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In Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1781), Immanuel Kant ended with the conclusion that there exists (1) a phenomenal world that we perceive and constitute via our mental categories and the notions of space and time, and (2) a noumenal world of which we cannot know anything positively - we can only try to use Pure Reason to discover slithers of a priori synthetical knowledge of this. Kant 'discovered' three things that exists in this noumenal world: (1) us, as immortal souls, (2) God, as a necessary cause and Supreme Being, and (3) freedom. Towards the end of the first Kritik, Kant mentions that we cannot know these three things for sure, but we need them for Morality.

It is in Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft (1788) that Kant further works out his earlier thoughts on Morality. Like the first Kritik, the second one is easy to summarize. It is also much shorter (you need to have read the first Kritik as a foundation, though).

From the start, Kant makes us grand promises: while Pure (Speculative) Reason can hint at the existence of immortal souls, God and freedom, the Pure Practical Reason can positively prove this. Sounds interesting. Let's see if he succeeds in convincing us.

In the first part of the Kritik, Kant analyzes the concepts of moral law and freedom. He does this in order to discover, by applying Pure Reason to Practice (praxis), the nature of Morality. In other words, he wants to find the form of the moral law (as synthetic knowledge a priori), independent of any experience a posteriori.

For Kant, Practical Reason is a mental faculty that we possess as 'thinking things'. It determines our will by applying universal principles of action (praxis) to particular cases. These principles come in two forms, which are fundamental in understand Kant's Kritik: hypothetical and categorial imperatives.

In order to find a genuine moral law, we have to apply Pure Reason. This means to leave the concepts themselves alone and focus on the logical relations between concepts. Kant doesn't want to find the content of Morality, but the form in which the laws come. This is not really accurate, though; Kant wants to find the content of the law in its form - independent from us as objects.

So, to begin with, we can base our actions on personal desires (these Kant calls maxims) but these have their foundation in us, as objects. These maxims are called hypothetical imperatives: they are conditionally (IF we want to achieve/possess/etc. something, THEN we have to do this or that) and they presuppose personal interests in us, as objects. Therefore, these hypothetical imperatives are not good enough.

In the end, Kant finds the only possible law in which the form determines the content, and is thereby independent of our experience or interests: the (infamous) categorical imperative. It is categorical, since - just like the 12 categories that we use to perceive and constitute the world around us - we use this imperative to constitute our behaviour. Kant's categorical imperative says that we should act in such a way that we could wish that our act would become a universal law, without creating internal contradictions. Is it just to lie? No, because we could not wish for lying to be universal - the meaning of our language would disappear. Is it just to commit suicide? No, because we could not wish for everyone committing suicide universally. Well, actually, both examples are problematic and they expose the flaws in his system (of which later more).

For Kant,the moral law (i.e. the categorical imperative) has its origin in the noumenal world. The law itself consists only of form and is therefore a piece of synthetic knowledge a priori that we can only discover by applying our Pure Reason. Since our desires and interests are part of the phenomenal world, they cannot restrain the moral law in any way. It is here that Kant sees our freedom (which is also part of the noumenal world): we are free in as far as we dictate our will by the moral law.

Morality is independent of any restraint and therefore autonomous (a thing in itself); respect for the moral law is equivalent to freedom. So we see that Kant has defined freedom, not only negatively (as in the first Kritik) as 'independent of phenomenal restraints', but now also positively as 'acting according to the moral law'.

To summarize: Kant has found that freedom is doing what the moral law (i.e. the categorial imperative) prescribes. Since this moral law is a noumenon, it is indepedent of any phenomenal restraint, hence personal interests such as happiness and satisfaction form no part of the moral law. In the last part of the Analytic, Kant uses this last discovery to do away with all of the preceding moral philosophies: epicureanism, aristotelean ethics, anything that is concerned with human interests cannot be (morally) Good. He praises the doctrine of stoics for seeking Virtue in denying worldly interests their influence on our constitution, but he only praises and subscribes to the christian morality - since this is the only morality that prescribes autonomous (therefore categorical and noumenal) laws; all the other systems of ethics are, ultimately, heterenomous (therefore hypothetical and phenomenal).

In the second part of the Kritik, Kant uses the dialectical method to do away with antinomies. Since Pure Reason cannot penetrate the noumenal world, we fall prey to either dogmatic rationalism or sceptical empiricism, leading to contradicting, unsolvable philosophical stand offs. Just like in the first Kritik, in the second one Kant tries to resolve the problems and in the process finds (this time, positive) truths about the noumenal world.

What's the problem in the second Kritik? Well, there is a problem in the conception of the highest good (or Summum Bonum, as Kant calls it). In one sense (thesis), the highest good is that which is necessarily required for all the other goods; in another sense (antithesis) it is the best good of all the goods, even though these goods might not be necessary (but contingent). In essence it is a conflict between duty and virtue - should we do our moral duty with the possibiliy of not being rewarded by the world around us, or should we strive for virtue and thereby happiness?

Kant's solution (synthesis) is very much like his solutions in the first Kritik. He uses the existence of two worlds to do away with the entire problem. We should always do our duty! When this doesn't lead to rewards, in the form of happiness, this is only a phenomenal issue. And this is not a problem anymore, since we exists as noumenal AND phenomenal things.

