What do you think?
Rate this book
賲鬲丕毓 丕賱賮賷賱爻賵賮: 禺賱丕氐丞 賵丕賮賷丞 賱賱賲賮丕賴賷賲 賵丕賱賲賳丕賴噩 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷丞
賷丐賲賾賳 賲鬲丕毓 丕賱賮賷賱爻賵賮 廿囟丕賮丞 賲賮賷丿丞 賵賲購丨鬲賮賻賶 亘賴丕 廿賱賶 丕賱賰鬲亘 丕賱賮賱爻賮賷丞 丕賱鬲賲賴賷丿賷丞 丕賱賲鬲賵賮乇丞. 賵賲賳 丕賱賲丐賰賻賾丿 兀賳賿 賷噩賽丿賻 丕賱卮禺氐 丕賱毓丕丿賷 丕賱賲賴鬲賲購賾 亘丕賱丨噩噩 賵丕賱賲賳胤賯貙 賵鬲毓賵夭購賴 丕賱禺賱賮賷丞 丕賱賰亘賷乇丞 賮賷 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 賴匕丕 丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲賮賷丿賸丕貙 賵賰匕丕 卮兀賳 賰賱賽賾 賲賻賳 賷丿乇賾爻 賲丕丿丞 賮賷 丕賱丨噩噩貙 兀賵 丕賱賲賳胤賯貙 兀賵 丕賱丨噩丕噩 丕賱毓賯賱賷. 賵賯丿 鬲賮賷丿 丨鬲賶 丕賱賲賵丕丿 丕賱鬲賲賴賷丿賷丞 賮賷 丕賱賮賱爻賮丞 亘賵噩賴 毓丕賲 賲賳賴 賱兀賳賴 賷毓乇囟 丕賱賰孬賷乇 賲賳 芦丕賱兀丿賵丕鬲禄 丕賱賲賮賴賵賲賷丞 丕賱囟乇賵乇賷丞貙 賮賷禺賵囟 亘丕賱賲亘鬲丿卅賷賳 賮賷 賲毓馗賲 丕賱兀丿賵丕鬲 丕賱賲賮賴賵賲賷丞 賵丕賱鬲賲賷賷夭丕鬲 丕賱兀爻丕爻賷丞 丕賱鬲賷 賷爻鬲禺丿賲賴丕 丕賱賮賱丕爻賮丞貙 亘兀爻賱賵亘賺 賲亘爻賻賾胤賺 賵賱賲賾丕丨貙 賲毓 毓丿丿 賰亘賷乇 賲賳 丕賱兀賲孬賱丞貙 賵賲氐丕丿乇 賲爻丕賳丿丞 賲購禺鬲丕乇丞 亘毓賳丕賷丞.
Paperback
First published January 1, 2001
318 people are currently reading
2,656 people want to read
About the author
Julian Baggini
64听books574听followersJulian Baggini is a British philosopher and the author of several books about philosophy written for a general audience. He is the author of The Pig that Wants to be Eaten and 99 other thought experiments (2005) and is co-founder and editor of The Philosophers' Magazine. He was awarded his Ph.D. in 1996 from University College London for a thesis on the philosophy of personal identity. In addition to his popular philosophy books, Baggini contributes to The Guardian, The Independent, The Observer, and the BBC. He has been a regular guest on BBC Radio 4's In Our Time.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 68 reviews
January 27, 2013
I've been looking about for a good reference-work on the conceptual tools used in philosophy, and even a bit curious about the tools used by those often dismissed as philosophical cranks.
This book is well-organized and well-describes, in the limits imposed by its size, the methods and ideas that thinkers throughout history have used.
This is not a book for telling you what is true, you must look elsewhere for that, but one that gives you a basic outline of ways to properly frame and ask your questions, perhaps to find out on your own.
Here and there are lots of examples and illustrations of the thinking tools used to help you understand the sometimes strange, and even seemingly absurd ideas discussed in the field.
I was a little intimidated by the organization and cross-referencing in this book, but that actually proven very helpful in understanding related sets of ideas that may be in separate categories, for it allows a better understanding of concepts as they form a more complete whole.
I recommend this book for anyone interested in taking up philosophy as a hobby, and as a starter for those taking it up as a vocation.
This book is well-organized and well-describes, in the limits imposed by its size, the methods and ideas that thinkers throughout history have used.
This is not a book for telling you what is true, you must look elsewhere for that, but one that gives you a basic outline of ways to properly frame and ask your questions, perhaps to find out on your own.
Here and there are lots of examples and illustrations of the thinking tools used to help you understand the sometimes strange, and even seemingly absurd ideas discussed in the field.
I was a little intimidated by the organization and cross-referencing in this book, but that actually proven very helpful in understanding related sets of ideas that may be in separate categories, for it allows a better understanding of concepts as they form a more complete whole.
I recommend this book for anyone interested in taking up philosophy as a hobby, and as a starter for those taking it up as a vocation.
June 25, 2020
I read the recently published third edition of this book - although how different it is from previous editions I do not know.
I suppose this is best thought of as a reference book, with short sections on a wide variety of philosophical tools, techniques and theories. I read it end-to-end as one of my background reads (I normally have several books on the go) and enjoyed it. As someone with a reasonable philosophy background much was simple reminders, but I enjoyed most the introduction to areas of philosophy I鈥檝e not studied and will no go on to read more about. This was helped by a short section of recommended references for every topic.
But having said I enjoyed it I鈥檓 not sure who this book is for. I suspect it will not be of interest to a complete beginner in philosophy as you can鈥檛 really understand philosophy in such short pieces with no over-arching discussion, and much is too shallow for someone with any significant philosophical training.
If you are like me and are happy to read reference books like this to refresh ideas I should not have forgotten and be pointed to new areas of exploration useful. For anyone else, I'm not sure!
I suppose this is best thought of as a reference book, with short sections on a wide variety of philosophical tools, techniques and theories. I read it end-to-end as one of my background reads (I normally have several books on the go) and enjoyed it. As someone with a reasonable philosophy background much was simple reminders, but I enjoyed most the introduction to areas of philosophy I鈥檝e not studied and will no go on to read more about. This was helped by a short section of recommended references for every topic.
But having said I enjoyed it I鈥檓 not sure who this book is for. I suspect it will not be of interest to a complete beginner in philosophy as you can鈥檛 really understand philosophy in such short pieces with no over-arching discussion, and much is too shallow for someone with any significant philosophical training.
If you are like me and are happy to read reference books like this to refresh ideas I should not have forgotten and be pointed to new areas of exploration useful. For anyone else, I'm not sure!
November 9, 2007
This book is a solid introduction to the tools of the debate. Not a philosophical text, not a dictionary, it lives up to it's name as a serviceable toolkit for the back and forth of various philosophical stances.
Each chapter is a brief of the subject at hand, historical approaches, the assumptions of those approaches, and lastly how every single philosophical stance is ultimately undermined by either a succinct argument, logical inconsistency, or pithy quip.
If you've ever wanted to be a smug know it all who crushes your less-than-rigorous enemies, yearns to see their cherished beliefs driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of their women (or some superlative noun of your own devising) . .. .then this book is for you.
Each chapter is a brief of the subject at hand, historical approaches, the assumptions of those approaches, and lastly how every single philosophical stance is ultimately undermined by either a succinct argument, logical inconsistency, or pithy quip.
If you've ever wanted to be a smug know it all who crushes your less-than-rigorous enemies, yearns to see their cherished beliefs driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of their women (or some superlative noun of your own devising) . .. .then this book is for you.
May 2, 2014
賵丕囟丨 賵賲禺鬲氐乇 賱賰賳賴 賲賵噩夭 賮賷 亘毓囟 丕賱賳賯丕胤 亘胤乇賷賯賴 賱丕 鬲賰賮賷 賱卮乇丨 丕賱賮賰乇丞.
兀賮囟賱 丕賱賮氐賵賱 賵丕賰孬乇賴丕 鬲卮賵賷賯丕 賴賷
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱乇丕亘毓 丕賱禺丕氐 亘鬲賲賷賷夭 丕賱賲賮丕賴賷賲 賵賴賵 賷賵囟丨 毓丿賴 賲賮丕賴賷賲 賮賱爻賮賷賴 毓賳 胤乇賷賯 丕賱鬲賯丕亘賱 .
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱爻丕丿爻 賵賴賵 賷鬲賰賱賲 毓賳 丕丿賵丕鬲 賲丿丕乇爻 丕賱賳賯丿 丕賱卮賴賷乇丞 丕毓噩亘賳賷 卮乇丨賴 賱賳賯丿 丕賱爻賱胤丞 毓賳 賲賷卮賷賱 賮賵賰賵.
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱爻丕亘毓 賷賳丕賯卮 賲賵丕囟賷毓 毓丿賴 匕丕鬲 丕賴賲賷丞 賮賱爻賮賷丞 賰亘賷乇丞
賵丕禺賷乇丕 丕賱丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 丕賱丕賰亘乇 賰丕賳鬲 賲賳 丕賱丕丨丕賱丕鬲 毓賱賶 賰鬲亘 賱賱賯乇丕亍丞 賮賷 賳賴丕賷丞 賰賱 噩夭亍.
丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲賳丕爻亘 噩丿丕 賱賷 賰賴丕賵賷 賱賱賮賱爻賮丞 亘賮囟賱 賱睾鬲賴 丕賱亘爻賷胤賴.
兀賮囟賱 丕賱賮氐賵賱 賵丕賰孬乇賴丕 鬲卮賵賷賯丕 賴賷
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱乇丕亘毓 丕賱禺丕氐 亘鬲賲賷賷夭 丕賱賲賮丕賴賷賲 賵賴賵 賷賵囟丨 毓丿賴 賲賮丕賴賷賲 賮賱爻賮賷賴 毓賳 胤乇賷賯 丕賱鬲賯丕亘賱 .
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱爻丕丿爻 賵賴賵 賷鬲賰賱賲 毓賳 丕丿賵丕鬲 賲丿丕乇爻 丕賱賳賯丿 丕賱卮賴賷乇丞 丕毓噩亘賳賷 卮乇丨賴 賱賳賯丿 丕賱爻賱胤丞 毓賳 賲賷卮賷賱 賮賵賰賵.
丕賱賮氐賱 丕賱爻丕亘毓 賷賳丕賯卮 賲賵丕囟賷毓 毓丿賴 匕丕鬲 丕賴賲賷丞 賮賱爻賮賷丞 賰亘賷乇丞
賵丕禺賷乇丕 丕賱丕爻鬲賮丕丿賴 丕賱丕賰亘乇 賰丕賳鬲 賲賳 丕賱丕丨丕賱丕鬲 毓賱賶 賰鬲亘 賱賱賯乇丕亍丞 賮賷 賳賴丕賷丞 賰賱 噩夭亍.
丕賱賰鬲丕亘 賲賳丕爻亘 噩丿丕 賱賷 賰賴丕賵賷 賱賱賮賱爻賮丞 亘賮囟賱 賱睾鬲賴 丕賱亘爻賷胤賴.
