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| 0745348661
| 9780745348667
| 0745348661
| 4.34
| 625
| Nov 30, 2023
| Nov 30, 2023
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None
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Notes are private!
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1
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Mar 18, 2025
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not set
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Mar 18, 2025
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Paperback
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| 1919601910
| 9781919601915
| 1919601910
| 3.62
| 45
| unknown
| 2021
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liked it
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Seize the means of ... interpretation?! The aim of “Psychoanalysis and Revolution� by Ian Parker and David Pavón-Cuéllar is twofold: 1) to critique mai Seize the means of ... interpretation?! The aim of “Psychoanalysis and Revolution� by Ian Parker and David Pavón-Cuéllar is twofold: 1) to critique mainstream “adaptive psy� professions and 2) to highlight the radical potential of psychoanalysis to support emancipatory movements both in theory and practice. 1. The authors criticize adaptive psy professions (a) for their tendency to overlook how often it is society that is “sick� and not the individual, (b) reinforcing individualism and separation, a form of dualism between the external environment and the Self, (c) their role in normalizing and adapting individuals into oppressive structures and (d) producing ‘good� (“functional�, “productive� and obedient) workers and consumers. For instance, treating depression and anxiety merely as “chemical imbalances� or using CBT to address “dysfunctional thinking patterns and behaviors� often obscures the role of societal factors such as economic insecurity, job dissatisfaction, social isolation, poverty, inequality, lack of access to support systems, the lack community and many other major contributors to mental health. The notion that “if only you’d think differently� or “balance your brain chemistry� will fix the problem serves as a tool to adapt people to reality instead of enabling them to change it. It’s not like drug treatments and “adaptive� psychotherapy are useless or never appropriate (they can even be life-saving in some cases) but they primarily address surface-level symptoms and tend to ignore the underlying root causes. As a result, the symptoms often reemerge or manifest in a different form. In a sense, I expect the argument to be self-evident to most radicals. What else would be the case? Systems tend to produce individuals who perpetuate and reproduce these systems. Most institutions evolve and are organized to produce, reproduce, and normalize their own existence and support the status quo. Much like the education system or news media, which are primarily designed to produce good workers and consumers � passive, obedient, and uninformed individuals. And surely, if people lacking class consciousness or awareness of other systems of oppression experience negative effects as a result of systemic oppression and encounter mainstream “adaptive psy� professions, they will likely be “adapted� again. But [anecdotal argument alert], I have had numerous friends and comrades suffering from depression, anxiety, drug addiction, or other issues, who went through mainstream psy treatments and, to some extent, benefited from them, without forgetting or ignoring the root causes of their suffering. Once they were better, they returned to their movements and organizations. It seems less likely to me that activists and radicals will be neutralized to the extent of abandoning their struggles by adaptive psychotherapy. 2. There is a long history of both tension and collaboration between psychoanalysis and movements such as Marxism, post-colonialism, feminism, and others. Figures like Wilhelm Reich, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, Louis Althusser, Slavoj Žižek, Frantz Fanon, Juliet Mitchell, and many others come to mind. The authors choose to focus on four key psychoanalytic concepts and their “radical potential�: the unconscious, repetition, drive, and transference. Unconscious: the ruling ideology structures the unconscious, influencing our desires, fears, and inner conflicts, dictating behavior and our internal sense of self and reality. The authors caution against two common misconceptions about the unconscious: � the notion that it is “something deep and dark within us�, connected to our biological nature while psychoanalysis serves to “civilize� it. � the Jungian idea of the “collective unconscious� as a mystical realm of universal archetypes, which easily leads to problematic concepts like “racial archetypes� where different ethnic groups are thought to have specific ways of thinking, and it is the work of “experts� to identify them. Instead, the unconscious is seen as “socially and historically produced and reproduced�. It is “the other side of language�. A part of the symbolic order, shaped by social and historical contexts. Repetition: we unconsciously repeat what we cannot remember because it is too intolerable or traumatic to face directly. We often repeat self-destructive behaviors, i.e. repeatedly choosing toxic romantic partners/friends/allies, overworking to the point of burnout, perpetuating exclusionary or hierarchical practices, or adhering to ineffective strategies in emancipatory movements. Free association provides the opportunity to unmask “the compulsion to repeat� self-destructive patterns and gives an opportunity “to repeat, and fail better�. Drive: the logic of Capital exploits our ‘vital drive� and transforms it into a ‘death drive�, manifested in the relentless pursuit of “dead money,� self-destructive work habits, ecological destruction and so on. Critically examining and understanding how our drives are manipulated and exploited, we can re-direct them towards emancipatory and collective goals. Transference: in the beginning, the Analysand may suppose that the Analyst has special knowledge and insight about them (and thus power over them) but in the process they can realize that they do not. No one does. Including other authority figures, be it parents or “charismatic leaders�. Through transference the Analysand can become aware and re-evaluate internalized hierarchies and illusions of authority, inside and outside the clinic. So in summary, the authors contend that through psychoanalysis, both theory and practice, radicals could gain a deeper understanding into the barriers, both internal and external, that hinder our pursuits for emancipation. On one hand, psychoanalysis as a theoretical lens, has undeniably inspired a multitude of thinkers, leading to insights across various disciplines. However, I remain somewhat unconvinced that psychoanalysis holds a unique position in offering these insights. For example, the notion that the “unconscious is historically and socially constructed� can be effectively explored through alternative models, even contemporary neuroscientific models such as Predictive Processing, i.e. how our “generative models and “precision weighting� mechanisms are shaped by prior experience, societal influences and roles, providing a compelling lens that in my opinion exceeds the explanatory (and predictive) power of psychoanalytic theory. Furthermore, I consider claims such as “capitalism fuels our death drives� to be truisms framed in psychoanalytic terms. On the other hand, psychoanalysis as a practice � although I have no personal experience � it seems more plausible that, if “reformed�, as Ian Parker and David Pavón-Cuéllar propose in this book, it could fulfill its radical potential by giving a space to analysands to work through their past trauma, become more aware of internal conflicts, gain a deeper understanding of how these conflicts intersect with broader societal structures and even become more critical and autonomous. The obstacle, of course, is that currently, psychoanalysis runs as privatized for-profit treatment. This creates a divide where those who can benefit the most from (critical) psychoanalysis cannot afford it, while those who can afford it will not fully appreciate its “radical potential�. To this end, the authors highlight various historical attempts and current movements in support of the “free clinic�, in Europe, Argentina and Brazil among other places, and call for a universal and socially-owned clinics. So on that note, yes, let us also seize and socialize the means of interpretation and free association. ...more |
Notes are private!
