
Still, it does have a lot to tell us about Sartre鈥檚 method. This book is an attempt to deduce the fundamental categories of being from everyday experience. And this attempt leads Sartre to the two most basic categories of all: being and nothingness. Being is all around us; it is manifest in every object we experience. Sartre defines existing objects as those which are self-identical鈥攖hat is, objects which simply are what they are鈥攁nd he dubs this type of being the 鈥渋n-itself.鈥� Humans, by contrast, cannot be so defined; they are constantly shifting, projecting themselves into an uncertain future. Rather than simply existing, they observe their own existence. Sartre calls this type of human existence the 鈥渇or-itself.鈥�
Already we see the old Cartesian dualism reappearing in these categories. Are we not confronted, once again, with the paradoxes of matter and mind? Not exactly. For Sartre does not consider the in-itself and the for-itself to be two different types of substances. In fact, the for-itself has no existence at all: it is a nothingness. To use Sartre鈥檚 expressions, human consciousness can be compared to 鈥渓ittle pools of non-being that we encounter in the heart of being,鈥� or elsewhere he says that the for-itself 鈥渋s like a hole in being at the heart of Being.鈥� The for-itself (a consciousness) is a particular privation of a specific in-itself (a human body), which functions as a nihilation that makes the world appear: for there would not be a 鈥渨orld鈥� as we know it without perception, and perception is, for Sartre, a type of nihilation.
Putting aside all of the difficulties with this view, we can examine the consequences which Sartre draws from these two sorts of being. If the for-itself is a nothingness, then it is forever removed from the world around it. That is, it cannot be determined, either by its past or by its environment. In short, it is free鈥攊nescapably free. Human behavior can thus never be adequately explained or even excused, since all explanations or excuses presuppose that humans are not fundamentally self-determining. But of course we explain and excuse all the time. We point to economic class, occupation, culture, gender, race, sexuality, upbringing, genetic background, mood鈥攖o a thousand different factors in order to understand why people act the way they do.
This attempt to treat humans as things rather than free beings Sartre calls 鈥渂ad faith.鈥� This constitutes the fundamental sin of existentialism. He gives the example of a waiter who so embraces his role as a waiter that his motions become calculated and mechanical; the waiter tries to embody himself in his role to the extent that he gives up his individual freedom and becomes a kind of automaton whose every movement is predictable. But of course life is full of examples of bad faith. I excuse my mistake by saying I hadn鈥檛 had my coffee yet; my friend cheats on his girlfriend, but it was because his father cheated on his mother; and so on.
This is the basic situation of the for-itself. Yet there is another type of being which Sartre later introduces us to: the for-others. Sartre introduces this category with a characteristically vivid example: Imagine a peeping Tom is looking through a keyhole into a room. His attention is completely fixed on what he sees. Then, suddenly, he hears footsteps coming down the hall; and he immediately becomes aware of himself as a body, as a thing. Sartre considers experiences like this to prove that we cannot doubt the existence of others, since being perceived by others totally changes how we experience ourselves.
This allows Sartre to launch into an analysis of human interaction, and particularly into love and sexuality. This analysis bears the obvious influence of Hegel鈥檚 famous Master-Slave dialectic, and it centers on the same sorts of paradoxes: the contradictory urges to subjugate and be subjugated, to be embodied and desired, to be free and to be freely chosen, and so on. However, Sartre鈥檚 best writing in this vein is not to be found here, but in his great play No Exit, where each character exhibits a particular type of bad faith. All three of the characters wish to be looked at in a particular way, yet each of them is stuck with others whose own particular sort of bad faith renders them unable to look in the 鈥渞ight鈥� way.
Sartre concludes from all this that our most fervent desire, and the reason we so often slip into bad faith, is that we wish to be an impossible combination of the in-itself and the for-itself. We want to be the foundation of our own being, a perfect self-identical creature, and yet absolutely free. We want to become gods. But, for Sartre, this is self-contradictory: the in-itself and the for-itself can never coexist. Thus, the idea of God arises as a sort of wish-fulfillment; but God is impossible by definition. As a result, human life 鈥渋s a useless passion鈥濃€攁 relentless striving to be something which cannot exist.
All this may be clearer if we avoid Sartre鈥檚 terminology and, instead, compare his philosophy to that of Buddhism (at least, the type of Western Buddhism I鈥檓 acquainted with). The mind is constantly searching for a sense of permanent identity. Though the mind is, by nature, groundless, we are uncomfortable with this; we want put ground under our feet. So we seek to identify ourselves with our jobs, our families, our marriages, our hobbies, our success, our money鈥攚ith any external good that lets us forget that our consciousness is constantly shifting and flowing, and that our identities can never be absolutely determined. So far, Buddhism and Sartrean existentialism have similar diagnoses of our problems. But Buddhism prescribes detachment, while Sartre prescribes the embrace of absolute freedom and the adoption of complete responsibility of our actions.
No summary of the book would be complete without Sartre鈥檚 critique of Freud. Sartre was clearly intrigued by Freud鈥檚 theories and wanted to use them in some way. However, Freud鈥檚 unconscious motivations and superconscious censorship is clearly incompatible with Sartre鈥檚 philosophy of freedom. In particular, Sartre found it self-contradictory to say that there could be a part of the mind which 鈥渨ants鈥� without us knowing it, or a part that is able to hide information from our awareness. For Sartre, all consciousness is self-consciousness, and it therefore does not make sense to 鈥渨ant鈥� or 鈥渒now鈥� something unconsciously.
In place of Freud鈥檚 psychoanalysis, then, Sartre proposes an existential psychoanalysis. For Sartre, every person is defined by a sort of fundamental choice that determines their stance towards the world (though, strangely, it seems that most people are not aware of having made this choice). It is the task of the existential psychoanalyst is to uncover this fundamental choice by a close examination of everyday actions. Indeed, Sartre believes that everything from one鈥檚 preference for onions to one鈥檚 aversion to cold water is a consequence of this fundamental choice. Sartre even goes so far as to insist that some things, by virtue of being so clearly suggestive of metaphor, have a universal meaning for the for-itself. As an example of this, he gives 鈥渟lime鈥濃€攙iscous liquid which Sartre thinks inspires a universal horror of the weight of existence.
This fairly well rounds out a summary of the book. So what are we to make of this?
The comparison with Heidegger is unavoidable. Sartre himself seems to have encouraged the comparison by giving his metaphysical tome a title redolent of the German professor鈥檚 magnum opus. The influence is clear: Sartre wrote Being and Nothingness after reading Being and Time during his brief imprisonment in a prisoner-of-war camp; and Heidegger is referenced throughout the book. Nevertheless, I think it would be inaccurate to describe Sartre as a follower of Heidegger, or his philosophy merely as an interpretation of Heidegger鈥檚. Indeed, I think that the superficial similarities between the two thinkers (stylistic obscurity, disregard of religion and ethics, a focus on human experience, a concern with 鈥渂eing鈥�) mask far more important differences.
Heidegger鈥檚 project, insofar as I understand it, is radically anti-Cartesian. He sought to replace the thinking and observing ego with the Dasein, a being thrown into the world, a being fundamentally ensconced in a community and surrounded by tools ready-to-hand. For Heidegger, the Cartesian perspective鈥攐f withdrawing from the world and deliberately reflecting and reasoning鈥攊s derivative of, and inferior to, this far more fundamental relationship to being. Sartre could not be further from this. Sartre鈥檚 perspective, to the contrary, is insistently Cartesian and subjectivist; it is the philosophy of a single mind urgently investigating its experience. Further, the concept of 鈥渇reedom鈥� plays almost no role in Heidegger鈥檚 philosophy; indeed, I believe he would criticize the very idea of free choice as enmeshed in the Cartesian framework he hoped to destroy.
In method, then, Sartre is far closer to Husserl鈥攁nother professed Cartesian鈥攖han to Heidegger. However, as we observed above, Sartre breaks Husserl鈥檚 most fundamental tenet by using subjective experiences to investigate being; and this was done clearly under the influence of Heidegger. These two, along with Freud, and Hegel, constitute the major intellectual influences on Sartre.
It should be no surprise, then, that Sartre鈥檚 style often verges on the obscure. Many passages in this book are comparable in ugliness and density to those German masters of opacity (Freud excluded). Heidegger is the most obvious influence here: for Sartre, like Heidegger, enjoys using clunky hyphenated terms and repurposing quotidian words in order to give them a special meaning. There is an important difference, however. When I did decipher Sartre鈥檚 more difficult passages, I usually found that the inky murkiness was rather unnecessary.
Believe me when I say that I am no lover of Heidegger鈥檚 writing. Nevertheless, I think Heidegger鈥檚 tortured locutions are more justifiable than Sartre鈥檚, for Heidegger was attempting to express something that is truly counter-intuitive, at least in the Western philosophical tradition; whereas Sartre鈥檚 philosophy, whatever novelties it possesses, is far more clearly in the mainline of Cartesian thinking. As a result, Sartre鈥檚 adventures in jargon come across as mere displays of pomp鈥攁 bejewelled robe he dons in order to appear more weighty鈥攁nd, occasionally, as mere abuses of language, concealing simple points in false paradoxes.
This is a shame, for when Sartre wished he could be quite a powerful writer. And, indeed, the best sections of this book are when Sartre switches from his psuedo-Heideggerian tone to that of the French novelist. The most memorable passages in this book are Sartre鈥檚 illustrations of his theories: the aforementioned waiter, or the Peeping Tom, or the passage on skiing. Whatever merit Sartre had as a philosopher, he was undoubtedly a genius in capturing the intricacies of subjective experience鈥攖he turns of thought and twinges of emotion that rush through the mind in everyday situations.
But what are we to make of his system? To my mind, the most immediately objectionable aspect is his idea of nothingness. Nothing is just that鈥攏othing: a complete lack of qualities, attributes, or activity of any kind. Indeed, if a nothingness can be defined at all, it must be via elimination: by excluding every existing thing. It seems incoherent, then, to say that the human mind is a nothingness, and is therefore condemned to be free. Consciousness has many definite qualities and, besides that, is constantly active and (in Sartre鈥檚 opinion at least) able to choose itself and change the world. How can a nothingness do that? And this is putting to the side the striking question of how the human brain can produce a complete absence of being. Maybe I am taking Sartre鈥檚 point too literally; but it is fair to say that he provides no account of how this nothingness came into being.
Once this idea of nothingness is called into question, the rest of Sartre鈥檚 conclusions are on extremely shaky ground. Sartre鈥檚 idea of freedom is especially suspect. If human consciousness is not separated from the world and from its past by a nothingness, then Sartre鈥檚 grand pronouncements of total freedom and total responsibility become dubious. To me it seems unlikely to the highest degree that, of all the known objects in the universe, including all of the animals (some of which are closely related to us), humans are the only things that are exempt from the chain of causality that binds everything together.
Besides finding it implausible, I also cannot help finding Sartre鈥檚 idea of total freedom and responsibility to be morally dubious. He himself, so far as I know, never managed to make his system compatible with a system of ethics. In any case, an emphasis on total responsibility can easily lead to a punitive mentality. According to Sartre, everyone deserves their fate.
Admittedly I do think his conception of 鈥渂ad faith鈥� is useful. Whether or not we are metaphysically 鈥渇ree,鈥� we often have more power over a situation than we admit. Denying our responsibility can lead to inauthenticity and immorality. And Sartre鈥檚 embrace of freedom can be a healthy antidote to an apathetic despair. Still, I do not think an elaborate ontological system is necessary in order to make this point.
Reading Sartre nowadays, I admit that it is difficult to take his conclusions seriously. For one, the next generation of French intellectuals set to work demonstrating that our freedom is constrained by society (Bourdeiu), psychology (Lacan), language (Derrida), and history (Foucault), among other factors. (Of course, these intellectual projects were not necessarily any more solid than Sartre鈥檚.) More importantly, Sartre鈥檚 system seems to be so completely bound up in both his times and his own psychology鈥攖wo things which he denied could determine human behavior鈥攖hat it ironically belies his conclusions. (As an example of the latter influence, Sartre鈥檚 revulsion and even horror of sex is apparent throughout the book, especially in the strange section on 鈥渟lime.鈥�)
In the end I was somewhat disappointed by this work. And I think my disappointment is ultimately a consequence of Sartre鈥檚 method: phenomenological ontology. It is simply incorrect to believe that we can closely interrogate our own experiences to determine the fundamental categories of being. Admittedly, Sartre is not entirely averse to making logical argument; but too many of his conclusions rest on the shaky ground of these narrations of subjective experience. Sartre is, indeed, a brilliant observer of this experience, and his descriptions are worth reading for their psychological insight alone. Nevertheless, as a system of ontology, I do not think it can stand on its own two feet.
November 10, 2015
IMMERSE ME IN YOUR SPLENDOUR!
"This is the one!"
[The Stone Roses]
It helps to have read Heidegger's "Being and Time" before this volume that some describe as a companion, others as a critique (it's both, actually).
Heidegger writes like someone who is a reader; Sartre like someone who is both a reader and a writer. This is not to deny that Heidegger is a good writer. Just that Sartre is a better one.
Sartre wrote while Heidegger's ideas were still fresh. He agreed with many, disagreed with some, fine-tuned others, and finished the project that Heidegger set himself, but failed to complete. Naturally, Sartre accomplished something that was different from what Heidegger had intended at any stage of his career. Two philosophers, at least two opinions.
Sartre described his work as "an essay on phenomenological ontology," its goal to set down "the basis for a general theory of being."
It is a systematic, analytical work. It has the hallmarks of the type of system that Heidegger envisaged but failed to achieve, because he segmented his project, stopped at the first phase (which was enough to gain him a professorial post), started to question and doubt subsequently, revised, and went on to other interests (including the reconciliation of his philosophy with National Socialism).
Ontology is an extremely speculative, subjective, arbitrary and even metaphorical study.
Sartre doesn't accord Heidegger any particular privileged status. He is simply one more philosopher trying to address issues posed by philosophy in general and Husserl in particular. Both are trying to feel their way in the dark, recording their perspectives and impressions as they progress.
You might not agree with everything that Sartre (or Heidegger, for that matter) wrote. At least, unlike "Being and Time", you can tell from the text of "Being and Nothingness" itself, what ideas and arguments belong to Sartre, what he has adopted from his predecessors (who are acknowledged), and what his differences and disagreements are. This is an argumentative work which tries to tease out the truth, rather than one that simply proclaims its truth imperiously and ex cathedra.
Ultimately, I found Sartre's work to be a more honest and accountable study than "Being and Time".
Notwithstanding its length, it is also a more engaging literary experience for a reader, once (if at all) you become comfortable with the terminology of phenomenology and ontology.
"Being and Nothingness" works hard to be both a philosophical and a literary experience. As a result, it is a source of greater illumination.
THE INSISTENCE OF THE CARTESIAN SUBJECT
[A Subjective Pr茅cis]:
Consciousness is what negates, differentiates, separates, determines, designates. It differentiates the Subject from the Object, and the Self from the Other. In order to identify itself, consciousness in the form of Being-for-itself turns inward and negates the Being-in-itself. Yet, Being-for-itself is nothing other than Being-in-itself. It is one and the same thing. Being is separated by nothingness. Consciousness identifies and chooses possibilities for being. Freedom is action in pursuit of possibilities. Freedom is the burden or responsibility of making our own choices. Freedom is the recognition and embrace of the possibilities of our own being. Bad faith occurs when consciousness eschews its responsibility to itself.
AT 38:
Heidegger and Sartre were both 38 at the time of publication of their respective works, "Being and Time" and "Being and Nothingness".
Meredith Joy Ostrom (Miriam) in "The Ninth Cloud"
THE MERE POSSIBILITY OF A RENASCENCE:
The Extreme Radicalisation of a Potentiality
"...Sartre's convictions are really closer to Heidegger's than to anyone else's. Indeed, the least inadequate capsule classification is to make of him the extreme radicalisation of a potentiality inherent in Heidegger's 'Sein und Zeit'.
"The passion with which he has expressed his convictions has given his philosophy a hard-hitting tone and has tended to spill over into the most exciting literature written by any philosopher since 'Zarathustra'."
Thomas Langan
The Post-structuralist Project
"It has been an unspoken goal of the post-structuralist project to render Sartre history -- and thereby to free itself from the weight of his thinking. Yet, to leave Sartre unspeakable through silence is silently to call attention to him as somehow fundamental; it is to suggest his having been given a reading, and call for a rereading."
Steve Martinot
Making An Instrument for His Own Project
"In sharp contrast to Heidegger, then, Sartre has no interest in conferring a meaning on (or otherwise deifying) being at the expense of the meaning conferring subject, for he believes (and not without good reason) that the individual鈥檚 conscious experience of the world is at the heart of the phenomenological impulse.
"Accordingly, Heideggerians such as Hubert Dreyfus, who believe that the 鈥渢heory of consciousness鈥� offered in Being and Nothingness is only a 鈥渕isguided reformulation of Being and Time,鈥� miss the point.
"Sartre does not aim to reformulate Being and Time any more than Heidegger aimed to reformulate Husserl鈥檚 phenomenology.
"Like all philosophers, he only aims to take from his predecessors what is useful for his own project, which, in Sartre鈥檚 case, revolves around the phenomenological freedom of the subject."
David Sherman
Understood for the First Time
"In 1946 in 'Letter on Humanism' Heidegger presented what is sometimes thought of as a devastating critique of Sartre, but only a year earlier in a note to himself he endorsed Sartre's reading of 'Being and Time'.
"Heidegger wrote in relation to Corbin's translation of 'What is Metaphysics?': 'Decisive effect on Sartre: from there 'Being and Time' understood for the first time.'
"Indeed on October 28, 1945 Heidegger wrote to Sartre, not only acknowledging that in 'Being and Nothingness' Sartre had shown a level of understanding of 'Being and Time' that he had not found elsewhere, but also recognising him as an independent thinker in his own right.
"Acting completely out of character, Heidegger told Sartre that he accepted Sartre's critique of the account of 'Mitsein' in 'Being and Time' and he acknowledged the legitimacy of Sartre's insistence on being-for-others...
"It was a remarkably conciliatory letter, even if one cannot avoid the suspicion that Heidegger was soliciting Sartre's help during what after Germany's defeat was a difficult time for him."
Robert Bernasconi
A SEA OF POSSIBILITIES: A SUBJECTIVE [DI-] VERSIFICATION OF VARIOUS SARTRESIAN MEDITATIONS
[Mostly in the Words of Sartre]:
"This is the one!"
[The Stone Roses]
It helps to have read Heidegger's "Being and Time" before this volume that some describe as a companion, others as a critique (it's both, actually).
Heidegger writes like someone who is a reader; Sartre like someone who is both a reader and a writer. This is not to deny that Heidegger is a good writer. Just that Sartre is a better one.
Sartre wrote while Heidegger's ideas were still fresh. He agreed with many, disagreed with some, fine-tuned others, and finished the project that Heidegger set himself, but failed to complete. Naturally, Sartre accomplished something that was different from what Heidegger had intended at any stage of his career. Two philosophers, at least two opinions.
Sartre described his work as "an essay on phenomenological ontology," its goal to set down "the basis for a general theory of being."
It is a systematic, analytical work. It has the hallmarks of the type of system that Heidegger envisaged but failed to achieve, because he segmented his project, stopped at the first phase (which was enough to gain him a professorial post), started to question and doubt subsequently, revised, and went on to other interests (including the reconciliation of his philosophy with National Socialism).
Ontology is an extremely speculative, subjective, arbitrary and even metaphorical study.
Sartre doesn't accord Heidegger any particular privileged status. He is simply one more philosopher trying to address issues posed by philosophy in general and Husserl in particular. Both are trying to feel their way in the dark, recording their perspectives and impressions as they progress.
You might not agree with everything that Sartre (or Heidegger, for that matter) wrote. At least, unlike "Being and Time", you can tell from the text of "Being and Nothingness" itself, what ideas and arguments belong to Sartre, what he has adopted from his predecessors (who are acknowledged), and what his differences and disagreements are. This is an argumentative work which tries to tease out the truth, rather than one that simply proclaims its truth imperiously and ex cathedra.
Ultimately, I found Sartre's work to be a more honest and accountable study than "Being and Time".
Notwithstanding its length, it is also a more engaging literary experience for a reader, once (if at all) you become comfortable with the terminology of phenomenology and ontology.
"Being and Nothingness" works hard to be both a philosophical and a literary experience. As a result, it is a source of greater illumination.
THE INSISTENCE OF THE CARTESIAN SUBJECT
[A Subjective Pr茅cis]:
Consciousness is what negates, differentiates, separates, determines, designates. It differentiates the Subject from the Object, and the Self from the Other. In order to identify itself, consciousness in the form of Being-for-itself turns inward and negates the Being-in-itself. Yet, Being-for-itself is nothing other than Being-in-itself. It is one and the same thing. Being is separated by nothingness. Consciousness identifies and chooses possibilities for being. Freedom is action in pursuit of possibilities. Freedom is the burden or responsibility of making our own choices. Freedom is the recognition and embrace of the possibilities of our own being. Bad faith occurs when consciousness eschews its responsibility to itself.
AT 38:
Heidegger and Sartre were both 38 at the time of publication of their respective works, "Being and Time" and "Being and Nothingness".
Meredith Joy Ostrom (Miriam) in "The Ninth Cloud"
THE MERE POSSIBILITY OF A RENASCENCE:
The Extreme Radicalisation of a Potentiality
"...Sartre's convictions are really closer to Heidegger's than to anyone else's. Indeed, the least inadequate capsule classification is to make of him the extreme radicalisation of a potentiality inherent in Heidegger's 'Sein und Zeit'.
"The passion with which he has expressed his convictions has given his philosophy a hard-hitting tone and has tended to spill over into the most exciting literature written by any philosopher since 'Zarathustra'."
Thomas Langan
The Post-structuralist Project
"It has been an unspoken goal of the post-structuralist project to render Sartre history -- and thereby to free itself from the weight of his thinking. Yet, to leave Sartre unspeakable through silence is silently to call attention to him as somehow fundamental; it is to suggest his having been given a reading, and call for a rereading."
Steve Martinot
Making An Instrument for His Own Project
"In sharp contrast to Heidegger, then, Sartre has no interest in conferring a meaning on (or otherwise deifying) being at the expense of the meaning conferring subject, for he believes (and not without good reason) that the individual鈥檚 conscious experience of the world is at the heart of the phenomenological impulse.
"Accordingly, Heideggerians such as Hubert Dreyfus, who believe that the 鈥渢heory of consciousness鈥� offered in Being and Nothingness is only a 鈥渕isguided reformulation of Being and Time,鈥� miss the point.
"Sartre does not aim to reformulate Being and Time any more than Heidegger aimed to reformulate Husserl鈥檚 phenomenology.
"Like all philosophers, he only aims to take from his predecessors what is useful for his own project, which, in Sartre鈥檚 case, revolves around the phenomenological freedom of the subject."
David Sherman
Understood for the First Time
"In 1946 in 'Letter on Humanism' Heidegger presented what is sometimes thought of as a devastating critique of Sartre, but only a year earlier in a note to himself he endorsed Sartre's reading of 'Being and Time'.
"Heidegger wrote in relation to Corbin's translation of 'What is Metaphysics?': 'Decisive effect on Sartre: from there 'Being and Time' understood for the first time.'
"Indeed on October 28, 1945 Heidegger wrote to Sartre, not only acknowledging that in 'Being and Nothingness' Sartre had shown a level of understanding of 'Being and Time' that he had not found elsewhere, but also recognising him as an independent thinker in his own right.
"Acting completely out of character, Heidegger told Sartre that he accepted Sartre's critique of the account of 'Mitsein' in 'Being and Time' and he acknowledged the legitimacy of Sartre's insistence on being-for-others...
"It was a remarkably conciliatory letter, even if one cannot avoid the suspicion that Heidegger was soliciting Sartre's help during what after Germany's defeat was a difficult time for him."
