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Trevor's Reviews > Gorgias

Gorgias by Plato
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it was amazing
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Well, if one was to sum up, it would be hard to go past Plato’s own summary:

“And of all that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life; and that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with a view to justice.�

I’ve read this book as someone who is an atheist and therefore someone who can place little concern on the rewards or punishments of the afterlife. Much of Plato’s argument is supported by the idea that we should be moral in this life to avoid punishment in the next life. I would like to think that his conclusions still stand for an atheist, even if his arguments do not.

I’m not sure how well Socrates answers Callicles� arguments � or rather attack. Nietzsche later says much the same things about Socrates and his arguments � his denial of life and how ugly Socrates is and how lacking in taste and common sense. It seems clear for much of the text that Callicles is bored by Socrates� arguments and only agrees to continue listening to Socrates because Gorgias asks to hear the rest of what Socrates has to say � he abandons participation in the argument, which is not the same as him being silenced by Socrates� argument. I would very much doubt that Callicles came away from this encounter feeling that Socrates was right and that one should prefer to suffer harm than to do harm.

The myth at the end was all very Christian � and it is easy to see why Plato was so easy to be used by the Church. I found it very interesting that at least two of what are taken to be standard Christian messages are clearly put forward by Socrates � turn the other cheek (literally in those terms, too) and the problem the rich and powerful will have in getting into paradise. The import of this dialogue seem to me to be an even clearer statement of the golden rule than that contained in the Christian message � (surely the idea that we must avoid doing ill, even prefering bad things to be done to us, is more virtuous than merely treating others as we would like to be treated ourselves).

So, the question for me is whether it is possible to establish this as a conclusion an atheist could follow. And, to be honest, I don’t know. I can’t see what an atheist could base the ‘good� that is necessary to sustain this argument on. Socrates is more than willing to be prepared to die for his truth because he knows there is an afterlife in which the pleasures and sufferings of this life are as nothing.

His argument is that doing wrong harms the wrong-doer’s soul � I think this is true, even if I don’t believe in a ‘soul� as such. If we know we have done wrong there is nothing worse than feeling we have been ‘rewarded� for it.

When I was a child my mother caught me cheating at patience (or solitaire for my American cousins). I must have been old enough for her merely saying, “Are you cheating?� to not really count for much. But what did count was when she said, “You are only cheating yourself.�

I’ve often wondered if that is a good lesson or not. I still don’t cheat and try to avoid situations where I can cheat myself or others � but it does often seem that those who do cheat (perhaps both themselves and others) do end up better off. And people do seem to have a near infinite capacity to rationalise away their actions so that they always do tend to see themselves in the end as entirely justified. Plato’s myth at the end of this dialogue where the wrong souls are being sent to the wrong places because they were being judged in their worldly finery just before they die seems relevant here.

Perhaps a means of attack on this is that the benefits of doing wrong are generally short lived � you cheat and the benefit is rather fleeting � but the knowledge that you cheated, that you are the sort of person who would cheat, that can be something that lasts with you all of your life. Perhaps then this is the ground to support Plato’s conclusions without resorting to his arguments � that in the end one needs to be able to live with one’s self � and that is easier to do if we have been wronged, than if we have wronged others. That the punishments we inflict upon ourselves for wronging others are often worse than the punishments others would give us if they were to punish us.

I enjoyed this more than the last time I read it � the last time I read it I was much more concerned that Socrates did not really answer Callicles’s argument � I still don’t think he answers it, but I’m not as concerned now.
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Reading Progress

Finished Reading
March 2, 2008 – Shelved
June 27, 2010 – Shelved as: philosophy

Comments Showing 1-17 of 17 (17 new)

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David Sarkies I really liked how you explored Socrates' views from an atheist's point of view. Being a theist myself I have always found that doing good for a reward in the afterlife is not actually a good reason for actually doing good. I think you point it out correctly that the reason we do good is because it makes us better, and more well respected, people here an now. You statement about cheating yourself is quite relevant, because, in the end, it is better to be known as an honest person than as a cheater.


Trevor There are so many bits to this that are so slippery and hard to keep in place long enough to really think about them. We all cause harm to others - as someone who left a marriage I know I've caused lots of pain in my time. So, it is difficult to know how far one can really take this maxim of suffering pain rather than causing it. When I left I felt I had suffered enough pain to be getting on with. And it is not just in actively causing pain. There is a sense in which any success one has in life can be felt by others to have been at their expense - but to what extent should success be avoided to limit that sort of pain to others? My life in the first world is paid for, in so many ways, by the pain and suffering of those in the developing world. What is the moral thing to do in that instance? What would a moral person do?

I sometimes worry that the God atheists believe in is the God of Richard Dawkins - that is, probably not a God any theist actually believes in - except perhaps crazy fundamentalists. Marx saw atheism as essentially negative and saw communism as the positive outcome of that dialectic. Basically, he felt we kill god so as to create a kingdom of god on earth. I worry I have nothing positive to add from my atheism and find that the neoliberal, radical free market atheism of many of Dawkins' followers is much more repulsive than believing in a nice old man with a great big pair of scales.

I guess, in the end, I'm just glad some people do good and kind acts, for whatever reason, and think this is better than being a selfish arse just because you can.


message 3: by Jasmine (new)

Jasmine Well said, Trevor! You made my (Sun)day...


Trevor Thanks Jasmine.


Christopher Porzenheim I think you are exactly right in that we have to live with ourselves, and the knowledge of our true character is its own reward and punishment. I'm still working my way through this dialogue right now, but I do think the arguments about being good and choosing to 'turn the cheek' work without the theology. As you noted, we can cheat ourselves of the option to grow our skills or character.

I think you could argue that its not just that we make living with ourselves more difficult when we do harm to others, but that if we keep this up, we will slowly but surely destroy our capacity for deep friendship with others. We actually make ourselves unfit for friendship or society over time. I think this is the thread of argument David Sarkies was picking up.

Someone who relies on their ability to rationalize anything to themselves lives in quicksand, or under the sword of Damocles. Justifying anything to yourself slowly but surely diminishes ones capacity for trust and increases ones superstitions and fears. The price of regular dishonest thought is suffering not just yourself, but also the company of others who will tolerate and encourage your dishonesty. Tyrants, emotional or political, are like a sticky gum draws other self justified tyrants towards them. Now that's a hell in this life.

I think that these arguments only become compelling when we apply them to everyday scenarios rather than extreme hard cases. I don't think we can get good answers for hard cases from Socrates. He keeps ignoring the extreme examples of Polus and Callicales because they are extreme. I don't see this as a fault of his, rather as a strength. Anyway, awesome review, I hope this wasn't too ranty.


Trevor I really can't, in any conscience, criticise others for being too ranty...as lacking in self-awareness as I can be, at least my self-blindness does not extend quite that far. Rant away...

I would be really interested to see what you make of The Hippias Minor if and when you get to it - it plays with the ideas here in a really interesting way. That is, that someone who consciously does bad is better than someone who does bad unknowingly.


Christopher Porzenheim The Phaedo is up next for me when I get through the Gorgias, but I'll make my way over to the Hippias minor then. Thanks for the suggestion.

I'm sympathetic to the idea that's it's worse to chose to bad than to do it unknowingly/be forced into it. Reminds me of an early book in the Nichomachean ethics.

I'm not finished with it yet, but so far in the Gorgias, I feel like there's something important about the fact that Socrates arguments are chosen because he's there with his friend Chaerophon, who has at times, studied under Gorgias. Chaerpohon and Gorgias are mostly members of the audience in this dialogue. What did you make of this?