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1
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Jul 23, 2024
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Jul 30, 2024
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Jul 23, 2024
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ebook
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| 024139452X
| 9780241394526
| 024139452X
| 3.92
| 852
| Mar 02, 2023
| May 02, 2023
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really liked it
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Came for the book’s cover and Andy Clark’s fabulous shirts, stayed to see why the title was “T Experience Machine� instead of “T Predictive Machin
Came for the book’s cover and Andy Clark’s fabulous shirts, stayed to see why the title was “T Experience Machine� instead of “T Predictive Machine�. The book introduces Predictive Processing, a neuroscientific model which promises to unify perception, cognition and action. Traces of predictive processing can be found all the way back to the work of Immanuel Kant e.g., the active application of innate categories and concepts such as Space, Time and Causality. Inspired by Kant, Hermann von Helmholtz developed the concept of unconscious inference, but it wasn’t until people like Karl Friston that Predictive Processing –and Active Inference� was formulated as a comprehensive neuroscientific model. But what is Predictive Processing? Well, perhaps it’s better to start with what it is not, or, what it aims to supplant: the conventional view of human perception, or the Bottom-Up (or feedforward) framework. In essence, according to the Bottom-Up model, the world is out there while the brain passively receives raw sensory information, processes the input signals and gradually constructs higher-level representations. Let’s take vision for example. In the Bottom-Up view, light hits the eye, stimulating the photoreceptor cells in the retina, which convert the light into neural impulses. These signals travel along the optic nerve to reach the visual cortex which processes the incoming signal, extracts features (e.g., edges, contours, shapes, colors, textures etc.). Gradually, higher-level features (e.g. object parts, configuration, movement, intentionality) are detected, forming a visual representation which can be combined with prior semantic information to recognize and categorize objects (e.g., a cat) along with typical characteristics (e.g., “furry�, “four-legged�), associated behaviors or attributes (e.g., “purring�, “playful�). [image] Predictive processing flips the script. It conceptualizes the brain as, first and foremost, a prediction machine constantly making predictions about the external world (and internal states) and adjusts them based on feedback (prediction errors) from sensory evidence, which are weighted based on their estimated importance (precision weighting). In essence, comprising the following elements: - A Generative Model is constantly generating predictions regarding both external events and internal states, which are informed by prior experiences, beliefs, knowledge, and prior states. - Moment-by-moment predictions allow for real-time adaptation to the evolving environment. - Prediction Errors: incorrect or incomplete predictions, serving as signals to reconcile predictions with sensory evidence. - Precision Weighting: estimates the significance of prediction errors within a specific context. Responsible for balancing between predictions and prediction errors. So let’s revisit an example of visual perception through the lens of Predictive Processing. As you walk through a forest, your brain anticipates what is likely to be present based on prior knowledge, expectations, and contextual cues—trees, bushes, and various vegetation. Suddenly, the brain receives an unexpected input. An unaccounted rustling noise nearby. This triggers the generation of new hypotheses regarding the possible causes of the noise, drawing upon your past experiences and expectations. - Input: “Rustling noise� + low-resolution visual input + contextual expectations + prior experience - Prediction: “Is that a snake!?! Prepare to flee!?!� - Prediction Error: “Oh no, Wait. That's not a snake!� - Precision weighting: “We must focus on the error from the visual input. We must get this right people!� - Prediction: “Oh, it was just a branch�. - Prediction Errors: “No incoming error!� � Andy Clark's begins with perception, where a lot of work has been done, aligning with both prior experimental findings and emerging research. He delves into how predictive processing offers a more comprehensive framework for understanding various perceptual phenomena, including illusions such as the convex face illusion, sine-wave speech, Mooney images, and even the “Viral Dress�. Beyond Perception But Predictive Processing does not only claim to account for perception, but also action, planning, learning, emotions and perhaps even consciousness. Very crudely: Action: a way to resolve predictive errors by changing the world. “I am going to be thirsty. I should be drinking that glass of water� -> Prediction error: “i am not drinking that glass of water� -> “move the hand, grab the glass and drink� fulfills the prediction. Learning: through repeated errors (e.g., playing the wrong note while learning to play the piano) and corrections, the generative model is optimized so as to reduce future errors. Emotions: Instead of discrete and hard-wired categories of experience that are produced by distinct brain circuits and triggered based on the context, Predictive Processing posits that emotions are well, predicted � constructed and socially learned. So in the previous example, the brain predicts the existence of a snake as well as the appropriate affective response if a snake was indeed there. This affective response encompasses a range of sensations and physiological changes that can be collectively summarized and categorized as “fear�. (See Lisa Feldman Barrett). Consciousness: Returning to my initial question, where does subjective experience fit into the picture? Clark admits that he “nervously� stands by his title, considering Predictive Processing to be our best clue so far for explaining subjective experience. In this view, sentience may be explained as the result of turning the predictive machinery inward, predicting future internal and bodily states. And by developing a predictive account of the construction of the self and language and self-awareness we might come close to explaining consciousness while deflating the Hard Problem. When things go wrong In the previous example, the predictive brain worked reasonably well, maintaining a reasonable balance between predictions and sensory evidence � or more precisely, the interplay between predictions, prediction errors and precision weighting. However, this balance is not static. There is no single best weighting schema optimal for every scenario. The importance, reliability or confidence of predictions can vary, as the world is highly complex, and different situations demand different responses. You can imagine how this process can go wrong. If too much emphasis is placed on predictions and not enough on prediction errors, the brain will start to hallucinate. Such imbalances could potentially explain conditions like psychosis. Here, we can also consider the role of prior experience (e.g., trauma) and expectations (e.g., social bias) in shaping the predictions of the generative model. For instance, if a person has PTSD from being bitten by a venomous snake, their brain might predict every branch as a snake to be on the “safe side�. Or how a racist cop might misperceive a Black person holding a phone as holding a gun based on false prior expectations and biases. (IF we are willing to take their word for it). Conversely, if too much emphasis is placed on sensory evidence, it becomes challenging to identify subtle patterns in noisy environments. The brain would struggle to determine where to focus its resources at any given time. According to Clark, emerging evidence suggests that individuals on the autism spectrum may experience an over-weighting of incoming sensory evidence, leading to difficulties in filtering and prioritizing information. Predictive brains may also have a tendency to fall into spurious self-confirming cycles, contributing to conditions such as social anxiety, depression, and chronic pain. For instance, while acute pain signals immediate danger, prompting the subject to stop an activity, with chronic pain, the system can become compromised, associating certain actions with the expectation of pain. This can lead to real pain experiences even in the absence of tissue damage (nociplastic pain). In such cases, the predicted experience of pain is materialized, reinforcing that the prediction was correct, thus creating a vicious cycle that is difficult to break. Hacking the Predictive Brain Andy Clark discusses how observations like these, aligns Predictive Processing very well with the emerging field of Computational Psychiatry, promising to bridge the gap between neuroscience and psychiatry. And while the aforementioned examples focused on how predictive brains can go wrong, there is also the flip side. We can improve predictive brains by nudging the predictive machinery to the desired direction � altering priors, expectations or re-calibrating precision weighting. Clark discusses Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, Self-affirmation, Pain Reprocessing Theory, VR therapy, Music therapy etc and how they fit in the Predictive Processing framework. For instance, consider how past trauma can be seen as over-weighting certain predictions in order to avoid the same traumatic event and how various approaches can help alter this weighting. Or how mindfulness may involve gaining greater control over the predictive machinery of the brain, particularly in terms of precision weighting, aka attention. Predicting the score of this review Overall, I found the initial chapters introducing Predictive Processing to be the strongest � with my favorite being the Appendix, which delved into more technical details. Sidenote: If you are already familiar with the work of Anil Seth or Lisa Feldman Barrett, you might not encounter much new information. Personally, I also appreciated the chapter on the connection between Predictive Processing and Computational Psychiatry even if Clark primarily re-contextualizes existing observations and knowledge from the perspective of Predictive Processing. Given that Predictive Processing is still in its infancy, it may be premature to expect some radical shift in our understanding of mental health. In any case, the field seems to have a promising future. On the other hand, I found Chapter 5 and 6 to be the weakest sections of the book. The former largely revisits Clark’s previous work, in collaboration with David Chalmer, on Extended Cognition, while the latter briefly explores the societal and political implications of Predictive Processing. It primarily delves into social biases, racial and gender stereotypes, and touches on the spread of misinformation—undoubtedly critical issues, yet I would have appreciated a broader (or at least deeper) exploration. Given my background in Computer Science and my current role as a Deep Learning researcher, Predictive Processing makes sense to me � maybe a bit too much sense. As a result, I approached the book with some caution, concerned that it might simply reaffirm my prior experiences with predictive and generative AI models. Consequently, I had hoped to encounter more in-depth discussions and comparisons with alternative models, as well as a greater emphasis on the current debates within the field and limitations of the framework. Unfortunately, these expectations were not met for the most part. Thankfully, I was pleased to encounter a recent examining the empirical evidence for predictive processing, concluding that they “offer modest support� and it “tends to explain behavioral data reasonably well�. There is also a nice (co-written by Andy Clark) that delves a bit more into the ongoing debates in the field. ...more |
Notes are private!
