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Out of all of the books I have read thus far on Russia and Putin � either directly about him or his leadership within the context of Russia (including but not limited to: Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, The Future Is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia, Politics in Russia and Developments in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics � the last two being academic textbooks) I truly felt that Short’s book gave the most unbiased reporting of Vladmir Putin’s leadership.

Rather than simply paint Putin as a one-dimensional villain acting purely out of corrupt self-interest (as the West continues to do) or as the altruistic hero who single-handedly saved Russia in the interest of restoring national pride (as Russian media outlets would have you believe), Short’s “Putin� weaves a much more complex narrative � as is often the case with leaders who have come to power in the midst of chaos. I would not however, in any way, consider him a “Putin apologist� as I believe some people may think.

Short narrates how historical events and events in Putin’s own life helped to shape him into the man he was, the man he is today, and the man he will likely become after stepping down from power. Most importantly, it allows the reader to gain a better understanding of how differently politics work in Russia vs. the US and other western European countries. To understand why Putin has taken the actions he has at various points during his leadership, it is imperative that one understands Russian politics from a Russian citizen’s perspective � and not in the context of American political history (because, quite simply, our brand of politics does not work there).

One of the most important facts that the West always tends to forget is that Russian citizens have often grown up with unstable or tyrannical governments. Therefore, they are often more than willing to exchange what we consider here to be “imperative human rights� for better economic conditions, job security, structure. To most Russians, especially in the rural areas, where Putin has the majority of his support (the majority of dissent is in more urban areas such as Moscow or St. Petersburg) Putin is either a consistent hero at best, or the only man capable of doing the job at worst. It seems as though it is hard for non-Russians to grasp that Putin could not maintain his grip on power without having the majority of the Russian electorate backing him.

Even now, his approval rating is still around 76%, possibly a little higher or lower. What we are never told in the West, really, is that the majority of Russians have supported the annexation of Ukraine. It has been a part of Russia FAR, FAR, longer than it has ever been a sovereign state. Even Navalny, whom much of the West sees as Putin’s most ardent critic, had to walk back a statement he had made in support of the annexation of Crimea and the Donbas (I believe this statement was made right before he became such a popular opposition figure, and he had to walk it back).

It’s important to know that even some of his most vocal critics (exiled, rich, and out of harm’s way � so no need to mince words) have backed his actions in Ukraine, as well as praised attributes of his during his time in government in St. Petersburg � attributes such as not overly greedy or materialistic, not corrupt, loyal, and viewing his place in politics as one more of “duty� than one that could bring him power and advance his own interests. It was precisely for this reason that Yeltsin announced Putin to be his successor � much to the surprise not only of many of Yeltsin’s closest allies, but even to Putin himself.

It was said by many of his now critics that when Putin first started the job, he was very different than other Russian presidents that career politicians had been used to dealing with. They found themselves quite taken aback by the fact that he would actually listen to new ideas and hire the most competent individuals for needed government jobs, rather than simply barking orders and promoting politicians based only on their connections and bribes.

I think is actually very fair to say that when Putin first took Russia’s oath as president in 2000, he was fairly optimistic about turning around relations with the U.S., as well as the rest of the western world. He wasn’t opposed to NATO, so long as they weren’t showing any signs of expanding into Russia’s territory and causing alarm among the electorate that their security might be at risk. He even pondered joining the EU, perhaps even NATO, in his first ten years as Russia’s leader. When asked by the BBC’s David Frost how he envisaged future relations with NATO, his response was unexpected, to say the least:

"Russia is a part of European culture. I cannot imagine my country in isolation from Europe and from the so-called, as we often say, civilized world. So I find it difficult to imagine NATO as an enemy. It seems to me that…even posing the question this way can be damaging…�

