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“Earlier fundamental work of Whitehead, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Whorf, etc., as well as my own attempt to use this earlier thinking as an epistemological base for psychiatric theory, led to a series of generalizations: That human verbal communication can operate and always does operate at many contrasting levels of abstraction. These range in two directions from the seemingly simple denotative level (鈥淭he cat is on the mat鈥�). One range or set of these more abstract levels includes those explicit or implicit messages where the subject of discourse is the language. We will call these metalinguistic (for example, 鈥淭he verbal sound 鈥榗at鈥� stands for any member of such and such class of objects鈥�, or 鈥淭he word, 鈥榗at鈥� has no fur and cannot scratch鈥�). The other set of levels of abstraction we will call metacommunicative (e.g., 鈥淢y telling you where to 铿乶d the cat was friendly鈥�, or 鈥淭his is play鈥�). In these, the subject of discourse is the relationship between the speakers. It will be noted that the vast majority of both metalinguistic and metacommunicative messages remain implicit; and also that, especially in the psychiatric interview, there occurs a further class of implicit messages about how metacommunicative messages of friendship and hostility are to be interpreted.”
― Gregory Bateson

“The ideal of explication differs not only from previous philosophy, and from Carnap鈥檚 own previous framework of rational reconstruction, but also from most present analytic philosophy. It differs from Quine鈥檚 influential programme, for instance, encapsulated in Neurath鈥檚 metaphor of reconstructing the boat of our conceptual scheme on the open sea, without being able to put it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from new materials. In Carnap鈥檚 framework, our collective mental life is not 鈥� to adopt the metaphor 鈥� all in the same boat. It consists rather of a give and take between two kinds of communicative devices that operate in different ways. Carnap鈥檚 boat is only one of these two parts, not both. It is the medium of action and practical decisions, in which vague concepts of ordinary language have a continuing, perhaps essential, role. This is not, in Carnap鈥檚 terms, a proper linguistic 鈥榝ramework鈥� at all. It is a medium not for the pursuit of truth but for getting things done, and it is well adapted to this purpose. To improve it further, we chip away at it and replace its components, a few at a time, with better ones 鈥� and this reconstruction, it is true, we carry out at sea. But the better components we acquire from the ports we call at, where we go shopping for proper linguistic frameworks. We take on board better materials and better navigational instruments that help us to reach whatever ports we hope to visit in future 鈥� where we can again bring on new and improved materials and instruments. Sometimes, the improved instruments will so influence our knowledge of where we are going that the whole plan of the journey will be revised, and we will change course. But the decision what port to head for next we have to make on board, in our pragmatic vernacular, with whatever improvements we have incorporated up to that point.”
― A.W. Carus, Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment

“Musil actually read the Logical Syntax and considered proposing it (somewhat ironically) as the 鈥榖est new book of the year鈥� of 1934 in response to a query from a literary magazine.”
― A.W. Carus, Carnap and Twentieth-Century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment