欧宝娱乐

“The situation鈥攈aving to choose between imposing higher retail prices and reducing investments and military spending鈥攃reated a dilemma for the government: deciding between conflict with the public or with the Party economic elite. But not making a decision heightened the risk that, as the crisis developed, there would be conflict with both the public and the elite.18 The new generation of leaders clearly did not understand this. The traditional management of the economy was oriented on natural, rather than abstract, parameters. The development of cattle breeding was discussed at the highest level more frequently than the country鈥檚 budget. Industry and business leaders regarded finances as necessary but dreary bookkeeping.19 In addition, information on the real state of the budget, hard currency reserves, foreign debt, and balance of payments was available only to an extremely narrow circle of people, many of whom understood nothing about it anyway.”
― Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia

“Most observers had overlooked the radical change in the relationship between the USSR and the world that took place in the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, the Soviet economy, formally still closed, had in fact become deeply integrated into the system of international trade and dependent on world markets (see table 4-19). This change, as a rule, was noticed only by researchers concerned with grain and oil markets. The majority of analysts studying the socialist system considered its foundation to be solid.99 Some publications spoke of risk factors that could undermine the stability of the Soviet regime. But they were exceptions, and their influence on the future image of the USSR was limited.100 In 1985 almost no one imagined that six years later there would be no Soviet Union, no ruling Communist Party, no Soviet economic system.”
― Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia

“袦械写懈褑懈薪械 懈蟹胁械褋褌械薪 褎械薪芯屑械薪: 械褋谢懈 褔械谢芯胁械泻褍 邪屑锌褍褌懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 薪芯谐褍, 芯褖褍褖械薪懈械, 褔褌芯 芯薪邪 斜芯谢懈褌, 薪械 锌褉芯褏芯写懈褌. 孝芯 卸械 芯褌薪芯褋懈褌褋褟 泻 锌芯褋褌懈屑锌械褉褋泻芯屑褍 褋芯蟹薪邪薪懈褞. 校褌褉邪褌邪 小小小袪 鈥� 褉械邪谢褜薪芯褋褌褜. 袪械邪谢褜薪芯褋褌褜 懈 褋芯褑懈邪谢褜薪邪褟 斜芯谢褜, 锌芯褉芯卸写械薪薪邪褟 锌褉芯斜谢械屑邪屑懈 褉邪蟹写械谢械薪薪褘褏 褋械屑械泄, 屑褘褌邪褉褋褌胁邪屑懈 褋芯芯褌械褔械褋褌胁械薪薪懈泻芯胁 蟹邪 褉褍斜械卸芯屑, 薪芯褋褌邪谢褜谐懈褔械褋泻懈屑懈 胁芯褋锌芯屑懈薪邪薪懈褟屑懈 芯 斜褘谢芯屑 胁械谢懈褔懈懈, 锌褉懈胁褘褔薪芯泄 谐械芯谐褉邪褎懈懈 褉芯写薪芯泄 褋褌褉邪薪褘, 褍屑械薪褜褕懈胁褕械泄褋褟, 锌芯褌械褉褟胁褕械泄 锌褉懈胁褘褔薪褘械 芯褔械褉褌邪薪懈褟. 协泻褋锌谢褍邪褌懈褉芯胁邪褌褜 褝褌褍 斜芯谢褜 胁 锌芯谢懈褌懈泻械 薪械褌褉褍写薪芯. 袩褉芯懈蟹薪械褋懈 薪械褋泻芯谢褜泻芯 褎褉邪蟹, 褋褍褌褜 泻芯褌芯褉褘褏 胁 褌芯屑, 褔褌芯 芦薪邪屑 薪邪薪械褋谢懈 褍写邪褉 薪芯卸芯屑 胁 褋锌懈薪褍禄, 芦胁芯 胁褋械屑 胁懈薪芯胁邪褌褘 懈薪芯褉芯写褑褘, 泻芯褌芯褉褘械 褉邪褋褏懈褌懈谢懈 薪邪褕械 斜芯谐邪褌褋褌胁芯禄, 芦褌械锌械褉褜 屑褘 芯褌斜械褉械屑 褍 薪懈褏 褋芯斜褋褌胁械薪薪芯褋褌褜 懈 蟹邪卸懈胁械屑 褏芯褉芯褕芯禄, 鈥� 懈 写械谢芯 褋写械谢邪薪芯. 协褌懈 褎褉邪蟹褘 薪械 薪邪写芯 胁褘写褍屑褘胁邪褌褜 褋邪屑芯屑褍, 写芯褋褌邪褌芯褔薪芯 锌褉芯褔械褋褌褜 褍褔械斜薪懈泻, 锌芯褋胁褟褖械薪薪褘泄 薪邪褑懈褋褌褋泻芯泄 锌褉芯锌邪谐邪薪写械. 校褋锌械褏 芯斜械褋锌械褔械薪.

协褌芯 锌芯谢懈褌懈褔械褋泻芯械 褟写械褉薪芯械 芯褉褍卸懈械. 袝谐芯 褉械写泻芯 锌褉懈屑械薪褟褞褌. 袣芯薪械褑 褌械褏, 泻褌芯 械谐芯 懈褋锌芯谢褜蟹褍械褌, 泻邪泻 锌褉邪胁懈谢芯, 褌褉邪谐懈褔械薪. 孝邪泻懈械 谢懈写械褉褘 锌褉懈胁芯写褟褌 褋胁芯懈 褋褌褉邪薪褘 泻 泻邪褌邪褋褌褉芯褎械. 袣 褋芯卸邪谢械薪懈褞, 胁 袪芯褋褋懈懈 胁 锌芯褋谢械写薪懈械 谐芯写褘 褟褖懈泻 袩邪薪写芯褉褘 芯泻邪蟹邪谢褋褟 芯褌泻褉褘褌褘屑. 袨斜褉邪褖械薪懈褟 泻 锌芯褋褌懈屑锌械褉褋泻芯泄 薪芯褋褌邪谢褜谐懈懈, 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈蟹屑褍, 泻褋械薪芯褎芯斜懈懈, 锌褉懈胁褘褔薪芯屑褍 邪薪褌懈邪屑械褉懈泻邪薪懈蟹屑褍 懈 写邪卸械 泻 薪械 胁锌芯谢薪械 锌褉懈胁褘褔薪芯屑褍 邪薪褌懈械胁褉芯锌械懈蟹屑褍 胁芯褕谢懈 胁 屑芯写褍, 邪 褌邪屑, 谐谢褟写懈褕褜, 胁芯泄写褍褌 懈 胁 薪芯褉屑褍. 袙邪卸薪芯 锌芯薪褟褌褜, 薪邪褋泻芯谢褜泻芯 褝褌芯 芯锌邪褋薪芯 写谢褟 褋褌褉邪薪褘 懈 屑懈褉邪 [13].”
― 袝谐芯褉 袚邪泄写邪褉, 袚懈斜械谢褜 懈屑锌械褉懈懈: 校褉芯泻懈 写谢褟 褋芯胁褉械屑械薪薪芯泄 袪芯褋褋懈懈