August 12, 2022
脦ncep芒nd s膬 citesc mai serios despre filosofie 葯i propun芒ndu-mi chiar abordarea scrierilor clasicilor domeniului, una din 卯ntreb膬ri era aceea legat膬 de instrumentelor unui filosof. Asta p芒n膬 ce am dat de acest volum, care, iat膬 face oarece lumin膬 卯ntr-un domeniu 卯n care, cel pu葲in la 卯nceput, cam orbec膬i鈥�
Dar, nu, s膬 nu ai impresia c膬 trusa cu sculele filosofului 卯i este dedicat膬 exclusiv acestuia. Dac膬 ai 鈥瀙u葲intic膬 r膬bdare, stimabile鈥�, vei vedea c膬 volumul con葲ine o chintesen葲膬 clar膬 a unor lucruri pe care le 卯nt芒lne葯ti ici 葯i colo, f膬r膬 a putea s膬 le faci un inventar. Cartea de fa葲膬 reu葯e葯te acest lucru, ne ofer膬 卯n paragrafe scurte esen葲a modalit膬葲ilor 卯n care se pot aborda problemele vie葲ii, chiar 葯i 卯n via葲a de zi cu zi, nu doar cele abordate 鈥瀎ilosofic鈥�.
Vei descoperi o carte bine organizat膬 葯i bine scris膬, date fiind limitele impuse de dimensiunea ei; vei g膬si metodele 葯i ideile apar葲in芒nd diver葯ilor g芒nditori, de-a lungul istoriei filosofiei, dar 葯i modul lor de folosire. Ea ofer膬 o schi葲膬 de baz膬 a modalit膬葲ilor de a 卯ncadra problemele 葯i de a pune 卯ntreb膬rile adecvate, 卯n procesul individual de a afla r膬spunsuri. Referin葲ele 卯ncruci葯ate 葯i leg膬turile astfel f膬cute 卯ntre diversele subcapitole permit o mai bun膬 卯n葲elegere a conceptelor.
Din nou, de precizat c膬 volumul poate fi considerat o carte de referin葲膬, cu sec葲iuni scurte despre o mare varietate de instrumente, tehnici 葯i teorii filosofice. Prin carte de referin葲膬, desigur c膬 se 卯n葲elege una la care, cel pu葲in din c芒nd 卯n c芒nd, revii pentru a-葲i reaminti ceva de care te love葯ti de-a lungul vie葲ii. 葮i 卯nc膬 o precizare: desigur, nu po葲i spune c膬 卯n葲elegi cu adev膬rat filozofia prin intermediul unor paragrafe at芒t de scurte, dar acestea pot st芒rni curiozit膬葲i pentru c膬utarea de lecturi suplimentare asociate. Setul de instrumente al filosofului este chiar un compendiu al celor mai importante instrumente 葯i concepte pe care le folosesc filosofii. Textul este foarte util 葯i accesibil 卯n clarificarea termenilor 葯i conceptelor filosofice de baz膬 卯n 葯apte capitole.
Mai mult, 卯ntr-o er膬 a dezinform膬rii, a葯a cum se prezint膬 epoca noastr膬, toat膬 lumea ar trebui s膬 citeasc膬 o astfel de carte pentru a ob葲ine mai multe perspective, 卯n vederea analizei corecte a informa葲iilor primite.
脦ntregul recenzumat ...
Dar, nu, s膬 nu ai impresia c膬 trusa cu sculele filosofului 卯i este dedicat膬 exclusiv acestuia. Dac膬 ai 鈥瀙u葲intic膬 r膬bdare, stimabile鈥�, vei vedea c膬 volumul con葲ine o chintesen葲膬 clar膬 a unor lucruri pe care le 卯nt芒lne葯ti ici 葯i colo, f膬r膬 a putea s膬 le faci un inventar. Cartea de fa葲膬 reu葯e葯te acest lucru, ne ofer膬 卯n paragrafe scurte esen葲a modalit膬葲ilor 卯n care se pot aborda problemele vie葲ii, chiar 葯i 卯n via葲a de zi cu zi, nu doar cele abordate 鈥瀎ilosofic鈥�.
Vei descoperi o carte bine organizat膬 葯i bine scris膬, date fiind limitele impuse de dimensiunea ei; vei g膬si metodele 葯i ideile apar葲in芒nd diver葯ilor g芒nditori, de-a lungul istoriei filosofiei, dar 葯i modul lor de folosire. Ea ofer膬 o schi葲膬 de baz膬 a modalit膬葲ilor de a 卯ncadra problemele 葯i de a pune 卯ntreb膬rile adecvate, 卯n procesul individual de a afla r膬spunsuri. Referin葲ele 卯ncruci葯ate 葯i leg膬turile astfel f膬cute 卯ntre diversele subcapitole permit o mai bun膬 卯n葲elegere a conceptelor.
Din nou, de precizat c膬 volumul poate fi considerat o carte de referin葲膬, cu sec葲iuni scurte despre o mare varietate de instrumente, tehnici 葯i teorii filosofice. Prin carte de referin葲膬, desigur c膬 se 卯n葲elege una la care, cel pu葲in din c芒nd 卯n c芒nd, revii pentru a-葲i reaminti ceva de care te love葯ti de-a lungul vie葲ii. 葮i 卯nc膬 o precizare: desigur, nu po葲i spune c膬 卯n葲elegi cu adev膬rat filozofia prin intermediul unor paragrafe at芒t de scurte, dar acestea pot st芒rni curiozit膬葲i pentru c膬utarea de lecturi suplimentare asociate. Setul de instrumente al filosofului este chiar un compendiu al celor mai importante instrumente 葯i concepte pe care le folosesc filosofii. Textul este foarte util 葯i accesibil 卯n clarificarea termenilor 葯i conceptelor filosofice de baz膬 卯n 葯apte capitole.
Mai mult, 卯ntr-o er膬 a dezinform膬rii, a葯a cum se prezint膬 epoca noastr膬, toat膬 lumea ar trebui s膬 citeasc膬 o astfel de carte pentru a ob葲ine mai multe perspective, 卯n vederea analizei corecte a informa葲iilor primite.
脦ntregul recenzumat ...
February 1, 2020
"The Philosopher's Toolkit" proved once again that philosophy and understanding its principles is complex for an ordinary person with non-philosophical background. Book demonstrates its ineffable value if one uses it properly because it discusses relevant topics, or 'tools', to understand, verify, proof philosophical theories or arguments. There are some new terms that are crucial for savvy person to understand and use in its speaches or writings. Furthermore, it is very convenient in the future if you want to revise some topics.
November 1, 2021
If you pick any philosophy introduction book, you're likely going to offer a history of philosophy. They often start chronologically. So you may start with Socrates, and then Plato and Socrates. Then you will likely cover Augustine, Hume, Kant, and so forth. It finishes with a contemporary philosopher and that's it.
This gives you a brief outlook on the history of philosophy, which is certainly interesting to learn and very much needed. However, there is something odd about it because it doesn't actually teach you how to do philosophy. It's a history lesson more than anything else.
For instance, if you learn about Hume but you disagree with some of his arguments, you automatically come up with a rebuttal in your head. That's doing philosophy and doesn't necessarily require historical knowledge (although it's very useful).
This is what this book is about. How philosophy is actually done. I got it precisely because while a historical account is indispensable, it's not sufficient. And I found myself getting too comfortable in expanding my knowledge without feeling like I was improving my competency at analysis and critique.
This book isn't a miracle and it won't make you a good philosopher by reading it. That requires many years of practice and quite honestly just raw intelligence. Nevertheless, it does help, at least at providing you with a foundation you can build on.
The first part is a standard introduction to logic. How arguments work, deduction, induction, validity, axioms, and so forth. This was a bit disappointing since it is somewhat basic. However afterwards it started to get a bit more complicated and I found it more useful. Do you know what the fallacy of denying the antecedent means?
The fallacy of denying the antecedent works like this:
1. If p, then q.
2. Not p.
3. Therefore, not q.
As an example:
1. If you are in your bedroom, then you have slippers
2. You're not in your bedroom
3. Therefore you don't have slippers
This is a rather basic example of logic, but I chose it to exemplify that some more formal aspects of philosophy can be overwhelming due to their jargon but once you learn it they are not that intimidating. Most examples, especially as the book progresses, are more complex. But overall they are still accessible.
Don't be mistaken to think the book is only about logic, however. I was surprised by how much the book covered, not only in sheer quantity but also in several kinds of "philosophical tools". One of my favourite sections deals with conceptual distinctions that philosophers have used. For example a priori vs a posteriori, nothingness vs being, realist vs non-realist, analytic vs synthetic, etc. The last section was also very enjoyable, which looked at methods of critique, such as the class critique of Marx, the critique of power from Foucault, or the metaphysics critique of Heidegger.
To be fair, it had more history into it than I initially expected. However, in hindsight that was unavoidable, and certainly not a negative aspect of it. The binary opposition of history vs practice I mentioned still applies, although it's certainly not a black and white distinction. And this truly has a strong bias towards practice. And it's very much needed for most people.
It was a great read and I'm glad I choose it. It gave me exactly what I wanted. If you're serious about studying philosophy, then this book is a must-read. Or at least a similar one, which I don't think I know any with this casual spirit and not being a textbook. However it might be a bit tedious if you're completely new to the subject. Having a read a few more standard philosophy books first is recommended.
This gives you a brief outlook on the history of philosophy, which is certainly interesting to learn and very much needed. However, there is something odd about it because it doesn't actually teach you how to do philosophy. It's a history lesson more than anything else.
For instance, if you learn about Hume but you disagree with some of his arguments, you automatically come up with a rebuttal in your head. That's doing philosophy and doesn't necessarily require historical knowledge (although it's very useful).
This is what this book is about. How philosophy is actually done. I got it precisely because while a historical account is indispensable, it's not sufficient. And I found myself getting too comfortable in expanding my knowledge without feeling like I was improving my competency at analysis and critique.
This book isn't a miracle and it won't make you a good philosopher by reading it. That requires many years of practice and quite honestly just raw intelligence. Nevertheless, it does help, at least at providing you with a foundation you can build on.
The first part is a standard introduction to logic. How arguments work, deduction, induction, validity, axioms, and so forth. This was a bit disappointing since it is somewhat basic. However afterwards it started to get a bit more complicated and I found it more useful. Do you know what the fallacy of denying the antecedent means?
The fallacy of denying the antecedent works like this:
1. If p, then q.
2. Not p.
3. Therefore, not q.
As an example:
1. If you are in your bedroom, then you have slippers
2. You're not in your bedroom
3. Therefore you don't have slippers
This is a rather basic example of logic, but I chose it to exemplify that some more formal aspects of philosophy can be overwhelming due to their jargon but once you learn it they are not that intimidating. Most examples, especially as the book progresses, are more complex. But overall they are still accessible.
Don't be mistaken to think the book is only about logic, however. I was surprised by how much the book covered, not only in sheer quantity but also in several kinds of "philosophical tools". One of my favourite sections deals with conceptual distinctions that philosophers have used. For example a priori vs a posteriori, nothingness vs being, realist vs non-realist, analytic vs synthetic, etc. The last section was also very enjoyable, which looked at methods of critique, such as the class critique of Marx, the critique of power from Foucault, or the metaphysics critique of Heidegger.
To be fair, it had more history into it than I initially expected. However, in hindsight that was unavoidable, and certainly not a negative aspect of it. The binary opposition of history vs practice I mentioned still applies, although it's certainly not a black and white distinction. And this truly has a strong bias towards practice. And it's very much needed for most people.
It was a great read and I'm glad I choose it. It gave me exactly what I wanted. If you're serious about studying philosophy, then this book is a must-read. Or at least a similar one, which I don't think I know any with this casual spirit and not being a textbook. However it might be a bit tedious if you're completely new to the subject. Having a read a few more standard philosophy books first is recommended.
