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| 1845294858
| 9781845294854
| 1845294858
| 4.03
| 59
| 1956
| Sep 14, 2006
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it was amazing
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This book is a true gem, sadly so forgotten these days. It presents not just an argument for a pragmatic form of leftist politics that is relevant eve
This book is a true gem, sadly so forgotten these days. It presents not just an argument for a pragmatic form of leftist politics that is relevant even now, almost 60 years after its publication, but also a great analysis of many aspects of public policy in Britain from the first principles. It oscillates between adorably archaic, through inspiringly aspirational, to very relevant even now. The core argument of the book is to draw a distinction between the means and the ends of socialism - which I must say he uses very loosely and even has multiple chapters dedicated to explaining. Socialism for Crosland is a strain of political thinking that cannot be precisely defined - but he very much argues against seeing it in its Eastern-European, totalitarian variety. For him it’s rather a living ideal, a set of values and principles that guide policy and politics towards a more just, equal and communal form. Crosland argues against the blind following of one particular strain of socialist dogmas (which he analyses in great detail) - like nationalising for the sake of nationalising - and instead argues for a pragmatic approach in pursuing the core values of socialism which he defines primarily as the pursuit of equality and social mobility. Crosland is a pluralist, arguing for freedom of choice and expression in all aspects of personal and economic life while keeping his focus on dismantling the rigid classist structure of the British society of the 1950s. Crosland believed in socialism 'not on paternalistic or totalitarian grounds, but as a means of increasing personal freedom and the range of choice.' Crosland believes in an economy and society that benefits everyone - where state-owned firms compete with co-operatives and private companies, because in the blood of the socialist, 'there should always run a trace of the anarchist and the libertarian, and not too much of the prig and the prude.' Debates around nationalism loom large in the book and analysis, but the more important sections of the book are dedicated to public service reform. Although Crosland became later known, as the Education Secretary, for his policy of dismantling the grammar schools, The Future of Socialism does not treat them as harshly and argues more against public schools (arguing for a policy of forcing them to have a quota of non-fee paying places) and for the growth of comprehensives. In general, Crosland argues for moving towards treating people and the users of public services as individuals, not as classes or groups of people. And of course, to improve their quality, so that the differences between levels of income and wealth are not present in accessing them. Another fascinating aspect of the book is the analysis of the time it was written in. The capitalism of 1950s Britain was a very different beast from the times we live in now - before the present-day level of financialization of everything, with much greater separation of ownership and control, nationalised industries such as steel, coal and railways and despite recent memories of shortages and rationing in the after-war period, a strong sense of the coming age of abundance - which was already present in the United States, which are always a fascinating reference point throughout the book (along with the socialist Sweden). It is also a time before capital gains taxes (which Crosland argues strongly for, on a flat rate), large pension funds or the creation of modern international development aid. The state was effectively running the economy, through regulations, National Boards and currency controls - and as is stressed at the beginning of the book, full employment and strong and competent Trade Unions meant that labour had much more power than a couple of decades prior, with much of the socialist dogmas of the interwar period about the cartoonishly evil aspects of capitalists and capitalism no longer being valid. While there are parts where Crosland had to argue for growth and greater consumption (as large parts of the Labour or socialist movement were rather austere and puritanical), in the end, he eventually calls for a government-owned private equity fund! There are fascinating quotes like 'No one of any standing now believes the once-popular Hayek thesis that any interference with the market mechanism must start us down the slippery slope that leads to totalitarianism.' Well, even in 2025, some people still do! I have been fascinated by this book ever since I read about its influence on young John Rawls (which he read during his time at Oxford) in 'In the Shadow of Justice' by Katrina Forrester. There are parts and sometimes even literal passages that feel proto-Rawlsian, such an emphasis on the importance of dignity and respect in debates around pursuing greater equality or in various parts where he stresses that ability being a chance factor, it should be rewarded only as much as it benefits the society as a whole. In 1956! The difference principle before Rawls! There is even a debate about meritocracy, thanks to Crosland's early debates with Michael Young, which is effectively the same argument made by Michael Sandel, half a century later. Although Crosland and his arguments can seem a bit technocratic, the opposite is true - this book is grounded in socialist, leftist and communitarian values, from William Morris, through Fabians to the legacy of Keir Hardie. And the whole of conclusion is dedicated to the need to finance beautification and the arts (Crosland even argues for longer opening hours of pubs - a timeless concern!). Interestingly enough in his argument for curated and beautiful public space he praises the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, which is now Blaine’s by a lot of policy thinkers on the right in creating extreme barriers for development. The book finishes with a sentence that I always thought was written by John Kenneth Galbraith or Keynes, but seems to be from the one and only, Tony Crosland; ‘We do not want to enter the age of abundance, only to find that we have lost the values which might teach us how to enjoy it.� So much of this book is fascinating even in itself, not just as a historical record. The Future of Socialism and Anthony Crosland to a large extent created the intellectual grounding for the Revisionist stream within the parliamentary and political Labour party - and one sees the impact on later movements like New Labour not just in Crosland's emphasis on the importance of public services. It is terribly sad that both Crosland as well as Hugh Gaitskell died so young and before they were able to pursue this moderate and pragmatic approach fully in a Labour government. ...more |
Notes are private!
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1
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Feb 26, 2025
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Apr 14, 2025
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Apr 14, 2025
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Paperback
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| 0802157076
| 9780802157072
| 0802157076
| 3.96
| 11,453
| Mar 02, 2021
| Mar 29, 2022
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really liked it
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An anti-colonial political treatise, masking as a thriller journey through the tortured mind of a former communist spy exiled to 1980s Paris. Painful
An anti-colonial political treatise, masking as a thriller journey through the tortured mind of a former communist spy exiled to 1980s Paris. Painful at times, but boy oh boy, this man can write. The novel follows the protagonist and his blood brother Bon as they arrive in France in the early 1980s, having escaped from a re-education camp in Vietnam. Struggling to survive as refugees, they become entangled in the world of the French elite, drug trafficking, and political pseudo-radicalism. The protagonist starts working as a lackey for a drug-dealing Boss while grappling with his fractured identity, the ghosts of his war, and the contradictions of colonialism and capitalism. The novel relentlessly critiques colonialism and its lingering effects, particularly in France and within the Vietnamese diaspora. It deconstructs the country's self-image as a beacon of liberty, equality, and fraternity, exposing the hypocrisy in its treatment of immigrants and former colonial subjects. The protagonist experiences this firsthand, encountering both overt racism and more insidious forms of condescension from the French intellectual elite, who claim to admire revolutionaries while benefiting from the very structures of power they critique. At times, the protagonist becomes a vessel for competing ideological debates, which can make the novel feel weighed down by its intellectual density of discussions of Fanon, Sartre, Adorno or Althusser. While, for the most part, it retains biting satire, its philosophical musings are sometimes quite painful and overshadow the narrative drive. Quite difficult is also the tone of the narration, when the author uses the dissociative implications of a mental breakdown to illustrate the ‘loosened screw� in the mind of the man of two minds. ...more |
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Feb 12, 2025
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Feb 17, 2025
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Feb 17, 2025
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| 0691163081
| 9780691163086
| 0691163081
| 4.03
| 79
| Sep 24, 2019
| Sep 24, 2019
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it was amazing
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In the Shadow of Justice is a monumental study of the impact - or rather domination - of John Rawls' thinking and framework on the topics of justice a
