This is a comprehensive indictment of peacekeeping in the early 90s. It is a series of qualitative case studies on individual missions. The author is This is a comprehensive indictment of peacekeeping in the early 90s. It is a series of qualitative case studies on individual missions. The author is highly critical of peacekeeping beyond the traditional interposition missions and unarmed observer missions, since the use of force to deter spoilers, and humanitarian interventions violates the holy trinity of peacekeeping: neutrality, consent of the parties, and minimum use of force only in self defense, which were the terms under which the first peacekeeping mission, UNEF, deployed during the Suez Crisis.
There are some quibbles with his analysis. For example, he sets too high of a bar for success in Cambodia (the complete disarmament of the Khmer Rouge), when most scholars consider it a qualified success. The same is true of East Timor. It is considered a qualified success by most, but Jett moves that into the failed column. Ditto Mozambique, since the full mandate was not achieved, like de-mining, when most scholars consider it a success.
This is an important perspective to read in order to cover the spectrum of scholarship on peacekeeping (there is a large contingent of scholars in the field who are nostalgic for the type of mission seen during the Cold War--truce supervision between states), but it is not the final word....more
This is a truly excellent critical take on why peacekeeping in the post war period is dominated by peacekeepers from the Global South. While it fits iThis is a truly excellent critical take on why peacekeeping in the post war period is dominated by peacekeepers from the Global South. While it fits in the critical tradition of international relations, this is not a typical exercise is navel gazing and phantasmagorical logical absurdities that characterized "research" labeled "critical" in the social sciences. Nor is it a typical exercise in third world solidarity that characterizes the research in neo-colonialism.
His thesis is that peacekeeping in post-Cold War conflicts, which are almost entirely civil wars, is a form of non-territorial imperialism. The United Nations functions to impose a Westphalian and liberal peace on the conflicts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Peacekeeping operations are used to manage conflict so that it does not upset the international order established after the Second World War. Essentially the UN uses illiberal means (military coercion) to achieve liberal ends (liberal democracies), because democratic peace theory, the idea that democracies do not war with one another, is a form of secular millenarianism.
That the bulk of peacekeepers come from the Global South (8 of the 10 largest troop contributing countries were former British or French colonies) is explained as a historical continuity with the experience of imperial policing during empire. For example, the army in Kenya was formed from the African Rifles that deployed all over the British empire to fight small wars. The British Indian Army was likewise deployed all over the empire, which explains why India and Pakistan are two of the largest contributors to peacekeeping operations. They staff peacekeeping operations because it is in their DNA.
Peacekeepers from the developing world are a bargain in both blood and treasure for the Americans and Europeans on the UN Security Council since they can be maintained in the field at a fourth the cost of a developed world soldier. This is the same reason why the Europeans maintained colonial troops for colonial policing. They were cheaper than forces from the metropole....more
Jett wrote one of the best qualitative studies of peacekeeping effectiveness. It is well organized and defensible in its conclusions. He selected two Jett wrote one of the best qualitative studies of peacekeeping effectiveness. It is well organized and defensible in its conclusions. He selected two cases of multi-dimmensional peacekeeping similar in many respects (decades long civil wars, super powers intervening on both sides, and lusophone countries) and deduces why one failed (UNAVEM II in Angola) and one succeeded (ONUMOZ in Mozambique).
While some reasons for the success of ONUMOZ were particular, such as a famine and withdrawal of South African support after the Apartheid regime fell, which forced the Renamo rebellion to agree to demobilize, he mainly highlights the following for success: large deployments to increase security (ONUMOZ was a huge armed peacekeeper deployment, UNAVEM II was a small unarmed observer mission), super power support for the peace settlement (which withdrew external support for the conflicting parties), and skilled Special Representatives of the Secretary General running the operations. Angola was run by a British UN bureaucrat who was a lifer and peter principled into position, who Jett describes as a spectator to events, whereas Mozambique was run by a stilled politician tapped to run it, who was skilled at negotiating a successful outcome and adapting to conditions on the ground rather than taking orders from UN headquarters in New York. That last aspect was highlighted as well in the case study done by Lise Howard in UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars....more
This is an important study of the reasons for variation in violence in civil wars. Crucial to the model is the political economy of defection. ViolencThis is an important study of the reasons for variation in violence in civil wars. Crucial to the model is the political economy of defection. Violence tends to be indiscriminate when a combatant is unable to control a territory, because the desire to to use punitive actions to force population compliance (or force migration). Violence becomes more discriminate when control is higher. The key to defeating a combatant in an unconventional war is to elicit civilian cooperation with you. You want the populace denouncing guerrillas and sympathizers. Thus violence needs to appear discriminate so as not to alienate potential sympathizers. When an area is contested, paradoxically violence against civilians is at a minimum, since neither side want to alienate potential sympathizers.
A great challenge is that denunciation is often for local reasons (feuds, etc.) rather than part of the master cleavage characterizing the war. It can be a challenge for authorities. The master cleavage ends up becoming a master narrative with little to do with the real reason why a person denounces another. ...more
This is a mid-90s book on peacekeeping. It uses two cases, the British Army experience in Bosnia (UNFROFOR) and the US Army experience in Somalia (UNOThis is a mid-90s book on peacekeeping. It uses two cases, the British Army experience in Bosnia (UNFROFOR) and the US Army experience in Somalia (UNOSOM II), to show how organizational culture determines doctrine for military operations other than war and peacekeeping. The British Army, with a past rooted in colonial policing and the regimental system, is much better equipped to do peacekeeping, than the US Army with its history rooted in total war during the Civil War, Clausewitz and Jomini, and failure in Vietnam, plus an organizational structure around a division, that leaves the US Army unable to conduct peacekeeping effectively....more
This is an important book in the history of theory about third party intervention in civil war. It is an edited volume broken into three sections: hisThis is an important book in the history of theory about third party intervention in civil war. It is an edited volume broken into three sections: history, theory, and case studies. It generally dwells on the failures of the early 1990s and serves as a backdrop to the UN Secretariat's An Agenda for Peace....more
This is an unusual book on peacekeeping in civil wars in that it focuses on the few positive case studies instead of dwelling on the numerous failuresThis is an unusual book on peacekeeping in civil wars in that it focuses on the few positive case studies instead of dwelling on the numerous failures. The key to success according to Howard is the peacekeeping operation's capacity for institutional learning in the field....more
Charles Ragin invented qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a tool for dealing with multiple conjoint causation--intersectionality to use the fasCharles Ragin invented qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a tool for dealing with multiple conjoint causation--intersectionality to use the fashionable term--that is, the intersection of multiple factors results in the observed phenomenon. It is an important tool in the political scientist's and sociologist's arsenal for studying social phenomena in addition to the usual regression methods. It is able to handle interactions without having to a priori specify the interactions as with regression.
This book deals with the application of fuzzy-set logic to QCA, that is set membership has gradations rather than a crisp definition. Male-female is a crisp set. Rich or poor is a fuzzy set. This is an extended dissertation on the value of QCA and the weakness of regression for studying social phenomena, therefore, quantitative researchers beware, you will be put of by Ragin's confrontational tone....more
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