March 16, 2023
Bagini, Julian and Fosl, Peter S. The Philosopher鈥檚 Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods. London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
If the word 鈥減hilosophy鈥� alarms you, as it might some pietists, substitute 鈥渃ritical thinking鈥� and this book will give you a crash course in key concepts used in the literature. The book is divided into seven sections, with each section denoted 3.1, 3.2, etc. Section 1 deals with the basic tools of argumentation (validity, soundness, etc). Section 2 explores more advanced topics, such as abduction and dialectic. Section 3 covers most of the basic fallacies. Section 4 is the most important in the book. Chapter 5 explores historical tools (e.g., Leibniz鈥檚 Law, Ockham鈥檚 Razor, etc.). Chapter 6 explores what will later be called 鈥渃ritical theory.鈥�
In section 4 he deals with a number of powerful concepts. For example, analytic philosophers have noted the difference between de re and de dictionary beliefs. De dicto refers to the statement about x, de re to the thing (4.6). In terms of necessity, it runs:
De dicto: Necessarily, (Fa)
De re: A is necessarily F.
In terms of historical analysis, for example, Baginini gives a lucid presentation of Edmund Husserl鈥檚 phenomenology鈥搉o mean feat. To note: consciousness is a fact of existence. However, we always experience ourselves as part of something in this world. How then can we find the essence of a thing? Husserl uses epoche to bracket out what may or may not exist. This allows him to focus on intentionality. In other words, consciousness is always consciousness of something.
Although most readers of this review will be hostile to critical theory, perhaps rightly so, that makes this chapter extremely important. Not all of the radical critiques are important. Even the pertinent ones are rarely logically cogent. As a result for this review, we will focus on a few. Per Marx, society is divided into opposing classes, with one class opposing the other
In terms of philosophy, deconstruction does not mean what it means to today鈥檚 鈥渆x-vangelicals.鈥� For Derrida, the problem with philosophy is a problem of metaphysical presence. It is not exactly the same as the thing in-itself, but close enough. Reality, by contrast, is always mediated through signs. We can never have ultimate meaning (6.2).
Conclusion
By all accounts this is a most useful tool for both beginning and advanced philosophy students. Each section contains a small recommended reading list.
If the word 鈥減hilosophy鈥� alarms you, as it might some pietists, substitute 鈥渃ritical thinking鈥� and this book will give you a crash course in key concepts used in the literature. The book is divided into seven sections, with each section denoted 3.1, 3.2, etc. Section 1 deals with the basic tools of argumentation (validity, soundness, etc). Section 2 explores more advanced topics, such as abduction and dialectic. Section 3 covers most of the basic fallacies. Section 4 is the most important in the book. Chapter 5 explores historical tools (e.g., Leibniz鈥檚 Law, Ockham鈥檚 Razor, etc.). Chapter 6 explores what will later be called 鈥渃ritical theory.鈥�
In section 4 he deals with a number of powerful concepts. For example, analytic philosophers have noted the difference between de re and de dictionary beliefs. De dicto refers to the statement about x, de re to the thing (4.6). In terms of necessity, it runs:
De dicto: Necessarily, (Fa)
De re: A is necessarily F.
In terms of historical analysis, for example, Baginini gives a lucid presentation of Edmund Husserl鈥檚 phenomenology鈥搉o mean feat. To note: consciousness is a fact of existence. However, we always experience ourselves as part of something in this world. How then can we find the essence of a thing? Husserl uses epoche to bracket out what may or may not exist. This allows him to focus on intentionality. In other words, consciousness is always consciousness of something.
Although most readers of this review will be hostile to critical theory, perhaps rightly so, that makes this chapter extremely important. Not all of the radical critiques are important. Even the pertinent ones are rarely logically cogent. As a result for this review, we will focus on a few. Per Marx, society is divided into opposing classes, with one class opposing the other
In terms of philosophy, deconstruction does not mean what it means to today鈥檚 鈥渆x-vangelicals.鈥� For Derrida, the problem with philosophy is a problem of metaphysical presence. It is not exactly the same as the thing in-itself, but close enough. Reality, by contrast, is always mediated through signs. We can never have ultimate meaning (6.2).
Conclusion
By all accounts this is a most useful tool for both beginning and advanced philosophy students. Each section contains a small recommended reading list.
November 10, 2014
Erilaisia el盲m盲nhallintaoppaita harrastaville heti alkuun suorasukainen varoitus: Ajattelun pikkuj盲ttil盲isen kannesta kanteen lukeminen ei tee t盲ydelliseksi ajattelijaksi. Se ei edell盲 mainittujen oppaiden luonteen mukaisesti lupaa parantaa muistia, tehd盲 menestyv盲ksi osakesijoittajaksi tai auttaa laihduttamaan sy枚m盲ll盲 enemm盲n. Parhaimmassa / pahimmassa tapauksessa se saattaa johtaa kriittiseen suhtautumiseen kaikenlaisia kvasifilosofisia viisauksia ja 盲kkiselt盲盲n objektiiviselta kuulostavia el盲m盲nohjeita kohtaan ja tehd盲 entist盲 systemaattisemman ja kriittisemm盲n ajattelijan.
Ajattelun pikkuj盲ttil盲inen esittelee systemaattiseen filosofiseen ajatteluun liittyv盲t keskeiset k盲sitteet ja metodit lyhyen盲 ja selke盲n盲 peruskurssina. Brittil盲isen filosofin Julian Bagginin ja h盲nen amerikkalaisen kollegansa Peter S. Foslin maailmalla myyntimenestykseksi noussut teos kokoaa yhteen kriittisen ajattelun avaink盲sitteet ja metodit. Teoksen selke盲 rakenne k盲y ilmi jo ensimm盲isi盲 sivuja lukiessa. Jokainen logiikan peruskurssille osallistunut, kaltaiseni heikoilla matemaattisilla taidoilla varustettu filosofian opiskelija, on v盲litt枚m盲sti sinut argumentaation perusv盲lineihin tutustuessaan. Esitysj盲rjestys on selke盲, suorastaan looginen. Kirja jakautuu seitsem盲盲n lukuun. Liikkeelle l盲hdet盲盲n argumentaation aakkosista, argumenteista, premisseist盲 ja johtop盲盲t枚ksist盲, ja edet盲盲n kehittyneempien v盲lineiden, kuten dialektiikan, analogioiden ja loogisten rakennelmien kautta erilaisten arviointi- ja k盲sitteellisen erottelun v盲lineisiin. Omat lukunsa ovat saaneet my枚s tunnettujen filosofien ja historiallisten filosofisten koulukuntien menetelm盲t sek盲 radikaalin kritiikin v盲lineet, kuten esimerkiksi feministinen kritiikki ja foucaultilainen valtakritiikki. Kahdesta viimeksi mainitusta luvusta on kiitett盲v盲盲 apua erityisesti filosofian tietoteorian alkeiden hahmottamisessa. Teos p盲盲ttyy viimeisess盲 luvussa mielenkiintoisesti filosofian pelikent盲n, eli tiedon rajojen pohtimiseen. Teoksen johdannossa k盲sitteelliseksi ty枚kalupakiksi luonnehditusta kirjasta saatavat mahdolliset hy枚dyt ja jatkokehittelyt on jokaisen kuitenkin teht盲v盲 itse, kuten filosofian luonteeseen kuuluu.
Teos on k盲yt盲nn枚ss盲 niin vaivaton, kuin se t盲llaisessa kompleksiseksi luonnehdittavassa kokonaisesityksess盲 voi olla. Pikkuj盲ttil盲isille on tyypillist盲 suurten tietom盲盲rien puristaminen tiiviiksi kokonaisuuksiksi. Niinp盲 Bagginia ja Foslia voi onnitella suuren tietom盲盲r盲n esitt盲misest盲 selke盲sti, nasevasti ja ns. punaisen langan s盲ilytt盲en. Jokaisen k盲sitelt盲v盲n aiheen kohdalta l枚ytyv盲t my枚s viittaukset keskeisiin, aihetta k盲sitteleviin filosofisiin teoksiin. Kokeneempi filosofian harrastaja laittaa merkille brittil盲isen empirismin, erityisesti David Humen skeptisen filosofian ja toisaalta viime vuosisadan analyyttisen filosofian ja Ludvig Wittgensteinin merkityksen, joihin teoksessa toistamiseen t枚rm盲盲. T盲m盲 on itsest盲盲n selv盲盲, kun pit盲盲 mieless盲 edell盲 mainittujen herrojen merkityksen tietokritiikin kehittymisen historiassa, mutta se tuo esiin my枚s Peter S. Foslin harrastaman tutkimuksellisen mielenkiinnon, h盲n kun on kunnostautunut juuri David Humen tapauksessa.
Konkarisuomentaja Tapani Kilpel盲ist盲 voi puolestaan kiitell盲 onnistuneesta k盲盲nn枚sty枚st盲. Todenn盲k枚isesti h盲n on joutunut kirjan tiiviin esitystavan vuoksi miettim盲盲n useimmissakin kohdissa pariinkin kertaan, miten jokin k盲site tai esimerkki kannattaisi parhaiten suomentaa. Lopputulos on kompleksisuuden huomioon ottaen kiitett盲v盲盲. Kilpel盲inen on kaivanut esiin my枚s suomalaista l盲hdekirjallisuutta ja mainitsee niit盲 k盲sitelt盲viss盲 asiayhteyksiss盲. Se tuo teokselle herkullista lis盲arvoa.
Vaikka lopputulos on kiitett盲v盲, joitakin pieni盲 asioita j盲盲 kaipaamaan. Kun kyseess盲 on pikkuj盲ttil盲isen kaltainen, my枚s suurelle yleis枚lle tarkoitettu tietokirja, olisin kaivannut jonkinlaista filosofista sanastoa selvent盲m盲盲n joitakin keskeisi盲, k盲ytettyj盲 k盲sitteit盲. Niit盲 ei ollut kiitett盲v盲n esitystavan vuoksi monta, mutta filosofiaan tottumattomalle lukijalle ne olisivat varmasti avanneet teosta nopeammin. Kirjan lopussa ollut hakemisto oli kyll盲 varsin selke盲 ja kompensoi osittain puutetta. Terminologia olisi tullut paremmin esiin, jos teoksessa olisi hy枚dynnetty toisista pikkuj盲ttil盲isist盲 tuttua graafista esitystapaa esimerkiksi tekstilaatikoin tai erotettavin v盲rein. Internetin aikakaudella hyv盲n tietokirjan menestyksen salaisuus on paitsi hyvin tuotettu sis盲lt枚, my枚s tietojen mahdollisimman vaivaton etsiminen ja esittely.
Brittil盲is-amerikkalaiselta kaksikolta on n&n 鈥搆irjojen kautta ilmestynyt suomeksi my枚s rinnakkaisteos, Etiikan pikkuj盲ttil盲inen. Se on Ajattelun pikkuj盲ttil盲isen ohella ehdottomasti lukemisen arvoinen ja noudattelee rakenteeltaan pitk盲lti samanlaista esitystapaa, esitellen keskeisimm盲t etiikkaan liittyv盲t perusteet, etiikan lajit, keskeiset k盲sitteet sek盲 arviointiin, arvosteluun, kritiikkiin ja etiikan rajoihin liittyv盲t seikat. Kirjat muodostavat hyv盲n kokonaisuuden ja ne voi ostaa edulliseen yhteishintaan n&n-kirjojen verkkokaupasta, mik盲li t盲llainen pienimuotoinen mainos t盲ss盲 sallitaan.
