Manny's Reviews > The Book of Why: The New Science of Cause and Effect
The Book of Why: The New Science of Cause and Effect
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Well, I am not an expert on statistics, so maybe I'm missing something important, but I really don't understand all the negative criticism that I see in other reviews of this book. Pearl, who has spent a long career working in an area which spans statistical reasoning, philosophy and AI, set himself an extremely ambitious goal: he wanted to establish a clear, logically consistent foundation for the notions of causality ("A makes B happen") and counterfactuals ("B would have happened if A had happened"). As he says, both statisticians and philosophers had been deeply mistrustful of both concepts, preferring only to talk about associations.
Pearl gives coherent reasons to believe that that this is overcautious. Human language is packed full of causality and counterfactuals: it's the fundamental substrate of our common worldview, we can't do without it. To take just one of many flagrant examples, it's impossible to make sense of fundamental legal and moral concepts like "responsibility" or "guilt" without using this language. If the prosecutor wants to convince the court that X is guilty of murdering Y, he needs to demonstrate that Y would have been alive had it not been for X's actions. To say that this is philosophically or mathematically inadmissible is to deny the validity of the entire field of legal reasoning. If you're familiar with the philosophical tradition, your knee-jerk response at this point may be to object "but what about Hume?". Pearl looks at what Hume actually says on the subject, and points out that his revised definition of causality is not just phrased in terms of associations. He also realised that he needed to add counterfactuals.
At least on his own account, Pearl and his students appear to have made a great deal of progress in attacking these thorny problems. They have developed a way of thinking about them where the central construct is a "causal diagram", a graph where different factors are connected by arrows representing hypothesized causal links. Causal diagrams are a good match to people's intuitions about causality, and Pearl gives many examples showing how they support different kinds of reasoning. Some of this reasoning is obvious, some of it is very subtle; some of it becomes obvious only after looking at the diagrams. For example, a pattern which comes up many times in different forms is so-called "collider bias", where two causal arrows meet at the same point: if you condition on the joining concept, you'll create a spurious association. Pearl gives a cute illustration from the world of dating, where the folk wisdom is that the good-looking dates tend to be jerks. His explanation is as follows. Being good-looking and having a pleasant personality are both features that make someone more attractive. It is reasonable to suppose that these two things may not actually be correlated. But if your sample is drawn from the people you've dated, you're conditioning on the "attractiveness" variable: you're only looking at people who were attractive enough that you dated them. This creates a spurious negative association between "good-looking" and "pleasant personality". So if someone is good-looking, they are more likely to have an unpleasant personality. "Collider bias" is very simple compared to some of the things covered in the book. Particularly impressive items are the "do-calculus" (an axiomatic framework for estimating the effect of performing an intervention), and a set of formulas for measuring direct and indirect effects when one factor operates on another through an intermediary; for example, smoking causing cancer through the intermediary of tar. Pearl describes the reasoning that led him to these ideas, where in many cases a deceptively simple formula is the product of several years of careful thought.
Well, it's possible that I'm a sucker who's been taken in by good marketing. But Pearl has an excellent reputation: he's published hundreds of widely cited papers and picked up just about every award going. To me, he looks like the real deal. I think I need to read his 2009 book Causality and download a causal inference package.
Pearl gives coherent reasons to believe that that this is overcautious. Human language is packed full of causality and counterfactuals: it's the fundamental substrate of our common worldview, we can't do without it. To take just one of many flagrant examples, it's impossible to make sense of fundamental legal and moral concepts like "responsibility" or "guilt" without using this language. If the prosecutor wants to convince the court that X is guilty of murdering Y, he needs to demonstrate that Y would have been alive had it not been for X's actions. To say that this is philosophically or mathematically inadmissible is to deny the validity of the entire field of legal reasoning. If you're familiar with the philosophical tradition, your knee-jerk response at this point may be to object "but what about Hume?". Pearl looks at what Hume actually says on the subject, and points out that his revised definition of causality is not just phrased in terms of associations. He also realised that he needed to add counterfactuals.
