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“That scientifically savvy philosopher Daniel Dennett pointed out that evolution counters one of the oldest ideas we have: 'the idea that it takes a big fancy smart thing to make a lesser thing. I call that the trickle-down theory of creation.”
― Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion

“McGrath briefly notes Bertrand Russell's Why I am not a Christian, and J. J. C. Smart gets a single mention, as does Adolf Grünbaum, but the other major defenders of philosophical atheism of the last half-century do not even merit a nod. His index contains no listings for Antony Flew, Wallace Matson, Kai Nielsen, Richard Gale, William L. Rowe, Michael Martin, J. L. Mackie, Daniel Dennett, Evan Fales, Michael Tooley, Quentin Smith, Jordan Howard Sobel, Robin Le Poidevin, Theodore Drange, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Nicholas Everitt, J. L. Schellenberg, or Graham Oppy.”
― Keith Parsons

“Once we have isolated the computational and neurological correlates of access-consciousness, there is nothing left to explain. It's just irrational to insist that sentience remains unexplained after all the manifestations of sentience have been accounted for, just because the computations don't have anything sentient in them. It's like insisting that wetness remains unexplained even after all the manifestations of wetness have been accounted for, because moving molecules aren't wet.”
― Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works

“What I should have said is that he thinks that there is a conflict between evolutionary biology and theism. Dennett thinks that evolutionary theory shows that it is irrational to believe that God exists; he thinks that the theory has this consequence because he thinks that the Design Argument was the only remotely plausible argument for God’s existence and evolutionary theory destroyed that argument.”
― Elliott Sober

“At one conference Hameroff told Dennett, publicly, "You know, Dan, maybe the reason you like this [mechanistic] idea is because you're a zombie. And maybe the reason I see things differently is because, I'm not."

Hameroff told me he was half-joking. But Dennett took offense. "I wound up apologizing," says Hameroff. "I guess he only likes the idea of being a zombie if we're all zombies.”
― Steve Volk, Fringe-ology: How I Tried to Explain Away the Unexplainable-And Couldn't

“Different conclusions to which Pierre Simon Laplace (Philosophical Essays on Probabilities [1814 ]) arrived stem from almost the same subject (the world) analyzed by Dennett. We must credit Laplace (which Dennett did) for thinking about the same problem two centuries ago without possibly being affected by the discoveries to which Dennett and other philosophers and scientists were exposed. However, we must emphasize that some other philosophers and scientists before Laplace treated the same subject, including Baron d’Holbach and Roger Boscovich (RuÄ‘er Josip BoÅ¡ković) in his Theory of Natural Philosophy .

“Laplace’s Damon� (argument):
“An intellect that at any given moment knew all the forces that animate Nature and the mutual positions of the beings that comprise it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit its data to analysis, would condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom; for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain; and the future, just like the past, would be present before its eyes.�
� Pierre Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities

There is nothing wrong with this argument since it is only hypothetical in terms of “An intellect which at any given moment knew all the forces that animate Nature …� This is not a positive or negative statement about determinism but only an intellectual proposition or question of what the case would be if there were such a “vast enough� intellect. Another question is if Laplace’s own belief or faith would lead him or not to such a conclusion. He only states that “an intellect which at any given moment knew all the forces that animate nature …� which is not proof that such an intellect exists or that he unconditionally believes in such an intellect. The mere intellectual proposition about an imagined intellect (not necessarily a real one) under the proposed conditions (not necessarily the real ones), we shall treat only as a hypothetical question or proposition or statement and not as an apparent belief (though there may be a clear belief behind it). Furthermore, this proposition doesn’t prove how it would undermine the compatibility between determinism and free will even if such an intellect existed.

Laplace's conclusion under the proposed conditions is proper and must be true. But the question is not whether the conclusion itself is true if the argument, Laplace’s Damon (actually intelligence), does not represent (demonstrate) or prove the fact (truth) but only a possibility that this may be a fact (if such an intellect existed). We cannot say that this is a definition of determinism by Laplace but a possible vision (of a definition) of a universe under the proposed conditions.”
― Dejan Stojanovic, ABSOLUTE