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“If the people of Europe had known as much of astronomy and geology when the bible was introduced among them, as they do now, there never could have been one believer in the doctrine of inspiration. If the writers of the various parts of the bible had known as much about the sciences as is now known by every intelligent man, the book never could have been written. It was produced by ignorance, and has been believed and defended by its author. It has lost power in the proportion that man has gained knowledge. A few years ago, this book was appealed to in the settlement of all scientific questions; but now, even the clergy confess that in such matters, it has ceased to speak with the voice of authority. For the establishment of facts, the word of man is now considered far better than the word of God. In the world of science, Jehovah was superseded by Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler. All that God told Moses, admitting the entire account to be true, is dust and ashes compared to the discoveries of Descartes, Laplace, and Humboldt. In matters of fact, the bible has ceased to be regarded as a standard. Science has succeeded in breaking the chains of theology. A few years ago, Science endeavored to show that it was not inconsistent with the bible. The tables have been turned, and now, Religion is endeavoring to prove that the bible is not inconsistent with Science. The standard has been changed.”
― Robert G. Ingersoll, Some Mistakes of Moses

“I often asked Laplace what he thought of God. He owned that he was an atheist.”
― Napoleon Bonaparte

“The first effect of the mind growing cultivated is that processes once multiple get to be performed in a single act. Lazarus has called this the progressive 'condensation' of thought. ... Steps really sink from sight. An advanced thinker sees the relations of his topics is such masses and so instantaneously that when he comes to explain to younger minds it is often hard ... Bowditch, who translated and annotated Laplace's Méchanique Céleste, said that whenever his author prefaced a proposition by the words 'it is evident,' he knew that many hours of hard study lay before him.”
― William James, The Principles of Psychology

“Willard Gibbs did for statistical mechanics and for thermodynamics what Laplace did for celestial mechanics and Maxwell did for electrodynamics, namely, made his field a well-nigh finished theoretical structure.”
― Robert Andrews Millikan

“The genius of Laplace was a perfect sledge hammer in bursting purely mathematical obstacles; but, like that useful instrument, it gave neither finish nor beauty to the results. In truth, in truism if the reader please, Laplace was neither Lagrange nor Euler, as every student is made to feel. The second is power and symmetry, the third power and simplicity; the first is power without either symmetry or simplicity. But, nevertheless, Laplace never attempted investigation of a subject without leaving upon it the marks of difficulties conquered: sometimes clumsily, sometimes indirectly, always without minuteness of design or arrangement of detail; but still, his end is obtained and the difficulty is conquered.”
― Augustus De Morgan

“The great masters of modern analysis are Lagrange, Laplace, and Gauss, who were contemporaries. It is interesting to note the marked contrast in their styles. Lagrange is perfect both in form and matter, he is careful to explain his procedure, and though his arguments are general they are easy to follow. Laplace on the other hand explains nothing, is indifferent to style, and, if satisfied that his results are correct, is content to leave them either with no proof or with a faulty one. Gauss is as exact and elegant as Lagrange, but even more difficult to follow than Laplace, for he removes every trace of the analysis by which he reached his results, and studies to give a proof which while rigorous shall be as concise and synthetical as possible.”
― W.W. Rouse Ball, A Short Account of the History of Mathematics

“Biot, who assisted Laplace in revising it [The Mécanique Céleste] for the press, says that Laplace himself was frequently unable to recover the details in the chain of reasoning, and if satisfied that the conclusions were correct, he was content to insert the constantly recurring formula, 'Il est àisé avoir' [it is easy to see].”
― W.W. Rouse Ball, A Short Account of the History of Mathematics

“How did Biot arrive at the partial differential equation? [the heat conduction equation] . . . Perhaps Laplace gave Biot the equation and left him to sink or swim for a few years in trying to derive it. That would have been merely an instance of the way great mathematicians since the very beginnings of mathematical research have effortlessly maintained their superiority over ordinary mortals.”
― Clifford A. Truesdell

“The mathematical exposition is extremely concise and occasionally awkward. Laplace was interested in results, not in how he got them. To avoid condensing a complicated mathematical argument to a brief, intelligible form he frequently omits everything but the conclusion, with the optimistic remark “Il est aisé à voirâ€� (It is easy to see). He himself would often be unable to restore the reasoning by which he had “seenâ€� these easy things without hours—sometimes days—of hard labor.”
― Eric Temple Bell, Men of Mathematics