In the Shadow of Justice is a monumental study of the impact - or rather domination - of John Rawls' thinking and framework on the topics of justice and equality in late 20th-century political philosophy. It approaches it from the perspective of the history of ideas, with Forrester being trained in the Cambridge school's tradition and under the strong influence of Quentin Skinner, which is present throughout the book. Forrester shows how liberal egalitarianism triumphed in the post-war period through its ability to incorporate various other strands of 'public affairs' within its framework and, to some extent, the evolution or shift of its focus in response to political changes. Rawls' thinking became so dominant that even his most ardent critics ultimately had to debate his ideas of justice on his terms, with his framework. Yet, Forrester argues that this dominance came at a cost—by establishing Rawlsian justice as the central paradigm, alternative approaches to thinking about justice, such as socialist and radical democratic traditions, were marginalized or constrained within Rawlsian boundaries. This had long-term consequences, particularly in shaping the ways in which political philosophy engaged (or failed to engage) with real-world inequalities, institutions, and political economy. The early chapters show the development of Rawls' approach to thinking about justice - from his wartime service, through years at Princeton and very importantly at Oxford. There he was influenced by the revisionist wing of Labour thinkers, particularly Anthony Crossland (which is a very interesting connection). This connected to his intellectual upbringing within the post-war American affluence, steady growth, and dominance within the capitalist world. Forrester shows the development of Rawls' thought - which ultimately constrained it to a large extent as was shown in the debates about the future in the 1980s - from an aversion towards the expansion of the administrative state and limits of state planning, an aversion to utilitarianism, to the importance of Tocqueville-style town hall democracy and family ties (with both family ties and future generations being represented in his framework through the 'heads of households' as agents in the original position - which is the influence of Jefferson and Rousseau). Young Rawls looked for a ‘prenez garde� state, where an effective predistribution would limit the need for an interventionist state and give more space to church, family and community. Forrester shows how Rawls began to think about society in terms of ‘games�, that should be fair so that everyone has the motivation to participate - ultimately giving rise to the original position as well as the difference principle. Rawls believed that inequalities should be psychologically acceptable to people in lower social positions (building on 18th-century French tradition), because what he calls the ‘special psychologies� interfere with the stability of society. Thus a just society should limit the impact of envy and the effects of humiliation on the individual in the least advantaged. In other words, ‘Rawls had chosen the principles of justice to limit the effects of contingency on collective life.� In the middle of the book, there are two chapters on civil disobedience and war and responsibility, which demonstrate the ways in which new forms of public morality were created in the 1960s and 70s. These sections highlight how Rawls engaged with Vietnam-era debates on just war theory, but also how his views on civil disobedience were shaped by the specific political moment in which he wrote, particularly the tensions within liberal democracies over race, war, and political obligation. Forrester also emphasizes how, by the end of the 20th century, Rawlsian liberalism had become entrenched within Anglo-American political thought, shaping not only academic debates but also the institutional frameworks of international justice. However, she argues that this success came with limitations—both external as the narratives dominated by Rawls� principles gave rice to technocratic discourses and despite his reservations at the end of his life (where he said he is ‘further left to the welfare state�) opened possibilities for accommodation of market-based approaches to justice and also some Third Way thinking - but also in academic terms particularly in how liberal egalitarianism struggled to respond to the rise of neoliberalism, as well as the broader challenges posed by feminist, communitarian, and radical democratic critiques. The book ultimately suggests that the Rawlsian framework, while deeply influential, left unresolved questions about power, capitalism, and structural injustice that later critics sought to address. Forrester also argues that Rawls shifted his positions more than he would admit. As someone without an extensive formal education in 20th-century philosophy, I particularly liked the first two and the last three chapters - on the development of Rawls' thought and later the rise of the communitarian and 'liberalism of fear' critiques. Especially towards the end of the book, Forrester shows how liberalism's dominance was not just intellectual but also institutional, shaping how justice was conceived within political philosophy and beyond. Overall, the book is very dense and detailed. I enjoyed it, but it is definitely not an easy read. I learned a lot not just about the context for Rawls� work, but also about Ronald Dworkin and late work of Judith Shklar. Forrester’s analysis is sharp, and while she clearly appreciates Rawls' contributions, she is unafraid to critique the limitations and consequences of his intellectual dominance. ...more |
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1
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Jan 24, 2025
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Feb 03, 2025
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Feb 03, 2025
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Hardcover
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| 0141396113
| 9780141396118
| 0141396113
| 4.07
| 9,198
| 1892
| Dec 08, 2015
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really liked it
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“Civilized nations have suffered too much in the long, hard struggle for the emancipation of the individual, to disown their past work and to tolerate
“Civilized nations have suffered too much in the long, hard struggle for the emancipation of the individual, to disown their past work and to tolerate a Government that would make itself felt in the smallest details of a citizen's life, even if that Government had no other aim than the good of the community. Should an authoritarian Socialist society ever succeed in establishing itself, it could not last; general discontent would soon force it to break up, or to reorganize itself on principles of liberty.� The Conquest of Bread is a classic of the literature of anarchist communism. More of a political manifest than a scientific study, it presents arguments against both statist strands within the communist (what he calls ‘collectivist�) tradition, as well as against capitalist or bourgeois thinking. Kropotkin argues for a free society with shared ownership, and without expropriation, states and dominant authority. The core of his idea is that property ownership and the excess benefit of one’s labour cannot be fair when they are based on the works, efforts, and inventions of previous generations. Much of the book is devoted to explaining how this kind of social structure and system could work within the social and economic standards of the late 19th century. There are individual chapters on clothing, housing, and working conditions, but most of the attention is spent explaining how societal needs could be satisfied without excess toil and labour through equitable resource distribution and the best use of the latest scientific discoveries of his time (like better and more effective use of greenhouses and fertilisation). The fascinating thing about this book is how it cuts across the debates of the 20th-century political divides. Kropotkin is a communist but very much against state intervention - he believes in human nature’s commonality and mutuality. At various points, he argues against state intervention and statist thinking in areas such as cross-European train networks - that did not arise from an imperial decree but through a ‘voluntary cooperation� of the individual train companies - effectively making the case for a free market - and in others argues against any kind of wage being paid to workers. In his vision of the future after the Social Revolution, the necessary physical labour - and its benefits - necessary to sustain life is spread across society evenly and voluntarily. Exploitation is in his arguments based both on economic, but also political (power-based) terms. Kropotkin bases a lot of his narrative in the first half-ish of the book on the experiences from the Paris Commune of 1871 (which for him, much like for a lot of anarchist literature naturally, forms the basis for the imagination of how the Social Revolution will look like) and the revolutions of 1848. It is quite interesting to see how important was the French Revolution for his thinking and how much it is referenced. The book is interesting and has some relatively novel and persuasive ideas, but the last third is quite repetitive and reading now of course very outdated. Nevertheless, it is an interesting contribution to the debate about social and economic justice and social organisation, and definitely a very important work of leftist literature. ...more |
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1
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Jan 29, 2025
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Jan 30, 2025
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Jan 31, 2025
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Paperback
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| 0241407605
| 9780241407608
| 0241407605
| 4.19
| 12,603
| Sep 15, 2020
| Sep 10, 2020
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liked it
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The Tyranny of Merit makes an interesting and at some points persuasive argument about the harmful effects of today’s over-obsession on meritocracy in