Kirjaa voi suositella kaikille systemaattisesta ajattelusta kiinnostuneille. Aloitteleva filosofian harrastaja tai opiskelija lukee kirjan mielell盲盲n kannesta kanteen. Pidemm盲lle ehtinyt konkari voi k盲ytt盲盲 sit盲 hyv盲n盲 hakuteoksena ja muistin virkist盲j盲n盲. Filosofian harrastajan, opiskelijan tai opettajan kirjahyllyyn teos kuuluu kuin itsest盲盲n.
Ajattelun pikkuj盲ttil盲inen esittelee systemaattiseen filosofiseen ajatteluun liittyv盲t keskeiset k盲sitteet ja metodit lyhyen盲 ja selke盲n盲 peruskurssina. Brittil盲isen filosofin Julian Bagginin ja h盲nen amerikkalaisen kollegansa Peter S. Foslin maailmalla myyntimenestykseksi noussut teos kokoaa yhteen kriittisen ajattelun avaink盲sitteet ja metodit. Teoksen selke盲 rakenne k盲y ilmi jo ensimm盲isi盲 sivuja lukiessa. Jokainen logiikan peruskurssille osallistunut, kaltaiseni heikoilla matemaattisilla taidoilla varustettu filosofian opiskelija, on v盲litt枚m盲sti sinut argumentaation perusv盲lineihin tutustuessaan. Esitysj盲rjestys on selke盲, suorastaan looginen. Kirja jakautuu seitsem盲盲n lukuun. Liikkeelle l盲hdet盲盲n argumentaation aakkosista, argumenteista, premisseist盲 ja johtop盲盲t枚ksist盲, ja edet盲盲n kehittyneempien v盲lineiden, kuten dialektiikan, analogioiden ja loogisten rakennelmien kautta erilaisten arviointi- ja k盲sitteellisen erottelun v盲lineisiin. Omat lukunsa ovat saaneet my枚s tunnettujen filosofien ja historiallisten filosofisten koulukuntien menetelm盲t sek盲 radikaalin kritiikin v盲lineet, kuten esimerkiksi feministinen kritiikki ja foucaultilainen valtakritiikki. Kahdesta viimeksi mainitusta luvusta on kiitett盲v盲盲 apua erityisesti filosofian tietoteorian alkeiden hahmottamisessa. Teos p盲盲ttyy viimeisess盲 luvussa mielenkiintoisesti filosofian pelikent盲n, eli tiedon rajojen pohtimiseen. Teoksen johdannossa k盲sitteelliseksi ty枚kalupakiksi luonnehditusta kirjasta saatavat mahdolliset hy枚dyt ja jatkokehittelyt on jokaisen kuitenkin teht盲v盲 itse, kuten filosofian luonteeseen kuuluu.
Teos on k盲yt盲nn枚ss盲 niin vaivaton, kuin se t盲llaisessa kompleksiseksi luonnehdittavassa kokonaisesityksess盲 voi olla. Pikkuj盲ttil盲isille on tyypillist盲 suurten tietom盲盲rien puristaminen tiiviiksi kokonaisuuksiksi. Niinp盲 Bagginia ja Foslia voi onnitella suuren tietom盲盲r盲n esitt盲misest盲 selke盲sti, nasevasti ja ns. punaisen langan s盲ilytt盲en. Jokaisen k盲sitelt盲v盲n aiheen kohdalta l枚ytyv盲t my枚s viittaukset keskeisiin, aihetta k盲sitteleviin filosofisiin teoksiin. Kokeneempi filosofian harrastaja laittaa merkille brittil盲isen empirismin, erityisesti David Humen skeptisen filosofian ja toisaalta viime vuosisadan analyyttisen filosofian ja Ludvig Wittgensteinin merkityksen, joihin teoksessa toistamiseen t枚rm盲盲. T盲m盲 on itsest盲盲n selv盲盲, kun pit盲盲 mieless盲 edell盲 mainittujen herrojen merkityksen tietokritiikin kehittymisen historiassa, mutta se tuo esiin my枚s Peter S. Foslin harrastaman tutkimuksellisen mielenkiinnon, h盲n kun on kunnostautunut juuri David Humen tapauksessa.
Konkarisuomentaja Tapani Kilpel盲ist盲 voi puolestaan kiitell盲 onnistuneesta k盲盲nn枚sty枚st盲. Todenn盲k枚isesti h盲n on joutunut kirjan tiiviin esitystavan vuoksi miettim盲盲n useimmissakin kohdissa pariinkin kertaan, miten jokin k盲site tai esimerkki kannattaisi parhaiten suomentaa. Lopputulos on kompleksisuuden huomioon ottaen kiitett盲v盲盲. Kilpel盲inen on kaivanut esiin my枚s suomalaista l盲hdekirjallisuutta ja mainitsee niit盲 k盲sitelt盲viss盲 asiayhteyksiss盲. Se tuo teokselle herkullista lis盲arvoa.
Vaikka lopputulos on kiitett盲v盲, joitakin pieni盲 asioita j盲盲 kaipaamaan. Kun kyseess盲 on pikkuj盲ttil盲isen kaltainen, my枚s suurelle yleis枚lle tarkoitettu tietokirja, olisin kaivannut jonkinlaista filosofista sanastoa selvent盲m盲盲n joitakin keskeisi盲, k盲ytettyj盲 k盲sitteit盲. Niit盲 ei ollut kiitett盲v盲n esitystavan vuoksi monta, mutta filosofiaan tottumattomalle lukijalle ne olisivat varmasti avanneet teosta nopeammin. Kirjan lopussa ollut hakemisto oli kyll盲 varsin selke盲 ja kompensoi osittain puutetta. Terminologia olisi tullut paremmin esiin, jos teoksessa olisi hy枚dynnetty toisista pikkuj盲ttil盲isist盲 tuttua graafista esitystapaa esimerkiksi tekstilaatikoin tai erotettavin v盲rein. Internetin aikakaudella hyv盲n tietokirjan menestyksen salaisuus on paitsi hyvin tuotettu sis盲lt枚, my枚s tietojen mahdollisimman vaivaton etsiminen ja esittely.
Brittil盲is-amerikkalaiselta kaksikolta on n&n 鈥搆irjojen kautta ilmestynyt suomeksi my枚s rinnakkaisteos, Etiikan pikkuj盲ttil盲inen. Se on Ajattelun pikkuj盲ttil盲isen ohella ehdottomasti lukemisen arvoinen ja noudattelee rakenteeltaan pitk盲lti samanlaista esitystapaa, esitellen keskeisimm盲t etiikkaan liittyv盲t perusteet, etiikan lajit, keskeiset k盲sitteet sek盲 arviointiin, arvosteluun, kritiikkiin ja etiikan rajoihin liittyv盲t seikat. Kirjat muodostavat hyv盲n kokonaisuuden ja ne voi ostaa edulliseen yhteishintaan n&n-kirjojen verkkokaupasta, mik盲li t盲llainen pienimuotoinen mainos t盲ss盲 sallitaan.
Kirjaa voi suositella kaikille systemaattisesta ajattelusta kiinnostuneille. Aloitteleva filosofian harrastaja tai opiskelija lukee kirjan mielell盲盲n kannesta kanteen. Pidemm盲lle ehtinyt konkari voi k盲ytt盲盲 sit盲 hyv盲n盲 hakuteoksena ja muistin virkist盲j盲n盲. Filosofian harrastajan, opiskelijan tai opettajan kirjahyllyyn teos kuuluu kuin itsest盲盲n.
July 15, 2022
Really clear and concise guide for the tools of philosophy!
As an undergrad, I'll definitely be coming back to this text to stay grounded in the basics.
As an undergrad, I'll definitely be coming back to this text to stay grounded in the basics.
January 7, 2023
Does Not Compute
Criticism of p. 37 in The Philosopher鈥檚 Toolkit in the section titled 鈥楥ertainty and validity鈥� the following argument is presented:
1. All humans are mortal
2. Socrates was a human
Therefore, Socrates was mortal
This is an unsound argument. This point is not acknowledged by the authors. The authors only tell us that this argument is deductively valid in that the conclusion follows logically from the premises. A sound argument must have both: true premises and valid logic.
This is technically a valid argument in that the truth of the premises is included in the truth of the conclusion as mentioned by the authors. However, the argument is sound if and only if the premises are also true.
The argument is unsound because the first premise is not true, it cannot be proven to be true, and it cannot be defended. The first premise is really an empirical generalization and should not be used as a premise in a deductive argument as shown by the use of 鈥楢ll鈥� which is a universal quantifier. This type of problem was pointed out by Bertrand Russell in his 1912 book, The Problems of Philosophy.
When the premises are known a priori, deduction is the correct mode of argument. When the premises are based on empirical knowledge, induction is the correct mode of argument. An a priori proposition does not need to be tested with observations to conclude that it is always true. Empirical knowledge is that which is gained through observation and testing. The statement 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥� is really an empirical generalization made about all humans. Such a generalization can only be based on observations. However, we have not observed all humans. We do not know what the longevity of a human might be in the future. It does not logically follow that just because every human has died that every human born in the future will die. We cannot defend 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥� as a priori knowledge nor can we defend it based on empirical grounds due to our limited number of observations.
We have observed many humans and all of them have turned out to be mortal. We thus have good reason to believe that every single human being who was born has died, we know of no examples to the contrary. If Socrates was human, then we can infer that he was probably mortal. This is actually a stronger argument because we do not have to defend the proposition that 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥�. However, we can defend the conclusion that Socrates was probably mortal based on the inference that we can make based on our actual observations. In fact, the probability that Socrates was mortal is actually higher than the probability that 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥�. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, any empirical generalization is less certain than the actual individual observations because each of the individual observations can be verified, the generalization cannot be verified. Put another way, we can say that the probability that Socrates was mortal is actually higher than the probability that 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥� because it is obvious that if 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥�, so was Socrates but if Socrates was mortal it does not follow that 鈥渁ll humans are mortal.鈥�
Here is the argument restated as an inference:
1. All observed humans have been found to be mortal
2. Socrates was a human
Therefore, Socrates was probably mortal
Interestingly, the authors do address the problem of universal claims on P. 48 with the statements 鈥渘o human is immortal鈥� and 鈥溾€t always remains logically possible that one of the surviving humans is immortal鈥︹€� to adduce the argumentative problems created with the use of universal claims but never relate this back as a corrective to the presentation on p. 37.
Criticism of p. 61 in The Philosopher鈥檚 Toolkit in the section titled 鈥楢 Complication鈥�:
The author鈥檚 engage in misplaced ontological reductionism. It does no good to reduce the objects of common experience to the molecular, atomic or subatomic level because these levels of existence, though real, are not the levels at which we interact with in the everyday world of common experience. They are outside of the relevant range of our common experience. It does no good to say that a table is not really the table as we see it because it is really nothing more than a logical construction based on a collection of atoms or the vibratory patterns of molecules in lattice structure. Our interaction with the table is at our casual level, our level of experience and existence. Our causal level is the same level of existence as where our sense perceptions are operative. We interact with tables as solitary units ascertainable by our sense perceptions. We do not sense at the molecular or atomic level of existence. This sort of ontological reductionism is a mistake and leads us away from dealing with the world at the causal level that is within the relevant range of our common experience. Such reductionism is appropriate to the laboratory, not to our common experience. Such ontological reductionism is an incorrect conflation of different levels of existence that leads to confusion about the nature of existence. A table is not just a logical construction in the way that we can say society is a logical construction made from the existence of individual human beings in a community. This logical construction is sensible in that it is derived from that which already exists at the casual level, human beings, which are within the relevant range of our common experience. It is a mistake to represent the table as a mere logical construction from which it is ultimately made, atoms etc., because atoms do not exist at our causal level or within the range of our common experience. Where does such a logical construction start and stop? Are we to say that the table is a mere local construction of the vibratory patterns of molecules in lattice structure and that these molecules are in turn the logical construction of atoms and that the atoms are in turn a mere logical construction of subatomic particles? If any of these exist, then all of these exist and can be experienced as real at their appropriate level of existence, at their appropriate causal level.
Nor can we think about atoms and quarks as logical constructions of the things that compose our ordinary, common-life world as the authors鈥� further state. This is the same mistake, in reverse, of representing the table as a mere logical construction of molecules, atoms or subatomic particles as described above, viz., the incorrect conflation of different levels of existence that leads to confusion about the nature of existence and experience. Tables are not the logical construction of, atoms and atoms are not the logical construction of tables. Each exists, but at a different causal level of existence. Each exists, but only within a relevant range of common experience. Atoms, as the mode of existence, is the relevant level of existence for the laboratory and tables, as solitary objects, is the relevant level of existence for the living room.
Again, interestingly the authors do hint at this problem on P. 129 with the statements 鈥淭he liquidity of water is not apparent in its microstructure, but that does not mean that the description of water as H2O is inadequate or mistaken鈥︹€� and further 鈥溾€ecause to ascribe a chemical structure to water is not to deny water鈥檚 liquidity 鈥� liquidity not being a property of atoms.鈥� These statements are precisely correct but never related back as a corrective to the presentation on p. 61. These statements implicitly recognize that a material thing can have existence that is relevant at different levels of existence-perception and that any given level of existence-perception is not the mere logical construction of a different level of existence-perception. Each is real, but only at its appropriate and relevant range of common experience.
On page 173 it is stated 鈥溾€� the law of excluded middle 鈥� which holds that a statement must be either true or false, but not some third alternative (see 3.3).鈥� From reading section 3.3, the statements on page 173 seems to be a statement of bivalence, or a conflation of bivalence and the excluded middle.
From 3.3:
Excluded middle rule: For any P, P or not-P must be true
Bivalence rule: Every statement is true or false.
On p. 173, would not be better to state that the fundamental principle of rationality is that of bivalence, not the excluded middle? As stated in section 3.3, 鈥淣ote that the principles of excluded middle and bivalence are not equivalent, since the former involves the concept of (鈥榥ot鈥�), whereas the latter does not.鈥�
Section 4.4:
Can we further distinguish ontological objectivity and subjectively from epistemological objectivity and subjectively? As pointed out in the text, many people will state that politics or mortality or ethics is entirely subjective and there can be no objective answers and that only science is objective. It seems to me that the concept of 鈥榠ntersubjectivity鈥� may perhaps rest on the confusion between ontological objectivity and subjectively with epistemological objectivity and subjectively. There very well may be an equivocation in that the terms objective and subjective are used to mean ontology at one point and then epistemology at another point in such statements.
Ontology is about existence. Epistemology is about knowledge, or what we know about what exists. There are ontologically objective phenomena that are observer independent such as the material reality of the world, e.g., the existence of particles, atoms, mountains, lakes etc. Ontologically subjective phenomena are also things that do exist but are observer dependent such as, pain, happiness, love. Morality, ethics, politics are ontologically subjective. They exist but they are observer dependent. For example, pain is real but it is ontologically subjective, it is a subjective experience. Does this mean that we can know say nothing or do nothing objectively about pain? Pain is still epistemologically objective. This is the basis on anesthesiology. Therefore, it does not follow that ontologically subjective subjects are also epistemologically subjective. Epistemology is about knowledge and we can thus come to know objective facts about ontologically subjective subjects such as politics, ethics and pain.
We can have epistemologically objective knowledge, facts and analysis, about things that are ontologically subjective such as politics, morality and ethics. The social sciences and humanities cannot be dismissed as purely subjective because they are ontologically subjective. Human choice is a subjective reality (ontology) about which we can derive objective knowledge (epistemology).
Section 5.6, Leibniz Law:
The law is correctly stated as: 鈥淴 is identical with Y, if and only if every property of X is a property of Y and every property of Y is a property of X鈥�. This is found on page 205. It is further stated on page 205, 鈥淚n any case, for most practical purposes the principles seem obviously true, and do similar work.鈥�
I do not believe that it we should be so quick to state that Leibniz Law is obviously true. I am not sure what is meant by 鈥溾€or most practical purposes鈥︹€�
Here is the problem:
Leibniz Law: 鈥淴 is identical with Y, if and only if every property of X is a property of Y and every property of Y is a property of X.鈥�
From Leibniz Law it follows that X can be substituted for Y and Y can be substituted for X.
Leibniz law is essentially one of substitutability of co-referential statements. However, there are examples of where the basic principle of substitutability fails. Sometimes expressions referring to the same object are not substitutable as it follows from Leibniz law. If the truth of a statement is dependent on how an object id referred to, the principle of substitutability will fail. W.V.O. Quine referred to the failure of substitutability as referential opacity.
Here is an example of how the principle of substitutability fails from John Searle:
Statement 1: The number of planets is eight
Statements 2: Eight is greater than seven
By substitution of the subject from Statement 1, 鈥淭he numbers of plants鈥� for the subject of statement 2, 鈥淓ight鈥� it necessarily follows that the number of planets is greater than seven.
Actually, this does not follow. There is nothing necessary about the number of planets being eight. It just so happens to be the case that the number of plants is eight, but it is not necessarily so. Until recently the number of plants was nine and we would have falsely concluded, via this same principle, that there must necessarily be nine planets.
Statement 1: The number of planets is nine
Statements 2: Nine is greater than eight
By substitution of the subject from Statement 1, 鈥淭he numbers of plants鈥� for the subject of statement 2, 鈥渘ine鈥� it necessarily follows that the number of planets is greater than eight.
My own example,
Bruce Wayne is identical with Batman. Every property of Bruce Wayne is a property of Batman and every property of Batman is a property of Bruce Wayne.
Just because Batman is Bruce Wayne it does not follow that Commissioner Gordon, Chief O鈥橦ara, The Joker, The Riddler, The Penguin and the rest of the hoard believe that Batman is Bruce Wayne. Batman cannot be substituted for Bruce Wayne and Bruce Wayne cannot be substituted for Batman for this hoard of characters as it is the case for Alfred. In this case, the expression referring to the thing is not substitutable. Batman cannot be substituted for Bruce Wayne. No one knows that the properties of Batman and Bruce Wayne are identical. Since they do not know that Bruce Wayne is Batman, substitutability does not hold thus Leibniz Law cannot be said to hold or be applicable in this case. Bruce Wayne and Batman remain two different individuals with different properties for the Commissioner Gordon, et. al. The separate identities of Bruce Wayne and Batman depend on the failure of the principle of substitutability and if we can say that the principle of substitutability is the main requirement for identity within Leibniz Law, can say that Leibniz Law does not hold?
Criticism of p. 37 in The Philosopher鈥檚 Toolkit in the section titled 鈥楥ertainty and validity鈥� the following argument is presented:
1. All humans are mortal
2. Socrates was a human
Therefore, Socrates was mortal
This is an unsound argument. This point is not acknowledged by the authors. The authors only tell us that this argument is deductively valid in that the conclusion follows logically from the premises. A sound argument must have both: true premises and valid logic.
This is technically a valid argument in that the truth of the premises is included in the truth of the conclusion as mentioned by the authors. However, the argument is sound if and only if the premises are also true.
The argument is unsound because the first premise is not true, it cannot be proven to be true, and it cannot be defended. The first premise is really an empirical generalization and should not be used as a premise in a deductive argument as shown by the use of 鈥楢ll鈥� which is a universal quantifier. This type of problem was pointed out by Bertrand Russell in his 1912 book, The Problems of Philosophy.
When the premises are known a priori, deduction is the correct mode of argument. When the premises are based on empirical knowledge, induction is the correct mode of argument. An a priori proposition does not need to be tested with observations to conclude that it is always true. Empirical knowledge is that which is gained through observation and testing. The statement 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥� is really an empirical generalization made about all humans. Such a generalization can only be based on observations. However, we have not observed all humans. We do not know what the longevity of a human might be in the future. It does not logically follow that just because every human has died that every human born in the future will die. We cannot defend 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥� as a priori knowledge nor can we defend it based on empirical grounds due to our limited number of observations.
We have observed many humans and all of them have turned out to be mortal. We thus have good reason to believe that every single human being who was born has died, we know of no examples to the contrary. If Socrates was human, then we can infer that he was probably mortal. This is actually a stronger argument because we do not have to defend the proposition that 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥�. However, we can defend the conclusion that Socrates was probably mortal based on the inference that we can make based on our actual observations. In fact, the probability that Socrates was mortal is actually higher than the probability that 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥�. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, any empirical generalization is less certain than the actual individual observations because each of the individual observations can be verified, the generalization cannot be verified. Put another way, we can say that the probability that Socrates was mortal is actually higher than the probability that 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥� because it is obvious that if 鈥渁ll humans are mortal鈥�, so was Socrates but if Socrates was mortal it does not follow that 鈥渁ll humans are mortal.鈥�
Here is the argument restated as an inference:
1. All observed humans have been found to be mortal
2. Socrates was a human
Therefore, Socrates was probably mortal
Interestingly, the authors do address the problem of universal claims on P. 48 with the statements 鈥渘o human is immortal鈥� and 鈥溾€t always remains logically possible that one of the surviving humans is immortal鈥︹€� to adduce the argumentative problems created with the use of universal claims but never relate this back as a corrective to the presentation on p. 37.
Criticism of p. 61 in The Philosopher鈥檚 Toolkit in the section titled 鈥楢 Complication鈥�:
The author鈥檚 engage in misplaced ontological reductionism. It does no good to reduce the objects of common experience to the molecular, atomic or subatomic level because these levels of existence, though real, are not the levels at which we interact with in the everyday world of common experience. They are outside of the relevant range of our common experience. It does no good to say that a table is not really the table as we see it because it is really nothing more than a logical construction based on a collection of atoms or the vibratory patterns of molecules in lattice structure. Our interaction with the table is at our casual level, our level of experience and existence. Our causal level is the same level of existence as where our sense perceptions are operative. We interact with tables as solitary units ascertainable by our sense perceptions. We do not sense at the molecular or atomic level of existence. This sort of ontological reductionism is a mistake and leads us away from dealing with the world at the causal level that is within the relevant range of our common experience. Such reductionism is appropriate to the laboratory, not to our common experience. Such ontological reductionism is an incorrect conflation of different levels of existence that leads to confusion about the nature of existence. A table is not just a logical construction in the way that we can say society is a logical construction made from the existence of individual human beings in a community. This logical construction is sensible in that it is derived from that which already exists at the casual level, human beings, which are within the relevant range of our common experience. It is a mistake to represent the table as a mere logical construction from which it is ultimately made, atoms etc., because atoms do not exist at our causal level or within the range of our common experience. Where does such a logical construction start and stop? Are we to say that the table is a mere local construction of the vibratory patterns of molecules in lattice structure and that these molecules are in turn the logical construction of atoms and that the atoms are in turn a mere logical construction of subatomic particles? If any of these exist, then all of these exist and can be experienced as real at their appropriate level of existence, at their appropriate causal level.
Nor can we think about atoms and quarks as logical constructions of the things that compose our ordinary, common-life world as the authors鈥� further state. This is the same mistake, in reverse, of representing the table as a mere logical construction of molecules, atoms or subatomic particles as described above, viz., the incorrect conflation of different levels of existence that leads to confusion about the nature of existence and experience. Tables are not the logical construction of, atoms and atoms are not the logical construction of tables. Each exists, but at a different causal level of existence. Each exists, but only within a relevant range of common experience. Atoms, as the mode of existence, is the relevant level of existence for the laboratory and tables, as solitary objects, is the relevant level of existence for the living room.
