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"Buffalo buffalo Buffalo buffalo buffalo buffalo Buffalo buffalo" is a sentence. However, it must be contextualized by the grammatical rules of American English for it to make any sense. Outside of this context, it is an abstract and incomprehensible blabbering string of letters. Similarly, Butler posits that the Self cannot be iterated without context; namely, that one cannot discuss one's Selfhood without the preontological conception of the Other, both a recipient of and critic of this discourse. This dialogue of the Self is thereby limited by social norms, or by a greater extension, what is accepted by the Other as Truth. Here is the dilemma. In order to wholly iterate the terms of one's own identity and existence, the Individual must be interchangeable with the Other. This defies the concept of differentiation (individuation) inherent to the notion of the Self. So, our self-referent dialogues, in order to be communicated, are limited by the confines of the social order within which we reside.

Not unlike the "Buffalo" sentence, Butler constructs her "thesis" from a string of relations; i.e. "Philosopher writing about their reading of a philosopher writing about their reading of a philosopher writing about their reading of a philosopher writing about [...]" She fails to make a distinct argument of her own but rather, uses a history of philosophizations on the Self/Other complex to guide the reader using the Socratic method. Her book makes sense (to her readers) in this way insofar as she is only iterating concepts stemming directly from a Truth previously projected by others. Unfortunately, Butler fails to distinguish herself as a philosopher independent from these historical schools of thought.

In this lack of self-interjection, Butler also fails to answer a problematic question raised by the text: how do novel ways of iterating Selfhood come about? For instance, how can one come to refer to oneself as intersex or trans* if this means of self-reference was formerly non-iteratable based on the confines of historical society? There must have been some sort of relation between two or more individuals who saw themselves in this way of identification, with these relations spreading among likeminded people until its audience was broad enough for it to be considered Truth. But what if these interactions are not possible? How does the individual reconcile these gaps in self-expression with one's own notion of the Self? What are the psychical implications when one's concept of identity cannot be fully and clearly iterated (as Butler asserts is always true)? As the leading figure in gender theory, I call Butler to consider the applications and implications of this work, to speak from her Self so that new theoretical frameworks can be constructed.