At least on his own account, Pearl and his students appear to have made a great deal of progress in attacking these thorny problems. They have developed a way of thinking about them where the central construct is a "causal diagram", a graph where different factors are connected by arrows representing hypothesized causal links. Causal diagrams are a good match to people's intuitions about causality, and Pearl gives many examples showing how they support different kinds of reasoning. Some of this reasoning is obvious, some of it is very subtle; some of it becomes obvious only after looking at the diagrams. For example, a pattern which comes up many times in different forms is so-called "collider bias", where two causal arrows meet at the same point: if you condition on the joining concept, you'll create a spurious association. Pearl gives a cute illustration from the world of dating, where the folk wisdom is that the good-looking dates tend to be jerks. His explanation is as follows. Being good-looking and having a pleasant personality are both features that make someone more attractive. It is reasonable to suppose that these two things may not actually be correlated. But if your sample is drawn from the people you've dated, you're conditioning on the "attractiveness" variable: you're only looking at people who were attractive enough that you dated them. This creates a spurious negative association between "good-looking" and "pleasant personality". So if someone is good-looking, they are more likely to have an unpleasant personality. "Collider bias" is very simple compared to some of the things covered in the book. Particularly impressive items are the "do-calculus" (an axiomatic framework for estimating the effect of performing an intervention), and a set of formulas for measuring direct and indirect effects when one factor operates on another through an intermediary; for example, smoking causing cancer through the intermediary of tar. Pearl describes the reasoning that led him to these ideas, where in many cases a deceptively simple formula is the product of several years of careful thought.
Well, it's possible that I'm a sucker who's been taken in by good marketing. But Pearl has an excellent reputation: he's published hundreds of widely cited papers and picked up just about every award going. To me, he looks like the real deal. I think I need to read his 2009 book Causality and download a causal inference package.
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Reading Progress
August 5, 2018
– Shelved
August 5, 2018
– Shelved as:
to-read
May 14, 2021
–
Started Reading
May 14, 2021
–
4.63%
"If correlation is not causation, then what is causation?
As Pearl says, surprising that more people haven't asked this question."
page
20
As Pearl says, surprising that more people haven't asked this question."
May 15, 2021
–
13.89%
"Well, this is certainly an interesting and ambitious book! He argues that "causation" should be treated as a primitive concept which can't be reduced to probability; he frequently cites Harari's Sapiens about the importance of being able to think about imaginary things, and claims that causal reasoning supplies the mechanism which makes it possible for people to do so in a useful way."
page
60
May 15, 2021
–
28.94%
"Pearl introduces Bayesian probabilities using breast cancer tests as his running example. A woman randomly chosen from the US population has about a one in seven hundred chance of developing breast cancer in any given year. If she receives a positive result from a mammogram, the probability that she has breast cancer goes up, but only to about one in a hundred and twenty. Pearl shows you how the math works."
page
125
May 16, 2021
–
38.19%
"It is interesting to see how strongly the statistical establishment resisted the idea that it might be generally respectable to talk about causality. Trying to think what arguments there might be to support the claim that causality exists, my top candidates are 1) it's bleeding obvious, 2) there is a clear macroscopic arrow of time deriving from the low entropy of the early universe."
page
165
May 17, 2021
–
48.61%
"An example of Simpson's Paradox from the world of baseball. In 1995, 1996 and 1997, David Justice had a higher batting average than Derek Jeter. But over the combined period 1995-97, Jeter's average was higher.
Also, Paul Erdös was fooled by the Monty Hall Paradox and refused to believe the answer until he saw a computer simulation."
page
210
Also, Paul Erdös was fooled by the Monty Hall Paradox and refused to believe the answer until he saw a computer simulation."
May 18, 2021
–
64.81%
"Unlike the one in Treatise of Human Nature Hume's definition of causality in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding uses counterfactuals:
"We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second had never existed.""
page
280
"We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second had never existed.""
May 21, 2021
–
79.86%
"Many people find formulas daunting, seeing them as a way of concealing rather than revealing information. But to a person adequately trained in the mathematical way of thinking, the reverse is true. When reading a scientific article, I often catch myself jumping from formula to formula, skipping the words altogether. To me, a formula is a baked idea. Words are ideas in the oven."
page
345
May 21, 2021
–
86.81%
"I think that understanding the benefits of the illusion of free will is the key to the stubbornly enigmatic problem of reconciling it with determinism. The problem will dissolve before our eyes once we endow a deterministic machine with the same benefits."
page
375
May 22, 2021
– Shelved as:
linguistics-and-philosophy
May 22, 2021
– Shelved as:
science
May 23, 2021
–
Finished Reading
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Michael
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May 20, 2021 05:02PM

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Sorry to come late to your review party.
a. In my understanding, Pearl gives probabilistic assumptions of correlations, and calls them causality -- correct?
b. How does Pearl addresses, basic philosophical methods of answering, the, Why question? i.e Aristotle's response.

a. Not at all! Pearl argues at length that correlation is not causality, and treats it as a primitive concept.
b. He treats 'why' questions using a statistical version of counterfactuals, and argues that this is basically consistent with Hume's line of reasoning.
It's an interesting book, you may want to look at it.