Again, interestingly the authors do hint at this problem on P. 129 with the statements 鈥淭he liquidity of water is not apparent in its microstructure, but that does not mean that the description of water as H2O is inadequate or mistaken鈥︹€� and further 鈥溾€ecause to ascribe a chemical structure to water is not to deny water鈥檚 liquidity 鈥� liquidity not being a property of atoms.鈥� These statements are precisely correct but never related back as a corrective to the presentation on p. 61. These statements implicitly recognize that a material thing can have existence that is relevant at different levels of existence-perception and that any given level of existence-perception is not the mere logical construction of a different level of existence-perception. Each is real, but only at its appropriate and relevant range of common experience.
On page 173 it is stated 鈥溾€� the law of excluded middle 鈥� which holds that a statement must be either true or false, but not some third alternative (see 3.3).鈥� From reading section 3.3, the statements on page 173 seems to be a statement of bivalence, or a conflation of bivalence and the excluded middle.
From 3.3:
Excluded middle rule: For any P, P or not-P must be true
Bivalence rule: Every statement is true or false.
On p. 173, would not be better to state that the fundamental principle of rationality is that of bivalence, not the excluded middle? As stated in section 3.3, 鈥淣ote that the principles of excluded middle and bivalence are not equivalent, since the former involves the concept of (鈥榥ot鈥�), whereas the latter does not.鈥�
Section 4.4:
Can we further distinguish ontological objectivity and subjectively from epistemological objectivity and subjectively? As pointed out in the text, many people will state that politics or mortality or ethics is entirely subjective and there can be no objective answers and that only science is objective. It seems to me that the concept of 鈥榠ntersubjectivity鈥� may perhaps rest on the confusion between ontological objectivity and subjectively with epistemological objectivity and subjectively. There very well may be an equivocation in that the terms objective and subjective are used to mean ontology at one point and then epistemology at another point in such statements.
Ontology is about existence. Epistemology is about knowledge, or what we know about what exists. There are ontologically objective phenomena that are observer independent such as the material reality of the world, e.g., the existence of particles, atoms, mountains, lakes etc. Ontologically subjective phenomena are also things that do exist but are observer dependent such as, pain, happiness, love. Morality, ethics, politics are ontologically subjective. They exist but they are observer dependent. For example, pain is real but it is ontologically subjective, it is a subjective experience. Does this mean that we can know say nothing or do nothing objectively about pain? Pain is still epistemologically objective. This is the basis on anesthesiology. Therefore, it does not follow that ontologically subjective subjects are also epistemologically subjective. Epistemology is about knowledge and we can thus come to know objective facts about ontologically subjective subjects such as politics, ethics and pain.
We can have epistemologically objective knowledge, facts and analysis, about things that are ontologically subjective such as politics, morality and ethics. The social sciences and humanities cannot be dismissed as purely subjective because they are ontologically subjective. Human choice is a subjective reality (ontology) about which we can derive objective knowledge (epistemology).
Section 5.6, Leibniz Law:
The law is correctly stated as: 鈥淴 is identical with Y, if and only if every property of X is a property of Y and every property of Y is a property of X鈥�. This is found on page 205. It is further stated on page 205, 鈥淚n any case, for most practical purposes the principles seem obviously true, and do similar work.鈥�
I do not believe that it we should be so quick to state that Leibniz Law is obviously true. I am not sure what is meant by 鈥溾€or most practical purposes鈥︹€�
Here is the problem:
Leibniz Law: 鈥淴 is identical with Y, if and only if every property of X is a property of Y and every property of Y is a property of X.鈥�
From Leibniz Law it follows that X can be substituted for Y and Y can be substituted for X.
Leibniz law is essentially one of substitutability of co-referential statements. However, there are examples of where the basic principle of substitutability fails. Sometimes expressions referring to the same object are not substitutable as it follows from Leibniz law. If the truth of a statement is dependent on how an object id referred to, the principle of substitutability will fail. W.V.O. Quine referred to the failure of substitutability as referential opacity.
Here is an example of how the principle of substitutability fails from John Searle:
Statement 1: The number of planets is eight
Statements 2: Eight is greater than seven
By substitution of the subject from Statement 1, 鈥淭he numbers of plants鈥� for the subject of statement 2, 鈥淓ight鈥� it necessarily follows that the number of planets is greater than seven.
Actually, this does not follow. There is nothing necessary about the number of planets being eight. It just so happens to be the case that the number of plants is eight, but it is not necessarily so. Until recently the number of plants was nine and we would have falsely concluded, via this same principle, that there must necessarily be nine planets.
Statement 1: The number of planets is nine
Statements 2: Nine is greater than eight
By substitution of the subject from Statement 1, 鈥淭he numbers of plants鈥� for the subject of statement 2, 鈥渘ine鈥� it necessarily follows that the number of planets is greater than eight.
My own example,
Bruce Wayne is identical with Batman. Every property of Bruce Wayne is a property of Batman and every property of Batman is a property of Bruce Wayne.
Just because Batman is Bruce Wayne it does not follow that Commissioner Gordon, Chief O鈥橦ara, The Joker, The Riddler, The Penguin and the rest of the hoard believe that Batman is Bruce Wayne. Batman cannot be substituted for Bruce Wayne and Bruce Wayne cannot be substituted for Batman for this hoard of characters as it is the case for Alfred. In this case, the expression referring to the thing is not substitutable. Batman cannot be substituted for Bruce Wayne. No one knows that the properties of Batman and Bruce Wayne are identical. Since they do not know that Bruce Wayne is Batman, substitutability does not hold thus Leibniz Law cannot be said to hold or be applicable in this case. Bruce Wayne and Batman remain two different individuals with different properties for the Commissioner Gordon, et. al. The separate identities of Bruce Wayne and Batman depend on the failure of the principle of substitutability and if we can say that the principle of substitutability is the main requirement for identity within Leibniz Law, can say that Leibniz Law does not hold?
December 28, 2020
讴鬲丕亘 賲孬賱 丕爻賲卮 讴賴 丿乇 趩丕倬 鬲乇噩賲賴 賮丕乇爻蹖卮 芦噩毓亘賴 丕亘夭丕乇 賮蹖賱爻賵賮禄 賴爻鬲 丿乇亘丕乇賴 丕亘夭丕乇賴丕蹖蹖爻鬲 亘乇丕蹖 丕爻鬲丿賱丕賱 讴乇丿賳 讴賴 丿乇 賮氐賵賱 賲禺鬲賱賮 亘賴 鬲乇鬲蹖亘 倬蹖趩蹖丿賴 鬲乇 賵 賮賱爻賮蹖 鬲乇 賲蹖卮賵丿 . 賲孬賱丕 賮氐賱 丕賵賱 賴賲丕賳 丕亘夭丕乇賴丕蹖 鬲賮讴乇 丕賳鬲賯丕丿蹖 乇賵 賲蹖诏賴 賵 亘毓丿 賲蹖丕丿 丿乇 賮氐賱 丿賵賲 丕亘夭丕乇賴丕蹖 倬蹖卮乇賮鬲賴 鬲乇 乇賵 賲蹖诏賴 賲孬賱丕 丕亘夭丕乇 丿蹖丕賱讴鬲蹖讴 蹖丕 丕亘夭丕乇 鬲賯賱蹖賱 诏乇丕蹖蹖 賵 ...
丿乇 讴賱 丕賲丕 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕丨鬲蹖 賳亘賵丿.亘毓囟蹖 噩丕賴丕 賵丕賯毓丕 賴賲 噩賲賱賴 亘賳丿蹖 賵 鬲乇噩賲賴 亘丿 賵 賴賲 賲賮賴賵賲 賲亘賴賲 讴賴 胤亘蹖毓鬲丕 賮賱爻賮赖 丕蹖噩丕亘 賲蹖讴賳賴 丕匕蹖鬲賲 讴乇丿 丕賲丕 丿乇 讴賱 亘毓囟蹖 噩丕賴丕卮 噩丕賱亘 亘賵丿 賵 亘賴 禺賵賳丿賳卮 賲蹖乇夭蹖丿 賲孬賱丕:
芦賳爻亘蹖 鬲賵氐蹖賮 讴乇丿賳 趩蹖夭蹖 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕 賳蹖爻鬲 讴賴 賴蹖趩 卮丕禺氐蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丿丕賵乇蹖 讴乇丿賳 丌賳 丿乇 讴丕乇 賳亘丕卮丿 蹖丕 丕氐胤賱丕丨丕 賴乇讴蹖 賴乇讴蹖 亘丕卮丿 亘賱讴賴 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕爻鬲 讴賴 卮丕禺氐 噩賴丕賳 卮賲賵賱蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕乇丿 賵 賳亘丕蹖丿 鬲氐賵乇 讴乇丿 丿爻鬲 卮爻鬲賳 丕夭 蹖讴 卮丕禺氐 賲胤賱賯 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕爻鬲 讴賴 丕氐賱丕 賳亘丕蹖丿 賴蹖趩 卮丕禺氐蹖 乇丕 亘倬匕蹖乇蹖賲 亘乇毓讴爻 賳爻亘蹖 诏乇丕蹖蹖 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕爻鬲 讴賴 卮丕禺氐 賴丕蹖 賲鬲毓丿丿蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿 讴賴 賴蹖趩 蹖讴 亘賴 賳丨賵 噩賴丕賳 卮賲賵賱 亘乇鬲乇 丕夭 丿蹖诏乇 卮丕禺氐 賴丕 賳蹖爻鬲 賵 賴乇蹖讴 丕夭 丌賳賴丕 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳賳丿 亘乇丕蹖 賲讴丕賳賴丕蹖 禺丕氐 蹖丕 丕賮乇丕丿蹖 禺丕氐 丨鬲蹖 卮丕蹖丿 亘賴 賳丨賵蹖 丕賳毓胤丕賮 賳丕倬匕蹖乇 丕胤賱丕賯 倬匕蹖乇 亘丕卮賳丿禄