The Tyranny of Merit makes an interesting and at some points persuasive argument about the harmful effects of today’s over-obsession on meritocracy in American society. Sandel puts this rise in emphasis on opportunity for meritocratic success and academic achievement as a way towards both financial prosperity and self-esteem into the context of the rise of first technocratic centrists and then populist or disruptive movements since the mid-2010s, which is I think a very useful contribution of the book. But the overall argument has a number of limitations. First, I am quite sceptical about the notion that meritocracy as a structure of the allocation of social prestige and success is worse than aristocracy because of the extreme amount of agency it places on an individual and omits the societal conditions necessary for meritocratic success. Some might see the ‘hope� for advancement in meritocracy as more painful than the ‘hopelessness� of the aristocracy (or other ways of organising society that is more on the basis of belonging to a certain social group or accident of birth), but I fundamentally disagree with that. Although the chances might be skewed, there are still chances � and as naïve as I might be, that is always better than nothing. I think a large part of why Sandel - a Harvard professor of philosophy - sees this as such is because of his extreme emphasis on entry into elite colleges, namely Harvard, Yale and Princeton. Unsuccessful applicants there surely have an unnecessarily inflated sense of agency in applications, which are overcrowded with legacy admissions, athletes and wealthy students who can afford to either get in through donations or through better preparation programs. But there is world outside of these schools, there are schools all around the US, in Europe, graduate schools, etc, where one can develop meritocratic credentials without necessarily being admitted to one of the three schools. And the reproduction of inequality through them is more of an symptom - painful for a lot of people believing in the American dream - but nevertheless more of an issue of modern financialised economy (which to his credit Sandel criticises) than these three schools. Second, his critique of egalitarian liberalism, and especially John Rawls, effectively argues that because Rawls allows for some extra material or financial benefits on the basis of one’s contributions to society � inequality in the equal opportunity principle � he too much allows for attribution of social esteem or credit for those gaining greater rewards. That is a slippery-slope argument that I find insincere. Alternatively, in terms of policy critique, Sandel’s critique of Clinton, Obama and yes, Tony Blair, rests to a large extent on their speeches, statements and anecdotes and much less on their actual policies (which he often, like in the case of wage subsidies such as the expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, either misunderstands or misattributes to heterodox critics like Oren Cass). I like his critique that the emphasis on ‘opportunity� was to some extent a vague replacement for more difficult political choices that could lead to greater redistribution or a sense of common good. However, he does not support this argument with a serious analysis of their policies. I would say that Yascha Mounk, his former PhD student, makes a much better case against this over-individualistic age in Western politics in his book ‘The Age of Responsibility�. Similarly, Daniel Markovits� makes a better argument against meritocracy in his book ‘The Meritocracy Trap� on the basis of our overly-narrow understanding of merit, as a narrow sense of cognitive ability. Overall, a useful contribution to the debate about the rise of populism and a good critique of liberal elites that perceive their status and position as a just moral desert, whereas it arises from a flawed meritocratic system. But overall, the story misses a lot of necessary points to be fully coherent and the alternatives it proposes would not be much fairer overall � even though they might be more just. ...more |
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1
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Jan 10, 2025
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Jan 22, 2025
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Jan 24, 2025
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Paperback
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| 0141012110
| 9780141012117
| 0141012110
| 3.83
| 8,690
| 2005
| Aug 29, 2006
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really liked it
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An interesting collection of essays by one of the greatest social science thinkers of our times. Amartya Sen is somebody who can be a truly global int
An interesting collection of essays by one of the greatest social science thinkers of our times. Amartya Sen is somebody who can be a truly global intellectual yet still be based on the long and complex tradition of Indian history and culture. The collection of essays is very wide, and while some of them deal with particularly Indian issues - like Indian calendars, the nature of Indian secularism, nationalism and religions (and atheism), large parts of them can be useful even from a more global perspective - like the essay on gender equality or western understandings of India (which somehow Sen manages to write without any direct reference to Edward Said). Most of the essays were previously published in the New York Review of Books or similar publications around the year 2000, so they, to some extent, deal with either historical evaluations of the first 55-ish years of Indian independence, the turn of the millennium or the political situation in India during this time. Some parts might be a bit outdated, but the greatest value of the book comes from Sen’s ability - present in his other books as well - to bring together timeless philosophy and history with an understanding of contemporary politics and economics. After the first couple of essays/chapters, some of the main arguments become a bit repetitive. Using Asoka (Buddhist emperor from the 3rd century BC) and Akhbar (16th-century Muslim emperor) as an argument against BJP’s conception of Hindutva nationalism (which he spends a lot of space arguing against, as it was during the first time BJP was in government and is now under PM Modi again) starts to feel rather simplistic quite soon. The State of Kerala has great human development outcomes (implied to be connected to cultural factors of greater respect for the female and matrimonial agency and more left-wing politics). Rabindranath Tagore is now an underappreciated genius (who founded the school where Amartya Sen studied, and he knew him personally), and Hinduism is a much more complex set of ideas than would seem from a distance (which he repeatedly demonstrates the differing understandings of Rama’s divinity). Subsequently, even without any deep understanding of Indian history and culture, I was left to wonder whether the book isn’t rather about Sen’s (whom I admire and respect) understanding or his vision of Indian culture and history, than about the actual reality. I would not argue against his greater points - that India has a long and deep history of argumentation, debate, religious tolerance and secularism (and atheism) - but more that Sen idealises the extent to which the idea of India he has is true in reality (as the repeated reelections of BJP and Narendra Modi showed in the past decade). ...more |
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Oct 06, 2024
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Nov 16, 2024
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Nov 18, 2024
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Paperback
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| B08QM8VHRT
| 4.12
| 52,920
| 2020
| Aug 2022
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really liked it
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This is at once an exciting and confusing book that melts the divide between fact and fiction, history and narrative, in trying to present the stories
This is at once an exciting and confusing book that melts the divide between fact and fiction, history and narrative, in trying to present the stories of scientists who touched and often pushed the limits of the human understanding of the universe. The English translation from the Spanish original is well-written and enthralling from the beginning. As the book progresses, the reader becomes more and more confused in trying to discern what is reality and what is artistic license - well, much like the characters within the book (which might have been the idea). In some way, Labatut achieves what great art should do - inspire emotion in areas where rationality often prevails. In this sense, this book does more to explain, for instance, what quantum mechanics is about. It expands the personal stories of scientists & mathematicians by trying to present their personal experiences in coming to terms with what it means to go to the edges of the human understanding of the universe. The early chapters on Fritz Haber, a man who created the first chemical weapons used in World War I and, at the same time, the Haber-Bosch process for directly synthesising ammonia from hydrogen and nitrogen, which helped to feed the billions of people born in the 20th century, and later Karl Schwarzschild, a physicist who provided the first complete mathematical formulation of Einstein’s theory of relativity, read more like standard non-fiction books on the lives of genius German scientists of Jewish origins who played their part in the story of German science used for military purposes in the first half of the 20th century. But after those, the book takes a rather strange turn, with a chapter on Alexander Grothendieck, a mathematician who revolutionised geometry in the middle of the 20th century and then suddenly left at the height of his fame to live the life of a recluse, in the Pyrenees. The book suggests that it was because he realised the destructive potential or nature of the mathematics he was working on, and this theme then continues with other characters mentioned in the chapter (like a fully fictional Japanese mathematician, whom the author states acknowledges he fully invented for the book). The second part of the book is, however, a whole different beast. Most of it deals with the debate or, rather, the feud between Erwin Schrödinger and Werner Heisenberg on the nature and expression of quantum mechanics. Not to spoil the plot (as it is basically not accepted as modern science), but Heisenberg (together with Neils Bohr) wins the day through his ‘uncertainty principle�. The second half of the book ends with Heisenberg discovering his uncertainty principle the book simplifies to be the end of Newtonian physics - that what the reality actually is changes with our observation of it. Wave function or individual electrons, matrices or equations, in the end, it all depends on how we are looking at it and how we are approaching trying to understand the world. As simplified as my understanding on the basis of this book is, I wish more people in sciences, such as economics, which are trying to imitate the physics� approach to understanding reality, would take away this lesson. The last part of the book seems to be written from the perspective of the author, in the first person and is rather confusing - although I would imagine it being written as a form of explanation, why he chose to write about scientists on the end of the human understanding of science and the universe. Throughout the book, there are various parts that have some form of grounding in reality but are to a large extent fictionalised - like Schrödinger’s almost-affair with a teenage girl during his stay in a Swiss sanatorium or details of Heisenberg’s stay at Heligoland. As it became progressively more difficult to distinguish what was true and what was not, I struggled with my approach to the book - from trying to gain as much information as I could to see it as an entertaining work of fiction. I enjoyed the book, and I must say that in the end, I think I took away the general lesson about the possible dangers of science-mathematics and the impossibility of fully understanding reality, expressed in the form of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. I could do with fewer scenes about the individual characters� sexual dreams and a bit more streamlined second part; various characters kind of followed a similar path, and it became quite tedious. ...more |