Robert Bernasconi
A SEA OF POSSIBILITIES: A SUBJECTIVE [DI-] VERSIFICATION OF VARIOUS SARTRESIAN MEDITATIONS
[Mostly in the Words of Sartre]:
October 10, 2016
鈥庁堌池з嗁� 诏乇丕賳賯丿乇貙 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 丕夭 400 氐賮丨賴 賵 5 賮氐賱 賲禺鬲賱賮 鬲卮讴蹖賱 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲 賵 亘禺卮賴丕蹖 丕氐賱蹖 讴賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘賴 丌賳 倬乇丿丕禺鬲賴 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 丕夭 賯乇丕乇 夭蹖乇 丕爻鬲
鈥庂囏池� 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖- 倬丿蹖丿賴 卮賳丕爻蹖- 丕蹖賲丕賳 賵 亘蹖 丕蹖賲丕賳蹖- 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 賴爻鬲蹖- 夭賲丕賳 丨丕賱 賵 丌蹖賳丿賴- 噩爻賲 賵 乇賵丕賳- 毓卮賯- 夭亘丕賳- 丕卮鬲蹖丕賯- 賴賵爻 賵 賳賮乇鬲- 爻丕丿蹖爻賲 賵 賲丕夭賵禺蹖爻賲
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鈥庁堌池з嗁� 毓夭蹖夭賲貙 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 賲賵囟賵毓 爻賳诏蹖賳 賵 倬蹖趩蹖丿賴 丕蹖 乇丕 亘乇丕蹖 卮乇丨 丿丕丿賳 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇诏夭蹖丿賴 丕爻鬲 賵 倬蹖 丿乇 倬蹖 丕夭 噩丕蹖蹖 亘賴 噩丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇 倬乇蹖丿賴 丕爻鬲... 賱匕丕 亘乇丕蹖 丌賳讴賴 卮賲丕 亘丕 趩讴蹖丿賴 賳馗乇蹖丕鬲 丕賵 丌卮賳丕 卮賵蹖丿.. 爻毓蹖 讴乇丿賲 亘賴 亘賴鬲乇蹖賳 卮讴賱 賲賲讴賳 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 丿乇 趩賳丿 禺胤 亘乇丕蹖 卮賲丕 丿賵爻鬲丕賳 禺乇丿诏乇丕貙 禺賱丕氐賴 賳賵蹖爻蹖 讴賳賲
鈥庁关槽屫藏з嗁呚� 爻賲鬲 賵 爻賵蹖 毓賯蹖丿賴贁 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 亘乇 丕蹖賳 丕爻丕爻 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 亘賴 胤賵乇 讴丕賲賱 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賳禺賵丕賴丿 亘賵丿貙 蹖毓賳蹖 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賴丕 賳蹖夭 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丿 丨賯丕蹖賯 乇賵卮賳 賵 賯丕亘賱 賮賴賲 丿丕乇賳丿
鈥庁ㄙ� 胤賵乇 賲孬丕賱: 賲爻丕賮鬲 亘乇丕蹖 賲丕 趩蹖夭蹖爻鬲 讴賴 亘丕蹖丿 讴賵卮卮 丿乇 丌賳 亘讴丕乇 乇賵丿 鬲丕 丕蹖賳 賲爻丕賮鬲 倬蹖賲賵丿賴 卮賵丿 賵 亘賴 毓亘丕乇鬲 丿蹖诏乇 丕蹖賳 讴賵卮卮 卮丕賲賱 丨乇讴鬲 賲丕 賲蹖亘丕卮丿 讴賴 賲爻丕賮鬲 乇丕 丕夭 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 亘賴 賴爻鬲蹖 鬲亘丿蹖賱 賲蹖讴賳丿貙 丿乇 丨丕賱蹖讴賴 賲蹖丿丕賳蹖賲 賯亘賱 丕夭 丨乇讴鬲賽 賲丕 丕蹖賳 賲爻丕賮鬲 丿乇 丨丕賱鬲 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕卮鬲賴 丕爻鬲貙 亘賳丕亘乇丕蹖賳 賴乇 丨賯蹖賯鬲 賲爻賱賾賲 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丿 賵囟毓 禺丕氐蹖 丿丕乇丿 賵 鬲賲丕賲蹖 丕蹖賳賴丕 亘賴 賴爻鬲蹖 丕賳爻丕賳 賲乇亘賵胤 賲蹖卮賵丿
鈥庁池ж必� 芦賵噩丿丕賳賽 丕賳爻丕賳禄 乇丕 賳賲丕蹖賳丿賴 賴爻鬲蹖 丿乇 賳馗乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕爻鬲貙 賵 爻倬爻 賴爻鬲蹖 乇丕 亘賴 丿賵 賯爻賲鬲 鬲賯爻蹖賲 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲: 賴爻鬲蹖 賲胤賱賯 賵 賴爻鬲蹖 賲毓賲賵賱蹖... 賵 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖賳讴賴 亘蹖賳 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賴爻鬲蹖 丕乇鬲亘丕胤蹖 亘乇賯乇丕乇 讴乇丿賴 亘丕卮丿貙 賲蹖賳賵蹖爻丿 讴賴 : 丕賲乇 賴爻鬲蹖 丕夭 賳丕亘賵丿蹖 賴爻鬲蹖 賲胤賱賯 丕蹖噩丕丿 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲 賵 賲孬賱 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 讴賴 蹖讴蹖 賵丕乇丿 丿蹖诏乇蹖 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲... 賵 丕賱亘鬲賴 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 亘丕 夭蹖乇讴蹖 丿乇 丌禺乇 亘蹖丕賳 賲蹖讴賳丿 讴賴 丕诏乇 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕卮鬲 賴爻鬲蹖 賳蹖夭 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 賳賲蹖 丌賲丿... 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕卮鬲賴 讴賴 噩丕蹖 禺賵丿 乇丕 亘賴 賴爻鬲蹖 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲... 蹖毓賳蹖 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 丕爻丕爻 蹖讴爻丕賳 賵 賵丕丨丿蹖 丿丕乇賳丿貙 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕 讴賴: 賵賯鬲蹖 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 倬丕蹖丕賳 蹖丕賮鬲貙 賴爻鬲蹖 丌睾丕夭 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賳蹖夭 丿乇 倬丕蹖丕賳 賴爻鬲蹖 丿賵亘丕乇賴 丌睾丕夭 賲蹖卮賵丿
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鈥庁堌池з嗁� 禺賵亘賲 丕蹖賳 賲賵囟賵毓 乇丕 丿乇 賳馗乇 亘诏蹖乇蹖丿 讴賴 鬲賲丕賲蹖 賲爻丕卅賱蹖 讴賴 亘蹖丕賳 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 夭賲丕賳蹖 丕乇夭卮 賮讴乇 讴乇丿賳 賵 蹖丕 亘賴 丌夭賲丕蹖卮 诏匕丕卮鬲賳 乇丕 倬蹖丿丕 賲蹖讴賳丿 讴賴 胤亘賯 亘蹖丕賳賽 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 賵 讴爻丕賳蹖 讴賴 丕夭 丌賳賴丕 賳賯賱 賯賵賱 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 丿賳蹖丕 賵 鬲賲丕賲蹖 丕蹖賳 噩賴丕賳 亘乇丕蹖 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕 禺賱賯 卮丿賴 亘丕卮丿 賵 賲丕 鬲毓蹖蹖賳 讴賳賳丿賴 <賴爻鬲蹖> 賵 <賳蹖爻鬲蹖> 亘丕卮蹖賲 賵 賵噩丿丕賳 賲丕 賵 禺乇丿 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕 賳賲丕蹖賳丿賴贁 賴爻鬲蹖 亘丕卮丿
鈥広┵� 禺賵亘 賲蹖丿丕賳蹖賲 讴賴 丕蹖賳 丿乇爻鬲 賳蹖爻鬲... 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕 丿乇 丕蹖賳 噩賴丕賳 賴蹖趩 賳亘賵丿賴 丕蹖賲 賵 賴蹖趩 賳蹖爻鬲蹖賲
鈥庁堌池з� 亘夭乇诏賵丕乇 賵 賳賵乇 趩卮賲丕賳賲貙 丕蹖賳 乇丕 亘丿丕賳蹖丿 讴賴 賴蹖趩 亘乇鬲乇蹖賾鬲蹖 丿乇 丌賮乇蹖賳卮 賲蹖丕賳賽 賲賳 賵 卮賲丕 賵 蹖讴 倬卮賴 貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賴爻鬲蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕乇丿. 賴蹖趩 賲賵噩賵丿蹖 丕卮乇賮 亘乇 賲禺賱賵賯丕鬲 丿蹖诏乇 賳蹖爻鬲. 丕蹖賳 讴賴 丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕 丕卮乇賮 賲禺賱賵賯丕鬲 賴爻鬲賳丿貙 夭丕蹖蹖丿踿 匕賴賳 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕蹖 亘蹖賲丕乇 賵 賲鬲賵賴賲 亘賵丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 禺賵丿鬲丕賳 亘賴鬲乇 賲蹖丿丕賳蹖丿... 丿丕賳卮 丕賲乇賵夭蹖 賳蹖夭 丕夭 賵噩賵丿賽 噩賴丕賳 賵 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 丌賲丿賳 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕 賵 讴乇賴 夭賲蹖賳 丕胤賱丕毓丕鬲 讴丕賮蹖 亘丿爻鬲 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘丿丕賳蹖賲 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕 亘賴 賯賵賱 禺丿丕蹖 鬲丕夭蹖丕賳 賵 禺丿丕蹖賽 丕丿蹖丕賳 丕亘乇丕賴蹖賲蹖貙 丕卮乇賮 賲禺賱賵賯丕鬲 賳蹖爻鬲蹖賲
鈥庂囐呚з嗁傌� 讴賴 賲賳 賵 卮賲丕 亘賴 賲賯蹖丕爻 卮毓賵乇 禺賵蹖卮貙 丨賯賽賾 夭賳丿诏蹖 讴乇丿賳 丿丕乇蹖賲貙 倬卮賴 丕蹖 賳蹖夭 丿乇 賲賯蹖丕爻 卮毓賵乇 禺賵蹖卮貙 丨賯 夭賳丿诏蹖 丿丕乇丿. 讴賴 賴賲踿 賲丕 夭丕蹖蹖丿賴贁 匕乇賾丕鬲蹖 賴爻鬲蹖賲 讴賴 賴爻鬲蹖 乇丕 丕丨丕胤賴 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲
鈥庁关槽屫藏з嗁� 賲賳貙 亘丕乇賴丕 诏賮鬲賴 丕賲 賵 亘丕夭 賲蹖诏賵蹖賲: 鬲丕夭蹖丕賳 乇丕 趩賵賳 賮囟蹖賱鬲蹖 賳蹖爻鬲貙 鬲丕 丨囟賵乇卮丕賳 乇丕 丿乇 賴爻鬲蹖 賲賵噩賾賴 噩賱賵賴 丿賴丿貙 丕蹖賳 趩賳蹖賳 禺賵丿 乇丕 丕卮乇賮 賲禺賱賵賯丕鬲 賯賱賲丿丕丿 賲蹖讴賳賳丿貙 鬲丕 毓賯丿賴 賴丕蹖 賳丕鬲賲丕賲 禺賵丿 乇丕 鬲賲丕賲 讴賳賳丿貙 賵 賲噩賵夭蹖 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮賳丿 鬲丕 丿乇 倬乇鬲賵 丌賳 噩賵丕夭貙 亘賴 睾丕乇鬲 賲丕賱 賵 噩丕賳 丿蹖诏乇丕賳 賯丿 毓賻賱賻賲 讴賳賳丿
鈥庁堌池з嗁� 賲賳貙 亘賴 噩丕蹖 鬲賮讴乇 丿乇 <賴爻鬲蹖> 賵 <賳蹖爻鬲蹖>貙 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 禺賵丿 賵 賮賴賲 丿乇賵賳鬲丕賳 亘蹖丕賳丿蹖卮蹖丿貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賴爻鬲蹖 亘夭乇诏鬲乇蹖賳 倬蹖丕賲亘乇 丌賮乇蹖賳卮貙 禺賵丿 丕賳爻丕賳 賵 禺賵丿 卮賲丕 賴爻鬲蹖丿貙 丕诏乇 讴賴 禺賽乇丿 鬲賵兀賲 亘丕 丿賱賽 禺賵丿 乇丕 賵 丿賱賽 鬲賵兀賲 亘丕 禺賽乇丿賽 禺賵丿 乇丕貙 丌賲賵夭诏丕乇 噩丕賳賽 禺賵丿 讴賳蹖丿... 毓夭蹖夭丕賳賲貙 賴蹖趩蹖讴 丕夭 禺丿丕蹖丕賳賽 賲禺賱賵賯賽 匕賴賳 丌丿賲蹖丕賳貙 蹖賴賴賵賴 賵 丕賱賱賴 賵 賲夭丿丕 賵 睾蹖乇賴 賵 睾蹖乇賴... 亘乇 讴乇爻蹖 讴賴讴卮丕賳 鬲讴蹖賴 賳丿丕丿賴 丕賳丿貙 鬲丕 亘乇丕蹖 賲丕 讴鬲丕亘蹖 亘賴 乇爻賲 鬲毓賱蹖賲蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丨蹖丕鬲賲丕賳貙 鬲丿賵蹖賳 讴賳賳丿貙 丌賳 賴賲 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖賳 丨蹖丕鬲 賲蹖讴乇賵爻讴倬蹖 讴賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賴爻鬲蹖 賱丕蹖鬲賳丕賴蹖貙 亘賴 賴蹖趩 卮賲乇丿賴 賳賲蹖卮賵丿... 丕賱亘鬲賴 丕诏乇 毓丿賴 丕蹖 丕氐乇丕乇 丿丕乇賳丿 讴賴 亘鬲賽 芦丕賱賱賴賽 丕讴亘乇禄 丕蹖賳 噩賴丕賳 乇丕 丌賮乇蹖丿賴 丕爻鬲 賵 丕丿丕乇賴 賲蹖讴賳丿貙 倬爻 賲賳 亘丕蹖丿 亘诏賵蹖賲 讴賴 丕蹖賳 亘鬲賽 芦丕賱賱賴賽 丕讴亘乇禄貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 毓馗賲鬲賽 亘蹖讴乇丕賳賽 賱丕蹖鬲賳賴丕賴蹖 丿乇 賴爻鬲蹖貙 讴賴 亘乇卮乇賵毓 倬丕蹖丕賳卮 賲噩丕賱蹖 賳蹖爻鬲貙 亘賴 丕丿丕乇踿 賴蹖趩 丕賲賵乇蹖 賲卮睾賵賱 賳蹖爻鬲 丕賱賾丕貙 鬲丿丕乇讴賽 禺賵乇丕讴貙 亘乇丕蹖 丌賱鬲 鬲賳丕爻賱蹖賽 噩賲丕毓鬲 賲爻賱賲丕賳 賵 鬲丿丕乇讴 賮丕丨卮賴 禺丕賳賴 丕蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 亘夭乇诏 讴賴 賲賲賱賵 丕夭 丨賵乇蹖 賵 睾賱賲丕賳 丕爻鬲... 賵 噩夭亍 丕蹖賳 讴丕乇蹖 丕夭 丕賵 賳丿蹖丿賴 丕賲 賵 賳卮賳蹖丿賴 丕賲
鈥庂矩� 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 亘丕卮毓賵乇貙 丿賯鬲 讴賳蹖丿 讴賴 賴賵蹖賾鬲賽 卮毓賵乇 賴乇 禺丿丕蹖蹖貙 賲胤丕亘賯 亘丕 爻乇夭賲蹖賳蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 丿乇 丌賳 賲鬲賵賱賾丿 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲... 毓夭蹖夭丕賳賲貙 亘丿丕賳蹖丿 讴賴 賳蹖卮 爻賻賲賾蹖 丨卮乇丕鬲 卮賳夭丕乇 乇丕貙 亘賴 賮賴賲 卮丕丿蹖賴丕蹖 丕賳爻丕賳蹖貙 匕賵賯蹖 賳蹖爻鬲
鈥庁з呟屫堌ж辟� 丕蹖賳 乇蹖賵蹖賵 亘乇丕蹖賽 賮乇夭賳丿丕賳賽 禺乇丿诏乇丕蹖賽 爻乇夭賲蹖賳賲貙 賲賮蹖丿 亘賵丿賴 亘丕卮賴
鈥幝聚屫辟堌� 亘丕卮蹖丿 賵 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖禄
鈥庂囏池� 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖- 倬丿蹖丿賴 卮賳丕爻蹖- 丕蹖賲丕賳 賵 亘蹖 丕蹖賲丕賳蹖- 賵丕賯毓蹖鬲 賴爻鬲蹖- 夭賲丕賳 丨丕賱 賵 丌蹖賳丿賴- 噩爻賲 賵 乇賵丕賳- 毓卮賯- 夭亘丕賳- 丕卮鬲蹖丕賯- 賴賵爻 賵 賳賮乇鬲- 爻丕丿蹖爻賲 賵 賲丕夭賵禺蹖爻賲
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鈥庁堌池з嗁� 毓夭蹖夭賲貙 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 賲賵囟賵毓 爻賳诏蹖賳 賵 倬蹖趩蹖丿賴 丕蹖 乇丕 亘乇丕蹖 卮乇丨 丿丕丿賳 丿乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 亘乇诏夭蹖丿賴 丕爻鬲 賵 倬蹖 丿乇 倬蹖 丕夭 噩丕蹖蹖 亘賴 噩丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇 倬乇蹖丿賴 丕爻鬲... 賱匕丕 亘乇丕蹖 丌賳讴賴 卮賲丕 亘丕 趩讴蹖丿賴 賳馗乇蹖丕鬲 丕賵 丌卮賳丕 卮賵蹖丿.. 爻毓蹖 讴乇丿賲 亘賴 亘賴鬲乇蹖賳 卮讴賱 賲賲讴賳 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕 丿乇 趩賳丿 禺胤 亘乇丕蹖 卮賲丕 丿賵爻鬲丕賳 禺乇丿诏乇丕貙 禺賱丕氐賴 賳賵蹖爻蹖 讴賳賲
鈥庁关槽屫藏з嗁呚� 爻賲鬲 賵 爻賵蹖 毓賯蹖丿賴贁 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 亘乇 丕蹖賳 丕爻丕爻 丕爻鬲 讴賴 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 亘賴 胤賵乇 讴丕賲賱 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賳禺賵丕賴丿 亘賵丿貙 蹖毓賳蹖 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賴丕 賳蹖夭 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丿 丨賯丕蹖賯 乇賵卮賳 賵 賯丕亘賱 賮賴賲 丿丕乇賳丿
鈥庁ㄙ� 胤賵乇 賲孬丕賱: 賲爻丕賮鬲 亘乇丕蹖 賲丕 趩蹖夭蹖爻鬲 讴賴 亘丕蹖丿 讴賵卮卮 丿乇 丌賳 亘讴丕乇 乇賵丿 鬲丕 丕蹖賳 賲爻丕賮鬲 倬蹖賲賵丿賴 卮賵丿 賵 亘賴 毓亘丕乇鬲 丿蹖诏乇 丕蹖賳 讴賵卮卮 卮丕賲賱 丨乇讴鬲 賲丕 賲蹖亘丕卮丿 讴賴 賲爻丕賮鬲 乇丕 丕夭 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 亘賴 賴爻鬲蹖 鬲亘丿蹖賱 賲蹖讴賳丿貙 丿乇 丨丕賱蹖讴賴 賲蹖丿丕賳蹖賲 賯亘賱 丕夭 丨乇讴鬲賽 賲丕 丕蹖賳 賲爻丕賮鬲 丿乇 丨丕賱鬲 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕卮鬲賴 丕爻鬲貙 亘賳丕亘乇丕蹖賳 賴乇 丨賯蹖賯鬲 賲爻賱賾賲 亘乇丕蹖 禺賵丿 賵囟毓 禺丕氐蹖 丿丕乇丿 賵 鬲賲丕賲蹖 丕蹖賳賴丕 亘賴 賴爻鬲蹖 丕賳爻丕賳 賲乇亘賵胤 賲蹖卮賵丿
鈥庁池ж必� 芦賵噩丿丕賳賽 丕賳爻丕賳禄 乇丕 賳賲丕蹖賳丿賴 賴爻鬲蹖 丿乇 賳馗乇 诏乇賮鬲賴 丕爻鬲貙 賵 爻倬爻 賴爻鬲蹖 乇丕 亘賴 丿賵 賯爻賲鬲 鬲賯爻蹖賲 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲: 賴爻鬲蹖 賲胤賱賯 賵 賴爻鬲蹖 賲毓賲賵賱蹖... 賵 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖賳讴賴 亘蹖賳 丕蹖賳 丿賵 賴爻鬲蹖 丕乇鬲亘丕胤蹖 亘乇賯乇丕乇 讴乇丿賴 亘丕卮丿貙 賲蹖賳賵蹖爻丿 讴賴 : 丕賲乇 賴爻鬲蹖 丕夭 賳丕亘賵丿蹖 賴爻鬲蹖 賲胤賱賯 丕蹖噩丕丿 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲 賵 賲孬賱 丕蹖賳 丕爻鬲 讴賴 蹖讴蹖 賵丕乇丿 丿蹖诏乇蹖 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲... 賵 丕賱亘鬲賴 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 亘丕 夭蹖乇讴蹖 丿乇 丌禺乇 亘蹖丕賳 賲蹖讴賳丿 讴賴 丕诏乇 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕卮鬲 賴爻鬲蹖 賳蹖夭 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 賳賲蹖 丌賲丿... 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕卮鬲賴 讴賴 噩丕蹖 禺賵丿 乇丕 亘賴 賴爻鬲蹖 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲... 蹖毓賳蹖 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 丕爻丕爻 蹖讴爻丕賳 賵 賵丕丨丿蹖 丿丕乇賳丿貙 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕 讴賴: 賵賯鬲蹖 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 倬丕蹖丕賳 蹖丕賮鬲貙 賴爻鬲蹖 丌睾丕夭 賲蹖卮賵丿 賵 賳蹖爻鬲蹖 賳蹖夭 丿乇 倬丕蹖丕賳 賴爻鬲蹖 丿賵亘丕乇賴 丌睾丕夭 賲蹖卮賵丿
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鈥庁堌池з嗁� 禺賵亘賲 丕蹖賳 賲賵囟賵毓 乇丕 丿乇 賳馗乇 亘诏蹖乇蹖丿 讴賴 鬲賲丕賲蹖 賲爻丕卅賱蹖 讴賴 亘蹖丕賳 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 夭賲丕賳蹖 丕乇夭卮 賮讴乇 讴乇丿賳 賵 蹖丕 亘賴 丌夭賲丕蹖卮 诏匕丕卮鬲賳 乇丕 倬蹖丿丕 賲蹖讴賳丿 讴賴 胤亘賯 亘蹖丕賳賽 芦爻丕乇鬲乇禄 賵 讴爻丕賳蹖 讴賴 丕夭 丌賳賴丕 賳賯賱 賯賵賱 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲貙 丿賳蹖丕 賵 鬲賲丕賲蹖 丕蹖賳 噩賴丕賳 亘乇丕蹖 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕 禺賱賯 卮丿賴 亘丕卮丿 賵 賲丕 鬲毓蹖蹖賳 讴賳賳丿賴 <賴爻鬲蹖> 賵 <賳蹖爻鬲蹖> 亘丕卮蹖賲 賵 賵噩丿丕賳 賲丕 賵 禺乇丿 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕 賳賲丕蹖賳丿賴贁 賴爻鬲蹖 亘丕卮丿
鈥広┵� 禺賵亘 賲蹖丿丕賳蹖賲 讴賴 丕蹖賳 丿乇爻鬲 賳蹖爻鬲... 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕 丿乇 丕蹖賳 噩賴丕賳 賴蹖趩 賳亘賵丿賴 丕蹖賲 賵 賴蹖趩 賳蹖爻鬲蹖賲
鈥庁堌池з� 亘夭乇诏賵丕乇 賵 賳賵乇 趩卮賲丕賳賲貙 丕蹖賳 乇丕 亘丿丕賳蹖丿 讴賴 賴蹖趩 亘乇鬲乇蹖賾鬲蹖 丿乇 丌賮乇蹖賳卮 賲蹖丕賳賽 賲賳 賵 卮賲丕 賵 蹖讴 倬卮賴 貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賴爻鬲蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕乇丿. 賴蹖趩 賲賵噩賵丿蹖 丕卮乇賮 亘乇 賲禺賱賵賯丕鬲 丿蹖诏乇 賳蹖爻鬲. 丕蹖賳 讴賴 丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕 丕卮乇賮 賲禺賱賵賯丕鬲 賴爻鬲賳丿貙 夭丕蹖蹖丿踿 匕賴賳 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕蹖 亘蹖賲丕乇 賵 賲鬲賵賴賲 亘賵丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 禺賵丿鬲丕賳 亘賴鬲乇 賲蹖丿丕賳蹖丿... 丿丕賳卮 丕賲乇賵夭蹖 賳蹖夭 丕夭 賵噩賵丿賽 噩賴丕賳 賵 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 丌賲丿賳 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕 賵 讴乇賴 夭賲蹖賳 丕胤賱丕毓丕鬲 讴丕賮蹖 亘丿爻鬲 丿丕丿賴 丕爻鬲 讴賴 亘丿丕賳蹖賲 賲丕 丕賳爻丕賳賴丕 亘賴 賯賵賱 禺丿丕蹖 鬲丕夭蹖丕賳 賵 禺丿丕蹖賽 丕丿蹖丕賳 丕亘乇丕賴蹖賲蹖貙 丕卮乇賮 賲禺賱賵賯丕鬲 賳蹖爻鬲蹖賲
鈥庂囐呚з嗁傌� 讴賴 賲賳 賵 卮賲丕 亘賴 賲賯蹖丕爻 卮毓賵乇 禺賵蹖卮貙 丨賯賽賾 夭賳丿诏蹖 讴乇丿賳 丿丕乇蹖賲貙 倬卮賴 丕蹖 賳蹖夭 丿乇 賲賯蹖丕爻 卮毓賵乇 禺賵蹖卮貙 丨賯 夭賳丿诏蹖 丿丕乇丿. 讴賴 賴賲踿 賲丕 夭丕蹖蹖丿賴贁 匕乇賾丕鬲蹖 賴爻鬲蹖賲 讴賴 賴爻鬲蹖 乇丕 丕丨丕胤賴 讴乇丿賴 丕爻鬲
鈥庁关槽屫藏з嗁� 賲賳貙 亘丕乇賴丕 诏賮鬲賴 丕賲 賵 亘丕夭 賲蹖诏賵蹖賲: 鬲丕夭蹖丕賳 乇丕 趩賵賳 賮囟蹖賱鬲蹖 賳蹖爻鬲貙 鬲丕 丨囟賵乇卮丕賳 乇丕 丿乇 賴爻鬲蹖 賲賵噩賾賴 噩賱賵賴 丿賴丿貙 丕蹖賳 趩賳蹖賳 禺賵丿 乇丕 丕卮乇賮 賲禺賱賵賯丕鬲 賯賱賲丿丕丿 賲蹖讴賳賳丿貙 鬲丕 毓賯丿賴 賴丕蹖 賳丕鬲賲丕賲 禺賵丿 乇丕 鬲賲丕賲 讴賳賳丿貙 賵 賲噩賵夭蹖 丿丕卮鬲賴 亘丕卮賳丿 鬲丕 丿乇 倬乇鬲賵 丌賳 噩賵丕夭貙 亘賴 睾丕乇鬲 賲丕賱 賵 噩丕賳 丿蹖诏乇丕賳 賯丿 毓賻賱賻賲 讴賳賳丿
鈥庁堌池з嗁� 賲賳貙 亘賴 噩丕蹖 鬲賮讴乇 丿乇 <賴爻鬲蹖> 賵 <賳蹖爻鬲蹖>貙 亘賴 賵噩賵丿 禺賵丿 賵 賮賴賲 丿乇賵賳鬲丕賳 亘蹖丕賳丿蹖卮蹖丿貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賴爻鬲蹖 亘夭乇诏鬲乇蹖賳 倬蹖丕賲亘乇 丌賮乇蹖賳卮貙 禺賵丿 丕賳爻丕賳 賵 禺賵丿 卮賲丕 賴爻鬲蹖丿貙 丕诏乇 讴賴 禺賽乇丿 鬲賵兀賲 亘丕 丿賱賽 禺賵丿 乇丕 賵 丿賱賽 鬲賵兀賲 亘丕 禺賽乇丿賽 禺賵丿 乇丕貙 丌賲賵夭诏丕乇 噩丕賳賽 禺賵丿 讴賳蹖丿... 毓夭蹖夭丕賳賲貙 賴蹖趩蹖讴 丕夭 禺丿丕蹖丕賳賽 賲禺賱賵賯賽 匕賴賳 丌丿賲蹖丕賳貙 蹖賴賴賵賴 賵 丕賱賱賴 賵 賲夭丿丕 賵 睾蹖乇賴 賵 睾蹖乇賴... 亘乇 讴乇爻蹖 讴賴讴卮丕賳 鬲讴蹖賴 賳丿丕丿賴 丕賳丿貙 鬲丕 亘乇丕蹖 賲丕 讴鬲丕亘蹖 亘賴 乇爻賲 鬲毓賱蹖賲蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丨蹖丕鬲賲丕賳貙 鬲丿賵蹖賳 讴賳賳丿貙 丌賳 賴賲 亘乇丕蹖 丕蹖賳 丨蹖丕鬲 賲蹖讴乇賵爻讴倬蹖 讴賴 丿乇 丕蹖賳 賴爻鬲蹖 賱丕蹖鬲賳丕賴蹖貙 亘賴 賴蹖趩 卮賲乇丿賴 賳賲蹖卮賵丿... 丕賱亘鬲賴 丕诏乇 毓丿賴 丕蹖 丕氐乇丕乇 丿丕乇賳丿 讴賴 亘鬲賽 芦丕賱賱賴賽 丕讴亘乇禄 丕蹖賳 噩賴丕賳 乇丕 丌賮乇蹖丿賴 丕爻鬲 賵 丕丿丕乇賴 賲蹖讴賳丿貙 倬爻 賲賳 亘丕蹖丿 亘诏賵蹖賲 讴賴 丕蹖賳 亘鬲賽 芦丕賱賱賴賽 丕讴亘乇禄貙 丿乇 丕蹖賳 毓馗賲鬲賽 亘蹖讴乇丕賳賽 賱丕蹖鬲賳賴丕賴蹖 丿乇 賴爻鬲蹖貙 讴賴 亘乇卮乇賵毓 倬丕蹖丕賳卮 賲噩丕賱蹖 賳蹖爻鬲貙 亘賴 丕丿丕乇踿 賴蹖趩 丕賲賵乇蹖 賲卮睾賵賱 賳蹖爻鬲 丕賱賾丕貙 鬲丿丕乇讴賽 禺賵乇丕讴貙 亘乇丕蹖 丌賱鬲 鬲賳丕爻賱蹖賽 噩賲丕毓鬲 賲爻賱賲丕賳 賵 鬲丿丕乇讴 賮丕丨卮賴 禺丕賳賴 丕蹖 亘爻蹖丕乇 亘夭乇诏 讴賴 賲賲賱賵 丕夭 丨賵乇蹖 賵 睾賱賲丕賳 丕爻鬲... 賵 噩夭亍 丕蹖賳 讴丕乇蹖 丕夭 丕賵 賳丿蹖丿賴 丕賲 賵 賳卮賳蹖丿賴 丕賲
鈥庂矩� 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖丕賳 亘丕卮毓賵乇貙 丿賯鬲 讴賳蹖丿 讴賴 賴賵蹖賾鬲賽 卮毓賵乇 賴乇 禺丿丕蹖蹖貙 賲胤丕亘賯 亘丕 爻乇夭賲蹖賳蹖 丕爻鬲 讴賴 丿乇 丌賳 賲鬲賵賱賾丿 卮丿賴 丕爻鬲... 毓夭蹖夭丕賳賲貙 亘丿丕賳蹖丿 讴賴 賳蹖卮 爻賻賲賾蹖 丨卮乇丕鬲 卮賳夭丕乇 乇丕貙 亘賴 賮賴賲 卮丕丿蹖賴丕蹖 丕賳爻丕賳蹖貙 匕賵賯蹖 賳蹖爻鬲
鈥庁з呟屫堌ж辟� 丕蹖賳 乇蹖賵蹖賵 亘乇丕蹖賽 賮乇夭賳丿丕賳賽 禺乇丿诏乇丕蹖賽 爻乇夭賲蹖賳賲貙 賲賮蹖丿 亘賵丿賴 亘丕卮賴
鈥幝聚屫辟堌� 亘丕卮蹖丿 賵 丕蹖乇丕賳蹖禄
Shelved as 'partial-credit'
May 21, 2017A few years ago I read about half of Being and Nothingness (finally!). Back in school days I thought I was cutting my philosophical teeth on Sartre and the others known as existentialists. I鈥檓 quite certain I was making most of it up. It was time to play catch-up and read Sartre鈥檚 work which I believed to have already assimilated. It evolves that I had moved quite a distance beyond Sartre鈥檚 鈥渆xistentialism.鈥� But I did not finish my reading for external reasons and it remains on my shelf for that eventual return.