“校褟蟹胁谢械薪薪芯械 锌芯褉邪卸械薪懈械屑 胁 胁芯泄薪械 芯斜褖械褋褌胁械薪薪芯械 褋芯蟹写邪薪懈械 薪械褌褉褍写薪芯 芯褔邪褉芯胁邪褌褜 屑懈褎邪屑懈. 袚懈褌谢械褉 谐芯胁芯褉懈谢, 褔褌芯 锌芯褉邪卸械薪懈褟 邪胁谐褍褋褌邪 1918 谐. 斜褘谢懈 懈谐褉褍褕泻芯泄 锌芯 褋褉邪胁薪械薪懈褞 褋 锌芯斜械写邪屑懈, 泻芯褌芯褉褘械 芯写械褉卸邪谢邪 写芯 褝褌芯谐芯 薪械屑械褑泻邪褟 邪褉屑懈褟, 褔褌芯 薪械 芯薪懈 褋褌邪谢懈 锌褉懈褔懈薪芯泄 泻邪锌懈褌褍谢褟褑懈懈. 袩芯 械谐芯 褋谢芯胁邪屑, 锌褉懈褔懈薪芯泄 锌芯褉邪卸械薪懈褟 斜褘谢邪 写械褟褌械谢褜薪芯褋褌褜 褌械褏, 泻褌芯 薪邪 锌褉芯褌褟卸械薪懈懈 写械褋褟褌懈谢械褌懈泄 褉邪斜芯褌邪谢 薪邪写 褍薪懈褔褌芯卸械薪懈械屑 锌芯谢懈褌懈褔械褋泻懈褏 懈 屑芯褉邪谢褜薪褘褏 褍褋褌邪薪芯胁谢械薪懈泄 懈 褋懈谢 薪械屑械褑泻芯泄 薪邪褑懈懈, 斜谢邪谐芯写邪褉褟 泻芯褌芯褉褘屑 薪邪褑懈褟 屑芯卸械褌 褋褍褖械褋褌胁芯胁邪褌褜.

袙褋锌芯屑懈薪邪褞褌褋褟 褋褌褉芯泻懈 袩褍褕泻懈薪邪: 芦袗褏, 芯斜屑邪薪褍褌褜 屑械薪褟 薪械 褌褉褍写薪芯, 褟 褋邪屑 芯斜屑邪薪褘胁邪褌褜褋褟 褉邪写禄. 袠褋褋谢械写芯胁邪褌械谢懈 懈褋褌芯褉懈懈 袙械泄屑邪褉褋泻芯泄 褉械褋锌褍斜谢懈泻懈 褋褔懈褌邪褞褌: 褌芯, 褔褌芯 械械 谢懈写械褉褘 薪械 斜褘谢懈 谐芯褌芯胁褘 锌褉械写邪褌褜 谐谢邪褋薪芯褋褌懈 屑邪褌械褉懈邪谢褘 芯斜 芯褌胁械褌褋褌胁械薪薪芯褋褌懈 谐械褉屑邪薪褋泻芯谐芯 褉褍泻芯胁芯写褋褌胁邪 蟹邪 褉邪蟹胁褟蟹褘胁邪薪懈械 袩械褉胁芯泄 屑懈褉芯胁芯泄 胁芯泄薪褘, 鈥� 芯写懈薪 懈蟹 胁邪卸薪械泄褕懈褏 褎邪泻褌芯褉芯胁, 锌褉懈胁械写褕懈褏 褉械褋锌褍斜谢懈泻褍 泻 泻褉邪褏褍. 袦懈褎 芯 薪械胁懈薪薪芯泄, 薪械锌芯斜械卸写械薪薪芯泄, 锌褉械写邪薪薪芯泄, 褍薪懈卸械薪薪芯泄 袚械褉屑邪薪懈懈 斜褘谢 芯褉褍卸懈械屑, 泻芯褌芯褉芯械 褉褍泻芯胁芯写懈褌械谢懈 褉械褋锌褍斜谢懈泻邪薪褋泻芯泄 胁谢邪褋褌懈 写邪谢懈 胁 褉褍泻懈 褌械屑, 泻褌芯 胁 写械屑芯泻褉邪褌懈褔械褋泻懈械 褑械薪薪芯褋褌懈 薪械 胁械褉懈谢.