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Oct 28, 2024
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Nov 18, 2024
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Nov 18, 2024
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Kindle Edition
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| 132407437X
| 9781324074373
| 132407437X
| 4.03
| 518
| 2024
| Apr 23, 2024
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really liked it
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A neo-Keynesian economist’s take on the freedom vs. liberty conundrum. Written in the usual style of Stiglitz - most of it is spent on analysis of the
A neo-Keynesian economist’s take on the freedom vs. liberty conundrum. Written in the usual style of Stiglitz - most of it is spent on analysis of the current neoliberal system, with the latter parts describing an alternative, which he calls ‘progressive capitalism� - essentially a Scandi-style social democracy. There is not much new in that sense, but some interesting analytical and/or campaigning points throughout the book - like calls for regulation, or repeated arguments that a certain level of coercion (say, traffic light) is necessary for ultimately better societal results. Much of the argument builds on John Rawls� Theory of Justice and the original position thought experiment, but he does not explicitly argue for the principles of justice, particularly for the difference principle (that inequality is justifiable only to the degree that it helps those worst off). In that way, Stiglitz is still an economist - even though he argues against thinking just about Pareto improvements, equilibria-based systems or sole focus on efficiency. His argument is ultimately still focused on the capitalist economy growing as a whole - albeit more equitably - than on actually reshaping the system. What Stiglitz does well in this book is to argue - against Hayek, the fellow intellectual traveller of his old nemesis Friedman, whom he, being an intellectual economist, gives too much credit for the transformation in the Western world in the past 50 years - that tyranny or authoritarianism does not come from contexts in which states overreach. Rather, as we could see in the recent US elections, it comes in states, contexts and economies where the state does not deliver what it ought to. There is not a lack of freedom for people, but too much ‘freedom to exploit� is exercised on the side of the more powerful, on the side of the corporate interests and plutocrats. In sum, good but predictable grounding in political philosophy, a vision focused more on macroeconomic interventions than nitty-gritty changes in specific policy areas and an attempt to take back the narrative for freedom beyond the Berlin-style call for positive freedom. Reading this in late November 2024, however, made me feel quite empty. Yes, we can debate these intellectual points, but in the end, the reactionary side can win the argument about the economy in the political arena almost only through naked aspirationalism and a misunderstanding of the difference between correlation and causation on the side of the electorate. ...more |
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1
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Oct 15, 2024
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Nov 12, 2024
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Nov 12, 2024
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Hardcover
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| 0691182264
| 9780691182261
| 0691182264
| 4.50
| 52
| unknown
| Nov 23, 2021
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it was amazing
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Hannah Arendt and Isaiah Berlin shared several commonalities that might presuppose them to at least engage with each other - both were political think
Hannah Arendt and Isaiah Berlin shared several commonalities that might presuppose them to at least engage with each other - both were political thinkers studying topics of freedom, inhumanity or the human condition itself, and both studied totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. They were Jewish emigres of the old Continental Europe, involuntarily transplanted into the Anglophone world, sharing various friends and acquaintances (like Arthur Schlesinger Jr. or Mary McCarthy). Nevertheless, they hated each other. Or rather, Berlin despised Arendt, to the extent that he could not even discuss her works, and she did not like him or rather did not think about him too much. Whereas he was an Anglophile, firmly rooted in the British (and Jewish) establishment, she was a permanent outsider, even if she later became more Americanised. Berlin saw himself as a liberal historian of ideas and a member of the English analytical philosophical tradition, whereas Arendt was a political thinker of the republican tradition, with roots in German continental philosophy. Their two physical meetings both ended catastrophically and even two decades after her death, Berlin could not willingly intellectually engage with his real ‘bête noire�. This fascinating dual intellectual biography puts these two of the greatest political thinkers of the 20th century next to each other and into a conversation. Hiruta presents their individual biographies, including stories of their meetings and interactions, but most of the book considers their individual perspectives on liberty/freedom (used interchangeably, with Berlin’s focus on free and unrestricted choice and Arendt’s on participation in political affairs of a society), the nature of totalitarian regimes (where it is fascinating how popular understanding is closer to Berlin’s view, even though Arendt’s works are much more prominent), the trial of Adolf Eichmann (and the extent to which is Arendt’s blame on the Jewish leadership justified) and lastly on revolutionary movements like the 1956 Hungarian revolution and 1968 student protests (where Arendt was amazed by both, Berlin reacting only to the 1968 and both omitting the nationalistic aspects of 1956). All through the book, there is a sense of division between Arendt, the independent, bold, self-confident thinker who left Germany in 1933 as a relatively mature person, who worked work Zionist causes throughout the 1930s and 1940s, and managed to just escape the wave of Nazism and even when established in New York, never felt full home - as her home was ultimately always the pre-war German academia more than anything else - but did ultimately did not want to. This is in contrast with Berlin, who wanted to belong to any establishment he could have, who was uncritically supportive of anything English and who envisaged a benign role for nationalism as a way to create a shared commonality. There is some sense that some part of Berlin’s antipathy towards Arendt was based on her being an independent-minded woman, who experienced and fought against the Nazi rule, thus having a greater personal understanding of the nature of totalitarian regimes, in contrast with his sense of guilt of living through the War in the relative safety of Oxford, New York and Washington D.C. Besides the topic of freedom, which is naturally exciting, there is an interesting contrast in their understandings of the origins of totalitarianism, which, according to Hiruta, is largely based on their personal backgrounds - Arendt having experienced democratic backsliding in the Weimar Republic in 1920s and 1930s, blaming weak political centre for the rise of Nazis, whereas Berlin being afraid of political fanatics on left and right as a result of his family having to flee then-Russian Riga after the October revolution of 1917. While Arendt is probably the more famous political thinker in our age (interestingly thanks more to her works of The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem, which are more empirical than her other more philosophical works), it is Berlin’s conceptualisation of the negative liberty, which had such a profound impact on not just the Cold War liberal philosophical tradition, but also arguably the world of politics and public policy. Whereas he saw the danger of totalitarianism lurking behind the prospects of positive liberty (although not to the extent as some caricatures of him make it seem so), Arendt put a high standard on what it meant to be actually free. A great analysis of their ideas, this book is a very enjoyable study of the development of ideas in and by two fascinating thinkers in a crucial historical period. ...more |
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Feb 2024
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Mar 27, 2024
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Mar 28, 2024
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Hardcover
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| 1805220012
| 9781805220015
| 1805220012
| 3.71
| 183
| Sep 07, 2023
| Sep 12, 2023
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really liked it
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Despite being marketed as such, this book is not primarily about AI (at least in the technical sense) and its takeover of our societies. Rather, it is