When asked about joining NATO and the possibility:
“Why not? Why not? I would not rule it out…But only if Russia’s interests are taken into account and if Russia is treated as a partner with equal rights. I want especially to emphasize this…When we speak out against NATO’s expansion to the east,…we are thinking first and foremost about our country’s place in the world…If there are attempts to exclude us from the process of decision-making, this naturally causes us concern and irritation.�

Instead however, no matter how hard it seemed Putin tried to cooperate with the U.S., giving the Bush administration helpful Intel and advice from their own firsthand experience (such as staying out of Afghanistan! � something the Soviet Union definitely realized was a grave mistake and warned the U.S. repeatedly as much!) the relationship was very one-sided. Russia was continuously treated as the “loser� of the Cold War and as such, often felt that the U.S. and its western allies were being hypocritical and patronizing toward a country that had, only a decade before, shared equal “great power� status with the U.S.

From all of the academic journal articles I’ve read on the subject assigned to me by my International Relations professors, professors of Russian politics, etc., it truly does seem as though the West failed Russia spectacularly when it had the chance to truly establish a lasting partnership. John Mearsheimer, considered one of today’s most influential political theorists in realism, published articles on NATO expansion by the West, and how the West was to ultimately to blame for the war in Ukraine. Controversial? Of course. True? Well, that’s up to the reader to decide. But to say that the West played no part or shoulders absolutely no blame for what is happening in Ukraine today would be a complete lie as well. It’s more of a question of just how much blame lay at the feet of the U.S. and its allies.

Before Putin, there was Yeltsin, who created complete economic chaos and allowed the oligarchs free reign over corporations and politics alike. Yeltsin was known for being a pretty bad alcoholic and was impeached � I believe � no less than 3 or 4 times? (Lol, somehow I have never managed to get the exact number on that correct, no matter how much it’s come up in my studies).

Before Yeltsin, you had Gorbachev, who was clearly a much more benevolent leader than those who came before him. However, benevolence did not translate into good policies for Russian citizens. It would seem that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin perhaps had some truly genuine hopes for reform � only they didn’t have the slightest clue as to how to properly turn these hopes into good legislation. Often they acted too hastily and while allowing much more criticism and personal freedoms to Russians, this resulted in a disastrous economy and no security for Russia.

So it’s quite easy to see why Russians (especially older Russians) view Putin the way they do. They remember the difficult times after the dissolution of the USSR, the hunger, the hours-long bread lines, the economic instability, the lack of jobs. In their eyes, Putin gave much of this security back to them (as mentioned earlier). It’s easy to understand why they’d continue to support him, given that he is either the only Russian leader they know, or, in the case of older citizens, the only Russian leader who actually made Russia a better place. Considering that Russia’s population is mostly older and their birth rate has remained stagnant at best (but usually declining) � it is no wonder that Putin still amasses great support from Russian citizens.

There are important mentions about his upbringing and just how much more he was already primed to join the KGB at a young age, rather than the usual rhetoric of "how much the KGB shaped Putin" (not much at all, really). Some people have complained about Short somehow "excusing" Putin for certain acts such as not having Boris Nemtsov gunned down right outside the Kremlin, not stealing what was equivalent to $28 million USD during his time in the mayoral department in St. Petersburg, nor the alleged KGB involvement in domestic terrorism and apartment building bombings and fires that the West was all too happy to blame on Putin. Short offered far too much proof to the contrary, so I don't exactly see how he is "making excuses", but rather reporting based on the most likely scenario after cross-checking a large number of accounts at that time.

He doesn't shy away from holding him responsible, however, for the poisoning of Alexander Litvichenko, or Alexei Navalny. It's just great to finally read a book that is more matter-of-fact, does its research, and leads the reader to draw their own conclusions on why Russia became the country it did under 23 years of Putin's rule.

I'm hoping to link to a few really fantastic positive reviews that give even better, more well-written details on this fantastic biography. I will try to do so later tonight, but if not, at least I did eventually get this one done on my own! Will try to do the last three books I read after this one as well between tonight and tomorrow.