袧械芯卸懈写邪薪薪芯褋褌褜, 斜褘褋褌褉芯褌邪, 褋 泻芯褌芯褉芯泄 褉褍褕邪褌褋褟, 泻邪蟹邪谢芯褋褜 斜褘, 薪械锌芯泻芯谢械斜懈屑褘械 懈屑锌械褉懈懈, 锌芯褉芯卸写邪褞褌 芯褖褍褖械薪懈械 薪械褉械邪谢褜薪芯褋褌懈 锌褉芯懈褋褏芯写褟褖械谐芯. 袠褉褉械邪谢褜薪芯褋褌褜 褋褉芯写薪懈 懈褉褉邪褑懈芯薪邪谢褜薪芯褋褌懈, 胁 褉邪屑泻邪褏 泻芯褌芯褉芯泄 胁芯蟹屑芯卸薪芯 谢褞斜芯械 褔褍写芯. 袧械褌褉褍写薪芯 褍斜械写懈褌褜 芯斜褖械褋褌胁芯, 褔褌芯 谐芯褋褍写邪褉褋褌胁芯, 泻芯褌芯褉芯械 褋褌芯谢褜 薪械芯卸懈写邪薪薪芯 褉邪蟹胁邪谢懈谢芯褋褜, 屑芯卸薪芯 褋褌芯谢褜 卸械 斜褘褋褌褉芯 胁芯褋褋褌邪薪芯胁懈褌褜. 协褌芯 懈谢谢褞蟹懈褟. 袩褉懈褔械屑 芯锌邪褋薪邪褟. 袩谢邪褌芯泄 蟹邪 薪械械 褋褌邪谢懈 褉械泻懈 泻褉芯胁懈, 锌褉芯谢懈褌褘械 胁 褏芯写械 袙褌芯褉芯泄 屑懈褉芯胁芯泄 胁芯泄薪褘 [11鈥�12].”
― 袝谐芯褉 袚邪泄写邪褉, 袚懈斜械谢褜 懈屑锌械褉懈懈: 校褉芯泻懈 写谢褟 褋芯胁褉械屑械薪薪芯泄 袪芯褋褋懈懈

“袙 褉芯褋褋懈泄褋泻懈褏 褍褋谢芯胁懈褟褏 胁褉械屑褟 褉邪褋褑胁械褌邪 锌芯褋褌懈屑锌械褉褋泻芯谐芯 褋懈薪写褉芯屑邪, 蟹邪屑械褕邪薪薪芯谐芯 薪邪 薪械屑 褉邪写懈泻邪谢褜薪芯谐芯 薪邪褑懈芯薪邪谢懈蟹屑邪, 胁芯锌褉械泻懈 芯卸懈写邪薪懈褟屑 邪胁褌芯褉邪 褝褌懈褏 褋褌褉芯泻, 锌褉懈褕谢芯褋褜 薪械 薪邪 锌械褉懈芯写, 薪械锌芯褋褉械写褋褌胁械薪薪芯 锌芯褋谢械写芯胁邪胁褕懈泄 蟹邪 泻褉褍褕械薪懈械屑 小小小袪, 邪 薪邪 斜芯谢械械 锌芯蟹写薪械械 胁褉械屑褟. 携 懈 屑芯懈 泻芯谢谢械谐懈, 薪邪褔懈薪邪胁褕懈械 褉械褎芯褉屑褘 胁 袪芯褋褋懈懈, 锌芯薪懈屑邪谢懈, 褔褌芯 锌械褉械褏芯写 泻 褉褘薪泻褍, 邪写邪锌褌邪褑懈褟 袪芯褋褋懈懈 泻 薪芯胁芯屑褍 锌芯谢芯卸械薪懈褞 胁 屑懈褉械, 褋褍褖械褋褌胁芯胁邪薪懈褞 薪芯胁褘褏 薪械蟹邪胁懈褋懈屑褘褏 谐芯褋褍写邪褉褋褌胁 斜褍写褍褌 锌褉芯褏芯写懈褌褜 薪械锌褉芯褋褌芯. 袧芯 屑褘 锌芯谢邪谐邪谢懈, 褔褌芯 锌褉械芯写芯谢械薪懈械 褌褉邪薪褋褎芯褉屑邪褑懈芯薪薪芯泄 褉械褑械褋褋懈懈, 薪邪褔邪谢芯 褝泻芯薪芯屑懈褔械褋泻芯谐芯 褉芯褋褌邪, 锌芯胁褘褕械薪懈械 褉械邪谢褜薪褘褏 写芯褏芯写芯胁 薪邪褋械谢械薪懈褟 锌芯蟹胁芯谢褟褌 蟹邪屑械薪懈褌褜 薪械褋斜褘褌芯褔薪褘械 屑械褔褌褘 芯 胁芯褋褋褌邪薪芯胁谢械薪懈懈 懈屑锌械褉懈懈 锌褉芯蟹邪懈褔薪褘屑懈 蟹邪斜芯褌邪屑懈 芯 褋芯斜褋褌胁械薪薪芯屑 斜谢邪谐芯褋芯褋褌芯褟薪懈懈. 袦褘 芯褕懈斜邪谢懈褋褜.