Despite being marketed as such, this book is not primarily about AI (at least in the technical sense) and its takeover of our societies. Rather, it is a narrative about the history of artificial agency in the sphere of social and political organisation, where Runciman’s focus is on states and corporations. Ruciman’s point of departure, as per usual, is Hobbes’s Leviathan. It is this analysis of the creation of an artificial man in the middle of the English Civil War, - an algorithm for collective decision-making - which produced the longest-lasting artificial agency in history - a modern bureaucratic state. Runciman expends a great amount of space explaining this dichotomy between ‘decisions� and ‘answers� which is important for his latter argument about the joining up of human intelligence, artificial intelligence and what he calls the ‘artificial agency� (states and corporations). The core argument of the book is that we have created the artificial agency of the state, as a permanent being (or rather machine) with a universal and general field of operation - which is distinct from most corporations and historical forms of collective organisation that were created for a specific purpose or have more limited timespan, even if they are older than states they operate within (they are essentially project-based). It is the “grinding, self-sustaining qualities of established institutions� which allow for a sense of unbroken continuity, which in turn allows for human and economic progress. The state can and most likely will outlive its citizens, and the humans that constitute it, and can take obligations based on its ability to control violence and levy taxes. By contrast, corporations, even if they are centuries old, do not have the permanence baked into the reality of their existence - but their response to different kinds of incentives can work in conjunction with the states (bureaucratic machines can talk to other kinds of bureaucratic machines) and produce technological progress. This provides a very interesting conceptualisation of some of the most frustrating parts of the modern state, which Runciman greatly reflects on in the latter chapters. Wanting the state to function like a startup or an agile enterprise, is almost as naive as wanting it to be empathetic or personal. It can seem to be, through its temporary leaders, who may use this in their political work - but it will always be merely a charade. For Runciman, as in all of his works, the good politicians see themselves as “representatives of an impersonal state�, whereas the bad ones believe they can humanise the levers of government by subordinating them to their designs. On the other hand, this analysis demonstrates a different perspective on Runciman’s thinking about the role and functioning of the state. In his discussion on the role of the modern state, imperialism is largely glossed over, as is the understanding of climate change as anything beyond a result of ‘wrong answers� by impersonal corporate agents, working within badly pre-defined rules. This allows his narrative of the modern state as a largely benign force, that allows for calmer and longer-term decision-making and processes, largely devoid of the madness of the crowds leading to social uphevals (although he acknowledges possibilities for elite groupthink). There are many further limitations of his argument, beyond the scope of this review - particularly when looking from a perspective of smaller states that, for instance also function within supranational entities such as the European Union (which he calls a mere ‘legal order�). While a large part of his analysis holds across many states, it is limited in seeing the state from the minimalist liberal tradition. His argument ultimately rests on the understanding of the necessity for the existence of the state through the Hobbesian lenses - as otherwise life would be 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'. But one does not need to be an anarchist to see, that both anthropological and archeological evidence shows that this was not and is not ultimately true. State as an arbiter and enforcer or structural violence is a historical choice - even if one can understand and empathise with a great deal of Runciman's analysis. The final chapters deal with the rise of AI and this part of the discussion is quite novel, as it incorporates the artificiality of the functioning of AIs within his narrative about the first singularity occurring during the rise of the modern state. But even here he operates with terms like ‘better answers� that are ultimately very normative, even if he does not provide full answers or prescriptions about the better organisation of society. Rather, he considers what various mixes of Human Intelligence (HI) � Artificial Intelligence (AI) � and Artificial Agency (AA) mean. While the book may be billed as a discourse on the future of AI, its primary objective is to uphold the enduring principles of an elite-centred variation of liberal ideology. It advocates for embracing the inherent detachment from centres of authority, reassuring individuals that such detachment serves their best interests. That is not to say that I did not enjoy reading it. ...more |
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Feb 23, 2024
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Feb 24, 2024
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Paperback
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| 0300266219
| 9780300266214
| 0300266219
| 3.81
| 136
| unknown
| Aug 29, 2023
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it was amazing
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It’s become a quite common refrain among a certain group of popular political science writers to argue, after diagnosing all the problems with the cur
It’s become a quite common refrain among a certain group of popular political science writers to argue, after diagnosing all the problems with the current ‘wokeism�/‘progressivism� that what is needed is the return to the Good Ol� liberalism, that respects individual liberty and protects individual interests by limiting the state’s power and the madness of crowds. I would say it’s also a popular go-to political position by men - it’s almost always men - in their 40-60s in places like Central Europe, who don’t want to go all the way to Hayek and Friedman in arguing against progressive political forces that envision state as something beyond a vehicle for the protection of selfishness and personal ambition. The problem is that this Good Ol� liberalism is, in terms of political philosophy according to Moyn’s argument, a relatively novel position. In this great book, Samuel Moyn charts the development of what he calls the ‘Cold War liberalism� from its origins in the aftermath of the Second World War through intellectual profiles of a series of some better-known thinkers - like Isaiah Berlin, Karl Popper or Hannah Arendt (who is not a part of the purely liberal tradition but serves as a component of his argument in the construction of what he calls the ‘anti-cannon� in her creation of the concept of totalitarianism, which he also finds relatively dubious) - and some relatively lesser known ones such as Judith Skhlar or Gertrude Himmelfarb. The core of his argument is that in response to the totalitarian threat against the Western (American) liberal order, a number of thinkers resorted to a distorted view of liberalism that served to protect only a very limited amount of political freedoms and largely abandoned the prospects of emancipation, progress and Enlightenment (which he argues were the essential components of 19th-century liberalism) as a whole, thus leaving the concept of progress to the Soviet Union. Instead of perceiving the state as a vehicle for betterment of the society, they saw its role as a mere protector of negative liberty. Moyn traces this through a wider set of intellectual developments - from the development of an anti-cannon (with Rousseau as the main villain), through the abandonment of historicism and Hegelianism, reinvention of historical figures like Tocqueville or Lord Acton, all the way to the greater introduction of Freudian ideas of self-control through thinkers like Lionel Trilling. There have been many great reviews of this book from both the history of ideas and philosophical standpoints, and I would not claim to be able to independently evaluate Moyn’s assessment of the individual figures. Although some reviewers have suggested that his interpretation of the ‘invention� of the Cold War liberalism is quite narrow and self-serving (essentially to argue against books like Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed) and a large part of the 19th-century liberal canon by figures like Benjamin Constant is precisely set against the usurpation of power by state authorities, what this book does well is the charting of the general trend in the post-war era. What I can say, however, is that the argument is persuasive and goes beyond this set of figures. Surely, the book is a relatively dense and while at some points quite a legalistic analysis of intellectual history, but it is also a case for more ambitious liberalism for our time. It is a call to reach beyond the narrow ambitions of the ‘Liberalism of Fear� (in Shklar’s terms) in the way that liberals conceptualise the past, the future and the possible. So that in today’s age of danger to the liberal order we do not constantly overreact and try to rush to treating the symptoms, but look at the way that the liberal system actually works so that arguments against it seem at least less appealing. As Moyn argues in his conclusion, the task of today’s liberalism is not to constantly reinvent its Cold-war past and constantly get lost in its entanglements, but rather to re-incorporate its former commitments to the emancipation of the powers of the public and the creation of the new as the highest life. I think that is something hopeful to believe in and work towards. ...more |
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Nov 30, 2023
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Jan 27, 2024
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Feb 05, 2024
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Hardcover
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| 0593493192
| 9780593493199
| B0BR4WYY2Z
| 4.06
| 2,011
| Sep 26, 2023
| Sep 26, 2023
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really liked it
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This book is an interesting and useful contribution to the debate about both the conceptualisation of collective and individual identities in contempo
This book is an interesting and useful contribution to the debate about both the conceptualisation of collective and individual identities in contemporary Western democracies and the structure of public debate around them. It provides a ‘liberal� (more on that later) argument against the movement that is now labelled as ‘woke� of sometimes less generously ‘progressive illiberalism�. As such, it is well structured and argued, and of course, Mounk is brilliant in his analysis of philosophical points and arguments. But while I share most of Mounk’s arguments and generally the perspective as well, I was slightly disappointed by the depth of the book’s argument and its prescriptions. The historical analysis is quite brief, effectively explaining what he calls the modern ‘identity synthesis� through Foucault (as it is usually done), Said (of course), Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (strategic essentialism) and later Derrick Bell and Kimberlé Crenshaw (CRT pioneers). But there is actually pretty limited causality tracking between the individual arguments and his later analysis of popular culture and the takeover of broader societal institutions. In this analysis, Mounk also from my perspective, gives too much credit to people like Robin DiAngelo and their influence on the corporate world. His prescriptions against this movement, which he considers detrimental to the long-term stability of liberal democratic orders (particularly relating to the freedom of speech issues), essentially reaffirms his commitment to universalist liberalism (very generally), can’t really be seen as anything but naive. His definition of liberalism is also relatively broad and for how much historical analysis he gives to arguments he opposes, pretty ahistorical. Sure, individual-focused policies confronting historical or structural injustices without damaging overall outcomes in targeting equity would be ideal (also an interesting point is that Mounk supports reparations), but implementing them effectively is the actual hard part of governing... Probably one of the best parts of the book is the appendix, which explains the differences between cultural Marxism and modern identity politics/identity synthesis - largely referencing the influence of post-modernism of Foucault et al. Definitely worth a read, as Mounk is always enjoyable and in this case provides a good structure for arguing against the somewhat dominant narratives, but not a definitive take on the issue, with limited actual applicability of the policy recommendations. ...more |
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Sep 25, 2023
not set
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Nov 30, 2023
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Dec 01, 2023
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Kindle Edition
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| 0691161038
| 9780691161037
| 0691161038
| 3.96
| 1,421
| Jan 01, 2012
| Mar 10, 2014
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really liked it
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This is not a work of pure "anarchist theory" (even in the introduction Scott says that he does not believe the state is always the enemy of freedom o
This is not a work of pure "anarchist theory" (even in the introduction Scott says that he does not believe the state is always the enemy of freedom or that he cannot imagine getting rid of it right now) - it is not concerned with anarchist organisation, justifications for the anarchist approach or historical developments, but rather the author's perspectives on various diverse topics like political and social institutions, urban planning, petty bourgeoisie, audit culture at universities or political charisma and spectacles, utilizing the core principles and lenses of anarchism - individual initiative, cooperation without hierarchy and coercion and the importance of working/vernacular, instead of visible/official order. The overall point of the book is largely that the systematisation and mechanisation of various aspects of life - workplaces, schools or states themselves - have over the past couple hundred years limited the individual's ability to take independent initiative, to break rules that do not make sense (i.e. jaywalking when there is visibly no car coming around) or generally to do what was sensible at the time. It highlights the functionality and sensibility of actual working orders, from things like living neighbourhoods to gardens in Guatemala, built based on real-life experience and embracing the uncertainty and learning it entails. Some of the points made in the book (a few are from Scott's earlier works like The Weapons of the Weak) are really interesting - like the impacts of "infrapolitics" (political actions of the politically unrepresented, weak and poor, not visible or recorded in elite accounts of history and politics) in things like desertions, squattering, absenteeism or foot-dragging on the grand historical and political movements that most historical accounts look at. Overall, it is interesting, but sometimes a bit repetitive, mentioning things briefly or making a lot of points without analysing them thoroughly. But I definitely enjoyed it and can appreciate its central argument. ...more |
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Jul 10, 2023
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Jul 11, 2023
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Jul 11, 2023
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Paperback
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| 0241428386
| 9780241428382
| 0241428386
| 3.95
| 355
| unknown
| Apr 20, 2023
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it was amazing
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While the impact of John Rawls� work on (English-language) political philosophy in the post-war era can hardly be overstated, the same cannot be said
While the impact of John Rawls� work on (English-language) political philosophy in the post-war era can hardly be overstated, the same cannot be said of the sphere of public policy. Why is it so has probably a lot to do with both the complexity and rather theoretical nature of the argument, which can be quite puzzling - I remember one conversation with a prominent economist and deputy governor of a central bank in my home country about how “he is fine with the more philosophical approaches to social policy, like from Amartya Sen, but always gets lost around Rawls�. I don’t blame him. The Free and Equal thus tries to offer a more accessible way to some key tenets of Rawls� thought - by primarily looking at his three principles of justice - the greatest equal liberty principle, equal opportunity principle and the difference principle and their application. The first part of the book, about a hundred pages, is essentially an explanation of these arguments, their clarification and limited defence. This is essentially a work of analytical political philosophy about Rawls� ideas of a just society that is fair (notably considering only the level of a national state), which however simplified, is still largely decontextualised and operates in idealised scenarios, so can be not as much difficult to comprehend, as to truly intellectually grasp in its complexity. The most interesting aspects of the theoretical justifications of these principles for me are the coherent structure of assessing which basic rights take precedence over others (with the general idea being those that are the most necessary for the development and preservation of the political community and liberty on individual and collective level through “public reason�, so greatest benefit for anyone in the society) and the very interesting nature of the difference principle. While the author highlights the just savings principle, as a justification for environmental policy, conservation and limiting of global greenhouse gas emissions, it is the different principle that I believe can be the most revolutionary, if adopted as a part of the presented structure of coherent set of ideas and principles. Chandler does a great job explaining that the difference principle (that inequality is justified only as much as it allows for the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society) is not so much about the equality or amount of income, but rather about power, opportunity and dignity. This, as well as other aspects of its egalitarianism, while maintaining support for private property, markets, hierarchies or national identities makes Rawls a centrist liberal, that can appeal to both sides of the central part of the political spectrum (while Chandler admits that mostly to the broad “progressive family�) The other half, or rather two-thirds, of the book, is more interesting and likely more impactful, as it presents a take on the application of these theoretical principles on specific (well, to a limited extent) policy questions and areas. Some are quite common - democratic reforms like doing elections through proportional representation, written constitution, limiting the amount of campaign spending or supporting public broadcasting and media. In the sphere of creating equality of opportunity, Chandler argues for greater support of pre-primary education (expanding instruments like the pupil’s premium in the UK), but also the abolishing of private schools and a form of student fees for universities (so that those who do not attend do not subsidise benefits for the mode advantaged in the society). What is interesting is how radically unradical these ideas sometimes feel - surely for instance the abolishment of private schools in the UK is a dramatic change, but it is well argued on the basis of the difference principle and one can see the coherence of its overall approach. Other ideas get more novel - like applying market-based solutions to things like declining revenues of serious media outlets or the impact of rich private donors on elections. Chandler proposes “democracy vouchers� of about 50 pounds for every voter, provided by the state, to spend during an election cycle. A version of this measure has been adopted in Seattle for local elections and seems to be working fine. Similarly, he proposes “media vouchers�, that would simulate markets in allowing people to support their favourite media outlets (tied to some specific conditions about transparency or truth in coverage). It is this support for not just private property and markets, but directly market-based incentives that can make Rawls� ideas a bit uncomfortable for people on the more radical left. And finally, some policy ideas, especially in the last two chapters, about shared prosperity and workplace democracy are really fascinating and quite radical. Chandler proposes the creation of a ‘citizen’s wealth fund�, a sovereign wealth fund-style instrument, that would be funded by increased taxes (on income from labour and capital income, but also wealth) with equalising effects and intentions. This fund would invest in public companies, without attempts for controlling interest - to maintain the market-based motivations - in order to create a shared source of wealth from shared ownership to fund social programs. There is of course a case for UBI (emphasised as a tool to give more power to the workers not to be afraid to quit their jobs or to retrain), but also a variation of universal inheritance (like baby bonds). The most convincing case is, however, for compulsory representations of workers on boards of companies (like is done in more tripartite systems and coordinated markets, in Germany or Austria, with a third of board seats in smaller companies and a half in bigger ones) as well as workers� cooperatives like the Mondragon Corporation in Spain - and Chandler proposes a few policies that would encourage this shared ownership model, through specialised banks creating financing for employee buyouts. The argumentation in this part was for me the most useful part of the book, providing a imaginative justification for policies achieving equity through relatively novel means. This book does a great job with a difficult subject and its relative novelty is in the application of Rawls� framework on today’s policy questions. Some parts of it are relatively straightforward, while the philosophical part can be hard to see within the broad framework. Overall, it is a very useful contribution to the debate and Rawls� arguments can serve as a really structurally coherent base for a progressive manifesto, that might be appealing to a wider range of political groups. ...more |
Notes are private!