But mostly I鈥檓 posting this note in order to remove a chip from my shoulder. My claim here is that Sartre is the only existentialist; and his existentialism is merely a portion of his work; and that it is the least important of his work. What I mean is that Sartre was a phenomenologist. His contribution to twentieth century philosophy was not the development of 鈥渢he philosophy of existentialism鈥� but rather his continuance of and contributions to the phenomenological researches begun by Husserl, carried further by Heidegger, contributions by Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Ricoeur, ETC. Sartre is perhaps the lesser philosopher. But as intellectual he was indubitably a giant on the French landscape. But, see, my claim is that he was more 鈥渋ntellectual鈥� than 鈥減hilosopher.鈥� And his existentialism had more to do with his status as intellectual than as philosopher; don鈥檛 hold too tight to that distinction.
But, let it be said, Sartre is perhaps the noblest figure of the twentieth century in regard to the question of atheism in so far as he was the only thinker to that time who fully realized the consequences brought on by the death/disappearance of a transcendental guarantee frequently known as 鈥淕od鈥�; existentialism was perhaps nothing more than a response to this question.
Let it be further said, that I don鈥檛 have too much to say about the literary grouping known as 鈥渆xistentialist,鈥� for writing such Sartre was also rather well known, along with de Beauvoir, Sarraute, and someone named Camus. I quit reading these things about the time I began to understand philosophy.
So then as to Sartre being the only existentialist. Here鈥檚 what I think happened, and which has caused more than two centuries of the history of philosophy to be misunderstood by the popular mind. A popularizer of philosophy, or a few, but mostly Walter Kaufman, read Sartre. His reading of Sartre allowed him to see similar themes and issues and orientations in philosophers from earlier eras; but without having read Sartre he would not have seen these things in other thinkers. This is a case similar to Kafka鈥檚 writing causing us to retrospectively find kafka-esque elements in writers who preceded Kafka, although we had never seen those things before or taken them as kafka-esque; and we find a whole series of kafka-ism preceding the thing itself. With a popular book or two; overnight we suddenly had an entire history of existentialist thinkers--Heidegger became one, so did Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, even back to Shakespeare and Pascal. Reading Sartre certainly causes us to read these thinkers in a new light, but to assimilate them to something like 鈥渆xistentialism鈥� is simply uninformative at best, misleading at worst. Depend upon it--anyone calling Heidegger an existentialist does not know the first thing (they are learning! patience!) about twentieth century philosophy. Anyone who believes that Kierkegaard or Nietzsche were existentialists!!! (and they absolutely were not and never could be 鈥減ostmodernists鈥�) --they were Hegelians, as is Sartre in his better moments.
This is really the only thing I want to say. Sartre is the only existentialist. Existentialism is and never was a very important part of twentieth century philosophy. What was important and still is, is phenomenology. Forget the existentialist reading of the history of philosophy. It causes more confusion than understanding.
But mostly I鈥檓 posting this note in order to remove a chip from my shoulder. My claim here is that Sartre is the only existentialist; and his existentialism is merely a portion of his work; and that it is the least important of his work. What I mean is that Sartre was a phenomenologist. His contribution to twentieth century philosophy was not the development of 鈥渢he philosophy of existentialism鈥� but rather his continuance of and contributions to the phenomenological researches begun by Husserl, carried further by Heidegger, contributions by Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Ricoeur, ETC. Sartre is perhaps the lesser philosopher. But as intellectual he was indubitably a giant on the French landscape. But, see, my claim is that he was more 鈥渋ntellectual鈥� than 鈥減hilosopher.鈥� And his existentialism had more to do with his status as intellectual than as philosopher; don鈥檛 hold too tight to that distinction.
But, let it be said, Sartre is perhaps the noblest figure of the twentieth century in regard to the question of atheism in so far as he was the only thinker to that time who fully realized the consequences brought on by the death/disappearance of a transcendental guarantee frequently known as 鈥淕od鈥�; existentialism was perhaps nothing more than a response to this question.
Let it be further said, that I don鈥檛 have too much to say about the literary grouping known as 鈥渆xistentialist,鈥� for writing such Sartre was also rather well known, along with de Beauvoir, Sarraute, and someone named Camus. I quit reading these things about the time I began to understand philosophy.
So then as to Sartre being the only existentialist. Here鈥檚 what I think happened, and which has caused more than two centuries of the history of philosophy to be misunderstood by the popular mind. A popularizer of philosophy, or a few, but mostly Walter Kaufman, read Sartre. His reading of Sartre allowed him to see similar themes and issues and orientations in philosophers from earlier eras; but without having read Sartre he would not have seen these things in other thinkers. This is a case similar to Kafka鈥檚 writing causing us to retrospectively find kafka-esque elements in writers who preceded Kafka, although we had never seen those things before or taken them as kafka-esque; and we find a whole series of kafka-ism preceding the thing itself. With a popular book or two; overnight we suddenly had an entire history of existentialist thinkers--Heidegger became one, so did Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, even back to Shakespeare and Pascal. Reading Sartre certainly causes us to read these thinkers in a new light, but to assimilate them to something like 鈥渆xistentialism鈥� is simply uninformative at best, misleading at worst. Depend upon it--anyone calling Heidegger an existentialist does not know the first thing (they are learning! patience!) about twentieth century philosophy. Anyone who believes that Kierkegaard or Nietzsche were existentialists!!! (and they absolutely were not and never could be 鈥減ostmodernists鈥�) --they were Hegelians, as is Sartre in his better moments.
This is really the only thing I want to say. Sartre is the only existentialist. Existentialism is and never was a very important part of twentieth century philosophy. What was important and still is, is phenomenology. Forget the existentialist reading of the history of philosophy. It causes more confusion than understanding.
September 10, 2017
亘賴 賳馗乇賲 賲賴賲 鬲乇蹖賳 丕孬乇 賮賱爻賮蹖 爻丕乇鬲乇 賴爻鬲蹖 賵 亘賴 噩乇卅鬲 賲蹖卮賴 诏賮鬲 讴賴 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 亘乇噩爻鬲賴 鬲乇蹖賳 丌孬丕乇 賮賱爻賮蹖 賯乇賳 亘蹖爻鬲賲 賴爻鬲卮. 賲賳 賵賯鬲蹖 丕賵賱蹖賳 亘丕乇 丕蹖賳 讴鬲丕亘 乇賵 禺乇蹖丿賲 賵 賲蹖禺賵丕爻鬲賲 卮乇賵毓 亘賴 禺賵賳丿賳卮 亘讴賳賲貙 蹖讴賲 鬲乇爻蹖丿賲貙 賴賲 丕夭 丨噩賲卮 賵 賴賲 丕夭 賲鬲賳卮貙 丕賲丕 亘毓丿 丕夭 禺賵賳丿賳 趩賳丿 氐賮丨賴 亘賴 胤賵乇 讴丕賲賱 丿乇 賲鬲賳 賯乇丕乇 诏乇賮鬲賲 賵 賲爻丕賱賴 亘乇丕賲 乇賵卮賳 卮丿. 亘賴 賳讴丕鬲 毓丕賱蹖 丕蹖 丕卮丕乇賴 賲蹖讴賳賴 鬲賵蹖 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 賵 賳賴 鬲賳賴丕 亘賴 亘乇乇爻蹖 賴爻鬲蹖鈥屫促嗀ж驰� 倬丿蹖丿丕乇卮賳丕禺鬲蹖 賲蹖 倬乇丿丕夭賴貙 亘賱讴賴 亘賴 賲爻丕卅賱 乇賵夭賲乇賴 丕賳爻丕賳 賴丕 賵 賮賱爻賮赖 毓賲賱蹖 賵 乇賵夭賲乇賴 賵 讴丕乇亘乇丿蹖 賳蹖夭 亘賴 賳丨賵 丕丨爻賳 賲蹖倬乇丿丕夭賴. 賳孬乇卮 丿賯蹖賯丕 賲孬賱 賳孬乇 爻丕蹖乇 丕孬丕乇 爻丕乇鬲乇 賲蹖賲賵賳賴 賵 賲孬丕賱 賴丕蹖 匕讴乇 卮丿賴 亘乇丕蹖 賴乇 賲爻丕賱賴 亘賴 乇賵卮賳 卮丿賳 亘賴鬲乇 賲爻丕賱賴 讴賲讴 賲蹖讴賳賴. 亘乇禺賱丕賮 丨噩賲 賵 馗丕賴乇 鬲乇爻賳丕讴卮 丕氐賱丕 賲爻丕賱賴 爻禺鬲蹖 丿乇 禺賵丿卮 賳丿丕乇賴 賵 亘丕 丕蹖賳 丨丕賱 讴丕賲賱貙 噩丕賲毓 賵 卮丕賲賱 賴爻鬲卮 丿乇 夭賲蹖賳賴 鬲丨賯蹖賯丕鬲蹖 禺賵丿卮. 賮賱爻賮赖 讴丕賲賱 爻丕鬲乇 讴賴 丿乇 鬲賲丕賲 丕孬乇賴丕蹖 丿蹖诏乇卮 亘賴 讴丕乇 乇賮鬲賴 乇賵 賲蹖卮賴 丿丕禺賱 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 丿蹖丿 賵 丿乇 賵丕賯毓 亘丕 禺賵賳丿賳 丕蹖賳 丕孬乇 鬲賲丕賲 丕孬丕乇 丿蹖诏賴 爻丕鬲乇 乇賵 賲蹖禺賵賳蹖賳. 禺賵賳丿賳卮 賲爻賱賲丕 亘賴 氐乇賮 賴夭蹖賳賴 賵 夭賲丕賳蹖 讴賴 亘乇丕卮 诏匕丕卮鬲賴 卮丿賴 賲蹖 丕乇夭賴.
鈥淚t is therefore senseless to think of complaining since nothing foreign has decided what we feel, what we live, or what we are.鈥�
鈥淚t is therefore senseless to think of complaining since nothing foreign has decided what we feel, what we live, or what we are.鈥�
January 10, 2013
I鈥檝e taken time on ideologically heavy books before, spending sometimes an hour on a single page to make sure I really understood, but I took 5 months on this 800 page beaut. I read Being And Nothingness in conjunction with an incredibly enlightening and comprehensible book of course notes by Paul Vincent Spade from Indiana University on the subject of Sartre and B&N. See . What they say about B&N is true. It was VERY difficult. Sartre uses ideas and language that have long been used and specialized by many other philosophers in history鈥攑hilosophers who Sartre often just assumes his readers are read-up on鈥攁nd if these obscure allusions and nomenclature weren鈥檛 a big enough hurdle, Sartre also speaks with neologisms and turned-on-head phrases to introduce original ideas that he was trying to break out of conventional modes of understanding. Someone recently asked me about what I was reading, and after I told them, they took out a piece of paper to write it down, and asked me if I thought the library carries it. I warned them not to even look in its direction until they read a few smaller works by Sartre that convinced them they can鈥檛 NOT read it. It鈥檚 a monumental task.
So, why did I read it, assuming I鈥檓 not a total a-hole and wanted just to brag that I read it? Well, I wanted to read this book because I had started to read more and more by Sartre that I liked; works such as Existentialism Is a Humanism, 2 plays鈥擭o Exit and The Flies, and excerpts from B&N in Existentialism edited by Robert Solomon. I was immediately attracted to how Sartre places a large emphasis on freedom and responsibility鈥攏o regrets and no excuses鈥攁nd seems to recognize much unrealized potential in people. I know many consider him to be an intellectual tour de force, and I agree, but I find his bravery to be most inspiring. He starts from the beginning, poring over the nature of being (ontology) and thought, and attempts to set forth a new theory of consciousness and reality that seriously challenges in imagination and utility the best systems I have ever heard of; and he may have come as close as anyone yet to understanding the nape of the infinitely-regressive cogito. More to the point, after reading it, I feel I better understand my world to a degree that I feel much more optimistic, appreciative of my life with its good or bad, and better able to see that I am capable to meet its challenges, identify opportunities, and make progress.
There were many moments in the book in which I truly felt I was understanding for the first time what鈥檚 going on. In life. In general. Imagine that. That鈥檚 my honest-to-God reaction. We (I) often attempt to forfeit our understanding of the world and our responsibility in it to a religious resignation, or we distract ourselves with busy-ness, blithe indifference, or destructive rage; but a better framework for understanding the world and myself in it鈥攏ot to be confused with a complete, or perfect understanding鈥攊s often uplifting and advantageous. Some may say Sartre鈥檚 philosophy is superfluous and ineffective. I鈥檒l be the judge of that for my own life anyway, and I say that Sartre鈥檚 views have positively impacted my life.
Let it be noted at the outset that the real Sartre, or who I understand to be the more authentic Sartre as I have come to know him through reading some of his writings, cannot be tainted by the grossly exaggerated and largely misunderstood appellation鈥攁nd what has become a hackneyed epithet towards postmodern thinkers鈥� nihilism. I used to think 'nothingness' in Sartre鈥檚 philosophy, and especially in the title of this book, was a reflection on a sort of metaphysical 鈥榙ead-space鈥�, crushing meaninglessness, the impossibility of certainty, and a kind of moral about how the world, our hopes, and our dreams all come to naught. Complete misunderstanding. The opposite seems to be true actually. Nothingness and non-being exist only on the surface of being, as Sartre pointed out, 鈥淏eing secretes nothingness.鈥� In other words, what is not can only be supported and defined by what IS; so the emphasis and foundation of nothingness is 鈥榮omething-ness鈥�.
Throughout the book one must also keep in mind, and Sartre insists on this again and again, that the author is not setting forth a theory of why being is or how it came to be, which Sartre reserves the term metaphysics for; but rather he is offering an explanation of what is and how it appears to work鈥攚hat he delineates as ontology. I鈥檓 not sure he is entirely successful in teasing out the differences between the two terms, and there appears to be quite a bit of overlap. However, this doesn鈥檛 bother me a bit, because we鈥檙e all out in deeper water here, and the ultimate test for an idea is not how cleanly it squeezes into a dictionary definition, but how helpful it is in thought experiments and, of course, real living.
He starts the book by establishing a simple duality of the finite and the infinite, which he argues offers more illumination than the antiquated dualities of matter and idea, flesh and spirit. This 鈥榝inite and infinite鈥� duality slowly morphs into a 鈥榤ind and world鈥� sort of pairing, and he eventually dubs them Being-In-Itself, and Being-For-Itself. These terms are throwbacks to other philosophers, viz. Heideggar and Kant, but of course Sartre is doing something new here which takes quite a bit of back-story and poetic intuition to keep up with.
Freedom is the crux of Sartre鈥檚 philosophy. It is not something we have, rather it is our nature. We are able to 鈥榮ecrete a nothingness鈥�, or separate ourselves from the tidal flow of the world or reality in such a way that our isolation protects us from determinism in the material world. Our separateness, our ability to look from a distance onto the world, is our ability to keep our shoestrings out of its gears. We reflect on it, and our objectified self in it, without being ground up in it. In this sense, we are free from the world. And we are this freedom, we are this separation. Freedom is not a thing or quality in the world, it is the transphenomenal being of the For-Itself (human beings).
The beauty of this (and the anguish, as I will mention momentarily) is that I鈥攖he 鈥業鈥� transcending the objectified 鈥榮elf鈥欌€攃hoose without being coerced or programmed. My choices are beyond any known source. This may not be appealing for some, but what this ultimately means for Sartre, is that I can live knowing that nobody is making me do anything. My life is my choice. Choosing oneself is a HUGE theme in B&N, and this means that we, at the core of who we are, want to be who we are, or we would not be who we are. Sartre builds the case that the For-Itself is essentially the universe become conscious of itself (though he never says it in those words), and now nothing determines it but itself. Now, that does not mean that we chose to be鈥攖hat is our 鈥渇acticity鈥�, the only thing we haven鈥檛 chosen鈥攂ut now that we are, we choose to be every second we live.
Now, this power of freedom lies deep, and all this talk of ownership and responsibility for the best and worst in life, as many will chafe at hearing, lends to our feelings of anxiety (鈥渁nguish鈥�) because it scares us that some part of us is this much in control, and we are, as Sartre puts it, 鈥渁fraid of our own spontaneity.鈥� From the translator, Barnes, in his introduction, 鈥淲e feel vertigo or anguish before our recognition that nothing in our own acts or discernible personality ensures our following of any of our usual patterns of conduct. There is nothing to prevent consciousness from making a wholly new choice of its way of being.鈥� Sartre鈥檚 famous expression, we are 鈥渃ondemned to be free鈥� has a certain ring of despair. 鈥淎ll the barriers, all the guard rails collapse鈥 do not have, nor can I have, recourse to any value against the fact that it is I who sustains values in being. Nothing can ensure [protect] me against myself.鈥� It鈥檚 not as if the For-Itself is sabotaging itself, but the point here is that one鈥檚 life is ultimately lived beyond the ability to pinpoint concrete, objectified motives, which could only succeed the creating subject.
Sartre soon gets to the meaning of our relationship in the world with other people. To begin with, the Other exists. Or rather, we act as though he does. In life, 鈥渨e encounter the other; we do not constitute him [mentally]鈥�. Something in us accepts the Other鈥檚 existence, not only as an external, objective reality; but we encounter him with an internal, subjective necessity for his existence. We only doubt his existence to the same extent as we may doubt our own existence, which we can鈥檛 really seriously. Psychologists have shown for quite some time that self-awareness develops in the presence of others as one learns to distinguish one鈥檚 self from other selves, and Sartre would go a step further in adducing that 鈥渢he cogito of the Other鈥檚 existence is merged with my cogito鈥� and therefore 鈥渢he Other penetrates me to the heart. I can not doubt him without doubting myself since [as Hegel put it,] 鈥榮elf-consciousness is real only in so far as it recognizes its echo (and its reflection) in another.鈥欌€� Ultimately our self-awareness cannot be dissociated from our awareness of others, and this is what Sartre elsewhere (most notably in Existentialism Is A Humanism) expands in his idea of 鈥榠ntersubjectivity鈥� (and I鈥檓 actually surprised I didn鈥檛 meet up with this term in this book, as it would have been helpful.)
One of the most important contributions of Sartre鈥檚 philosophy is his proclamation that we choose our lives. Every moment we live is a chosen moment. To live is to realize oneself in situation, inseparable from a physical/social environment that is as real and necessary as our original inheritance of our own bodies. 鈥淭o live this [situation] is to choose myself through it and to choose it through my choice of myself.鈥� It is ours, and no one else鈥檚. No one but us can be blamed. We may want to change things in our lives, but everything that is in our life is material (our 鈥榮ituation鈥� or 鈥榝acticity鈥�) which may be used by us to create something better. We are the architects, and to work with what has been given to us is to, in some sense, accept what has been given to us, which is to accept our self that has been revealed through this situation.