袣邪泻 锌芯泻邪蟹邪谢 芯锌褘褌, 胁芯 胁褉械屑褟 谐谢褍斜芯泻芯谐芯 褝泻芯薪芯屑懈褔械褋泻芯谐芯 泻褉懈蟹懈褋邪, 泻芯谐写邪 薪械褟褋薪芯, 褏胁邪褌懈褌 谢懈 写械薪械谐, 褔褌芯斜褘 锌褉芯泻芯褉屑懈褌褜 褋械屑褜褞 写芯 褋谢械写褍褞褖械泄 蟹邪褉锌谢邪褌褘, 胁褘锌谢邪褌褟褌 谢薪 械械 胁芯芯斜褖械, 薪械 芯泻邪卸械褕褜褋褟 谢懈 蟹邪胁褌褉邪 斜械蟹 褉邪斜芯褌褘, 斜芯谢褜褕懈薪褋褌胁褍 谢褞写械泄 薪械 写芯 懈屑锌械褉褋泻芯谐芯 胁械谢懈褔懈褟. 袧邪锌褉芯褌懈胁, 胁 褌芯 胁褉械屑褟, 泻芯谐写邪 斜谢邪谐芯褋芯褋褌芯褟薪懈械 薪邪褔懈薪邪械褌 褉邪褋褌懈, 锌芯褟胁谢褟械褌褋褟 褍胁械褉械薪薪芯褋褌褜, 褔褌芯 胁 褝褌芯屑 谐芯写褍 蟹邪褉锌谢邪褌邪 斜褍写械褌 胁褘褕械, 褔械屑 胁 锌褉械写褘写褍褖械屑, 斜械蟹褉邪斜芯褌懈褑邪, 械褋谢懈 薪械 卸懈胁械褕褜 胁 写械锌褉械褋褋懈胁薪芯屑 褉械谐懈芯薪械, 褌械斜褟 薪械 泻芯褋薪械褌褋褟, 卸懈蟹薪褜 懈蟹屑械薪懈谢邪褋褜, 薪芯 胁薪芯胁褜 芯斜褉械谢邪 褔械褉褌褘 褋褌邪斜懈谢褜薪芯褋褌懈, 屑芯卸薪芯, 锌褉懈写褟 写芯屑芯泄, 褋械褋褌褜 懈 锌芯褋屑芯褌褉械褌褜 胁屑械褋褌械 褋 褋械屑褜械泄 褋芯胁械褌褋泻懈泄 褎懈谢褜屑, 胁 泻芯褌芯褉芯屑 薪邪褕懈 褉邪蟹胁械写褔懈泻懈 谢褍褔褕械 懈褏 褕锌懈芯薪芯胁, 屑褘 胁褋械谐写邪 锌芯斜械卸写邪械屑, 邪 卸懈蟹薪褜, 懈蟹芯斜褉邪卸械薪薪邪褟 薪邪 褝泻褉邪薪械, 斜械蟹芯斜谢邪褔薪邪, 锌芯褉邪褋褋褍卸写邪褌褜 芯 褌芯屑, 泻邪泻 胁褉邪谐懈 褉邪蟹胁邪谢懈谢懈 胁械谢懈泻褍褞 写械褉卸邪胁褍, 泻邪泻 屑褘 胁褋械屑 械褖械 锌芯泻邪卸械屑, 泻褌芯 谐谢邪胁薪褘泄 [16].”
― 袝谐芯褉 袚邪泄写邪褉, 袚懈斜械谢褜 懈屑锌械褉懈懈: 校褉芯泻懈 写谢褟 褋芯胁褉械屑械薪薪芯泄 袪芯褋褋懈懈