芦夭賳丿诏蹖 爻賮乇 丕爻鬲/賲賴乇亘丕賳蹖 禺賵丕爻鬲诏丕賴 馗賱賲 賵 爻鬲賲 丕爻鬲 / 禺乇丿賲賳丿鬲乇蹖賳 賲乇丿賲丕賳 賴賲 讴丕賴 賲夭禺乇賮丕鬲 乇丕 丿賵爻鬲 丿丕乇賳丿... 睾丕賱亘丕 鬲氐賵乇 賲蹖卮賵丿 趩賳蹖賳 诏夭蹖賳 讴賵賳賴 賴丕蹖蹖 賮賱爻賮蹖 丕賳丿 賵 賮賱爻賮赖 乇丕 丿乇 倬蹖卮 倬丕 丕賮鬲丕丿賴 鬲乇蹖賳 卮讴賱 亘蹖丕賳 賲蹖讴賳賳丿.诏夭蹖賳 诏賵蹖賴 賴丕 卮亘蹖賴 鬲賵蹖蹖鬲乇 賮賱爻賮赖 丕賳丿 丕夭 胤乇賮蹖 丿蹖诏乇 賮賱爻賮赖 賵丕賯毓蹖-賮賱爻賮赖 禺賵亘 賵 賲爻鬲丨讴賲-趩蹖夭蹖 噩夭 胤乇丕賮鬲 賵 倬蹖趩蹖丿诏蹖 賳蹖爻鬲 . 丌蹖丕 亘乇丕蹖 亘蹖丕賳 丕賳丿蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 賮賱爻賮蹖 睾丕賲囟 亘丕 鬲賲丕賲 馗乇丕賮鬲賴丕 倬蹖趩蹖丿诏蹖賴丕 賵 丿賯鬲賴丕 乇爻丕賱賴 賴丕蹖 丿卮賵丕乇 賵 胤賵賱丕賳蹖 賱丕夭賲 丕爻鬲 責 賴賲丕賳诏賵賳賴 讴賴 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 賲毓賱賲賴丕蹖 賲丕 丿乇 诏夭蹖賳 诏賵蹖賴 丕蹖 賳睾夭 丕馗賴丕乇 讴乇丿賴:芦賴乇 賮賱爻賮赖 丕蹖 讴賴 丿乇 倬賵爻鬲 诏乇丿賵 亘诏賳噩丿 噩丕蹖卮 賴賲丕賳 倬賵爻鬲 诏乇丿賵 丕爻鬲禄 禄
丿乇 讴賱 丕賲丕 讴鬲丕亘 乇丕丨鬲蹖 賳亘賵丿.亘毓囟蹖 噩丕賴丕 賵丕賯毓丕 賴賲 噩賲賱賴 亘賳丿蹖 賵 鬲乇噩賲賴 亘丿 賵 賴賲 賲賮賴賵賲 賲亘賴賲 讴賴 胤亘蹖毓鬲丕 賮賱爻賮赖 丕蹖噩丕亘 賲蹖讴賳賴 丕匕蹖鬲賲 讴乇丿 丕賲丕 丿乇 讴賱 亘毓囟蹖 噩丕賴丕卮 噩丕賱亘 亘賵丿 賵 亘賴 禺賵賳丿賳卮 賲蹖乇夭蹖丿 賲孬賱丕:
芦賳爻亘蹖 鬲賵氐蹖賮 讴乇丿賳 趩蹖夭蹖 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕 賳蹖爻鬲 讴賴 賴蹖趩 卮丕禺氐蹖 亘乇丕蹖 丿丕賵乇蹖 讴乇丿賳 丌賳 丿乇 讴丕乇 賳亘丕卮丿 蹖丕 丕氐胤賱丕丨丕 賴乇讴蹖 賴乇讴蹖 亘丕卮丿 亘賱讴賴 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕爻鬲 讴賴 卮丕禺氐 噩賴丕賳 卮賲賵賱蹖 賵噩賵丿 賳丿丕乇丿 賵 賳亘丕蹖丿 鬲氐賵乇 讴乇丿 丿爻鬲 卮爻鬲賳 丕夭 蹖讴 卮丕禺氐 賲胤賱賯 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕爻鬲 讴賴 丕氐賱丕 賳亘丕蹖丿 賴蹖趩 卮丕禺氐蹖 乇丕 亘倬匕蹖乇蹖賲 亘乇毓讴爻 賳爻亘蹖 诏乇丕蹖蹖 亘賴 丕蹖賳 賲毓賳丕爻鬲 讴賴 卮丕禺氐 賴丕蹖 賲鬲毓丿丿蹖 賵噩賵丿 丿丕乇丿 讴賴 賴蹖趩 蹖讴 亘賴 賳丨賵 噩賴丕賳 卮賲賵賱 亘乇鬲乇 丕夭 丿蹖诏乇 卮丕禺氐 賴丕 賳蹖爻鬲 賵 賴乇蹖讴 丕夭 丌賳賴丕 賲蹖鬲賵丕賳賳丿 亘乇丕蹖 賲讴丕賳賴丕蹖 禺丕氐 蹖丕 丕賮乇丕丿蹖 禺丕氐 丨鬲蹖 卮丕蹖丿 亘賴 賳丨賵蹖 丕賳毓胤丕賮 賳丕倬匕蹖乇 丕胤賱丕賯 倬匕蹖乇 亘丕卮賳丿禄
芦夭賳丿诏蹖 爻賮乇 丕爻鬲/賲賴乇亘丕賳蹖 禺賵丕爻鬲诏丕賴 馗賱賲 賵 爻鬲賲 丕爻鬲 / 禺乇丿賲賳丿鬲乇蹖賳 賲乇丿賲丕賳 賴賲 讴丕賴 賲夭禺乇賮丕鬲 乇丕 丿賵爻鬲 丿丕乇賳丿... 睾丕賱亘丕 鬲氐賵乇 賲蹖卮賵丿 趩賳蹖賳 诏夭蹖賳 讴賵賳賴 賴丕蹖蹖 賮賱爻賮蹖 丕賳丿 賵 賮賱爻賮赖 乇丕 丿乇 倬蹖卮 倬丕 丕賮鬲丕丿賴 鬲乇蹖賳 卮讴賱 亘蹖丕賳 賲蹖讴賳賳丿.诏夭蹖賳 诏賵蹖賴 賴丕 卮亘蹖賴 鬲賵蹖蹖鬲乇 賮賱爻賮赖 丕賳丿 丕夭 胤乇賮蹖 丿蹖诏乇 賮賱爻賮赖 賵丕賯毓蹖-賮賱爻賮赖 禺賵亘 賵 賲爻鬲丨讴賲-趩蹖夭蹖 噩夭 胤乇丕賮鬲 賵 倬蹖趩蹖丿诏蹖 賳蹖爻鬲 . 丌蹖丕 亘乇丕蹖 亘蹖丕賳 丕賳丿蹖卮賴 賴丕蹖 賮賱爻賮蹖 睾丕賲囟 亘丕 鬲賲丕賲 馗乇丕賮鬲賴丕 倬蹖趩蹖丿诏蹖賴丕 賵 丿賯鬲賴丕 乇爻丕賱賴 賴丕蹖 丿卮賵丕乇 賵 胤賵賱丕賳蹖 賱丕夭賲 丕爻鬲 責 賴賲丕賳诏賵賳賴 讴賴 蹖讴蹖 丕夭 賲毓賱賲賴丕蹖 賲丕 丿乇 诏夭蹖賳 诏賵蹖賴 丕蹖 賳睾夭 丕馗賴丕乇 讴乇丿賴:芦賴乇 賮賱爻賮赖 丕蹖 讴賴 丿乇 倬賵爻鬲 诏乇丿賵 亘诏賳噩丿 噩丕蹖卮 賴賲丕賳 倬賵爻鬲 诏乇丿賵 丕爻鬲禄 禄
March 11, 2008
True to its title, this book is basically an index of philosophical techniques. The author doesn't go into much depth talking about the techniques, although he does give recommended readings for them. And this, I think, is the book's best use.
Beware: The author's treatment of some topics is brief and lacking nuance. Of course, this is understandable given the nature of the text. But at other times, it is dubious. (For instance, his first example of a question-begging argument is an otherwise valid syllogism. Although some contend that this form begs the question, others accept it as valid. For the beginner seeking information, a less contentious example would be more useful.)
Beware: The author's treatment of some topics is brief and lacking nuance. Of course, this is understandable given the nature of the text. But at other times, it is dubious. (For instance, his first example of a question-begging argument is an otherwise valid syllogism. Although some contend that this form begs the question, others accept it as valid. For the beginner seeking information, a less contentious example would be more useful.)
June 25, 2011
A decent summary and explanation of common philosophical arguments. I got this book a while ago and have been reading it in short stints, kinda like reading an encyclopedia. I lost interest in this for a while, read a bunch of other works since, then decided to finish it all in one night because I had the additional context to be interested again. I'll probably use this as a touch stone in the future.
March 29, 2014
Baggini is one of the truly great philosophical authors. He writes in a way that makes philosophy approachable for people who, like me, are not trained in philospohy.
The book explains the basic tools and concepts of philosophy in nice digestible bites. Each day I would read a section and consider what I had learned.
I strongly recommend not only this book, but anything written by Baggini.
The book explains the basic tools and concepts of philosophy in nice digestible bites. Each day I would read a section and consider what I had learned.
I strongly recommend not only this book, but anything written by Baggini.
November 1, 2013
A clear explanation of a huge number of philosophical concepts, with excellent examples, written engagingly. This book is exactly what it says on the tin, and it's absolutely fantastic as a crash course in the philosophical style of thinking.
June 22, 2018
Started to like philosophy
It's not a deep book about philosophy but makes you a better thinker. I have read it twice, and I am always learning new things. Besides, I started to look at the world with a different view.
It's not a deep book about philosophy but makes you a better thinker. I have read it twice, and I am always learning new things. Besides, I started to look at the world with a different view.
July 9, 2019
The Philosopher鈥檚 Toolkit is an adequate trial in collecting 鈥� as the title suggests- all the tools a beginner in philosophy or even a master might find useful to refer to. Julian Baggini, the author, in 2003, has concisely but succinctly tackled many philosophical definitions and problems in a thought-provoking way. The book is divided into seven sections, one for each set of tools; from the very rock bottom of how to build a decent, sound argument to how to detect logical fallacies and infer their strengths and weaknesses, how to assess certain ideas or arguments, and what some of the over-arching principles of philosophy- such as realism, epistemology, identity, and scepticism- are.
One good thing about how the book flows is the recommended readings after almost every technique mentioned; one knows he/she is reading a worthy one when the author relates key ideas to each other, for example, after explaining briefly what the issue of alternative explanations might hold, he gave reference to the subsection of 鈥渁bduction鈥� which is also called 鈥渁rgument to the best explanation.鈥� to keep in mind the four factors we choose upon: simplicity, coherence, testability, and comprehensiveness in scope. As brief as the book seems, it still allows for the much easier diving into the depth of the problem. Another thing to notice while reading the book is how the author鈥檚 way of writing is a vivid example of a professional usage of the tools. For instance, one part that really spoke to me is the Error Theory; Baggini claims 鈥淚f we find our beliefs apparently overturned all too quickly and easily, we may actually start to become suspicious of our capacity to form any reliable position. For while evidence for the new view is being amassed, a wholly different question arises:鈥�; Now, going through the following paragraphs, one can see the application of this tool on most of the examples he introduced; he aims to show the reader how the pillars of a good philosophical work are built. In addition, through the aid of this book, one got to understand some much more sophisticated terms and their power, ambiguity vs. vagueness, incoherence vs. confusion, and subjectivity vs. objectivity, only it is relatively brief one would need extra resources to fully grasp the whole concept.
On reading 鈥淜ant once wrote that one should always treat persons as ends, never as means.鈥� (Baggini, 2003, p.95), I, as a reader, reflected upon how reality perfectly breaks this rule in almost every simple instance. It鈥檚 ideal but never in practice, at least for this reader鈥檚 humble eyes; and here he goes, the author, by reading my mind and presenting exactly the same thing via the trolley problem and how consequentialists view it in contrast with deontologists. The non-biased standpoint Baggini adopted made him an unimpeachable author and made it easier for the reader to focus on acquiring the tools they aim to. Baggini showed awareness to the effective manipulation techniques yet he just chose to put them all down on the table and hide none. One can notice this truth by realizing he is an atheist yet none of his claims about religious issues embraced the ad hominum fallacy nor showed any mortification to any party. It is clear that he predominantly depended on logos and avoided its fallacies and that did not, in principal, fail him. Baggini鈥檚 evocative examples are one of the things that made me more excited about this book; while showing how one can fall into building a tower of conceptual incoherence, he mentioned 鈥淜nowing how Iron behaves when left in conditions optimal to its continued, unchanged existence only gives a partial view of its nature.鈥�, this has spoken to me in a really poetic way; you can never understand your own self if you never experience different environments, you can never understand the human nature as to what extent it is malleable and open to change and to what extent it keeps its originality without going through multiple experiments and situations. Baggini showed in a flawless manner what philosophers go through to understand, analyse, and determine what type of questions is applicable and meaningful and what type is just a mere waste of time.