Now, if I may be so bold so as to rephrase another major premise of what I think Sartre is getting at in his writings, it鈥檚 this: we all live 'in story'. At no point are we 鈥榦ut of story鈥�. There is always a beginning and an ending (which posts are constantly being adjusted by ourselves), obstacles in between, joy of progress, and awareness (even if it is indirect awareness, or, what Sartre terms 鈥榥on-positional awareness鈥�) that all this is happening. It鈥檚 not possible to live outside of story. Sartre鈥檚 'projects', or what you and I call stories, determine the meaning of everything we do and say and think, and if we suppose we are able to think or live outside of story, we are simply looking for a way into the next chapter. Sartre thinks that being honest with ourselves about our projects (and our 鈥榦riginal project鈥� as he calls the primary thrust of manifesting our self in the universe) can help us to better adjust to different settings, or situations. Furthermore, we will know how to respond when someone else attempts to foist their stories or religion on us as if we have no right to be creators of our own story; for though we are caught up in 鈥榮tory鈥� together (intersubjectivity), we can鈥檛 coerce each other鈥檚 stories to conform to our own without objectifying the Other.
Oddly enough, though to some it may seem that Sartre is attempting to divest the world of meaning and magic, the opposite is actually true. He is helping us see that meaning is not so far removed from us that we must wait with saintly patience to one day see the veneer of this world peeled back to reveal the 鈥榯ruest truth鈥欌€攖he real meaning of the universe. This is the essential meaning of his duality of finite/infinite: everything we see is a REAL manifestation of the infinite. As a matter of fact, all we do, or say, or see IS the infinite, at least in part. Meaning is HERE, everywhere. And the universe is not one big, impersonal machine that plows blindly ahead without rhyme or reason. He blows mechanamorphism鈥攁n attempt to explain the meaning of the universe in purely mechanistic terms鈥攐ut of the water. 鈥淭he world is human鈥� he states, and nothing is so completely inhuman so as not to be penetrated through and through with our meanings and鈥ersonality. Measurement can鈥檛 even begin in science without human scale and location. 鈥淭he real is realization [by a person].鈥� The real is here. Not a bad place to start.
Well, I loved it all. I loved my ideological gleanings, as well as the challenge of trying to 鈥榖reak my eye open鈥� with complex logic and innovative thought and language. I鈥檓 actually interested in reading more from Sartre, if that says anything. I think he cares about others, I think his ideas are courageous, and I think he helped to topple pedantic and petrified academic philosophy that looked down loftily from the height of detached, anemic ideals onto the world of living, bleeding, thinking folk every bit as 鈥榬eal鈥� and valid as the pale-faced intelligentsia. Sartre affirmed that each of our stories are existential centers of the universe, and we affect each other no matter how seemingly insignificant one feels themselves to be. I hope I never forget what I read. I truly think Sartre鈥檚 ideas are a contribution and advancement to philosophy, and help to iron out some of the wrinkles in the way we think about ourselves and the world. I have a notebook full of 11 pages of quotations and notes from B&N, Barnes introduction to B&N, and Spade鈥檚 course notes available for anyone who may be interested in receiving a copy of them. Chew before swallowing.
This is an abbreviated version of my review of Being And Nothingness. For the complete review, check to see if you inadvertently skipped your meds, get caught up, then visit:
So, why did I read it, assuming I鈥檓 not a total a-hole and wanted just to brag that I read it? Well, I wanted to read this book because I had started to read more and more by Sartre that I liked; works such as Existentialism Is a Humanism, 2 plays鈥擭o Exit and The Flies, and excerpts from B&N in Existentialism edited by Robert Solomon. I was immediately attracted to how Sartre places a large emphasis on freedom and responsibility鈥攏o regrets and no excuses鈥攁nd seems to recognize much unrealized potential in people. I know many consider him to be an intellectual tour de force, and I agree, but I find his bravery to be most inspiring. He starts from the beginning, poring over the nature of being (ontology) and thought, and attempts to set forth a new theory of consciousness and reality that seriously challenges in imagination and utility the best systems I have ever heard of; and he may have come as close as anyone yet to understanding the nape of the infinitely-regressive cogito. More to the point, after reading it, I feel I better understand my world to a degree that I feel much more optimistic, appreciative of my life with its good or bad, and better able to see that I am capable to meet its challenges, identify opportunities, and make progress.
There were many moments in the book in which I truly felt I was understanding for the first time what鈥檚 going on. In life. In general. Imagine that. That鈥檚 my honest-to-God reaction. We (I) often attempt to forfeit our understanding of the world and our responsibility in it to a religious resignation, or we distract ourselves with busy-ness, blithe indifference, or destructive rage; but a better framework for understanding the world and myself in it鈥攏ot to be confused with a complete, or perfect understanding鈥攊s often uplifting and advantageous. Some may say Sartre鈥檚 philosophy is superfluous and ineffective. I鈥檒l be the judge of that for my own life anyway, and I say that Sartre鈥檚 views have positively impacted my life.
Let it be noted at the outset that the real Sartre, or who I understand to be the more authentic Sartre as I have come to know him through reading some of his writings, cannot be tainted by the grossly exaggerated and largely misunderstood appellation鈥攁nd what has become a hackneyed epithet towards postmodern thinkers鈥� nihilism. I used to think 'nothingness' in Sartre鈥檚 philosophy, and especially in the title of this book, was a reflection on a sort of metaphysical 鈥榙ead-space鈥�, crushing meaninglessness, the impossibility of certainty, and a kind of moral about how the world, our hopes, and our dreams all come to naught. Complete misunderstanding. The opposite seems to be true actually. Nothingness and non-being exist only on the surface of being, as Sartre pointed out, 鈥淏eing secretes nothingness.鈥� In other words, what is not can only be supported and defined by what IS; so the emphasis and foundation of nothingness is 鈥榮omething-ness鈥�.
Throughout the book one must also keep in mind, and Sartre insists on this again and again, that the author is not setting forth a theory of why being is or how it came to be, which Sartre reserves the term metaphysics for; but rather he is offering an explanation of what is and how it appears to work鈥攚hat he delineates as ontology. I鈥檓 not sure he is entirely successful in teasing out the differences between the two terms, and there appears to be quite a bit of overlap. However, this doesn鈥檛 bother me a bit, because we鈥檙e all out in deeper water here, and the ultimate test for an idea is not how cleanly it squeezes into a dictionary definition, but how helpful it is in thought experiments and, of course, real living.
He starts the book by establishing a simple duality of the finite and the infinite, which he argues offers more illumination than the antiquated dualities of matter and idea, flesh and spirit. This 鈥榝inite and infinite鈥� duality slowly morphs into a 鈥榤ind and world鈥� sort of pairing, and he eventually dubs them Being-In-Itself, and Being-For-Itself. These terms are throwbacks to other philosophers, viz. Heideggar and Kant, but of course Sartre is doing something new here which takes quite a bit of back-story and poetic intuition to keep up with.
Freedom is the crux of Sartre鈥檚 philosophy. It is not something we have, rather it is our nature. We are able to 鈥榮ecrete a nothingness鈥�, or separate ourselves from the tidal flow of the world or reality in such a way that our isolation protects us from determinism in the material world. Our separateness, our ability to look from a distance onto the world, is our ability to keep our shoestrings out of its gears. We reflect on it, and our objectified self in it, without being ground up in it. In this sense, we are free from the world. And we are this freedom, we are this separation. Freedom is not a thing or quality in the world, it is the transphenomenal being of the For-Itself (human beings).
The beauty of this (and the anguish, as I will mention momentarily) is that I鈥攖he 鈥業鈥� transcending the objectified 鈥榮elf鈥欌€攃hoose without being coerced or programmed. My choices are beyond any known source. This may not be appealing for some, but what this ultimately means for Sartre, is that I can live knowing that nobody is making me do anything. My life is my choice. Choosing oneself is a HUGE theme in B&N, and this means that we, at the core of who we are, want to be who we are, or we would not be who we are. Sartre builds the case that the For-Itself is essentially the universe become conscious of itself (though he never says it in those words), and now nothing determines it but itself. Now, that does not mean that we chose to be鈥攖hat is our 鈥渇acticity鈥�, the only thing we haven鈥檛 chosen鈥攂ut now that we are, we choose to be every second we live.
Now, this power of freedom lies deep, and all this talk of ownership and responsibility for the best and worst in life, as many will chafe at hearing, lends to our feelings of anxiety (鈥渁nguish鈥�) because it scares us that some part of us is this much in control, and we are, as Sartre puts it, 鈥渁fraid of our own spontaneity.鈥� From the translator, Barnes, in his introduction, 鈥淲e feel vertigo or anguish before our recognition that nothing in our own acts or discernible personality ensures our following of any of our usual patterns of conduct. There is nothing to prevent consciousness from making a wholly new choice of its way of being.鈥� Sartre鈥檚 famous expression, we are 鈥渃ondemned to be free鈥� has a certain ring of despair. 鈥淎ll the barriers, all the guard rails collapse鈥 do not have, nor can I have, recourse to any value against the fact that it is I who sustains values in being. Nothing can ensure [protect] me against myself.鈥� It鈥檚 not as if the For-Itself is sabotaging itself, but the point here is that one鈥檚 life is ultimately lived beyond the ability to pinpoint concrete, objectified motives, which could only succeed the creating subject.
Sartre soon gets to the meaning of our relationship in the world with other people. To begin with, the Other exists. Or rather, we act as though he does. In life, 鈥渨e encounter the other; we do not constitute him [mentally]鈥�. Something in us accepts the Other鈥檚 existence, not only as an external, objective reality; but we encounter him with an internal, subjective necessity for his existence. We only doubt his existence to the same extent as we may doubt our own existence, which we can鈥檛 really seriously. Psychologists have shown for quite some time that self-awareness develops in the presence of others as one learns to distinguish one鈥檚 self from other selves, and Sartre would go a step further in adducing that 鈥渢he cogito of the Other鈥檚 existence is merged with my cogito鈥� and therefore 鈥渢he Other penetrates me to the heart. I can not doubt him without doubting myself since [as Hegel put it,] 鈥榮elf-consciousness is real only in so far as it recognizes its echo (and its reflection) in another.鈥欌€� Ultimately our self-awareness cannot be dissociated from our awareness of others, and this is what Sartre elsewhere (most notably in Existentialism Is A Humanism) expands in his idea of 鈥榠ntersubjectivity鈥� (and I鈥檓 actually surprised I didn鈥檛 meet up with this term in this book, as it would have been helpful.)
One of the most important contributions of Sartre鈥檚 philosophy is his proclamation that we choose our lives. Every moment we live is a chosen moment. To live is to realize oneself in situation, inseparable from a physical/social environment that is as real and necessary as our original inheritance of our own bodies. 鈥淭o live this [situation] is to choose myself through it and to choose it through my choice of myself.鈥� It is ours, and no one else鈥檚. No one but us can be blamed. We may want to change things in our lives, but everything that is in our life is material (our 鈥榮ituation鈥� or 鈥榝acticity鈥�) which may be used by us to create something better. We are the architects, and to work with what has been given to us is to, in some sense, accept what has been given to us, which is to accept our self that has been revealed through this situation.
Now, if I may be so bold so as to rephrase another major premise of what I think Sartre is getting at in his writings, it鈥檚 this: we all live 'in story'. At no point are we 鈥榦ut of story鈥�. There is always a beginning and an ending (which posts are constantly being adjusted by ourselves), obstacles in between, joy of progress, and awareness (even if it is indirect awareness, or, what Sartre terms 鈥榥on-positional awareness鈥�) that all this is happening. It鈥檚 not possible to live outside of story. Sartre鈥檚 'projects', or what you and I call stories, determine the meaning of everything we do and say and think, and if we suppose we are able to think or live outside of story, we are simply looking for a way into the next chapter. Sartre thinks that being honest with ourselves about our projects (and our 鈥榦riginal project鈥� as he calls the primary thrust of manifesting our self in the universe) can help us to better adjust to different settings, or situations. Furthermore, we will know how to respond when someone else attempts to foist their stories or religion on us as if we have no right to be creators of our own story; for though we are caught up in 鈥榮tory鈥� together (intersubjectivity), we can鈥檛 coerce each other鈥檚 stories to conform to our own without objectifying the Other.
Oddly enough, though to some it may seem that Sartre is attempting to divest the world of meaning and magic, the opposite is actually true. He is helping us see that meaning is not so far removed from us that we must wait with saintly patience to one day see the veneer of this world peeled back to reveal the 鈥榯ruest truth鈥欌€攖he real meaning of the universe. This is the essential meaning of his duality of finite/infinite: everything we see is a REAL manifestation of the infinite. As a matter of fact, all we do, or say, or see IS the infinite, at least in part. Meaning is HERE, everywhere. And the universe is not one big, impersonal machine that plows blindly ahead without rhyme or reason. He blows mechanamorphism鈥攁n attempt to explain the meaning of the universe in purely mechanistic terms鈥攐ut of the water. 鈥淭he world is human鈥� he states, and nothing is so completely inhuman so as not to be penetrated through and through with our meanings and鈥ersonality. Measurement can鈥檛 even begin in science without human scale and location. 鈥淭he real is realization [by a person].鈥� The real is here. Not a bad place to start.
Well, I loved it all. I loved my ideological gleanings, as well as the challenge of trying to 鈥榖reak my eye open鈥� with complex logic and innovative thought and language. I鈥檓 actually interested in reading more from Sartre, if that says anything. I think he cares about others, I think his ideas are courageous, and I think he helped to topple pedantic and petrified academic philosophy that looked down loftily from the height of detached, anemic ideals onto the world of living, bleeding, thinking folk every bit as 鈥榬eal鈥� and valid as the pale-faced intelligentsia. Sartre affirmed that each of our stories are existential centers of the universe, and we affect each other no matter how seemingly insignificant one feels themselves to be. I hope I never forget what I read. I truly think Sartre鈥檚 ideas are a contribution and advancement to philosophy, and help to iron out some of the wrinkles in the way we think about ourselves and the world. I have a notebook full of 11 pages of quotations and notes from B&N, Barnes introduction to B&N, and Spade鈥檚 course notes available for anyone who may be interested in receiving a copy of them. Chew before swallowing.
This is an abbreviated version of my review of Being And Nothingness. For the complete review, check to see if you inadvertently skipped your meds, get caught up, then visit:
September 20, 2007
dear reader,
character limit!
REVIEW:
where do you even begin?
first of all: the common subtitle "a phenomenological essay on ontology" is incorrectly translated from the french, and should read "an essay on phenomenological ontology."
undoubtedly one of the most significant books of the 20th century, and of modern history itself.
significant ideas:
1. being-in-itself: matter, existence, the world, the chair, the table, the tree. undifferentiated in itself, without essence, naked, stark, overwhelming, forcing itself into every crevice. without consciousness.
2. being-for-itself: conscious. human existence. gives essence to the world, to being-in-itself. also without essence, but allowed to define its own essense. lots more. wants to be god, can't.
3. bad faith: a lack of authenticity, the most central, perhaps only, existential "moral." being what one is not. famous example: the waiter: playing at being a waiter: too friendly, too quick, too eager: all traits he would not have were he to truly be himself. for sartre, action is the only measure of value or worth, and so only opinions or feelings that are acted upon are valid. so if one thinks, "well, i was going to fight for my fellow man's rights, but i didn't have the money" and still holds themself in high regard for at least having a good intent, they are acting in bad faith. no exit is all about this, esp. garcin: he holds himself to be a hero, even though his heroic intentions were thwarted and he was executed. he (and common morality) think that since he had the right intentions, he is still heroic, yet sartre says that he instead is acting in bad faith and is actually a coward. yeah bad faith is really central for sartre, and is a very noble standard of living. one does not make a moral choice in one's head, but with one's actions.
4. the other: fascinating concept, largely if not entirely borrowed from husserl (see: logische Uuntersuchunge and die krisis der europaischen wissenschaften...). subjectivity is central to sartrean existentialism (and almost all other forms). it is our experience of the world. i am the subject, all else is object to me. yet there are other consciousnesses, who are also subjects, and to them, *gasp*, i am the object. the look of the other attempts to objectify my (and to the other, does), while the look of the subject attempts to objectify the other. this creates, in a word, tension. this is another great example of how what begins as a phenomenological discover bleeds into already obvious conclusions elsewhere: psychology, sociology, romance, even theology (wanting to be ultimate subject). we try to import others into our subjective value system, and are terrified (well, 99.9% of people are just in denial (bad faith)) that others are importing us into their subjective value system.
yep. that's it i guess. sartre went on to write the critique of dialectical reason, which reconciles (very poorly, actually, it fails) the ontological system developed here with marxism.
more importantly, sartre, as promised at the end of being and nothingness, went on to attempt to develop an ethical system, or at least explore the ethical implications of the system developed here. the result of this is perhaps one of the most underrated works of philosophy: two notebooks in which he tries to work out a system of ethics. he never finished - it's been argued, for obvious reasons, that an ethics of his existentialism is impossible - and these notebooks weren't published until after his death.
VERDICT:
you're reading a review of "being and nothingness." seriously.
character limit!
REVIEW:
where do you even begin?
first of all: the common subtitle "a phenomenological essay on ontology" is incorrectly translated from the french, and should read "an essay on phenomenological ontology."
undoubtedly one of the most significant books of the 20th century, and of modern history itself.
significant ideas:
1. being-in-itself: matter, existence, the world, the chair, the table, the tree. undifferentiated in itself, without essence, naked, stark, overwhelming, forcing itself into every crevice. without consciousness.
2. being-for-itself: conscious. human existence. gives essence to the world, to being-in-itself. also without essence, but allowed to define its own essense. lots more. wants to be god, can't.
3. bad faith: a lack of authenticity, the most central, perhaps only, existential "moral." being what one is not. famous example: the waiter: playing at being a waiter: too friendly, too quick, too eager: all traits he would not have were he to truly be himself. for sartre, action is the only measure of value or worth, and so only opinions or feelings that are acted upon are valid. so if one thinks, "well, i was going to fight for my fellow man's rights, but i didn't have the money" and still holds themself in high regard for at least having a good intent, they are acting in bad faith. no exit is all about this, esp. garcin: he holds himself to be a hero, even though his heroic intentions were thwarted and he was executed. he (and common morality) think that since he had the right intentions, he is still heroic, yet sartre says that he instead is acting in bad faith and is actually a coward. yeah bad faith is really central for sartre, and is a very noble standard of living. one does not make a moral choice in one's head, but with one's actions.
4. the other: fascinating concept, largely if not entirely borrowed from husserl (see: logische Uuntersuchunge and die krisis der europaischen wissenschaften...). subjectivity is central to sartrean existentialism (and almost all other forms). it is our experience of the world. i am the subject, all else is object to me. yet there are other consciousnesses, who are also subjects, and to them, *gasp*, i am the object. the look of the other attempts to objectify my (and to the other, does), while the look of the subject attempts to objectify the other. this creates, in a word, tension. this is another great example of how what begins as a phenomenological discover bleeds into already obvious conclusions elsewhere: psychology, sociology, romance, even theology (wanting to be ultimate subject). we try to import others into our subjective value system, and are terrified (well, 99.9% of people are just in denial (bad faith)) that others are importing us into their subjective value system.
yep. that's it i guess. sartre went on to write the critique of dialectical reason, which reconciles (very poorly, actually, it fails) the ontological system developed here with marxism.
more importantly, sartre, as promised at the end of being and nothingness, went on to attempt to develop an ethical system, or at least explore the ethical implications of the system developed here. the result of this is perhaps one of the most underrated works of philosophy: two notebooks in which he tries to work out a system of ethics. he never finished - it's been argued, for obvious reasons, that an ethics of his existentialism is impossible - and these notebooks weren't published until after his death.
VERDICT:
you're reading a review of "being and nothingness." seriously.
February 19, 2016
(Update Jan. 2015) I am beginning 2015 by rereading one of my all time favorite books for the 15th time, this time in the original language. It is about time.
When I say read it in the original language it is more like a first- or third-grader sort of doping out a newspaper article that is too advanced for him. I know some of the words. I know the English translation so well that I have a good Idea of what is passing before my eyes. But it isn't really reading in the usual sense.
I am studying French for the second time. The first time was a disaster. I don't know what to say. Right now I am making progress. I thought it would be good to read a couple of pages per day as a form of immersion as part of the process. And in the end, the primary reason I am studying French is because I want to be able to read the book in its original language.
I have been through this before. It is about like 30 years ago when I reread the book all of those times in English. Sometimes it really was just the words passing over my eyes. But I would understand a little and then a little more until I came to be able to read it like any other book. So, I am optimistic. My goal is to have gotten through the French course by the end of the first week in September. My expectation is that I will pick up more and more as I learn more about the language and maybe have the reading comprehension of a 4th or 5th grader by the end of the calendar year.
--------------
I picked up this book in the summer of 1985. Over the next three years I read and reread it seven times. Once I realized it was going to be a multiple reading event I started varying my approach with each pass by dividing the book up into chunks and reading them in different orders. During my sixth run-through I did it backwards. I started with the last page of the book and read each page until I got to the title page. After that, I really had the content down and during the seventh I was able to comprehend everything like I would any other book during the first read through.
Why would a 21 to 24 year-old be motivated to do such a thing? Because it intrigued me. During each reread I picked up a little more. I liked what I saw, and during each pass I held more of the over-all picture in my mind. What he wrote was and is important to me. Because in the end, I believe Sartre was right more often than not.
He characterized us with the phrase "Man is the being who is what he is not and is not what he is." I think the way he worked that out in theme after theme explains a lot about what humans are, our behavior, and the reason we do the things we do. The last major section is easy to read. It outlines a new psychology based upon his phenomenological existentialism. I have always wished I could find such a thing.
In the decades since, I have returned to the book when my inner compulsion reaches a tipping point. I believe the last time was within the last two or three years. It will probably always be my number one favorite book.
When I say read it in the original language it is more like a first- or third-grader sort of doping out a newspaper article that is too advanced for him. I know some of the words. I know the English translation so well that I have a good Idea of what is passing before my eyes. But it isn't really reading in the usual sense.
I am studying French for the second time. The first time was a disaster. I don't know what to say. Right now I am making progress. I thought it would be good to read a couple of pages per day as a form of immersion as part of the process. And in the end, the primary reason I am studying French is because I want to be able to read the book in its original language.
I have been through this before. It is about like 30 years ago when I reread the book all of those times in English. Sometimes it really was just the words passing over my eyes. But I would understand a little and then a little more until I came to be able to read it like any other book. So, I am optimistic. My goal is to have gotten through the French course by the end of the first week in September. My expectation is that I will pick up more and more as I learn more about the language and maybe have the reading comprehension of a 4th or 5th grader by the end of the calendar year.
--------------
I picked up this book in the summer of 1985. Over the next three years I read and reread it seven times. Once I realized it was going to be a multiple reading event I started varying my approach with each pass by dividing the book up into chunks and reading them in different orders. During my sixth run-through I did it backwards. I started with the last page of the book and read each page until I got to the title page. After that, I really had the content down and during the seventh I was able to comprehend everything like I would any other book during the first read through.
Why would a 21 to 24 year-old be motivated to do such a thing? Because it intrigued me. During each reread I picked up a little more. I liked what I saw, and during each pass I held more of the over-all picture in my mind. What he wrote was and is important to me. Because in the end, I believe Sartre was right more often than not.
He characterized us with the phrase "Man is the being who is what he is not and is not what he is." I think the way he worked that out in theme after theme explains a lot about what humans are, our behavior, and the reason we do the things we do. The last major section is easy to read. It outlines a new psychology based upon his phenomenological existentialism. I have always wished I could find such a thing.
In the decades since, I have returned to the book when my inner compulsion reaches a tipping point. I believe the last time was within the last two or three years. It will probably always be my number one favorite book.
June 24, 2012
Well, really, Being and Nothingness is a literary tract disguised as philosophy. The many metaphors he uses to illustrate his points are not philosophical in nature, but imagistic and suggestive. There is a certain wholeness to the book, but it reminds me more of Ulysses than Heidegger. The one real philosophical idea is that of Bad Faith, which is just his super super ego working overtime. Although an important landmark for 20th century literature, it is an unpleasant book to read, and the pain is not worth the insular, faux insights. He tries to create a philosophical no exit, but it really is more of an imagistic cul de sac.
August 8, 2008
You have to deal with existentialism at some point and this book essentially gives you one of the best starts on the subject. Some people think that you'll feel like killing yourself after reading Sartre but honestly, this book had the opposite effect on me. I took it more as if Sartre was telling me that human life still has value even if there's no point in having a life.
Read it and you'll see what I mean. It takes a while to plow through it but it's worth the wait. Even before fully reading it, you'll be blabbing about the transcendence of consciousness to all your friends. . .
Read it and you'll see what I mean. It takes a while to plow through it but it's worth the wait. Even before fully reading it, you'll be blabbing about the transcendence of consciousness to all your friends. . .
February 12, 2021
Testo indubbiamente denso e complesso, sul quale certamente torner貌 in futuro. Una vera e propria "bibbia" del movimento filosofico esistenzialista. L'esistenza umana, la sua divisione tra per s茅 cosciente e in s茅 incosciente, la vita intesa come progetto libero e possibile, la capacit脿 propria dell'uomo di nullificare il mondo circostante per attribuirvi un proprio significato, il concetto di responsabilit脿 sono solo alcuni dei grandi temi che il celebre filosofo francese sviluppa con incredibile lucidit脿 in quest'opera, sino a condurci quasi a dubitar delle nostre pi霉 salde certezze.
October 19, 2021
Sartre's a pretty terrible writer. This is a 900 page book, but its substantial points could be explained and defended in full detail in probably no more than 100 pages. Sartre likes repeating his points again and again, and rarely in the form of illuminating or helpful examples; there are a few such examples which have made it into the popular literature (Pierre in the cafe, the voyeur at the keyhole), but these are few and in between. Fortunately, the substantial parts of the book are very good and well-argued for; this is the only reason why I'm not giving this a lower rating. Let me summarize what I take to be the substantial parts below.
Sartre grounds freedom in the fact that there are two fundamentally distinct aspects of conscious experience. He calls these positional consciousness and non-positional consciousness. Positional consciousness refers to our awareness of the intentional objects of experience. When we look upon the world, think about an idea, or introspect on a past experience, we become aware of the objects around us, the thought, and the past experience鈥攖he presentation of each of these intentional objects to our awareness in each of these experiences constitutes the positional consciousness of these experiences.
Non-positional consciousness refers to our awareness of ourselves as subjects having experiences, or encountering the contents of positional consciousness. Whether I am looking upon the world, thinking about an idea, or introspecting on a past experience, I am aware that this experience is had by me. If non-positional consciousness didn鈥檛 exist, the contents of my experience would show up to me as standing as absolute reality itself, as non-negotiable facts, given that there is no subject that these contents are conditioned by. The way by which my being is presented to myself in non-positional consciousness is very different from the way by which that intentional objects are presented in positional consciousness. It is neither that my embodied person shows up in my perceptual field alongside the other objects of experience; nor that a thought about myself accompanies every experience. Sartre doesn鈥檛 seem to explicitly characterize the phenomenology of this way by which my being shows up to me; but he details the causal consequences of this fact, or what this awareness allows us to do, which I will explain below.
According to Sartre, every conscious experience necessarily involves both positional and non-positional consciousness. I cannot have an experience without being aware of myself as the subject of that experience. This fact makes our freedom possible. On Sartre鈥檚 metaphysics, every object as we experience it is necessarily non-identical to the object as it stands independently of our experience of it; and our non-positional consciousness enables us to be aware of this fact when we apprehend objects of positional consciousness. Every object as we positionally experience it is, rather, is partial, incomplete, and dependent on our subjectivity that partially constitutes it. Objects show up as manifesting values and significances, for example, and these depend on our projects and commitments.
In contrast, the sense of self which is presented in non-positional consciousness is not incomplete in this same way. Sartre seems to presuppose that the exact way the self is presented in this consciousness does not reveal the self in any determinate form; for example, the self as we experience it non-positionally does not possess characteristics like being shy or warm-hearted. Sartre identifies this self with nothingness; it metaphysically lacks any determinate or essential characteristics, unlike the objects of positional consciousness. (Sartre may also get to this conclusion with committing to that, phenomenologically, the self presented in non-positional consciousness possesses determinate characteristics; he could add the premise that this self as presented is non-identical to the self as it stands independently of our experiencing it, and then argue that the latter is metaphysically indeterminate, and we can be aware of that fact while encountering a determinate sense of self in non-positional consciousness. I am not familiar enough with the text and secondary literature to know with certainty which of these positions Sartre takes).
Sartre ascribes to the self of non-positional consciousness the power to negotiate with any object of positional consciousness. In other words, we are always and necessarily able to remove the significance that a particular object possesses in our experience and replace it with new significance. Even emotions do not necessarily possess that which we typically take to be their essential significances. We typically think that is we are in a blind rage, this rage makes us act aggressively or violently, and lose any desire to care or protect the creature that instigated our rage. Sartre would argue that such rage does not necessarily have this significance for us. We can choose its significance. We could choose that this rage won鈥檛 lead to our aggression; perhaps we choose that is rather a purely physiological state, just as feeling warm and cold are purely physiological states. Without the significance of indicating our compulsion towards violence, the feeling of rage may be compatible with our standing still peacefully.
What is the relationship between the fact that the self is nothingness with this power that this self possesses? What about the self being nothingness could enable it to possess this power of transforming any significance in the world, or conversely, what about the self possessing this power would make it ontologically consist in nothingness? My understanding is that if the self didn鈥檛 possess any essential or determinate characteristics, and so is nothingness, it could temporarily adopt any indeterminate and non-essential dispositions, values, or other kinds of 鈥渕ental鈥� characteristics. These mental characteristics, in turn, would make possible new significances that objects of positional consciousness may manifest. The significance of an object depends on a prior mental characteristic, such as a disposition or value. For example, the disposition to use spoons to eat soup may lead to the perception of a bowl of soup served without a spoon on the side to manifest the significance of a missing spoon, so that one gets up to look for a spoon.
The idea that we are nothingness amounts to that we are constantly changing and recreating ourselves, whether this recreation is the renewal of a previously temporary characteristic, or is the rejection of one and the adaption of a new temporary characteristic. These changes in the self correspond with changes in the significances of objects of experience; so we may constantly free ourselves from previous meanings, and the emotions, thoughts, or behaviors those encourage. Moreover, such changes could happen in any direction whatsoever; there are no previous experiences or causal conditions that determine the directions into which we change.
I think one could get away with reading only the chapters "The origin of negation," "Bad faith," and "Being and doing" and grasp all that's substantial about this book. All the other chapters seem to involve Sartre just going through the same exercise of showing how some traditional philosophical phenomenon in fact may be reduced to or is adequately explained by his view on freedom.
Sartre grounds freedom in the fact that there are two fundamentally distinct aspects of conscious experience. He calls these positional consciousness and non-positional consciousness. Positional consciousness refers to our awareness of the intentional objects of experience. When we look upon the world, think about an idea, or introspect on a past experience, we become aware of the objects around us, the thought, and the past experience鈥攖he presentation of each of these intentional objects to our awareness in each of these experiences constitutes the positional consciousness of these experiences.
Non-positional consciousness refers to our awareness of ourselves as subjects having experiences, or encountering the contents of positional consciousness. Whether I am looking upon the world, thinking about an idea, or introspecting on a past experience, I am aware that this experience is had by me. If non-positional consciousness didn鈥檛 exist, the contents of my experience would show up to me as standing as absolute reality itself, as non-negotiable facts, given that there is no subject that these contents are conditioned by. The way by which my being is presented to myself in non-positional consciousness is very different from the way by which that intentional objects are presented in positional consciousness. It is neither that my embodied person shows up in my perceptual field alongside the other objects of experience; nor that a thought about myself accompanies every experience. Sartre doesn鈥檛 seem to explicitly characterize the phenomenology of this way by which my being shows up to me; but he details the causal consequences of this fact, or what this awareness allows us to do, which I will explain below.
According to Sartre, every conscious experience necessarily involves both positional and non-positional consciousness. I cannot have an experience without being aware of myself as the subject of that experience. This fact makes our freedom possible. On Sartre鈥檚 metaphysics, every object as we experience it is necessarily non-identical to the object as it stands independently of our experience of it; and our non-positional consciousness enables us to be aware of this fact when we apprehend objects of positional consciousness. Every object as we positionally experience it is, rather, is partial, incomplete, and dependent on our subjectivity that partially constitutes it. Objects show up as manifesting values and significances, for example, and these depend on our projects and commitments.
In contrast, the sense of self which is presented in non-positional consciousness is not incomplete in this same way. Sartre seems to presuppose that the exact way the self is presented in this consciousness does not reveal the self in any determinate form; for example, the self as we experience it non-positionally does not possess characteristics like being shy or warm-hearted. Sartre identifies this self with nothingness; it metaphysically lacks any determinate or essential characteristics, unlike the objects of positional consciousness. (Sartre may also get to this conclusion with committing to that, phenomenologically, the self presented in non-positional consciousness possesses determinate characteristics; he could add the premise that this self as presented is non-identical to the self as it stands independently of our experiencing it, and then argue that the latter is metaphysically indeterminate, and we can be aware of that fact while encountering a determinate sense of self in non-positional consciousness. I am not familiar enough with the text and secondary literature to know with certainty which of these positions Sartre takes).
Sartre ascribes to the self of non-positional consciousness the power to negotiate with any object of positional consciousness. In other words, we are always and necessarily able to remove the significance that a particular object possesses in our experience and replace it with new significance. Even emotions do not necessarily possess that which we typically take to be their essential significances. We typically think that is we are in a blind rage, this rage makes us act aggressively or violently, and lose any desire to care or protect the creature that instigated our rage. Sartre would argue that such rage does not necessarily have this significance for us. We can choose its significance. We could choose that this rage won鈥檛 lead to our aggression; perhaps we choose that is rather a purely physiological state, just as feeling warm and cold are purely physiological states. Without the significance of indicating our compulsion towards violence, the feeling of rage may be compatible with our standing still peacefully.
What is the relationship between the fact that the self is nothingness with this power that this self possesses? What about the self being nothingness could enable it to possess this power of transforming any significance in the world, or conversely, what about the self possessing this power would make it ontologically consist in nothingness? My understanding is that if the self didn鈥檛 possess any essential or determinate characteristics, and so is nothingness, it could temporarily adopt any indeterminate and non-essential dispositions, values, or other kinds of 鈥渕ental鈥� characteristics. These mental characteristics, in turn, would make possible new significances that objects of positional consciousness may manifest. The significance of an object depends on a prior mental characteristic, such as a disposition or value. For example, the disposition to use spoons to eat soup may lead to the perception of a bowl of soup served without a spoon on the side to manifest the significance of a missing spoon, so that one gets up to look for a spoon.
The idea that we are nothingness amounts to that we are constantly changing and recreating ourselves, whether this recreation is the renewal of a previously temporary characteristic, or is the rejection of one and the adaption of a new temporary characteristic. These changes in the self correspond with changes in the significances of objects of experience; so we may constantly free ourselves from previous meanings, and the emotions, thoughts, or behaviors those encourage. Moreover, such changes could happen in any direction whatsoever; there are no previous experiences or causal conditions that determine the directions into which we change.
I think one could get away with reading only the chapters "The origin of negation," "Bad faith," and "Being and doing" and grasp all that's substantial about this book. All the other chapters seem to involve Sartre just going through the same exercise of showing how some traditional philosophical phenomenon in fact may be reduced to or is adequately explained by his view on freedom.
March 2, 2022
201122: i had thought to read this again before writing about it, as it has been years (decades...) since i first read this as an eager twenty three year-old. i do have a new copy. but there are other books to read and my interests in philosophy have moved from sartre through heidegger through merleau-ponty etc... so much of sartrean existentialism is now embedded i am unsure what came from this book. i can certainly agree bergson is easier to read. it is a long, long, intricate essay that resists review so i will simply recall how it affected me then...
and as this was my first serious philosophy text i was blown away. only in recognition of all the later philosophy i read, much that critiques this, is this four and not five. i had read some of the introduction, thought i understood, embarked on the rest. without any guidance, any net, any idea. it was great: here was a philosophy that i could agree with, that promised absolute responsibility and freedom, that suggested it was all down to me how i would live authentically in the world. i loved that it had nothing to do with science. i loved that the mind was focus. i could grasp everything from bad faith to authenticity to the gaze of the other. mostly i was intoxicated with the idea of freedom. i was young. i have only over the years (decades...) learned to respect that 鈥榮ituation鈥� which so affects freedom...
i have read that the ideal form for continental philosophy is a novel: well that is what this is. i found it absorbing as narrative perhaps because i was not reading it as 鈥榩hilosophy鈥� and trying to parse, argue, affirm ideas he presents in vignettes such as the girl who 鈥榝orgets鈥� her hand when approached, the eye looking through a keyhole seen in turn, and of course that waiter who decides he is no more than 鈥榳aiter鈥�... i have heard it seen as heidegger鈥檚 being and time simplified, but what i have read of that is far from a novel...
and then there is the total 鈥榗ultural鈥� effect of existentialism which is difficult to separate from this book. sometimes i wish i had started with merleau-ponty in philosophy but i might not have persisted, and certainly by now i have read a lot of various phenomenonologists and philosophy in general, and as mentioned sartre is often reasonably critiqued. the ambition he had, from the history of european philosophy, still impresses me. and from what i read, he did follow his convictions, including his relationship with de beauvoir...
i do not know if i actually want to read it again: it might break the spell of pleasant memories, aside from reminding me of my age. if there is a major, significant philosophy text you want to read to understand much of the 20th century, this is it... ah, to be young and eager again!
more
and as this was my first serious philosophy text i was blown away. only in recognition of all the later philosophy i read, much that critiques this, is this four and not five. i had read some of the introduction, thought i understood, embarked on the rest. without any guidance, any net, any idea. it was great: here was a philosophy that i could agree with, that promised absolute responsibility and freedom, that suggested it was all down to me how i would live authentically in the world. i loved that it had nothing to do with science. i loved that the mind was focus. i could grasp everything from bad faith to authenticity to the gaze of the other. mostly i was intoxicated with the idea of freedom. i was young. i have only over the years (decades...) learned to respect that 鈥榮ituation鈥� which so affects freedom...
i have read that the ideal form for continental philosophy is a novel: well that is what this is. i found it absorbing as narrative perhaps because i was not reading it as 鈥榩hilosophy鈥� and trying to parse, argue, affirm ideas he presents in vignettes such as the girl who 鈥榝orgets鈥� her hand when approached, the eye looking through a keyhole seen in turn, and of course that waiter who decides he is no more than 鈥榳aiter鈥�... i have heard it seen as heidegger鈥檚 being and time simplified, but what i have read of that is far from a novel...
and then there is the total 鈥榗ultural鈥� effect of existentialism which is difficult to separate from this book. sometimes i wish i had started with merleau-ponty in philosophy but i might not have persisted, and certainly by now i have read a lot of various phenomenonologists and philosophy in general, and as mentioned sartre is often reasonably critiqued. the ambition he had, from the history of european philosophy, still impresses me. and from what i read, he did follow his convictions, including his relationship with de beauvoir...
i do not know if i actually want to read it again: it might break the spell of pleasant memories, aside from reminding me of my age. if there is a major, significant philosophy text you want to read to understand much of the 20th century, this is it... ah, to be young and eager again!
more
December 12, 2019
銆娢の� 蟽蟿喂纬渭萎 蟿慰蠀 尾位苇渭渭伪蟿慰蟼 蟿慰蠀 维位位慰蠀 魏伪蟿伪谓慰蠋 蟺蠅蟼 慰 蔚伪蠀蟿蠈蟼 渭慰蠀 蔚委谓伪喂 慰蟻伪蟿蠈蟼 魏伪喂 蟿慰 谓伪 魏伪蟿伪谓慰蠋 蟿慰谓 蔚伪蠀蟿蠈 渭慰蠀 蟺蠅蟼 蔚委谓伪喂 慰蟻伪蟿蠈蟼 蔚委谓伪喂, 蟽蟿畏谓 蟺蟻伪纬渭伪蟿喂魏蠈蟿畏蟿伪, 蟿慰 谓伪 魏伪蟿伪谓慰蠋 蟿慰 蠈蟿喂 蠁伪委谓慰渭伪喂 蟽蟿慰谓 魏蠈蟽渭慰.銆�
August 4, 2017
Instead of reading this book I would strongly suggest watching the "No Exit" with Harold Pinter available on youtube written by Sartre. It illustrates a large part of his philosophy of the Other, the Look and the self. And, you'll get a hint on why Sartre doesn't work today. In addition, my favorite phrase ever and the one that I make as my own comes from that play "l'enfer c'est les autres" (hell, is others), and my second favorite is "vous ete mon bourreau" (you are my torturer).
I think the three ugliest words in the English Language are "be a man" (or equivalent statements such as don't be a sissy, act like a man, you're weak, be tough, stop being a woman, and so on). Books likes these are what allows that kind of thinking to take place. Matter of fact, he uses that framing in one of his examples about being too tired to climb a hill and the fear of "being a sissy" is what motivates him to keep hiking. Yes, I realized it was just an example he uses but he really goes to pains to defend it. (Even in today's New York Times (February 6, 2016), I saw a story on how China thinks they need more men teachers because the male students are "timid, self centered and weak" like girls and need to be taught to be men. I'm not making this up. That kind of thinking just permeates even today).
This book is completely passe today. Time has past it by. I'm so glad the 1950s through the 80s are behind us. This book's popularity during that time period is clearly because the way it tied itself to the various schools of psychoanalysis (Gestalt, Adler, experimental psychoanalysis, and even Freudian but with twists) and they could use Sartre's argument to re-enforce their psychoanalytical paradigms. Sartre ends the book by trying to change the paradigm slightly to what he calls "existentialism psychoanalysis". I don't think it ever caught on.
He tweaks the Freudian approach of where behavior is explained by "libido and will to power" to a paradigm that considers the 'choice of being' from the freedom the individual posseses acting for the project (the future). In my opinion, all he is doing is saying instead of blaming the mother (or father), he's going to blame the person (victim). He never really gets the fact that the mind and body are different and some of our behavior is caused by our genetics (being born that way). He's really falling further down the rabbit hole and wants to blame the victim for lacking culture, community and the proper values. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (and other such techniques) and effective drugs came along in the 80s and started making a difference because they were so much more effective than "talking therapy".
His real fundamental error about seeing the world is along the lines of when he says "Pierre is not a waiter he is only acting as a waiter' and "there is no such thing as homosexuals, there are just homosexual acts".
The author really has a warped view about love with his concept of possessing and possessed and domination, and appropriation (taking). He thinks other people take away from our freedom by existing, we are always becoming, and our choices are always are own (you choose to be homosexual, or neurodiverse, or OCD, or any behavior you have). The only thing we are not free to be is not free.
Even with all my negativism expressed above, I can still recommend this book. It only cost me $2.05 and credit at my favorite used book store and I'll get credit when I most certainly return it. It's a perfect example on how we got off track as a society, but managed to move past woo from books like this one. The author is not hard to follow. (He's not really a philosopher in my opinion). Never trust other peoples opinions about someones philosophy until you've read it yourself.
I think the three ugliest words in the English Language are "be a man" (or equivalent statements such as don't be a sissy, act like a man, you're weak, be tough, stop being a woman, and so on). Books likes these are what allows that kind of thinking to take place. Matter of fact, he uses that framing in one of his examples about being too tired to climb a hill and the fear of "being a sissy" is what motivates him to keep hiking. Yes, I realized it was just an example he uses but he really goes to pains to defend it. (Even in today's New York Times (February 6, 2016), I saw a story on how China thinks they need more men teachers because the male students are "timid, self centered and weak" like girls and need to be taught to be men. I'm not making this up. That kind of thinking just permeates even today).
This book is completely passe today. Time has past it by. I'm so glad the 1950s through the 80s are behind us. This book's popularity during that time period is clearly because the way it tied itself to the various schools of psychoanalysis (Gestalt, Adler, experimental psychoanalysis, and even Freudian but with twists) and they could use Sartre's argument to re-enforce their psychoanalytical paradigms. Sartre ends the book by trying to change the paradigm slightly to what he calls "existentialism psychoanalysis". I don't think it ever caught on.
He tweaks the Freudian approach of where behavior is explained by "libido and will to power" to a paradigm that considers the 'choice of being' from the freedom the individual posseses acting for the project (the future). In my opinion, all he is doing is saying instead of blaming the mother (or father), he's going to blame the person (victim). He never really gets the fact that the mind and body are different and some of our behavior is caused by our genetics (being born that way). He's really falling further down the rabbit hole and wants to blame the victim for lacking culture, community and the proper values. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (and other such techniques) and effective drugs came along in the 80s and started making a difference because they were so much more effective than "talking therapy".
His real fundamental error about seeing the world is along the lines of when he says "Pierre is not a waiter he is only acting as a waiter' and "there is no such thing as homosexuals, there are just homosexual acts".
The author really has a warped view about love with his concept of possessing and possessed and domination, and appropriation (taking). He thinks other people take away from our freedom by existing, we are always becoming, and our choices are always are own (you choose to be homosexual, or neurodiverse, or OCD, or any behavior you have). The only thing we are not free to be is not free.
Even with all my negativism expressed above, I can still recommend this book. It only cost me $2.05 and credit at my favorite used book store and I'll get credit when I most certainly return it. It's a perfect example on how we got off track as a society, but managed to move past woo from books like this one. The author is not hard to follow. (He's not really a philosopher in my opinion). Never trust other peoples opinions about someones philosophy until you've read it yourself.
February 12, 2017
I honestly believe that not even Sartre could explain some of these passages. In other words, I think they are pure nonsense. But he has written a complete philosophical system, such as it is, and that is worthy of reading. Just keep in mind the extreme difficulty. I would recommend reading his novel Nausea. It's far more interesting. But I give this five stars because it is in parts quite brilliant. And it is a necessary for any amateur philosopher.
"The reality of that cup is that it is there and that it is not me." That's always a key point in Sartre. I'm here and all of you and everything else is out there. It kind of makes me a bit different. How do I make anything out of all that stuff out there?
The idea of "appearance." "There arises a legitimate problem concerning the being of this appearing." When we look at anything that appears before us, how do we know of its actual being? "Absence" can also determine being. When something is no longer there, we notice that it is missing. This, of course, also applies to missing people. Or as in Bishop Berkeley's great motto: "Esse est percipi." To be is to be perceived.
"All consciousness is consciousness of something."
"Nevertheless the primary characteristic of the being of an existent is never to reveal itself completely to consciousness."
The idea of "creationism" allowed people "to suppose that God had given being to the world, being always appeared tainted with a certain passivity. But a creation ex nihilo can not explain the coming to pass of being . . . " But being does not create itself. Being is itself.
With nothingness, "it is necessary to recognize that destruction is essentially a human thing . . . "
Sartre has "an appointment with Pierre at four o'clock." But Pierre is not there. "The cafe is a fullness of being." But no Pierre. I guess I would say that Pierre has entered into nothingness. Hegel says about being and nothingness that "the one is as empty as the other." But "he forgets that emptiness is emptiness of something. Being is empty of all other determination than identity with itself, but non-being is empty of being. In a word, we must recall here against Hegel that being is and nothingness is not."
"Nothingness haunts being. . . . Non-being exists only on the surface of being."
Heidegger uses the famous expression: "Das Nichts nichtet." Or "Nothing nothings."
"Dasein manages to realize the contingency of the world; that is, to raise the question, 'How does it happen that there is something rather than nothing?'"
"Nothingness [surrounds] being on every side and at the same time [is] expelled from being."
Heidegger: "human reality" is "remote from itself."
Sartre: "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being--like a worm." Compare William Blake poem about the rose.
"Where does nothingness come from? . . . Nothingness is not, Nothingness 'is made-to-be,' Nothingness does not nihilate itself; Nothingness is 'nihilated.' . . . Man presents himself . . . as a being who causes Nothingness to arise in the world, inasmuch as he himself is affected with non-being to this end."
"What is human freedom if through it nothingness comes into the world?"
Kierkegaard describes anguish in the face of freedom. Heidegger instead considers anguish as apprehension in the face of nothingness. One implies the other.
Artillery preparation invokes fear in a soldier, but anguish is born when he asks himself if will be able to "hold up." And "a new recruit can be afraid of being afraid."
When our alarm clock rings, "it is I who confer on the alarm clock its exigency--I and I alone."
"In anguish I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself."
Sartre criticizes determinists--of which I am one--because it reduces us to "never being anything but what we are, it reintroduces in us the absolute positivity of being-in-itself and thereby reinstates us as the heart of being."
"Bad faith" is a lying to oneself. It can be a degree of good faith to be aware of bad faith. How can I be true to myself when there is no such thing as "self"?
Now Sartre does give an example of a homosexual getting over feelings of guilt. I can understand that point he makes there.
"I posit my freedom in respect to it; my future is virgin; everything is allowed to me."
Really? Everything? Sounds like one of those self-help gurus. If you haven't made it out of poverty, then it's your fault. Bullshit. Sartre seems to me to be ignoring heredity, environment, and chance. He seems to be talking as a nice and comfortable middle-class Frenchman. Bully for him. Not everyone has his advantages.
"In the final analysis the goal of sincerity and the goal of bad faith are not so different." Sounds like a contradiction to me. He appears to mean it as a paradox. Both are denials of who you are.
"Every belief is a belief that falls short; one never wholly believes what one believes."
"One does not find, one does not disclose nothingness in the manner in which one can find, disclose being. Nothingness is always an elsewhere."
"Thus nothingness is this hole in being."
"In fact since possibility precedes existence, it can be possibility only with respect to our thought."
"Desire is a lack of being."
"To borrow Heidegger's definition, the world is 'that in terms of which human reality makes known to itself what it is.'"
"Once and for all we must raise the question: what is the being of a past being?"
"The past is not nothing; neither is it the present; but at its very source it is bound to a certain present and a certain future, to both of which it belongs."
Andre Malraux: "The terrible thing about Death is that it transforms life into Destiny."
"Today I alone am responsible for the being of the dead Pierre, I in my freedom. Those dead who have not been able to be saved and transported to the boundaries of the concrete past of a survivor are not past; they along with their pasts are annihilated."