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Jun 26, 2023
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Jul 02, 2023
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Jul 02, 2023
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Hardcover
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| 0525509054
| 9780525509059
| 0525509054
| 4.42
| 3,062
| May 19, 2020
| Apr 20, 2021
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it was amazing
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About 2/3rds of the book is a fascinating intellectual biography of John Meynard Keynes, considering his intellectual developments, and achievements,
About 2/3rds of the book is a fascinating intellectual biography of John Meynard Keynes, considering his intellectual developments, and achievements, but also the values he was grounded in. It presents a complex portrait of Keynes - a public intellectual explaining complex theoretical ideas to the masses and an academic economist, developing complex ideas comprehensible for the very few; a mover-and-shaker within the halls of Whitehall, influencing the levers of power, but also a truthteller, not shying away from attacking people he closely worked with for years. While Taylor to a large extent skips Keynesâ€� childhood and early adulthood (the book really begins with the outbreak of the First World War)- his university days, friendships with Bertrand Russel and Ludwig Wittgenstein and work for the India Office are briefly mentioned, but not really explored - Taylor shows the importance of the Apostles and Bloomsbury circles to Keynes and his lifelong values. Artistic expression and appreciation for its various forms was a cornerstone for his worldview and economics was only among the means to securing “the good lifeâ€� of virtues. Keynes that Taylor presents is much more than an economist - a philosopher, political thinker and social theorist and critic, but also a financial speculator and businessman (he was bold in actions like self-publishing the Economic Consequences of the Peace on which he made a lot of money which together with his speculation allowed him to buy the magazine The Nation, which not just influenced the Liberal discourse, but also bankrolled much of the Bloomsbury group). He was pragmatic, intellectually agile and able to develop his opinions - like for instance about tariffs and free trade - during his career in response to the changing circumstances of the global order. But, Taylor argues, a key aspect of Keynesianism was always his Burkean belief in the necessity to preserve social stability and order - that, more than radicalism attempting to upset orthodoxy, informed his books and ideas from the Economic Consequences of the Peace to the end of his life. One of the best aspects of the books is the analysis of Keynesâ€� major books, which put them in intellectual, political, but also interpersonal contexts. Like for instance that the Economic Consequences of the Peace was not just a rant out of desperation, written after the disappointments of the negotiations at Versailles, but also an attempt to gain recognition in the Bloomsbury group as a writer, where among all the artists (like Virginia Woolf, Keynes was merely a lowly economist and diplomat. A Treatise on Probability and A Tract on Monetary Reform show the early versions of ideas that influenced his later thinking, departing from the classical economics of his mentor Alfred Marshall (who again, is only briefly mentioned, largely in relation to his misogyny). Beginning with The End of Lasses-Faire and later Treatise on Money, Taylor shows how Keynes began to truly break the grip of the classical orthodoxy. Especially Keynesâ€� work on economic history in The Treatise on Money shows that money was always a product of the state, which was revolutionary in his time and is still often misinterpreted in today’s popular economic discourse. And while The Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren is often remembered for its prediction about a 15-hour workweek, it is more convoluted - it shows the possibilities for a future not just post-scarcity, but also after satisfying the investment needs of 1930s Britain (Keynes argued for the government doing 2/3 of all investments in the economy), which formed an important part of his argumentation for massive programs of public works, to get Britain out of the Depression. All across the book are references to Keynesâ€� memorable quotes, like his reference to the need to build .“a form of society which shall be ethically tolerable and economically not intolerable.â€� , or this amazing quote from The Treatise on Money: “The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do those things which at present are not done at all." It is also great to read about the influence of economists around Keynes like most of all, Joan Robinson (and her intellectual journey sketched across the book is itself fascinating, as she is probably the most undervalued of modern economists - like few people really stress that she created the theory of monopsony), but also lesser-known figures, like Richard Kahn, Keynesâ€� academic right-hand man. In the whole book, it is fascinating to read how Keynes was able to think both within and outside of his time. To move his thinking beyond the 19th-century tenets of scarcity and efficiency, to the problems of allocation and inequality, with the ultimate focus on their political effects. —â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä� The last 166 pages of the book, however, somewhat feel like a different book - focusing solely on the interpretation of post-war economics and economic developments in the United States - and to a lesser extent within the economic profession in general. How, in the author’s words ‘Keynes the philosopher of war has given way to Keynes the fiscal therapist.â€� It shows how Keynesianism moved and transformed in its political effects from Burkean conservatism (Keynes) through 1930s radicalism (Robinson, but also Lauchlin Currie) to, what Taylor argues, was an adaptation to the political mood and environment in the United States (Samuelson hiding Keynes behind econometrics, Galbraith embracing corporate America with his theory of the equilibrium of power/countervailing power). Large parts of the latter part of the book feel like an intellectual biography of John Kenneth Galbraith. Taylor does not idealise Galbraith (he is described as arrogant and self-important) but believes his ideas to be truer to Keynesian values than those of Heller, Samuelson or Solow. Especially the discussion of the Affluent Society is interesting and insightful, also in relation to the discussion of what really is Keynesianism, economics and economic policy in the post-Keynes era - a toolbox of solutions for crises, or a more complex (and philosophical/value-driven) approach to a better state and society? As Galbraith has to a large extent faded into history in recent decades, it is nevertheless fascinating to read about his influence on the public debates in the 1950s and 1960s, the experiences with taming inflation and price controls in the US (which are more than relevant now) and generally his critiques that established today’s common phrases like “conventional wisdomâ€� - “the class of ideas considered acceptable to right-thinking people in government. Those ideas were not necessarily directly related to the financial interests of the ruling class, but they were the ideas that elites found most comfortable and enjoyed reading about in newspapers or hearing repeated in speeches or represented in art. Such thinking was not necessarily wrong, but it was inevitably behind the times; the conventional wisdom had always been developed in response to a particular set of circumstances and was always vulnerable to political and social change.â€� This part also has some incredible quotes by Joan Robinson that should be more present in contemporary discourse, like “Normality is a fiction of economic textbooks.â€� or “The point of the General Theory was to restore human agency to economic theory.â€� (which she argues was eliminated by Samuelson, Hicks and Solow); or “economic production could not be understood as a self-sustaining set of processes independent from social norms and political realities.â€� Some other bits of the latter part are also fascinating - like the story about the first Keynesian textbook in the US, written by by Lorie Tarshis was cancelled after a letter-writing campaign by Merwin Hart, a pre-cursor to the neoliberal activists of the political Right in the US, utilizing the power of donor funding to influence the mainstream economic narrative, that is, as is shown even in Kenyesâ€� own exchanges with Hayek, inherently political. (Generally interesting are also discussions about the antisemitism across the book, latent in the Bloomsbury circle and by Kenyes himself, and relatively frequent by the circle around Luhnow that funded Hayek and Friedman). But there are also annoying bits, like constant references to what the author thinks would Keynes think at one junction or another (which is difficult to say, not least because of Keynesâ€� pragmatism in questions of policy), over-use of neoliberalism for most of what the author disagrees with or excessive use of Norman Angell without reference to his book as a shibboleth for false belief in the pacifying influence of international trade. —â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä”â¶Ä� Overall, the book is well worth a read - it just should be rather labelled for what it is - a composite of an excellent intellectual biography of a complex man and thinker and author’s narrative about the post-war economy and economics in the United States. ...more |
Notes are private!
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May 25, 2023
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Jun 07, 2023
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Jun 10, 2023
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Paperback
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| 0972819649
| 9780972819640
| 0972819649
| 4.22
| 3,212
| 2004
| Apr 01, 2004
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it was amazing
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This book attempts to bridge anarchism and anthropological theory, by sketching both a number of avenues for research in the novel subdiscipline of 'a
This book attempts to bridge anarchism and anthropological theory, by sketching both a number of avenues for research in the novel subdiscipline of 'anarchist anthropology' as well as a sort of action programme for anarchism at the time of the publishing of the book. It takes an interesting approach of exploring anarchist-ish thinking present in the early stages of the development of the anthropological discipline (like showing the transformation of “a student named Al Brown� also known as Anarchy Brown, an admirer of Kropotkin, who later became the famous A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, one of the early leaders of structural functionalism) and later by analysing the potential contributions that anarchistic theory or rather perspective of analysis can have on the discipline of anthropology, as well as what that discipline could be uniquely positioned to explore. It is genuinely fascinating to read, albeit in a short and dense text, about the influences of anarchism on early social anthropology - like the story behind The Gift by Marcel Mauss, which was written as an argument that “socialism could never be built by state fiat but only gradually, from below, that it was possible to begin building a new society based on mutual aid and self-organization in the shell of the old;� meaning that existing popular practices provided the basis both for a moral critique of capitalism and possible glimpses of what that future society would be like. This is, Graeber argues, a traditional anarchist position. Generally, Graeber’s definition of anarchism is far from the rabble-rousing, flame-throwing, destructive image that one would generally have in mind. Rather, he defines anarchism more as an ethical stance than a mechanism, more as a (voluntary) action, than a high theory approach, along the lines of Kropotkin's definition of anarchistic society as one where "harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs and aspirations of a civilized being." Graeber juxtaposes Marxism as a High theory approach concerning revolutionary strategy with Anarchism as an ethical discourse about revolutionary practice, while showing how alienating it is to the traditional academic approaches (one can see here in this text from 2004, in pokes into the academia - "the only Western institution other than the Catholic Church and British monarchy that has survived in much the same form from the Middle Ages," why the bastion of American conservativism Yale would have problems in granting Graeber tenure). Graeber describes some aspects of the functioning of anarchist societies in that they do operate in alternative ethics, but at the same time are aware of “human capacities for envy, gluttony, or sloth�, but have developed alternative ethics - either a theory of ‘imaginative counterpower� as a cosmical, religious or spiritual war around the society, to which it must respond with consensus and peace, or an institutional and societal structures forbidding the developments of political or economic dominance. He does not advocate violent revolution - quite the opposite is very sceptical to it - instead suggesting the development of alternative societies and communities or attempts in ignoring some of the actions of power - much like the Tsimihety group in Madagascar was developed in opposition to the French attempts on rule in late 19th century: “under the French, administrators would complain that they could send delegations to arrange for labor to build a road near a Tsimihety village, negotiate the terms with apparently cooperative elders, and return with the equipment a week later only to discover the village entirely abandoned � every single inhabitant had moved in with some relative in another part of the country.� Amazing. There are so many fascinating tiny bits of creative analysis, that provide a novel perspective on the contemporary and historical political situation - like the fact that democracy as being built on voting is inherently based on violence in forcing the minority to abide by the rules of the majority, even if implicitly (as was the heavily armed Athenian society), unlike the consensus-driven anarchist setting. Or how “The notion of “policy� presumes a state or governing apparatus which imposes its will on others.� - as the definition of the course of action determined by someone implies the force set to implement it. There is a great deal of Graeber’s argument, known later from other books, that the history of humanity is much more varied than is generally understood or assumed and we should lean more on ethnographical evidence, especially in demonstrating the various non-linear developments of societies all over the world. Overall, the book provides a fascinating narrative that is witty, entertaining and radical, but in a compassionate sense. It has not converted me to anarchism, but it has shown it to be an interesting analytical perspective for considering alternatives to the present state of being, determined by domination by force. ...more |
Notes are private!
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May 27, 2023
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Jun 06, 2023
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Paperback
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| 1912454416
| 9781912454419
| B07Y4LNBDF
| 4.41
| 945
| May 2020
| May 2020
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really liked it
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I have mixed feelings about this book. It is at the same time a very poignant history of a selective grouping of ideas within liberalism, but also a v
I have mixed feelings about this book. It is at the same time a very poignant history of a selective grouping of ideas within liberalism, but also a very general and descriptive historical narrative. I understand the author's willingness to put the ideas he argues for (or contrasts them with some he argues against) into context - historically and personally - but it does not help everywhere. The book is something akin to a manifesto, of elite-focused political and economic liberalism with high moral standards. The story the author presents is compelling - tracing the liberalism from Descartes, through the Levellers and Putney Debates, then Benjamin Constant and Harrier Taylor and John Stuart Mill, later branching into what he calls laissez-faire and egalitarian liberalism (personified through Hayek vs Keynes debates and one amazing description of the two sitting on the top of a Cambridge building during the Second World War). There and from the beginning, Dunt shows liberalism's internal tensions - between the more conservative and revolutionary or radical streams, which when taken to extremes can lead to his boogymen of nationalism and totalitarianism (I say boogeyman not because I would share the positions of those movements, but rather because of the way the authors constructs their descriptions). This later develops into interesting chapters on group identity, contrasting the ideas of George Orwell and Isaiah Berlin on national identities and later critiquing the more recent growth of identity politics (both from the perspective of one's expression only through group identity and then through the elite-led tribalism, using inaccessible language to advance the power goals of some of the movement's leaders), arguing against it on the basis of the development of tribalism without any advancement of debate. But it is not clear how the author actually resolves the tensions and besides some more ethical and some more moral principles, the overall coherence of his argument is limited. For someone without pure political philosophy or history of ideas background, this was all useful, as were a few earlier (concerning English Civil Wars) and some later chapters of the general narrative (like reflections on Trump's actions towards WTO). But so much of it draws for too long and feels unhelpful to the overall narrative. The book is meant to serve as a call to action (based on the last chapters), but that definitely does not require whole chapters devoted to narrating the developments of relatively well-known parts of history. On the other hand, the book brings into the discussion of philosophers' ideas their personal histories, which helps to illuminate the context in which they worked. Dunt’s analysis of Benjamin Constant and especially the emphasis on Harriet Taylor’s share of their joint work with John Stuart Mill is really well written and interesting to read. It is useful for structuring one’s thinking to go through the development of liberalism as first opposed to the oppression by the state and then to the society (like the early stages of the French Revolution) - this is where the historical narrative is useful. The liberalism Dunt describes is one based on individuality and individual dignity, fitting somewhere on the centre-left spectrum. The book is interesting as a history of ideas, as a manifesto and a call to action. Could have been slimmed down, but it is still an interesting read. ...more |
Notes are private!
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May 10, 2023
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May 29, 2023
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May 29, 2023
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Hardcover
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| 0674237676
| 9780674237674
| 0674237676
| 3.66
| 79
| May 09, 2017
| Jun 01, 2019
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really liked it
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This is a very thought-provoking work of analytical philosophy, an edited version of the author’s PhD thesis under Michael Sandel (whose work it heavi
This is a very thought-provoking work of analytical philosophy, an edited version of the author’s PhD thesis under Michael Sandel (whose work it heavily draws on). Its primary focus is not necessarily in the realm of policy analysis, but rather the shifts in the political and to a lesser degree moral philosophy since the post-war era (from consequentialism to contractualism), which is contrasted or connected with the shift towards “responsibility-tracking� mechanisms in welfare policies in countries like the US or UK. The book develops a complex philosophical argument that debates the appropriateness of the ascription of responsibility - understood as responsibility-as-accountability (as opposed to responsibility-as-duty) to agents within the policy sphere of the welfare state. This is firstly from the perspective of a “punitive conception of responsibility� - behaviour-conditioned welfare provision based on deserving benefits in some prescribed way - and then secondly from the perspective of “denial of responsibility� - essentially an argument of modern Left that argues for the extreme primacy of structure in determining the success or failure of an individual. Eventually, Mounk develops his own argument, about what he calls a “positive conception of responsibility� - an attempt to move beyond the Age of Responsibility, “to reconceive of our moral and political lives in the language of other, long-neglected values.� He argues for a reconceptualisation of welfare policies from “pre-institutional� or “pre-political� responsibility towards its ‘institutional� form. This perspective does not deny the responsibility of agents - making a solid argument why it is important - but rather bases the provision of welfare support on institutional values - like the fact that people in this setting are always helped in this particular way. This more empowering conception of responsibility would allow people to develop deeper responsibilities toward others and towards their personal projects. He purposely does not specify or define the institutional values, leaving that to the conscious decision of the polity, about which values it exercises through its set-up of welfare provision. “Since political institutions are meant to serve the citizens who created them, each of these desires and aspirations has implications for how we should design public policy. Social and economic policies should recognize that many people value being in productive work, especially when the form that work takes leaves some real agency to employees. But it should also recognize that most people value many things beyond work, and use its regulatory arsenal—including rules about overtime pay, legislation that facilitates the creation of part-time work, the decoupling of health care and paid work, and much more—to enable people to contribute meaningfully to the projects and commitments that matter to them beyond their work lives. Similarly, and perhaps most importantly, the singular focus on people providing for themselves should give way to a recognition that one large social contribution can consist in raising children, or caring for needy relatives.� Throughout the book, there is another point seeping throughout the pages - that many of the institutions - in this case, mechanisms and programs of the welfare state - do not perform the roles they were set up for, but rather something else, more punitive or ideological (he does not make this point explicitly, but one can understand it. Mounk thus challenges policymakers to ask - what is the actual role of the policy? And is the design - depriving people of dignity or inflicting some form of mental price or pain on them - just a budgetary necessity, or a misconstruction of its original purpose? The book is easy to read, yet not always that easy to comprehend fully, especially if one, like me, is not too accustomed to the style of writing of modern analytical philosophy. There are also quite little of policy implications until very late in the book when Mounk contrasts Danish and US welfare administrations (Danish being less punitive and more in line with his “positive� approach to responsibility), as well as Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) - SSDI being, again, more in line with his positive conceúption of responsibility, due to it being set up for people “widely perceived as being more deserving of help because they are less responsible for their fate�. I really enjoyed the book and find it useful in providing a novel way of looking at the modern welfare state and its commitments. It is, however, relatively detached from the beginning of its argument and for instance, does not show how harmful is the Earned Income Tax Credit (sure, I admit I am a fan of it, but would like it to be firstly truly deconstructed to see it as evil), and relies probably too a great deal on the name of Clinton’s welfare reform act - the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996. Mounk’s way is both intellectually sound, as well as humanly kind and I believe it could inform new social contracts, not just concerning collective social safety nets. ...more |
Notes are private!
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Apr 11, 2023
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Apr 25, 2023
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