“According to Daniel Dennett and many other philosophers, free will and determinism are compatible. Despite my agreement with this view, I must admit that my way of coming to the same conclusion may be slightly different, contain different motivations, and come from a different perspective. Therefore, this topic deserves further clarification; although findings may be the same, they may be so for different reasons. Even if they would be the same for the same reasons, they might be based not only on different approaches to the same problem but also on a different perspective in viewing the world—understanding the world, the concept of the world, its potential, and its appearance to us.”
― Dejan Stojanovic, ABSOLUTE

“Different conclusions to which Pierre Simon Laplace (Philosophical Essays on Probabilities [1814 ]) arrived stem from almost the same subject (the world) analyzed by Dennett. We must credit Laplace (which Dennett did) for thinking about the same problem two centuries ago without possibly being affected by the discoveries to which Dennett and other philosophers and scientists were exposed. However, we must emphasize that some other philosophers and scientists before Laplace treated the same subject, including Baron d’Holbach and Roger Boscovich (RuÄ‘er Josip BoÅ¡ković) in his Theory of Natural Philosophy .

“Laplace’s Damon� (argument):
“An intellect that at any given moment knew all the forces that animate Nature and the mutual positions of the beings that comprise it, if this intellect were vast enough to submit its data to analysis, would condense into a single formula the movement of the greatest bodies of the universe and that of the lightest atom; for such an intellect nothing could be uncertain; and the future, just like the past, would be present before its eyes.�
� Pierre Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities

There is nothing wrong with this argument since it is only hypothetical in terms of “An intellect which at any given moment knew all the forces that animate Nature …� This is not a positive or negative statement about determinism but only an intellectual proposition or question of what the case would be if there were such a “vast enough� intellect. Another question is if Laplace’s own belief or faith would lead him or not to such a conclusion. He only states that “an intellect which at any given moment knew all the forces that animate nature …� which is not proof that such an intellect exists or that he unconditionally believes in such an intellect. The mere intellectual proposition about an imagined intellect (not necessarily a real one) under the proposed conditions (not necessarily the real ones), we shall treat only as a hypothetical question or proposition or statement and not as an apparent belief (though there may be a clear belief behind it). Furthermore, this proposition doesn’t prove how it would undermine the compatibility between determinism and free will even if such an intellect existed.

Laplace's conclusion under the proposed conditions is proper and must be true. But the question is not whether the conclusion itself is true if the argument, Laplace’s Damon (actually intelligence), does not represent (demonstrate) or prove the fact (truth) but only a possibility that this may be a fact (if such an intellect existed). We cannot say that this is a definition of determinism by Laplace but a possible vision (of a definition) of a universe under the proposed conditions.”
― Dejan Stojanovic, ABSOLUTE

“To prove this to be a definition, not only of determinism but also of the actual world (Universe), to which goal Laplace aims, Laplace would have (or should have) offered “proofâ€� of the actual state of the Universe. Since this was impossible, he defined a world under such “idealâ€� conditions through an example as a proposition. The question of whether the world, under such “idealâ€� conditions, would be ideal is highly debatable (we would dare to think that such a world would be not only far from perfect but on the verge of horror). From this argument, it follows that if such a world were not, in fact, ideal, then imagined or proposed “ideal conditionsâ€� would not be ideal either.”
― Dejan Stojanovic, ABSOLUTE

“We must conclude that any proposition (definition) of abstract concepts (linguistically or philosophically) is not necessarily a proposition (definition) of that to which these concepts or propositions (definitions) ought to be applied. This kind of thinking, or definitions coming from such thinking, is inherently false.

On the other hand, if the supposed or proposed argument reflected reality, it would be a definition of a fact and not a proposition (“definition�) of an imagined concept. Laplace didn’t show interest in proving that this is the actual reality or even stating it, so it must be that he either imagined his argument as a hypothesis or he believed that this example argument contains enough merits of itself to justify not only the argument but also the fact or truth itself.

From our point of view and the idea of the Universal Mind as having a potential for infinite variety, we can conclude that even an “intellectâ€� of a Universal Mind cannot predict and know all the varieties of its potential and the potential of all possible universes in infinity, which saves it from its own perfection while opening the door for infinite potential of the “free will.”
― Dejan Stojanovic, ABSOLUTE