Trevor I think Socrates often gets a better rap about his 'method' than he perhaps deserves. Generally how and where the discussion is going to unfold is totally in his hands - it is more an unfolding of an argument than a dialogue. I can't remember now where, but Nietzsche uses the same arguments against Socrates as Callicles does in this - maybe in Twilight, but I can't really remember. The most frequent response to Socrates in the dialogues is 'yes, I'm sure you are right', which doesn't really make for much of a 'dialogue', if you know what I mean. Maybe that is why I'm quite fond of the Symposium. Hard to say.


message 9: by Christopher (last edited Mar 15, 2017 06:09PM) (new) - rated it 4 stars

Christopher Porzenheim The Symposium is probably my favorite as well for pretty much the same reason. I do find I like my Plato in proportion to how many people talk other than Socrates, or strange Eleatic Strangers.

I just read Twilight, and it definitely went after Socrates. I must confess that I don't remember what Nietzche's arguments were, but that he reminded me of Holden Caulfield attacking every phony in sight. I'm curious what his arguments were!

I agree that it doesn't look like much of a dialogue, but I think the fact that we are reading this dialogue is what makes it seem like a monologue.

Often times in normal conversation, one person listens to almost the exclusion of saying anything other than agreeing or nodding. In person we can rely on body language, tonality, and so on.

This is a weird comparison, but I think when Plato uses a narrative, its a lot like the narrative style of the Jewish Bible or Old Testament, which has a lot of repetition.

So far as I know, that repetition is a product of the story coming from an oral culture. Normally, when modern readers read repetition, its boring as hell. It looks visually ugly. It numbs the mind. But when you hear repetition, like music, it works. In music a small change to repetition is powerful, and we expect to hear these changes. In the same way the 'storytelling' in the Bible comes in the small deviations from strict patterns of repetition. A man reporting a report might drop one word, but otherwise repeat everything else. Easy to hear, hard to see. Annoying to read.

All this to say, that I think that Socrates often doesn't know where he's going in the argument. I think we sometimes confuse the fact that we know as readers, that Socrates will probably "win" with the fact that Socrates doesn't know that, and doesn't only care about "winning the argument." I think Socratic Irony is often confused with Dramatic Irony.

How visually ugly Socrates monologues are to read hides how much like real conversation his conversations could be.

I'm thinking particularly of whenever Socrates refers back to an older part of the conversations and restates it, he always changes little details. I have to force myself to pay attention at these moments, because my eyes see visual clutter and my brain turns off. But its at these moments that I think were important storytelling. Or, I'm reading too much into Plato! ¯\_(�)_/¯.


Trevor I don't think you are reading too much into Plato - and I'm no expert (by any means), but I think his dialogues always feel much more structured than merely a 'conversation'. Now, this is interesting, as one of the three sources we have for Socrates is Xenophon and his works are called 'conversations' - the much less esteemed word in English than the 'dialogue' one that Plato gets.

It was Twilight that I was thinking of. Nietzsche uses much the same argument against Socrates as he uses against Christianity - that it is the moral justification of the degenerate. But I've always found Nietzsche's attack - particularly on Socrates being ugly - as more telling in relation to Nietzsche. As he says, "To judge from his origin, Socrates belonged to the lowest of the low: Socrates was mob. You know, and you can still see it for yourself, how ugly he was. But ugliness, which in itself is an objection, was almost a refutation among the Greeks."

Nietzsche is seeking to give a kind of psychological reading to Socrates and the 'great error' of western philosophy in being stuck with reason and dialectics over intuition and noble sentiment - for instance, "The moral bias of Greek philosophy from Plato onward, is the outcome of a pathological condition, as is also its appreciation of dialectics. Reason = Virtue = Happiness, simply means: we must imitate Socrates, and confront the dark passions permanently with the light of day—the light of reason. We must at all costs be clever, precise, clear: all yielding to the instincts, to the unconscious, leads downwards."