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Apr 25, 2024
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Apr 25, 2024
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Hardcover
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| 0062906712
| 9780062906717
| 0062906712
| 3.83
| 8,221
| 2019
| Jun 04, 2019
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it was ok
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For such a short book, Annaka Harris covers a lot of ground. She discusses: the Hard problem of consciousness, neural binding, the illusions of the Se
For such a short book, Annaka Harris covers a lot of ground. She discusses: the Hard problem of consciousness, neural binding, the illusions of the Self and Conscious Free Will, split brain patients, meditation, altered states, psychedelics and Panpsychism. Although “Brief Guide� is right there in the title –so I can't complain too much� the book's length prevents it from delving deeply into any one topic. Moreover, I was expecting a contemporary exploration of the topic, ideally with some updates on recent developments in the field, however, there is little new to be found here. If you're seeking a concise introduction to the subject, I would instead recommend Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction by Susan Blackmore or the more recent Being You: A New Science of Consciousness by Anil Seth (though admittedly, i haven't finished yet). Harris wants to highlight the Mystery of consciousness and to challenge our intuitions about consciousness, the Conscious Self and Free Will. Harris begins by adopting Thomas Nagel’s “definition�, taken from the famous “What it’s like to be a bat� essay, which posits that an organism is conscious if there is “something that it is like to be� that organism. While this is a common place starting point, I find it overly vague and loaded. Firstly, probing what it's like to be something –such as a human� encompasses a myriad of interconnected aspects beyond mere sensations and feelings. It includes memory, language, thoughts, selfhood, agency etc which aren't necessarily tied to the question of consciousness. Secondly, it evokes dualist intuitions that can cloud our understanding. Dualism is often considered a philosophical “dead� end or at least “it is to be avoided�. It posits the existence of two separate realms: the material (physical) and the immaterial (mental). However, this gives rise to the interaction problem. If these realms are fundamentally distinct, how can they possibly interact? How does an immaterial soul influence and control a material body? How could a “ghost� move the “machine�? If such interaction is possible, it should, in principle, be detectable (so far, we haven't). If not, it would violate the first law of thermodynamics. Nevertheless, even individuals who intellectually reject dualism often find themselves influenced by “trap� of Dualism. For instance, Harris references the Philosophical Zombie thought experiment, which suggests that it is conceivable to imagine a human who behaves identically to a normal individual but lacks conscious experience. From this premise, some thinkers draw the conclusion that 1) consciousness must be something beyond mere physical processes, leading to theories like Substance or Property Dualism, and/or 2) that consciousness is epiphenomenal, meaning it plays no essential role in behavior—essentially, “it does nothing�. It's this latter perspective that Harris adopts. I got 99 Hard Problems, but ... Annaka Harris aligns with David Chalmers on the Hard Problem of consciousness. Unlike the “easy� problems (as easy as going to Mars or curing cancer, Steven Pinker), which concern cognitive functions like language processing, motor control, and memory, the Hard Problem delves into the mystery of subjective experience. It questions how a physical organ like the brain, a network of neurons, or an information processing system could give rise to consciousness. How can science explain the “what it is like� aspect of consciousness—the subjective experience of “redness� when seeing a “red object�, for instance? Proponents of the Hard Problem argue that while science may elucidate all the brain's processes, it can never provide a mechanistic explanation for subjective experience. While science may explain the mechanics of vision, it cannot account for the subjective experience of seeing “redness�. I consider the Hard Problem to constitute a category mistake, or a series of “pseudo-questions� as Massimo Pigliucci or Noam Chomsky have argued, respectively. �Of course an explanation isn't the same as an experience, but that's because the two are completely independent categories, like colors and triangles. It is obvious that I cannot experience what it is like to be you, but I can potentially have a complete explanation of how and why it is possible to be you�. Let us imagine a scenario. We've time-traveled back to Ancient Athens and presented its inhabitants with a smartphone (let's assume: infinite battery life) and left. Naturally, people would react in various ways. Some might see it as magical, while others would be eager to learn how to use it—taking photos, playing games, and so forth. Some might even attempt to dissect it, examining its inner workings. There would inevitably be those who argue that the physical processes inside the device could never account for its beautiful and user-friendly interface, leading them to proclaim the “Hard Problem of UI�. They might argue that even if we understand the workings of its mechanical components, we'll never truly comprehend how the color red, for example, is rendered on the screen. Some might grasp the significance of programming and software, yet still assert, ‘We'll never truly comprehend how the color red is rendered on the screen, given that they're just 0 to 255 values on the RGB color model�. However, we would recognize that such skepticism stems from a lack of imagination, driven by their limited understanding of technology. Similarly, people once reacted to the “hard problem of life�: there could be no physicalist explanation of what lif is. Life necessitated a “Mysterious Extra�. The Élan vital. However, as our understanding of the mechanisms of life, such as homeostasis and reproduction, grew, the problem of vitalism simply withered away. The “New Mysterians�, such as Steven Pinker, may turn out to be correct that our cognitive limitations will prevent us from ever fully grasping consciousness. Nevertheless, we might as well try! Already, in the past decade or so, there has been notable progress, e.g. in terms of Embodied Cognition and Predictive Processing (see Anil Seth and Andy Clark). Perhaps, one day, similar to vitalism, we will know enough about consiousness and the brain, and the Hard Problem will wither away. Could Consciousness be an Illusion?! Another issue with the book is that Harris misrepresents and quickly glosses over “Illusionism�. She equates illusionism with the notion that “consciousness is an illusion� in the sense that “it does not exist�. In reality, illusionism posits that consciousness does indeed exist, but it is not “what it seems to be�. According to this view, access consciousness IS real, but phenomenal consciousness, or Qualia, are illusory. While I find the term “illusionism� to be misleading –it really asks for trouble� I consider proponents like Daniel Dennet, Keith Frankish and Susan Blackmore to offer valuable insights into the nature of consciousness. In rejecting what Daniel Dennett terms the “Cartesian Theater�, we dispense with the notion of a singular locus within the brain where all cognitive processes converge to form the subjective experience of the Self. In this perspective, there is no “theater� where consciousness unfolds, nor is there an “audience� that observes and experiences it. Rather than a unified field or stream of consciousness, there exist discrete and momentary conscious events—a conscious sensation, an image, a sound. Separate conscious occurrences are combined to create a sense of Self and a sense of a “stream� of consciousness. Concerning epiphenomenalism, when we eschew Dualism and view consciousness as an integral aspect of neural processes, Illusionists contend that it serves a functional purpose, i.e. a simplified and rather useful representation of the complex interplay of neuronal information processes through which the organism is able to engage with and make sense of the world. Concerning phenomenal experience, Illusionists posit that Qualia are devoid of intrinsic attributes such as “red-ness� or “pain-ness�. These concepts are essentially empty, lacking inherent qualities. (Here, we could draw on the Zen notion of “emptiness� to provide an intuitive grasp of this idea). For instance, when I was a meat eater, the smell of cooked flesh would excite me but after transitioning to a vegan diet, the same sensation evokes repulsion. Has my Qualia changed? The smell seems the same. Did the interpretation of Qualia change? What would that even mean? Or maybe my recollection of past Qualia is mistaken? etc. These interpretations can seem interchangeable and see no way to distinguish between these possibilities. Let us also consider a more challenging case: pain. It may seem counterintuitive, but there might not be an inherent essence of “pain-ness� or “awfulness� in pain. For example, I have a herniated disc: on bad days, ofcourse, there is pain but it's accompanied by a host of negative associations. The discomfort disrupts everyday activities like sitting comfortably or bending to tie shoes, and negative thoughts swirl “I will have to cancel X�, “how will i do Y?�. I can imagine removing all these associations, one by one, and there wouldn’t be an inherent “awful-ness� and “pain-ness� left. Moreover, I can imagine having the exact same Qualia in a different context, e.g. during intense training at the gym. Despite the (presumably) identical sensation, the association will be different—interpreted as proof of a rigorous workout� with even positive connotations. An alternative interpretation suggests that experiences involve active inference � an interpretation of the world, such as the perception of a red apple, followed by a labeling of "red-ness" and a cascade of associations, memories, and behaviors. While Dennett and Frankish dismiss phenomanal properties as an “illusion�, they usually serve as a very useful and practical abstraction. Thank goodness I do not have to deal with the myriad raw sensory inputs and neural processes that run in the background and instead enjoy a simplified user interface. Nevertheless, within this framework, the workings of access consciousness and the presence of sensation itself still remains unanswered. If you are interested in this perspective, consider Daniel Dennet's seminal work, Consciousness Explained, which laid the groundwork or Susan Blackmore’s Zen and the Art of Consciousness, which provides an accessible first-person exploration on the topic, or Keith Frankish’s . A Fundamental Mystery? In the latter part of the book, Annaka Harris turns to Panpsychism, a concept positing consciousness to be Fundamental. Inherent in all matter. This perspective suggests that while elementary particles may not possess complex emotions or thoughts, they exhibit some type of ultra-rudimentary form of consciousness, which is combined to form more sophisticated forms of subjective experience and awareness. I may not be “in principle� opposed to Panpsychism, but current formulations tend to be untestable and unfalsifiable, and they seem to create more problems that they “solve�. Moreover, one could similarly propose “pan-agentism� to advocate for Free Will or “pan-moralism� to support “objective morality� and so on. It seems meaningless to me. First of all, Panpshycist have to adequately explain the “Combination problem�, which Harris touches on but does not adequately address. The problem is: how the consciousness of individual particles or atoms combines to form unified, complex conscious experiences? If combining atoms can give rise to more complicated forms of consciousness then rocks should be conscious. Mountains should be conscious. Whole planets and the universe as a whole should be one giant consciousness. But then there is also, let's call it, the “Separation problem�: why does it seem that we are separate individuals? Why do I have my thoughts and memories but do not have direct access to those of the people around me? And what happens when we use local anesthesia? Does the anesthetized body part remain conscious but the rest of the organism doesn’t feel it? An alternative path would involve positing that more intricate forms of consciousness emerge exclusively in certain systems, such as information processing systems and neurons � as some interpretations of Integrated Information Theory (IIT) suggest. In this scenario, Panpsychists would need to elucidate why this phenomenon occurs and demonstrate how elementary particles exhibit different behavior within these systems. As Physicist Sean Carroll has pointed out, Panpsychists encounter a dilemma: either they must demonstrate what is wrong or missing about the “Core Theory� or argue that there's no need to modify it. In the first scenario, they would need to identify a specific particle or field capable of accounting for consciousness (talk about a Hard problem...), or devise experiments to show how electrons behave differently within neurons and brains compared to rocks or chairs. In the second scenario, Panpsychism would be recognized as inherently untestable, lacking any explanatory power. Consequently, it would exert no discernible influence on our comprehension of the world or the methodologies employed in scientific investigation. Instead, it would persist as a pursuit confined to the realm of pure Metaphysics. And I do not see a way or find any good reason to choose Panpsychism over alternative “first philosophies�, such as Idealism (“Everything is mind�) or the Simulation hypothesis. Personally, I have come to find little appeal or use in such pursuits. ...more |
Notes are private!