So even though we might not by happy in the phenomenal world when doing our duty, we are happy in the noumenal world. By doing our duty continuously, we progress, as immortal souls, on an infinite road to perfection, which we will never reach, according to Kant, but this doesn't make it less important to strive for this.

As a lucky corollary, for Kant at least, when striving for this highest good (ultimate happiness in doing our duty) - which, once again, we will never reach, as fallible beings - we need a perfect Supreme Being as a rewarding mechanism and lawmaker. This Being should be omniscient, since it has to know everything about us at any time; this Being should be omnipotent, since it has to be able to make any law that is has to make and to reward us in any way that is demanded; the Being should be be perfectly good, since it has to love justice.

In other words: by trying to find the universal moral law, Kant has ingenuously postively proved the existence of (1) our freedom, (2) the existence of us as immortal souls and (3) the existence of a Supreme Being, God; all three as noumena in the Transcendental World. Three noumena that were only hinted at as possible existing things in the first Kritik!

To summarize the whole of Kant's Practical Reason: when we apply Pure Reason to Morality, we find a universal moral law, a categorical imperative, that says that we should act only in such a way that we could want every human being acting thus, without this leading to contradictions. Our freedom lies in our respect for and our duty towards this moral law, as an autonomous object. When we do our duty, we set out on an infinite road to the highest good (i.e. summum bonum), and this requires us to exist as infinite intelligences (i.e. immortal souls). God, as Supreme Being, necessarily exists as lawmaker and mechanism of reward. These three things, freedom, immortal souls and God, positively exist as noumena - they are needed for a universal moral law.

Now, what should we make of all this? In the first Kritik, I found it very convenient that Kant posits another, unknowable world in which he could deposit all the problems in philosophy. In the second Kritik, this becomes problematical. In the first Kritik, he could get away with saying that immortal souls, human freedom and God might exists - we could not prove or disprove this, but in the second Kritik this is not an option anymore. Kant needs these three things as existing noumena, since they are the building blocks of his Moral Law. This shows the weakness of the whole system.

In my view, he overstretches his method of Pure Reason to acquire synthetic knowledge a priori by wanting say too much. He wants to prove there is a universal moral law (the categorical imperative) and therefore has to cross his own admitted epistemological boundaries. He basically contradicts his first Kritik with the publication of the second Kritik. This is problematic.

There are, basically, two important problems for Kant (as far as I can see).

1. When dealing with the impossibility of positively proving the existence of God, Kant claimed that the existence of God (as object) could not be proved by predicates. "Existence" is a subjective thing which is logically unrelated to the object (God). In other words: trying to prove the existence of noumenal things by using phenomenal things is impossible, by definition. Now, in the second Kritik, Kant seems to prove the existence of immortal souls, freedom and God as noumena by using a very similar argument as the one he criticized earlier. He says we need these three things for the Moral Law, but just because we need them, doesn't prove that they positively exist. Utility is not an argument for existence; I can think of thousands of very useful things, but this doesn't make them exist. It is in broad outlines the same as the ontological argument: existence is part of perfection, but this doesn't prove anything.

2. But let's grant Kant, for the sake of argument, the existence of the three pillars under his Moral Law. When the moral law, or the categorical imperative, becomes problematic, then the three pillars become superfluous anyway. So what about the categorical imperative? Well, it seems very problematic, to say the least. We should do only the things that we could wish were universal without leading to contradictions. Kant mentions suicide as an example; but if everyone wants to commit suicide, does it lead to a contradiction when we apply it to the categorical test? Of course not. If everyone wants to commit suicide, then it doesn't lead to a contradiction when I commit suicide. And it's the same with killing off the whole entire human race. Does it lead to a contradiction when the entire human race wants to kill the whole human race and I do it? Ofcourse not, I would only put in practice what everyone wants anyway. And a thrid and last example: if I should never lie, because it would lead to a contradiction if I should want that everyone lies, should I lie to a murderer who wants to kill my friend and asks for his location (which I know)? Kant would say: tell the truth, you will be rewarded as a noumenon. Right... Benjamin Constant offered the last example to show the problems of Kant's categorical imperative, and I think it is convincing.

So to conclude: we can think of examples that we would class as immoral acts but that would nonetheless be moral according to the categorical imperative; we can also think of examples that would class as moral acts (protecting a friend from a murderer) but which are immoral according to the categorical imperative. So we are back to square one: Kant wanted to find a universal law, but the failure of his categorical imperative leads us to consider every situation as a particular moral instance, which is the one thing Kant wanted to do away with. This makes his three building blocks - which are problematic on their own merits - superfluous oddities in a failing moral theory.

Should we then just ridicule Immanuel Kant for concocting such an arcane idea? Of course we should not. Kant showed us that we should view human beings not only as means to ends (hypothetical), but also ALWAYS AND AT THE SAME TIME as goals in and of themselves (categorical). Respect for this moral law (which Kant preached) is an Enlightenment ideal we should never lose out of out sight. Besides respect for our fellow human beings, Kant learned us that intentions do matter. We should not only focus on consequences of actions - like utilitarians or religious believers who, out of prudence (i.e. self-love), follow God's laws as if following a dictator - we should always weigh the intentions of ourselves and others when thinking about morality. These are two important lessons, never mind the confused philosophy that is attached to it.