"In this sense the Cartesian cogito ought to be formulated rather: 'I think; therefore I was.'"
"Once we have confined the Present to the Present, it is evident that we will never get out of it. It would be of no use to describe the Present as 'pregnant with the future.'"
"Our body has for its peculiar characteristic the fact that it is essentially that which is known by the Other."
". . . through the world I make known to myself what I am." Which is it then: We create the world, or does the world create us? Or both?
"The Look." How the Other looks at me, defines me. I can be ashamed in front of the Other. I can be elated. Maybe we all need the Look to be one that makes us feel--what?--optimistic? positive? The Other can make "all my schemes collapse."
". . . my body is constituted exactly like all those which have been shown to me on the dissection table or of which I have seen colored drawings in books. . . . My body as it is for me does not appear to me in the midst of the world. . . . it was much more my property than my being. . . . I am the other in relation to my eye. . . . I cannot 'see the seeing' . . . Similarly I see my hand touching objects, but I do not know it in its act of touching them."
". . . then we must of necessity admit that paradox of a physical instrument handled by a soul, which, as we know, causes us to fall into inextricable aporias."
"The Other looks at me and as such he holds the secret of my being, he knows what I am. Thus the profound meaning of my being is outside of me, imprisoned in an absence. The Other has the advantage over me. . . . I can turn my back upon the Other so as to make an object out of him in turn . . . ."
"Everything which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me."
"Thus to want to be loved is to invest the Other with one's own facticity . . . "
"Heidegger is right in declaring that I am what I say."
"Without the Other I apprehend fully and nakedly this terrible necessity of being free which is my lot; that is, the fact that I can not put the responsibility for making-myself-be off to anyone but myself even though I have not chosen to be and although I have been born."
"The Other is on principle inapprehensible; he flees me when I seek him and possesses me when I flee him."
"It is before the Other that I am guilty. I am guilty first when beneath the Other's look I experience my alienation and my nakedness as a fall from grace which I must assume. This is the meaning of the famous line from Scripture: 'They knew that they were naked.'"
"This petrifaction in in-itself by the Other's look is the profound meaning of the myth of Medusa."
"Having, doing, and being are the cardinal categories of human reality." Denis de Rougemont said of Don Juan: "He was not capable of having."
". . . to act is to modify the shape of the world . . . . We should observe first that an action is intentional." But we cannot foresee all of its consequences.
"Existence precedes and commands essence." The main principle of existentialism.
"I am condemned to be free."
"Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all."
"Only two solutions are possible: either man is wholly determined . . . or he is wholly free." There is just too much scientific evidence for me to go with Sartre on the free side, so if I have to choose, I go with wholly determined.
"The reality of that cup is that it is there and that it is not me." That's always a key point in Sartre. I'm here and all of you and everything else is out there. It kind of makes me a bit different. How do I make anything out of all that stuff out there?
The idea of "appearance." "There arises a legitimate problem concerning the being of this appearing." When we look at anything that appears before us, how do we know of its actual being? "Absence" can also determine being. When something is no longer there, we notice that it is missing. This, of course, also applies to missing people. Or as in Bishop Berkeley's great motto: "Esse est percipi." To be is to be perceived.
"All consciousness is consciousness of something."
"Nevertheless the primary characteristic of the being of an existent is never to reveal itself completely to consciousness."
The idea of "creationism" allowed people "to suppose that God had given being to the world, being always appeared tainted with a certain passivity. But a creation ex nihilo can not explain the coming to pass of being . . . " But being does not create itself. Being is itself.
With nothingness, "it is necessary to recognize that destruction is essentially a human thing . . . "
Sartre has "an appointment with Pierre at four o'clock." But Pierre is not there. "The cafe is a fullness of being." But no Pierre. I guess I would say that Pierre has entered into nothingness. Hegel says about being and nothingness that "the one is as empty as the other." But "he forgets that emptiness is emptiness of something. Being is empty of all other determination than identity with itself, but non-being is empty of being. In a word, we must recall here against Hegel that being is and nothingness is not."
"Nothingness haunts being. . . . Non-being exists only on the surface of being."
Heidegger uses the famous expression: "Das Nichts nichtet." Or "Nothing nothings."
"Dasein manages to realize the contingency of the world; that is, to raise the question, 'How does it happen that there is something rather than nothing?'"
"Nothingness [surrounds] being on every side and at the same time [is] expelled from being."
Heidegger: "human reality" is "remote from itself."
Sartre: "Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being--like a worm." Compare William Blake poem about the rose.
"Where does nothingness come from? . . . Nothingness is not, Nothingness 'is made-to-be,' Nothingness does not nihilate itself; Nothingness is 'nihilated.' . . . Man presents himself . . . as a being who causes Nothingness to arise in the world, inasmuch as he himself is affected with non-being to this end."
"What is human freedom if through it nothingness comes into the world?"
Kierkegaard describes anguish in the face of freedom. Heidegger instead considers anguish as apprehension in the face of nothingness. One implies the other.
Artillery preparation invokes fear in a soldier, but anguish is born when he asks himself if will be able to "hold up." And "a new recruit can be afraid of being afraid."
When our alarm clock rings, "it is I who confer on the alarm clock its exigency--I and I alone."
"In anguish I apprehend myself at once as totally free and as not being able to derive the meaning of the world except as coming from myself."
Sartre criticizes determinists--of which I am one--because it reduces us to "never being anything but what we are, it reintroduces in us the absolute positivity of being-in-itself and thereby reinstates us as the heart of being."
"Bad faith" is a lying to oneself. It can be a degree of good faith to be aware of bad faith. How can I be true to myself when there is no such thing as "self"?
Now Sartre does give an example of a homosexual getting over feelings of guilt. I can understand that point he makes there.
"I posit my freedom in respect to it; my future is virgin; everything is allowed to me."
Really? Everything? Sounds like one of those self-help gurus. If you haven't made it out of poverty, then it's your fault. Bullshit. Sartre seems to me to be ignoring heredity, environment, and chance. He seems to be talking as a nice and comfortable middle-class Frenchman. Bully for him. Not everyone has his advantages.
"In the final analysis the goal of sincerity and the goal of bad faith are not so different." Sounds like a contradiction to me. He appears to mean it as a paradox. Both are denials of who you are.
"Every belief is a belief that falls short; one never wholly believes what one believes."
"One does not find, one does not disclose nothingness in the manner in which one can find, disclose being. Nothingness is always an elsewhere."
"Thus nothingness is this hole in being."
"In fact since possibility precedes existence, it can be possibility only with respect to our thought."
"Desire is a lack of being."
"To borrow Heidegger's definition, the world is 'that in terms of which human reality makes known to itself what it is.'"
"Once and for all we must raise the question: what is the being of a past being?"
"The past is not nothing; neither is it the present; but at its very source it is bound to a certain present and a certain future, to both of which it belongs."
Andre Malraux: "The terrible thing about Death is that it transforms life into Destiny."
"Today I alone am responsible for the being of the dead Pierre, I in my freedom. Those dead who have not been able to be saved and transported to the boundaries of the concrete past of a survivor are not past; they along with their pasts are annihilated."
"In this sense the Cartesian cogito ought to be formulated rather: 'I think; therefore I was.'"
"Once we have confined the Present to the Present, it is evident that we will never get out of it. It would be of no use to describe the Present as 'pregnant with the future.'"
"Our body has for its peculiar characteristic the fact that it is essentially that which is known by the Other."
". . . through the world I make known to myself what I am." Which is it then: We create the world, or does the world create us? Or both?
"The Look." How the Other looks at me, defines me. I can be ashamed in front of the Other. I can be elated. Maybe we all need the Look to be one that makes us feel--what?--optimistic? positive? The Other can make "all my schemes collapse."
". . . my body is constituted exactly like all those which have been shown to me on the dissection table or of which I have seen colored drawings in books. . . . My body as it is for me does not appear to me in the midst of the world. . . . it was much more my property than my being. . . . I am the other in relation to my eye. . . . I cannot 'see the seeing' . . . Similarly I see my hand touching objects, but I do not know it in its act of touching them."
". . . then we must of necessity admit that paradox of a physical instrument handled by a soul, which, as we know, causes us to fall into inextricable aporias."
"The Other looks at me and as such he holds the secret of my being, he knows what I am. Thus the profound meaning of my being is outside of me, imprisoned in an absence. The Other has the advantage over me. . . . I can turn my back upon the Other so as to make an object out of him in turn . . . ."
"Everything which may be said of me in my relations with the Other applies to him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me."
"Thus to want to be loved is to invest the Other with one's own facticity . . . "
"Heidegger is right in declaring that I am what I say."
"Without the Other I apprehend fully and nakedly this terrible necessity of being free which is my lot; that is, the fact that I can not put the responsibility for making-myself-be off to anyone but myself even though I have not chosen to be and although I have been born."
"The Other is on principle inapprehensible; he flees me when I seek him and possesses me when I flee him."
"It is before the Other that I am guilty. I am guilty first when beneath the Other's look I experience my alienation and my nakedness as a fall from grace which I must assume. This is the meaning of the famous line from Scripture: 'They knew that they were naked.'"
"This petrifaction in in-itself by the Other's look is the profound meaning of the myth of Medusa."
"Having, doing, and being are the cardinal categories of human reality." Denis de Rougemont said of Don Juan: "He was not capable of having."
". . . to act is to modify the shape of the world . . . . We should observe first that an action is intentional." But we cannot foresee all of its consequences.
"Existence precedes and commands essence." The main principle of existentialism.
"I am condemned to be free."
"Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all."
"Only two solutions are possible: either man is wholly determined . . . or he is wholly free." There is just too much scientific evidence for me to go with Sartre on the free side, so if I have to choose, I go with wholly determined.
February 15, 2022
Preface to the Routledge Classics Edition
Introduction
Translator's Preface
--Being and Nothingness
Key to Special Terminology
Name Index
Introduction
Translator's Preface
--Being and Nothingness
Key to Special Terminology
Name Index
May 25, 2018
賴匕丕 丕賱賳鬲丕噩 丕賱賮賰乇賷 賴賵 亘賲孬丕亘丞 - 賵囟毓 丕賱賳賯胤 毓賱賶 丕賱丨乇賵賮 - 賱賱賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞貙 丕賱鬲賷 賯丕賲 亘鬲兀爻賷爻賴丕 賴賵爻乇賱 賵氐賯賱賴丕 賲賳 亘毓丿賴 賴丕賷丿诏乇 賵乇爻賲 賲賱丕賲丨賴丕 丕賱賳賴丕卅賷丞 賴賵 爻丕乇鬲乇.
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賮賷 丕賱亘丿丕賷丞貨 鬲賳賯爻賲 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞 丕賱賶 賯爻賲丕賳:
兀- 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞 丕賱賲丐賲賳丞.
亘- 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞 丕賱賲賱丨丿丞.
賵爻丕乇鬲乇 鬲亘賳賶 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱賲賱丨丿丞 賵禺氐氐 賰賱 賲毓乇賮鬲賴 賱賴丕貙 賮賯丿 賰鬲亘 賲爻乇丨賷丕鬲賴 賵賲賳 丕賴賲賴丕 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 賱賷 賴賷 (丕賱賲賵賲爻 丕賱賮丕囟賱丞) 賵乇賵丕賷丕鬲賴 賵丕賴賲賴丕 (丕賱睾孬賷丕賳) 賵賳氐賵氐賴 丕賱丕丿亘賷丞 丕賱丕禺乇賶 亘賱 賵丨鬲賶 賲賯丕賱丕鬲賴 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賱賴匕賴 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞.
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鬲乇鬲賰夭 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞 毓賱賶 丕賱賮賷賳賵賲賵賱賵噩賷丕 - 丕賷 鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱囟賵丕賴乇 賱乇丕卅丿賴丕 賴賵爻乇賱 賵賲賳賴賶 鬲鬲噩賱賶 賴匕賴 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞貙 賵丕賱丿丕夭賷賳 丕賱匕賷 賷賵囟丨賴 亘廿爻賴丕亘 賲丕乇鬲賳 賴丕賷丿诏乇貙 賵賲賳 孬賲 丕賱匕丕鬲賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 丕亘丿毓 亘賴丕 爻丕乇鬲乇.
賷賳賯爻賲 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賶 禺賲爻丞 丕賯爻丕賲 賵賴賷:
丕賱賲賯丿賲丞 賵賮賷賴丕 賷鬲丨丿孬 丕賱賲丐賱賮 毓賳 丕賱馗丕賴乇丞賵賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱丕丿乇丕賰 丕賱丨爻賷 賵丕賱亘乇賴丕賳 丕賱丕賳胤賵賱賵噩賷 賵匕丕鬲 丕賱賰賷賳賵賳丞.
亘毓丿 丕賱賲賯丿賲丞 賷賯爻賾賲 賰鬲丕亘丞 丕賱賶 丕乇亘毓丞 丕賯爻丕賲 賵賷鬲賳丕賵賱 賮賷貙
丕賱亘丕亘 丕賱丕賵賱 丕賱爻賱亘 賵丕賱鬲爻丕丐賱 賵丕賱毓丿賲 賵丕氐賱賴.
賵賰賲丕 賷鬲賳丕賵賱 亘賴 丕賱禺丿丕毓 賵丕賱禺丿丕毓 丕賱賳賮爻賷 賵丕賱鬲氐乇賮丕鬲 丕賱禺丿丕毓賷丞 賵丕賱丕賷賲丕賳 亘賴賲丕.
丕賱亘丕亘 丕賱孬丕賳賷 賷賳丕賯卮 亘賴 丕賱匕丕鬲 賵丕賱夭賲賳賷丞 賵丕賱鬲毓丕賱賷.
丕賱亘丕亘 丕賱孬丕賱孬 賷鬲丨丿孬 亘賴 毓賳 丕賱賰賷賳賵賳丞 賱賱丕禺乇 賵賷賳丕賯卮 賲爻兀賱丞 賵噩賵丿 丕賱丌禺乇 賵丕賱噩爻匕 賵丕賱毓賱丕賯丞 亘丕賱丕禺乇 .
丕賱亘丕亘 丕賱乇丕亘毓 賵丕賱丕禺賷乇 賷賳丕賯卮 亘賴 賲賮賴賵賲 丕賱丨乇賷丞 亘賰賱 鬲噩賱賷丕鬲賴丕.
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賷鬲毓賲賯 賵賷爻賴亘 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賮賷 丕賱丨乇賷丞 賵丕賱丌禺乇 賵賲爻兀賱丞 丕賱賲賵鬲 賵丕賱賵噩賵丿 賵丕賱夭賲丕賳 賵丕賱匕丕鬲賷丞 賵賲卮賰賱丕鬲 賮賱爻賮賷丞 丕禺乇賶 賲鬲卮毓亘丞 賵毓賲賷賯丞.
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賲丕 賷賲賷夭 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賳賴 亘丕賱乇睾賲 賲賳 賰賵賳賴 賷賯丕乇亘 丕賱丕賱賮 氐賮丨丞 丕賱丕 丕賳賴 毓亘丕乇丞 毓賳 賳鬲丕噩 賮賱爻賮賷 賵丕囟丨 丕賱賲毓丕賱賲 賵丿丕賲睾 丕賱丕丿賱丞 賵爻賱爻 丕賱鬲賳丕賵賱.
丕卮噩毓 賰賱 賲賳 賷乇睾亘 亘丕賱丨氐賵賱 毓賱賶 丕噩丕亘丞 賱賱爻丐丕賱 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷: "賴賱 丕賱賵噩賵丿 賷爻亘賯 丕賱賲丕賴賷丞貙 丕賲 丕賳 丕賱賲丕賴賷丞 鬲爻亘賯 丕賱賵噩賵丿責" 爻賷噩丿 囟丕賱鬲賴 賴賳丕 丨鬲賲丕.
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賰賳鬲 賯丿 賯乇乇鬲 丕賳 丕卮乇丨 丕賰孬乇 毓賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱丕 丕賳賳賷 賯乇乇鬲 丕賳 丕禺鬲氐乇 賵丕禺鬲賲 鬲賯賷賲賷 亘賴匕賴 丕賱毓亘丕乇丞 賱爻丕乇鬲乇 賮賷 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賯丿 鬲丨賲賱 丕賱賵噩賴 丕賱丕賵囟丨 賱賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賵丕賱鬲賷 鬲賯賵賱:
((廿賳賾 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳 丕賱匕賷 賴賵 賲丨賰賵賲賹 亘兀賳 賷賰賵賳 丨乇賾丕賸貙 賷丨賲賱 毓賱賶 毓丕鬲賯賴 孬賯賱 丕賱毓丕賱賲 亘兀賰賲賱賴貙 廿賳賴 賲爻丐賵賱 毓賳 丕賱毓丕賱賲 賵毓賳 賳賮爻賴 賲賳 丨賷孬 賰賵賳賴 胤乇賷賯丞 賵噩賵丿.))
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賮賷 丕賱亘丿丕賷丞貨 鬲賳賯爻賲 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞 丕賱賶 賯爻賲丕賳:
兀- 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞 丕賱賲丐賲賳丞.
亘- 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞 丕賱賲賱丨丿丞.
賵爻丕乇鬲乇 鬲亘賳賶 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱賲賱丨丿丞 賵禺氐氐 賰賱 賲毓乇賮鬲賴 賱賴丕貙 賮賯丿 賰鬲亘 賲爻乇丨賷丕鬲賴 賵賲賳 丕賴賲賴丕 亘丕賱賳爻亘丞 賱賷 賴賷 (丕賱賲賵賲爻 丕賱賮丕囟賱丞) 賵乇賵丕賷丕鬲賴 賵丕賴賲賴丕 (丕賱睾孬賷丕賳) 賵賳氐賵氐賴 丕賱丕丿亘賷丞 丕賱丕禺乇賶 亘賱 賵丨鬲賶 賲賯丕賱丕鬲賴 丕賱爻賷丕爻賷丞 賱賴匕賴 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞.
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鬲乇鬲賰夭 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞 毓賱賶 丕賱賮賷賳賵賲賵賱賵噩賷丕 - 丕賷 鬲賮爻賷乇 丕賱囟賵丕賴乇 賱乇丕卅丿賴丕 賴賵爻乇賱 賵賲賳賴賶 鬲鬲噩賱賶 賴匕賴 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞貙 賵丕賱丿丕夭賷賳 丕賱匕賷 賷賵囟丨賴 亘廿爻賴丕亘 賲丕乇鬲賳 賴丕賷丿诏乇貙 賵賲賳 孬賲 丕賱匕丕鬲賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 丕亘丿毓 亘賴丕 爻丕乇鬲乇.
賷賳賯爻賲 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱賶 禺賲爻丞 丕賯爻丕賲 賵賴賷:
丕賱賲賯丿賲丞 賵賮賷賴丕 賷鬲丨丿孬 丕賱賲丐賱賮 毓賳 丕賱馗丕賴乇丞賵賲賵囟賵毓 丕賱丕丿乇丕賰 丕賱丨爻賷 賵丕賱亘乇賴丕賳 丕賱丕賳胤賵賱賵噩賷 賵匕丕鬲 丕賱賰賷賳賵賳丞.
亘毓丿 丕賱賲賯丿賲丞 賷賯爻賾賲 賰鬲丕亘丞 丕賱賶 丕乇亘毓丞 丕賯爻丕賲 賵賷鬲賳丕賵賱 賮賷貙
丕賱亘丕亘 丕賱丕賵賱 丕賱爻賱亘 賵丕賱鬲爻丕丐賱 賵丕賱毓丿賲 賵丕氐賱賴.
賵賰賲丕 賷鬲賳丕賵賱 亘賴 丕賱禺丿丕毓 賵丕賱禺丿丕毓 丕賱賳賮爻賷 賵丕賱鬲氐乇賮丕鬲 丕賱禺丿丕毓賷丞 賵丕賱丕賷賲丕賳 亘賴賲丕.
丕賱亘丕亘 丕賱孬丕賳賷 賷賳丕賯卮 亘賴 丕賱匕丕鬲 賵丕賱夭賲賳賷丞 賵丕賱鬲毓丕賱賷.
丕賱亘丕亘 丕賱孬丕賱孬 賷鬲丨丿孬 亘賴 毓賳 丕賱賰賷賳賵賳丞 賱賱丕禺乇 賵賷賳丕賯卮 賲爻兀賱丞 賵噩賵丿 丕賱丌禺乇 賵丕賱噩爻匕 賵丕賱毓賱丕賯丞 亘丕賱丕禺乇 .
丕賱亘丕亘 丕賱乇丕亘毓 賵丕賱丕禺賷乇 賷賳丕賯卮 亘賴 賲賮賴賵賲 丕賱丨乇賷丞 亘賰賱 鬲噩賱賷丕鬲賴丕.
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賷鬲毓賲賯 賵賷爻賴亘 丕賱賰丕鬲亘 賮賷 丕賱丨乇賷丞 賵丕賱丌禺乇 賵賲爻兀賱丞 丕賱賲賵鬲 賵丕賱賵噩賵丿 賵丕賱夭賲丕賳 賵丕賱匕丕鬲賷丞 賵賲卮賰賱丕鬲 賮賱爻賮賷丞 丕禺乇賶 賲鬲卮毓亘丞 賵毓賲賷賯丞.
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賲丕 賷賲賷夭 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賳賴 亘丕賱乇睾賲 賲賳 賰賵賳賴 賷賯丕乇亘 丕賱丕賱賮 氐賮丨丞 丕賱丕 丕賳賴 毓亘丕乇丞 毓賳 賳鬲丕噩 賮賱爻賮賷 賵丕囟丨 丕賱賲毓丕賱賲 賵丿丕賲睾 丕賱丕丿賱丞 賵爻賱爻 丕賱鬲賳丕賵賱.
丕卮噩毓 賰賱 賲賳 賷乇睾亘 亘丕賱丨氐賵賱 毓賱賶 丕噩丕亘丞 賱賱爻丐丕賱 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷: "賴賱 丕賱賵噩賵丿 賷爻亘賯 丕賱賲丕賴賷丞貙 丕賲 丕賳 丕賱賲丕賴賷丞 鬲爻亘賯 丕賱賵噩賵丿責" 爻賷噩丿 囟丕賱鬲賴 賴賳丕 丨鬲賲丕.
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賰賳鬲 賯丿 賯乇乇鬲 丕賳 丕卮乇丨 丕賰孬乇 毓賳 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 丕賱丕 丕賳賳賷 賯乇乇鬲 丕賳 丕禺鬲氐乇 賵丕禺鬲賲 鬲賯賷賲賷 亘賴匕賴 丕賱毓亘丕乇丞 賱爻丕乇鬲乇 賮賷 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賯丿 鬲丨賲賱 丕賱賵噩賴 丕賱丕賵囟丨 賱賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賵丕賱鬲賷 鬲賯賵賱:
((廿賳賾 丕賱廿賳爻丕賳 丕賱匕賷 賴賵 賲丨賰賵賲賹 亘兀賳 賷賰賵賳 丨乇賾丕賸貙 賷丨賲賱 毓賱賶 毓丕鬲賯賴 孬賯賱 丕賱毓丕賱賲 亘兀賰賲賱賴貙 廿賳賴 賲爻丐賵賱 毓賳 丕賱毓丕賱賲 賵毓賳 賳賮爻賴 賲賳 丨賷孬 賰賵賳賴 胤乇賷賯丞 賵噩賵丿.))
October 16, 2024
La c茅l茅brit茅 d'un auteur peut-锚tre un pi猫ge pour son 艙uvre. La r猫gle est g茅n茅rale mais le cas de Sartre l'illustre 脿 merveille.
Alors qu'il 茅tait un v茅ritable ma卯tre 脿 penser philosophique et politique pour les premi猫res g茅n茅rations de l'apr猫s guerre, depuis son oeuvre semble d茅finitivement 锚tre tomb茅e en d茅su茅tude.
Le tournant intervint d猫s la deuxi猫me moiti茅 des ann茅es soixante, au moment o霉 les trois pilliers sur lesquels s'appuie l'oeuvre sartrienne (l'engagement litt茅raire, le marxisme et la philosophie de conscience) s'茅croulent l'un apr猫s l'autre. Dor茅navant, Sartre sera consid茅r茅 comme un philosophe du pass茅, totalement obsol猫te voire m锚me un peu ridicule. La nouvelle g茅n茅ration de penseurs dits "structuralistes" ou "post-structuralistes" portait en effet un jugement tr猫s s茅v猫re sur son oeuvre. Pour Michel Foucault, par exemple, Sartre n'茅tait qu'un homme du dix-neuvi猫me si猫cle qui s'effor莽ait en vain 脿 penser le vingti猫me si猫cle. Jacques Derrida, pour sa part, estimait qu'il n'茅tait "ni un philosophe tr猫s puissant, ni un grand 茅crivain."
Malgr茅 quelques tentatives maladroites de r茅habilitation posthume (je pense notamment au Si猫cle de Sartre de Bernard-Henri L茅vy), ce jugement s茅v猫re sur l'inactualit茅 de l'oeuvre sartrienne reste aujourd'hui tr猫s r茅pandu. L'image m茅diatis茅e de l'intellectuel engag茅 et son indulgence 脿 l'茅gard du totalitarisme sovi茅tique y ont sans doute pas mal contribu茅. Si Sartre a pu tellement se tromper en politique alors que d'autres de sa g茅n茅ration se montraient plus lucides, est-ce que cela n'en dit pas long aussi sur sa philosophie?