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Apr 18, 2024
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Apr 24, 2024
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Apr 18, 2024
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Hardcover
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| 0691226237
| 9780691226224
| B0C1QYSYJ1
| 3.88
| 298
| Oct 03, 2023
| Oct 03, 2023
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it was ok
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Immediately after reading Robert Sapolsky’s
Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will
I was interested in hearing the “opposite� perspective
Immediately after reading Robert Sapolsky’s
Determined: A Science of Life without Free Will
I was interested in hearing the “opposite� perspective on the topic, ideally, from the point of view of another neurobiologist. Enter: Kevin J. Mitchell, whose book came out the same month as Sapolsky’s and for anyone interested, he debated both and on the issue. Short version: “Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Will� Kevin Mitchell sets out to “nٳܰ� the concept of Free Will. He rejects Dualism and Libertarian Free Will and begins by re-defining Free Will to essentially mean the capacity of the organism “as a whole� for self-control and rational deliberation. He grounds the emergency of such agency on an evolutionary narrative, evocative of Daniel Dennett’s approach in �Freedom Evolves�. So far so good. Well, actually, Mitchell wants a bit more than that. He wants to break from Compatibilist notions � which he considered to be incoherent � and instead, establish a type of “could have done otherwise� Free Will. To this end, he challenges Determinism by primarily invoking Quantum Mechanics and arguing that the universe is under-determined at any given time and that this provides the “causal slack� necessary for the evolution of Free Will. In the process, he conflates Causal Determinism with Predeterminism and does not provide a convincing account of how indeterminacy makes room for Free Will nor does he provide an account on how biological organisms could escape Causality, which is arguably the main question at hand, especially if “Determinism is false� and “Compatibilism is incoherent�. For this reason, Mitchell proposes a two-stage model based on “conscious cognitive control�, “top-down� or “mental� causation and adds some “random noise� in the mix that can give rise to novel thoughts or break habitual patterns when necessary. Ultimately, I do not think that his model gives us the “could have done otherwise� Free Will that he wants. In short,: 1) he conflates “would have done otherwise� with “could have done otherwise�. 2) Top-down causation does not mean the “I�, the “conscious Self�, do the “causing�. 3) More importantly “Conscious cognitive control� is asserted without enough evidence to back it up, while opposing evidence � for instance Daniel Wegner’s �The Illusion of Conscious Will� � are not seriously considered. Kevin Mitchel gathers the pieces but does not put them together. There are missing parts so that the reader can fill a belief in Free Will. Unfortunately, these gaps rely on conflation, internal contradictions and ignoring opposing evidence. For a naturalistic defense of free will, maybe you’d be better off reading Dennett’s �Freedom Evolves� or �Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting�. For a longer version, feel free to read my semi-organised notes and thoughts below. The evolution of agency Keving Mitchell begins with the beginning of life on Earth. From the first simple replicators, the first living organisms, the first neurons, all the way up to human beings. Living organisms are not passive entities, pushed around by external stimuli. Even the simplests living organisms require energy to fuel their existence and battle against entropy. The world is complicated and in perpetual flux. This necessitates some means to sense their surroundings in order to respond appropriately to dynamic situations. Even simple organisms have to derive behaviors driven by their intrinsic motivations (e.g., eat, survive, propagate). If they did not, they couldn’t survive and propagate. Organisms that can not persist, do not. Thus, even the simplest organisms exhibit rudimentary decision-making capabilities and agency. Furthermore, neural systems have the advantage of learning from experience, what are some useful strategies for surviving, mating and even living in groups. On top of that, cognition, the ability to deliberate or meta-cognition, having thoughts about thoughts, can help organisms navigate and adapt to even more complicated, natural and social, environments. Thoughts are not “mere� neural firings, but meaningful patterns of neural activity that can have causal effect onto the organism and onto the world. Furthermore, brains evolved with the ability to even make long term plans and have the necessary self-control to carry them through. Mitchell provides a plausible evolutionary account of agency and how these mechanisms could have emerged through the process of natural selection. Naturalizing Free Will That is all well and good! But Mitchell doesn’t stop there. That’s not the goal of the book. Instead, he argues that we are FREE agents and that through evolution we gained the ability of Free Will. Not libertarian Free Will. Mitchell wants to “nٳܰ� the Self and Free Will, aka reject Dualism (there is no immaterial soul thinking the thoughts and making the decisions) and instead provide naturalistic accounts for these concepts. Instead, “I� as a whole organism, as an embodied brain, make decisions. This argument should sound very familiar to anyone who has read Compatibilists, especially Daniel Dennet. In Freedom Evolves (2003), Dennett provides a similar account of how evolution creates little controllers. Dennett “notoriously� (for some) redefines Free Will to mean essentially the ability of self-control and rational deliberation. If an agent’s intentions align with their will and there is no external coercion or internal pathologies and if the agent has the ability to control their will and deliberate and reason over alternatives, we can speak of free will in a pragmatic sense required for moral responsibility. This type of free will comes in various degrees according to Dennett. However, Mitchell considers this line of thinking to be incoherent. We can’t hold people responsible if they “could not have done otherwise�. Thus, he wants to dispute Determinism and maintain a sort of “could have done otherwise� free will while maintaining a naturalistic/materialist framework. Determinism vs Indeterminism For Mitchell there is no reason to accept that the Universe is deterministic. Quantum randomness and Chaos Theory show that the universe is under-determined at any given time. He does not make the naive claim that “quantum randomness = free will�. If quantum effects bubble up and affect my behavior, this would not be “free and willed choice�. Instead, Mitchell contends that randomness provides some “causal slack� in the system that is necessary for Free Will. He claims that this “flips the script�. “We don’t need to ask where freedom comes from. Freedom comes for free. It’s just in the universe. But now we have to ask something else� How can an organism control what happens? Of all these possibilities, how can it make what it wants to happen?� Mitchell’s claim about indeterminism is debatable. It depends on specific interpretations of quantum mechanics, and assumptions that these effects appear and have effects at the macro-level. But let’s grant them for the moment. Ultimately, I don't think that the “Determinism vs Indeterminism� debate has much bearing on Free Will. The real question is about Causality. If biological, human brains could escape Causality (including random causes). And I doubt that they can. Two-stage model + Indeterminism = Free Will? Mitchell supports a Two stage model, when faced with an important decision, various alternatives are generated, filtered through various mechanisms (stage one) and afterwards the agent can deliberate over these possibilities and choose (stage two). During the first stage, the agent may have no direct control over the generated alternatives. Alternatives arise in combination given the current circumstances Randomness or noise in the brain can affect the generation. Some of these alternatives may be filtered out given the agent’s past (e.g., personality). During the second stage, the agent can deliberate, reason for and against each alternative, weigh their pros and cons and make a decision. For Mitchell, randomness and “noise� in the brain can help the system break from habitual neural pathways and lead to novel thoughts. Let’s consider the Quintessential philosophical question: Coffee or Tea?. Let’s imagine that I have formed a daily habit. Each morning, I wake up and go to the nearest coffee shop to grab an espresso. However, this morning, while going to the coffee shop, I recalled an article that I read last night about some supposed negative side effects of drinking coffee. So now I have to make a decision. Should I grab an espresso or something else? [Stage 1] Generation of alternatives: [Coffee, Black Tea, Green Tea] Given the circumstances and my prior experience and preferences, the brain does not even consider choices such as Beer, Kombucha, Mate or Cocoa with dairy milk. It’s early in the morning so i wouldn’t choose Beer.The store doesn’t provide Kombucha or Mate. Nor do I really like them. Being Vegan for 10+ years, the brain does not even consider a dairy-based option as a candidate. So here I am. Three alternatives enter conscious experience and I deliberate over them. E.g.: “Well I like the taste of coffee but it makes me jittery sometimes� � “Green tea is ok but i’d like something to wake me up a bit� � “Let’s have a black tea� (Stage 2). So, I enter the coffee shop. The barista asks me “what would you like?�. I reply: “I’ll have a black tea� . A Determinist would say that, if we rolled back the tape of life, the outcome would not change. If we could go back to the moment that I started from my home with the intention to grab a coffee while maintaining ALL factors the same, every atom in the universe is exactly as it was, then the exact thing will happen, a million times over. I will have the same candidate options, the same thoughts will arise in my brain and I will choose to buy a black team every single time. The indeterminist would say: “Aha! But there are random quantum fluctuations bubbling up to the macro scale. There is “random noise� in the brain. The universe is “chaotic� and complex.� Does this give us Free Will? Well! Let’s say that while walking some random event causes a novel thought to arise in my brain and I end up with a different choice. A flicker of light hits my retina, I notice that a new option has been added to the menu, Chai Latte with oat milk. “Great! I want to change things up. I’ll have that!�. So in this case: I did otherwise. And I would do otherwise many times over. But what does this have to do with Free Will? In all scenarios, I did not have control over the random events that altered my behavior, nor about the thoughts that arose as a result. I know such examples seem inconsequential but I think they are illustrative and the same logic can be applied to truly meaningful decisions. “Would do otherwise� is different from “could do otherwise� and the former is not really an indication of Free Will and ”Really Free Choices�. Unless thought processes can be shown to somehow be independent of the chain of Causality, I do not see how any such Two Stage model can give us the type of Free Will. Only if we were talking about a Compatibilist definition, which Mitchell explicitly denies. Time + Self Control = Free Will? Or, “On Building Character� Okay, so maybe we do not have “true� control at any given moment. But how about over time? Let’s consider habits. For Mitchell, habits are learned adaptations to our environment. They can be very useful in guiding behavior. I’ve built good habits since childhood of having a nutritious breakfast each morning and brushing my teeth. Now, I don’t have to deliberate each day on these issues and I can spend my time on other more important things. But of course, some habits are not as useful or can be destructive. Human beings, or atleast many of us, have the ability to recognise bad habits and work to overcome them and replace them with better habits. To some extent at least. Breaking habits require continuous and repeated effort. For Mitchell, we may be biological organisms who are shaped by our biology, environment and our past experience, but we also have the ability to shape and change our habits and shape our Character to some extent. By extension, our Character will shape and influence our future decisions. Mitchell acknowledges that some people may be better than others at that and some may not have that ability at all. But if we accept the previous argument, that we can’t make “Really Free Choice� in the moment, aka our choices can not escape causality, then how can we speak about making choices over time and be responsible for building our Character? Moreover, this type of self-control can be affected by multiple factors including being hungry, lacking sleep, hormonal levels etc, it can be depleted and manipulated and we can not “will� to have more self-control in any given moment. It is a matter of “Moral Luck�: to have had the appropriate genetic material, brain anatomy, upbringing, etc in order to develop the ability of self-control and to make “good decisions� that will contribute to building a “better� Character. “Willing what we will� Mitchell also criticizes the famous Arthur Schopenhauer quote: “Man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills�. Instead, Mitchell posits that we change our will and motivations all the time. We can deliberate, “do I want to be this sort of person?� and we can change course of action. For instance: I am hungry. I want to order a burger. But then I contend: “Do I want to be this person?�. “I should eat something more healthy� and “I should save money� -> “Let’s cook something healthy and inexpensive�. But isn’t that just another “will�? How was that “will� selected and prevailed over the others? I would contend that it just arose as all the other “wills�, based on prior causes. Top-down Causation and Conscious Cognitive Control So far my criticism of Mitchell’s argument may sound overly critical. My criticism relies on the idea that “Really Free Choice� does not make sense under a non-dualist and naturalistic framework. Mitchell could consider a Compatibilist account of agency, but he considers it incoherent and wants a naturalistic version of “could have done otherwise� Free WIll. That’s why I insist on the incoherence of “Really Free Choice� in Mithcell’s account. His last resort is “conscious cognitive control� and top-down causation. He : “I am consciously deciding what I am going to say, lifting my hand up and putting it down, and I know that I am conscious of my reasons for doing these things because I can articulate them. So, we have this meta-cognition which allows us to reason about our reasons …� So Mitchell sets out to naturalize the Self and Free Will. To conceptualize Free Will as a characteristic that the human being, as a total organism, possesses. But he wants more. He says that Free Will is “Conscious Cognitive Control� or “Conscious Rational Control� but this is just asserted. No evidence provided. And evidence negating his position are not seriously considered. There is no serious discussion on the experiments that would show the problems with the idea of the conscious will. For instance, Daniel Wegner, in “T illusion of conscious will� draws from various experiments, from Ramachandran, Penfield, Delgado and others, to show how we produce post-hoc rationalizations to justify our behavior while maintaining the sense of ownership. Mitchell makes a big deal of “top-down� or “mental� causation. I hear in the news about a terrible accident, the information is propagated, deciphered and interpreted by the brain and causes an emotional reaction. In this sense, the “top� (meaning) caused the “down� (emotional response). But, firstly I had no control over this process. The “conscious self� did not make the choice to have an emotional response. The emotional response was caused by the interpretation of information and its associated neural activity. Similarly, the conscious experience and the emotional response could be mere correlations and that the former is not necessary for the latter. For instance, consider how sub-liminal or implicit biases can arise that can cause emotional responses even without conscious awareness. But there is no explanation how the conscious experience produced by a mechanical brain, could have itself causal power, somehow independent of these processes. I mean, Mitchell could be right. There may be some central Self that we’ve missed which exhibits actual conscious control of our thoughts and actions. But that should be somehow demonstrated. It can not simply be asserted and assumed true - if we want a scientific account for Free Will. However, if we deny Dualism and the materialist Cartesian Theater, I'd say that “conscious cognitive control� may be rather limited, unless we can demonstrate some type of “strong emergence� which also sounds somewhat unlikely to me. (Continues Below) ...more |
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Kindle Edition
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| 0525560971
| 9780525560975
| 0525560971
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| 6,053
| Oct 17, 2023
| Oct 17, 2023
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it was amazing
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Me: Hey Doc! I'm curious about your latest book, Determined. Could you give me an overview? What were your intentions behind writing it? Sapolsky: “T Me: Hey Doc! I'm curious about your latest book, Determined. Could you give me an overview? What were your intentions behind writing it? Sapolsky: “T approach of this book is to show how determinism works, to explore how the biology over which you had no control, interacting with environment over which you had no control, made you you. […] The goal is to get people to think differently about moral responsibility, blame and praise, and the notion of our being free agents. […] We can subtract responsibility out of our view of aspects of behavior. And this makes the world a better place.� Me: Hmm, I must admit, the topic of Free Will hasn't held my interest for quite some time. I've dabbled in some amateur reading on the subject before, delving into the works of Sam Harris, Susan Blackmore, Patricia Churchland and Daniel Dennett, all of which reject Dualism and libertarian notions of Free Will but disagree on the compatibility of “free will� with Determinism and Moral Responsibility. Sapolsky: What’s your takeaway? Me: I was convinced that we are “heavily Influenced� and “shaped� � if not “completely determined� � by our environment, past experiences, biology, societal norms and moral luck. However, when it came to the debate between Compatibilism and Incompatibilism, I found myself unconvinced by either side. It seemed that people were talking past each other, with the crux of the matter lying in how one defines terms like “I�, “free� and “will�. Given that the majority of philosophers lean towards Compatibilism, I figured it was a safe position to adopt. Plus, it is a “convenient� position to hold since it requires minimal adjustment. Nonetheless, I eventually lost interest in the debate, shifted my focus to other subjects, and haven't really revisited the topic in years. Sapolsky: So what changed? Why are you reading and reviewing Determined? Me: As many tales unfold nowadays, mine begins with an algorithm –YouTube, to be precise� accurately predicting my inclination toward certain content. In this case, it led me to your recent interviews and debates. Initially, I brushed them off, but then I stumbled upon your debate with Daniel Dennett. That, I couldn’t pass. The discussion proved immensely thought-provoking, rekindling my interest. I was hooked. Eager for more, I found myself torn between your book, Dennett’s “Freedom Evolves� and Kevin Mitchel’s latest work, “Free Agents�. I recall consciously deliberating over the three options. Weighing the merits and drawbacks of each. Already familiar with Dennett's arguments and craving fresh perspectives to challenge my beliefs etc, I opted for your book, although it feels that I easily could have chosen otherwise. Isn’t that an example of free will? Sapolsky: Wow there buddy! How did you become the short of person that “gets hooked� by such philosophical discussions or actively seeks to “challenge your beliefs�? Consider the moments leading up to your decision: - What happened a few seconds, minutes or hours before making your decision? What were your testosterone and glucose levels? Were you hungry, tired, sleep deprived? “What sensory information flowing into your brain (including some you’re not even conscious of) in the preceding seconds to minutes helped form that intent?� - What occurred in the days or years leading up to this decision? Were there experiences of chronic stress or any significant traumatic events that might have influenced your mindset? - What role did your teenage years and childhood play in shaping your outlook? What was your parents� parenting style? What’s your ACE (adverse childhood experiences) score and socioeconomic status? - What about hundreds of years ago? What cultural context did your ancestors hail from? Were they raised in an individualist or collectivist society? Did they endure periods of occupation or grapple with devastating pandemics? - What about millennia ago? Considering the evolution of your genes and the trajectory of the species, tracing back to the Big Bang itself. Genes and culture may not be destiny but the amalgamation of these factors, among countless others, have shaped who you are. “We are nothing more or less than the cumulative biological and environmental luck, over which we had no control, that has brought us to any moment� Me: I understand all that. Countless factors beyond my control have converged to make me, me. Additionally, I've been fortunate to have a decent upbringing, education, and genetic makeup, for which I cannot claim ultimate responsibility. However, at this moment, I find myself endowed with the capacity � albeit somewhat constrained � to make choices freely. Perhaps I didn't actively “choose� to be intrigued by the topic; the discussion simply captivated me and resonated with something within. Yet, I retain the agency to opt against reading your book, or any book on the subject, for that matter. Sapolsky: So “you�, the conscious self, chose A rather than B but “could have done otherwise�. However, this does not make sense in a deterministic universe. We are our biological machines navigating a mechanical universe. And don't even think of invoking Chaos Theory, Quantum Indeterminacy or Emergence theory. Chaos is still deterministic, even if unpredictable. Unpredictability does not equate indeterminacy. Emergent complexity is immensely cool but emergent properties are still fundamentally determined by their constituent parts. And quantum effects do not manifest at the level of entire neurons or brains. Even if they did, they would merely result in random actions, leading to nonsensical utterances mid-sentence. Instead, you would have to “show me a neuron being a causeless cause in this total sense. [...] a neuron (or brain) whose generation of a behavior is independent of the sum of its biological past and you’ve demonstrated Free Will. […] Show that some behavior just happened out of thin air in the sense of considering all the biological precursors.