“For want of a nail, the shoe was lost; for want of a shoe the horse was lost; and for want of a horse the rider was lost, being overtaken and slain by the enemy, all for want of care about a horseshoe nail.鈥� The excuse for the profound economic crisis that provoked the collapse of a superpower was the fall of oil prices in the mid-1980s, which for all its significance is incommensurate with the consequences. Developments on the oil market were, for the Soviet economy, not the reason but the excuse for its collapse.”
― Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia

“I believe that the presence of nuclear weapons in the former USSR played a part as well. At the end of 1991, Ukraine had almost one-fifth of the ground-based warheads in the strategic triad. The total number of strategic weapons there was greater than the total in England and France combined. Data on the distribution of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union are not completely reliable. This is even more evidence of how dangerous the situation was for the country at the end of 1991. See tables 8-6 and 8-7 for (the sometimes conflicting) data provided by informed analysts who have studied the history of the USSR鈥檚 nuclear endeavors.”
― Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia

“The new tactics were evident in the negotiations between Gorbachev and President George H. W. Bush in Malta (November 1989). Gorbachev鈥檚 amiability and willingness to make arms concessions was not related so much to a desire to lower the burden of military expenditures. That was strategically important but politically difficult. It would take time for the reduction in military spending to influence the economic situation in the USSR. Something else was of critical significance for the Soviets: the willingness of the United States and its allies to support government loans to the USSR, loans from the IMF and World Bank. For the Soviets, this was fundamental. In order to improve their chances of getting the money, they provided informal assurances that the USSR would not use force to maintain its political control in Eastern Europe.11”
― Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia

“The uncertainty of weather-dependent harvests, particularly after the 1950s decision to exploit virgin lands, and the continuing low oil prices made the foreign trade balance catastrophic. This, not Mikhail Gorbachev鈥檚 personal qualities or the errors made by his team, was the first cause of the crisis in the Soviet political and economic structure.4 Taking the measures necessary to handle that crisis threatened not only the leadership in power but the entire Communist regime. Rejecting them, if the changes in the world market were long-lasting, would make the crash of the socialist economy and the Soviet Empire inevitable.”
― Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia

“This is the picture that dominates Russian public opinion: (1) twenty years ago there existed a stable, developing, and powerful country, the Soviet Union; (2) strange people (perhaps agents of foreign intelligence services) started political and economic reforms within it; (3) the results of these reforms were catastrophic; (4) in 1999鈥�2000 people came to power who were concerned with the country鈥檚 state interests; (5) life became better after that. This myth is as far from the truth as the one of an unconquerable and loyal Germany that was popular among the Germans in the late 1920s and 1930s.”
― Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia

“Appealing to imperial symbols of grandeur is a powerful tool for managing the political process. The more official Russian propaganda tries to present the Great Patriotic War as a chain of events leading to the preordained victory organized by the ruler, the faster memories of Stalinist repression vanish, and people forget that Stalin himself sanctioned the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and played a large role in starting the war. Positive feelings toward Stalin grew from 19 percent in 1998 to 53 percent in 2003. When asked, 鈥淚f Stalin were alive and running for President of Russia, would you vote for him?鈥� 26鈥�27 percent of Russian residents replied yes.24 This is a man who killed more of our fellow countrymen than anyone else in the long and complex history of Russia. I think that fact alone is enough to indicate the scale of the dangers associated with post-imperial syndrome in our country.”
― Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia