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This is a strange, tricky and sometimes disturbing account of military developments since WO II.
Strange, because it really is not one coherent story the writers tell, but several lose ones, knitted together on the umbrella of 'The Evolution of Warfare' in a failed attempt to make it look like a comprehensive study.
Tricky, because it's very nearsighted on just actual conflicts and the way they were conducted, but hardly ever questions the 'why', with what reasons a war was fought in the first place.
And last but not least, sometimes disturbing, because both writers have an very simple minded patriotic view of world history and politics.

As you might expect of a book written partialy by an American General, this is not going to be a balanced account of Military Conflict since 1945. Already in the first chapter the writers cut short any discussion about the start of the Cold war by putting all the blame for that on one person, Joseph Stalin. And although Stalin's paranoia and ruthlessness did play a very big part in creating the Cold war athmosphere, it is somewhat shortsighted to neglect the role the western powers played in feeding that paranoia.
The fact that GB and France in 1938 prefered Hitler destroying the Soviet Union, instead of accepting Stalin's offer to fight Nazi Germany together, is largerly overlooked by these two biased writers, trumpeting US role in preserving the World Peace for all. Not to mention Truman's haste to dump unnecesary nuclair bombs on Japan just to show Stalin how powerfull the US was at that moment.

The premisse of the first half of this book: Americans are good, Communist are bad. In the second half of the book the realm of Bad guys is broadend to Out of control (Sadam Hussein) or drugtrafficking dictators (Noriega) and of course Isamic fanatics, but basically that's what the book tries to tell, Americans are the good guys battling the bad guys.
However, only how these battles were fought are under critical scrutiny. The book almost never challenges the intentions of the call for arms, only it's execution. Even American actions in Vietnam are redemped in some way. At least the 'Cord' counter insurgency program in the later half of the War and the Bombing campaign towards the end get credit for what they where trying to achieve.
And there also goods marks for American action in Nigaragua, Panama and Grenada. The book makes even Ronald Reagan and George Bush de Second look good in times of crisis.

And that's where the book get's disturbing sometimes. When the focus shifs to much to the good, heroic intentions of Americans as defenders of democratic values, helping out in the World. Kipling would have been proud of this reevaluation of 'The White Man's Burden'. Although in this case it's usually the poor blacks who risk their lives as military fodder. But that's a completely different matter of course.

Petraeus somewhat redeems himself with his very critical account of the War in Afghanistan and the second War on Iraq. Wars in which he himself was personally involved, and which makes a lot of what he writes a kind of reckoning with the Powers he was dealing with. Especialy Rumsfeld en Wolowitz get a torough dressing down for there descision making, or lack of it. In both cases of wars the critique however is again more in the poor political or organisational execution, then in questioning what they where doing there in the first place.
Nevertheless, he leaves no doubt about the absolute mess the Americans left in both countries. And that is indeed something, coming from a higher US military man.

In the end the book left me diaspointed. There is something to be said for a renewed look a importance of military logic in this day and age. Especialy in the light of a new World Order which is emerging, one where the cold part of 'The Cold War' suddenly looks like a nostalig memory of simpelere times. But without something of a moral, political and historical perspective of these kind of military developments, you're left with the basic question: 'Do we have to go to war in the first place?' Because sometimes we do, and sometimes we don't. But failing to answer these question, this book misses the point for me. But again that's probably expected from a book co-writen by a decorated American General.