The myth is, I feel, that Socrates used the method to uncover true - all I know is I know nothing, so tell me what you know and I will see if you know more than the nothing I know - except I never come away from the dialogues feeling this is actually what he does. There seems to be an underlying certainty to his exchanges that directs the outcome. Don't get me wrong, I can't see how else such a method would work - but the reality and the myth don't seem to jell for me.


message 11: by Christopher (last edited Mar 15, 2017 07:10PM) (new) - rated it 4 stars

Christopher Porzenheim I agree Trevor. I think Socrates is much more certain than a strict understanding of the Platonic myth of his 'not knowing' allows. The reality and the Platonic myth don't jell for me either.

Thanks for the relevant Nietzche!

I was just reading that Socrates didn't necessarily come from the low classes. One of his parents married pretty well, and it was on that basis, or his skills as a teacher, that he hung around with all the aristocratic pretty boys like Alcibiades and Critias.

How can Socrates have been so influential, have had so many followers, made such a splash, unless he was willing to actually teach direct principles? I just can't believe the Platonic 'not knowing' myth in any strict sense. More than anything else, It just seems like a tricky way to argue that Socrates is no 'sophist' at Plato's imaginary version of Socrates's trial.

If the 'not knowing' myth has any truth I think it means that Socrates was a genuinely optimistic conversation partner who hoped he could learn from others. But unlike the average person, he was pretty judicious about what he thought he knew for certain. At a minimum, if Socrates learned nothing else in conversation, he learned about his conversational partner. And if he was as fascinated with the opinions of people as Xenohon and Plato suggest I think its fun to see him as a roaming psychologist. A man just as interested in peoples views of love as his own views of love.

I find this looser read of Plato's trial myth allows Socrates to have the certainty he exhibits in argument, while still letting him see if he can learn anything. This is how I reconcile the myth and what I think the reality was.

I'm curious what your thoughts on Xenophon are?

I'm not a big fan of the way in which Xenophon is sometimes considered second fiddle to Plato. Except out of tradition, why do one over the other when we don't know if either one is more truthful?


Trevor If I was a betting man - and I'm really not - I would put my money on the historical Socrates being closer to Xenophon's character than to Plato's - but that is just Irish bloody-mindedness and fondness for irony. I think Plato's Socrates gets smarter as the dialogues go on - and that has a lot more to do with Plato than with Socrates. Where one (Socrates) starts and the other (Plato) ends - god knows.

I read Xenophon's Persian Expedition once and didn't particularly come away from it with a high opinion of him. I've his Hellenica, but getting time to read it is the problem. I think Plato is the smarter of the two - not really saying much, given Plato is probably one of the greatest of all philosophers by popular consent - but as is clear over and over in Plato's dialogues, people take from Socrates what they are able to given their understanding - and so perhaps Xenophon is a real life example of that?


Christopher Porzenheim Trevor wrote: "If I was a betting man - and I'm really not - I would put my money on the historical Socrates being closer to Xenophon's character than to Plato's - but that is just Irish bloody-mindedness and fon..."

Perhaps indeed. What exactly did Plato take from Socrates given his understanding... Anyway, thank you for the discussion. Its been a pleasure.


Trevor Likewise


message 15: by Brad (new) - rated it 5 stars

Brad Lyerla This is a fine review. It provoked an enlightened commentary. I genuinely appreciate it.

I am writing years after the fact, but if you are still active on GR then I congratulate you.


message 16: by Ranas (new) - added it

Ranas “but it does often seem that those who do cheat (perhaps both themselves and others) do end up better off.� - I used to see self-deception is a weakness. But now I am beginning to wonder the same. Whether the ability to lie to oneself and believe it unconditionally, is not in-fact an indispensable skill to success? The question then becomes how one sustains this self-deception to soothe ones self-conscience but also have enough brains to see through things so as no to become completely unhinged. The best answer then likely lies in Nietzsche’s Advice? - �268
What Makes You Heroic? To face at the same time your greatest suffering and your greatest hope.�


Trevor Thanks Brad. Less active here now than I was, but still writing reviews when I can.

Ranas, I think Nietzsche’s perspectivism makes such decisions merely a matter of will to power. That line of his about his memory saying he did something, his pride says he didn’t, finally his memory yields covers a lot of ground.


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