� Me: That definition falls short. If quantum effects affected behavior, they demonstrate an uncaused behavior � “out of thin air� � but as you acknowledge, that wouldn't be free will. The point is to demonstrate that the individual, or self, or consciousness serves as the cause behind a behavior. Sapolsky: Okay Mr. smarty-pants. But you get the point. You have to demonstrate an uncaused cause to establish Free Will. Me: Okay. I understand all that. If we reject Dualism there is no room for this “magical� kind of Free Will. The ghost in the machine being the captain of the ship. Nevertheless, the whole time you are “trashing� Compatibilists but they do not even disagree with you on Determinism. You are arguing against a strawman. Compatibilist do not define Free Will as a lofty “metaphysical� concept; rather, they view it in a more practical light: the capacity to act in accordance with one’s conscious intentions and reasons, free from coercion and undue constraint. It involves the ability to deliberate over choices, weigh alternatives, and possess the necessary autonomy and self-control to enact a decision while suppressing alternatives. In essence, seeing human beings as agents. I mean, you demonstrated the ability to plan and exercised enough self-control to organize and write this book, didn't you? Sapolsky: This is not what most people mean by free will � Me: Maybe not, but yow do you know that? Any studies on that? Sapolsky: How did you become this sort of person, with this sort of intentions � Me: We went over that � Sapolsky: Okay okay. All that good stuff that you and Compatibilists describe are still products of the brain ... Me: Yes, where else would they come from? Sapolsky: ... and you did not choose how your frontal cortex � responsible for willpower and self-control � was developed. And all that goodies like “willpower� and “self control� can easily be depleted and manipulated. Are you hungry? Are you sleep deprived? Are you stressed? Good luck maintaining the same level of willpower and self-control. Me: Still! This framing allows for varying degrees of freedom. It’s not an “all-or-nothing� case. It suggests that there are moments where I possess some level of “free will� (the “self control� type) but then I get hungry and that control diminishes. Yet, armed with this understanding, I can choose to delay any significant decision-making until I've satisfied my hunger. It's not “absolute freedom� nor is it flawless. At times, external influences may exert overwhelming force, preventing me from even considering deferring decisions. Nonetheless, for practical intents and purposes, isn't this type of free will “worth wanting�? Sapolsky: You said it yourself. You don't choose the thoughts that you think. You can't “wish what you are going to wish� . “Can't will yourself to have more willpower�. You do not control the biological and social luck that made you, you. You can't even control whether the thought and intention of delaying decision making will arise. Me: Ughhh. So what role does consciousness play in all that? Is consciousness just an epiphenomena? And conscious control is a mere illusion? Sapolsky: I will not pretend to understand anything meaningful about consciousness. But my argument remains valid regardless. Me: Okay, me neither. If I am being honest, when I carefully observe my phenomenological experience, I notice thoughts, feelings and sensations bubbling up. The sense that “I� am the thinker of thoughts, the chooser of choices, doesn't seem to hold true. Instead, there is simply conscious awareness and its contents, as noted by Susan Blackmore, Sam Harris, and many others, particularly within various Buddhist traditions. Choices are made, words are spoken, but consciousness itself doesn't actively engage in these processes. Then, I find myself immersed in the stream of thoughts and narratives that construct the sense of self and free will. I'm not quite sure what to make of all that... Sapolsky: My goal isn’t to convince you that there’s no free will; it will suffice if you merely conclude that there’s so much less free will than you thought that you have to change your thinking about some truly important things. Me: Alright, that's an easier pill to shallow. But let's suppose that you are correct. Free Will is an illusion. In this scenario, under these exact circumstances, I couldn't have made any other choice but to read your book. Now what? Sapolsky: Moral responsibility is out the window! “‘Does that mean that violent criminals should just run wild with no responsibility for their actions?� No. A car that, through no fault of its own, has brakes that don’t work should be kept off the road. A person with active COVID-19, through no fault of their own, should be blocked from attending a crowded concert. A leopard that would shred you, through no fault of its own, should be barred from your home�. See Pareboom’s quarantine model. Me: Let's entertain that notion, setting aside the comparison of human beings with cars and earthquakes. Does it truly alter much? If my research partner is caught plagiarizing, my initial anger may not be justified since it's “not their fault�, but I'll likely refrain from collaborating with them again. Similarly, if my friend is consistently late, I'll opt to stop making plans with them. And so on. While our interpretation of these events may shift (quite Stoic of you), acknowledging that “it's not their fault�, the ultimate outcome remains unchanged with or without the existence of free will. Consequently, the concept of responsibility can still retain its significance and utility as a social construct in numerous circumstances. For instance, if an individual is deemed “not responsible� (i.e., unreliable, inconsistent, etc.) to operate a vehicle, they will not be granted a driver's license. Sapolsky: It's far from inconsequential! Rejecting the notion of Free Will renders concepts like “blame� and “hate� meaningless. In the recent past, we have been subtracting responsibility in cases of schizophrenia, epilepsy, autism, ptsd, dyslexia, and more, and the world became a better place as a result. Extending this approach to additional spheres of life would continue this trend. Me: Less hate and more compassion sounds appealing. I don't deny the potential for this approach to improve the world. However, it fails to address the tangible material conditions affecting people's lives—factors like poverty, limited access to resources, education, and healthcare. Furthermore, within this framework, there's no meaningful distinction drawn between: 1) an individual with a significant brain tumor impacting their decision-making abilities, 2) a impoverished homeless person who endured a harsh upbringing involving abusive parents, drug addiction, and chronic poverty, resorting to petty theft for survival, 3) a wealthy CEO who opts to dump toxic chemicals into a river to bolster profits by cutting costs, or 4) a corrupt politician who accepts lobbying money to turn a blind eye, conceal, or even advocate for the legalization of such environmentally damaging practices. Are all these individuals equally devoid of responsibility and blame? Sapolsky: As hard as that may be to shallow, yes! Without Free Will, blame and praise lose their significance entirely! “Tre is no justifiable ‘deserve�. […] The only possible moral conclusion is that you are no more entitled to have your needs and desires met than is any other human. That there is no human who is less worthy than you to have their well-being considered�. Me: Now we’re onto something! Why not follow this to its logical conclusion? In that case, meritocracy, economic and social inequalities, and hierarchies are inherently unjustifiable. It's imperative to redistribute wealth and power, ensuring genuine freedom from coercion and exploitation for human flourishing. What truly matters is tangible freedom from the constraints of societal structures, not some abstract, metaphysical freedom from determinism and the laws of nature. What do you think? Sapolsky: “Pereboom’s quarantine model has been extended by philosopher Gregg Caruso of the State University of New York, another leading incompatibilist. Public health scientists don’t just figure out that, say, the brains of migrant farmworkers� kids are damaged by pesticide residues. They also have a moral imperative to work to prevent that from happening in the first place (say, by testifying in lawsuits against pesticide manufacturers). Caruso extends this thinking to criminology—yes, the person is dangerous because of causes that they couldn’t control, and we don’t know how to rehabilitate them, so let’s minimally constrain them to keep everyone safe. But let’s also address the root causes, typically putting us in the realm of social justice. Just as public health workers think about the social determinants of health, a public health–oriented quarantine model that replaces the criminal justice system requires attention to the social determinants of criminal behavior. In effect, it implies that while a criminal can be dangerous, the poverty, bias, systemic disadvantaging, and so on that produce criminals are more dangerous.� Me: Alright! That’s good enough for me from a “pop-science� book! Finally, how is one to live with the knowledge that they do not have Free Will? Sapolsky: Uhhh, sorry. No. Gotta run! Gonna grab a cold one with the baboons. Uhhh, I meant the boys. So what’s your actual review of my book? Me: Well, I kind of loved it despite its limitations. I found it well-researched, captivating and thought-provoking, but I wish that you had taken Philosophy more seriously and have addressed the arguments of Compatibilist more honestly and directly instead of resorting to strawman arguments and definitions. For the larger part of the book you debunk a “magical� Libertarian sort of Free Will –where I agree with you and you do a great job at that� but then use the same arguments against Compatibilists even if they wouldn’t disagree with you on Determinism. But anyway, i woke up with high serotonin levels today, so I “FREELY CHOOSE� to round up to 5 stars. Similarly, I would have appreciated delving deeper into the political and economic ramifications of your argument, along with exploring strategies for coming to terms with the absence of Free Will. But I guess you were շѱ� not to, hehe. Sapolsky: Ughh, it feels like I’m stuck in a bottomless pit of senseless predetermined punchlines � ...more |
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Mar 06, 2024
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Mar 21, 2024
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Mar 06, 2024
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Hardcover
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| 163286830X
| 9781632868305
| 163286830X
| 4.26
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| Jan 11, 2018
| Jan 23, 2018
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really liked it
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Jan 03, 2024
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Jan 25, 2024
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Jan 03, 2024
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| 0593138511
| 9780593138519
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| 4.23
| 67,708
| Jan 06, 2022
| Jan 25, 2022
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really liked it
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Dec 11, 2023
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Dec 18, 2023
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Dec 11, 2023
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| Sep 28, 2017
| Oct 03, 2017
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May 16, 2021
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May 27, 2021
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Jan 28, 2021
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| 1847081924
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| 3.80
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it was amazing
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Sep 05, 2015
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Sep 30, 2015
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Sep 02, 2015
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Paperback
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| 0393068382
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| 0393068382
| 4.08
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not set
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not set
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Jul 10, 2015
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| 0691124477
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| Sep 25, 2006
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Jul 2015
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Jul 11, 2015
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Apr 17, 2015
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Hardcover
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| 0307455777
| 9780307455772
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| Feb 12, 2013
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really liked it
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One important criterion in my consideration about a book’s value is how often i think about it after reading it. It’s been more than two months since
One important criterion in my consideration about a book’s value is how often i think about it after reading it. It’s been more than two months since i finished the Righteous mind and it has proved its worthiness - like few other books have. It discusses moral and social psychology, ethics and decision-making and their effects in politics, religion and in everyday aspects of life. Thankfully, it has affected my thinking deeply and improved my understanding of the social world and myself. At first, Jonathan Haidt offers a brief history of moral psychology the field of how morality and altruism have evolved, how we develop/acquire morals and how we make our moral-decisions. He presents the older schools of thought such as nativism, empiricism, rationalism, their strengths and weaknesses as models, and comes to reject all of them. Instead, he propose that an innate moral basis, related with emotions of disgust, empathy, disrespect, self-control etc, exists but we have to learn what is considered culturally moral and then develop a natural moral code triggered in the right context. Our morally structured unconscious mind, constantly and instantly evaluates our environments and our thoughts and when we face any situation/moral problem, emotions arise. In this process reason mostly works as an ad hoc justification - a rationalisation after the fact. He then discusses moral foundation theory and its evolutionary history. Our morals, he claims, are not based on a ‘simple-minded� utilitarian calculation of harm and pleasure nor in absolute deontological commands but span on six different aspects of care/harm, fairness/cheating, liberty/oppression, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation. It is how we have learned to think about these foundations that constructs our moral intuitions.Lastly, in the third part, we enter the field of sociology and we find that people who belong in a social group with shared morals, purposes and an identified ‘enemy� are prone to be blinded by it’s ‘moral matrix� and find it hard to understand and address to other ‘matrices�.This especially applies for sport’s fanatics, followers of political and religious ideologies etc. In sum, the three basic principles in order to understand moral psychology are 1)intuition comes first, strategic reasoning second, 2)there is more to morality than harm and fairness, and 3) morality binds and blinds. These are the basic ideas of his position but this book is extremely rich in material with many interesting pieces. For example, he attacks the idea often found in philosophical and scientific circles that ‘morality is and should be exclusively based on reason� as an illusion and possibly a dangerous one because it can help us reach almost any conclusion we want to and not necessarily to the most moral. Of course, reason is very important (who reasonable person could deny that?) but mostly because it can trigger new intuitions, face our internal contradictions and in time possibly construct our morals them from scratch.Then there is in depth discussion about group selection in evolutionary theory and more specifically he claims that religion is not just a set of beliefs about supernatural agents or a ‘virus of the mind� as the New atheist claim. This part may be an adaptive evolutionary byproduct as a hypersensitivity agency detection device, an evolved imagination enabling dualism etc but once this was established it may have been a group selection phenomenon binding our ancestors and increase their change of survival. We should not exclude the sociological aspect, especially after considering it’s explanatory strength, if we really want to understand the origin of religion. After presenting his case filled with high-quality scientific research and insights he draws conclusion on why politics and religion divide good people and why it’s so hard for them understand each other.This is the part of his argument i’m still processing and continue researching but i think that Haidt is onto something. A very intriguing and factual thesis that anyone interested in the topic should consider. The book is extremely well-written with helpful and vivid metaphors and a short summary after each chapter.An instant favourite.Highly recommended! ...more |
Notes are private!
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1
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Jul 14, 2014
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Jul 23, 2014
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Jul 14, 2014
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Paperback
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| 0393058328
| 9780393058321
| 0393058328
| 3.81
| 820
| Jul 22, 2013
| Jul 22, 2013
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really liked it
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Books like touching a nerve are difficult to find.It touches on a hard-to-access topic, full of technical jargon and many sensitive issues and yet, ma
Books like touching a nerve are difficult to find.It touches on a hard-to-access topic, full of technical jargon and many sensitive issues and yet, manages to be surprisingly comprehensible, highly educative on a wide range of topics, respectful on delicate matters and all in all a very entertaining read.The main subject is the science of the brain and how the three-pound mass of jelly (as Ramachandran likes to put it) was engineered by evolution and how it makes us who we are.Patricia Chrurchland makes clear that neuroscience is a field in it’s infancy and many issues remain unkown, nevertheless it has already offered us great insight and we could only be optimistic about it’s future. In the book she discusses dualism,’after-death� experiences, the evolution of morality and aggression, self-control, free will, habits, unconscious cognition, sleeping and consciousness.There is a lot in here. There are three implicit messages, Patricia Churchland makes, that i particularly appreciated.The first, spans throughout the book, is a powerful case against the traditional philosophical inquiry about the questions of morality, free will, consciousness and human nature that is wholly based on pure reason and introspection; and instead shows how much we can learn from neuroscience.The second being against the view,few philosophers hold, that “we’ll never understand consciousness� which is groundless and unproductively pessimistic.Surely,we will never understand it if we won’t try.The third is, mostly addresses to us, laypeople, and the fear that learning about the brain would somehow belittle our existence and everything we hold dear and throw us in nihilism. A view i consider to be completely unsound.Neuroscience simply shows us that we were not what we thought we were.Heliocentrism and evolution told us that we are not in the center of the universe,nor separate from animalia.Likewise neuroscience told us, among others, that we are the product of our brains, not immaterial souls and that this is the only life we have.At first, these may be unsettling thoughts but really...they do not affect anything truly important. We can still love, appreciate the aesthetic, live meaningful and moral lives, positively affect the world and additionally have the pleasure of knowing and overcoming our ignorance. If only i weren’t a biased prick that confuses unfamiliarity to content with it’s quality i would give it five stars.So engaging and intriguing.Truly worth reading! ...more |
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1
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Jul 15, 2014
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Jul 17, 2014
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Jun 24, 2014
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Hardcover
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| 0062183591
| 9780062183590
| 0062183591
| 3.93
| 16,643
| Jun 05, 2012
| Jun 05, 2012
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really liked it
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Dan Ariely adds another excellent piece of work in his highly educational and delightful repertoire.Τhis time he examines human dishonesty towards our
Dan Ariely adds another excellent piece of work in his highly educational and delightful repertoire.Τhis time he examines human dishonesty towards ourselves and others. Context:The typical assumption about human dishonesty,and immoral acts in general, is that,under situation where cheating is possible,people perform a cost-benefit analysis of the possible scenarios and their consequences.Their chances of being caught and punished versus the gains - and then follow the most profitable decision.If i were,for example,alone in the nearby bookstore and all of the employees were busy - not minding me - i should reason that by stealing it i could save some money,the chances of being caught were extremely low - noone is looking plus there is no monitoring system - even if i got caught the consequences would be minimal - and since i really want this book so much it would be rational to take it.But as it turns out,this is not how most of us think.Hopefully!?I’ve been reading a lot about behavioral economics lately,a field - i have to admit - i’m very fond of.Instead of forming theoretical models from forsight,what behavioral science does,is to ignore all assumptions about decision making and empirically test how we actually behave in certain circumstances and how we make decisions.And once again,aspects of the rational-agent model of standard economics is falsified. What Dan and his team found,is that - given the change - we want to benefit from stealing but at the same time, maintain the belief that we are honest and moral people.Hence we steal just by a little and then justify our actions,in a way or the other,even if we have to totally ‘brainwash� ourselves. I remember how as a kid,i would go with my friends to the local market with a simple plan - one would distract the owner,the other would steal one or two chocolates and then we shared the earnings.We quickly became experts at the task.It was easy since the owner was rather old with limited visual abilities, but we got even better at justifying our action.”He is profitizing by overcharging the chocolates and anyway it’s only one or two chocolates.He probably doesn’t even need the money anyway,he is surely getting an old-age pension� etc.You get the point.You’ve been there.But one day,my friend thought that we were not profiting as much as we could and suggested stealing more.We decided then to get the whole pack.Ten large chocolates.Performed the typical ritual,got the pack and we were off and running.The problem now was that we felt terrible,we felt bad for the guy and about ourselves - this time,we couldn’t justify such an action.This was our last business together. Of course,it’s nice to know that most of us are less dishonest than economics assumes us to be but there is still much to be overcomed.The prevailing assumption is that cheating is being done by the few and that most of us are moral and honest people.Both assumptions turn out to be wrong.As we see in these experiments,only an extremely small minority were big cheaters and instead,the overwelming majority were slight cheaters and the later costed much more money to the expiramenters in total than the former.For example,it’s not only the few corrupt politicians that causes financial deficiencies but also the vast population of citizens and companies that even slightly cheat in their tax report.But since the politician’s field of influence is larger they are the one’s being mostly blaimed,(of course) fairly blaimed but slight cheaters are as well part of the problem and have to be eliminated.Another case is our views on lying.Most people i talk with,believe that lying is in most cases a bad decision.Getting caught lying feels very uncomftable,people are most likely to trust us less,lies perplex our reality,many times we have to remember our made-up stories and cover up holes etc.But i find the very same people lying and justifying their lies far more often than they understand - i’m as well cathing myself lying more that i want to believe. The thing is that there are many different aspects and cases of dishonesty and this book touches most.Like:does the social environment affects people’s morality;what happens when we are many steps removed from directly committing a crime - when we don’t directly see the consequences;what happens when we face a conflict of interest;does cultural norms change people’s dishonesty and more.People were found to be much more dishonest when they were surrounded with dishonest people or when they were few steps removed from cheating, e.g when instead of money they were taking plastic tokens that could exchange for money later.Yet, Dan gives us a glimpse of hope and optimism when he answers the big question of ‘how to eliminate dishonesty'.He found in his experiments that when people are reminded of morality - when they are asked to remember the ten commandments or sign ‘not to break the moral code of their school� - people do not cheat or at least,not as much. The finding are intriguing.The problem is of great significance.It all suggests,once again,that we have to rethink our social policies and education. ...more |
Notes are private!
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1
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May 29, 2014
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Jun 02, 2014
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May 26, 2014
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Hardcover
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| 0061995037
| 9780061995033
| 0061995037
| 4.03
| 35,675
| 2010
| Jun 01, 2010
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really liked it
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Dan Ariely,a great teacher,writer and,above all,a leading figure in the fields of social science and behavioral economics,proves once again to be da m
Dan Ariely,a great teacher,writer and,above all,a leading figure in the fields of social science and behavioral economics,proves once again to be da man(!) and Upside of irrationality to be a decent follow-up of Predictably Irrational. The main target of the book is,of course,debunking rational-choice-models of standard economics which assumes that human beings always understand their needs and wants.That we are calculating machines,striving for maximizing economic utility,always following our best interest.Thus, using such a definition,everyone acting against his economical interest is irrational.According to this model - and today’s business thinking - if,for example,you want your employee to work harder,be more motivated and productive,you offer higher payments, right?Well,it turns out that when it comes to mental activities,high payments negatively affects motivation - reducing productivity.Instead,people get more productive by feeling autonomous and finding their work meaningful.This is,by now, a well studied and established fact that business totally ignores.To my mind,irrational is a model that tries to adjust it’s members to it’s assumptions instead of adjusting itself to it’s members - ignoring the destructive consequences.This is the rational agent model that runs ,for most part,our economy. On the contrary,what behavioral economics does,is to ignore all the assumptions and study how people actually behave and make decisions,in practice.The results are extremely intriguing and shows how deep our all too human flaws span,affecting virtually every aspects of ours lives. The main goal of the book is to explore how we can benefit by understanding these innate flaws.It's the upside of irrationality.On the one side,find artificial solutions for negative flaws such as procrastination and our limited empathy and on the other,embrace our positive ones such as our need for autonomy and meaning in labor. What i appreciate most in Dan’s work,is it’s clarity and vividness.He explains in great detail his well constructed case studies on which he mostly draws his conclusion,using minimum theorizing,leaving little,if no,room for misinterpreting the results.Although it’s not as intriguing as predictably irrational,it’s still a worthy and fun read.For those interested in the content but not willing to read the entire thing,there is a great done by Dan that summarizes pretty much everything on the book. ...more |
Notes are private!
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1
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May 23, 2014
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May 26, 2014
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May 22, 2014
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Hardcover
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| 1847677851
| 9781847677853
| 1847677851
| 3.85
| 8,994
| 2007
| Jan 01, 2011
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really liked it
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Jonah Lehrer,admittedly,tried to make an original case that i found rather flawed and his argumentation weak.He claims that science is not,and should
Jonah Lehrer,admittedly,tried to make an original case that i found rather flawed and his argumentation weak.He claims that science is not,and should not be,our only method/source of ‘objective� knowledge.On the contrary we should consult the arts and create an inbetween communication bridge in order to discuss and exchange ideas. Firstly,i’m unable to imagine how someone lacking the qualification,unfamiliar with the literature could contribute to any of the hard sciences let’s say quantum physics,biology or chemistry.(maybe i’m lacking the required imagination!?) Furthermore,i’m also unable to understand why one should pursue such an encounter of the two disciplines.Everyone is free to acquaint his insights/findings and make suggestions by publishing a scholarly paper and similarly,every scientist is free to undertake fiction writing - fortunately some,such as Arthur C Clarke and Isaac Asimov,did - with excellent results.The reasons for forcing such a meeting are unclear to me. On top,Lehrer argument is based on weak foundation.It’s easy to find from hindsight a historical person to fit your data and with a bit of exaggeration make a case.Performing a quick memory search i could claim that Dostoevsky was the father of behavioral economics.He wrote in the Notes from the underground that humans usually act against their interest as a demonstration of their free will,thus implying that we do not fit the rational-agent model of standard economics and that we are predictably irrational.Followed by some references to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky i could move on to the next artist.Of course, Lehrer’s demonstrations are not that shallow but even so,what would this show? That Dostoevsky was a intelligent man?Undoubtedly.That he was revolutionizing economics and psychology?This i doubt(although he greatly influenced Freud).Or does it show that Lehrer went a bit too far to make a soundly-interesting case but failed?I’d go with the second.Proust wasn’t a neuroscientist afterall.He undoubtedly was a brilliant mind that turned out to be right.So what? That being said and put to the side,i admit that i,actually,enjoyed the book quite a lot.It’s filled with very interesting biographical information and historical context of many great artists i knew little if nothing about - followed by an introduction to some of modern psychology’s and neurology’s topics.For example,how George Eliot rejected the deterministic views of her time and that we now know about the ‘biology of freedom� that consists of neuroplasticity and epigenetics or how Marcel Proust sensed the unreliability of our memories and other.I learned quite a few new things and it heated my lost interest for modernist literature.Hopefully the interesting content of the book over-weighted an overall indifferent case. ...more |
Notes are private!
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1
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May 07, 2014
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May 19, 2014
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May 04, 2014
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Hardcover
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| 067003830X
| 9780670038305
| 067003830X
| 4.20
| 39,207
| Mar 15, 2007
| Mar 15, 2007
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really liked it
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A well known ancient Greek proverb urge us to ‘know thyself� but a significant contemporary problem rings our bell.Which self?The internal or the exte
A well known ancient Greek proverb urge us to ‘know thyself� but a significant contemporary problem rings our bell.Which self?The internal or the external,the neurological or the genetic,the behavioristic or the evolutionary?Our human nature is so complicated that we have to study it from so many different perspectives and in great depth,in order to finally,if ever,understand it.Until then we may built progressively better models that describe these different aspects and try to improve our human condition and well-being. Dr. Norman introduces our plastic self,our brain’s ability to change/rewire itself due to changes in behavior,environment and neural processes which goes against the idea that each part of the brain performs a specific mental function that exists in a genetically predetermined or hardwired location.This is a wondrous revolution in brain science and as it turns out, plasticity can work as a grand theory since it can explain,addiction,sexual preferences,cultural and gender differences and help us improve various (practical,cognitive,mental) abilities,treat illnesses,neuroses and many many more. Many individual medical cases are presented in this book,some literally moved me to tears and others filled me with awe.A girl that restored her lost sense of balance,a stroke that victim learned to speak and move again,a girl born with half a brain that trained it to function normally and many more.But although there is a significant amount of supporting data presented in this book it seems somehow limited to gratify such immense generalizations.Nonetheless it is worth reading and utterly amazing and fortunately,more research is being done today,shedding even more light on the topic and gets us even closer to understand ourselves. p.s If anyone is interested i would strongly suggest watching Michael’s Merzenich talk on TED about the to get a glimpse or the which is a short overview of the book. ...more |
Notes are private!
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1
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May 03, 2014
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May 08, 2014
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May 01, 2014
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Hardcover
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| 0374275637
| 9780374275631
| 0374275637
| 4.17
| 552,938
| Oct 25, 2011
| Oct 25, 2011
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really liked it
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None
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Notes are private!
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1
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Feb 06, 2014
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Mar 20, 2014
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Feb 06, 2014
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Hardcover
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| 1400077427
| 9781400077427
| 1400077427
| 3.82
| 62,733
| May 02, 2006
| Mar 20, 2007
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really liked it
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None
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Notes are private!
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1
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Feb 20, 2014
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Feb 23, 2014
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Jan 25, 2014
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Paperback
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| 4.34
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not set
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Mar 18, 2025
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| 3.62
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liked it
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Jul 30, 2024
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Jul 23, 2024
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| 3.92
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really liked it
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May 16, 2024
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Apr 25, 2024
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| 3.83
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it was ok
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Apr 24, 2024
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Apr 18, 2024
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| 3.88
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it was ok
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Apr 05, 2024
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Mar 27, 2024
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| 4.24
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it was amazing
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Mar 21, 2024
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Mar 06, 2024
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| 4.26
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really liked it
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Jan 25, 2024
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Jan 03, 2024
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| 4.23
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really liked it
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Dec 18, 2023
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Dec 11, 2023
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| 4.38
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liked it
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May 27, 2021
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Jan 28, 2021
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| 3.80
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it was amazing
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Sep 30, 2015
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Sep 02, 2015
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| 4.08
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it was amazing
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not set
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Jul 10, 2015
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| 3.81
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really liked it
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Jul 11, 2015
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Apr 17, 2015
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| 4.20
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really liked it
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Jul 23, 2014
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Jul 14, 2014
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| 3.81
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really liked it
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Jul 17, 2014
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Jun 24, 2014
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| 3.93
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really liked it
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Jun 02, 2014
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May 26, 2014
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| 4.03
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really liked it
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May 26, 2014
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May 22, 2014
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| 3.85
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really liked it
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May 19, 2014
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May 04, 2014
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really liked it
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May 08, 2014
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May 01, 2014
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really liked it
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Mar 20, 2014
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Feb 06, 2014
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| 3.82
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really liked it
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Feb 23, 2014
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Jan 25, 2014
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