Il n'en r茅sulte pas pour autant que Sartre ne soit plus lu de nos jours, loin de l脿. Plus de quarante ans apr猫s sa mort, l'existentialisme sartrien est toujours enseign茅 dans les lyc茅es et dans les facult茅s de philosophie. Cependant, dans la plupart des cas, c'est 脿 la mani猫re d'un courant philosophique historique qu'on en parle, en se r茅f茅rant 脿 quelques formules c茅l猫bres cens茅es r茅sumer l'essentiel de la pens茅e sartrienne ("L'existence pr茅c猫de l'essence"; "L'homme est condamn茅 脿 锚tre libre"; "L'enfer c'est les autres", etc.).
Penseur 脿 la fois d茅pass茅 et classique, il est difficile de nos jours d'aborder l'oeuvre de Sartre sans pr茅jug茅s. N茅anmoins, en d茅pit de son statut canonis茅 - ou peut-锚tre 脿 cause de celui-ci - un texte comme '脢tre et le N茅ant a toujours de quoi surprendre celui qui, comme moi, pensait d茅j脿 (un peu) savoir ce dont il s'agissait. Voici ce qui m'a particuli猫rement frapp茅 lors de ma lecture:
1/ La virtuosit茅 m茅thodologique
L'originalit茅 de cet essai ontologique ambitieux r茅side tout d'abord dans l'application de la m茅thode ph茅nom茅nologique. Cette derni猫re consiste 脿 d茅crire de la mani猫re la plus concr猫te et pr茅cise possible l'exp茅rience humaine de la r茅alit茅 pour ensuite s'interroger sur les structures de l'锚tre qui rendent cette exp茅rience possible. Comment faut-il concevoir la conscience humaine et son rapport 脿 la r茅alit茅 pour que mon v茅cu concret soit possible? Voil脿 la question 茅minemment ph茅nom茅nologique 脿 laquelle l'脢tre et le N茅ant cherche une r茅ponse.
Bien s没r, Sartre n'a pas 茅t茅 le premier 脿 la soulever; avant lui Husserl et, surtout, Heidegger, formulaient la t芒che premi猫re de la philosophie ph茅nom茅nologique en des termes largement analogues. Or, le moins qu'on puisse dire est que Sartre applique la m茅thode ph茅nom茅nologique avec brio. En comparaison des descriptions assez ternes de l'exp茅rience que l'on trouve chez Husserl ou des descriptions certes tr猫s fascinantes mais pas toujours tr猫s intuitives de Heidegger, celles de Sartre sont bien plus parlantes et vivantes.
Certaines de ces "vignettes ph茅nom茅nologiques" sont devenues justement c茅l猫bres comme celle du gar莽on de caf茅 qui joue 脿 锚tre gar莽on de caf茅 (p. 94) ou de l'homme qui d茅couvre sa propre libert茅 angoissante au moment o霉 il se rend compte que rien ne l'emp锚che de se jeter dans le pr茅cipice (p. 65). Or, il y en a beaucoup d'autres que j'ignorais et que j'ai trouv茅es tout aussi remarquables comme celle de la femme qui se d茅solidarise de sa propre main parce qu'elle refuse de s'avouer qu'elle est en train de se laisser s茅duire (p. 90) et celle de la caresse qui r茅v猫le la chair d'autrui en d茅shabillant le corps de son action (p. 431).
Franchement, je crois que Sartre a d没 s'amuser pas mal en inventant ces illustrations 脿 premi猫re vue un peu frivoles. L'analyse philosophique qui s'appuie sur celles-ci et qui vise 脿 r茅v茅ler les structures fondamentales de la conscience dans ses rapports avec soi, le temps, le monde et autrui est pourtant on ne peut plus s茅rieuse. Dans mon exp茅rience de lecture, ce m茅lange de l'abstrait et du concret, du s茅rieux et de l'anecdotique romanesque contribue pas mal au charme du texte.
2/ L'effort de p茅dagogie et le style
Le style philosophique de Sartre a fait l'objet de nombre de critiques et de parodies. Le jargon existentialiste et l'usage fr茅quent de n茅ologismes ("n茅antiser", "锚tre-dans-le-monde", "ips茅it茅", "ustensilit茅", etc.) se pr锚tent en effet facilement 脿 la moquerie. Il en va de m锚me de l'abondance de substantifs verbalis茅s ("le pr茅sent pr茅sentifie" (p. 306), "mes possibles se possibilisent" (p. 233)) et de phrases paradoxales construites enti猫rement autour d'abstractions ("Que doit 锚tre l'homme en son 锚tre pour que par lui le n茅ant vienne 脿 l'锚tre?" (p. 60))
Pourtant, il serait difficile de nier l'effort de p茅dagogie qui sous-tend le texte tout entier. Tout au long du livre, l'auteur prend soin de bien articuler les 茅tapes de son raisonnement de mani猫re explicite en invoquant et r茅futant des contre-arguments possibles avant de conclure sur tel ou tel point pr茅cis. Il marque aussi r茅guli猫rement des pauses afin de r茅sumer le chemin parcouru avant d'encha卯ner sur un autre aspect du probl猫me analys茅. On est bien loin ici de du style quasi-mystique de certains textes Heideggeriens. Si le vocabulaire sartrien s'inspire clairement du philosophie allemand, la mani猫re d'argumenter reste cart茅sienne.
Or, bien que l'expos茅 soit structur茅 de mani猫re tr猫s didactique, je ne l'ai jamais trouv茅 ennuyeux gr芒ce au langage imag茅 qui est, lui aussi, typiquement sartrien (qui d'autre comparerait l'锚tre humain 脿 "un trou d'锚tre au sein de l'脢tre" (p. 665) ou la fascination du voyeur pour ce qu'il observe par le trou de serrure 脿 une mani猫re "de se faire boire par les choses comme l'encre par un buvard" (p. 298)?).
Sartre reste aussi le ma卯tre des formules heureuses et des bons mots et j'en ai r茅p茅r茅 plusieurs dans l'脢tre et le N茅ant qui m'ont fait r茅fl茅chir ou sourire et, parfois, les deux 脿 la fois ("Si le temps est r茅el, il faut que Dieu attende que le sucre fonde"; "Pour que le futur soit r茅alisable, il faut que le pass茅 soit irr茅m茅diable" (p. 542); "La conscience est h茅g茅lienne, mais c'est sa plus grande illusion" (p. 190) :-))
3/ La pr茅figuration de l'oeuvre future
L'脢tre et le N茅ant fut publi茅 en 1943. C'est pendant les premi猫res ann茅es de la guerre que Sartre en con莽oit le projet et qu'il y travaille de mani猫re acharn茅e. Gr芒ce aux Carnets de la dr么le de guerre (publi茅s posthumement en 1983) je savais qu'il travaillait 脿 d'autres projets en m锚me temps et notamment 脿 L'脗ge de raison, roman qui sera publi茅 en 1945 comme le premier volume des "Chemins de la libert茅".
Par contre, je ne m'imaginais pas du tout 脿 quel point "L'脢tre et le N茅ant" pr茅figure l'oeuvre future. Vers la toute fin du texte, les quelques pages que Sartre consacre 脿 la pratique du ski (pp. 627-630) anticipent clairement sur la fin des "Mots", son autobiographie d'enfance, plubli茅e plus de vingt ans plus tard. La phrase d'introduction du tout dernier paragraphe que, dans "Les Mots", Sartre met dans la bouche de sa grand-m猫re ("Glissez, mortels, n'appuyez pas") est d茅j脿 cit茅e verbatim dans "l'脢tre et le N茅ant" et y fait l'objet d'une analyse mi-philosophique, mi-po茅tique qui m'a paru tr猫s r茅v茅latrice sur le sens (et le non-sens) du projet biographique post茅rieur.
J'ai trouv茅 encore plus 茅patant que, dans "l'脢tre et le N茅ant", Sartre annonce d茅j脿 la grande biographie sur Flaubert qu'il ne publiera pas avant 1971. Pour quelqu'un qui, comme moi, ne sait pas encore ce qu'il aura envie de lire la semaine prochaine, il 茅tait frappant de voir un auteur annoncer le projet biographique monumental auquel il se mettra trois d茅cennies plus tard.
Alors? Que conclure? Sans doute Foucault n'a-t-il pas tort; Sartre est effectivement un philosophe d'une autre 茅poque. Il n'emp锚che que l'脢tre et le N茅ant reste un texte fascinant. Non seulement, il m'a procur茅 un r茅el plaisir de lecture, mais j'y suis souvent retourn茅 depuis. En fait, cela fait maintenant plusieurs mois que j'ai termin茅 la lecture et je n'ai toujours pas rang茅 le livre. Je me retrouve souvent, le soir, 脿 le feuilleter pour y chercher tel ou tel passage sp茅cifique et 脿 relire des sections tout enti猫res avec autant d'int茅r锚t que la premi猫re fois. Pour moi, c'est signe que les quatre 茅toiles sont plus que m茅rit茅es.
Alors qu'il 茅tait un v茅ritable ma卯tre 脿 penser philosophique et politique pour les premi猫res g茅n茅rations de l'apr猫s guerre, depuis son oeuvre semble d茅finitivement 锚tre tomb茅e en d茅su茅tude.
Le tournant intervint d猫s la deuxi猫me moiti茅 des ann茅es soixante, au moment o霉 les trois pilliers sur lesquels s'appuie l'oeuvre sartrienne (l'engagement litt茅raire, le marxisme et la philosophie de conscience) s'茅croulent l'un apr猫s l'autre. Dor茅navant, Sartre sera consid茅r茅 comme un philosophe du pass茅, totalement obsol猫te voire m锚me un peu ridicule. La nouvelle g茅n茅ration de penseurs dits "structuralistes" ou "post-structuralistes" portait en effet un jugement tr猫s s茅v猫re sur son oeuvre. Pour Michel Foucault, par exemple, Sartre n'茅tait qu'un homme du dix-neuvi猫me si猫cle qui s'effor莽ait en vain 脿 penser le vingti猫me si猫cle. Jacques Derrida, pour sa part, estimait qu'il n'茅tait "ni un philosophe tr猫s puissant, ni un grand 茅crivain."
Malgr茅 quelques tentatives maladroites de r茅habilitation posthume (je pense notamment au Si猫cle de Sartre de Bernard-Henri L茅vy), ce jugement s茅v猫re sur l'inactualit茅 de l'oeuvre sartrienne reste aujourd'hui tr猫s r茅pandu. L'image m茅diatis茅e de l'intellectuel engag茅 et son indulgence 脿 l'茅gard du totalitarisme sovi茅tique y ont sans doute pas mal contribu茅. Si Sartre a pu tellement se tromper en politique alors que d'autres de sa g茅n茅ration se montraient plus lucides, est-ce que cela n'en dit pas long aussi sur sa philosophie?
Il n'en r茅sulte pas pour autant que Sartre ne soit plus lu de nos jours, loin de l脿. Plus de quarante ans apr猫s sa mort, l'existentialisme sartrien est toujours enseign茅 dans les lyc茅es et dans les facult茅s de philosophie. Cependant, dans la plupart des cas, c'est 脿 la mani猫re d'un courant philosophique historique qu'on en parle, en se r茅f茅rant 脿 quelques formules c茅l猫bres cens茅es r茅sumer l'essentiel de la pens茅e sartrienne ("L'existence pr茅c猫de l'essence"; "L'homme est condamn茅 脿 锚tre libre"; "L'enfer c'est les autres", etc.).
Penseur 脿 la fois d茅pass茅 et classique, il est difficile de nos jours d'aborder l'oeuvre de Sartre sans pr茅jug茅s. N茅anmoins, en d茅pit de son statut canonis茅 - ou peut-锚tre 脿 cause de celui-ci - un texte comme '脢tre et le N茅ant a toujours de quoi surprendre celui qui, comme moi, pensait d茅j脿 (un peu) savoir ce dont il s'agissait. Voici ce qui m'a particuli猫rement frapp茅 lors de ma lecture:
1/ La virtuosit茅 m茅thodologique
L'originalit茅 de cet essai ontologique ambitieux r茅side tout d'abord dans l'application de la m茅thode ph茅nom茅nologique. Cette derni猫re consiste 脿 d茅crire de la mani猫re la plus concr猫te et pr茅cise possible l'exp茅rience humaine de la r茅alit茅 pour ensuite s'interroger sur les structures de l'锚tre qui rendent cette exp茅rience possible. Comment faut-il concevoir la conscience humaine et son rapport 脿 la r茅alit茅 pour que mon v茅cu concret soit possible? Voil脿 la question 茅minemment ph茅nom茅nologique 脿 laquelle l'脢tre et le N茅ant cherche une r茅ponse.
Bien s没r, Sartre n'a pas 茅t茅 le premier 脿 la soulever; avant lui Husserl et, surtout, Heidegger, formulaient la t芒che premi猫re de la philosophie ph茅nom茅nologique en des termes largement analogues. Or, le moins qu'on puisse dire est que Sartre applique la m茅thode ph茅nom茅nologique avec brio. En comparaison des descriptions assez ternes de l'exp茅rience que l'on trouve chez Husserl ou des descriptions certes tr猫s fascinantes mais pas toujours tr猫s intuitives de Heidegger, celles de Sartre sont bien plus parlantes et vivantes.
Certaines de ces "vignettes ph茅nom茅nologiques" sont devenues justement c茅l猫bres comme celle du gar莽on de caf茅 qui joue 脿 锚tre gar莽on de caf茅 (p. 94) ou de l'homme qui d茅couvre sa propre libert茅 angoissante au moment o霉 il se rend compte que rien ne l'emp锚che de se jeter dans le pr茅cipice (p. 65). Or, il y en a beaucoup d'autres que j'ignorais et que j'ai trouv茅es tout aussi remarquables comme celle de la femme qui se d茅solidarise de sa propre main parce qu'elle refuse de s'avouer qu'elle est en train de se laisser s茅duire (p. 90) et celle de la caresse qui r茅v猫le la chair d'autrui en d茅shabillant le corps de son action (p. 431).
Franchement, je crois que Sartre a d没 s'amuser pas mal en inventant ces illustrations 脿 premi猫re vue un peu frivoles. L'analyse philosophique qui s'appuie sur celles-ci et qui vise 脿 r茅v茅ler les structures fondamentales de la conscience dans ses rapports avec soi, le temps, le monde et autrui est pourtant on ne peut plus s茅rieuse. Dans mon exp茅rience de lecture, ce m茅lange de l'abstrait et du concret, du s茅rieux et de l'anecdotique romanesque contribue pas mal au charme du texte.
2/ L'effort de p茅dagogie et le style
Le style philosophique de Sartre a fait l'objet de nombre de critiques et de parodies. Le jargon existentialiste et l'usage fr茅quent de n茅ologismes ("n茅antiser", "锚tre-dans-le-monde", "ips茅it茅", "ustensilit茅", etc.) se pr锚tent en effet facilement 脿 la moquerie. Il en va de m锚me de l'abondance de substantifs verbalis茅s ("le pr茅sent pr茅sentifie" (p. 306), "mes possibles se possibilisent" (p. 233)) et de phrases paradoxales construites enti猫rement autour d'abstractions ("Que doit 锚tre l'homme en son 锚tre pour que par lui le n茅ant vienne 脿 l'锚tre?" (p. 60))
Pourtant, il serait difficile de nier l'effort de p茅dagogie qui sous-tend le texte tout entier. Tout au long du livre, l'auteur prend soin de bien articuler les 茅tapes de son raisonnement de mani猫re explicite en invoquant et r茅futant des contre-arguments possibles avant de conclure sur tel ou tel point pr茅cis. Il marque aussi r茅guli猫rement des pauses afin de r茅sumer le chemin parcouru avant d'encha卯ner sur un autre aspect du probl猫me analys茅. On est bien loin ici de du style quasi-mystique de certains textes Heideggeriens. Si le vocabulaire sartrien s'inspire clairement du philosophie allemand, la mani猫re d'argumenter reste cart茅sienne.
Or, bien que l'expos茅 soit structur茅 de mani猫re tr猫s didactique, je ne l'ai jamais trouv茅 ennuyeux gr芒ce au langage imag茅 qui est, lui aussi, typiquement sartrien (qui d'autre comparerait l'锚tre humain 脿 "un trou d'锚tre au sein de l'脢tre" (p. 665) ou la fascination du voyeur pour ce qu'il observe par le trou de serrure 脿 une mani猫re "de se faire boire par les choses comme l'encre par un buvard" (p. 298)?).
Sartre reste aussi le ma卯tre des formules heureuses et des bons mots et j'en ai r茅p茅r茅 plusieurs dans l'脢tre et le N茅ant qui m'ont fait r茅fl茅chir ou sourire et, parfois, les deux 脿 la fois ("Si le temps est r茅el, il faut que Dieu attende que le sucre fonde"; "Pour que le futur soit r茅alisable, il faut que le pass茅 soit irr茅m茅diable" (p. 542); "La conscience est h茅g茅lienne, mais c'est sa plus grande illusion" (p. 190) :-))
3/ La pr茅figuration de l'oeuvre future
L'脢tre et le N茅ant fut publi茅 en 1943. C'est pendant les premi猫res ann茅es de la guerre que Sartre en con莽oit le projet et qu'il y travaille de mani猫re acharn茅e. Gr芒ce aux Carnets de la dr么le de guerre (publi茅s posthumement en 1983) je savais qu'il travaillait 脿 d'autres projets en m锚me temps et notamment 脿 L'脗ge de raison, roman qui sera publi茅 en 1945 comme le premier volume des "Chemins de la libert茅".
Par contre, je ne m'imaginais pas du tout 脿 quel point "L'脢tre et le N茅ant" pr茅figure l'oeuvre future. Vers la toute fin du texte, les quelques pages que Sartre consacre 脿 la pratique du ski (pp. 627-630) anticipent clairement sur la fin des "Mots", son autobiographie d'enfance, plubli茅e plus de vingt ans plus tard. La phrase d'introduction du tout dernier paragraphe que, dans "Les Mots", Sartre met dans la bouche de sa grand-m猫re ("Glissez, mortels, n'appuyez pas") est d茅j脿 cit茅e verbatim dans "l'脢tre et le N茅ant" et y fait l'objet d'une analyse mi-philosophique, mi-po茅tique qui m'a paru tr猫s r茅v茅latrice sur le sens (et le non-sens) du projet biographique post茅rieur.
J'ai trouv茅 encore plus 茅patant que, dans "l'脢tre et le N茅ant", Sartre annonce d茅j脿 la grande biographie sur Flaubert qu'il ne publiera pas avant 1971. Pour quelqu'un qui, comme moi, ne sait pas encore ce qu'il aura envie de lire la semaine prochaine, il 茅tait frappant de voir un auteur annoncer le projet biographique monumental auquel il se mettra trois d茅cennies plus tard.
Alors? Que conclure? Sans doute Foucault n'a-t-il pas tort; Sartre est effectivement un philosophe d'une autre 茅poque. Il n'emp锚che que l'脢tre et le N茅ant reste un texte fascinant. Non seulement, il m'a procur茅 un r茅el plaisir de lecture, mais j'y suis souvent retourn茅 depuis. En fait, cela fait maintenant plusieurs mois que j'ai termin茅 la lecture et je n'ai toujours pas rang茅 le livre. Je me retrouve souvent, le soir, 脿 le feuilleter pour y chercher tel ou tel passage sp茅cifique et 脿 relire des sections tout enti猫res avec autant d'int茅r锚t que la premi猫re fois. Pour moi, c'est signe que les quatre 茅toiles sont plus que m茅rit茅es.
August 12, 2023
Now I can safely conclude Sartre is an overrated philosopher. His ideas aren't original nor very interesting to unravel due to his flat prose. He effectively borrows hitherto ideas from previous thinkers (of which there is nothing inherently wrong with doing) and packages it in a "Bible" esc book which is double the length it realistically needed to be. I was engrossed by his first few chapters but after this it just gets repetitive and a bit dull. Admittedly, Sartre is a philosopher I should have read long ago when I started philosophy, but because of this, I've also, quite simply, read better thinkers.
The following are a selection of passages I thought were interesting:
鈥淎ll consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no 鈥榗ontent鈥�.鈥� // Pg.07
鈥淐onsciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure 鈥榓ppearance鈥� in the sense that it exists only to the degree to which it appears. But it is precisely because consciousness is pure appearance, because it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it) 鈥� it is because of this identity of appearance and existence within it that it can be considered as the absolute.鈥� // Pg.12
鈥淐onsciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, that consciousness arises oriented towards a being which is not itself. This is what we call the ontological proof.鈥� // Pg.17
鈥淲e are here on the ground of being, not of knowledge. It is not a question of showing that the phenomena of inner sense imply the existence of objective spatial phenomena, but that consciousness implies in its being a non-conscious and transphenomenal being. In particular there is no point in replying that in fact subjectivity implies objectivity and that it constitutes itself in constituting the objective; we have seen that subjectivity is powerless to constitute the objective. To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it.
Thus we have left pure appearance and have arrived at full being. Consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence, and inversely it is consciousness of a being, whose essence implies its existence; that is, in which appearance lays claim to being. Being is everywhere. Certainly we could apply to consciousness the definition which Heidegger reserves for Dasein and say that it is a being such that in its being, its being is in question. But it would be necessary to complete the definition and formulate it more like this: consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself.
We must understand that this being is no other than the transphenomenal being of phenomena and not a noumenal being which is hidden behind them. It is the being of this table, of this package of tobacco, of the lamp, more generally the being of the world which is implied by consciousness. It requires simply that the being of that which appears does not exist only in so far as it appears. The transphenomenal being of what exists for consciousness is itself in itself (lui-m锚me en soi).鈥� // Pg.18
鈥淲e can now form a few definite conclusions about the phenomenon of being, which we have considered in order to make the preceding observations. Consciousness is the revealed-revelation of existents, and existents appear before consciousness on the foundation of their being. Nevertheless the primary characteristic of the being of an existent is never to reveal itself completely to consciousness. An existent can not be stripped of its being; being is the ever present foundation of the existent; it is everywhere in it and nowhere. There is no being which is not the being of a certain mode of being, none which can not be apprehended through the mode of being which manifests being and veils it at the same time. Consciousness can always pass beyond the existent, not toward its being, but toward the meaning of this being. That is why we call it ontic-ontological, since a fundamental characteristic of its transcendence is to transcend the ontic toward the ontological. The meaning of the being of the existent in so far as it reveals itself to consciousness is the phenomenon of being. This meaning has itself a being, based on which it manifests itself.鈥� // Pg.19
鈥淚f being exists as over against God, it is its own support; it does not preserve the least trace of divine creation. In a word, even if it had been created, being-in-itself would be inexplicable in terms of creation; for it assumes its being beyond the creation.鈥� // Pg.20
鈥淸B]eing is isolated in its being and that it does not enter into any connection with what is not itself. Transition, becoming, anything which permits us to say that being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it is not 鈥� all that is forbidden on principle. For being is the being of becoming and due to this fact it is beyond becoming. It is what it is.鈥� // Pg.22
鈥淏eing is. Being is in-itself. Being is what it is. These are the three characteristics which the preliminary examination of the phenomenon of being allows us to assign to the being of phenomena.鈥� // Pg.22
鈥淭hus anyone who introduces negation into being from outside will discover subsequently that he makes it pass into non-being. But here we have a play on words involving the very idea of negation. For if I refuse to allow being any determination or content, I am nevertheless forced to affirm at least that it is. Thus, let anyone deny being whatever he wishes, he can not cause it not to be, thanks to the very fact that he denies that it is this or that. Negation can not touch the nucleus of being of Being, which is absolute plenitude and entire positivity. By contrast Non-being is a negation which aims at this nucleus of absolute density. Non-being is denied at the heart of Being. When Hegel writes, 鈥�(Being and nothingness) are empty abstractions, and the one is as empty as the other,鈥� he forgets that emptiness is emptiness of some-thing. Being is empty of all other determination than identity with itself, but non-being is empty of being. In a word, we must recall here against Hegel that being is and that nothingness is not.鈥� // Pg.39
鈥淎t the same time it is from the point of view of beyond the world that being is organized into the world, which means on the one hand that human reality rises up as an emergence of being in non-being and on the other hand that the world is 鈥榮uspended鈥� in nothingness. Anguish is the discovery of this double, perpetual nihilation. It is in terms of this surpassing of the world that Dasein manages to realize the contingency of the world; that is, to raise the question, 鈥楬ow does it happen that there is something rather than nothing?鈥� Thus the contingency of the world appears to human reality in so far as human reality has established itself in nothingness in order to apprehend the contingency.鈥� // Pg.42
鈥淢an is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world.鈥� // Pg.48
The following are a selection of passages I thought were interesting:
鈥淎ll consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that consciousness has no 鈥榗ontent鈥�.鈥� // Pg.07
鈥淐onsciousness has nothing substantial, it is pure 鈥榓ppearance鈥� in the sense that it exists only to the degree to which it appears. But it is precisely because consciousness is pure appearance, because it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it) 鈥� it is because of this identity of appearance and existence within it that it can be considered as the absolute.鈥� // Pg.12
鈥淐onsciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, that consciousness arises oriented towards a being which is not itself. This is what we call the ontological proof.鈥� // Pg.17
鈥淲e are here on the ground of being, not of knowledge. It is not a question of showing that the phenomena of inner sense imply the existence of objective spatial phenomena, but that consciousness implies in its being a non-conscious and transphenomenal being. In particular there is no point in replying that in fact subjectivity implies objectivity and that it constitutes itself in constituting the objective; we have seen that subjectivity is powerless to constitute the objective. To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it.