This is a book that would definitely work as a propellant for one鈥檚 critical and creative thinking; a fertile land to begin one鈥檚 own quest for what is true, what is right, and what is sane. It makes philosophy looks more approachable and friendly. If I were to recommend this book, I would totally do it despite the book鈥檚 brevity and compactness; this is because of the useful referencing and recommendations at the end of each and every subsection. The author displayed thorough knowledge of the essentials and therefore, one might think, he would not fail us in any of his other books.
One good thing about how the book flows is the recommended readings after almost every technique mentioned; one knows he/she is reading a worthy one when the author relates key ideas to each other, for example, after explaining briefly what the issue of alternative explanations might hold, he gave reference to the subsection of 鈥渁bduction鈥� which is also called 鈥渁rgument to the best explanation.鈥� to keep in mind the four factors we choose upon: simplicity, coherence, testability, and comprehensiveness in scope. As brief as the book seems, it still allows for the much easier diving into the depth of the problem. Another thing to notice while reading the book is how the author鈥檚 way of writing is a vivid example of a professional usage of the tools. For instance, one part that really spoke to me is the Error Theory; Baggini claims 鈥淚f we find our beliefs apparently overturned all too quickly and easily, we may actually start to become suspicious of our capacity to form any reliable position. For while evidence for the new view is being amassed, a wholly different question arises:鈥�; Now, going through the following paragraphs, one can see the application of this tool on most of the examples he introduced; he aims to show the reader how the pillars of a good philosophical work are built. In addition, through the aid of this book, one got to understand some much more sophisticated terms and their power, ambiguity vs. vagueness, incoherence vs. confusion, and subjectivity vs. objectivity, only it is relatively brief one would need extra resources to fully grasp the whole concept.
On reading 鈥淜ant once wrote that one should always treat persons as ends, never as means.鈥� (Baggini, 2003, p.95), I, as a reader, reflected upon how reality perfectly breaks this rule in almost every simple instance. It鈥檚 ideal but never in practice, at least for this reader鈥檚 humble eyes; and here he goes, the author, by reading my mind and presenting exactly the same thing via the trolley problem and how consequentialists view it in contrast with deontologists. The non-biased standpoint Baggini adopted made him an unimpeachable author and made it easier for the reader to focus on acquiring the tools they aim to. Baggini showed awareness to the effective manipulation techniques yet he just chose to put them all down on the table and hide none. One can notice this truth by realizing he is an atheist yet none of his claims about religious issues embraced the ad hominum fallacy nor showed any mortification to any party. It is clear that he predominantly depended on logos and avoided its fallacies and that did not, in principal, fail him. Baggini鈥檚 evocative examples are one of the things that made me more excited about this book; while showing how one can fall into building a tower of conceptual incoherence, he mentioned 鈥淜nowing how Iron behaves when left in conditions optimal to its continued, unchanged existence only gives a partial view of its nature.鈥�, this has spoken to me in a really poetic way; you can never understand your own self if you never experience different environments, you can never understand the human nature as to what extent it is malleable and open to change and to what extent it keeps its originality without going through multiple experiments and situations. Baggini showed in a flawless manner what philosophers go through to understand, analyse, and determine what type of questions is applicable and meaningful and what type is just a mere waste of time.
This is a book that would definitely work as a propellant for one鈥檚 critical and creative thinking; a fertile land to begin one鈥檚 own quest for what is true, what is right, and what is sane. It makes philosophy looks more approachable and friendly. If I were to recommend this book, I would totally do it despite the book鈥檚 brevity and compactness; this is because of the useful referencing and recommendations at the end of each and every subsection. The author displayed thorough knowledge of the essentials and therefore, one might think, he would not fail us in any of his other books.
July 12, 2022
The philosopher's Toolkit is exactly what it says it is. It is a compendium of the most essential tools and concepts that philosophers use. The text is highly useful and accessible in clarifying basic philosophical terms and concepts in seven chapters. You can use this book as a ready reference apart from just reading cover to cover.
The first two chapters of the book deal with the devices used in arguments: deduction and induction, fallacies and tautologies, ....
Chapter Three is about how we would evaluate the arguments with features like ambiguity, circularity, genetic fallacy, redundancy...
Chapter Four shows us how to distinguish between complementary pairs of philosophical concepts 鈥� analytic and synthetic, cause and reason, sense and reference, objective and subjective arguments...
Chapter Five examines some of the most famous arguments that were used by famous philosophers 鈥� like Hegel's dialectics, Hume鈥檚 Fork, Ogham鈥檚 Razor...
The remaining two chapters are also written in a historical context dealing with radical critique and other schools of philosophy and the views of some great philosophers of the past 鈥� Leibniz, Nietzsche, Sartre, and other more modern French philosophers Foucault, Lacan, and others.
All in all, this book is a great toolkit for serious students of philosophy who want to have a reference to essential terms and tools in philosophy.
The first two chapters of the book deal with the devices used in arguments: deduction and induction, fallacies and tautologies, ....
Chapter Three is about how we would evaluate the arguments with features like ambiguity, circularity, genetic fallacy, redundancy...
Chapter Four shows us how to distinguish between complementary pairs of philosophical concepts 鈥� analytic and synthetic, cause and reason, sense and reference, objective and subjective arguments...
Chapter Five examines some of the most famous arguments that were used by famous philosophers 鈥� like Hegel's dialectics, Hume鈥檚 Fork, Ogham鈥檚 Razor...
The remaining two chapters are also written in a historical context dealing with radical critique and other schools of philosophy and the views of some great philosophers of the past 鈥� Leibniz, Nietzsche, Sartre, and other more modern French philosophers Foucault, Lacan, and others.
All in all, this book is a great toolkit for serious students of philosophy who want to have a reference to essential terms and tools in philosophy.
September 16, 2018
Rational Foundations
The graphic use of trade tools on the cover to form the word "Toolkit" is ingenious, and the content does not disappoint. Baggini and Fosl provide a witty and readable guide to the basic premises of a wide range of western philosophical schools. The book begins with a summary of the methods and modalities of philosophical argument and pleases the reader with wonderfully succinct illustrations of common and sometimes exotic terms used. At the same time they introduce many key ideas, writers and controversies that have arisen in the field. In a nod to hypertextuality, each of the topics ends with useful references to related topics elsewhere in the book.
All of us get involved in various kinds of argumentation . As such it is useful to step back and consider the kind of argument it is, the premises being invoked and the basis on which it is being judged, and an assessment whether the reasoning is valid, testable or a fallacy, let alone true, the distinctions being admirably addressed by the authors. Whether one's interest is in theories of society, politics, morality, knowledge, systems of belief, the schools of western philosophy or simply the mechanics of better argumentation, this is a very enjoyable read!
The graphic use of trade tools on the cover to form the word "Toolkit" is ingenious, and the content does not disappoint. Baggini and Fosl provide a witty and readable guide to the basic premises of a wide range of western philosophical schools. The book begins with a summary of the methods and modalities of philosophical argument and pleases the reader with wonderfully succinct illustrations of common and sometimes exotic terms used. At the same time they introduce many key ideas, writers and controversies that have arisen in the field. In a nod to hypertextuality, each of the topics ends with useful references to related topics elsewhere in the book.
All of us get involved in various kinds of argumentation . As such it is useful to step back and consider the kind of argument it is, the premises being invoked and the basis on which it is being judged, and an assessment whether the reasoning is valid, testable or a fallacy, let alone true, the distinctions being admirably addressed by the authors. Whether one's interest is in theories of society, politics, morality, knowledge, systems of belief, the schools of western philosophy or simply the mechanics of better argumentation, this is a very enjoyable read!
January 21, 2022
I'd say that the book would be extremely helpful for beginners while being introduced to the subject. I liked the book not only because it demonstrates the tools and creativity of a philosopher's world, but because it also shows the humility of philosophy by showing how it's often not an end all be all. I think that when I started learning about philosophy, it was hard to imagine what even the subject was about. I learned the basic philosophical method, and couldn't really pretend I knew anything else about what philosophy can do / has done. Similar to how a person may take their first science class and think that science could only be based around that single scientific
method that you learn about. Contrary to what an intro course could/should do, this book gives you a more nuanced perspective into philosophy, so I'm immensely grateful for
that.
method that you learn about. Contrary to what an intro course could/should do, this book gives you a more nuanced perspective into philosophy, so I'm immensely grateful for
that.
February 25, 2025
Pretty decent overview of philosophical methods and tools. Very informative, concise and comprehensive... perhaps too concise and comprehensive. First, I don't think it can serve as an introductory walkthrough to the topic, since quite complicated concepts and not necessarily well-known authors are discussed in a superficial and hastened manner. Secondly, the author has a an all-encompassing ambition that generates unnecessary repetitions and ends up making the main title of the book sound a bit absurd; some of the terms discussed, such as doxa/para-doxa or aphorisms, can hardly be considered tools. Lastly, the inclusion of certain authors whose contributions to philosophy are questionable is very underwhelming. Chapter 6, in particular, is in almost its entirety skippable.
January 14, 2022
A very densely packed and tremendously useful book - I particularly enjoy how the authors balance between keeping concepts comprehensible but still very informative. Also, sometimes one gets surprised by wonderfully dry humour. This book is best read chapter by chapter, by making notes and sketching out concepts. If you're searching for an easy-digestible read, probably you'll be disappointed but if you are searching for something with a dense page/information ratio, this is a great choice - also useful for looking things up, due to the way it's structured and references added at the end of each chapter. As interested laywoman working through the book gave me lots of valuable insights.
November 5, 2022
In my pursuit to fill in gaps and review concepts and arguments from philosophy, I came across some books that were utterly dreadful and should not be used for anything but quick reference. This was not the case with this book. Although I still see its value as being mostly about a quick reference if I need a reminder about a concept or topic I forgot about while reading something else, it was still delightful and informative to read it from beginning to end. It served as a good refresher on topics I knew, a reminder of the ones I was shaky about and a quick intro to others I was not familiar with.
March 19, 2023
It is nice introduction to the world of philosophy. It starts with simple concept and ends with complex one. It shows that philosophy has been always the basic of research and even the modern research and medical research. Accordingly, it is the basic of all the sciences and evidence based knowledge that we know today.
February 9, 2024
Bit weird, I mostly expected the book to explain various techniques for argumentation or critical thinking (and to be fair, a large part of the book was exactly that), but a lot was dedicated to explaining various points and arguments certain philosophers had made about metaphysics or epistemology. It was interesting, I definitely found myself wanting to learn more about some of the topics mentioned, but the coverage was not as extensive as I would have wanted.
May 25, 2018
I read it cover to cover, and enjoyed every moment. It's not often you can say that about a reference work. Great refresher if you are in to the tools of argumentation (and not just arguing).
April 27, 2020
It's been helping to have a good hold on the basics. Otherwise, I've just been stumbling upon philosophical texts and trying to make sense out of those on my own for a while.
Read
August 12, 2020DNF at 58%. It is not a bad book, but... well, dry.
December 14, 2020
if you are starting out, must read this. just as the title says, book is good beginners and explains the stuff in easy terms as well.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 68 reviews
Can't find what you're looking for?
Get help and learn more about the design.