Thus we have left pure appearance and have arrived at full being. Consciousness is a being whose existence posits its essence, and inversely it is consciousness of a being, whose essence implies its existence; that is, in which appearance lays claim to being. Being is everywhere. Certainly we could apply to consciousness the definition which Heidegger reserves for Dasein and say that it is a being such that in its being, its being is in question. But it would be necessary to complete the definition and formulate it more like this: consciousness is a being such that in its being, its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself.
We must understand that this being is no other than the transphenomenal being of phenomena and not a noumenal being which is hidden behind them. It is the being of this table, of this package of tobacco, of the lamp, more generally the being of the world which is implied by consciousness. It requires simply that the being of that which appears does not exist only in so far as it appears. The transphenomenal being of what exists for consciousness is itself in itself (lui-m锚me en soi).鈥� // Pg.18
鈥淲e can now form a few definite conclusions about the phenomenon of being, which we have considered in order to make the preceding observations. Consciousness is the revealed-revelation of existents, and existents appear before consciousness on the foundation of their being. Nevertheless the primary characteristic of the being of an existent is never to reveal itself completely to consciousness. An existent can not be stripped of its being; being is the ever present foundation of the existent; it is everywhere in it and nowhere. There is no being which is not the being of a certain mode of being, none which can not be apprehended through the mode of being which manifests being and veils it at the same time. Consciousness can always pass beyond the existent, not toward its being, but toward the meaning of this being. That is why we call it ontic-ontological, since a fundamental characteristic of its transcendence is to transcend the ontic toward the ontological. The meaning of the being of the existent in so far as it reveals itself to consciousness is the phenomenon of being. This meaning has itself a being, based on which it manifests itself.鈥� // Pg.19
鈥淚f being exists as over against God, it is its own support; it does not preserve the least trace of divine creation. In a word, even if it had been created, being-in-itself would be inexplicable in terms of creation; for it assumes its being beyond the creation.鈥� // Pg.20
鈥淸B]eing is isolated in its being and that it does not enter into any connection with what is not itself. Transition, becoming, anything which permits us to say that being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it is not 鈥� all that is forbidden on principle. For being is the being of becoming and due to this fact it is beyond becoming. It is what it is.鈥� // Pg.22
鈥淏eing is. Being is in-itself. Being is what it is. These are the three characteristics which the preliminary examination of the phenomenon of being allows us to assign to the being of phenomena.鈥� // Pg.22
鈥淭hus anyone who introduces negation into being from outside will discover subsequently that he makes it pass into non-being. But here we have a play on words involving the very idea of negation. For if I refuse to allow being any determination or content, I am nevertheless forced to affirm at least that it is. Thus, let anyone deny being whatever he wishes, he can not cause it not to be, thanks to the very fact that he denies that it is this or that. Negation can not touch the nucleus of being of Being, which is absolute plenitude and entire positivity. By contrast Non-being is a negation which aims at this nucleus of absolute density. Non-being is denied at the heart of Being. When Hegel writes, 鈥�(Being and nothingness) are empty abstractions, and the one is as empty as the other,鈥� he forgets that emptiness is emptiness of some-thing. Being is empty of all other determination than identity with itself, but non-being is empty of being. In a word, we must recall here against Hegel that being is and that nothingness is not.鈥� // Pg.39
鈥淎t the same time it is from the point of view of beyond the world that being is organized into the world, which means on the one hand that human reality rises up as an emergence of being in non-being and on the other hand that the world is 鈥榮uspended鈥� in nothingness. Anguish is the discovery of this double, perpetual nihilation. It is in terms of this surpassing of the world that Dasein manages to realize the contingency of the world; that is, to raise the question, 鈥楬ow does it happen that there is something rather than nothing?鈥� Thus the contingency of the world appears to human reality in so far as human reality has established itself in nothingness in order to apprehend the contingency.鈥� // Pg.42
鈥淢an is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world.鈥� // Pg.48
December 10, 2022
Reading 鈥渂eing and nothingness鈥�, I got the sense Jean-Paul Sartre was trying to impress everybody by writing an unreadable book. He could sum up the entire book in three pages, an empty page on being and nothingness, one page on bad faith, and one page on the look. 800 pages, the guy had a huge ego. I understand why philosophers consider jean-Paul Sartre overrated, some call him an asshole, I agree. I could say Jean-Paul Sartre is in bad faith, trying to be a philosopher, he was not a philosopher. Most philosophers consider his ideas pass茅, I agree. He is completely over rated as a philosopher, 鈥渂eing and nothingness鈥� is gibberish nonsense. It is considered the principle text of existentialism, we philosophers need a new principle text for existentialism. Jean-Paul Sartre is a sophist engaging in sophistry, he may sound clever but there is nothing to Sartre鈥檚 writings. He copy and paste all his ideas from real philosophers, the guy is an empty suit.
After re-reading 鈥淏eing and Nothingness鈥�, it is like 鈥淲aiting for Godot鈥�, Sartre is saying life is like 鈥淏eing and Nothingness鈥�, long, gibberish nonsense with no meaning. There is no purpose to life without God鈥檚 providence鈥檚. Life is an endless set of meaningless words.
After re-reading 鈥淏eing and Nothingness鈥�, it is like 鈥淲aiting for Godot鈥�, Sartre is saying life is like 鈥淏eing and Nothingness鈥�, long, gibberish nonsense with no meaning. There is no purpose to life without God鈥檚 providence鈥檚. Life is an endless set of meaningless words.
December 20, 2023
the first half is really, really bad, but the second half saves it. an attempt to answer freud through (mis)readings of hegel, husserl.& heidegger. existential psychoanalysis sets the stage for merleau-ponty and lacan: the subject as a desiring-subject, desire as a lack in being, jouissance, the short circuit, the gaze, flesh, synesthesia, self-alienation via the other, the other as the ego (moi)... i need to lie down
May 27, 2019
I wish 欧宝娱乐 had another main category for books for when you abandon them yet still intend one day to come back and finish them. Don't want it cluttering up my Currently Reading list and yet cannot tag as read or remove entirely. Oh well...
If I was going to be completely honest I think from what I read of this I would probably rate it closer to 3.5 stars (for whatever that's worth). Recently learning more about Kojeve and his lectures on Hegel, it's easy to see how Sartre took what he might have learned in those lessons and used it to add his own thoughts to phenomenology.
My main gripe if I have one is that I can't help feeling that Sartre makes all of this much more complicated than it has to be. I realize that some of these concepts are incredibly abstract, yet Sartre seems to revel in his over-complicated language and descriptions when I think the meat of what he was trying to say could probably be broken down and disseminated much more simply.
If I was going to be completely honest I think from what I read of this I would probably rate it closer to 3.5 stars (for whatever that's worth). Recently learning more about Kojeve and his lectures on Hegel, it's easy to see how Sartre took what he might have learned in those lessons and used it to add his own thoughts to phenomenology.
My main gripe if I have one is that I can't help feeling that Sartre makes all of this much more complicated than it has to be. I realize that some of these concepts are incredibly abstract, yet Sartre seems to revel in his over-complicated language and descriptions when I think the meat of what he was trying to say could probably be broken down and disseminated much more simply.
October 21, 2013
賴匕丕 兀賴賲 賰鬲丕亘 賮賱爻賮賷 賱賱賲丿乇爻丞 丕賱賵噩賵丿賷丞 賵賴賵 兀賷囟丕 賲乇噩毓 廿氐賱丕丨賷 賴丕賲 賱賲毓丕賳賷 丕賱廿丿乇丕賰 賵鬲賱賲爻 丕賱匕丕鬲 賵丕賱賰賵賳 賵賮賴賲 賲毓賳賶 丕賱丨賯賷賯丞
爻丕乇鬲乇 賮賷 賳馗乇賷 兀丨丿 兀賴賲 佶 賮賱丕爻賮丞 賮賷 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺 賵賴賵 賮賷 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 氐賳毓 賲噩丿 丨賰賲鬲賴 賵賮乇囟賷丕鬲賴 賵丨噩鬲賴
爻賷噩亘乇賰 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 毓賱賶 賵囟毓 賰孬賷乇 賲賳 賯賳丕毓丕鬲賰 賮賷 賲丨賰 丕賱賲乇丕噩毓丞 賵丕賱鬲乇丿丿
爻丕乇鬲乇 賮賷 賳馗乇賷 兀丨丿 兀賴賲 佶 賮賱丕爻賮丞 賮賷 丕賱鬲丕乇賷禺 賵賴賵 賮賷 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 氐賳毓 賲噩丿 丨賰賲鬲賴 賵賮乇囟賷丕鬲賴 賵丨噩鬲賴
爻賷噩亘乇賰 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 毓賱賶 賵囟毓 賰孬賷乇 賲賳 賯賳丕毓丕鬲賰 賮賷 賲丨賰 丕賱賲乇丕噩毓丞 賵丕賱鬲乇丿丿
June 1, 2024
Being and Nothingness.
Oh FFFUUUCCCKKK!!!
Ok.
厂辞鈥�
This book is A LOT!
础苍诲鈥�
It鈥檚 ABSOLUTELY INFAMOUS for being A LOT.
And RIGHTLY SO.
It鈥檚 DEFINITELY A LOT.
础苍诲鈥�
It鈥檚 a very polarizing text.
It seems like serious philosophers dismiss it.
It also seems like historical philosophers can鈥檛.
Duly noted.
叠耻迟鈥�
础苍诲鈥�
BEGINNING OF INSUFFERABLY LONG PREFACE:
I鈥檓 trying to read the important sources texts in phenomenology. Both for fun, and as a part of a literature review for a phenomenological qualitative research project I鈥檓 currently undertaking for my doctoral degree.
Tangent:
I did my masters (MA) in clinical psychology at an otherwise completely unknown Buddhist university, University Of The West (UWEST), just outside downtown Los Angeles. I say 鈥渙therwise unknown鈥� because it actually has a world renowned Buddhist studies department.
The 鈥渓argest鈥� if not the 鈥渂est鈥� one of those in US if not the world. Whatever right? Anyway. I sat in on A LOT of MA level and PhD level Buddhist studies seminars. The students had between 300-800 pages of assigned reading per week.
They HAD to know the difference between 鈥渞eading鈥� and 鈥渟tudying鈥� a text. If you鈥檙e really working on a text. You may give it innumerable reads. At various levels of focus. Looking for something different at each level.
That鈥檚 a LONG way of saying.
I only 鈥渞ead鈥� this text.
I did not 鈥渟tudy鈥� it.
Meaning, I gave it only a provisional read.
Rather than a slower, more systematic, more intentional read.
So, just because I read this motherfucker. Doesn鈥檛 mean I understand MOST or even ANY of this RIDICULOUSLY COMPLEX and DENSE and all but OPAQUE text.
Because I didn鈥檛.
As such. I will use this review as a way of circling back, and (at least attempting to) dissect the text at the major joints. And (at to least try) to gain purchase on the BIG IDEAS.
Additionally. In the age of CHAT-GPT. Book reviews by actual people no longer need to systematically summarize the book. AI already does that better than non expert people like me.
If I want a crib notes summary of this text. It鈥檚 only one text prompt away. As such. I will use CHAT-GPT as an outline for this review. But I will (at least attempt) to disambiguate the ideas from my personal perspective. And in my voice.
NOTE: There is LITERALLY nothing of value that I could contribute to understanding this historical text. But I am going to give it a go anyway. That being said. I am giving this book 5/5 stars. Not simply because it absolutely deserves it. But I think it鈥檚 LAME/PRETENTIOUS to give historically important books less than 5 stars. Unless you鈥檙e a legitimate expert scholar. And if you are. Then why are you interested at all rating books 1/5 on social media? That seems beneath you.
Anyway:
This review is (a) a social media post meant to be fun and entertaining, (b) a record of my reading history, (c) an attempt to better understanding of this book (both b-c are mostly for my benefit, but may also have some value for others), and (d) another installment in my virtual book collection/obsession.
END OF INSUFFERABLY LONG PREFACE:
Being and Nothingness (B&N) is Sartre鈥檚 1943 magnum opus.
It is one of the (if not the) seminal works of existentialist philosophy/psychology/psychoanalysis.
B&N explores the nature of human existence/consciousness.
In short:
B&N asserts that the facticity of 鈥渂eing鈥� (the fact of being something) is indissoluble from the facticity of nothingness (and the existence and eventuality of nothing/nonbeing).
In other words. The fact that we live. And can be, and and experience something. Necessarily entails that we were a 鈥渘othing鈥� before we were a 鈥渟omething鈥�, and (at least until they solve this particular problem) we will die, and cease to be something, and as such will be nothing again.
And that applies to all people/places/things/objects.
Everything.
The fact that there is 鈥渟omething鈥� necessarily connotes that there is a nothing. If not. How the fuck would we know that 鈥渟omething鈥� is something? Something as opposed to what?
The main themes of B&N are as follows:
BEING:
For Sartre, 鈥渂eing-in-itself鈥� (锚tre-en-soi) refers to the simple existence of things. Objects simply are; they exist with or without consciousness.
Whereas 鈥渂eing-for-itself鈥� (锚tre-pour-soi) refers to human consciousness. Humans are aware of their own existence, and as such can reflect, compare, and a 鈥渇ree鈥� to choose and change.
NOTHINGNESS:
Sartre argues that nothingness (n茅ant), is an indissoluble component of human reality. If we can be aware of our own existence (being-for-itself), that we must also always maintain the awareness that we will someday cease to be.
CONSCIOUSNESS:
Sartre argues that consciousness is always consciousness of something, but it also introduces a gap (nothingness) between the subject, and the object, allowing for freedom and change. NOTE: Victor Frankle would later extrude upon this notion in his form of existential therapy known as LogoTherapy. Frankle is famous for saying: 鈥渂etween stimulus and response, there is a gap from which all human freedom emerges鈥� (paraphrased but you get it).
FREEDOM:
As such, human consciousness of being (being-for-itself) engenders anxiety (because we know we鈥檙e gonna fucking suffer and die). But it can also engender freedom (because we can choose to do cool and meaningful shit before we die).
RESPONSIBILITY:
Sartre further argues that humans are 鈥渃ondemned鈥� to be free, meaning we can鈥檛 escape the necessity of choosing. Even apathy and inaction are choices for Sartre. As such, the
the ability to make choices comes the weight of responsibility to chose to do the right thing.
Fore Sartre, the facticity of freedom and responsibility is the essence of being human.
For Fore Sartre, humans CREATE their essence via choosing and taking action.
BAD FAITH:
Sartre defines Bad Faith (mauvaise foi) as a particularly dangerous form of self-deception, whereby individuals deny their freedom and responsibility. What some refers to as the 鈥渧ictim mentality鈥� and/or denial as ego defense.
In what is in retrospect, an OBSCENELY HOMOPHOBIC passage. Sartre prattles on about how homosexuality is a form of bad faith.
Needless to say. The example didn鈥檛 age well.
Perhaps a more appropriate example might be someone who conforms to a harmful social injunction (genocide) and later claims innocence because they were 鈥渏ust taking orders鈥� and as such claim that they had no choice in the matter, as thusly avoid responsibility for their actions.
Basically. This is pretty much all of us (to varying degrees). As our human existence is essentially engendering mass extinction. And bearing the weight of all that freedom to consume, and the responsibility of global climate catastrophe is.
Well.
A little too much for most if us to bear.
Sartre might call that 鈥渂ad faith consumerism鈥�.
THE LOOK:
Just incase you forgot this is French philosophy,
Sartre discusses how the presence of others influences self-awareness. An effect he refers to as The Look (le regard). Especially, this means that when another person looks at us, we become aware of ourselves as objects in their world, leading to a sense of being judged or defined by the other. This can cause feelings of alienation or conflict. A very French observation.
And also.
Very Modern (verging on postmodern).
AUTHENTICITY:
Sartre advocates for living authentically, which means acknowledging one's accepting freedom and taking responsibility for one's actions. This necessarily entails creating one's essence via conscious choices, rather than conforming to external pressures or living in bad faith.
And JUST LIKE THAT.
We鈥檙e no longer verging on the postmodern anymore. We鈥檙e SOLIDLY back in modernity.
But that 100% ok.
Because Sartre was basically bootstrapping himself (and the rest of the world) out of the premodern world view. And into the modern (verging on, but not quite achieving the postmodern, but CERTAINLY paving the way).
CONCLUSION:
B&N is a DENSE, nearly OPAQUE TEXT.
I am MORE THAN SATISFIED with a provisional read. If I was a total fucking masochist (which I am not), I might devote a little more of my ONE WILD LIFE to STUDY this text. But I鈥檓 going to 20/80 this bitch (meaning, a 20% investment gets you 80% of the total returns). I will take what I have. And leave the heavy lifting to professional historians and philosophers.
Given that.
I fell VERY enriched after stumbling through this monster. And while I can鈥檛 in good faith recommend that you read it. In fact I recommend that you DON鈥橳. I do recommend that humans (if not you, than someone) continue to read it.
5/5 馃ぉ
Oh FFFUUUCCCKKK!!!
Ok.
厂辞鈥�
This book is A LOT!
础苍诲鈥�
It鈥檚 ABSOLUTELY INFAMOUS for being A LOT.
And RIGHTLY SO.
It鈥檚 DEFINITELY A LOT.
础苍诲鈥�
It鈥檚 a very polarizing text.
It seems like serious philosophers dismiss it.
It also seems like historical philosophers can鈥檛.
Duly noted.
叠耻迟鈥�
础苍诲鈥�
BEGINNING OF INSUFFERABLY LONG PREFACE:
I鈥檓 trying to read the important sources texts in phenomenology. Both for fun, and as a part of a literature review for a phenomenological qualitative research project I鈥檓 currently undertaking for my doctoral degree.
Tangent:
I did my masters (MA) in clinical psychology at an otherwise completely unknown Buddhist university, University Of The West (UWEST), just outside downtown Los Angeles. I say 鈥渙therwise unknown鈥� because it actually has a world renowned Buddhist studies department.
The 鈥渓argest鈥� if not the 鈥渂est鈥� one of those in US if not the world. Whatever right? Anyway. I sat in on A LOT of MA level and PhD level Buddhist studies seminars. The students had between 300-800 pages of assigned reading per week.
They HAD to know the difference between 鈥渞eading鈥� and 鈥渟tudying鈥� a text. If you鈥檙e really working on a text. You may give it innumerable reads. At various levels of focus. Looking for something different at each level.
That鈥檚 a LONG way of saying.
I only 鈥渞ead鈥� this text.
I did not 鈥渟tudy鈥� it.
Meaning, I gave it only a provisional read.
Rather than a slower, more systematic, more intentional read.
So, just because I read this motherfucker. Doesn鈥檛 mean I understand MOST or even ANY of this RIDICULOUSLY COMPLEX and DENSE and all but OPAQUE text.
Because I didn鈥檛.
As such. I will use this review as a way of circling back, and (at least attempting to) dissect the text at the major joints. And (at to least try) to gain purchase on the BIG IDEAS.
Additionally. In the age of CHAT-GPT. Book reviews by actual people no longer need to systematically summarize the book. AI already does that better than non expert people like me.
If I want a crib notes summary of this text. It鈥檚 only one text prompt away. As such. I will use CHAT-GPT as an outline for this review. But I will (at least attempt) to disambiguate the ideas from my personal perspective. And in my voice.
NOTE: There is LITERALLY nothing of value that I could contribute to understanding this historical text. But I am going to give it a go anyway. That being said. I am giving this book 5/5 stars. Not simply because it absolutely deserves it. But I think it鈥檚 LAME/PRETENTIOUS to give historically important books less than 5 stars. Unless you鈥檙e a legitimate expert scholar. And if you are. Then why are you interested at all rating books 1/5 on social media? That seems beneath you.
Anyway:
This review is (a) a social media post meant to be fun and entertaining, (b) a record of my reading history, (c) an attempt to better understanding of this book (both b-c are mostly for my benefit, but may also have some value for others), and (d) another installment in my virtual book collection/obsession.
END OF INSUFFERABLY LONG PREFACE:
Being and Nothingness (B&N) is Sartre鈥檚 1943 magnum opus.
It is one of the (if not the) seminal works of existentialist philosophy/psychology/psychoanalysis.
B&N explores the nature of human existence/consciousness.
In short:
B&N asserts that the facticity of 鈥渂eing鈥� (the fact of being something) is indissoluble from the facticity of nothingness (and the existence and eventuality of nothing/nonbeing).
In other words. The fact that we live. And can be, and and experience something. Necessarily entails that we were a 鈥渘othing鈥� before we were a 鈥渟omething鈥�, and (at least until they solve this particular problem) we will die, and cease to be something, and as such will be nothing again.
And that applies to all people/places/things/objects.
Everything.
The fact that there is 鈥渟omething鈥� necessarily connotes that there is a nothing. If not. How the fuck would we know that 鈥渟omething鈥� is something? Something as opposed to what?
The main themes of B&N are as follows:
BEING:
For Sartre, 鈥渂eing-in-itself鈥� (锚tre-en-soi) refers to the simple existence of things. Objects simply are; they exist with or without consciousness.
Whereas 鈥渂eing-for-itself鈥� (锚tre-pour-soi) refers to human consciousness. Humans are aware of their own existence, and as such can reflect, compare, and a 鈥渇ree鈥� to choose and change.
NOTHINGNESS:
Sartre argues that nothingness (n茅ant), is an indissoluble component of human reality. If we can be aware of our own existence (being-for-itself), that we must also always maintain the awareness that we will someday cease to be.
CONSCIOUSNESS:
Sartre argues that consciousness is always consciousness of something, but it also introduces a gap (nothingness) between the subject, and the object, allowing for freedom and change. NOTE: Victor Frankle would later extrude upon this notion in his form of existential therapy known as LogoTherapy. Frankle is famous for saying: 鈥渂etween stimulus and response, there is a gap from which all human freedom emerges鈥� (paraphrased but you get it).
FREEDOM:
As such, human consciousness of being (being-for-itself) engenders anxiety (because we know we鈥檙e gonna fucking suffer and die). But it can also engender freedom (because we can choose to do cool and meaningful shit before we die).
RESPONSIBILITY:
Sartre further argues that humans are 鈥渃ondemned鈥� to be free, meaning we can鈥檛 escape the necessity of choosing. Even apathy and inaction are choices for Sartre. As such, the
the ability to make choices comes the weight of responsibility to chose to do the right thing.
Fore Sartre, the facticity of freedom and responsibility is the essence of being human.
For Fore Sartre, humans CREATE their essence via choosing and taking action.
BAD FAITH:
Sartre defines Bad Faith (mauvaise foi) as a particularly dangerous form of self-deception, whereby individuals deny their freedom and responsibility. What some refers to as the 鈥渧ictim mentality鈥� and/or denial as ego defense.
In what is in retrospect, an OBSCENELY HOMOPHOBIC passage. Sartre prattles on about how homosexuality is a form of bad faith.
Needless to say. The example didn鈥檛 age well.
Perhaps a more appropriate example might be someone who conforms to a harmful social injunction (genocide) and later claims innocence because they were 鈥渏ust taking orders鈥� and as such claim that they had no choice in the matter, as thusly avoid responsibility for their actions.
Basically. This is pretty much all of us (to varying degrees). As our human existence is essentially engendering mass extinction. And bearing the weight of all that freedom to consume, and the responsibility of global climate catastrophe is.
Well.
A little too much for most if us to bear.
Sartre might call that 鈥渂ad faith consumerism鈥�.
THE LOOK:
Just incase you forgot this is French philosophy,
Sartre discusses how the presence of others influences self-awareness. An effect he refers to as The Look (le regard). Especially, this means that when another person looks at us, we become aware of ourselves as objects in their world, leading to a sense of being judged or defined by the other. This can cause feelings of alienation or conflict. A very French observation.
And also.
Very Modern (verging on postmodern).
AUTHENTICITY:
Sartre advocates for living authentically, which means acknowledging one's accepting freedom and taking responsibility for one's actions. This necessarily entails creating one's essence via conscious choices, rather than conforming to external pressures or living in bad faith.
And JUST LIKE THAT.
We鈥檙e no longer verging on the postmodern anymore. We鈥檙e SOLIDLY back in modernity.
But that 100% ok.
Because Sartre was basically bootstrapping himself (and the rest of the world) out of the premodern world view. And into the modern (verging on, but not quite achieving the postmodern, but CERTAINLY paving the way).
CONCLUSION:
B&N is a DENSE, nearly OPAQUE TEXT.
I am MORE THAN SATISFIED with a provisional read. If I was a total fucking masochist (which I am not), I might devote a little more of my ONE WILD LIFE to STUDY this text. But I鈥檓 going to 20/80 this bitch (meaning, a 20% investment gets you 80% of the total returns). I will take what I have. And leave the heavy lifting to professional historians and philosophers.
Given that.
I fell VERY enriched after stumbling through this monster. And while I can鈥檛 in good faith recommend that you read it. In fact I recommend that you DON鈥橳. I do recommend that humans (if not you, than someone) continue to read it.
5/5 馃ぉ
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